Beagle Crisis: The Planned Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas (v1.5)

Assault on the Chilean Government Buildings

Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas

By Esteban McLaren



On 22 December 1978, known as D-Day, various military actions would have been initiated in a coordinated manner along the borders with Chile within the framework of Operation Soberanía (Sovereignty). It is very difficult to determine with certainty which of all the planned actions would have actually started the war, but it is clear that it would have been a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The main focus would have been the naval battle and the landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) would attempt to land part of its troops on the islands of Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by troops of the Chilean Marine Corps, CIM) and Picton, while other troops would seek to occupy the rest of the islands. This front will be the subject of future analysis. Synchronously, there would be a ground advance on the Southern front setting out from Río Gallegos (with a potential second line of advance from Rospentek Aike), with Punta Arenas as the final objective. The purpose of this article is to essay an alternative-history scenario. The war never happened, but how would it have unfolded if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation? That will be our point of divergence from real history. Let us appeal to rationality and foresight in an exercise that will always be incomplete and whose final outcome belongs to another space–time.

Start of the assault on Chilean positions on the border, with Mount Aymond in the background.

Context and development of the invasion

In the southern winter of 1978, tension between Argentina and Chile over the dispute regarding the Beagle Channel reached its peak. In the early hours of 21 December, Argentine troops stationed in Río Gallegos, Rospentek and other border locations received the order to begin the invasion of Chile. Since July, Chilean forces had been preparing for this confrontation, aware that diplomacy might not be enough to resolve the conflict.

The Argentine Forces

Argentina mobilised a formidable force, including the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade. The X Mechanised Infantry Brigade was deployed in Río Gallegos, ready to cross the border. All units would be reinforced as circumstances required.

In the air, A-4 Skyhawk, Mirage Dagger and Nesher fighter aircraft —as well as up to 14 F-86 Sabres (which had already violated Chilean airspace weeks earlier)— were ready to provide air support, while the Argentine Navy, with its destroyers and frigates, patrolled the nearby waters.

Argentine Forces:

• V Army Corps — General José Antonio Vaquero —. Assigned mission: Strategic offensive starting at 24:00 (H+2), departing from Santa Cruz, with the likely objective of conquering Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas. Thereafter, it would support Army Corps III in its advance through Puyehue towards Chile, cutting communications between the central zone and the south of Chilean territory.
• 1st Infantry Division (with elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade)
• X Mechanised Infantry Brigade (based in Río Gallegos)
• XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade
• Argentine National Gendarmerie: Border guard forces
• Air Force with A-4 Skyhawk, F-86-F Sabre and Mirage III fighter aircraft
• Naval Forces: IMARA together with the T-28 Fennec, with nearly 20 units stationed on the island of Tierra del Fuego.

Urban combat in the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, Punta Arenas

The Chilean Defence

In response, Chile positioned its III Army Division in Punta Arenas, reinforced by the 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros” and the 6th Army Division, with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade. The general in charge of the defence of the Magallanes region, General Nilo Floody Buxton, always stated that at this stage the border guards (Carabineros) would be his troops of choice. The Chilean Air Force, equipped with 12 A-37 Dragonfly aircraft and 6 Hawker Hunters, was on maximum alert, and the Chilean Navy, with its ships and submarine, was ready to intercept any Argentine naval advance.

Chilean Forces:

• III Army Division (based in Punta Arenas)

• 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros”

• 6th Army Division (with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade)

• Carabineros: Border guard who, on this front, had disproportionate importance due to their knowledge of the frontier. The general in charge of the defence of Punta Arenas always stressed their importance in the defence, but as any militarised police force they were not proper infantry, and their only “encounter” with Argentine forces had left them in a very poor position. See further below.

