Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 18, 2024

Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata: British Preparations for the Invasion of 1806

Preparation of the English Invasions



May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.


William Pitt, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Napoleon, Emperor of France. They dispute the domination of the world. Engraving from 1805

At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Charles IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.


The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

 -Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"
The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, ​​Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is already, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

 -Miranda, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect his pledged word to the end. In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of ​​conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but he refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other bank of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. At the instigation of this directive, in all the ports of the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly on the construction of thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve:

“Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and this is what he states, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English, it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French, who are known to have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.


William Pitt Portrait

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

 -Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.
Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805. The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.


Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, ahead of the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.

June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the reduced invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach the knowledge of Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in La Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and with the arrival of new reports that indicate the appearance tion of the English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree summoning all men capable of bearing arms to join the militia corps within three days. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and set course towards the southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this small force is made up of professional combatants, for whom war is nothing more than a job. Veterans of a hundred battles, they are determined, like their boss, to take by storm a city whose population exceeds 40,000 inhabitants. That is the order, and they will have to comply with it, facing any risk.

With the arrival of day, Beresford orders his troops to prepare for the attack. At eleven o'clock the drums begin their roll, and the flags are displayed in the wind. From the top of the ravine facing the beach, the deputy inspector general of the troops, Colonel Pedro de Arce, sent by Sobremonte to contain the English, observes the movement of the enemy forces. With a measured step, and accompanied by the martial airs of the bagpipers, the British advance towards the swamp that separates them from Arce and his 600 militiamen. The latter, armed with a few carbines, swords and chuzas, grouped behind the three cannons with which they intended to repel the British assault.


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat inland.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that moment he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.

Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrived at the Fort, with a Parliament flag. He expressed that his boss demanded the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the inhabitants.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:

-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses considers the company to be finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.

Historiador del País

Sunday, January 28, 2024

Malvinas/Falklands: Port Egmont and the British retreat

The Malvinas/Falklands Betweeen History and Law


Chapter II

The first settlements on the islands. The 1771 Agreement and British abandonment. Spanish withdrawal after the beginning of Argentine process of independence




Introduction

This chapter analyses the period of 1764-1811 and the first European settlements on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the 18th century; it also deals with the subsequent disputes among France, Spain and Great Britain. It will show that the first occupant of the Falklands/Malvinas was France, which immediately recognised Spain´s pre-existing sovereignty and handed over the islands to the legitimate sovereign. It will also show that Britain´s occupation of a port on one of the islands of the archipelago was in breach of existing treaties; and that this occupation was belated, precarious, secretive and subsequently abandoned. Besides the treaties analysed in the previous chapter, the 1770 incident, the Hispano-British declaration of 1771, British withdrawal from the site authorised by Spain, and the fact that Spain exercised exclusive possession and sovereignty over the islands for decades, until the beginning of the Argentine process of independence in 1810, prove that Argentina incontestably succeeded to Spain´s rights.

A. France, the first occupant

Pascoe and Pepper begin by correctly stating that Louis-Antoine de Bougainville was the first to establish a settlement in the Falklands/Malvinas.51 The settlement was located on Soledad or East Island and was named “Port Louis”, in tribute t o the French monarch. The purpose of Bougainville´s voyage was to establish a settlement on the Malouines islands in order to “take control of trade in the South Seas” after France´s colony in Canada was lost to Great Britain. His project was quickly approved by the French authorities. On September 15th, 1763 he set sail with 150 men from Saint-Malo on board the frigate “L´Aigle”, together with the corvette “Le Sphinx”. Land was made at the beginning of February 1764, and on March 17th, construction work had already started. On April 5th, 1764, once the construction of the fort was finished, Bougainville carried out an official ceremony to take possession of the islands on behalf of King Louis XV, which was confirmed (and made public) by the French monarch on September 12th, 1764.52

B. The clandestine presence of Great Britain

The French had already occupied the Falklands/Malvinas when British commodore John Byron set sail for the West Indies on June 21st, 1764. The purpose of his voyage was kept secret. Upon reaching the coast of Brazil, the true objective of the expedition was revealed: to call at His Majesty´s Islands call´d Falkland´s and Pepys `Islands situate in the Atlantick Ocean near The Streights of Magellan in order to make better surveys thereof, than had yet been made, and to determine a place or places, most proper for a new settlement or settlements thereon.53
Byron sighted land on January 12th, 1765 (that is to say, almost one year after Bougainville officially took possession) and landed on Saunders Island (Isla Trinidad), a small island to the west of Gran Malvina/West Falkland, where he took possession of a location called Port Egmont (“Puerto de la Cruzada” in Spanish) on behalf of King George III, “of that port and all neighboring islands.”54
It is worth noting that the directions given to Byron refer to the “Falkland and Peppys” islands. The latter were often believed to be situated in an area near the Falklands/Malvinas, but they do not exist. The  British government believed they had been “discovered” by His Majesty´s seamen. It gave secret instructions to its sailors in full awareness of the opposition Spain had manifested years before, leading Byron to believe that the islands he was to survey already belonged to the British crown.
However, the orders Byron received made no reference whatsoever to taking possession of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. His only task was to perform a survey. Pascoe and Pepper give this event a legal significance which it does not have, flagrantly contradicting themselves when comparing their analysis of Byron´s taking of possession with that of Jewett on behalf of Argentina in 1820,. As we shall see, they try to diminish the value of Argentina´s taking possession in 1820 because, they allege that precise instructions given by the government of Buenos Aires directing Jewett to take possession of the Falklands/Malvinas have not been found. Yet at the same time, they characterised Byron´s act as capable of conferring sovereignty on Britain, despite Byron clearly going beyond his instructions, as he had not received any order to take possession of the islands.55
Differently to Bougainville´s actions, which consisted in establishing a colony, Byron took possession, left the British flag raised and set sail a few days later (on January 27th) without leaving behind any settlement. A month later, he sent the ship “Florida” to Great Britain to bring news. When the “Florida” landed on June 21st, 1765, British authorities decided to build a settlement at Port Egmont. News had already been received of France´s establishment.

C. Spanish protests and France’s recognition of sovereignty.

On the Spanish side, news of the French settlement set alarm bells ringing. In September 1765, the Spanish minister of State, the Marquis of Grimaldi, gave instructions to Ambassador Fuentes to submit to Choiseul an official request for France´s withdrawal, on the basis of Spanish sovereignty, as well as legal and political considerations.56 After Choiseul´s first refusal, Fernando de Magallón, secretary at the Spanish embassy in France, reminded him that Spain had already asserted its rights against England in 1749 when it came to know about Anson´s expedition. Only twenty-four hours later, Choiseul met Fuentes and acceded to Spain´s request. When Bougainville returned, he was notified of the situation and asked to go to Madrid to iron out the details of the transfer.

