Moore on Continuing the War

Moore

British General Jeremy Moore admitted:

“I was afraid that the war would continue.

I do not hate the Argentines, and I never would. I felt ashamed when Parliament mocked them; that was no way to conduct a war.”

He also answered the major question posed by a Clarín journalist: could the Argentines have won?

“Yes. They were only days away from winning the war. They forced us to operate at night. At night, confusion and chaos prevail, but we were trained to master that chaos.

“The Argentine servicemen fought bravely, defending the ground inch by inch. Every metre of the islands cost us the sacrifice and blood of our men.”

“We had received instructions from London that I was to use the term ‘unconditional surrender’, but logic told me that ‘unconditional’ had no significance beyond its psychological effect,” he recalled. “I was well aware that the Argentines are a proud people and that military honour is extremely important to them, so I feared that the term might cause them to refuse to sign the document.

“So, as I was on my way to Puerto Argentino to meet Menéndez, I contacted my headquarters and told them that, if the Argentine general objected to the term, I would remove it. I then immediately ended the communication.”

The British general also recounted that he felt both ashamed and astonished when he saw General Menéndez freshly bathed and impeccably dressed, while he himself had arrived directly from the front in combat uniform, covered in mud and having soiled his trousers after falling into his own excrement during the bombardment.

He died at the age of 79, according to The Times, described as a local newspaper from his home town. When the politicians in office were asked why he had not been accorded military honours, their reply was:

“He was a general who was no longer on active service.”

Argentina's Rights on Malvinas

Malvinas: 1813 British Acknowledgment

British Acknowledgment

In 1813, the British requested permission from Buenos Aires to go to the Malvinas Islands.

UK: "International Bandits"

Infography: Chronology of Malvinas Sovereignty

Kelper Bullshit: "We discovered them first, then"...

If "we discovered them first"...

Watch the film. Read the sources. Then ask whether the certainty survives the evidence.

If "we discovered them first" is your defence of British ownership of the Malvinas, prove it. Repeating "John Davis, 1592" is not proof.

Davis recorded a sighting of islands generally identified as the Falklands. That supports an English sighting in 1592. It does not establish that nobody had reached them before him. Yet that missing step is precisely what the claim of British discovery priority requires. 

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/davis_john

Davis's voyage and its historical interpretation.

The challenge comes from the Dictionary of Falklands Biography itself. Writing there, Graham Pascoe describes the claim that Davis was the first discoverer as "clearly disproved" by earlier maps. That is his interpretation, rather than a universal scholarly verdict - but it demolishes any pretence that Davis's priority is an undisputed fact. Read Pascoe's argument.

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/discoverers_the

Consider what existed before 1592.

Around 1586, André Thevet's Grand Insulaire included "Les Isles de Sanson ou des Geantz", a map identified by historians with the Falklands. The Bibliothèque nationale de France records that identification. Thevet said his information came from an older Portuguese source. Its origins remain disputed, but a discovery narrative beginning with Davis must explain this earlier evidence, rather than simply omit it. 
https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40618578z

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/discoverers_the

BnF catalogue, discussion of Thevet's source.

The cartographic debate reaches further back. A 2023 study dates Pedro Reinel's polar chart to approximately 1521–1524 and links its geographical information to the San Antonio, which deserted Magellan's expedition in 1520. This does not establish that the ship sighted the islands. It does show why confident discovery claims require careful examination of the earlier charts. 

https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00087041.2023.2216496

Gaspar, The Cartographic Journal.

And the human story may begin centuries before any of these European voyages.

Research published in Science Advances reported marine-animal bone deposits on New Island dated to approximately 1275–1420, alongside charcoal evidence and a locally made stone projectile point. The authors interpret the combined evidence as consistent with visits by Indigenous people from Tierra del Fuego.

The visitors' identity remains uncertain. The point was not directly dated, and the findings do not demonstrate permanent settlement. Those qualifications matter. So does the possibility of a human history that predates Davis by centuries. 
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8550247/


This evidence does not, by itself, resolve sovereignty. It challenges the historical certainty invoked when "Britain discovered them first" is used to justify ownership.

