Operation Uka Uka (Parte 2)
by Guillermhe PoggioPart 1 || Part 2
Puerto Argentino
We left Comandante Espora in two Hercules (I was traveling in the one carrying the ITB) and arrived at Comodoro Rivadavia, where the flight plan was to cross to the islands. At night we left for the island, we flew low to avoid being detected by enemy radar. The altitude was so low that seawater splashed on the plane's windshield, and it couldn't tilt sideways to avoid hitting the wing in the sea unless it went up (suicidal, since it would be an easy target).Every half hour we went up quickly to do a radar scan to detect any enemy activity, and we returned to the flyover. Meanwhile, we were flying with our eyes glued to the horizon in order to identify the silhouette of an enemy ship. I believe that the praise received by our fellow Air Force and Navy pilots, regarding their courage and professionalism, is more than worthy given the degree of risk they face, especially in transport aircraft.
After three hours of flying we were informed that the airport was under attack and that they had to return. Only on the third attempt did he manage to cross with the two C-130s. There were moments of tension and feelings as if we were in a "flying coffin."
Once we arrived in the Malvinas Islands, we put the two trucks in a warehouse in Puerto Argentino. The next day, Admiral Otero appointed Lieutenant Edgardo Rodríguez and Mario Abadal to collaborate with me in the operation of the system. Lieutenant Charles Ries Centeno, from the reserve, joined the group, producing the film "The Adventure of Man", who was with the film crew on the islands. I explained to the entire ITB operation and how the launch was done.
Shortly after, Ries Centeno was joined by Sergeant Eduardo Sánchez (Argentine Army) who operated the Rasit radar, the only portable radar available that could provide information about the target, although it was a ground surveillance radar.
The Rasit gave the information in thousandths and the operation of the Exocet system was in degrees and kilometers. A conversion table was made to feed the data into the system. In addition, other calculations must be carried out, which were also tabulated. The ITB was so poor that some data was entered with the help of potentiometers to adjust the value of each voltage measured with a "tester".
As already mentioned, the system was carried on two carts, one cart to carry more missiles, as it could not be moved in the purchase release we had anticipated. Thanks to a crane mounted on a forklift to launch. Shortly after, aligning with the trailer axle and releasing the neutral axle Rasit and began the process of connecting the entire system, starting the generator and checking if everything was in order.
Depending on the weight of the system, it was only possible to move it along the only paved road between Puerto Argentino and the airport. Finally, to put it in shooting position, we had to carry out this operation at night to avoid attracting people's attention.
At dusk (approximately 1800 hours) he began to maneuver the assembly, and the launcher of the drums around 2100. Around 4 in the morning he began to maneuver the disassembly to store it in a shed, so that with the first light of day It was not possible to see the installation (as is known, the British were never aware of the system).
On June 6, at 0100 hours, the Rasit detected a ship. We went to the information on the ITB and we did the whole process to launch it, but the missile did not make it "off". I was really very disappointed, but I decided to repeat the procedure with the second missile.
On that occasion, he could not determine whether the problem was an ITB failure or a missile. Due to poor installation, to carry out a new version you must wait twenty minutes, the time spent by the "discharge" of the ITB capacitor circuit and the only way to feed the system with the new information. Due to the emotion of the moment, without waiting the necessary time, we made the second version.
I realized that a half hour had passed between the first launch attempt and the second one, but, as Ries Centeno told me a few days later, it was about five minutes. The adrenaline in my brain advanced the clock at an unprecedented speed. The missile left, we saw it disappear into the night, we could only see the nozzle of the flame. Apparently, they did not deviate to the right and did not know where they fell. Concrete was at that time we fired the first shot of an MM-38 missile from the shore, but for reasons I could not determine at the time, he had not acquired the target.
It was a great frustration. It was found that it was possible to launch the missile, but could not explain why the missile had not followed the provided path. When a few days later Ries Centeno told me the time elapsed between the two versions, then I understood what was wrong. It must be added, informally, that the missile was launched against me and the two lieutenants, several meters from where we were. One of them fell on a box containing all my notes, charts and notes in the dark and I had to find that the documentation had been lost to spread.
The next day we made a request to Puerto Belgrano to send more missiles and a few days later we received two more.
During this time, it was completely checked and the system detected that it did not reach the 400 power cycles. With the help of Mr. Sanders (Ries Centeno team) he found that one of the voltage regulator diodes had burned out. By the way, this was the only English part of the entire system! I started looking for a replacement and found the Marine Infantry Anti-Aircraft Battalion (BIAA), commanded by Lieutenant Commander IM Héctor Silva, which was stationed in Puerto Argentino. In all parts of the "Tiger Cat" system I had exactly the same diode I needed! It was truly a miracle!
