Malvinas: Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Part 1

Background

Consolidation of the British Beachhead at San Carlos

Following the successful attacks carried out by the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) on the afternoon of 21 May, during the night of 21–22 May, the enemy undertook an intense effort to land the bulk of its forces and deploy security elements to the high ground surrounding the beachhead. All available helicopters were used successively for that purpose.

On the same afternoon of 21 May, numerous troop movements were observed, transporting personnel, heavy weapons, and air defence systems to the northwest of Cerro Alberdi, as well as to the heights southeast of San Carlos settlement and Montevideo Hill.

By the afternoon of 22 May, when the FAA resumed its attacks, the enemy had succeeded in consolidating its landing, with an effective ground-based air defence network already established around the beachhead.

On 21 May, the Joint Command Malvinas requested continuation of aerial bombing, which was carried out as mentioned above, although the results could not be assessed. Requests for aerial photography could not be fulfilled due to active enemy air defences.

On 22 May, since the heavy mortars of Regiment 12 (RI 12) had not yet arrived at Puerto Argentino, orders were issued to embark two artillery pieces from the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) with their crews aboard an Argentine Coast Guard vessel. This ship departed for Darwin at first light on 23 May. Near the entrance to Choiseul Bay, the vessel was attacked by British Harrier aircraft, which inflicted severe damage, forcing the ship to run aground on the northern shore.

A fire broke out onboard. The crew managed to disembark and take cover under makeshift shelters along the beach. Later, they were able to recover equipment and supplies from the ship, including materials for treating the wounded. On 24 May, during a risky helicopter operation, the personnel were evacuated, along with the artillery pieces and ammunition, which were transported to Darwin, where they were immediately assigned to defensive positions. The operation was secured by a patrol under the command of an officer dispatched from Darwin. Once the mission was completed, the patrol had to withdraw on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters. Only one of the rescued artillery pieces could be brought back into service; the second had been damaged in the bombing and could not be repaired.

On the morning of 23 May, British aircraft attacked south of Howard a formation of Army helicopters that had departed Puerto Argentino en route to that location. The helicopters were carrying supplies and heavy mortars for RI 12 (received on that date), conducting reconnaissance south of San Carlos, and attempting to extract personnel from 601 Commando Company, who were operating in the area of RI 5 on a previously assigned mission.

In this attack, two Puma helicopters and one Augusta A-209 helicopter were destroyed. A second Puma, piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Alberto Pérez Cometo, managed to evade the enemy strike, returned to the area, and rescued the crews of the downed helicopters — risking a second enemy attack to save his comrades. Subsequently, patrols from RI 5 recovered the heavy weapons and part of the ammunition.

On the same day, 23 May, following intense air attacks, the British seriously damaged the Carcarañá vessel, which was anchored in San Carlos Strait near Soledad Island Bay. Another British air attack hit the Bahía Buen Suceso, anchored in Fox Bay, causing damage. The vessel was later repaired and restored to sailing condition.

On 24 May at 21:00, the Commander of the Coastal Group issued the Commander of Task Force Mercedes (RI 12) the defence operations order, which was received on 25 May at 18:00, followed by an order for a disruption attack, received on 26 May at 08:30.

On 26 May, two 105 mm howitzers from GA Aerot 4, along with their crews, were airlifted to Darwin by Army helicopters to reinforce the guns received the day before. They were assigned fire missions against Cerro Alberdi and Monte Osborne. As previously mentioned, only three artillery pieces were operational.

Operations of Task Force Mercedes from 1 May to 27 May (Darwin Position)

By 30 April, RI 12 had completed the concentration of its forces, except for Company B (still at Monte Challenger under orders of the Joint Command Malvinas), the Signals Section and part of the Service Company in Puerto Argentino, and the Heavy Mortar Section, which had not yet been transported from the mainland. The Commando Company and the remaining elements of the Service Company completed their movement to Darwin on 22 May.

In the afternoon, the RI 12 Commander attended a briefing by the Commander of RI 25 on the situation and deployment of his unit. He also met with the Commander of the Vicecommodore Pedrozo Military Air Base, who briefed him on the deployment of available resources and the measures taken with the local population. Reconnaissance was carried out alongside company commanders and members of the Logistics Planning Team (PL My).

It continued to rain, as it had in previous days. Since arriving in Malvinas, troops and officers had been operating with damp clothing. Nevertheless, overall health conditions remained acceptable, although several cases of frostbite in the lower limbs were reported. The unit was bivouacked near the airstrip.

The RI 12 Commander ordered that the companies bivouacked near the airstrip immediately relocate to the positions reconnoitred the previous afternoon by Company A. By 06:00, the movement was completed, and the elements were positioned 4 km from their original location.

At 08:30, the anticipated British air attack on Darwin began. Four Sea Harrier aircraft struck the area around the airstrip. A Pucará aircraft, with engines running, took an almost direct hit. Two more bombs fell on the runway, and a fourth landed near a Jeep carrying personnel.

At Fanning Head, the SBS accepted the surrender of Argentine soldiers — marking the first encounter between the two infantry forces.

Deployment and Combat Readiness in the Darwin–Goose Green Area

The unit takes up its assigned positions. All light and heavy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and the large field gear bags —impractical for troops in operations— must be transported manually and across open terrain. The transport means belonging to the Military Air Base (helicopters, jeeps, and tractors) cannot be used, as they are reserved for exclusive use by the Air Force.

Digging of positions begins using short-handled shovels — the only available entrenching tools, which are in limited supply. Improvised tools are also used. Only by nightfall are troops able to have a hot meal. Since arrival, it has rained almost constantly.

As of 2 May, Argentine forces deployed in Darwin–Goose Green number 642 men, with 202 from the Air Force (FAA).

On 3 May, reports from the BAM Commander suggest that the 1 May Harrier attack on the airstrip may have been guided from the ground, allegedly with assistance from a local resident. Control measures are adopted over the civilian population, also intended to protect them from renewed British air and naval strikes. The population is gathered inside the local church. This decision provokes significant complaints from the Kelpers.

On 4 May, at first light, a Chinook helicopter from the FAA transports the Deputy Commander of RI 12, one officer, and 18 soldiers from the Commando Company still stationed in the Monte Challenger area to Darwin, along with a food resupply.

Shortly after, a British air raid targets the airstrip from east to west. A Sea Harrier is shot down; the pilot ejects but is found dead, only 20 metres from the runway threshold. He is identified as Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. The wreckage and body show numerous small-calibre bullet impacts, indicating that concentrated light weapons fire can be effective against low-flying aircraft.