• Chilean Air Force with Hawker Hunter and A-37 combat aircraft (no confirmation of any of them)

• Naval Forces (CIM tasked with the islands of the channel)

The case of the Carabineros as soldiers

One issue that has rarely been discussed with the attention it deserves —and which seems to have obsessed only the author— is Chile’s decision to employ the Carabineros de Chile (CC) as an infantry force, or even as mechanised infantry, during the Beagle conflict. This decision is particularly striking if one considers the institutional nature of the Carabineros: by their own definition, they are a national police force with functions of internal security and border control, making them a hybrid institution but essentially police. Their role is equivalent, in the Argentine case, to a combination of three forces: the Federal Police, the provincial police forces, and the Argentine National Gendarmerie (GNA), the latter indeed being a militarised security force with responsibility in border areas. Within this framework, any reasonable comparison between the CC and armed or military forces should carry strong conceptual reservations.

During the escalation of the Beagle Channel conflict, responsibility for the defence of the Magallanes Region —whose capital is Punta Arenas— fell to General Ernesto Floody Buxton. A singular figure, of British descent, fair-skinned and with manners that his supporters considered charismatic, Floody stood out for public statements as controversial as they were unfortunate, both in content and in form. It is surprising that an officer of his rank repeatedly declared in Chilean media that, if necessary, he would face a potential armed conflict exclusively with “troops” of the Carabineros. This assertion, far from anecdotal, has been corroborated by multiple testimonies and documentary records.

The underlying problem lies in the military planning implicit in this decision. From positions such as Monte Aymond, on the border, the deployment of Argentine armoured means was evident, suggesting that, in the event of hostilities, Argentina would opt for a high-intensity mechanised offensive. In this context arises a legitimate and deeply troubling question: did General Floody really expect to contain an armoured advance with police personnel lacking training in conventional war doctrine, or in combat as light or mechanised infantry?

The most basic military logic questions this disposition. What previous experience did the Carabineros have in high-intensity engagements? What tactical logic supported this choice? It is not only difficult to imagine an Argentine military plan that, for example, placed the GNA in the first line of an assault on Punta Arenas, but even in a counter-offensive situation it would be highly improbable to delegate to a militarised police force the containment of enemy troops.

And yet, that seems to have been exactly the Chilean approach. The official justifications referred to the use of the Carabineros as rearguard elements —for tasks such as control of prisoners of war and surveillance of civilian areas— but the empirical evidence contradicts that explanation. Carabineros were transported on LAN Chile night flights to Magallanes, with the aim of not alerting Argentine intelligence, and were deployed directly on the front line. Although they had received only a few weeks of training at the infantry school, their additional preparation was no more than that. Contemporary photographs and accounts place them armed with anti-tank rocket launchers in Cabeza de Mar, and other records document their transfer from Chabunco to Porvenir, in the heart of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego —all positions within the immediate theatre of operations.

This deployment not only contradicts the official version but also exposes an alarming lack of strategic judgement. Far from being an extraordinary resource in the face of a logistical or tactical emergency, the use of the CC as a military vanguard reflects serious doctrinal disorganisation and, ultimately, an anachronistic view of modern warfare on the part of the Chilean high command. The defence of the country’s southernmost region was left in the hands of a force inadequate for the type of combat that was taking shape. If one also considers that the very same Carabineros had surrendered almost without resistance in the Lago del Desierto incident years earlier, the decision is not only questionable but openly irresponsible. It is true that in war one goes with what one has, but was there really no other ECh infantry available to employ in their place?

Invasion Routes

The Argentine forces planned their advance towards Punta Arenas using two main routes. The northern route, departing from Río Gallegos, crossed the border through Monte Aymond, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas. This road, although relatively flat, presented natural challenges such as rivers and hills that could slow the advance.

The alternative route, departing from Rospentek, crossed the border following Route CH-40 and then headed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas. This road was more difficult, with mountainous and wooded terrain that would complicate the advance of the armoured formations.

1. Main Northern Route:

• Starting point: Río Gallegos

• Main points: Advance through the Monte Aymond border crossing, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas.

