Hour-H's D-Day
The aircraft carrier "25 de Mayo" is heading to the area of operations
(Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y Arqueología Marítima)
In the first days of December, the Argentine fleet sailed towards the Beagle Channel under the command of Rear Admiral Humberto José Barbuzzi, a veteran naval officer who, as a lieutenant commander in 1964, had commanded the minesweeper ARA Seaver of the River Squadron. Aboard her, he had conducted patrols along the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, as well as several exercises in the Río de la Plata.
A year before the outbreak of the crisis, Barbuzzi had been appointed Secretary-General of the Navy, a post he held until the Military Junta appointed him Chief of Operations of the Naval General Staff, replacing Rear Admiral José Néstor Estévez.
At the time, the Argentine naval force was one of the most powerful in Latin America. It comprised the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo (V-2); the cruiser ARA General Belgrano (C-4); the First Destroyer Division’s ARA Hércules (D-28), ARA Domecq García (D-23), ARA Seguí (D-25) and ARA Hipólito Bouchard (D-26); and the Second Destroyer Division’s ARA Piedrabuena (D-29), ARA Almirante Storni (D-24), ARA Py (D-27), ARA Rosales (D-22) and ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2). It also included the corvettes ARA Drummond (P-1) and ARA Guerrico (P-2); the auxiliary vessels ARA Alférez Sobral (A-9) and ARA Comodoro Somellera (A-10); the landing ships ARA Cándido de Lasala (Q-43), ARA Cabo San Antonio (Q-42) and ARA Punta Médanos (B-18); the minesweepers ARA Neuquén (M-1), ARA Río Negro (M-2), ARA Chubut (M-3), ARA Tierra del Fuego (M-4), ARA Chaco (M-5) and ARA Formosa (M-6); the transport ship ARA Canal de Beagle (B-3); the tanker ARA Punta Médanos; and several tankers belonging to the state oil company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), which provided auxiliary support to the Navy. The Submarine Force, meanwhile, consisted of ARA Salta (S-31), ARA San Luis (S-32), ARA Santa Fe (S-21) and ARA Santiago del Estero (S-22), together with its assigned auxiliary vessel, ARA Comandante Irigoyen (A-1).
As it sailed towards the southern tip of the continent, the fleet operated in three battle groups. The first was led by 25 de Mayo and its Carrier Air Group, comprising eight Douglas A-4Q Skyhawks, four Grumman S-2 Trackers, four Sikorsky S-61D-4 Sea King helicopters and one Alouette helicopter. Its escorts were the guided-missile destroyer Hércules, armed with two Exocet MM38 missiles, and the ultramodern A-69-class missile corvettes Drummond and Guerrico, each carrying another four Exocet MM38s.
The second group was led by the venerable cruiser General Belgrano and escorted by the destroyers Rosales, Hipólito Bouchard and Piedrabuena. The first two were also armed with four Exocet MM38 missiles. The group additionally included the landing ships Cándido de Lasala and Cabo San Antonio, the tanker Punta Médanos and other vessels belonging to the state-owned YPF company.
The third group sailed with the destroyers Py and Seguí in the lead, both armed with four Exocet MM38 missiles, followed by Almirante Storni and Domecq García as escorts.
To these forces must be added the four submarines of the Submarine Force Command and their assigned auxiliary vessel, Comandante Irigoyen, along with the patrol boats of the Fast Boat Group operating from Ushuaia Naval Base: ARA Indómita (P-86), ARA Intrépida (P-85), and the torpedo boats ARA Alakush (P-84) and ARA Towora (P-82). Compared with the fleet then available to Chile, this was a formidable force.
The Naval Aviation Command also deployed its veteran Lockheed SP-2H Neptune long-range patrol aircraft, North American Aviation T-28 Trojan/Fennecs, Aermacchi MB-339As, Beechcraft T-34 Mentors and several transport aircraft.
The Argentine Army, for its part, had 123 light advanced main battle tanks, 120 upgraded M4 Shermans, between 50 and 60 Mowag Grenadiers fitted with 120 mm guns, 100 M113s, between 100 and 130 M3/9s, between 20 and 25 AMX infantry fighting vehicles, 24 AMX 155 mm self-propelled guns, horse-drawn Schneider 105 and 155 mm guns, 101 OTO Melara 105 mm guns, 1935-model Oerlikon L70 20 mm guns, 1938-model Bofors L70 40 mm guns, Roland-Czekalski 105 mm recoilless guns, M67 90 mm guns and several 35 mm Skyguard systems. The Army also possessed a substantial number of Bell UH-1H helicopters—between 20 and 25—along with ten Pumas, nine Agustas and 109 Hirundos.
In compliance with its orders, the Argentine Air Force deployed a large proportion of its available strength: Douglas A-4B and A-4C Skyhawks, Mirage IIIEs, Israeli-built Mirage V Daggers, between eight and ten Canberra Mk 62s, and twelve domestically manufactured IA-58 Pucarás. The latter had already received their baptism of fire in Tucumán against the subversive organisations operating in that province between 1974 and 1976.
Against all this firepower, the Chileans claimed that they would rely on their “fighting spirit” and “warrior ethos”.
Tension continued to mount as the days passed. This was reflected in the press of both countries, which reported on the crisis under prominent headlines.
