The HMS Conqueror chasing the Belgrano
The Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror, which had 3 units, with nuclear propulsion, was launched on 05/12/1967 and joined the Sea Fleet on 09/11/1971. The main objective of these submarines was, in the Cold War, to spy on the movements of the Soviet submarine naval force. She was retired in 1990. To this day she was the only nuclear submarine to sink an enemy ship with conventional torpedoes, the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, in 1982.)
by LAWRENCE FREEDMAN and VIRGINIA GAMBA
On April 27, the Argentine Navy had been deployed to oppose the planned landing of British forces. On April 29, the fleet divided into two groups and took up positions to defend the Falklands. The most important group included 25 de Mayo, with two destroyers equipped with guided missiles, as well as four smaller destroyers and frigates. This group was divided into two (Task Groups 79.1 and 79.4) and occupied positions on the edge of the Maritime Exclusion Zone, and to the northwest of the islands (Task Group 79.1 was 270 nautical miles east of the Gulf of San Jorge, in Patagonia, and Task Group 79.4 northeast of the same position).
The smaller group, which included the cruiser General Belgrano, plus two destroyers (Task Group 79.3), went on to occupy a position 260 miles south of the islands. His orders were to "search and destroy the Bitany fleet if the islands or the mainland were attacked." The Navy had been ordered to respect the 200-mile zone imposed by the British and not to launch attacks.
At 15:13 on 1 May, Admiral Allara, commanding Task Group I aboard 25 May, had received aerial reconnaissance to the effect that seven British ships were They were about 120 miles away, north of Puerto Argentino. Lombardo would later recall:
Our people in the Falklands, in the Malvinas, began to claim that there was a landing... Landing with helicopters and boats, with boats, both at various points, near Puerto Argentino, near Port Stanley... So I had to accept that that was the day of disembarkation. We believed that the British would concentrate efforts in the vicinity of Port Stanley and tried to attack isolated ships or small groups of ships outside that region. The Air Force would attack the ships that were near Port Stanley."
More or less simultaneously, information sent by Rear Admiral Otero of the South Atlantic Command arrived and said that there was a "landing underway north of the islands." The ships were claimed to have held between 010 and 145 degrees off Stanley, at intervals of 90, 40 and 10 nautical miles, protected by Sea Harriers.
At 15:55, upon receiving information from Admiral Allara, Lombardo left him "free of action to attack." Allara interpreted this as a modification of Argentine combat rules. He could now take action against the British fleet and issued orders to that effect to the groups under his command. This change was made without reference to higher authorities.
There is no reason to believe that if he had consulted he would have thought better of it. Admiral Anaya, commander in chief of the Navy, feared that the navy would not respond quickly enough, and that all the honors of the battle would go to the Air Force. He ordered Lombardo to commit the Navy and then backed off, as he thought his own attitude was unfair. Lombardo was "closer to the action" and, therefore, had to do what he judged "necessary and appropriate." In reality, Lombardo had already ordered the attack.
Granted freedom of action, Allara began moving toward the task force. At 20:07, now that he had more information about the British cannonades and possible landings, Allara gave the general order to begin offensive operations. At 8:39 p.m., General Menéndez, in Puerto Argentino, was convinced that a landing was taking place. At 20:55 there was intense naval fire on the airport and the helicopters approached the coast. But shortly before midnight the ships ceased fire and withdrew. No Sea Harrier attacks had been sustained since 19:00. More or less at that time the first SAS units were disembarking on Soledad Island (East Falkland). If, as has been suggested, the Argentine radars on the coast detected the Sea King helicopters transporting the men of the SAS units, it is possible that this verification reinforced the impression of a landing attempt.
At noon, a Tracker plane, on a reconnaissance mission, discovered six British ships. Allara, who was on board the May 25, was informed. Allara hoped to dispatch six Skyhawks with a combat radius of 240 miles, each armed with six 250-kilogram bombs. He needed a 40-knot wind to do it. At 10 p.m. the wind began to decrease. He now calculated that he would need to wait until 6 o'clock before finding himself in a position that would allow him to unleash the attack. Two hours later he had decreased even more. To send the planes from the ship he would have to load them with less fuel and fewer weapons. The radius of action was reduced to 140 miles and the load to two bombs. It was now concluded that the attack would not be possible until 11am on 2 May. Regardless, Allara decided to continue moving towards the task force.