• Characteristics: Relatively flat terrain but with possible natural obstacles such as rivers and hills.

• Open ground in many sections for an armoured battle and for the deployment of forces in line, wedge, or V formation.

2. Alternative Western Route:

• Starting point: Rospentek

• Main points: Border crossing via Route CH-40, then proceed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas.

• Initial objective: Would begin with the capture and securing of Puerto Natales, a concentration point for Chilean forces.

• Characteristics: Mountainous and wooded terrain, more difficult for the advance of large armoured formations. Suitable ground for ambushes.

• Engineering considerations: Bridges along the route would be destroyed (for example, Puente Rubens, Río Pendiente), necessitating engineer units.

• Suitability for armour: Poorly suited to broad armoured formations (only columns or diamond formations feasible).

These are the troops of the Chilean 5th Cavalry Regiment “Lanceros” [Lancers] deployed to defend Puerto Natales. They were going to face an Argentine armoured advance with horse-mounted cavalry, Polish style. No joke.

Chilean population in Argentine Patagonia

In his chronicle Cuando el río no era turbio (“When the river was not murky”), Ramón Arriagada recounts the close relationship between Chilean workers, mainly chilotes, and the Río Turbio coalfield in Argentina during the 1950s to 1970s. According to the 1970 census, Puerto Natales had 13,675 inhabitants, of whom 2,800 worked in the mine. By 1976, around 600 Chilean miners were commuting in shifts, using Natales as a dormitory town due to the lack of housing in Río Turbio.

Arriagada cites the writer Nicasio Tangol, who emphasised that the chilotes were fundamental in shaping Patagonia. In 1961, the newspaper El Austral reported that the mine produced 500 tonnes per day and employed 1,200 miners, mostly Chilean–chilotes. In addition, about 1,800 workers were employed on the surface, 80% of them Chileans as well. Another 600 Chileans worked on the construction of the 270-kilometre railway between Río Turbio and Río Gallegos, and by 1951 there were already 1,200 miners working in the coalfield.

The author highlights how migration from Chiloé to Patagonia increased, especially after the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, and how the 1978 border conflict between Chile and Argentina marked a change, when Chilean miners were replaced by workers from northern Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay.

In his chronicle Sueños de Carbón (“Dreams of Coal”), Arriagada addresses the 2004 mining accident, which left 14 dead, and how retired miners from Natales who had worked in Río Turbio survive on miserable pensions and must cross the border to receive medical care, since they have no access to social security in Chile, making them outcasts in their own country. (El Tirapiedras)

From these population movements, entirely under the sovereign authority of the Argentine Republic, Chilean General Floody would complain, associating them with an act of war. No joke.

Following with the story, both routes converge at Laguna Cabeza de Mar where, if two coordinated invasion forces were to set out, they could regroup and continue on to Punta Arenas. The road to Punta Arenas via CH-9 is a coastal route highly vulnerable to air attacks and ambushes or hit-and-run strikes. The route leads the force to the core of Chilean regional military power: the Chabunco air base and, opposite it, the headquarters of the III Army Division.

Chilean defensive lines

Chile would have adopted a defence-in-depth strategy, as declared by the general in charge of the Army Division (Southern Theatre of Operations). The first line of defence could already have been sited at Monte Aymond and its surroundings, right on the frontier. That line was, from the few photographs gathered, a jumble of foxholes and trenches, with poorly equipped soldiers — undoubtedly cannon fodder to wear down the advance.

When a penetration of this kind occurs, the theory of war leads us to think of three phases for the force facing it:

1. Containment: Hold the penetration in place — that is, stop it or slow it so it cannot continue to advance.
2. Flanking: Begin moving forces to the flanks of the penetration, basically to the sectors close to where the breach began. This is done to operate on those flanks simultaneously and “strangle” the penetration by cutting the enemy’s communications with its rear.
3. Annihilation: The detailed destruction of the encircled troops (death or capture).