We do not have to identify the first visitor before questioning an unsupported claim of priority. The burden of proof belongs to whoever insists that England was first.

An incomplete historical record is no licence to award first place to Britain.

Against Whom Did We Fight the Malvinas War?

UK Has Fallen

50 million Muslims now live in Europe, representing 10% of the continent's population!!!
In 2000, there were fewer than 500,000.

In 26 years, the Muslim population has multiplied by 100!!! The European Union wants to increase this figure even more!

Even Americans worry about this.

Malvinas: After the British Invasion, Gaucho Was the Main Workforce

Gauchos remain a main population during the initial years of British occupation

An 1856 British engraving in *The Illustrated London News* depicts "Spanish-American gauchos" capturing horses with boleadoras in the Malvinas.
The English press documented the established presence of Rioplatense culture following the 1833 occupation—a history that supports our sovereignty.





The colonial authorities relied on them. In a British Parliament report (1843), Admiral King details the urgent shipment from the Río de la Plata of "trained horses and 6 recados (gaucho saddles)," as Luis Vernet’s own stock was exhausted.



The report highlights Antonina Roxa, a legendary Rioplatense woman who played a key role in taming cattle on East Falkland (Isla Soledad). In 1841, Colonial Lieutenant Tyssen admitted that, to venture into the interior, he was left "alone with an Indian, a boy, and Antonina." They needed her expertise.



Faced with isolation, Tyssen pleaded in his official letters for the urgent hiring of more "gauchos from Buenos Aires or Montevideo who understood the trade." They knew full well that the economy and survival of the islands were impossible without the Rioplatense criollo.



The archive reveals that the British referred to the Argentine governor as “Don Louis Vernet,” thereby acknowledging his prior role de facto.
Sovereignty is not merely a legal claim; it is etched into the land, the place names, and the documents of those who occupied the territory.

Documentary: Argentine Primer

Argentine Army: SPH Crusader Mk.1

Self-propelled Gun Crusader Mk.1 is AA service

 
 

The Argentine Army converted the British Crusader Mk I tank into a self-propelled gun. Lieutenant Colonel Carlos R. Doglioli recalled:

“The chassis of the British Crusaders were fitted with French 105 mm Schneider-Creusot Model 1928 guns and Swedish 75 mm Bofors Model 1935 howitzers. The design was conceived by Colonel Bidone, now deceased, an artillery officer who was also a military engineer. His two sons likewise retired from the Army with the rank of Colonel. One of them was my artillery instructor at the Staff College, which is how I know this.”

He also added:

“The photograph showing a woman standing in front of one of the 105 mm self-propelled guns became very well known in September 1955. It was taken during the revolutionary events of those days and was widely reproduced in contemporary magazines. I remember it very clearly. It was originally published in a special issue of one of the illustrated news magazines of the period.

“The other two photographs of these Crusader self-propelled guns, judging by the colonial-style cork pith helmets being worn, were taken during the usual spring manoeuvres, which were generally held during the second half of October.

“None of these vehicles has survived. They were all scrapped a long time ago, most probably sometime during the 1960s.”


 

Specifications

Crew: 5 (75 mm version); 7 (105 mm version)
Weight: 17.5 tonnes
Engine: Nuffield-Liberty V12, 340 hp
Speed: 58 km/h on road
Range: 140 km on road
Fuel capacity: 500 litres
Length: 6.7 m
Width: ?
Height: 2.27 m
Armour: ?
Armament: three versions

1. Schneider 10.5 cm L/18 Model 1928 howitzer
2. Krupp 7.5 cm L/30 Model 1909 howitzer
3. Bofors 7.5 cm L/40 Model 1935 gun

All versions were also fitted with a 7.65 mm Madsen Model 1926 No. 3 machine gun.


 
 

TANKS!