At 0:30 on 2 May an echo was detected about 110 miles away, approaching Task Group 1. It was identified shortly afterwards as a Sea Harrier. The plane circled about 60 to 70 miles away from Task Group 1, which it had apparently discovered. At 1:19 Lombardo sent Allara the following signal: "Su 012007. There have been no air attacks on MLV since 011900. I do not know the position of enemy aircraft carriers. Unengaged enemy constitutes a strong threat to T 79."
If the enemy was not attacking Puerto Argentino now, it could be found anywhere within a wide radius. So now not only was there no immediate need to attack the Royal Navy, since there was no landing, but there was a threat to the Argentine fleet. This was not an order to retreat, but the consequences were clear.
Allara was not fully aware of the risks, as he had just been located by an enemy Sea Harrier. At 1:45 he informed Lombardo that there was little point in continuing the march, because wind conditions made an attack impossible, and the forecast for the next day suggested that things would not improve. Accordingly, he ordered the task groups to "return to their previous positions... That is, the two northern groups towards the mainland and the southern group towards the Island of the States." He wanted to return to shallower waters to limit the risk of falling victim to a submarine attack. When Admiral Anaya arrived at the Operations Center, at 2:30, he confirmed the messages from Allara and Lombardo and annulled the orders ordering the offensive action to begin.
Meanwhile, the Belgrano and the two accompanying destroyers patrolled between States Island and Bordwook Bank, southwest of the Falklands, with the double objective of preventing another British warship from joining the task force coming from the Pacific, and to warn of any movement towards the continental territory. That group was also destined to prevent Chilean intervention. On the afternoon of May 1, he received the order to avoid approaching the Exclusion Zone, and to avoid confronting the enemy without prior authorization; Instead, he was to offer a lateral threat, so that the enemy would divide his forces. Like the rest of the fleet, he had been ordered to intercept enemy units that were damaged or isolated, or had become separated from the main body of the British task force, if the opportunity arose. He was not to engage in a frontal attack.
At 2:50 the Belgrano commander received the order given by Allara at 1:45. He began to really alter course at 5:11. This maneuver ended at 6, and at that moment the cruiser pointed its bow towards the Island of the States. About ten hours later she was hit by two torpedoes from the port side. She immediately lost propulsive power and began to list. Half an hour later the evacuation was ordered, and at 5:02 p.m. the Belgrano sank. An accompanying destroyer, Hipólito Bouchard, believed she had been hit by a third torpedo that did not explode. With the other destroyer, the Piedrabuena, she adopted anti-submarine measures and moved away from her.
Lombardo later explained why the destroyers had not helped pick up survivors, and alluded to "the first spectacular submarine action" during the Great War, in the channel. A German submarine torpedoed a British ship, which began to sink, and then successively sank the two accompanying ships, which had stopped to pick up survivors. "The ships are not at sea to pick up survivors," he added, "but to fight and not be sunk." In the most costly individual encounter of the war, 321 crew members of the Belgrano lost their lives.
Woodward Request
As it came many hours after the fighting on May 1, it appeared that this British attack was unrelated to the previous combat. But it wasn't like that. He closely followed the action of the day before. To explain this, it is necessary to return to the way the British viewed the military situation.
On April 30, the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror was sent to the Tierra del Fuego area, with orders to search for the Belgrano. The information that the cruise ship was in that area may have come from Chilean sources; According to one version, the Chilean naval command in Punta Arenas at the end of April sent a message to the British military attaché in Santiago through an intermediary. Later in the afternoon, the Conqueror picked up the first sounds on sonar. In reality, she was a tanker that accompanied the Belgrano.
The Conqueror's orders, received at 9 p.m., local time, on April 30, were to intercept the Belgrano and attack her when she entered, as it was expected she would, into the Total Exclusion Zone. The next morning he sighted the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it, and that were refueling with fuel from the tanker. At 11 o'clock the three ships began to move away towards the southeast, at the speed of 8 knots. The Conqueror began to follow them and sent signals to Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, outside London, indicating that she had established contact, and indicating her position and course. The signal also reached Admiral Woodward, who was aboard the Hermes. At 1 on May 2, the Conqueror reported that he was still following the Belgrano.