D. The secret occupation of Port Egmont

On the British side, on September 26th, 1765, Commander J. McBride received orders to build a fort “in Port Egmont in the Falkland Island.”57 On January 8th, 1766, he entered the port. McBride´s men sighted the French settlement on December 2nd, 1766, and were already in Port Louis on December 4th, setting sail for England in January 1767. Although the sailors declared that the islands belonged to His Majesty, the British government did not lodge any official protest over France´s presence in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.
Contrary to the French occupation, and later to Argentina´s taking of possession in 1820, no public announcement was given of Britain´s settlement at Port Egmont. This point, and the absence of British protest, show that the British government maintained a clandestine occupation of a place in the Falklands/Malvinas, in the knowledge that its settlement was in violation of the treaties concluded with Spain, and that France had been the first to occupy the islands.

E. The transfer of French occupation to Spain

On April 9th, 1766, Bougainville set off for Madrid with information regarding the condition of the colony and the aim of transferring it to Spain. Already in May, a Report written by the French sailor himself was submitted to the Spanish ministers, requesting compensation for the expenses incurred in Port Louis; the document “Réflexions sur les 36 moyens de commencer l´établissement des Isles Malouines” set out the objectives Spain had to consider in settling the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.58
On September 13th, 1766, the relevant transfer documents were handed over and compensation for the expenses incurred in the colony was agreed. The British pamphlet states that neither France nor Bougainville recognised any preexisting rights to Spain.59
Bougainville´s text proves quite the opposite. On October 4th, Bougainville handed over the receipt for the amount paid as compensation for expenses. The document read as follows:

Monsieur Louis de Bougainville colonel of his Most Christian Majesty's Army. I have received six hundred and eighteen thousand one hundred and eight livres thirteen sols and eleven deniers being the amount of an estimate that I have given in of the expenses incurred by the St. Malo Company in equipment for founding their intrusive establishments in the Malvinas Islands belonging to his Catholic Majesty. (...) In consideration of these payments as well as in obedience to his Most Christian Majesty's orders I am bound to deliver up in due formality to the court of Spain those establishments along with the families, houses, works, timber and shipping built there, and employed in the expedition, and finally everything therein belonging to the St. Malo Company as included in the accounts, which are so settled and to his Most Christian Majesty by this voluntary cession making void forever all claims that the company or any person interested therein may have or might produce upon the treasury of his Most Catholic Majesty nor can they henceforth demand more pecuniary or any other compensation whatsoever.”
60 Bougainville´s formal recognition that the settlement had been established in Spanish territory, and that its cession had been voluntary, was both express and manifest.

In his famed Voyage autour du monde, Bougainville describes the situation in a manner that also leaves no room for doubt: France having acknowledged the Catholic King´s right to the Malouines, he, by a principle of the law of nations, owed no reimbursement to these costs. However, as his majesty took all the ships, boats, goods, arms, ammunition, and provisions that belonged to our settlement, he being equally just and generous, desired that we should be reimbursed for what we had laid out; and the above sum was remitted to us by his treasurers; part at Paris, and the rest at Buenos Ayres.61

<
Figure 3 Receipt note of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville for the transfer of the colony to Spain recognizing its right. A.G.N. Sala X 3-4-5

Furthermore, Choiseul´s comments to the British Ambassador in Paris demonstrate that not only did France recognise Spain´s pre-existing sovereignty, but that it also informed the British  government  of  it.  Again,  the  British  government  did  not  raise  any  claim  of  sovereignty in the circumstances, which proves it either did not consider itself sovereign, or if it did, it was abandoning its claim against third States.
On that same occasion, Spanish Navy Captain Mr Felipe Ruiz Puente received the order to take over the colony as Governor, and was notified that the islands´ authorities would be under the command of the Governor and General Captain of Buenos Aires Province,63 Mr Francisco de Paula Bucarelli, whose orders he had to obey. That is to say, from the administrative point of view, the government of the Falklands/Malvinas was part of the Captaincy General of Buenos Aires.
On April 1st, 1767, the Spanish governor and Louis-Antoine de Bougainville landed at the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The official transfer of the colony to the Spanish Crown was performed, and the name Port Louis changed to Puerto de la Soledad.
Bougainville expressly refers to the transfer of all the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and not, as some British authors argued, only Port Louis. In this connection, suffice it to recall the words of the renowned French sailor: In February 1764, France began to make a settlement on the Iles Malouines. Spain reclaimed these isles as belonging to the continent of South America; and her right to them having been acknowledged by the King, I received orders to deliver our settlement to the Spaniards, and to proceed to the East Indies by crossing the South Seas between the tropics. 64

F.  The legal point of view

By  the  year  1767,  three  powers  had  established  themselves  in  the  Falkland/Malvinas Islands, with varying degrees of lawfulness. France can claim the right of first occupant, despite  recognising,  when  faced  with  Spanish  protests, that  the  islands  belonged to Spain. This was consistent with recognition by the powers of the time that the region was considered to be Spanish.



Figure 4 Royal Order by which is named Don Felipe Ruiz Puente as the Governor of the Falklands/Malvinas islands and that the islands will depend on the General Capitancy of the Province of Buenos Aires - A.G.N. Sala X 8-10-3

Byron´s declaration lacks any legal effect. It was a merely symbolic act performed at a moment in which another nation was already effectively occupying the archipelago, and furthermore in a region that Great Britain had recognised as being Spanish. The settlement established by McBride years later suffers the same defects: occupation does not establish sovereignty over a territory that is not terra nullius (land belonging to nobody), either because the occupying State recognises that the territory belongs to another nation (Spain), or because the territory was previously occupied (by France). In international law, occupation of the main island constitutes occupation of the archipelago as a whole, as long as no other nation is present in any other area of the archipelago, as Judge Levi Carneiro explained in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case before the International Court of Justice.65 This was the situation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands when they were occupied by France.
The system of treaties binding Spain and Great Britain analysed in the prior section made it impossible for the latter to sail or trade in the American seas and territories belonging to the Spanish Crown. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands were among those possessions, as demonstrated by Spain´s reaction to the expedition proposed by Lord Anson in 1749. The settlement of Port Egmont was a flagrant violation of those agreements and, therefore, a violation of the basic principle of the international law known as pacta sunt servanda, by virtue of which treaties must be respected.
What is more, the founding of Port Egmont in the Falklands/Malvinas did not even comply with the minimum requirements for an effective occupation capable of giving rise to sovereignty, even if, at the time, the Falklands/Malvinas were a terra nullius – which was not the case. As we have seen, unlike that of France, British occupation was undertaken in the greatest secret in accordance with the orders given by Lord Egmont.66 The reasons for this are clear: the British government knew that the territory was in Spain´s zone of influence. An act that was voluntarily kept secret could not be opposed to other nations.
Not even the British Parliament was aware of the existence of the settlement. Its existence was not therefore submitted to Parliament for approval, and as such, the Falklands/Malvinas was never legally a domain of the British Crown.67 As the French ambassador to London said to the British Prime Minister, Lord North, the “covert” settlement established by the British, being unrecognized by Spain was not cause enough for Spain´s loss of rights; North agreed with the correctness of the principle.68
The British settlement was clearly established in bad faith. Great Britain knew about France´s settlement, Spain´s protests and the subsequent cession, which was relayed by Choiseul on September 17th, 1766. The British government did not raise any objection. It is possible to conclude with the description made by Bougainville himself, who after describing the islands, correctly summarizes the legal situation in the following manner: “Such was the state of the Malouines, when we put them into the hands of the Spaniards, whose prior right was thus enforced by that which we possessed by making the first settlement.”69