Mountain passes at the latitude of Mendoza
To mislead the enemy, Naval Command circulated false information, monitoring and manipulating the dispatches sent to their newspapers by war correspondents aboard naval vessels. This is a measure employed by every nation in wartime to achieve its objectives, and the Beagle crisis was no exception. On 11 December, when the fleet was sailing off the coast of Santa Cruz, the correspondent for the newspaper La Razón filed the following report::
Aboard the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, at sea, 11 December (Télam) — When this correspondent believed he was about to sail southwards through the Atlantic, he was surprised to discover that the voyage was actually taking us north of our port of departure. At present, with a temperature of 18°C, we are sailing off the coast of Mar del Plata. Although we cannot see the city, we imagine its holidaymakers basking on its golden beaches.
Meanwhile, aboard this aircraft carrier, which flies the flag of the commander of the Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Humberto José Barbuzzi, this year’s training exercises continue. The pilots of both the attack squadrons and the submarine-search units continue to launch from the catapult and return to make arrested landings. This is an exercise they must perform constantly to remain prepared, just as an athlete must train to maintain his physical condition and be ready to compete.
A few miles around us are the logistical support vessels and warships, carrying out various formations as part of their specialist training. The officers who have no operational duties, meanwhile, gather in the wardroom and pass the time playing various indoor games. And so, peacefully and with the silhouettes of our warships visible on the horizon, the final stage of the 1978 naval campaign continues.
.Meeting behind closed doors, the senior figures of the Process devoted their attention to the dispute with Chile, carefully reviewing the instructions given to Pastor regarding the imminent summit with his Chilean counterpart. The meeting continued until noon and concluded with the drafting of a statement, which was released to the press an hour later:
Later that afternoon, Lieutenant General Viola summoned the Army’s senior commanders to a meeting on the morning of Thursday the 14th, to be attended by all divisional generals and the most senior brigadier general. The purpose of the meeting was to brief them on his forthcoming inspection of units in the south and on the decisions taken regarding mobilisation.
Meanwhile, as part of the Summer Antarctic Campaign, the icebreaker ARA General San Martín (Q-4) resupplied Esperanza Base on Trinity Peninsula, at the northern tip of San Martín Land. In Santiago, Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos prepared to leave for Buenos Aires carrying his government’s proposals and a message from Pinochet to Videla, the contents of which were not disclosed.
As his aircraft was preparing to take off, an anonymous caller warned that a bomb had been placed aboard. The VARIG aircraft was evacuated and subjected to a thorough inspection, delaying its departure until 4.30 p.m. Once it had been established that the warning was a hoax, the aircraft departed and landed at Ezeiza two hours later.
The following day, the Brazilian Government issued a statement urging both governments to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. It also emerged that General Carol Lopicich had assumed command of the Fifth Division and that Buenos Aires was unaware of the representations Chile had been making to the White House.
Argentine helicopters from the Insular Air Group in tactical formation patrol the Fuegian channels (December 1978)
‘…we oppose the military government because of its undemocratic practices and its suppression of civil liberties, but it is clear that a conflict with dramatic consequences is being encouraged here—and not by Chile.’
On 8 December, the former president reaffirmed that Chile’s position was legally and morally beyond dispute, no doubt recalling the 1965 Laguna del Desierto incident, which had occurred during his presidency.
Three days earlier, the Santiago newspaper La Segunda had falsely reported that Argentina’s 1956 and 1957 conscription classes, together with all discharged military personnel, had been called up by the authorities to increase the armed forces to 500,000 men ‘…in its mad rush towards war with Chile’.
Meanwhile, trenches were being dug, shelters constructed, mines laid and barbed-wire entanglements erected in Puerto Natales and elsewhere in southern Chile, including Dorotea and Cerro Castillo. With an invasion believed to be imminent, reservists were being called up.
According to Sergeant Major Juan Vladinic of the Lancer Regiment, 120 former conscripts had reported to his barracks, and more were still expected.
The crisis reached its highest point of tension in the early afternoon of 11 December, when it emerged that Argentina had forced an aircraft belonging to Ladeco, a major Chilean airline operating since 1958, to return to Pudahuel. In response, headlines such as ‘We shall respond to the OIRT boycott by increasing exports’, ‘New military commander calls for calm’ (La Prensa Austral, 12 December 1978), ‘Chileans expelled from Argentina’ (UPI, 14 December), ‘Navy’s ability to defend national sovereignty’ (La Prensa Austral, 14 December 1978), ‘Argentina on a war footing’ (Cable Express/ANSA/UPI, 17 December 1978), ‘Argentina blocks lorries travelling from Brazil to Chile’ (Uruguaiana, Brazil, 17 December 1978), ‘Hostility towards Chileans increases in Argentina’ (EFE/La Tercera, 17 December 1978), ‘Defences prepared on Lennox, Nueva and Picton Islands’ (ANSA, 17 December 1978) and ‘Wartime atmosphere in Ushuaia’ (Clarín, 18 December 1978) flooded the Chilean media in reports arriving from abroad.