During this action, the courageous conduct of Military Chaplain Santiago Mora is noteworthy, as he moves among positions under enemy fire, providing spiritual support to the troops.

Personnel continue to improve their positions and lay mines and obstacles. At 17:30, a formation is held and honours rendered to Lt. Nicholas Taylor, followed by the burial of his remains.

Due to food shortages, sheep begin to be requisitioned for troop rations. The situation is reported by radio to higher command. On 9 May, the food supply situation becomes critical and is reiterated to command. A shipment of provisions for 10 days is arranged and begins arriving on 10 May.

On 11 May, a helicopter delivers food for 7 days. At 23:30, the ship Montsunen arrives carrying 100 drums of JP-1 fuel (helicopter fuel), 97 drums of petrol, and 100 crates of 105 mm ammunition.

On 13 May, the Commander of the Coastal Task Group issues an operations order to detach a reduced-strength company-sized element to occupy the San Carlos area. Urgent allocation of support weapons is requested for this.

On 17 May at 09:00, two air attacks strike anti-air and heavy weapons positions near the airstrip and within the C Company / RI 12 sector. Numerous Beluga-type bomblets are scattered across the terrain. This is the first air raid since 4 May. That night, starting at 23:00, British helicopters once again overfly the area.

On 18 May, the BAM and TF Mercedes Commanders conduct a joint inspection of positions to coordinate use of FAA and Army resources. It is agreed to employ 500 lb bombs as interceptive fire. A request is made to Coastal Task Command for anti-personnel mines and detonators.

Rotationally, troops use designated barns to dry clothing and conduct physical recovery — a system in place since 5 May, yielding satisfactory results despite tactical constraints.

On 19 May, the Signals Section finally arrives from Puerto Argentino, though without its equipment, which remains in Comodoro Rivadavia, awaiting transport. First Lieutenant Ernesto Kishimoto, the Section Commander, reorganises the existing system. Civilian radio equipment is requisitioned for wireless communication, both with higher command and between company and platoon commanders. These sets are mounted on jeeps due to their battery requirements. Company leaders lack both wired and wireless communication with their sections, and sections have no comms with their squads. A wired network is improvised using discarded materials sourced from the local population.

That evening, from 21:00, British helicopters again overfly the area but withdraw under fire.

On 20 May, the health of the troops begins to deteriorate. Officers and soldiers suffer from harsh weather conditions (constant humidity and cold, especially at night) and insufficient food. Measures are taken to prioritise care for the worst affected. Some officers and NCOs, despite illness, refuse to abandon their posts. Twelve soldiers are hospitalised in an improvised infirmary, nine of them due to malnutrition.

On 21 May at 09:00, a 120 mm mortar section (one piece) arrives under an officer. From 09:00 to 11:00, intense naval gunfire is received from the northwest, directed by a British helicopter. Fire is accurate and targets anti-aircraft and heavy weapons positions. One FAA 20 mm cannon is knocked out, though no casualties occur. Between 11:00 and 12:00, enemy aircraft conduct two simulated attack runs.

On 22 May at 09:30, two air strikes target the runway. One enemy aircraft appears damaged and is seen heading out to sea.

Night Attacks, Artillery Movements and Contact with the Enemy

On 24 May, 30 troops previously attacked by Harriers and helicopters 17 km from Goose Green, are airlifted to the position from the Iguazú Coast Guard ship. Patrols are dispatched to recover two 105 mm artillery pieces and ammunition. That night, the enemy launches illumination rounds and conducts naval fire against the position.

During the morning of 26 May, four air raid alerts are issued. Between 04:20 and 12:30, heavy naval shelling hits the position. A Company, ordered to relocate to new frontline positions at the isthmus entrance, becomes pinned down in open terrain.

At 08:30, an order for a disruption attack is received from the Coastal Task Commander. It includes:

1. Confirm the current defence order.

2. Conduct a night attack (26/27 May) with one infantry company against potential enemy concentrations south and southwest of Cerro Alberdi, supported by reconnaissance elements in Sussex.

3. Based on outcomes, launch a second similar attack the following night (27/28 May).

4. All operations must be conducted at night; other units are to continue improving defences.

Between 12:30 and 13:00, four air attacks are launched from east–west and north–south approaches. One enemy aircraft is shot down.

During the afternoon, reconnaissance of the new position is carried out. Artillery pieces are manually moved due to the Land Rovers being unfit for towing. Fire missions are calculated and executed that night on hills to the north and northeast, using 30% of available ammunition.

A Company advances north of the isthmus, preceded by Reconnaissance Section patrols. The advance is made in wedge formation, with the 1st Section deployed. With extreme effort, they reach the vicinity of Camilla Creek, without encountering enemy forces. From that line, the company commander reports back and is ordered to return. The troops are exhausted.

The rest of the unit continues intense work, constructing new positions and moving equipment and supplies.

At 23:00, a patrol 20 km southeast of the position reports a large vessel sailing in Darwin Bay. One artillery piece is repositioned and opens long-range fire toward the presumed enemy ship. The South Sector Commander is ordered to deploy patrols to the beach to monitor for possible landings.

At 04:00, Coastal Task Command orders the deployment of a reduced section to Saladero (18 km northwest of Goose Green) to verify possible presence of the British ship Uganda and determine its mission.

A patrol under Sergeant First Class Berdugo is launched but subsequently loses all contact. Transported by FAA helicopter, they cannot be retrieved due to lack of air assets. Later, it is learned that after repeatedly evading British forces, the patrol was captured on 7 June following a brief engagement.

Operational Development

General Situation as of 27 May

The Reconnaissance Section, the Combat Advance, and A Company, as well as one section of the Commando Company deployed west of Darwin, have not yet managed to establish their positions or transport their logistical supplies. Notably, A Company and the Reconnaissance Section are exhausted due to the operation carried out during the night of 26/27 May, combined with the hardships, physical strain, and tension of the preceding days.

On the high ground to the north-northeast and east of Boca House, the RI 8 Section (under Second Lieutenant Aliaga) has been positioned, along with a group of service personnel equivalent to two understrength sections. To equip the latter with FAL rifles, it was necessary to withdraw such weapons from the personnel of 4th Airborne Artillery Group and the Section of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group, who were instead issued 11.25 mm pistols.

To the north of Salinas Beach, one section of the Argentine Air Force is operating independently, under the direct command of the BAM Commander (totaling 202 personnel).