We change the diode in question and the ITB is working again and the following nights we continue putting the system in its position and removing it before dawn. So the days passed, but now the British ships were not showing. They had not detected the existence of our system, but for unknown reasons they crossed routes that were not available in our system.
This created a tense moment of waiting with a touch of humor to the drama of the situation and which later turned out to "baptize" the operation.
Lieutenant Rodríguez said that when he was a midshipman, he led a field exercise for several days. One night, one of the midshipmen had an idea, jokingly, to pray for rain by dancing around a tree and imitating the sound of "Uka, Uka," like the Indians do in American Western movies. Therefore, it would be possible to temporarily suspend the exercise. Immediately the guards, the navies began to dance according to the described ritual. The fact, Rodríguez said, is that the next day it started to rain and they had to evacuate the flooded field, with the suspension as a result of the exercise.
At first I laughed, but in the end, even as a way to combat the cold, I accepted the idea and at eleven o'clock at night on June 11 and in total darkness, and Rodríguez lieutenants Abadal and a captain of the frigate who was I, No one saw us, we walked around the ITB dancing the "Uka Uka". We returned to take our places in the ITB, without anyone noticing and with the promise of two lieutenants who did not say what they had done.
About three hours later (I don't believe in witches, but...), around 2 a.m. on June 12, a ship entered the firing zone of our launcher and Ries Centeno was able to capture the target with the Rasit, informing us, that it was within reach.
In haste he proceeded with the procedure for launching the missile, along with the glow of the nozzle in the darkness of the night. Then we saw a brief flash, so I thought it was an Exocet missile launched at SeaCat, and then an explosion that illuminated the horizon and was reflected in the low clouds. The missile had hit the cruiser Glamorgan Light (later repaired and modernized, it was transferred to the Chilean Navy).
All Army and Marine units that were in higher positions saw the launch (in fact, it was following the missile booster in the dark) and, at the same time, began to spread news reported, furthermore Briefly the communication channels were saturated. The next day, at night, the English did not appear in Puerto Argentino and there was no naval fire.
When the next night we wanted to reinstall the ITB, the crane that was used to put the missiles broke and therefore, we could not get into position and we were at the end of the war.
On the morning of June 14, we received a heavy naval bombardment. The 5th Marine Battalion took my partner, then Lieutenant Commander Hugo Robacio, had exhausted his ammunition, and this happened with almost all the other units. When the fall was imminent, together with Lieutenant Rodríguez prepared a few hand grenade to blow up the ITB, but Admiral Edgardo Otero, after asking if the British had the system before the Exocet and my response for what he ordered : Don't destroy ITB and you won't learn anything new about the Exocet, but see how we get to a ship and thus learn the capabilities of the Argentine Navy. (Pictured below is a British soldier in front of the tow after the fall of Puerto Argentino).
After the War
After the war, and as ordered by the Navy, I gave two interviews to journalists. To celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the war, a British television channel was allowed to interview and record some people who had a role in the conflict. After them, I had the opportunity to contact via e-mail the English officer who was on duty on the bridge of the Glamorgan when the ship was hit, and we exchanged greetings.It was also found that, as is public knowledge, the British sold the Chilean Navy a system called Excalibur (French sources said that the British had installed in Gibraltar), which was nothing more than our ITB, but in an improved form and not improvised
Defeat is not an event you want and it is difficult to overcome the feeling of anger and helplessness that comes with it, especially when you suffer the humiliation of becoming a prisoner of war. The technical success meant that the launch could be an effective satisfaction of all those who participated in the project from its beginning to its conclusion, but I am particularly interested in the following question: what would have happened if, instead of there being no first attempt Was it successful? Would there not have been a favorable effect on our future position in the circumstances? No one can know or will ever know.
It is my hope that this article is a tribute and gratitude to all those who in different ways have contributed to this unprecedented experience and also an incentive for new classes of Navy officers to face the challenges faced by the new circumstances.
Finally, I must thank my two children, who at the time they volunteered to go to the Malvinas Islands, and my wife who, in addition to ignoring my whereabouts for more than a month, suffered, like many other mothers , the anguish of thinking that he could lose his children forever.
Source: Pérez, J. M. UKA UKA-Operación. Boletín del Centro Naval, Nº 82, desde abril hasta junio 2008
Poder Naval