Yet amid the darkness, a faint glimmer of hope occasionally appeared. ‘Cardinal Samoré optimistic: “Peace is difficult but possible”’ (APP, 17 December 1978); ‘A solution to the crisis remains possible: the delimitation of the waters is all that remains to be settled’ (Le Monde, 18 December 1978).
As the international press reported at the time, the Argentine Government ordered the repatriation of thousands of Chileans living in the country.
Under strict guard, hundreds of Chilean families were forced aboard coaches and long railway convoys bound for their homeland. The scenes at Buenos Aires’s Retiro and Once railway stations—with shouting, heavily armed guards pointing their weapons or restraining fierce dogs on leads—evoked images of the Second World War. Some passengers and passers-by hurled abuse and racist insults at those being repatriated. Similar scenes occurred in Bahía Blanca, Viedma, Rawson, Trelew, Comodoro Rivadavia and Río Gallegos, where Chileans faced threats and assaults of every kind.
War nearly broke out when, in the middle of the Beagle Channel, an Argentine torpedo boat almost sank a Chilean barge, one day after Buenos Aires had decided to close the route used by lorries travelling between Brazil and Chile.
While these events were unfolding, Chilean troops were preparing their defences on Picton, Lennox and Nueva Islands by digging trenches, erecting barbed-wire entanglements, laying mines along the beaches and positioning heavy artillery.Around that time, the contents of a letter dated 5 December 1978, sent by a Chilean soldier from the front to his mother, began to circulate. The letter carried particular significance because its author was the nephew of Lieutenant Hernán Merino Correa, the Carabineros officer killed by Argentine gendarmes at Laguna del Desierto. It read:
I know this letter will make you anxious, but I also know that fate has willed it this way.
We have been transferred to a place I cannot name, but it is very close to where Uncle Hernán died. If that is so, it is because our destiny is bound to that of our beloved Chile.
I think a great deal about you and my younger brothers, but I believe there is no other way. If anything should happen to me, my younger brothers will look after you. It is my duty to take my place in the ranks and carry on our family legacy, and I hope you will understand, however many tears it may cost us.
An ordinary day here is much like it was back in Santiago. They always get us up very early, although on some days they spoil us and give us something extra for breakfast. Then we begin our training, which is no longer basic but more specialised. I now serve as a machine-gunner, and my friend Luis and I train while joking with each other as the corporals instruct us. As you can imagine, they do not find this very amusing, so we receive our fair share of punishments: ‘On the ground, recruit! Begin press-ups!’ ‘Up! Double march!’ ‘About turn! Double march!’
There are other punishments too, and although they leave us exhausted, we cannot stop laughing. That only makes the corporals even angrier.
I remember doing exercises at home with Uncle Hernán while I was preparing to join the Carabineros like him, although I never understood why we had to train every day. Now I understand why we ran such long distances and why he strengthened my arms with shark drills and press-ups. That is why I laugh when the corporals punish me with exercises I have already mastered.
Well, they are calling us to the mess, so I must finish this letter if I am to send it today.
I send many kisses to you and my younger brothers. Do not forget to read them this letter so that they know I am always thinking of them. Tell them, my dearest Mum, that they must behave themselves and that you will tell me how each of them has been behaving.
When you go to visit Dad, take him a flower from me, and another one for Uncle Hernán.
Your son,
Hernán Rodríguez Merino
P.S. The scarf you knitted for me fits perfectly. I badly needed it, as the cold here is bitter.
.
I wish to turn my attention to the imminent meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile, in the earnest hope that the dispute dividing your countries, which causes me such deep anguish, may be overcome.
May these talks pave the way for further reflection, avoiding steps that might have unforeseen consequences and allowing the differences between the two countries to continue to be examined calmly and responsibly. In this way, the demands of justice, fairness and prudence may prevail as the firm and lasting foundation of fraternal relations between your peoples, responding to their profound desire for peace at home and abroad, upon which a better future may be built.
Dialogue does not prejudice existing rights. It broadens the range of reasonable possibilities and brings honour to those who have the courage and good judgement to pursue it tirelessly in the face of every obstacle.
This endeavour will be blessed by God, supported by the agreement of your peoples and welcomed by the international community.
My appeal is inspired by the paternal affection I feel for those two beloved nations and by the confidence I draw from the sense of responsibility they have shown thus far, of which I hope to see renewed evidence.
With my best wishes and my Blessing.
Vatican City, 12 December 1978
IOANNES PAULUS PP. II
An hour earlier, a Chilean Navy CASA 212 Aviocar, possibly aircraft N-146, had taken off from Chabunco Air Base in Punta Arenas and flown directly eastwards in search of the Argentine fleet.
At 2.40 p.m., the aircraft reached 58°55′S, 63°48′W, flying at 150 knots and an altitude of 5,000 feet. It was then detected by the fleet’s airborne warning systems.
At the time, two A-4Q Skyhawks had taken off from 25 de Mayo: aircraft 0654/3-A-301, flown by Lieutenant Commander Julio Italo Lavezzo, and 0660/3-A-307, flown by Lieutenant Julio Alberto Poch. They began receiving vectors towards two radar contacts. The first proved to be a friendly Grumman S-2 Tracker, crewed by Lieutenant Enrique Fortini and Midshipman Marcelo Álvarez, which was flying with its IFF system switched on. The second was the Chilean Aviocar. Both Skyhawks headed towards it, prepared to shoot it down.