G. Spain evicts the English fort

In 1766 the Prince of Masseran, Spain´s ambassador to London, upon learning that the British fleet had been sent to the South Atlantic, immediately informed Madrid. When Charles III realised that the British were in a region of Spanish dominion, he directed Masseran to submit a request for information about the facts in question.
London´s reply initially went from ignoring the fact to refusing to take a stance on the substance of the matter. The talks stalled, and in December 1766 the Governor of Buenos Aires, Mr. Francisco de Paula Bucarelli, was ordered to explore the Falkland/Malvinas islands and the coasts of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego up to Cape Horn in order to gather information about the location of the British settlement.70

Fearing that England might settle indefinitely in its dominions, Spain hardened its position. The Secretary of the Indies, Mr. Julián de Arriaga, ordered Bucarelli: “no English settlement whatsoever is allowed, and to expel by force any already formed if warnings according to law are not enough: and without the need for further orders or instructions.”71 On the basis of this order, on October 15th, 1768 a fleet under the command of the Navy Chief of Staff, Juan Ignacio de Madariaga, set sail from Cadiz.
Only in the second half of November 1769 was the British settlement finally discovered by a Spanish schooner. Governor Ruiz Puente immediately sent Infantry Lieutenant Mario Plata to order the eviction of the intruders, since their stay in the area “is entirely opposed to the faithful and religious observance of the Treaties of Peace.”72 The British captain Anthony Hunt answered on December 10th, stating that the islands belonged to His Britannic Majesty and that he ordered the Spanish to leave Port Soledad within six months.
In May 1770, having sent a fleet in February to survey the British settlement and having protested against the British “intruding in an alien domain”,73 the governor of Buenos Aires dispatched Chief of Staff Madariaga with four frigates and two small ships with the aim of evicting the intruders. Between June 7th and 9th, both parties fruitlessly exchanged requests and threats. On June 10th, Madariaga considered that the situation had become unsustainable, and ordered the takeover of the settlement. At the first volley of cannon fire, the British surrendered and 156 men laid down their weapons. Port Egmont was free from invaders.

H. Negotiations to avoid war

In September 1770, the British Crown discovered what had happened in the Falklands/Malvinas and protested to Spain. The Spanish and French prepared to begin new negotiations to avoid, or at least put off, the outbreak of an armed conflict. It is not within the scope of this work to go further into the long and difficult diplomatic negotiations. The stances of both parties can be easily summarised as follows: the British sought unconditional compensation and the resettlement of Port Egmont, while Spain offered to express disapproval of Bucarelli´s actions and the reestablishment of the settlement at Port Egmont, in exchange for His Britannic Majesty´s disapproval of the requests and threats made by Captain Hunt, as well as an express backing of Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago.
Several proposals were discussed and discarded until an impasse was reached. While the negotiations were being conducted, both powers had speeded up the readying of their armed forces. When all signs pointed to the only way out being war, some changes took place which allowed a peaceful solution to be reached. One of those changes was the verbal promise made by the English minister, who said that if Spain granted the British what they had requested, they would leave Port Egmont. This point will be discussed in depth below.
In order to convince Spain to reach a new agreement and to avoid a new war at all costs, the French King Louis XV presented to the Spanish King Charles III the thesis according to which simple possession could not be stripped by force, notwithstanding its legal defects: “The British have established a settlement in the Maluinas islands, and I am certain that no title has authorised them to do so, but they were in possession when they were evicted by His Majesty´s weapons. Conversely to all the laws according to which a dispossessed tenant must be re-established before discussing the substance of their requests. This is what the British are demanding to His Majesty by means of a statement.”74 It should be noted, en passant, that Great Britain took a completely opposing attitude towards Argentina in 1833, when they used force to deprive Argentina of its possession on the basis of unfounded arguments of sovereignty.
An agreement was reached on January 22nd, 1771 with a statement by Prince Masseran and its acceptance by the British government. The relevant statement read as follows: “(...) the Prince of Masseran declares, that his Catholic Majesty engages to give immediate orders, that things shall be restored in the Great Malouine at the port called Egmont, precisely to the state in which they were before the 10th of June, 1770. For which purpose his Catholic Majesty will give orders to one of his Officers, to deliver up to the Officer authorized by
his Britannic Majesty the port and fort called Egmont, with all the artillery, stores, and effects of his Britannic Majesty and his subjects which were at that place (...) The Prince of Masseran declares, at the same time, in the name of the King his master, that the engagement of his said Catholic Majesty, to restore to his British Majesty the possession of the port and fort called Egmont, cannot nor ought any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty of the Malouine islands, otherwise called Falkland Islands.”75 The British pamphlet claims that Argentina uses a false translation of Masseran´s declaration, and that the reservation of sovereignty is applicable to both countries.76 Both assertions are wrong. The quote appearing above is the same that appears in Pascoe and Pepper´s pamphlet, and does not support the thesis of a “mutual” reservation of sovereignty in any way. British acceptance was limited to the declaration of the Spanish Crown and to consider it as “compensation for the offence caused to the British Crown”.77
Pascoe and Pepper highlight a proposal made during the negotiations to explicitly recognise Spanish sovereignty, which was not accepted by the British government. The proposal would have been considered an unacceptable humiliation by British public opinion, which had closely followed news of the eviction from the fort in Port Egmont. However, the fact that no explicit recognition of Spanish sovereignty was given in the declaration did not mean that Spain had abandoned its position and implicitly accepted that of the other party.
In the final text, only one party formulated a reservation of sovereignty: Spain. The other failed to do so. One of the parties returned exclusive possession of a fort, affirming that this restitution in no way affected the question of sovereignty. What sovereignty could this possibly be but Spain´s? It would be absurd for a State that claims sovereignty to reserve the alleged sovereignty of the other, as the British pamphlet naively claims.
Furthermore, Masseran´s declaration mentions no legal compensation or reestablishment of rights of sovereignty; it only refers to the return of possession, not the restitution of the archipelago as a whole, not of Isla Trinidad/Saunders Island (where the British settlement was established) or nearby Gran Malvina/West Falkland, but only “the port and the fort named Egmont”. It merely concerns the physical restitution of British possession of the port and fort. British acceptance is also expressed in the same manner, and does not clarify or modify the geographical position, but merely makes express reference to the “port and fort named Egmont.” 78 Neither does it refer to any reinstatement of sovereignty rights, but simply to the return of a factual status quo, and last but not least, does not mention the reservation of sovereignty rights made by Spain in the final paragraph of its declaration –which amounts to an implicit acceptance of the reservation. The French representative in London highlighted this issue when asserting that: “Upon receiving this reservation and not protesting, England tacitly recognises the rights of Spain, which (...) acquire a renewed vigor through the silence of England”.79
William Pitt also had the same understanding, when stating in the British Parliament, on January 25th, that the Masseran Declaration “appeared to be an ignominious compromise. It was no satisfaction; no reparation. The right was not secured, and even the restitution was incomplete; that Port Egmont alone is restored, not Falkland´s Island”.80
The British pamphlet makes the unsupported claim that Dr Samuel Johnson, a renowned English intellectual of the time, “confirmed” its interpretation, that is to say, that both countries reserved their position regarding sovereignty. This does not transpire from Dr Johnson´s publication on the Port Egmont conflict - quite the contrary. The renowned British author stated in his pamphlet: This reserve [that of the Spanish sovereignty] has supplied matter for much clamour, and, perhaps the English ministry would have been better pleased had the declaration been without it. But when we have obtained all that was asked, why should we complain that we have not more?81 All the British had demanded was the restitution of Port Egmont and compensation for the offence they had suffered. The same author wrote that: To have inquired whether our settlement at port Egmont was any violation of the Spanish rights, had been to enter upon a discussion, which the pertinacity of political disputants might have continued without end. We, therefore, called for restitution, not as a confession of right, but as a reparation of honour.82 Dr. Johnson´s analysis does not in any way support the forced and unjustified interpretation made by the British pamphlet.
In summary: Spain only returned possession of Port Egmont and reserved its rights of sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas and the archipelago as a whole. The British government was happy to accept this as satisfaction for the stain on its honour caused by the forceful eviction, without seeking to make any claim with respect to their alleged sovereignty.

