Showing posts with label Demalvinisation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Demalvinisation. Show all posts

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Guerrero: A Soldier with a Missile as Sword

Miguel Vicente Guerrero, the patriot who dreamed of a strong Argentina: the life, science and sovereignty of the “father” of the Condor II





To speak of Commodore Miguel Vicente Guerrero is to speak of one of those extraordinary Argentine figures who, even after having devoted their intellect, vocation and life to the service of the Nation, did not always receive in their own country the recognition they deserved. A soldier, scientist, strategist, teacher and nationalist, Guerrero was far more than the principal driving force behind the Condor II missile project: he was a man convinced that Argentina had to develop its own power, its own technology and its own defence capability in order to cease depending on others and to act in the world with sovereign dignity.

Born on 26 July 1943 in Caucete, San Juan, his life was marked from childhood by a national tragedy: the devastating San Juan earthquake of 15 January 1944. Guerrero survived that disaster, which destroyed the province and claimed the lives of thousands of Argentines, among them two of his younger sisters. That early wound, shaped by pain, loss and the harshness of a country that so often forced its sons to rise again from the ruins, seems to have forged in him a singular strength. From a very young age, he understood that life demanded fortitude, sacrifice and a sense of mission.

He studied on a scholarship at the Military Lyceum of Mendoza and later joined the Argentine Air Force, where he began a brilliant career. He qualified as an electronic and aeronautical engineer, graduating from the Military Aviation School, and his outstanding performance quickly placed him among the most promising officers of his generation. In 1964, while holding the rank of second lieutenant, he travelled to the United States on a scholarship to further his education. Years later, in 1974, he returned to specialise in missile technology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the most prestigious institutions in the world, where he graduated with the highest academic distinction. That period abroad did not turn him into a technician in the service of foreign interests; on the contrary, it reinforced his conviction that the most advanced knowledge had to be placed at the service of Argentina.


Guerrero was an electronic and aeronautical engineer, graduating from the Military Aviation School.

Guerrero belonged to that rare breed of men who understood that science and national defence were not separate worlds, but parts of one and the same historical task. For him, a nation without technological capability of its own was a vulnerable nation. And a vulnerable nation, sooner or later, falls subject to the will of others. That idea would become central to his life’s work.

His name became permanently associated with the Condor project, and especially with the Condor II, one of the greatest technological achievements attained by Argentina in strategic matters. At the Falda del Carmen facilities in Córdoba, within a highly secret complex under Air Force control, Guerrero led, together with Argentine technicians, scientists and military personnel, an undertaking of enormous scale: to develop a vehicle with an indigenous projection capability, combining spatial, scientific and military deterrent applications.



The project did not emerge from nowhere, nor was it a mere military whim. It was the product of a comprehensive vision of the nation. On the one hand, it sought to provide Argentina with the capability to place satellites into orbit by national means, that is, to advance towards space autonomy. On the other, it offered a concrete instrument of deterrence against external threats, especially after the Malvinas War, when the brutal asymmetry between Argentina and a NATO power such as the United Kingdom was painfully laid bare.



Miguel Vicente Guerrero during his time at MIT (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), where he graduated in Missile Technology in 1974

Guerrero clearly understood something that many political leaders never wished to understand: the recovery of bargaining power vis-à-vis the British occupier could not rest solely on diplomatic declarations, but also on the construction of national power. His reasoning was underpinned by impeccable geopolitical logic. If Argentina possessed a system capable of representing a genuine threat to the British military posture in the South Atlantic, London would be forced to increase enormously the cost of maintaining its occupation of the islands. And when the cost of an occupation becomes too high, politics begins to shift. This was not a reckless impulse, but a deterrence strategy aimed at narrowing the military gap and bringing the United Kingdom to the negotiating table from a different position.

For that reason, many quite rightly regard him as the “father of the Condor II”. For he was neither a secondary figure nor a mere administrator: he was one of its central minds, one of the men who gave direction, shape and strategic purpose to one of the most ambitious projects in the history of Argentine technology.

His career, however, did not end there. Guerrero also served as President of the National Commission for Space Research (CNIE) and was a pioneer of Argentine satellite telecommunications, in addition to working as a university lecturer and later as Dean of the Faculty of Science and Technology at the University of Salvador. In other words, he did not think only in terms of defence: he also sowed knowledge, trained professionals and helped to build lasting scientific capabilities for the country. His patriotism was not rhetorical; it was concrete, technical, institutional and profoundly Argentine.



During the Malvinas War, moreover, he served as a Major in the Argentine Air Force and took part in the planning of air missions. Once the conflict had ended, he joined the Rattenbach Commission, tasked with analysing responsibilities and assessing the conduct of the war. He had fought, he had thought deeply about defence, and he had contributed to the subsequent critical evaluation. He was, in short, a man of complete military integrity: committed to the Nation before the conveniences of the moment.



Bunker for the launch and control of the Condor missile at Cabo Raso, Chubut.