The forces of Task Force Mercedes, with the exception of the central sector between Goose Green and the airstrip (where small FAA elements operate independently), are cut off from one another. This situation forces the Regiment Commander to deploy service personnel with limited training in frontline positions. Communications between the Task Force Commander and company commanders, and between them and subordinate levels, are entirely inadequate due to the unit never having received its communications equipment.

With regard to the personnel and materiel situation within Task Force Mercedes, it is important to note that most of the heavy equipment embarked on the ship Córdoba never arrived. The unit has the following support weapons in service:

• Two 81 mm mortars, each with 126 rounds of standard and high-capacity ammunition

• One 120 mm mortar, used with limitations, as its base plate had been welded to the tube

• Two additional 120 mm mortars, left on the mainland, arrived at Puerto Argentino on the night of 27 May, and were redirected to Darwin on the afternoon of 28 May, by which time the battle was essentially over and they did not take part in it

• One 105 mm recoilless rifle, without a sighting device

• Ten MAG general-purpose machine guns

• One 12.7 mm machine gun, mounted on a requisitioned jeep

B Company, detached and deployed to the Monte Kent area under the command of the Joint Command Malvinas, arrived in the combat zone —minus one section that remained in Puerto Argentino— at nightfall on 28 May 1982. It was airlanded 4 km south of Goose Green, at a point when the situation had already become critical.

C Company, formed from a redistribution of NCOs and conscripted soldiers, is organised into two rifle sections, each with four squads. Its only support weapon is a single MAG machine gun. Of the company's 22 NCOs, 16 are acting corporals from the Sergeant Cabral NCO School.

The Service Company has only part of its personnel present, since most members of the Intendance and Ordnance Sections remain in Puerto Deseado (loading and unloading the Córdoba) and in Comodoro Rivadavia (airlifting equipment and supplies), and have not yet arrived in the theatre of operations.

Pucara's Rocket Launcher Transportations

Formation and Composition of Ec Güemes (San Carlos Area)

To form Ec Güemes —operating in the San Carlos area— the following elements have been employed: the Company Commander, the Company Command Group, and 1st Section of C Company / RI 25; along with the Support Section of RI 12, composed of two 81 mm mortars (out of the four available to the unit) and two 105 mm recoilless rifles (out of three available).

As a result, the remaining support weapons available for combat are one 105 mm recoilless rifle, which lacks a sighting device, and two 81 mm mortars.

The A Battery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) is composed of three howitzers, a third of their ammunition having been expended in fire missions between 26 and 27 May. An additional cannon, recovered following the attack on GC Iguazú, could not be repaired and remains out of use.

3rd Battery, 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (3/B GADA 601) is equipped with two 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, integrated into the air defence system established by the Condor Military Air Base (J BAM Cóndor).

Argentine Air Force (FAA) personnel assigned to the BAM are deployed in air defence roles around the runway, in securing installations and deployed equipment, and in forming a section-level defensive position northwest of the airstrip.

The unified command structure under the Task Force Commander —intended to coordinate ground defensive operations— was not ultimately established.

Pucará rocket launcher installed on top of a tin shed

Company Leadership and Logistical Situation – Task Force Mercedes

The company commanders of RI 12 assigned to lead these detachments are not the unit’s original organic officers, as they were replaced in order to complete the organisational structure. The appointed commanders are senior in rank to the original company commanders, who now remain with their respective elements as executive officers.

Logistical Situation of Task Force Mercedes

Rations:
Since 15 May, food has been reduced to one ration per day due to the shortage of supplies. Distribution has been severely hampered by the lack of transport, thermal containers, and the long distances involved. At the start of the British ground assault, the force had autonomy for 3 to 5 days.

Although airdrops of food supplies were carried out on 25 and 26 May to extend this autonomy, part of the cargo was lost, and another portion was retained by the FAA detachment for its own needs. As a result, only a limited amount of provisions reached Task Force Mercedes.

Personnel have, in general, lost a significant amount of weight due to the imposed restrictions since 1 May, compounded by prior shortages since the unit left its home garrison. This situation, combined with accumulated physical strain, has had a clear impact on morale.

Equipment and Materials:
No spare parts, replacement materials, or equipment are available. Of particular concern is the lack of cleaning equipment for weapons, which has had a very negative impact on their performance — especially under the prevailing climatic conditions.

Ammunition:
The ammunition allocation for personal weapons is sufficient for 3 to 5 days of combat. The quantity of available rounds for 81 mm and 120 mm mortars is very limited. Ammunition stocks for the 105 mm guns are satisfactory (3 to 5 days of combat). The FAA garrison maintains its own supply depots.

Argentine soldiers surrender at Goose Green


Infanteria.mil.ar

Gibraltar and Malvinas: The Same Claim

Malvinas and a Decision with the 22nd Century in Sight

The joint Spanish-British resolution regarding Gibraltar is a strategic move that belongs more to the future than to the present. It would be a mistake to interpret this particular action as a mere gesture of compliance with international law on the part of the United Kingdom.
Por Juan Recce

This was not an act driven by a iure vocation. It was a pragmatic manoeuvre that instantly dissolved a massive snowball threatening British interests in Europe. The UK chose to eliminate outright any possibility of Argentine involvement in continental European disputes — and, by extension, the involvement of Latin America as a whole. It was a low-cost move with high strategic return.

The United Kingdom is not a country of double standards — it is a country of multiple standards: Malvinas, Gibraltar, Chagos, the Caribbean, and so on. The only consistent thread in its international conduct is pure, unvarnished pragmatism. The issue here is not how much Malvinas resemble Gibraltar, but rather how much Gibraltar resembles Malvinas.

Gibraltar, while still a strategic enclave, is clearly in decline — due both to the global shift of power towards the Pacific axis and the retreat of European private capital from the Middle East and hydrocarbon-rich Africa.

In the eyes of Britain’s power elites and corporate interests, Gibraltar is far cheaper than Malvinas. Malvinas serve as the gateway to the last planetary frontier of natural resources: Antarctica — the final large, unallocated landmass on Earth — and the world’s second-largest continental shelf, encompassing six million square kilometres of submerged Argentine territory.

One must never underestimate British cunning. With its gaze fixed on the 22nd century, the UK pre-emptively blocked the landing of a Malvinas-style logic at Europe’s doorstep — all in one calculated move.