Goose Green: The End of Two Sea Harriers

 

The Death of Lieutenant Nick Taylor over Goose Green

On 4 May 1982, the British invaders launched an air strike against the Pucará aircraft stationed at Cóndor Military Air Base near Goose Green. The mission ended in tragedy for the attackers. Argentine anti-aircraft artillery proved highly effective, while troops on the ground concentrated their small-arms fire on the incoming aircraft. Two of the three Sea Harriers were shot down.

The first to fall was Lieutenant Nick Taylor, flying Sea Harrier FRS.1 XZ450. An eyewitness later recalled:

“Sea Harrier No. 2, flown by Lieutenant Taylor, came in almost directly behind No. 1. I then saw a burst of black smoke erupt from it, followed by red flames. It banked to the left and struck the ground on the left-hand side of the field beside the runway, producing a spectacular mushroom cloud.”

Lieutenant Taylor’s remains were subsequently recovered by Argentine servicemen, who gave him a Christian burial with full military honours. He still rests at Darwin, in the place where the Argentine forces laid him to rest.

Argentina Rejects the MI6 Campaign Against Us: Fuck Your Own Arse, England!

Argentina Is More Than the Worst Things Said About It

The author responds to the campaign of criticism against the country in the context of the World Cup; he urges people not to be swayed by prejudice and invites us to acknowledge our failures and continue to grow

Celebrations in Buenos Aires following the victory over England in the World Cup

Esteban Bullrich
LA NACION

There are moments when silence becomes a form of surrender.

In recent weeks, I have watched as my country—and our national football team—became the target of accusations that go far beyond criticism of unacceptable behaviour. Argentina has been portrayed as a racist nation. Some have even suggested that our national identity is somehow intertwined with Nazism.

Those words hurt.

Not because Argentina is perfect. It is not.

Like every country, we have racism, prejudice, ignorance and intolerance. We have people who say offensive things, people who discriminate and people who fail to recognise the dignity of another human being. We should never deny that reality. We must confront it honestly.

But honesty also requires us to tell the whole story.

I have admired Samuel L. Jackson for decades. His work has entertained and inspired millions of people around the world, myself included. I also respect every public figure who chooses to fight racism. Humanity needs more such voices, not fewer.

Admiration, however, does not remove the responsibility to disagree when disagreement is justified.

When public figures reduce Argentina to a caricature, they overlook a history that deserves to be known.

In 1813, when much of the world still accepted slavery as normal, Argentina passed the Free Womb Law, which declared the children of enslaved women free. Forty years later, our Constitution of 1853 abolished slavery entirely.

Those decisions came half a century before Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation and a decade before the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery throughout the United States.

This is not a contest in moral virtue.

History should never be used to declare one nation superior to another.

The point is simpler.

Facts matter.

A nation should not be judged solely by its darkest chapter, nor by its loudest voices.

Critics often point out that Nazi war criminals fled to Argentina after the Second World War. That happened. It is a stain on our history that no serious Argentine seeks to erase.

But history also tells us that many countries—including the United States, Canada and several European nations—admitted former Nazis through various immigration programmes or intelligence operations during the Cold War. Evil exploited political circumstances across several continents.

To conclude from that reality that Argentina is ‘a Nazi country’ is as unfair as saying that the United States is defined by slavery or that Europe is defined by colonialism.

Civilisations are always greater than their mistakes.

Perhaps what saddens me most is that these accusations have emerged at a time when the world desperately needs less contempt and more humility.

Humility begins by acknowledging our own failures before condemning those of others.

Every society carries wounds.

Some countries struggle with antisemitism.

Others struggle with Islamophobia.

Others with xenophobia.

Others with police violence rooted in racism.

Others with discrimination against Indigenous peoples.

No nation has completed the task of recognising the equal dignity of every human being.

Argentina certainly has not.

But neither has anyone else.

As someone living with ALS, I depend on the kindness of others for much of my life. I can no longer speak in my own voice. I can move only my eyes. The disease has stripped me of every illusion of self-sufficiency.

It has also taught me something unexpected.