When Lavezzo brought the intruder within firing range, the Chilean aircraft turned sharply and escaped towards Punta Arenas under cover of the clouds, without completing its mission. Four minutes later, another three A-4Q Skyhawks took off from 25 de Mayo with orders to pursue and intercept any hostile aircraft, but they made no contact.
Throughout that day, the Chilean fleet remained motionless inside the fjords near the O’Brien Channel, barely 100 miles from Cape Horn, awaiting instructions. That same night, the CIA informed the White House that an Argentine attack was imminent and would take place no later than 21 or 22 December, although it could not specify the exact time. In response, Jimmy Carter hastened the return of his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who was then travelling abroad. At almost the same time, Brazil confirmed the scale of the military movements under way in the far south.
On the morning of 19 December, acting on orders from the High Command, the Argentine fleet left its positions east of Isla de los Estados and sailed at 20 knots towards the Beagle Channel and Cape Horn. It advanced through heavy seas, with strong westerly winds and waves reaching four metres in height.
At that same moment, Ambassador Enrique Ros, Argentina’s representative to the United Nations, placed in his briefcase the document he was to submit to the Security Council and entered a diplomatic vehicle that would take him to the organisation’s headquarters. It contained his government’s complaint against ‘…the illegal measures adopted by Chile which, because of their military character, pose a renewed threat to international peace and security by altering the region’s status quo’. In effect, this was the justification for launching the invasion. The intention was to portray Chile before the Security Council as the aggressor, occupying Argentine territory and thereby creating a casus belli that entitled its neighbour to recover ‘what belonged to it’ by force.
While this was taking place in distant New York, the Chilean ships remained concealed in their hiding places. They were still there when, at 4.49 a.m., one of their aircraft—apparently the CASA 212 Aviocar N-147—detected two radar contacts.
Aboard 25 de Mayo, Lieutenant Pettinari was sitting inside his A-4Q Skyhawk on the flight deck at Alert Five when he received orders to take off and intercept the enemy.
After checking his instruments and confirming that everything was in order, Pettinari brought the engine to full power and, carefully following the flight-deck signals, launched at high speed before setting a westerly course.
A fighter was always kept ready on the carrier’s catapult, armed with missiles and bombs but without external fuel tanks.
Pettinari was flying the same aircraft that Lavezzo had used. In it, he intercepted the CASA 212 as it flew at 150 knots and an altitude of 3,000 feet at 54°30′S, 60°53′W.
Pettinari positioned his aircraft alongside the enemy aeroplane, buffeting it violently with his jet wash. Once he had the CASA lined up in his gunsight, he radioed the carrier’s control tower for permission to shoot it down.
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| Chilean Aviocar CASA 212 |
The Chilean aircraft fled at full speed under cover of the clouds, while Pettinari turned back towards the carrier.
That same morning, Vice-Admiral López Silva, commander of the Chilean fleet at sea, was listening closely to a Radio Minería news broadcast on his battery-powered radio when he heard the Argentine Foreign Minister declare that, as far as relations with Chile were concerned, the time for words had ended and the time for action had begun.
Without delay, López Silva rose and made his way to the bridge, where he ordered his ships to prepare to sail and begin the customary preparations for battle. He made it clear that every vessel was to remove anything flammable that was not essential to its mission.
Aboard *Portales*, Mariano Sepúlveda recalled that this was standard practice to prevent fires if the ship was struck by enemy shells. On the frigate *Condell*, Lieutenant Edwin Conn ordered the gun crews to begin their preparations. ‘We sailed with our guns ready, because loading them in heavy seas out in the Drake Passage is no easy task.’
At that moment, the flagship received an encrypted message from Naval Command warning that the invasion was imminent: ‘Prepare to commence combat operations at dawn. Attack imminent. Good luck.’ From then on, the crews knew that the sounding of action stations would signal the beginning of hostilities.
At 10.20 a.m. that same day, López Silva received a second message from Admiral Merino. It read: ‘Attack and destroy any enemy vessel found within Chilean territorial waters.’
Shortly afterwards, US intelligence sources confirmed to the Chilean Government that the attack would take place that very night.
At 9.50 p.m., Captain Ramón Undurraga, commanding officer of the destroyer Williams, went to the ship’s safe to retrieve the key that unlocked the Exocet MM38 missile-control console. He was deeply troubled because he knew that war would break out that night. As he placed the key in his trouser pocket, he felt the enormous weight of his responsibility. Anguish, excitement and nervousness overwhelmed him all at once.
Several miles to the east, Admiral Barbuzzi was battling a violent storm, with enormous waves reaching 12 metres and seas that threatened to become even rougher. Under such conditions, any attempt to approach the islands was unthinkable. Realising that the weather was continuing to deteriorate, he ordered a report to be transmitted to the communications room in the Libertad Building, the headquarters of Naval Command in Buenos Aires.
In response, the High Command ordered him to reverse course and await an improvement in the weather. The fleet began complying with the order at 8.15 a.m. on Wednesday, 20 December.