InfoNews

5th Marine Infantry Battalion, The Elite Unit that Emerged from the Trenches

The 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5), reinforced with 200 Army personnel, became a heroic legend due to its extraordinary performance in the 1982 war. This unit was trained, organised, and prepared for combat by its commanding officer, then Frigate Captain Carlos H. Robacio.

Once in the Malvinas, Robacio led his men in combat with such determination that he astonished the enemy. As M. Hastings notes in The Battle for the Falklands:

"The Scots Guards (an elite unit) could hear the Argentinians shouting and even singing as they fought. They were the best troops... the 5th Argentine Marine Infantry Battalion."

The Sunday Times reported:

"The Argentinians did not surrender or retreat on Mount Tumbledown, where the Scots Guards had to face the fiercest action of all. There, they encountered highly skilled and well-entrenched Argentine Marine Infantry who kept firing relentlessly and with remarkable intensity."

Robacio and his BIM 5 refused to obey the order to surrender on 14 June 1982. They continued to fight fiercely until they ran out of ammunition, and then engaged in hand-to-hand combat using cold steel. They marched into Puerto Argentino in perfect formation, weapons shouldered and in ceremonial step. The British, astonished by such an extraordinary display of courage, lined up to salute them and received them with military honours...



Carlos Hugo Robacio

• Medal for Valour in Combat

• Honoured by the National Congress of Argentina

• Argentine Army: Order of Distinguished Service and Military Merit in the rank of Commander

• Republic of Peru: Peruvian Cross for Naval Merit and Legion of Merit in the rank of Commander
  Adm VI

 

Patagonia: When the British Tried to Buy Peninsula Valdés

Península Valdés, 1880: The Falkland Island Association Offers to Buy It – The Navy Fights to Ensure Our Flag Flies

When the Welsh landed at Puerto Madryn, “the flag with the red dragon in the centre was flying on the hill above the caves…”. In 1965, to mark the centenary of the arrival of the first contingent of Welsh immigrants, Camwy magazine – published by the regional museum in Gaiman – reproduced in its July issue (No. 5) the diary of Lewis Humphreys, but transcribed the phrase as: “the Argentine flag with the red dragon…” (emphasis mine – C.I.D.). This version, with the word “Argentine” inserted, has been repeated by other writers without verifying its accuracy or providing any explanation. From the original account it is clear that it referred to the Welsh flag, which the Emigration Commission had given to Luis Jones and Edwin Roberts when they departed from Wales on 10 February 1865 to prepare the site for disembarkation. This is confirmed by Edwin Roberts’ own account, in which he relates that, once the warehouse was built, “as the friends of the Colony in Liverpool had sent a flag with the Red Dragon, a tall pole was set up in front of the depot and that flag was raised” (quoted by Matthew H. Jones in Trelew, un desafío patagónico, vol. I, p. 122). Another Welsh chronicler gives the same version: “On 27 July [1865] Edwin saw the Mimosa approaching and hurried to the white rocks near the shore. He hoisted the Red Dragon flag and fired into the air, then went out by boat to the ship to welcome them”.

To carry out the Interior Minister’s instructions, the military commander of Patagones, Lieutenant Colonel Julián Murga, was sent. On 15 September 1865, at the very spot where Enrique Líbanus Jones had established the settlement, he raised the Argentine flag once again.

Abraham Matthews, in his Chronicle of the Welsh Colony in Patagonia, recounts it as follows: “Captain Murga (who was the military commander of Patagones) came on behalf of the Argentine government to raise the flag of the Argentine Republic in the place and to give us formal permission to take possession of the land and settle it.”

The official record drawn up by Murga states that “in the name of his government he made formal delivery and placed in possession of the national lands granted to the Colony from the Country of Wales… After this, and having raised the Argentine flag and saluted it with a rifle volley as a sign of respect to the Argentine Nation which it represents, the Colony from the Country of Wales was established.” “The flag was raised in complete silence. The raising of the Argentine flag that day dealt a mortal blow to the idea of a Welsh Colony. Nonetheless, there was not the slightest sign of protest from the settlers.”

The flag raised on that occasion was brought to Chubut by Commander Murga from Patagones, and it remained there. This is evident from a note Murga sent on 1 October 1866 to the Inspector and Commander General of Arms of the Republic, General Benito Nazar, requesting the dispatch of “two National Flags”, as there was none in that Command “as one had been sent to Chubut, and the one left behind” was completely destroyed “due to the strong and constant winds”.

There, “inside and outside the Old Fort”, or on the embankment itself, the first houses were built, forming the initial nucleus of the city of Rawson – the oldest in Patagonia after Patagones and Viedma. When, ten years later, Antonio Oneto was appointed as the Executive Power’s representative for the administration of the colony, his instructions emphasised: “Prudence, tolerance, morality and the strictest justice must be the standard of all your administrative acts, so that the national flag may fly proudly over your residence and be respected and blessed by all.”

Ensuring the presence of the national flag in Patagonia – so coveted by foreigners – was no easy task, as the reader will see in the following pages. In late 1878, Commander Daniel de Solier of the gunboat La República found a company on Tova Island, in the northern part of the Gulf of San Jorge, engaged in hunting penguins and seals without Argentine government authorisation, operating under the French flag. Solier ordered them to lower it and to raise the Argentine flag on land, which they did without resistance.

A similar situation occurred on Leones Island, east of the previous one. Ordered by Captain Augusto Lasserre of the gunboat Paraná to suspend operations, the manager did so some time later. Upon leaving, he left the French flag flying and the Argentine flag rolled up at the base of the mast. This is how, in 1883, Captain Francisco Villarino of the schooner Santa Cruz found them, ordering the French flag lowered and the Argentine flag raised, with the corresponding honours. Similar incidents took place at other points along the Patagonian coast. Companies from various countries (United States, Britain, France, Chile), flying their own flags, exploited natural resources as if they were their property.

On 21 December 1880, the Falkland Island Association attempted to purchase from the Argentine Government the Península Valdés and “one hundred and sixty leagues in the vicinity of San Sebastián Bay in Tierra del Fuego” for the purpose of colonisation and livestock breeding. The request was denied; had it been accepted, it is certain the Argentine flag would never have been flown there.

From the book “Patagonia azul y blanca” by Clemente Dumrauf.

La Voz de Chubut

Malvinas: The Gurkha Myth

The Gurkha Myth

Beyond certain particular traits, the Gurkhas are nothing more than a regular unit of the British Army. There was a British psychological operations campaign during the war which, aided by local dissemination, reached extraordinary levels.