When the body becomes fragile, people cease to look like categories.

There are no conservatives helping me into bed.

There are no progressives adjusting my wheelchair.

There are no Catholics, Jews, Muslims or atheists offering me comfort.

There are only human beings serving another human being.

That is where dignity begins.

And perhaps that is also where leadership should begin.

Leadership is not the ability to win arguments.

It is the willingness to seek the truth rather than applause.

True leadership rejects racism without turning entire nations into stereotypes.

It condemns hateful words without forgetting the humanity of those who spoke them.

It remembers that justice without mercy can easily become moral self-righteousness.

Football, like politics, often magnifies our worst instincts. Passion can become arrogance. Celebration can become insult. National pride can become exclusion.

When that happens, we should apologise without making excuses.

But an apology should never require us to accept false identities imposed upon us by others.

The Argentina I know is not built on hatred.

It was built by immigrants who crossed oceans carrying little more than hope.

It was built by grandparents who escaped wars.

By Jewish families who found refuge.

By Syrian and Lebanese shopkeepers.

By Italians and Spaniards who rebuilt their lives.

By teachers, doctors, farmers, workers and volunteers who quietly serve their communities every day.

That Argentina rarely makes international news.

It should.

The deepest lesson of my illness is that none of us will be remembered for the arguments we won on social media or for the insults we directed at strangers.

We will be remembered for whether we lightened another person’s burden.

Countries deserve to be measured by the same standard.

Judge Argentina by the truth.

Judge us by our entire history.

Judge us by our willingness to acknowledge our failures and continue to grow.

But please, do not judge us by stereotypes.

The world has already suffered enough because of them.

Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata: The Disastrous British Invasions of 1806/07

Argentina: British-origin Sailors Death In Argentine Service

British Sailors Death in Argentine Service

Malvinas: The Bad Guys Had An Impressive Logistics

The Impressive Logistics of the Invader

On 2 June 1982, the invading British troops completed the temporary Harrier landing strip at San Carlos Water.

Built in just a few days by the Royal Engineers and support units, the strip was designed to bring British air cover closer to the front line.

Constructed from prefabricated aluminium panels originally developed for use in Europe in the event that NATO airfields were destroyed during a Soviet invasion, it provided a simple but effective forward operating base in the Malvinas / Falklands.

The strip was not intended to be a fully equipped air base. There were no facilities for rearming aircraft, only for refuelling them. Fuel was stored in large floating fuel bladders anchored in San Carlos Water and pumped ashore to support operations.



The aim was simple: to allow the Harriers to land, refuel quickly and return to the skies, extending their patrol times over Gran Malvina / East Falkland and reducing the need to fly back to the aircraft carriers to refuel.

The first Harriers from HMS Hermes would arrive on 5 June, and the forward operating base quickly became an important part of the British air defence network. At times, up to four aircraft operated there, ready to launch at short notice against Argentine air attacks or to provide support to British troops advancing towards Puerto Argentino.

The landing strip remained operational until the end of the war, though not without incident.

On one occasion, a loose connector pin from the surface of the strip was sucked into the engine of a Harrier during take-off. The resulting damage caused the aircraft to crash, although the pilot escaped unharmed.



After the accident, flight operations from the strip were temporarily suspended, and some Harriers operated instead from HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid using vertical landings.

The San Carlos Forward Operating Base was a remarkable achievement. Built in a remote war zone under the threat of air attack, it helped keep the Harriers over the battlefield for longer. This deployment demonstrated the enormous logistical capacity of the British invader, who did not hesitate to use every means available for the sustained support and supply of his troops, in contrast to the Argentine command, which had never anticipated the possibility of a British blockade. This left the ground forces in a state close to abandonment, forced to face combat with undernourished, freezing, poorly armed soldiers, and without adequate support and communications systems.