Admiral Woodward wanted the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano. He gave Conqueror a direct order to attack at 4:10 (8:10 British time) on the morning of 2 May. The order had to pass through Northwood, where Admiral Herbert, commander of the submarines, rescinded it, because he realized that he would need political approval. Woodward had the authority to attack the Argentine ships with his surface ships or aircraft, and he could have done so in this case, although not so easily. What he now demanded required that the forms of combat be modified, a step that Northwood was already contemplating.
Desde Northwood se envió una señal al capitán Wreford-Brown, del Conqueror, a las 6:15, y probablemente lo sorprendió la orden de que se abstuviera de desencadenar un ataque hasta que cambiasen las reglas.
Although Britain seemed embroiled in a possibly unlimited naval battle with Argentina, the task force was constrained with respect to the possible use of its most lethal weapons - nuclear submarines - by established rules of combat.
In Northwood, Woodward's attitude aroused irritation. It was suggested that Admiral Fieldhouse had expressed his displeasure with him. Still, Woodward's request highlighted something that was already being addressed. Fieldhouse supported Woodward's view that the rules should be changed to allow the attack.
At Northwood it was estimated that there was enough time to get the rules of engagement modified before the Belgrano reached the task force. Not long after receiving Woodward's signal, at 9:15 British time on the morning of 2 May, Admiral Lewin arrived at Northwood and reviewed the situation with other senior commanders before proceeding to Checkers for a meeting. meeting of the War Cabinet. It was agreed that Lewin would lobby the War Cabinet for changes to the rules of engagement.
Admiral Woodward explained his concern this way:
"Early on May 2, everything indicated that the 25 de Mayo, the Argentine aircraft carrier and a group of escort ships had crossed my SSN barrier heading north, and that the cruiser General Belgrano and its escort ships were trying to complete the pincer movement from the south, still outside the Total Exclusion Zone. But the Belgrano was still followed by the Conqueror. My fear was based on the Belgrano breaking away from the SSN as it passed through the not-so-deep waters of Burdwood Bank, and that my advanced SSN barrier would also be evaded there. Therefore, I demanded, for the first and only time in the course of the campaign, a major change in the Rules of Combat, in order to allow the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano outside the Exclusion Zone."
Woodward's concern therefore related to the immediate tactical situation in which he found himself. His own previous experience in Royal Navy exercises with the United States Navy meant that he knew that carrier groups were not invulnerable to surface ship action groups. He sent his claim to the Conqueror not long after receiving information indicating that the most important Argentine group was advancing towards him, and the union of the two fragments of information raised the possibility of a "pincer movement." It was known that the destroyers that accompanied the Belgrano carried Exocet, and it was possible that the cruiser itself had this missile. If anything, her 6-inch guns outclassed the British 4.5-inch guns. To attack the cruiser she only had the Harriers and the SSN. The Harriers were needed for the air defense task, especially because there was still a risk that the Skyhawks would be launched from the 25 de Mayo. The Conqueror remained. The concern here was that if the Belgrano sailed across the submerged risk called Burwood Bank, the Conqueror would have serious difficulties maintaining contact, especially if she wanted her presence not to be detected.
Based on available intelligence, Northwood's assessment was also that the Argentine Navy was attempting a pincer movement. What was known then about the Argentine movements? According to a number of versions, the signal sent by Admiral Allara at 15:55 (19:55 British time) ordering the groups under his command to begin the offensive against the British fleet had been intercepted, and this was which affected the Belgrano and its escort ships.
Lewin has also pointed out that the evaluation was based on the knowledge that there had been a significant flow of radio traffic between the different units of the Argentine Navy, and on the "evaluation of what one would have done if one had been in the place of Argentina".
The reference to radio traffic reflects Woodward's officers' analysis of the position and progress of the Argentine carrier group on the basis of interpretation of "wireless traffic patterns and observation of the direction from which they could approach." the planes of May 25".
After radar contact with one of the Tracker search aircraft launched on May 25, the Sea Harriers attempted to discover the aircraft carrier. One of them detected the presence of four or five ships not long after midnight local time. The pilot immediately noticed that he was also being illuminated by the search radar of a Type 909 Sea Dart. With this alarming confirmation that he had found enemy ships he hurried back to the Hermes. As we now know, this same contact was a fundamental factor in the Argentine decision to withdraw, and the withdrawal was taking place while Northwood officers considered how to deal with a threat they believed was looming.