They were neither mercenaries nor throat-slitting machines—nothing of the sort. Yet many believed it; even Gabo García Márquez bought into the story and helped to spread it. The press also contributed, whether through the information it published or the manner in which it did so. 

It’s hard to accept that a myth was swallowed whole, but that’s exactly what happened. Even Carlos Robacio commented on them — they were a misrepresentation of the Gurkhas. They fought very little and stopped almost as soon as they began.

We must stop spreading claims about the war that never actually occurred. Don’t you agree?



Imagen: Infobae.

Malvinas: Superb Deception

Malvinas – The Grand Narrative

Sources and Rumours in War Reporting

(An intriguing analysis of how British communication was managed in support of military operations)

"On 31 March, two days before Argentine forces landed in Malvinas, the Argentine newspaper Clarín published a report, which appeared to originate from London, claiming that the British had deployed the nuclear submarine Superb to Argentine waters. The Foreign Office had no comment to offer on that 'version', and the Argentine press concluded that this was a leak of highly classified military information.

On 1 April, as Argentine troops were preparing for the landing in Malvinas, Clarín reported that the Superb displaced 45,000 tonnes and had a crew of 97 men trained in anti-submarine warfare.

By 4 April, the submarine had allegedly been sighted off the Argentine coast. British military sources responded that they had no intention of disclosing the location of their submarines.

On 18 April, a Brazilian pilot reported having seen the Superb near Santa Catarina and even claimed to have photographed it; unfortunately, the image was nearly unreadable due to fog.

Then, when the British expeditionary force was genuinely just eighty kilometres from the war zone, with real warships and actual submarines, the Superb vanished. On 22 April, Clarín reported that the submarine had supposedly returned to Scotland. The next day, 23 April, the Scottish newspaper Daily Record revealed that, in fact, the Superb had remained anchored at its Scottish base the entire time.

What interests me most is how the story grew—from a vague rumour—into a full-fledged submarine narrative, thanks to the collective efforts of many. It became a 'character' in its own right."

Mount Longdon: The Real British Casualties Commented by the Bad Guys

Malvinas: The use of cluster bomb by the British forces

The Myth of British Illegality in the Use of Hunting Engineering BL755 Cluster Bombs

During the 1982 Malvinas War, the British invading forces made use of the Hunting Engineering BL755 cluster bomb—a weapon not equipped with anti-personnel charges, but with shaped charges intended to destroy material targets. As such, its use was permitted under international law. Any cluster bomb designed to destroy enemy hardware—be it aircraft, tanks or ships—can be lawfully employed, and continues to be used by many militaries without violating any existing international conventions.

In contrast, cluster munitions such as the French-made Belouga BLG-66 from MATRA, designed to disperse shrapnel specifically to injure or kill human beings, are clearly prohibited. Such bombs were not used by the British in the Malvinas theatre.

That a blast-fragmentation anti-materiel bomb may wound or kill personnel as collateral damage does not make it an anti-personnel weapon per se. This distinction is crucial. Dum-dum bullets or Claymore-type mines—favoured tools of extremist Castro-Guevarist factions that waged genocidal campaigns against Argentina between 1959 and 1990—are examples of explicitly anti-personnel munitions.

The BL755, produced in the United Kingdom, was originally conceived as an anti-tank cluster bomb to counter the overwhelming numerical advantage of Warsaw Pact armoured units over NATO. It contains 147 high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) submunitions, each housed in a pre-fragmented casing that releases approximately 1,400 shards upon detonation. Naturally, these can cause harm to any individual within their effective radius—but that does not qualify them as illegal anti-personnel weapons. For comparison, a single Belouga can release over 200,000 lethal fragments.

To be clear: the use of a BL755 bomb, dispersing 147 submunitions that may each produce around 1,400 fragments, aimed at disabling enemy material across a broad zone of impact, cannot reasonably be equated with a weapon designed solely to maim or kill personnel. The intent and design of the weapon matter under international law.

Yet, ironically, Argentina did possess such anti-personnel cluster bombs in its arsenal—specifically the Belouga BLG-66, supplied by France and seen post-war mounted on aircraft such as the A-4C and Alpha Jet. These were acquired alongside Mirage IIIEA/DA fighters, originally for air superiority roles. The Belougas were tested and operational across several Argentine aircraft, including the A-4B/C and the Super Étendard. There is no confirmed information on whether they were adapted for use in the IA-58A Pucará or the Navy’s A-4Q. Still, Argentine commanders chose not to employ these weapons during the conflict.

In fact, even though Argentine forces had access to incendiary Napalm bombs—deployed on the Malvinas themselves—these too were not used against enemy troops, despite their obvious anti-personnel effects.

For Argentine soldiers subjected to these British weapons, the legality or ethics of their use were of little concern in the moment. A single fragment could wound, mutilate, or kill—but those same soldiers would have employed such weapons without hesitation had it meant surviving or gaining an upper hand. And still, despite possessing bombs with greater destructive power than those used by the British, Argentina chose restraint—out of adherence to the laws of war and a deeply human sense of morality, even in the inhuman context of battle.

Some claim Britain crossed into illegality—not due to the raw power of its bombs, but in the tactical method of their use. The sheer lethality of 147 submunitions and over 200,000 potential fragments raining down on an Argentine infantry company is known only to those who lived it. But the difference between that and a Belouga’s 198,600 extra fragments—a 1,430% increase in destructive capability—puts the argument of proportionality into sharp perspective.

It’s also true that no formal declaration of war was ever issued by either side. The conflict unfolded in fact, not in law, with both nations operating in murky legal waters. Nonetheless, both Argentina and the UK largely respected the humanitarian norms of armed engagement, barring isolated abuses triggered by the brutal chaos of close combat.

Had this been a total war—like the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, or Yugoslavia—different thresholds of legitimacy and restraint would likely have applied to both sides.

The Hunting Engineering BL755, developed in the early 1970s with a standard weight of 264 kg, a length of 2.45 m, and a diameter of 419 mm, was manufactured in several variants (BL755, IBL755, RBL755). Beyond the Malvinas, it was also used in the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by Britain and Germany (now withdrawn from service), and reportedly by Iran, Serbia (possibly reverse-engineered), and India—still in service today on aircraft such as the MiG-27, Jaguar, Sea Harrier, and possibly the MiG-29, HAL Tejas, and Su-30.