At dawn on the 21st, the Chilean fleet left its positions in the strait and headed south through the Drake Passage, putting greater distance between its ships and the enemy air bases. The previous afternoon, it had received orders to enter the area in two sections. The first, designated ‘Steel’, was to advance in front, skirting the islands of the Drake Passage and acting as a defensive screen that would bear the brunt of the enemy’s initial attack. The second, ‘Bronze’, would remain farther south and respond to the assault with its missiles.
Meanwhile, aboard the Argentine ships, the crews knew that the enemy fleet was expected to be detected in little more than four hours, and every precaution had therefore been taken to begin combat operations. The storm, however, continued to batter the area and appeared to be growing even more severe.
A new incident then occurred, seemingly indicating that the attacking forces had begun the invasion.
The cruiser "General Belgrano" near Ushuaia (Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y arqueología Marítima)
As the surface vessels moved through the rough waters near Cape Horn, one of the ships obtained a sonar contact on bearing 278, classified as a possible submarine. Once the information had been reported, orders were received to attack it immediately. A Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King helicopter, serial number 2-H-231, was dispatched towards the target without delay. It lifted off from the deck of *25 de Mayo* beneath an overcast sky and set course despite the severe conditions.
The aircraft carried beneath its fuselage a US-built Mk 44 anti-submarine torpedo divided into four sections. The first, housed in its blunt nose, contained the 75-pound active-sonar seeker, with the 34-kilogram high-explosive warhead immediately behind it.
Upon reaching the target, the operator prepared to release the torpedo. When he pressed the firing button, however, the weapon failed to detach. The helicopter withdrew, but its escort launched several British-built Hedgehog anti-submarine projectiles. Although they exploded, there was no evidence that they had struck anything.
A Grumman S-2 Tracker arrived behind the helicopter and, at 8.45 a.m., dropped a torpedo of the same type. It disappeared into the depths without reaching the target.
Forty minutes later, the Sea King carrying the defective torpedo landed aboard *25 de Mayo*. With the assistance of the deck crew, its release mechanism was tested and this time operated perfectly.
The cause of the sonar contact was never established. It is certain, however, that it was not an enemy vessel: at that moment, the Chilean fleet’s only available submarine was operating in Pacific waters, many kilometres away.
Pope John Paul II instructs Cardinal Agostino Casaroli to announce his mediation
At 6.15 a.m. that same day, Chile’s ambassador to the Holy See, Héctor Riesle, telephoned his country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform the Foreign Minister that Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican Secretary of State, had told him that Pope John Paul II was prepared to intervene personally to prevent the war. The Vatican official proposed sending a representative to both capitals to obtain direct and specific information about each side’s position. The same proposal had also been conveyed to the Argentine representative to the Holy See.
It also emerged that the Apostolic Nuncio in Buenos Aires, Archbishop Pío Laghi, had already taken the necessary steps and that the Primate of Argentina, Cardinal Raúl Primatesta, had sent an urgent telegram to Rome, dated 19 December, imploring the Holy Father to intervene immediately.
As soon as he finished speaking to Riesle, Cubillos rushed to La Moneda to deliver the news to the President. After listening with great attention, Pinochet ordered him to reply immediately and accept the proposal.
Argentina’s response arrived at 1.30 p.m. and struck Chilean government circles like a bombshell: it was an unequivocal refusal. The Chilean officials stared at one another, first in astonishment and then with mounting indignation.
‘All the members of the advisory committee were meeting with the Minister when we learnt the contents of the message,’ Enrique Bernstein would recall years later. ‘As I listened to it, I could not help recalling the notes exchanged between the European foreign ministries on the eve of the First World War. Not only did it avoid responding to Chile’s proposal, but it also accused Chile of acting contrary to international law in an attempt to “assert claims over island and maritime areas under Argentine sovereignty”. It concluded by stating that, because our note persisted in the position already adopted, it “does not allow suitable formulas to be found to safeguard the negotiating process”.7
Immediately afterwards, a second report reached Santiago suggesting that the war had already begun.
Chilean businessman Andrónico Luksic Abaroa, Ford’s representative in Argentina, was preparing to collect a shipment of pick-up trucks from the port of Ingeniero White in Bahía Blanca when Argentine government officials arrived with a decree confiscating the consignment. ‘The Republic being in a state of war, the consignment is hereby requisitioned,’ the order stated tersely.
‘That was when we began to realise that there was no turning back,’ Cubillos would explain years later. Pinochet then ordered his ministers to implement all the measures planned for the outbreak of hostilities and the protection of the civilian population. It is said that, on the same day, the United States supplied him with satellite photographs showing the movements of the Argentine fleet.
At 5.30 p.m. on 20 December, Argentine ground forces took up their positions and began final preparations for the invasion.
In the Morro Chico sector, twenty-six M4 Sherman tanks started their engines while anti-aircraft guns trained their sights on their targets. At almost the same time, A-4Q Skyhawks took off from 25 de Mayo. Twenty minutes later, they landed at Río Grande Air Base, where ground crews were waiting to service and prepare them.
To counter the attack, the Chileans deployed twelve M4 Sherman tanks and numerous 105 mm guns towards Cabeza de Mar, while truck-borne troops hurried in the direction of Morro Chico.
At 6.15 p.m., shortly after a Chilean naval CASA 212 reported the advance of Argentine naval units, three Chilean Air Force A-37 Dragonflies, led by Captain Herrera, took off from Chabunco on another reconnaissance mission over Cabeza de Mar.