I. Britain’s secret promise to evacuate Port Egmont

From the moment the 1771 agreement was concluded, much has been said and written about the existence of a secret promise by which, once British honour had been restored by the restitution of Port Egmont, the port would eventually be abandoned.
For reasons of internal politics and public opinion, the promise could not be made in writing. Pascoe and Pepper venture to claim that such a promise never existed. The only argument they put forward is that in 1829, when for the first time in almost half a century the British government showed some interest in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Sir Herbert Jenner, the King´s Lawyer, affirmed that he could not find any documents supporting that promise.83 This is evidently a weak argument, especially because it is well known that Jenner was looking for arguments in support of Britain´s purported sovereignty over the islands.
Even though no written document containing the promise has been found, there is ample evidence as to the existence of a verbal promise and its content. The exchange of letters between the Spanish and the French ambassadors in London, British diplomatic notes, and debates in Parliament and in British newspapers are strong indications that such a promise did in fact exist.
It is apparent from the notes of Masseran and Francés, respectively representing Spain and France in London, that on different occasions Lord North not only asked them to trust Britain, but also pointed out that if their requests were satisfied, the British would abandon the islands.84 In the same vein, Lord Rochford stated that “they did not have the intention of keeping the Falkland Islands”.85
Despite Masseran´s doubts about Great Britain´s good faith, he advised on December 9th that the ministers of His Britannic Majesty “should wait for return of Mail in order to see if the King supports this latest project and wishes to trust the good faith of this Ministry, when it insinuates that it will abandon Gran Malvina once we grant the satisfaction it requests.”86 This is solid proof of the existence of the promise. At the end of the month, Masseran again reported that, “North insisted on us trusting them and compensating them as requested, without any hesitation, [...] The Minister does not wish it to be said that it is he who proposed [the agreement], nor do the Secretaries of State wish to get involved in the matter, as they have the intention of stating in the House of Lords that they have never strayed from the unconditional request for satisfaction from the start: they maintain that in this way from now on, they will be more entitled to deal with questions of law or to abandon an Island that not only the Navy Officers, but also the People perceive as onerous; they state that they cannot agree to this in an agreement, because Parliament would assume they had sold themselves to Spain, and that they did not know how to uphold England´s rights, which would cost them not only their jobs, but also their heads.”87 These letters, in addition to the request by the French King to make all sacrifices necessaryto keep the peace, resulted in the orders Grimaldi gave to Masseran, on January 2nd, 1771, which read as follows: “As [the British] do not wish to hear of stipulating [the] evacuation of [the] island, in case satisfaction, being conditional, is threatened, but they assure us that they will afterwards abandon Falkland [island], and that we should trust their word; the King is determined to reconfigure his Project, to save honour, and to leave the negotiation about evacuation of the Island for later, accepting the offer, though it is only made by word.
Your Excellency must try to obtain this in the best possible way.”88
Similar British evidence abounds. A few days after the Masseran Declaration, the British representative in Madrid reported that “They also report that we have given a verbal assurance to evacuate Falkland Island in the space of two months.”89
Colonel Isaac Barré, member of the House of Commons, wrote to William Pitt, stating that: “I take up the pen in a hurry to acquaint your Lordship, that I am just returned from the House of Commons, where Lord North informed us, that Prince Masseran had this morning presented a declaration, signed by the King of Spain, which his Majesty had accepted of, and which would be laid before the House on Friday next. The terms, as I am informed, are not very honourable- the island to be put into our possession; and it is whispered, that there is a secret article to save the rights and pretensions in that country of the crown of Spain; which seems to promise our abandoning the spot silently, upon some future day.”90


Figure 5 Satyric image in relation to the Hispanic-British negotiations where Lord North is inclined before Masseran who is stepping on the British flag, giving it a paper in which is read "Falkland Island

Thomas Pownall´s statement in the British Parliament, on March 5th, 1771, is equally clear:

whatever may be the present ostensible form of the convention, mark well the end: It will
end on our part either in the actual cession of the island or in a gradual direliction of it.
Without some such idea as this; namely that as soon as reparation is made to our honour
for the violent and hostile manner in which we were driven off that island, and as soon as
we were put in a situation to evacuate it of our own motion, its tacitly understood we are to
cede it. Without some such idea as this; the whole of the negotiation is inexplicable and unintelligible. But taking this line, as going to a matter mutually understood, the whole is
plain, definite and but of one construction.
” 92