To Argentine Malvinas War Veterans, the BL755 remains a haunting symbol of destruction. Though no longer in production, its legacy is etched into the memories of those who faced it. And it remains a testament to the resilience, sacrifice, and moral clarity of Argentine forces, who fought with dignity—even as shadows fell over the South Atlantic skies.

Operation Fingent: The United Kingdom “sells” radar to Chile to spy on Argentine flights

Operation Fingent: the radar the British sold to Chile to spy on Argentine movements during the Malvinas War

In a rushed move, Great Britain devised plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases — a reminder of how, even in wartime, they were willing to involve neighbouring countries to monitor and undermine Argentine efforts in defending the Malvinas.

Based on Mariano P. Sciaroni || Infobae





As the British fleet set sail toward the Malvinas, the British high command was well aware it would face a serious problem if confronted by Argentina’s Air Force and Naval Aviation. At that time, the Royal Navy was designed to operate in the North Atlantic, under the protection of aerial cover and early warning systems provided both by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the U.S. Navy.

Operating outside that zone, with only the limited number of carrier-based aircraft aboard the Invincible and Hermes, the British would lack the advance warning needed to ready their missiles and position interceptors to counter any aerial threat.

Without such anticipation, every Argentine attack would effectively become a surprise, detected only when it was already mere miles from its target — something the British simply could not afford.

In a scramble, they rushed to design plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases. The core idea was that no plane should be able to lift off from Argentine soil without being noticed, giving the British fleet at least 45 minutes’ warning of an incoming airstrike — just enough time to call a “Yellow Alert” for planes in the air and prepare for bombs or missiles.

First, special forces (possibly the famed Special Air Service) would be deployed on the continent to report movements at the Río Grande, Río Gallegos, and Comodoro Rivadavia bases (this fell under the so-called “Operation Shutter”; the commandos were only present from late May to early June, and it remains a mystery how they got there or how they left, as details on the matter are still classified).



Naval Station “Almirante Hermes Quijada” in Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, during the war

They also considered that nuclear submarines would approach the Argentine coast to report on aerial movements, detecting them either through their periscopes or with electronic surveillance equipment.

Finally, arrangements were made with the “friendly” Chilean Air Force, whose Thomson-CSF radar located near Punta Arenas would provide alerts about takeoffs from Ushuaia, Río Grande, and Río Gallegos.

However, there remained a large gap: the entire province of Chubut and the Comodoro Rivadavia base were beyond radar coverage. That was a serious problem.

Luckily for the British, Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, the Royal Air Force’s delegate in Chile, had already secured from General Fernando Matthei, commander of the Chilean Air Force, a “blank check” to move forward in solving such inconveniences.

But the Chileans had no radar stationed there — nor did they have a mobile radar system.

To overcome this, the British had to urgently sell them a radar. The operation was quickly agreed upon: the price was set at under one British pound (and, for the same token, they also received six Hawker Hunter fighter jets, three Canberra bombers, and anti-aircraft missiles). An entire air force for less than 60 Argentine pesos at today’s exchange rate — a bargain, to put it mildly.

With political approval secured, the military phase began moving. Thus, the so-called “Operation Fingent” was designed and took shape. It was decided that the radar to be transferred (or rather, sold) would be a Marconi S259 transportable unit, part of the British Royal Air Force’s Mobile Reserve.


A S259 radar operating at RAF Saxa Vord in the 70s in the Shetland Islands, North Scotland. Possibly this very same radar has been sold to Chile in 1982,

The radar would be accompanied by a so-called “sales team” — which, in reality, was nothing more than British Royal Air Force military personnel dressed in civilian clothes, tasked with operating the radar and training the supposed new “owners.”

This “sales team” was made up of four officers and seven non-commissioned officers, who would carry no weapons and would formally be working under the Chilean armed forces. They were instructed to buy warm civilian clothing and ensure their passports were in order. They were also informed that their mission was absolutely secret and that they were to behave at all times as civilian contractors.

They were forbidden from speaking about this matter to anyone — neither in Great Britain nor in Chile.

The deployment location was ultimately decided by General Matthei: it would be set up in Balmaceda, positioned at the latitude of Comodoro Rivadavia, and would be protected by the Chilean Army. A strategic spot, ideal for monitoring Argentine movements.

With the mission in place, on May 5, 1982, a Boeing 747 from the Flying Tigers airline departed RAF Brize Norton (not far from London), loaded with the radar equipment and personnel, heading for Santiago de Chile. The route included a stop in San Juan, Puerto Rico, making it a long journey.

Upon landing, a military transport plane — a C-130 Hercules — appeared to carry them to their final destination. The issue was that this aircraft bore camouflage very similar to British military planes, and painted on its fuselage were the words FUERZA AREA (not AÉREA) DE CHILE — in short, it was a British plane.

A British plane, carrying British military personnel and British radar, to just a few kilometers from the Argentine border.

A Chilean C-130 Hercules and another from the British Royal Air Force (RAF) wait on the tarmac, photographed from an RAF VC-10. The photo was taken on April 24, 1982, on Easter Island (Chile).

Soon after, the radar reached its final destination and was swiftly installed. The British put it to good use, while Chilean troops guarded the area to prevent any issues.

The information gathered by the radar was securely transmitted to the headquarters of the Chilean Air Force’s intelligence service. From there, a special British team operating a satellite communication system would relay the data to their fleet.

It was a well-oiled system that ultimately worked very effectively — and, as mentioned earlier, it was complemented by reports from ground commandos, another radar, and finally the nuclear submarines near the coast (for example, the submarine HMS Valiant, operating near Río Grande, alone provided 300 alerts of aircraft in the air).

When it was all over, as General Matthei later explained, “we kept the radars, the missiles, and the planes, and they were satisfied because they received the information they needed on time. The deal was over, and Sidney Edwards was dismissed the next day.”

“Argentina has its back well covered,” said Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Chile’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, not long before. A peculiar statement, considering that right in the middle of Argentina’s back, a British radar was operating — helping foreign forces monitor and strike at Argentine defenses in the Malvinas.

Malvinas: The Real British Casualties and Why the Secret?

The Malvinas/Falklands: Why Will British Casualty Figures Remain Classified Until 14 June 2072?

At the end of the Malvinas/Falklands War, the British government enacted a military secrecy order effective until 14 June 2072—a period of 90 years. Until that date, anyone who discloses or publishes any information contained within that classified material will face appropriate prosecution before a court martial.

This is not merely a preliminary form of censorship but a clear instance of state-imposed secrecy for national security reasons.