Malvinas: The Performance of the Argentine Submarines

Argentine submarines in the Malvinas conflict

Alexander Mitrofanov || Top War

Submarine S-21 Santa Fe

At the outbreak of the armed conflict, the Argentine Navy had four submarines. Two of them, S-22 Santiago del Estero and S-21 Santa Fe, had been built in the United States in 1944 as SS-341 Chivo and SS-339 Catfish, respectively, and belonged to the Balao class. Between 1948 and 1949, Catfish was modernised under the GUPPY II programme, and in 1961 Chivo was modernised under the GUPPY IIA programme. In 1971, the submarines were transferred to Argentina. Santiago del Estero was decommissioned in 1981, and Santa Fe met the same fate between August and September 1982.

SS-339 Catfish in 1946

SS-339 Catfish after her modernisation, 1969.

SS-339 Catfish before and after the upgrade

The fleet also included two modern Type 209 submarines. These submarines were designed in West Germany by Ingenieurkontor Lübeck, Project IK-68, and their sections were built at the HDW shipyards in Kiel. In 1974, after being assembled in Argentina, the submarines S-31 Salta and S-32 San Luis joined the Argentine fleet. When used skilfully, these submarines represented a serious threat. A good example is provided by their sister submarines in the Peruvian Navy. During the inter-American Unitas-1996 exercises, for example, Pisagua sank the US SSN Narwhal six times, always being the first to attack the surface ships. In 2001, during the US-Peruvian SIFOREX-2001 exercises, a Peruvian submarine sank a US frigate. Since then, every year one of the Peruvian submarines has taken part in US anti-submarine exercises in the Atlantic, based at Norfolk.

Argentine Type 209 submarine

At the outbreak of hostilities, only S-32 San Luis was operational, while her sister, S-31 Salta, was undergoing repairs. She sailed in mid-April, but because of excessive noise, never entered combat. To replace the Balao-class submarines, the submarines S-41 Santa Cruz and S-42 San Juan were being built in West Germany to the TR 1700 design. The most experienced submariners were assigned to commission them, creating certain difficulties in manning the remaining submarines. Construction of four more submarines of this type was planned at a Buenos Aires shipyard. Had this plan been implemented, it would have given the military junta led by General Galtieri a very persuasive argument: eight latest-generation submarines.

Specifications	S-21 Santa Fe	S-32 San Luis
Displacement, t: surfaced submerged	1870 2340	1248 1440
Maximum length, m	93.9	55.9
Maximum beam, m	8.3	6.3
Mean draught, m	5.2	5.5
Hull design type	double hull	single hull
Operational diving depth, m	150	250 (max. 500)
Endurance, days	?	50
Number × power (type) of diesel engines, hp	4 × ? (General Motors 16-278A)	4 × 600 (MTU 12V493AZ80)
Number × power of electric propulsion motors, hp	2 × 2400	1 × 4600
Maximum speed, knots: surfaced under snorkel submerged	18 9 15 - one hour, 6 - 34 days	10 11 22
Range (at speed, knots), miles: surfaced economical submerged	10,000 (10) 95 (5)	6000 (8) 400 (4)
Torpedo armament: number of torpedo tubes (bow/stern) × calibre, mm torpedo stowage (type)	10 (6/4) × 533 24 (Mk 14, Mk 37)	8 × 533 14 (SST-4, Mk 37)

Main tactical and technical characteristics of Argentine submarines

Actions of the submarine "Santa Fe"

In late March 1982, the Argentine Armed Forces launched Operation Rosario to recover the Malvinas Islands and South Georgia. Three naval forces were created for this purpose: a covering force, Task Force 20; a landing force for the Malvinas, Task Force 40; and a landing force for South Georgia, Task Force 60. Task Force 40 included a landing ship, two transports, two destroyers, two corvettes and the submarine S-21 Santa Fe. The submarine was assigned two missions: first, to land the tactical group Task Unit 40.1.1, made up of 13 naval special-forces combat divers, Agrupación de Buzos Tácticos - APBT, near Cape San Felipe, north of Port Stanley, to capture the Cape Pembroke lighthouse and Port Stanley airport — this mission was later cancelled — and to reconnoitre and mark the main force landing area, the "Yellow Zone"; the second was to patrol the assigned area.