Lord Chatham´s speech is categorical: “it appeared to be an ignominious compromise. It was no satisfaction, no reparation. The right was not secured, and even the restitution was  incomplete; Port Egmont alone was restored, not Falkland Island”. 93

Lord Chatham further makes a compelling analysis: “While Lord Rochford was negotiating with  Prince  Masseran,  Mr.  Stuart  Mackenzie  was  negotiating  with  Mons.  Francois.  At length, about an hour before the meeting of Parliament, on the twenty second of January 1771, a declaration was signed by the Spanish Ambassador, under French orders, and a French indemnification, for the restitution of Falkland's Islands to his Britannic Majesty; but the important condition, upon which this declaration was obtained, was not mentioned in the declaration. This condition was, that the British forces should evacuate Falkland's Islands as soon as convenient after they were put in possession of Port and Fort Egmont” 94
Similar criticisms were expressed by the famed writer or journalist going by the pen name “Junius” in his letters to the Public Advertiser, such as the one dated January 30th where he stated  that  in  the  Masseran  Declaration,  Port  Egmont is  described, “not  as  a  part  of  the King's territory or proper dominion, but merely as a possession, a word expressly chosen in contradistinction  to and  exclusion  of  the  idea  of  right  and  to  prepare  us  for  a  future surrender both of the right and of the possession. (...) It seemed to promise that whatever might be given up by secret stipulation some care would be taken to save appearances to the  public.” 95
Junius  came  to  the  charge  again  with  another  letter  dated  February  13th in which,  referring  to  the  Masseran  Declaration,  he  affirmed: “(...) when  that  stipulation carries along with it also a private insinuation or encouragement to the Catholic King tohope,  and  most  probably,  not  to  say  certainly,  an  express  assurance,  that  not  only  Port Egmont now restored to us, but the whole island, shall in due time, as soon as they dare, be surrendered to the crown of Spain.” 96
On its part, the Public Advertiser affirmed: “... the Convention with Spain contains several secret chapters in which we shamefully waive our claim to the Falklands”. 97
This  ample  documentation  is  simply  ignored  by  the  British  pamphlet.  The  evidence concerning the secret promise made by Great Britain to abandon Port Egmont – and with it any  fanciful  claim  of  sovereignty – is  conclusive.  It  comes  from  those  having  directly participated  in  the  negotiations,  and  the  officials  involved.  Further  facts  support  this evidence:  England  left  Port  Egmont  in  1774,  and  despite  leaving  behind  a  plaque  and  a flag,  no  official  act  of  possession,  no  act  of  authority,  nor  any  protest  was  made  again, despite Spain´s presence in the archipelago and particularly the destruction of the fort and the removal of the British symbols by the Spanish authorities in the Falklands/Malvinas. Although  not  formally  concluded,  the  promise  was  binding: pacta  sunt  servanda. In  any case, even if the promise had not existed, Great Britain left Port Egmont and, as we shall
see, did not reserve its rights of sovereignty as against Spain.

J.  London begins to gradually withdraw upon the restitution of fort Egmont

On  September  16th,  1771,  the  Spanish  official  Francisco  de  Orduña,  sent  by  the  Spanish  Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Felipe Ruiz Puente, officially handed over Port Egmont  to  the  British  Captain  John  Stott. 98
The  British  authors  appear  to  neglect  an unavoidable conclusion: if the islands were British, then Great Britain should have been the one to authorise Spanish presence on the islands. Instead, quite the opposite happened. In the  entire  course  of  events,  not  a  single  British  note  exists  protesting  against  Spain´s
presence on the islands.

The British government began taking action to reduce Port Egmont´s garrison to the bare minimum already in early 1772, a move supported by the Admiralty. By the middle of the same year, at the moment of the handover, Britain´s presence was reduced to 50 men and a small  ship.  This  reduction  of  forces  was  communicated  to  the  British  Ambassador  in Madrid so that he could pass the information on to the Spanish government. 99
On February 10th, 1774, Lord Rochford informed the Spanish Ambassador in London that Britain was
determined to withdraw its garrison from the Falklands/Malvinas due to the effects of “an economic system”, and that as he had said to Masseran in the past, if Spain insisted on the abandonment  of  the  islands,  Britain  would  not  abandon  them;  but  if  left  free  do  as  they pleased, they would carry out the withdrawal when least expected.100
The following day, Rochford wrote to the British ambassador in Madrid that “with the purpose of reducing the naval force in the western Indies” the troops deployed in the Falklands/Malvinas would be repatriated, and that he was “inclined to think from what passed formerly on this Subject that they will be rather pleased at this Event”.101

It is interesting to highlight the British note sent to Spain. If Great Britain considered itself sovereign over the islands, there would be no reason to notify Spain. Yet the note existed. And, if a note existed, its aim must have been the preservation of sovereignty - especially when the power abandoning the territory knows  that  the  other  will  remain  on  the  territory.  There  was  no  such  note  reserving sovereignty.  Nor  was  there  any  request  for  Spain  to  withdraw,  and  less  still  any “authorisation”  for  Spain  to  remain  on  the  territory.  The  reasons  invoked  are  less  than credible. What economic influence could be wielded by 50 men , who were relieved once a year and could in any case be put to use elsewhere, within the British Empire´s military budget? If the purpose of the withdrawal was to reduce the naval forces in the Indies, why only repatriate the garrison at Port Egmont?
In  short,  in  1771,  Great  Britain,  one  of the  greatest  military  powers  of  the  time,  was determined to go to war over Port Egmont, but the following year it considerably reduced the troops deployed in that port and only 2 years later ordered the abandonment of a 50-man  garrison  “for  economic  reasons”.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  reason  for  the abandonment  of  Port  Egmont  was  something  more  important  that  a  mere  budgetary readjustment.
The unavoidable truth is that the only wish the British government had in 1771-1774 was to save face. And as we shall see, if they were not in a condition to maintain their position at  Port Egmont, the simple fact of leaving behind British insignia was not sufficient to retain any title over the territory.