The aircraft climbed one after another until they broke through the cloud layer at an altitude of 700 metres, then turned east towards the designated area.
Chilean ships in the Beagle Channel
As they approached, their radars detected an electronic signal identifying a friendly aircraft (FF). This confirmed a message transmitted by Brigadier General Carol Lopicic, commander of the Army’s Fifth Division, from his underground command post between Kon Aysen and Cabeza de Mar. The encrypted message ordered an overflight of his sector and included instructions containing RMA coordinate codes, together with additional reconnaissance data for a border-control area between Monte Aymond and Río Gallegos Chico.
The following exchange took place between the pilots:
Puma 4: Puma 4, Beta 1 passed Foxtrot, over.
Rayo: Rayo Beta 232 at Foxtrot, over.
Puma 4: Indio 1, instruct Lima to Ñandú 9…52…04…45.1 Charlie Papa through Tango Papa 4, over.
Rayo: Roger. Foxtrot closed, out.
Once the objective had been confirmed, Captain Herrera, carrying the aeronautical chart on his right thigh, identified the firing range and headed towards it. His wingmen followed at an altitude of 600 metres as they flew over the Altos de Terramontes, near San Gregorio.
Rayo: Ñandú 9, this is Rayo Beta 232… Over.
Ñandú 9: Ñandú 9, Alfa-Tango 4563, monitoring on Foxtrot. This is Ñandú 9, over.
Rayo: Puma 2 orders one Papa to be sent to Charlie at Post 4, Papa Charlie to Post 4, to receive a final combat order and reinforcements, over.
Ñandú 9: Roger, over.
Rayo: Any relevant news?
Ñandú 9: Negative… Same as always… Foxtrot closed, out.
Rayo: Roger. Foxtrot closed, out.
At 11.30 a.m., another aerial incident occurred, this time involving the A-4Q Skyhawk flown by Lieutenant Marcelo Márquez, who would be killed in action less than four years later during the South Atlantic War. At that time, his aircraft intercepted a third CASA 212 Aviocar, possibly N-145, flying eastwards in search of the Argentine fleet.
Márquez lined up the aircraft in his sights and immediately contacted his base to request permission to shoot it down.
‘Request authorisation to shoot down enemy aircraft.’
‘Negative, Bronco. Negative,’ came the reply.
Márquez was surprised, but he was still not authorised to open fire.
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| TN Marcelo Márquez, He will die heroically in 1982 |
The Argentine pilot turned back and landed at Río Grande, where he delivered his report in the pilots’ briefing room, giving a detailed account of the encounter.
Pinochet was presiding over an officers’ graduation ceremony at the Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins Military Academy when his aide-de-camp, Colonel Jorge Ballerino, hurried over to hand him an urgent message from Punta Arenas. The President read it in silence and immediately slipped the paper into one of his pockets. Operations were beginning.
Pedro Daza, the Chilean Foreign Ministry’s special envoy in Washington, was preparing to request an urgent meeting of the OAS under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, while the Strategic Political Advisory Committee (CAPE) met on the tenth floor of the Diego Portales Building to decide whether Chile should appeal to the International Court of Justice. It was understood that Argentina would regard such a step as a casus belli, after which there would be no turning back. Argentine Interior Minister Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy had said as much to the Chilean ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sergio Jarpa Reyes. For that reason, after listening silently to the arguments, Pinochet decided to postpone the initiative for another twenty-four hours.
Meanwhile, Chilean intelligence attempted to obtain further information through its agent in the Argentine capital, Enrique Arancibia Clavel, a homosexual native of Punta Arenas who had been accused of involvement in the killing of his fellow Chilean, General René Schneider, on 25 October 1970. He was continually pressed for information.
On 21 December, the Argentine High Command launched Operation Sovereignty.
At 10 p.m. that day, designated H-1, the 3rd and 4th Marine Infantry Battalions were to occupy the islands and the eastern entrance to the channel. The ground offensive in both Tierra del Fuego and on the mainland was to begin at midnight, designated H-2. The Fifth Army Corps would advance from Santa Cruz towards Punta Arenas, Puerto Natales and Puerto Aden, securing the area once all enemy resistance had been destroyed. Having accomplished this objective, the corps would transfer one-third of its forces to support the Third Army Corps, which was to advance against the Chilean capital and Osorno through the Puyehue Pass. From there, it would continue southwards towards Puerto Montt, supported by the advance of the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Brigade.
At 6 a.m. on 23 December, designated H-8, the Air Force and Naval Aviation would proceed to destroy the enemy fleet and capture Puerto Williams on the Magellanic coast, with support from the Sea Fleet, as envisaged in Phase I of the plan.
Phase II called for the Third Army Corps to advance towards Santiago, Valparaíso and Puerto Montt through the Los Libertadores, Maipú and Puyehue passes. Its objective was to cut Chile into four sections and capture as much territory as possible, supported by Air Force strategic bombing raids against enemy positions and selected targets in cities and along major roads.
Lieutenant Marcelo Márquez's A-4Q departs on an interception mission (Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y Arqueología Marítima)
Meanwhile, the Second Army Corps would remain on standby along the Brazilian border, while the 2nd Brigade, based at Comodoro Rivadavia, would hold its positions as the strategic reserve.