Here, Chilean troops would have built forward positions to slow the enemy’s advance. Anti-tank guns and conventional field artillery — not in great quantity or variety — are visible in photographs and documentaries. Probably the best trans-Andean weaponry in this phase was the deployment of anti-tank mines. A second line of defence would be at San Gregorio, with fortifications, minefields and trenches ready to resist an assault. From there to the regional capital, various points could be fortified. The final defence is concentrated around Punta Arenas, where troops, long-range artillery and the best anti-tank defences are assembled.

See below the “Maginot line” that Chilean strategists had developed: simple trenches and foxholes. The soldier in the front line is using an old bolt-action Mauser 1909 rifle from the First World War.

Photo of a “foxhole” with a Chilean infantryman armed with a bolt-action Mauser rifle near Monte Aymond

The Chilean defence-in-depth would probably have included:

• First line of defence: Forward positions at Monte Aymond and surrounding areas.
• Second line of defence: Fortifications and trenches around San Gregorio along Route CH-40, and ambushes from wooded areas between Laguna Arauco and Primavera. Trenches at Laguna Cabeza de Mar (Arancia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano, 2017:164). All bridges were fitted with explosive charges, cavalry units armed with anti-tank rockets were sent forward, and night firing zones were prepared and properly “staked out” and painted to avoid confusion (AC&BS, 2017:141).
• Final defence: Fortifications and troops concentrated near Punta Arenas, including long-range artillery and anti-tank defences (few and outdated in the ECh inventory of that period). Many civilians actively collaborated in the mobilisation. Much of the vehicles and heavy machinery used in the construction of trenches, shelters, watch posts and anti-tank ditches was provided by local businessmen. In turn, ranch owners made available sheds to house troops and store equipment and supplies (AC&BS, 2017:114).

It should be noted that this scenario contained several factors that emerged over time. For example, Chilean forces lacked anti-tank mines and ammunition was scarce. The soldiers in the first line of defence were placed as cannon fodder, with only 80 cartridges per weapon and no resupply. Many — perhaps too many — indicators showed that Chile was very, very poorly prepared for war.

The stalemate of the advance

The Argentine advance faced its first major test at San Gregorio, where Chilean defences would be well prepared and the terrain favoured the defenders. Here, the advance would slow considerably, turning into a battle of attrition. The apparently most fortified area was the road in the lagoon zone of Cabeza de Mar.

From Rospentek, the troops would have to overcome harassment attacks and construct bridges over river crossings where the bridges had been destroyed. Once joined with the forces coming from Río Gallegos, they would need to regroup and assess the damage and the reorganisation of the advance.

There is a key issue to bear in mind throughout this entire campaign: Argentine air superiority. The only Chilean air base in the Area of Operations was Chabunco, in Punta Arenas. That air base was to be attacked by the Argentine Air Force in the early hours of the advance, and finished off later that same afternoon by the Naval Aviation Command. Any resistance put up by Chilean ground forces would then have to endure continued aerial harassment.

How many examples are there of ground defences being immune to simultaneous air and land attacks? Imagine a pocket of Chilean resistance — perhaps an artillery battery hidden in a ravine, or machine-gun nests strategically positioned along the route of advance. The Argentine military commander would simply need to pass the coordinates to Río Gallegos, to the dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, or to the naval air base at Río Grande, so that aircraft from both air branches could deliver machine-gun fire, bombs or rockets to dismantle the defence.

These same options were not available to the Chilean commander.

Armored Regiment No. 5 "Punta Arenas", deployed in 1978 in the Magallanes region. The Scorpion Detachment advances, in M-41 tanks and M-113 armoured personnel carriers.

Countering the Chilean defence

To overcome this obstacle, Argentina could deploy the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade to penetrate and disrupt the initial defences. Argentine artillery would bombard the Chilean positions, while airborne units and the air force would carry out flanking manoeuvres and provide crucial air support.