K. The British abandonment of Port Egmont in 1774 and the exclusive presence of Spain in the archipelago

Whatever  the  reason  for  the  abandonment,  it  was  carried  out  in  mid-May  1774,  leaving  behind a leaden plaque stating that the islands belonged to the King of Great Britain. As we already saw in the case of discovery, a merely symbolic act (such as installing a cross or a  plaque) was not enough to establish a right of sovereignty – much less could a symbolic act  of this nature be sufficient to retain sovereignty over time. But that is not all.
Even  before  the British  effectively  left,  the  Spanish  government  in  Madrid  was  already giving orders to the Governor of Malvinas to ensure that the British would not return to the islands. A note dated April 9th, 1774 written by Julián de Arriaga, Secretary of the State of the Indies, read as follows:
“Being offered by the Court of London to abandon the settlement built in Gran Malvina, withdrawing  the  few  troops  deployed  there,  and  some  inhabitants,  the  King  wishes to inform you of this fact, in order to consequently observe prudently and carefully whether the  British  do in  fact  abandon  said settlement,  without  reestablishing a new one in the  vicinity, and that once you have verified the fact in the terms agreed upon, from time to time, take the necessary precautions to ensure that the British do not return to the area, and inform  me  in  the  greatest  detail  about  everything  that  happens  there,  both  now and henceforth.” 102

This note is particularly important for a variety of reasons: 1) because it clearly shows that the Spanish government understood Britain´s withdrawal as a relinquishment 2) because it explicitly  stated  the  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty  over  the  port  which  had  up  to  that moment  been  in  Great  Britain´s  hands,  3)  because  it  clearly  states  the  intention  of preventing the British from returning, which implies the will to exercise sovereignty and exclusive possession over the archipelago as a whole and 4) because both British conduct and the Spanish note support the thesis of the British promise to abandon Port Egmont once it had been returned.
These orders were carried out first in November 1774 and then in February 1775. At the turn of 1775, Captain Juan de la Peña confirmed that nobody was living in or travelling to the  British  settlement.  On  January 24th, 1776,  pilot  Juan  Pascual  Callexas  withdrew  the plaque affixed by the British and sent it to Buenos Aires. 103
On June 30th, 1777, José Gálvez, Minister of the Indies, sent a Royal Order to the Viceroy  of the Río de la Plata for him to “proceed to burn the buildings of all types that may be completed or started, doing the same with the materials that are gathered” 104
This order was fulfilled at the beginning of 1780 by an expedition under the command of Callexas, thus erasing any sign of Britain´s presence in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands (see Figure 6). Many  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  this  important  order  and  its  execution,  namely:
Spain  maintained  control  over  the  whole  archipelago,  the  order  was  issued  in  a  time  of peace with Great Britain (that is to say, it was not a mere act of war nor an act carried out by reason of a war) and last but not least, the order was issued to (and executed by) the official in control of the Governorate of the Malvinas (under whose authority the islands lay), that is, the Viceroy of the Río de la Plata.
Great Britain abandoned Port Egmont in 1774 and since then, for 55 years, there was no official British presence on the islands, nor any official acts relating to them, and less still any effective acts of sovereignty over the islands or in relation to them. On the contrary, there was no official reaction to the destruction of the settlement at Port Egmont carried out by Spain and nothing was said about the continuous and exclusive presence of Spain in the islands, with 32 governors that reported to Buenos Aires.




Figure 6 Drawing of Port Egmont destroyed by the Spaniards; the legend reads:"Drawing of the establishment of the Englishmen in Port Egmont of the Island of the Great Malvina, burned and demolished its buildings on March 22, 1780 by order of Excmo. Sr. Dn Juan Jose de Vertiz, General of the Royal Armies Viceroy Governor and Capitan General of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, by the First Pilot of the Number of the Royal Navy and Capitan of the King the Rosario Dn Juan Pasqual Callexa"

Britain said nothing at the time it signed the convention of Nootka Sound, which by virtue of its Article VI prevented Britain from settling the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Not a word was said when in 1806-1807 British officials invaded Buenos Aires and found the leaden plaque left behind in the once-British settlement. Another relevant question is why Great Britain, when attempting to conquer the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, did not take any action  against  Spain´s  presence  in  the  only  territory  that  supposedly  was  British.  If  the question had not been settled in 1771, here was an excellent opportunity to settle it in their favour. On Spain´s part, the removal of the plaque left at Port Egmont was a clear sign of its will to repudiate any pretention of British sovereignty. Even leaving aside the lack of British  reaction  to  the  Spanish  authorities´  control  over  Port  Egmont,  including  its subsequent  destruction,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  the  British  found  the  plaque  the Spanish  had  removed  in  Buenos  Aires,  between  1806  and  1807.  There  was  no  official reaction by Great Britain in regard to acts of enforcement performed by Spain against the sailors  of  the  British  Crown  visiting  the  islands,  as  we  will  see  later.  Nor  was  there  any reaction by Britain to the various acts of sovereignty carried out by the new-born Argentine government between 1810 and 1829.
The abandonment of 1774 was not a simple physical withdrawal from Port Egmont, but it  meant  the  total  relinquishment  by  Great  Britain  of  any  kind  of  claim  over  the  Falkland/Malvinas Islands. A period of 55 years with no British presence or official acts as against a nearly four-decade-long Spanish presence, as well as the Argentine acts that took place from the beginning of the process of independence until 1829 clearly show not only the absence of British corpus possessionis, but also the absence of any intention of having sovereignty. 105