As the ground invasion progressed, the Navy would deploy its various task groups. Task Group 1 (GT1) would support the landings on the islands in the channel, while Task Group 2 (GT2) would prevent the enemy fleet from advancing towards the Atlantic and support the troops assigned to capture Gable Island, the preliminary step towards taking Puerto Williams.
While these operations were under way, at H-2 the battle-hardened 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5), which would distinguish itself at Tumbledown three years later, was to occupy the Freycinet, Herschel, Wollaston, Deceit and Hornos island groups and drive out the opposing forces stationed there. This would place the territories of the far south and the interoceanic passage under Argentine control.
The Air Force would bomb targets in Punta Arenas, Puerto Williams, Talcahuano, Puerto Montt and Santiago. Its principal targets were military and government buildings, ports, airports, military bases, bridges, docks, roads and fuel depots. The plan assumed that by dawn and the early hours of 23 December, the Chilean Air Force would either have been destroyed entirely or reduced by 75 per cent.
To accomplish this, Argentine aircraft were to approach their targets at low altitude to avoid radar detection, then attack with heat-seeking missiles as the Chilean aircraft were preparing to take off or running their engines at the ends of the runways. The intention was to destroy both aircraft and pilots, thereby neutralising the Chilean Air Force completely.
This part of the plan was designated Operation Sudden Death and consisted of lightning attacks against the following targets:
- Quintero Air Base, Valparaíso
- Pudahuel Air Base, Santiago
- Comodoro Arturo Merino Benítez Air Base, Santiago
- El Bosque Air Base
- Cerrillos Air Base
- Concepción Air Base
- Manquehue Air Base, Temuco
- Pichoy Air Base, Valdivia
- El Tepual Air Base, Puerto Montt
- Balmaceda Air Base, Aysén
This would neutralise all logistical and operational support, leaving Chile without air cover and giving Argentina complete control of the skies.
Under the plans drawn up by the High Command, the Juliet Group, comprising two Canberra Mk 62 bombers supported by two Mirage IIIEAs, would attack Quintero Air Base. The Lima Group would strike Pudahuel, El Bosque and Cerrillos with five A-4B Skyhawks, five A-4Cs, four Mirage IIIEAs providing cover and three Canberra Mk 62s. The Kapa Group would attack Concepción, Temuco and Valdivia with three Canberra Mk 62s, five A-4Bs, five A-4Cs and four Mirage IIIEAs. The Foxtrot Group would strike El Tepual with five A-4Bs, five A-4Cs and four Mirage IIIEAs. Finally, the Papo Group would attack Coyhaique with five A-4Bs and five A-4Cs.
Chilean torpedo boat in the Beagle Channel
The defence of the far south against an enemy air attack would be entrusted to Naval Aviation’s Southern Group. It comprised the eleven A-4Q Skyhawks operating from the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo and Río Grande Air Base, where seven Aermacchi MB-339/As had also been deployed, together with an unspecified number of single-seat North American F-86 reconnaissance aircraft and T-34 Mentors. These aircraft would be supported by eight A-4Bs and seven A-4Cs from the Argentine Air Force’s 6th Fighter Group. The C-130 Hercules transports were also essential for moving troops and heavy equipment.
What the Argentine High Command had failed to anticipate was the severe deterioration in the weather on 21 December. Heavy rain, hurricane-force winds and waves more than twelve metres high made any approach to the objectives impossible, let alone air operations. Even so, Rear Admiral Barbuzzi maintained his course towards the operational area, waiting for the storm to subside so that the attack could begin.
At 10 p.m. that same day, Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos was meeting with his closest advisers when he was informed that an urgent telephone call was waiting.
He listened closely to the caller and, after hanging up, told his advisers that the invasion had begun:
‘We have just been informed that our naval aircraft have detected the Argentine battle fleet in the Cape Horn area, sailing in attack formation. Continuous surveillance is under way. Control over the area is being intensified. Our Navy has already taken up its positions. The order to act will be issued within minutes.’
Argentine soldiers are moving somewhere in the south. On the night of December 21-22, some units entered Chilean territory undetected.
In the Beagle Channel, Vice-Admiral López Silva received another message from Admiral Toribio Merino: ‘Sail immediately and engage the Argentines.’
Such was the atmosphere on both sides of the Andes when the Pinochet Government invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and requested an urgent hemispheric consultation to denounce Argentina as the aggressor, while continuing to seek a diplomatic solution that might prevent war.
The invasion was due to begin at 10 p.m. on 21 December, but the growing violence of the storm forced it to be postponed.
The helicopters waited on deck for the order to depart, but the storm showed no sign of abating. The increasingly rough seas tossed the ships with mounting violence, preventing the operation from beginning.
Inside the aircraft, commandos and elite troops waited in silence, gripping their weapons tightly in gloved hands. Their faces were blackened with boot polish and their heads covered with black woollen caps. Pilots and aircrew remained on alert, ready to take off, while thousands of soldiers on the mainland prepared to begin their advance. Morale was high and the desire to fight intense, but the hours passed and nothing suggested that the weather would improve.