So far, no substantial details regarding the contents of the secrecy order have emerged, but it is widely believed that one of its main points concerns the significant loss of life suffered by the United Kingdom during the conflict. There are also suggestions that it includes records of considerable losses of military vehicles—both naval and aerial. A large part of Britain’s logistical apparatus was reportedly destroyed or left at the bottom of the Atlantic.

The official British figures list 255 killed, 777 wounded, and approximately 280 subsequent suicides linked to war-related trauma. However, taking into account that an attacking force typically suffers higher casualties than a defending force—with even the most conservative estimates ranging from 2:1 to 3:1—the official numbers appear questionable, especially considering the harsh terrain, comparable to Greenland or the Scottish Highlands.

Below is a day-by-day account of British losses from their arrival at South Georgia on 23 April until 14 June 1982, when the islands were retaken. (In red are the daily combat casualties; in brackets, in some cases, are estimated figures reflecting the likely proportion of troops lost in each engagement):

Summary:

23/04: 1 – A Sea King helicopter crashes at South Georgia.
01/05: 10 (2) – Two Harriers destroyed near Port Stanley. Eight sailors killed in attacks on: HMS Arrow, HMS Exeter, HMS Glamorgan, HMS Hermes, HMS Alacrity.
02/05: 1 – A Sea Harrier shot down over Port Stanley by 20 mm artillery.
04/05: 43 (3) – Harriers downed at Condor Air Base. HMS Sheffield sinks (40 dead). HMS Hermes possibly hit by an Exocet missile, forcing a change of course and reducing air coverage. Some reports suggest severe damage or partial sinking.
05/05: 1 (1) – Royal Marine killed at Elephant Bay.
06/05: 2 (2) – Two Harriers shot down north of East Falkland.
12/05: 4 – HMS Glasgow disabled; attack on HMS Brilliant.
17/05: 1 (1) – Sea King helicopter downed near the Argentine coast.
18/05: 22 – Sea King crashes into Albatross (Argentine sources claim it was shot down).
19/05: 1 (1) – Sea King helicopter crash; SAS specialist killed.
21/05: 32 – Two Gazelles downed at San Carlos (3 dead). HMS Ardent sunk (22 dead). HMS Argonaut, HMS Antrim, HMS Brilliant disabled; HMS Broadsword damaged. Three Sea Harriers (1) and one Sea King (1) shot down.
22/05: 1 – Harrier shot down.
23/05: 8 – Harrier crashes during a night sortie from HMS Hermes (1 dead). HMS Antelope sunk (7 dead).
24/05: 10 – Damage to: HMS Sir Lancelot, HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Bedivere, HMS Fearless (6+ casualties; actual figures may be higher, given the number of troops on board and the circumstances of the attack).
25/05: 135 – Three Harriers downed (3 dead). HMS Coventry sunk (90+ dead), HMS Atlantic Conveyor sunk (20 dead). HMS Broadsword, HMS Sir Lancelot disabled; HMS Alacrity, HMS Yarmouth damaged. Two Sea Kings shot down; two others damaged.
27/05: 11 – Seven Royal Marines killed at San Carlos (7 dead). Three Gazelle helicopters and one Sea King downed (4 dead).
28/05: 136 – Two Sea Kings and a Scout helicopter downed (3 dead). One soldier killed on West Falkland (1 dead). 130 troops from 2 Para and the Royal Auxiliary killed during the Battle of Darwin (27–29 May)—the equivalent of an entire infantry company.
30/05: 44 – 38 killed during the Battle of Goose Green (23–30 May). A Sea Harrier crashes (1 dead). HMS Invincible reportedly attacked (5+ casualties) by an Exocet and two 250 kg bombs. Unconfirmed reports suggest the ship sank, which would imply higher casualties.
08/06: 162 – Fitzroy attack: HMS Sir Galahad (89 dead), HMS Sir Tristam (40 dead), Foxtrot 4 landing craft (6+ dead). Several Chinese dockworkers killed on the beach during heavy bombardments. HMS Avenger disabled. HMS Plymouth attacked by five Argentine missiles at Pleasant Bay.
09/06: 18 – Two Sisters Mountain, SAS commandos.
10/06: 4 – Four Royal Marines killed in an accident.
11/06: 44 – Deaths between 11 and 12 June: (3) at Mount Harriet, (23) from 3 Para at Mount Longdon, (4) from 45 Commando, (1) from 42 Commando, (13) from B Company.
12/06: 29 – (4) at Two Sisters Mountain. HMS Glamorgan (25 dead) disabled by an Exocet missile fired from Port Stanley.
13/06: 360 – Deaths between 13 and 14 June in the battles of Mount Longdon, Mount Williams, and Wireless Ridge.
14/06: 10 (5) at Tumbledown; two Sea Kings shot down. Five killed at Top Malo House.

Total: 1,090 killed, not including potential additional unrecorded losses.

Damaged and Lost Vessels:

• Sunk/Destroyed: 8 ships (including HMS Sheffield, HMS Coventry, HMS Ardent, HMS Antelope, HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Tristam, Atlantic Conveyor, Foxtrot 4 landing craft).

• Disabled: 9 ships (e.g., HMS Invincible (possibly sunk), HMS Alacrity, HMS Avenger, HMS Glamorgan, HMS Glasgow).

• Heavily Damaged: 5 ships (e.g., HMS Brilliant, HMS Broadsword, HMS Plymouth, HMS Ambuscade, HMS Sir Lancelot).

• Moderately Damaged: 9 ships (e.g., HMS Hermes, HMS Exeter, HMS Fearless, plus others).

Total Affected Ships: 31.

Aircraft Losses:

• Fleet Air Arm: 19 Sea Harriers shot down, 10 grounded due to mechanical failure; 13 helicopters downed, 32 others disabled.

• RAF: 12 Harriers downed, 5 grounded; 12 helicopters downed, 26 grounded.

• Royal Marines and Army: Multiple helicopters lost (46 downed overall; 62 disabled).

Total Aircraft Lost: 154.

Of 77 fixed-wing aircraft deployed (Harriers and Sea Harriers), 46 were rendered inoperable. Out of 171 helicopters deployed, 108 became unusable.

Conclusion:

• Total Dead: 1,090.

• Total Ships Affected: 31.

• Total Aircraft Lost: 154.

The UK has never disclosed the full extent of its personnel and equipment losses, which, by all accounts, exceeded those of Argentina and are reflected in the scale of damage sustained.

