Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata: British Preparations for the Invasion of 1806

Preparation of the English Invasions

May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.


William Pitt, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Napoleon, Emperor of France. They dispute the domination of the world. Engraving from 1805

At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Charles IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.


The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

 -Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"

The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, ​​Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is already, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

 -Miranda, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect his pledged word to the end. In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of ​​conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but he refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other bank of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. At the instigation of this directive, in all the ports of the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly on the construction of thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve:

“Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and this is what he states, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English, it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French, who are known to have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.


William Pitt Portrait

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

 -Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.

Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805. The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.


Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, ahead of the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.

June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the reduced invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach the knowledge of Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in La Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and with the arrival of new reports that indicate the appearance tion of the English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree summoning all men capable of bearing arms to join the militia corps within three days. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and set course towards the southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this small force is made up of professional combatants, for whom war is nothing more than a job. Veterans of a hundred battles, they are determined, like their boss, to take by storm a city whose population exceeds 40,000 inhabitants. That is the order, and they will have to comply with it, facing any risk.

With the arrival of day, Beresford orders his troops to prepare for the attack. At eleven o'clock the drums begin their roll, and the flags are displayed in the wind. From the top of the ravine facing the beach, the deputy inspector general of the troops, Colonel Pedro de Arce, sent by Sobremonte to contain the English, observes the movement of the enemy forces. With a measured step, and accompanied by the martial airs of the bagpipers, the British advance towards the swamp that separates them from Arce and his 600 militiamen. The latter, armed with a few carbines, swords and chuzas, grouped behind the three cannons with which they intended to repel the British assault.


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat inland.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that moment he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.

Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrived at the Fort, with a Parliament flag. He expressed that his boss demanded the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the inhabitants.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:

-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses considers the company to be finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.

Historiador del País

Viceroyalty of the River Plate: British preparations for the Invasion of 1806

Preparation of the English Invasions

 

May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.

At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Carlos IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.

 
The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

-Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"

The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is now, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

-Mirando, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect her pledged word to the end.

In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other side of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. Under the spell of this directive, in all the ports on the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly building thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve: “Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and he states this, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French who you know, they have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.


Portrait of William Pitt

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

-Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.

Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805. The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.


Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty. 

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, overtakes the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.

June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the small invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and given the arrival of new reports indicating the appearance of English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree calling on all men fit to take up arms to join the corps within three days. of militias. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and headed southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this reduction


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat towards the interior.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that time he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.

Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrives at the Fort, with the Parliament flag. He expresses that his chief demands the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the population.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:

-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses consider that the company is finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.

Historiador del País