 

• The XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade must penetrate and disorganise the initial defences.
• Artillery forces to bombard defensive positions.
• Airborne units and Air Force for flanking and air support.
• The Chabunco air base would have to be put out of action for the advance to succeed.

Trans-Andean soldiers firing the service SIG rifle

Airborne assault on Punta Arenas

In the context of this conflict, Argentine forces planned a bold airborne assault on Punta Arenas. Accounts from veterans of this crisis, particularly from the 14th Parachute Infantry Regiment based in Córdoba, indicate that an airborne assault was being planned to capture the city of Punta Arenas. For this purpose, BAM Río Gallegos was already hosting DC-3 and C-130 transport aircraft ready for the operation.

The main objectives of this assault included seizing Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport, thereby securing a vital bridgehead for the continuous flow of troops and supplies. It would also focus on destroying Chilean command and control facilities to disrupt their defences, and on capturing the port and key logistical installations, thus cutting off enemy supplies and reinforcements.

This could be achieved following a surprise Air Base Attack (ABA) carried out by the Argentine Air Force using A-4 Skyhawks and BAC Canberras at H+2 of the invasion.

Main objectives:

• Capture Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport to secure a bridgehead and allow the continuous flow of troops and supplies.
• Destroy command-and-control facilities to disorganise Chilean forces.
• Seize the port and principal logistical installations to cut supplies and reinforcements.

Entry into Punta Arenas

Argentine armour and mechanised infantry would move rapidly along Route 9, advancing with lethal precision. Armoured vehicles would adopt line formations to maximise frontal firepower, while infantry units would follow closely, ready to disembark and secure the streets. A secondary column would advance along road Y-505, flanking the Chilean defences and dividing their attention.

Objectives in the city

The Port of Punta Arenas was one of the principal objectives. By the time of the ground assault the actual condition of the airport would need to be assessed, since it would probably already have been put out of action by an initial air attack by the Argentine Air Force (case analysed in this link). Controlling the port would allow Argentine forces to secure a vital supply line and receive maritime reinforcements. Specialised commandos and mechanised infantry units would be deployed to seize the docks and port facilities, facing fierce Chilean resistance.

The Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport and its annex, the Chabunco air base, would also be crucial. Controlling the airport would guarantee an airhead, allowing the continuous transport of troops and supplies. Argentine airborne and rapid-assault units, already familiar with the terrain from their operations at Chabunco, would be launched in a swift offensive to secure the runways and neutralise any resistance. There would be a high probability of runways and facilities being blown up to deny their use to the attackers. It was entirely to be expected that, before falling into the hands of Argentine troops, the locals would demolish all installations crucial to their operation.

Government and communications buildings will be equally strategic. Battle-hardened Argentine forces will infiltrate the city center to capture the Magallanes Intendancy and the police headquarters, seeking to disrupt Chilean defenses and establish administrative control. These will undoubtedly be the most savage scenes imaginable throughout the campaign, due to the very nature of urban combat.

The capture of Punta Arenas

Urban resistance

As Argentine troops pushed into Punta Arenas, they would encounter tenacious resistance at several key points. The Civic Centre area, with its government and commercial buildings, would undoubtedly become a battlefield. Chilean troops, entrenched inside buildings, would mount an organised defence, slowing the Argentine advance.

In the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, a dense residential area of mostly wooden houses, Chilean forces would adopt urban guerrilla tactics. Ambushes, snipers and improvised barricades turned every street and every house into a point of resistance. Fighting intensified, with Argentine troops battling house by house to clear the area. It would also prove an area very easy to destroy with fire, given the predominance of wood in its construction.

The industrial zone north of the city could also be a focus of resistance. Chilean defenses, using industrial equipment and heavy vehicles as barricades, would turn factories and warehouses into makeshift fortifications. Argentine troops should consider deploying specialized assault units to overcome these defenses.