It has been suggested that Lombardo's signal at 1:19 (5:19 British time) had also been intercepted by GCHQ, but was not yet deciphered.
This signal was more of a warning than an order to retreat (which later came from Allara), although retreat was implied. It is possible that other signals were intercepted that could have provided a clearer picture if deciphered; but even if this had been the case, the decryption task would have taken several hours.
According to the Foreign Affairs committee of the House of Commons, whose members were shown the available intelligence material: "The classified evidence we have seen and other evidence authoritatively and conclusively demonstrate that before the sinking of the Belgrano they did not come into the hands of the government "British intercepted orders regarding a withdrawal of Argentine forces."
The most recent direct evidence would have confirmed the impression that the Argentine fleet was continuing to advance. The Conqueror had reported at 5 (London time) that it was continuing to follow the Belgrano, which was undoubtedly avoiding the Exclusion Zone, but was approaching the task force at a speed of 13 knots.
So the tactical picture was in some ways disconcerting. The Argentine fleet, and especially the aircraft carrier, would have been drawn to sea according to plan, but the plan had been thwarted as the nuclear submarine HMS Splendid had been unable to establish contact with the 25 de Mayo, which was now in front. of the Argentine offensive. The only part of this offensive with which there was any contact was the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it. The Belgrano probably did not carry Exocet anti-ship missiles, but she could carry them, and the escort destroyers possessed such weapons. Likewise, although the speed at that time was reduced, it would still catch up with the task force.
This was calculated on the basis of the "Widest Circle", that is, a circle whose center is the last known position of the enemy, and whose radius is the maximum known speed of the enemy multiplied by the time that has elapsed since the last time he saw it. This circle widens with the passage of time. The Belgrano's last reported speed, i.e. 13 knots, was less than its maximum speed of 30 knots, but a prudent commander concerned about the vulnerability of the ships under his command would have felt compelled to assume the worst. .
Another tactical risk was that the Belgrano could have participated in a new expedition to occupy South Georgia, which did not have a good defense at that time. Meanwhile, the need to monitor it would be a further burden on the task force's strained helicopter and Harrier core.
Another factor that weighed on the minds of the commanders concerned the risk of delaying the special forces that were to reconnoiter the islands on the coast. According to Lewin's version:
"Having reached the vicinity of the Falkland Islands, he (Woodward) had to secretly send special forces to gather information on the Argentine dispositions. For this purpose he needed to approach within a very short distance of the Falklands every night. Whether it was to disembark or to resupply the committed special forces. He could not perform any of these tasks if the Argentine fleet was at sea. He did not know where he was, and it was assumed that his intention was to attack him. He could preserve his safety by retreating to the east and staying out of reach of the Argentines. If he adopted that criterion, he would be unable to fulfill his mission."
In addition to concerns that the Belgrano was part of an imminent offensive, there were other reasons why task force commanders strongly supported an attack. Firstly, one of the original objectives of yesterday's operations was to create opportunities that would allow the Argentine Navy and Air Force to be worn down. Perhaps not all the consequences of the loss of the Belgrano were foreseen, but in any case it was an opportunity that the commanders did not want to waste. To quote Lewin again: "In war, it is necessary to seize opportunities while they exist; there may be no second chance."
There was something else. These arguments were themselves symptomatic of the fact that the limitations imposed on submarines seemed anomalous. All the information coming from the South Atlantic regarding the previous day's activity indicated that the fighting had begun in earnest. All this was clearly deduced from the attack in which the Glamorgan barely escaped, and from the evidence that at least one Argentine submarine had been searching for prey. The reports that arrived from Buenos Aires in the morning reinforced that impression.
The Argentine statements regarding the successes obtained the day before, although undoubtedly exaggerated, were nevertheless interpreted as a reliable indication of that country's intentions, and in themselves contributed to creating the atmosphere of the War Cabinet's subsequent decision.
Regardless of the specific reasons given in relation to the Belgrano, Lewin would have pressured the War Cabinet in favor of a change in the rules of combat. If the specific tactical situation of May 1 and 2 had not forced a change the question would have been raised the following day, during the War Cabinet meeting. The change would determine that all Argentine warships would be threatened by British submarines, and not just the Belgrano.