Yet, as so often happened in Argentina to those who dared to build real sovereignty, Guerrero’s fate ended up being marked by the political pettiness of an era. The Condor project, which had advanced significantly and aroused the concern of foreign powers, was ultimately dismantled during the government of Carlos Menem, within the framework of automatic alignment with the United States and Great Britain. The names of Domingo Cavallo, Guido Di Tella and the pressures exerted from the American embassy became associated with that decision, which brought to an end one of the country’s most promising strategic developments.


He studied on a scholarship at the Military Lyceum of Mendoza and later joined the Air Force.

It was not merely the closure of a programme: it was the deliberate renunciation of a historic opportunity for autonomy. And, as if that were not enough, Guerrero was not honoured for having carried out with distinction the mission that the State itself had entrusted to him; instead, he was punished by being forced into retirement, while the teams of technicians and scientists who had made that achievement possible were broken up. The paradox was scandalous: Argentina penalised one of its most capable officers for having succeeded in a task of vital importance to the national interest.


The Civil Association Friends of Cabo Raso were the driving force behind the tribute and also built a cenotaph in memory of Commodore Guerrero..

Even so, Guerrero did not yield. And it is here that the moral dimension of his character reappears. After his retirement, he received offers to continue his career in the United States, including in academic circles. He could have chosen prestige abroad, the comfort of foreign recognition, or the ease of a life detached from Argentine frustrations. He did not do so. He chose to remain in his country and to devote his knowledge to the education of new generations. He was a lecturer, dean, director and teacher. He continued serving the Nation from the classroom and from science, with the same loyalty with which he had once served in uniform.



Those who knew him remember him as a noble, brilliant, sober man, deeply committed to the Fatherland. He was neither an improviser nor an adventurer: he was a consummate professional, a serious strategist, a respected scientist and an Argentine firmly convinced that sovereignty is not begged for, but built. In times of cultural dependence, he championed national development. In times of political subordination, he thought on a grand scale. In times of resignation, he placed his faith in an Argentina that was capable.

His death, in August 2019, passed for many almost in silence, as though the nation’s forgetfulness were determined to repeat one of its worst habits: forgetting its finest sons. Yet the figure of Miguel Vicente Guerrero withstands that oblivion. He lives on in every Argentine who understands that there is no independence without science, that there is no effective diplomacy without power of one’s own, and that there is no future for the Nation if those who worked to make it freer, stronger and more respected are held in contempt.




To remember Commodore Miguel Vicente Guerrero is not merely to do justice to an exceptional man. It is also to recover a central lesson for contemporary Argentina: countries that renounce their strategic talent, punish their patriots and surrender their technological capabilities without resistance condemn themselves to impotence. By contrast, those peoples who honour their men of science, their honest servicemen and their builders of sovereignty keep alive the possibility of standing up once again.



The Condor II on its service tower.


Miguel Vicente Guerrero was one of those indispensable Argentines. A man from San Juan marked by tragedy, shaped by excellence, devoted to service, a leading figure in national defence, a driving force behind space and missile development, and an example of fidelity to the Fatherland. His life shows that Argentine greatness is not an empty nostalgia: it is a concrete possibility whenever men emerge who are willing to think, work and sacrifice for it.



And if Argentina should ever decide to rediscover its destiny as a sovereign, industrial, scientific and respected nation, it will have to look again towards figures such as his. For there, in men like Guerrero, there still beats an idea of the country that never surrendered.


En el 2016 recibió una distinción por su carrera en la Fuerza Aérea

Tuesday, November 11, 2025

Gibraltar and Malvinas: The Same Claim

Malvinas and a Decision with the 22nd Century in Sight


The joint Spanish-British resolution regarding Gibraltar is a strategic move that belongs more to the future than to the present. It would be a mistake to interpret this particular action as a mere gesture of compliance with international law on the part of the United Kingdom.

Por Juan Recce


This was not an act driven by a iure vocation. It was a pragmatic manoeuvre that instantly dissolved a massive snowball threatening British interests in Europe. The UK chose to eliminate outright any possibility of Argentine involvement in continental European disputes — and, by extension, the involvement of Latin America as a whole. It was a low-cost move with high strategic return.

The United Kingdom is not a country of double standards — it is a country of multiple standards: Malvinas, Gibraltar, Chagos, the Caribbean, and so on. The only consistent thread in its international conduct is pure, unvarnished pragmatism. The issue here is not how much Malvinas resemble Gibraltar, but rather how much Gibraltar resembles Malvinas.

Gibraltar, while still a strategic enclave, is clearly in decline — due both to the global shift of power towards the Pacific axis and the retreat of European private capital from the Middle East and hydrocarbon-rich Africa.

In the eyes of Britain’s power elites and corporate interests, Gibraltar is far cheaper than Malvinas. Malvinas serve as the gateway to the last planetary frontier of natural resources: Antarctica — the final large, unallocated landmass on Earth — and the world’s second-largest continental shelf, encompassing six million square kilometres of submerged Argentine territory.

One must never underestimate British cunning. With its gaze fixed on the 22nd century, the UK pre-emptively blocked the landing of a Malvinas-style logic at Europe’s doorstep — all in one calculated move.