Trans-Andean soldiers armed with SIG rifles parading

Argentine Strategies

To counter Chilean resistance, Argentine forces deployed a combination of tactics and resources. The use of artillery and air support would be crucial to weaken defenses before the ground assault. Precise bombing raids disrupted Chilean lines, facilitating the advance of ground units.


Paratroopers from the Leopardo Company of the 2nd "General Balcarce" Airborne Infantry Regiment, Argentine Army, Ushuaia, November 1978

Commando operations (the newly created Halcón 8 special team) and paratroopers would play a pivotal role. Elite units infiltrated the city to neutralize strategic points, capturing key objectives quickly and with the fewest casualties possible. These commandos would carry out surgical strikes against Chilean defenses, facilitating the advance of the main forces.

Urban warfare would become the main focus. Mechanized patrols, assault teams, and specialized urban combat units would systematically advance, facing fierce resistance but managing to secure key areas. Coordination and communication would be essential to maintain the momentum of the advance.

Population Control and Stabilization

Finally, to maintain control of the city and prevent acts of sabotage, Argentine forces would establish checkpoints and conduct regular patrols. The constant presence of troops would help stabilize the situation and ensure that the city remained under Argentine control after the capture of the main objectives. Acts of guerrilla warfare and resistance would be expected throughout the period.

The Fall

The capture of Punta Arenas would be a complex and bloody operation, testing the capabilities and determination of the Argentine forces. Their numerical and material superiority would give them a significant advantage, but the Chilean resistance, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and well-prepared defenses, would turn each advance into a fierce struggle. The city would eventually fall, but at a significant human cost to both sides.

 

Probability analysis of success

Argentina’s numerical and material superiority is evident: a ratio of 5:1 in armour, 4:1 in aircraft and 3:1 in infantry. These advantages, together with strategic planning and tactical execution, suggest a high probability of success for Argentina in the capture of Punta Arenas. However, Chile’s preparation and defensive strategy, making use of knowledge of the terrain and defence in depth, also held possibilities of success.

Probability of success for Argentina: 70%
Probability of success for Chile: 40%

Argentina:

• Probability of success: High, due to numerical and material superiority (armour, aircraft and infantry), although it would face significant difficulties in terrain and well-prepared defences.

• Estimated success: 70%

Chile:

• Probability of success: Moderate, considering defence in depth and knowledge of the terrain, although outnumbered and out-equipped.

• Estimated success: 40%

Tanks entering 18 de Septiembre slum

Estimated casualties

Casualties in this conflict would be significant for both sides, reflecting the intensity of the fighting and the well-prepared defences.

• Estimated Argentine casualties: minimum of 15,000–20,000 (including dead, wounded and prisoners)

• Estimated Chilean casualties: minimum of 15,000–40,000 (including dead, wounded, prisoners and civilians depending on their degree of involvement)

These estimates underline the human cost of a conflict which, although hypothetical, reflects the gravity of a military escalation between two neighbouring nations.

Summary

An armoured campaign by the Argentine Army against Chilean forces in the Magallanes region would have been a bloody affair under any consideration. The possibility of success existed, but it was by no means guaranteed. With time and when comparing opposing analyses from each side, it becomes clear that, from the Chilean perspective, many potential Argentine attacks would have been completely surprising and even innovative, despite being drawn straight from doctrinal manuals since the Second World War. The Chilean defensive scheme was classical — one could even say out of yellowed pages of defensive tactics books. A layered tactical and static defence, but with a severe shortage of resources, making them like bricks without mortar. And here I refer to the very comments of the mining explosives producer turned arms magnate in exile, Mr Cardoen. In an interview for a state television programme across the Andes, he himself remarked that the armed forces had requested his services to produce anti-tank mines since the Chilean Army had none at all in its inventory. In other words, the defence of Magallanes was not going to be flooded with AT mines — far from it — perhaps one of the key elements to slow an armoured advance. Not my words, I repeat. Without that, Mr Floody’s defence looks like a giant scarecrow.