Lewin went to Checkers with Admiral Fieldhouse to highlight the military's argument. When he arrived, he immediately explained the situation to the prime minister and asked for the rules to be changed.
The War Cabinet itself did not discuss the matter. Outside of Lewin, the chiefs of staff were not included in the discussion, although they all agreed with Lewin's recommendation. As the matter was urgent, Thatcher called together the ministers and civil servants who had been invited to lunch before the formal body met in the afternoon. Therefore, it was not recorded in the minutes. There was little time to consider in advance the consequences of the step. The discussion lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. One version states that there was a fairly extensive discussion, but in practice it seems that it was rather superficial, and that there was a general reluctance to question military judgment.
Whitelaw later recalled that it was "one of the easiest decisions he personally participated in" as soon as he (Whitelaw) realized the risk of losing contact with the Belgrano if the Conqueror was not allowed to attack it.
The absence of the Foreign Office Secretary may have meant that diplomatic aspects were not analyzed as carefully as they could have been. Antony Acland, head of the Diplomatic Service, may have been present, but his immediate predecessor, Sir Michael Palliser, who was now an adviser to the War Cabinet, had not yet arrived. Sir Michael Havers was concerned about the possible effect on international public opinion, but the effect on the peace negotiations was not taken into account, as it was believed that no such efforts existed at the time.
The accepted change was to "allow attacks on all Argentine ships on the high seas, as had previously been agreed only in relation to May 25." Nor was the need to immediately communicate the change to Argentina considered in this case. Once it was decided to send the signal, Lewin warned that by the time the Conqueror received it he might have lost sight of the Belgrano. At the time, he believed there was a 75 percent chance that the Conqueror would be successful.
At 13 (British time) Lewin contacted Northwood from Checkers, and thirty minutes later he reported this change to the task force.
The communications had to occupy space on a North American communications satellite that was available only infrequently and supported only short, precise messages. Furthermore, if the nuclear submarine was not waiting for a message, and also taking measures to prevent the enemy from discovering it, it might not receive the communication.
Apparently, this is what happened at 1:30 p.m. on May 2, when Northwood announced the change in the rules of engagement. It is claimed that the captain of the Conqueror received a "confusing" message. He had faced problems with communications during the eve, as a result of the damage caused to his masts by the rough seas. Furthermore, he probably wanted to ensure that the situation was fully understood before taking such an important step. Taking advantage of the next available slot at 3 p.m. British time (11 a.m. in the South Atlantic), the Conqueror reported that his quarry had altered course at 9 a.m. The course was now 270 degrees, and the speed was 14 knots.
Northwood's order could not be repeated until 5 p.m., and this time, at 5:30 p.m., the Conqueror acknowledged receipt and informed Northwood of its intention to attack. Information that the Belgrano had altered course reached Northwood at 3:40 p.m., but reportedly reached no further than Admiral Herbert, senior submarine commander. It seems that this commander did not then consider the information to be important: the cruiser could have changed course again, as he had done before, or had moved to attack South Georgia.
Aboard Conqueror, Wreford-Brown had decided to attack with the older and shorter-range Mark 8 torpedo, as a result of its larger warhead, which gave it a better chance of piercing the warship's armor and anti-torpedo shields. Likewise, he was a short distance from the target.
"I spent more than two hours trying to find an attack position on the port side of the cruiser. It was still day. Visibility was variable; at one point she descended to 2,000 yards. I insisted on going up to take a look - but when we were at periscope depth we would distance ourselves - and then I had to dive and catch up with them. I did the same thing five or six times. They weren't using sonar; They were limited to zigzagging slowly at the approximate speed of 13 knots. Twice I was in a reasonable firing position, but I found that they had deviated a few degrees".
At 20 o'clock the Conqueror was in position to fire three torpedoes at Belgrano. At 20:30 British time (16:30 local time), he informed Northwood that the Belgrano had been successfully hit. The Conqueror had to escape quickly, because she soon faced an intense anti-submarine attack from the cruiser's escort ships.
16:25: The hull was inclined at 20° and submerged 7 meters. Because of the wind, the rafts had difficulty separating. Photo: Courtesy of the Friends of the General Belgrano Cruise Association
Source: Urgente 24.