Due to her poor technical condition, the submarine’s combat value was practically nil: worn batteries required a long time to charge and limited the time she could remain submerged, some of the torpedo tubes were inoperative and many systems were unreliable. The maximum diving depth was reduced to 120 m.

At 23:00 on 27 March, Santa Fe, under Captain Horacio Bicain and with an ARVT detachment commanded by Captain Alfredo Cufré, left the Mar del Plata naval base. Despite strong winds, the passage passed without incident on 28 March. The next day, taking advantage of improved weather, ARVT carried out a landing exercise with personnel in inflatable boats in sea state 2 to 3. Later, the wind increased to 40-50 km/h, prompting the order to delay the start of the operation by 24 hours, until 22:00 on 30 April; the landing had initially been scheduled for 1 April.

On 31 March, the submarine approached the north-eastern coast of Gran Malvina (East Falkland) to reconnoitre the currents and determine the landing area. The sonar operators detected the sound of a propeller, and periscope observations revealed lights on the shore, vehicle movement and a ship leaving Port Stanley; this ship was the Royal Navy’s A171 Endurance, en route to South Georgia.

On 1 April, the submarine commander received an order changing the combat mission, under which the APBT was to mark the "Red Section" landing area north of the previously planned landing zone. At 12:30 on 1 April, due to an electrical fault, the submarine lost radio contact, and at 17:30 the submarine and APBT commanders decided to begin the landing without waiting for contact with command. While approaching the coast at 23:50, the radar station failed and did not work again until 1:00 a.m. The landing took place north of Punta Celebronya, near Rinión Island. At 2:30, the APBT began boarding three inflatable boats, which set off from one side and reached the shore at 2:50. At 3:35, the reconnaissance and marking with signal lights of the main force landing area in York Bay was successfully completed. Shortly afterwards, the 2nd Battalion of the Argentine Marine Corps landed here from the landing ship Cabo San Antonio.

Routes of the Argentine naval force for the capture of South Georgia and the Malvinas Islands.

Capture of Port Stanley: 1 - Argentine landing in the Malvinas Islands; 2 - Reconnaissance by the submarine Santa Fe and marking of the "red section" of the landing between 02:30 and 03:35 on 2 April 1982; 5 - Landing of marines from Cabo San Antonio at 06:30 on 2 April 1982.

Santa Fe then moved to patrol area 080 San Felipe 60, 100 miles east of Port Stanley, before returning to Mar del Plata on 7 April. The trip back to base was not without incidents: communications were intermittent, the cooling system suffered constant failures, the bilge pumps could only operate at periscope depth, the main engines’ oil consumption exceeded all permitted limits, and the outer cover of the rubbish-disposal hatch jammed open.

Personnel from the Mar del Plata Naval Arsenal and Santa Fe worked non-stop for eight days to fix the problems and prepare the submarine for deployment. Twenty-three torpedoes, 20 Mk14 and the rest Mk37, fuel, fresh water and provisions for 60 days were loaded aboard. At that time, the arsenal had only 12 torpedoes of the required type, received from the United States along with the submarines, so the remaining torpedoes were provided by "friendly" countries — Peru? The Mk37 torpedoes could only be fired from the bow torpedo tubes.

Mk14 torpedo

Mk37 torpedo

Santa Fe’s main mission was to deliver 20 marines, Golf Group, armed with Bantam anti-tank missiles, recoilless guns and anti-tank grenade launchers to reinforce the South Georgia garrison, four tonnes of ammunition and equipment, and a new commander for the Argentine garrison on the island. The boat would subsequently patrol north of the island. Owing to uncertainty over the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between Britain and Argentina, Horacio Bicain was ordered to avoid engaging the enemy first, which considerably reduced his chances of success.