---

Malvinas: Blood Over The Murrell River

Blood on the Murrell River: The Commandos Who Fought in the "Death Zone" and Escaped an Ambush

"They're going to kill us all," muttered the Army and Gendarmerie men as they faced off against British paratroopers in the Falklands. They were trapped in the strip of land where a soldier’s chances of survival are nearly nonexistent—but they fought back. The bullets shattering the rocks, the shrapnel that tore into them, and how they ultimately forced the British to retreat when all seemed lost.
Nicolás Kasanzew || Infobae




Captain Figueroa (center), Lieutenant Anadón (right) y First Lieutenant García Pinasco (back), planifying the mission, June 6th, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)


Through freezing cold and sleet, they navigated a sector battered by naval gunfire and riddled with their own minefields. Leading them was Lieutenant Marcelo Anadón, who knew the terrain well. Advancing cautiously along the riverbank, spaced about fifty meters apart, they suddenly found themselves bathed in the glow of a massive, radiant moon.

Sergeant Guillén, scanning the far side of the Murrell, noticed a faint glimmer. At first, he assumed it was just the moonlight reflecting off the water. Only later would he realize—it had been the sheen of a plastic poncho worn by a British soldier.


"They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

As they reached the bridge—a simple wooden structure with no railings—Anadón and his men prepared to cross. That was when the British opened fire.

Figueroa, along with Non-Commissioned Officers Poggi and Tunini, was making his way back from the far side of the river, where they had gone to set up a post-ambush blockade. Just then, an explosion ripped through the air, followed by gunfire. Instinctively, all the commandos flattened themselves against the ground.

The British were about 80 meters away, positioned on a rocky high ground across the river.

"We're exposed. They're going to kill all three of us," Figueroa thought. In trying to set an ambush, they had walked straight into one. Without hesitation, he opened fire toward the flashes of enemy gunfire. His blood felt like it was bubbling in his veins, and his nostrils were flooded with the sharp scent of adrenaline.

The Argentine commandos had landed in what soldiers call the "death zone"—a stretch of battlefield where survival is almost impossible.


Figueroa: "We're Exposed. They're Going to Kill All Three of Us."

The British fired both in single shots and rapid bursts. Figueroa saw streaks of red and orange whipping through the darkness, writhing toward him like demonic ribbons, hunting for his life. They were tracer rounds—illuminated bullets the British loaded every five shots to guide their fire in the night.

"It was the most magnificent sight I’ve ever witnessed in my life," he tells me.

Bullets slammed into the nearby rocks, shattering them into a storm of dust and shrapnel. The acrid scent of gunpowder filled his lungs, leaving him lightheaded, almost intoxicated. The fear of death dulled, swallowed by

• "Captain, I'm hit!"
• "Where did they get you?"
• "In the leg, but I can crawl back."
• "Fall back, we’ll get to you soon."

"I'll help him and pull back with him," Tunini interjected.

The round had pierced Poggi’s calf, passing clean through without hitting bone.

Figueroa kept firing until his rifle jammed. Fortunately, his comrades—especially Sergeant Guillén—were scattered beyond the bridge, taking cover behind the rocks. Their relentless fire on the hill forced the British machine guns and rifles to divide their attention, shifting some of the incoming fire away from Figueroa.

Guillén recalls: "They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

"Cheto" (Handsome) Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to charge the British, but the section leader held him back, telling him to wait until daylight.

As Figueroa fell back, he heard several explosions—then silence. The British machine guns had gone quiet. It was the fearless Anadón, standard-bearer of Commando 601, who, with deadly precision, had launched FAL-mounted PDF grenades directly into the enemy’s position. Only their riflemen were still firing now.

Once again, "Cheto" Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to attack. Again, the lieutenant denied him, insisting they wait. But as Figueroa reached their position, he roared, "Let’s go get these bastards!" The adrenaline and fury coursing through him made it impossible to hold back.

Despite his reservations, García Pinasco relented. Figueroa took command, and the unit stormed across the bridge to launch their assault. Anadón quickly organized his men into a staggered formation: Vergara, Suárez, Quinteros, and two gendarmes from the elite Alacrán group—Natalio Figueredo and Miguel Puentes.

A faint light was beginning to creep over the battlefield. The attack was about to begin.

"The objective was to sprint forward, surround them from both sides of the ridge, and wipe them out—leave no one behind," recalls Captain Figueroa.

Once everything was set, he raised his right arm and gave the order: "Charge, damn it! Let’s wipe these bastards out!"

The commandos stormed ahead, firing from the hip in fully automatic bursts, mimicking the cadence of a machine gun. Their shouts and insults tore through the night, meant to unnerve the British troops.

The first to reach the enemy position was the fearless Lieutenant Anadón. But as he scanned the area, he realized the British paratroopers had already fled in haste, dragging their wounded with them.

In their retreat, the enemy had left behind a trove of abandoned equipment—firearms, radios, rucksacks, tents, communication codes, berets, gloves, a camera, and even a small Union Jack. That flag would soon be displayed as a trophy at the Commando 601 headquarters in Puerto Argentino/Stanley.

García Pinasco had been ordered to strike the enemy with a swift raid and set up an ambush.

The sheer speed of the assault forced the British paratroopers into a chaotic retreat. In their haste, they left behind an active radio—still transmitting—used to communicate with their high command. Bloodstains pooled on the ground, grim evidence of their casualties.

Later, the Argentine troops intercepted enemy radio chatter: urgent requests for helicopters to evacuate the wounded. Not long after, about four kilometers away, they spotted a flare piercing the sky—followed by the descent of a Sea King helicopter, marked with the white insignia of a medical evacuation unit.

After the battle, Guillén helped Indio Poggi to his feet. Poggi looked at him and said, "Wash my wound."

Guillén reached into his pack and pulled out a Margaret River triangle-shaped bottle. He raised it to his lips, pretending to take a swig.

"You bastard!" Poggi roared. "Don’t drink my medicine!"

Spoils of Battle: British Paratroopers’ Abandoned Gear – June 7, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)

Needless to say, the commandos eagerly devoured the gourmet rations abandoned by the men of the 3rd Parachute Battalion—dried apple compote, chocolate, nuts, biscuits, and raisins.

A bitter blow for the Brits; a feast fit for kings for the Argies.

But not all rewards were sweet. The Gendarmerie generously decorated its two men for their role in the battle. The Army, however, completely ignored the commandos of 601—the very unit that had handed them victory at the Murrell River.