Tuesday, October 14, 2025

A Practical Guide to Detect Anglophilia in Argentina

Anglophilia: A Practical Guide to Detecting It

 

Demalvinisation refers to the systematic process of minimising, silencing, or discrediting Argentina’s narrative, memory, or national sentiment around the Falklands/Malvinas War and its claim to the islands—particularly after 1982.

After the Battle for the Malvinas, the United Kingdom faced the challenge of constructing an "exportable" doctrine—tailored specifically for Argentina and designed to penetrate the Argentine psyche in order to diminish any sense of national pride that might once again ignite the powerful will to resist, as was shown in 1982.

That experience became the UK's greatest military disaster since the Second World War. London, aware that there can be no defence without first possessing the determination and will to claim what Argentinians know to be rightfully theirs—as demonstrated in the Malvinas—found that the most effective long-term strategy was to suppress Argentina’s will and determination. To that end, they set about engaging Argentine organisations, public figures, and politicians who would actively work to erode national self-esteem while simultaneously convincing the public that the "Malvinas issue" wasn’t so serious or important as to hinder other potential areas of development or cooperation with the UK.

The processes of demalvinisation and the dismantling of Argentina’s Armed Forces were just the tip of the iceberg, the visible portion of a much broader ideological infrastructure that was encouraged, promoted, and even financed by the United Kingdom. Often left out of view are the legislators, businessmen, and high-ranking military officers who silently (and increasingly less so) make up this powerful structure, whose brain operates both from across the Atlantic and from within Argentina itself.

A major triumph of this British strategy—promoted in Argentina by many compatriots—has been the continual downplaying of the Malvinas Conflict, and the construction of a language that, passively and almost unconsciously, has been absorbed by anglophile citizens who have become repeaters of narratives crafted by the British establishment.

Today, we offer a practical guide for recognising an anglophile—whether they are an active participant in that British-built skeleton operating in Argentina, or simply a citizen who dreams of belonging to the "Anglo world" due to national self-esteem issues (proof, if any were needed, that the British plan worked) or a disconnection from their own national identity.

An anglophile, be they civilian, military, or political, is easily identified because, lacking authentic arguments, they always resort to the same language as their "brothers", to favour, promote, and defend British interests in Argentina. Here are some of their most common expressions:

🇬🇧 “The war was a desperate manoeuvre by the Military Junta. A meaningless war.”
(Denies the historical background, legal precedents, and international law supporting Argentina’s sovereignty claim.)

🇬🇧 “The only way to recover the Malvinas is through peaceful means.”
(In practice, advocates for military dismantling, deliberately ignoring the concept of deterrence. This sort of anglophile would probably consider San Martín merely a murderer for taking up arms in the cause of independence.)

🇬🇧 “We must cooperate with the British in all other areas without jeopardising the sovereignty issue.”
(A dangerous anglophile: effectively proposes postponing sovereignty discussions—when they should be a top priority—while encouraging us to “burn through” tools of pressure and cooperation that could strengthen our negotiation stance.)

🇬🇧 “It’s impossible to manufacture national weapons systems—it would take 20 years to develop deterrent technology.”
(A mentally colonised anglophile relying on arguments from the 1990s. Well, over 30 years have passed and there’s still been no will to produce anything. The Cóndor II missile took under a decade from design to launch readiness. This kind of anglophile seeks to turn national defence development into a utopia in order to maintain dependency.)

🇬🇧 “The Malvinas would be ours today if we hadn’t started the war in 1982.”
(A malicious anglophile who falsely blames Argentina for starting the war and ignores the UK’s original aggression in 1833. This specimen denies Argentina’s right to legitimate self-defence under international law.)

🇬🇧 “We’ll recover the Malvinas when we convince the kelpers (Falklanders) to want to be Argentinian.”
(A servile anglophile: not only accepts British occupation, but insists we must “seduce” a population implanted by force—granting them a right to self-determination they do not possess. The kelpers have no legitimate say, being a population settled by an occupying power.)

🇬🇧 “We’ll recover the Malvinas when it becomes too costly for the UK to maintain their defence.”
(A sophisticated neo-anglophile: this logic delays urgent action, ignoring that no cost in history has ever deterred the UK from its imperial foothold. In 1982, during a major economic crisis, Britain still dispatched a fleet over 13,000 km. A statement of naïveté or outright irresponsibility.)

🇬🇧 “The Malvinas war was pointless.”
(One of the most harmful kinds of anglophiles. This argument was central to demalvinisation and has driven many veterans to take their own lives, believing their fight was meaningless. This type denies all historical, legal, and international support for Argentina’s claim, and supports dismantling the Armed Forces by suggesting they are unnecessary. Also ignores the basic principles of Defence and deterrence.)

🇬🇧 “There are no longer any conflict hypotheses.”
(A foolish anglophile: It’s not a hypothesis—there is a conflict. An Argentine province remains under foreign occupation, yet this mantra helps pave the way for disarmament, perfectly aligned with British interests.)

Know other anglophile expressions we missed? Let us know in the comments.

Text: Eric Torrado – Malvinas en la Mira