Santa Fe sailed from Mar del Plata at 23:30 on 16 April, and a few miles out new problems arose. The electrical control system of the propulsion system failed, leaving the boat adrift for three hours while repairs were made. The following day, the piston of diesel engine No. 1 failed, requiring 24 hours to bring it back into service. On 19 April, a failure in the cooling-pump gear caused diesel engine No. 4 to overheat. Emergency repairs with epoxy resins took 48 hours. This caused a delay in the planned landing.

On 20 April, due to bad weather, the submarine was forced to dive and continue the voyage submerged, which further delayed the landing. Between 21 and 22 April, despite a strong storm, Santa Fe continued surfacing, causing damage to the bridge rail and superstructure. The submarine submerged again. The damaged hull vibrated, interfering with the sonar system and revealing the submarine’s presence.

On 23 April they surfaced to find and remove the source of the noise. By then, the delay had reached 36 hours. That afternoon, the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance intercepted a coded radio message indicating the presence of an enemy submarine, presumably Santa Fe, 100 miles from South Georgia. This caused some concern among the British command, as two British tankers were in the area transferring fuel from one ship to another.

The frigate HMS Plymouth was sent to the area to protect the tankers and escort them beyond the 200-mile zone. Admiral Sandy Woodward noted in his memoirs, One Hundred Days:

Tension was rising and the operation in South Georgia seemed to be stalled by fear of an Argentine submarine. Unfortunately, the range of our patrol aircraft from Ascension Island was insufficient.

The frigate HMS Brilliant and the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror were sent to reinforce the British anti-submarine force heading for the island.

Santa Fe received information on the location of British ships near South Georgia from Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, C-130 Hercules and Boeing 707. For example, Endurance intercepted radio signals from the Boeing addressed to the submarine, indicating that it was heading towards the island to deploy special forces and had orders to sink Endurance.

HMS Endurance

In the early hours of 24 April, news was received that British forces had begun the liberation of South Georgia. Santa Fe’s commander received orders to speed up the operation. It was decided to head for Cape North, the western end of the island, and then to Cumberland Bay. The boat remained surfaced all night, submerged at 5:00 a.m. and snorkelled until dusk.

At 11:30 p.m., Santa Fe reached her destination and, stopping one mile from King Edward Point, unloaded Golf Group and the cargo between 2:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. using a motor launch captured from a British polar station. After completing the unloading, the boat’s commander decided to seek shelter in one of the many bays, carry out repairs and then proceed to the patrol area. But one hour later, when the boat was five miles from Grytviken, the administrative centre of the British Overseas Territory of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, a battle alarm sounded: radar detected an approaching air target.

South Georgia

It was a Wessex helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Commander Stanley from the destroyer HMS Antrim. The destroyer’s sonar detected the noise of the Argentine submarine at a distance of approximately 50 miles. The helicopter dropped two Mk II depth charges, with fuzes set to minimum depth, which detonated off the starboard stern. The resulting damage prevented the submarine from diving. The submariners, in turn, opened fire on the Wessex with small arms.

A Wasp helicopter with an AS 12 missile

Wasp helicopter attacks Santa Fe

Depth-charge attack on Santa Fe

The Sea Lynx and Wasp helicopters from HMS Endurance, HMS Plymouth and HMS Brilliant arrived shortly afterwards, launching a Mk 46 torpedo, which passed beneath the submarine’s hull, and attacking her with AS 12 missiles and machine-gun fire. Three AS 12 missiles struck the fibreglass structure of the conning tower but did not detonate, disabling the snorkel and other retractable devices and seriously wounding a crew member. To avoid further casualties, Bikain ordered the crew to take shelter inside the pressure hull and, at 7:30, approached the quay at King Edward Point using a periscope.

Under cover of fire from the Argentine marines, the submariners abandoned their boat and took refuge ashore. A few hours later, the South Georgia garrison surrendered to the British with virtually no resistance; the island had been called San Pedro for only 23 days. The only fatal casualty of the operation was a Santa Fe sailor, who was immediately evacuated by helicopter to Antrim, where he underwent a successful leg-amputation operation.