L.  The continuous and exclusive presence of Spain in the Falklands/Malvinas
until 1811
During  the  period  under  discussion,  Spain  had  a  continuous  presence  in  the Falkland/Malvinas  Islands  from  April  1st,  1767,  when  Louis-Antoine  de  Bougainville transferred the French settlement founded in 1764 to the Spanish authorities, until February 13th, 1811, when Spanish troops were withdrawn from Port Soledad. Spain was present “à titre de souverain”, as is proven by the appointment of Mr. Felipe Ruiz Puente as Governor of  the  Malvinas,  and  the  proclamation  of  the  islands  as  a  dependency  of  the  General Captaincy of Buenos Aires made by King Charles II on October 4
th, 1766. Official Spanish presence was permanent, and its authorities succeed one another on a continuous basis for the  entire  period  (32  Governors  and  Commandants  were  appointed by  the  Viceroy  of Buenos Aires); by order of the King of Spain, they were to be relieved annually, between
mid December and mid January. 106
The Commandants relied upon a minister of the Royal Treasury  and  periodically  formed  governing  boards  (juntas  de  gobierno)  which  also included the Commander of the main ship anchored at Port Soledad. 107
The islands were inhabited by a military detachment, prisoners, settlers and Catholic priests. The Church of Nuestra  Señora  de  la  Soledad  operated  on  Soledad  Island,  and  construction  of  the  stone church was completed on November 4th, 1801.108
British  sources  refer  to  the  Spanish  settlement  as  a  prison;  this  probably  arises  from  the translation of the word “presidio” and its current meaning of “prison”. However, in Spanish America, “presidios” were not prisons. The term was used to refer to settlements situated at the outermost points of Spain´s dominions that worked as protection against the frequent attacks of privateers and pirates, as well as being a means of protecting Spanish sovereignty by preventing other nations from settling in the area. Regardless, even if the only Spanish presence had been a prison, it would still have been sufficient to constitute an effective act of government authority.
The Governors of the islands were mostly preoccupied with maintaining Spanish presence in the southernmost territories of the Empire, and to control the activities of other nations in the region. This was an official and public presence that no other maritime power ignored or could ignore, which was in charge of policing and law enforcement in and around the islands of the entire archipelago. Frequent journeys were made around the archipelago and along the Patagonian coasts. Spanish authorities on the islands also kept a detailed record of
the cattle present on the islands, which was considered to belong to the Royal Treasury, and
carried out maintenance of military facilities, as proven by the periodical reports on both
matters sent by the Commandants to Buenos Aires.
There  are  hundreds  of  examples  of  the  control  exercised  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  but
suffice it to cite the following: a note dated August 17
th
, 1790, requesting the payment of
expenses  incurred  for  the  transfer  and  rations  of  the  “British  individuals”  found  fishing
illegally in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands on the corvette Sta. Elena.
109
Another example is
Communication No. 239 dated February 26
th
, 1806 in the Malvinas, by which Commandant
of the Malvinas Antonio Leal de Ibarra “Communicate[s] the seizure of the English brig St.
Agustin (alias) El  Talquino, its  cargo  and  subsequent  events,  giving  some  news  of  the
privateers who are in the South Seas”. The vessel in question was a Spanish ship that had
been captured by English privateers. The note addressed to Viceroy Sobremonte in Buenos
Aires gives an idea of the patrols of the coasts and seas of the region carried out from Port
Soledad: “Having  sent  six  armed  men  for  reconnaissance  of  the  Southern  coast  of  this
island to guard myself against the surprise of Enemies, which have been repeatedly sighted
with hostile aims....” The note affirms that the enemies were found on the sections of coast
named Puerto de los Leones and de los Pájaros, and that the brig captured by the Spanish
was anchored at the nearby island of Santa Isabel”. Captain Andrés Jonson [according to
the original spelling] and his five-man crew were taken prisoner – all of them British.110
A similar example can be found in Pedro Sanguineto´s report addressed to Viceroy Nicolás de
Arredondo,  dated  March  4th, 1794  in  the  Malvinas,  by  which  he  reports  to  have  warned
French, American and British fishing vessels devoted to “whale fishing” operating in the areas surrounding the islands.111
Another example is the report dated January 15th, 1810, by which  the  Commandant  of  the  Malvinas,  Gerardo  Bordas,  informs  Viceroy  Cisneros  of Buenos  Aires: Having  ignored  up  to  the  18th
of  the  current  [sic]  the  unfortunate  events  occurred in our Peninsula, of which the second pilot of the Royal Navy, Mr. Pablo Guillén who  entered  this  port  commanding  the  Zumaca  Carlota  to  relieve  me  informed  me  exofficio [...] Being this Colony, the only spot of the Monarchy, that ignoring the occurrences due to its location; and consequently the only territory where due obedience to our King
and  natural  lord  was  not  sworn;  I  immediately  thought  to  carry  out  this  act,  which  took place on the 14th of the current (sic) between 8 and 9 a.m. in the church yard, as solemnly as possible and to the acclaim of the crowd. 112
As we can see, no other State made any kind of claim, nor carried out any act of public power  over  any  part  of  the  archipelago,  nor  made  any  protest  against  the  countless  and continuous manifestations of Spanish public authority. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Office affirms in answering a question raised by the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Commons: “Spanish occupation from 1774 to 1811 was undisturbed by any other power”. 113
Various  internal  Foreign  Office  memoranda  express  similar  views  on  the Falkland/Malvinas  Islands.  Two of  these  (dated  1911  and  1928)  read  as  follows: “No objection  appears  to  have  been  made  at  any  time  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  the possession of Soledad by the Spaniards, who continued in undisturbed exercise of all the rights  of  sovereignty,  not  only over  the  East  Falkland  Island,  but  over  the  whole  group, until, according to R. Greenhow, about the year 1808. They, however, appear, according to other writers, to have exercised these rights until a later period, for G. A. Thompson, in his "Geographical and  Historical  Dictionary  of  America  and  the  West  Indies",  published  in 1812, states that: "The Spaniards now send criminals to these inhospitable shores (of the Falkland  Islands)  for  their  settlements  in  America;  and  Dr.  G.  Hassel,  in  his  "Geographisch-Statistisches Handwörterbuch", published in 1817, says: "Die Spanier aber  besitzen noch ein geringes Dorf auf der grössen Insel bei Port Soledad". Of the extent of the Spanish Settlement at Soledad during this period we have no distinct accounts. The remains of  the  town  show  that  though  small  it  was  tolerably  well-built  and  provided  with  a Government  House,  church,  store-houses  and  forts,  all  of  stone.  It  was  under  the superintendence of an officer entitled "Commandant of the Malvinas", who was dependent on the Viceroy of La Plata; and vessels of war were from time to time sent from Buenos Aires  to  cruise  among  the  islands  and  to  warn  all  vessels  of  other  nations  against