On the other hand, it is essential to point out the alarming overestimation that the organiser of the defence, the aforementioned Mr Floody Buxton, gave to the Carabineros. This is, indisputably, a civilian border police force, and under no circumstances should it be considered a combat force. It is possible that this man intended to make use of their vast knowledge as baqueanos of the region or through intelligence with infiltrated farmhands, but did this officer of British descent really think he could successfully face an armoured or airborne assault with Carabineros? Did Floody truly believe he could entrust his life and the defence of Punta Arenas to a militarised police force without any wartime record? Worse still, their only “combat record” had been invading Argentine territory at Lago del Desierto. There, a Carabineros patrol stationed itself for several days with SIG rifles, entrenched in a shed turned checkpoint, defending the position. No need to invoke La Concepción or Prat: at the first burst from the gendarmes, which killed one Chilean soldier, all the Carabineros surrendered. All of them. Was that the force upon which this “majestic” general pinned his hopes? By any analysis, both in terms of function and of record, Floody was completely mistaken.

Finally, and the final blow, Chile lacked air superiority. What would the Chilean infantry or cavalry, even entrenched in a well-planned defensive position, have done when 450- or 500-kilogram bombs fell on their position with impunity? Historical evidence shows that troops in defensive positions have managed to survive air or artillery attacks (Monte Cassino, Stalingrad, among others). However, it is obvious that this is not the side of the battlefield the troops wished to be on, and there is also further evidence that defensive positions have been dismantled by overwhelming air attacks that disarmed and demoralized the resistance.

All analyses lead to an inexorable Chilean defeat in which, at best, a stalemate might have been achieved within current Chilean territory. The damage to local infrastructure would have been in the billions, and human casualties in the tens of thousands. A scenario, in every respect, lamentable. This fear instilled in the Chilean armed forces, together with the Malvinas event in 1982, would shape that country’s entire defence policy up to the present day.

Citations

Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Francisco Bulnes Serrano. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas. Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017. ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0

Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata: British Preparations for the Invasion of 1806

Preparation of the English Invasions

May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.


William Pitt, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Napoleon, Emperor of France. They dispute the domination of the world. Engraving from 1805

At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Charles IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.


The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

 -Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"

The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, ​​Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is already, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

 -Miranda, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect his pledged word to the end. In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of ​​conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but he refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other bank of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. At the instigation of this directive, in all the ports of the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly on the construction of thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve:

“Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and this is what he states, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English, it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French, who are known to have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.


William Pitt Portrait

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

 -Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.

Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805. The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.


Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, ahead of the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.

June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the reduced invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach the knowledge of Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in La Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and with the arrival of new reports that indicate the appearance tion of the English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree summoning all men capable of bearing arms to join the militia corps within three days. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and set course towards the southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this small force is made up of professional combatants, for whom war is nothing more than a job. Veterans of a hundred battles, they are determined, like their boss, to take by storm a city whose population exceeds 40,000 inhabitants. That is the order, and they will have to comply with it, facing any risk.

With the arrival of day, Beresford orders his troops to prepare for the attack. At eleven o'clock the drums begin their roll, and the flags are displayed in the wind. From the top of the ravine facing the beach, the deputy inspector general of the troops, Colonel Pedro de Arce, sent by Sobremonte to contain the English, observes the movement of the enemy forces. With a measured step, and accompanied by the martial airs of the bagpipers, the British advance towards the swamp that separates them from Arce and his 600 militiamen. The latter, armed with a few carbines, swords and chuzas, grouped behind the three cannons with which they intended to repel the British assault.


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat inland.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that moment he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.

Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrived at the Fort, with a Parliament flag. He expressed that his boss demanded the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the inhabitants.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:

-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses considers the company to be finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.

Historiador del País