A Sea Lynx helicopter with a torpedo slung underneath.

Frigate HMS Brilliant

The captured Argentines were housed in a building near the quay. Santa Fe’s commander requested permission for several members of his crew to return aboard the submarine to collect personal belongings, food and medical supplies. The request was granted, and half a dozen petty officers, escorted by British marines, boarded the submarine. Some managed to enter the heads and the galley and open the water-system valves to flood the submarine. The next day, the British decided to re-moor the boat about 400 metres from the quay of the old whaling plant in Grytviken, since the ammunition and batteries aboard posed a serious danger. In addition to the submarine’s commander, six other crew members took part in the mooring, supervised by a group of British marines. By then, the submarine’s stern had begun to sink, and a rotary blower was used to empty the ballast tanks and maintain buoyancy. Propulsion was provided by electric motors, using remaining electrical power. During the re-mooring, a tragedy occurred: Petty Officer Félix Artuso, who was operating the compressor and the diving-and-surfacing system valves, was killed. The English sentry, unfamiliar with submarines, mistook Artuso’s rapid movements — he had to operate 24 valves simultaneously — for an attempt to sink the submarine. The submariner did not understand English and did not respond to the warnings. The sentry fired a burst from his Sterling submachine gun.

Félix Artuso

Under these circumstances, the mooring was cancelled and, a few days later, Santa Fe sank at her mooring in 20 metres of water, listing to port. Only the superstructure railing remained afloat. The deceased submariner was buried with military honours in the local cemetery. The remaining crew members were transferred aboard the tanker RFA Tidespring to Ascension Island, and from there a chartered KLM aircraft flew to Montevideo.

The funeral of F. Artuso in Grytviken cemetery.

Santa Fe semi-submerged at the Grytviken quay.

After the end of the war, the British Ministry of Defence decided to refloat Santa Fe, which was obstructing the quay and, moreover, whose torpedoes and other ammunition aboard posed a serious danger. Work began at the end of June and was carried out by the crews of Endurance, the tug Typhoon and the salvage vessel Salvageman. Their task was to pump the water from the flooded compartments using portable pumps and, subsequently, to empty the ballast tanks with the compressed air remaining in the submarine’s cylinders. The situation was complicated by the virtual absence of submarine-engineering specialists; only two Endurance officers, a hydrographer and a supply officer, had served briefly in a submarine. There were also no plans of the submarine. Nevertheless, after more than two weeks of intense work, Santa Fe was afloat again, albeit with a 25-degree list.

Santa Fe alongside Salvageman after the boat had been raised.

This is how Endurance’s commander, N. Barker, described the scene that unfolded before the British sailors:

We also discovered a considerable collection of weapons, including torpedoes, mines, boxes of small arms, ammunition and explosives. Four homing torpedoes were piled up in the bunks, as if they were plague victims. A large number of torpedoes were stored on racks, in the removable deck flooring and in the torpedo tubes. One of the tubes was empty; they were probably trying to sink one of our ships, and it may have been us!
On 15 July, a team of specialists arrived from England to inspect Santa Fe, which had been pumped out. We all recognised a serious problem: the large quantities of TNT, which were drying out rapidly, were becoming increasingly unstable. Thanks to our efforts, Santa Fe had become a floating time bomb.

The divers prepare to inspect Santa Fe.

Therefore, it was decided to tow the vessel to a safer place and beach her there with the hatches and bulkhead doors open. It was believed that this would gradually flood the compartments and make the wet TNT safe again.

Santa Fe is being towed to the beach.

Between 1984 and 1985, after four months of work — the divers made 868 dives — the RMAS rescue ships Goosander and Salvageman, using 10 inflatable pontoons, refloated the submarine on 11 February 1985 and, after removing harmful substances, including diesel fuel, attempted to tow her to deep water away from the coast on 20 February 1985, Operation Okehampton, but the submarine sank 5 miles north of South Georgia at a depth of 350 m.

Raising of Santa Fe

Santa Fe is being towed to the sinking site.

To be continued ...