A fierce storm struck the fleet on December 22, delaying the Argentine invasion. (Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y Arqueología Marítima)
Chilean sources claim that at 7.19 p.m. another CASA 212 confirmed the position of the Argentine fleet on a bearing of 134 degrees, 120 kilometres south-east of Cape Horn, in the midst of a violent storm. What its sensors had actually detected, however, was hydrographic noise generated by US vessels sailing near that position.
That afternoon, Naval Command ordered Captain Pablo Wunderlich to move his men to Nueva Island, as it was expected to be the enemy’s first objective. The officer accordingly prepared the 150 elite troops of his Marine detachment and sailed aboard the destroyer Serrano towards the island, where they took up positions within sight of the enemy.
In their deductive fantasy, Chilean sources claim that Admiral Merino’s message must necessarily have been intercepted by the Argentine fleet. In their own words, this must have been ‘bad news for them, because it meant that the Chilean fleet knew their position and that they would be forced to fight before they could attempt to land on the islands’.
Captain John Howard, the area’s chief of staff, maintains that ‘when the Argentines received this message, they cannot have been at all pleased’.
It is difficult to believe that people who claim expertise in such matters could think that the Argentine Navy had not considered the possibility of being detected or expected to enter combat—which, in any event, never occurred.
At 11 p.m. that same night, another reconnaissance aircraft reported that it had detected the fleet moving near the islands in the channel and that one of its ships had already begun landing troops. The report caused considerable alarm among the Chilean forces stationed in the region. It soon emerged, however, that the aircraft’s crew had misidentified the contacts. The vessels appearing on their screens were actually the Chilean torpedo boats Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda and Guacolda, which were sailing through the area. Vice-Admiral López Silva’s naval units were quickly informed of the mistake, preventing them from being attacked by friendly fire.
A Chilean naval high command officer points to the spot where the cruiser "General Belgrano" entered its territorial waters (Image: emol.com)
Finally, the Argentine High Command gave the order to begin the attack. Shortly after receiving it, Rear Admiral Barbuzzi issued the corresponding directives in the midst of the storm and the violent seas off Cape Horn.
During the night of 21–22 December 1978, after twenty days at sea and at least one postponement of the opening of hostilities, the Argentine ships—crowded with troops and landing equipment—continued their advance towards the conflict zone to begin the largest amphibious operation in the history of the Americas.
The invasion had begun.
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| Chilean "Escuadra" sailst to the South |
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| Chilean frigate sailing towards the Beagle |
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| "Almirante Lynch" Destroyer |
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| "Ministro Zenteno" Destroyer |
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| A4Q Skyhawk aircraft on the deck of the aircraft carrier "25 de Mayo" |
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| Chilean Northtrop F-5 E Tigre II |
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| Lieutenant Marcelo Márquez's A4Q departs on an interception mission (Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y Arqueología Marítima) |
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| Another A4Q Skyhawk is preparing for takeoff (Image: Fundación Histarmar. Historia y Arqueología Marítima) |
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| Chilean torpedo boat in the Beagle Channel |
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| Argentine radar Westinghouse AN-TPS43 and W-430 |
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| Chilean soldiers patrol the south (Image: "Mi Mejor enemigo", Alex Bowen) |
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| Chilean Hawker Hunter formation |
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| Lieutenant Commander Augusto Bedacarratz carried out the first night engagement on the aircraft carrier "25 de Mayo" piloting an A4Q Skyhawk. He was the one who sank the British missile destroyer HMS "Sheffield" with an Exocet missile fired from a Super Etendard.
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| A Canberra Mk-62 deployed in the south |
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| The "25 de Mayo" positioned itself east of Isla de los Estados, awaiting instructions. |
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The Chilean freighter "Araucano" sails through the waters of the Beagle Channel
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| The press reports the imminent entry into action |
Notes
The author belongs to the 1957 conscription class which, together with the preceding class, was exempted from military service following the reform introduced during the government of General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse. Neither class was ever called up.
‘El año que vivimos en peligro’, Capital, No. 237, 17 September–2 October 2008.
https://www.capital.cl/poder/2008/09/15/220919-el-ano-que-vivimos-en-peligro
Ibid.
This is what he later told Monsignor Pío Laghi in Buenos Aires.
Patricia Arancibia Clavel and Francisco Bulnes Serrano, La Escuadra en Acción 1978: El conflicto del Beagle visto a través de sus protagonistas, Random House Mondadori, Santiago, November 2004, Chapter 1.
The second section contains the guidance system and gyroscopes. The third houses the 24-kilowatt seawater battery, which uses silver chloride and magnesium electrodes, with seawater acting as the electrolyte. Finally, the propulsion section contains the electric motor, four rectangular control fins and two propellers.
Enrique Bernstein Carabantes, Recuerdos de un diplomático ante el Papa mediador, 1979–1982, Vol. IV, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, Chile, 1989, p. 27.
Thirty-three years later, on 28 April 2011, Arancibia was found dead in his Buenos Aires flat, murdered by a lover who had allegedly stolen US$35,000 from him.
It was once suggested, although without much supporting evidence, that after completing its operations against Chile—with its rear secured by the elimination of a potential enemy and the Chilean military arsenal confiscated—Argentina would begin operations in southern Brazil.
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