51 Pascoe, Graham and Pepper, Peter,op. cit., p. 6.
52 Universidad de Buenos Aires, Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de las Islas Malvinas,
Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Historia, 1957, Vol. I, p. 351.
53 Conway to Lords of Admiralty, July 20 1765 (State Papers) in Goebel, Julius, op. cit., p. 231.
54 The pamphlet by the British “government” of the islands mentions that Byron disembarked on Gran
Malvina (West Falkland), which is incorrect as Isla Saunders/Trinidad is a different island.
55 Pascoe, Graham and Pepper, Peter, op. cit., p. 7.
56 Lennox to Shelbourne, September 17, 1766 (RO State Papers, France, 271).
57 Universidad de Buenos Aires, op. cit., T. I, pp. 102-103.
58 Caillet-Bois, Ricardo, op. cit. p. 102
59 Pascoe, Graham and Pepper, Peter, op. cit., p. 7. The pamphlet by the British “government” of the islands asserts that Spain “bought” the islands.
60 Philip Parker King, Charles Darwin; Proceedings of the second expedition, 1831-1836, under the command of Captain Robert Fitz-Roy, London, Henry Colburn, 1839, pp. 149-150. Original in AGN Sala X 3-4-5
61 Bougainville, Louis-Antoine, Voyage autour du monde [1771], París, Presses Universitaires de Paris-
Sorbonne, 2001, ch. III, p. 86.
62 Lennox to Shelbourne, September 17, 1766 (RO State Papers, France, 271)
63 AGN Sala X 8-10-3
64 Bougainville, Louis-Antoine, op. cit. p. 61
65 “[...] Just as a State which has occupied the coast or an important part of an island is deemed to have
occupied the island as a whole, the occupation of the principal islands of an archipelago must also be deemed to include the occupation of islets and rocks in the same archipelago, which have not been actually occupied by another State”; individual opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro, Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France/United Kingdom), ICJ Reports 1953, p. 99
66 Egmont to the Duke of Grafton, July 20th, 1765, Records of the Admiralty. State Papers, Foreign, Spain, Supplementary, Miscellaneous Papers, 1761-1770, in Ferrer Vieyra, Enrique, Segunda Cronología Legal Anotada sobre las Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands), Córdoba, EGB, 1993, p. 364.
67 Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, op. cit., 1975, p. 130.
68 Frances to Choiseul, December 22, 1770, AECP, Angleterre, v.494, f. 418 in Ferrer Vieyra, Segunda
Cronología..., op. cit., p. 327.
69 Bougainville, Louis-Antoine de, op. cit., p. 92.
70 Royal Order of December 29th, 1766, in Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, op. cit., p. 38.
71 Royal Order of February 25th, 1768 in id., p. 40.
72 Ruiz Puente to Hunt, November 30th, 1769 in Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, op. cit., p. 41.
73 Note from Rubalcava to Hunt, February 20th, 1770 in Hidalgo Nieto, Manuel, La cuestión de las Malvinas, contribución al estudio de las relaciones hispano-inglesas en el siglo XVIII, Madrid, CSIC, 1947, pp. 645-646.
74 Luis XV to Carlos III, December 20th, 1770, in AHN, Estado, leg. 2850
75 Text reproduced in a number of works. See ie. Goebel, Julius, op. cit., p. 400, AGS, State, file 6980, annex to letter No2042; De Martens, Geo. Fred., Recueil de traites d’alliance, de paix, de trève, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d’échange etc.... des puissances et etats de l’Europe ...depuis 1761 jusqu’à présent, Tome 1 (1771-1779), Gotinguen, 2a ed., Librairie Dieterich, 1817, pp. 1-2; Parry, G., The Consolidated Treaty Series (1767-1772), Vol. 44, Nueva York, Oceana Publication Inc., 1969, pp. 425-426; Del Cantillo, Alejandro, Tratados, op. cit., pp. 519-520; Almon, J.,A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce, between Great-Britain and Other Powers: From the Revolution in 1688 to the Present Time, London, Vol. II, Opposite Burlington, 1772, pp. 328-330; British and Foreign State Papers 1833-1834, Vol.
22, London, 1847, pp. 1387-1388.
76 Pascoe y Pepper, op. cit., p. 8 and from the same authors: “False Falklands History at the United Nations. How Argentina misled the UN in 1964 – and still does”, 2012, p. 3
77 AGS, Estado, Legajo 6980, annex to letter No2042; in Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, op. cit., pp. 199-200.
78 Ibid.
79 Frances to La Vrilliere, January 22nd, 1771, in AECP, Angleterre, vol. 495, fols. 79 a 81; cit. in Zorraquín Becú, Ricardo, op. cit., p. 86.
80 The Parliamentary History of England from the earliest period to the year 1803. Vol. XVI. A.D. 1765-
1771. London, Hansard, 1813, p. 1339.
81 Johnson, Samuel, Thoughts on the Late Transactions Respecting the Falkland’s Islands, 2nd ed., London, Cadell, 1771, p. 36.
82 Ibid., p. 64.
83 Pascoe, Graham and Pepper, Peter, op. cit., p. 8
84 Letter from Masseran to Grimaldi, November 28th, 1770 No2003, en AHN, Estado, leg. 4274 (1), p. 7.
Letter from Masseran a Grimaldi, December 3rd, 1770, No2008, in AHN, Estado, leg. 6980..
85 Letter from Frances to Choiseul, November 29th, 1770, in AECP, Angleterre, vol. 494, fols. 259-263.
86 Letter from Masseran to Grimaldi, December 9th, 1770 in AGS, Estado, leg. 6980, letter No2011
87 Letter from Masseran to Grimaldi, December 31st, 1770, AGS, Estado, leg. 6980, letter No2020.
88 Grimaldi to Masseran, January 2nd, 1771, in AHN, Estado, leg. 4261 (2).
89 Harris to Rochford, February 14th, 1771 (Record Office, State Papers, Spain, 186, No80).
90 “Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham”, Vol. IV, edited by William Stanhope Taylor, Esq, and Captain John Henry Pringle, London, A. Spottiswoode, 1840, p. 71.
91 Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Providence, U.S.A
92 Hansard, XXVI, 1385-1402.
93 “Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham”, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 87.
94 Anecdotes of the Right Honourable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, vol. III, ch. 39.
95 Junius: including letters by the same writer under other signatures; to which are added his confidential
correspondence with Mr. Wilkes, and his private letters to Mr. H.S. Woodfall; a new and enlarged edition...,  by John Wade, 2 vols., London, 1884. Letter XLII, II, 318-319.
96 Ibid., II, 343-344.
97 AGS, Estado, leg. 6980.
98 Caillet-Bois, Ricardo, op. cit. p. 148.
99 Rochford to Grantham, March 6th, 1772, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 22, p. 1393.
100 Francisco de Escarano to Grimaldi, Fabruary 11th, 1774, in Hidalgo Nieto, Manuel,  op. cit., p. 261.
101 Rochford to Grantham, February 11th, 1774, in Goebel, Julius, op. cit., p. 456.
102 AGN Sala VII, Fondo Biblioteca Nacional, T.189.
103 Caillet-Bois, Ricardo, op. cit. p. 152.
104 Royal Order dated June 30th, 1777, in AGI, leg. Buenos Aires, 413
105 On  the  requirement  of  both  elements,  objective  (intention  to  act  as  a  sovereign)  and  subjective  (performance of acts of sovereignty), see Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1993, judgment, PCIJ, series A/B n° 53, pp. 45-46.
106 Notification  issued  by  Ship  Captain  of  the  Royal  Navy  and  Chief  Commander  of  the  Naval  Base  of Montevideo, José María Salazar of January 4th, 1811. Archivo General de Marina Don Álvaro de Bazán. In El Viso del Marqués (Ciudad Real) Expediciones de Indias Nr. 524. Pages 10, 11 and 12.
107 See, for example, the government agreement of April 18th, 1800 in Gómez Langenheim, A., op. cit., T. I, pp. 178-179. At the end of the period, the Commandant of the Falklands/Malvinas was also the commander of the main ship anchored at the islands.
108 AGN Sala IX 16-9-8
109 AGN Sala IX 16-9-8.
110 AGN Sala IX 17-1-3
111 See supra. Chap I,  fn 38
112 AGN Sala X 2-3-15.
113 Question  No  3,  House  of  Commons,  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Session  1982-1983.  Falkland  Islands, Minutes of Evidence, Monday 17 January 1983.