Malvinas: Operation Georgias

Operation Georgias 

Satellite Image of South Georgia Islands Taken by NASA

Date: 3 April 1982
Location: Grytviken, South Georgia Islands
Outcome: Argentina takes control of Leith Harbour and Grytviken

Belligerents:
Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Commanders:
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills

Forces Engaged:
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
United Kingdom: 22 Royal Marines and HMS Endurance

Casualties:
Argentina: 3 killed, 9 wounded, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
United Kingdom: 1 wounded, 22 taken prisoner

Operation Georgias was the codename used by the Argentine Armed Forces for the operation to occupy the South Georgia Islands at the start of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on 3 April 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed Isla San Pedro) after forcing the surrender of a small contingent of British Royal Marines in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on 19 March 1982, when a group of civilian workers arrived at Leith Harbour aboard the transport vessel ARA Bahía Buen Suceso (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated the group, posing as civilian scientists.

Polar Ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata, February 1982, shortly before its involvement in South Georgia

Argentine Workers in South Georgia

The Davidoff Contracts

In September 1979, Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and a scrap metal dealer, signed a contract with the Edinburgh-based firm Christian Salvesen Co. The agreement granted him the right to remove the remains of the abandoned whaling stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik on the South Georgia Islands.
Davidoff approached the British Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting the use of the polar ship HMS Endurance to transport personnel and equipment necessary for dismantling the facilities. When the British authorities refused permission to use HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff sought approval from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy to book passage aboard Antarctic transport vessels.
Aware of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating a possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Argentine Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed him to travel to the islands at least twice a year.

Project and Operation Alfa

In September 1981, the Argentine Navy developed a plan to use Davidoff's salvage operations in South Georgia as a cover for establishing a covert base in the disputed territory. This initiative was given the codename Project Alfa. The plan involved infiltrating military personnel among the workers, posing as scientists. Once HMS Endurance had left the South Atlantic (from April onwards), they would be joined by 14 marines aboard a ship assigned to Antarctic base support, who would then establish a permanent military outpost on South Georgia. The base would benefit from the onset of winter, which would hinder any British attempt to remove it.

Parallel to this project, in October 1981, the commander of Antarctic naval operations received an order from the Chief of Operations of the Navy General Staff to study the possibility of establishing a scientific base on one of the disputed islands with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base would be set up during the 1981–1982 Antarctic campaign. This operation was designated Operation Alfa.
In early December, a decision was made that the base would be manned by military personnel rather than civilians, due to the need for secrecy. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to assign 1 officer and 6 NCOs. The same instruction applied to an equal number of tactical divers.

On 29 January 1981, training began for the selected commandos and divers, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz. The team included Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diver NCO, 1 medic NCO, 5 diver corporals, and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On 28 February, they boarded the Antarctic campaign vessel ARA Bahía Paraíso in Ushuaia.
To avoid interfering with planned operations in the Malvinas, the Military Committee cancelled Operation Alfa on 16 March. However, the commandos remained onboard as a precaution and departed on 18 March towards the South Orkney Islands, accompanying the vessel’s Antarctic campaign.

ARA Almirante Irízar

Davidoff’s Journeys

The Argentine businessman informed the British Embassy of his trip but did not request permission to travel aboard the icebreaker. On 16 December 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5) to carry out an inventory of the facilities to be dismantled at Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and departed a few days later.
On 23 December, the British magistrate in South Georgia discovered evidence of Argentine presence at Leith Harbour and reported it to Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, who relayed the information to London on 31 December. The British government instructed its embassy to issue a formal note of protest against the unauthorised landing, considered a breach of sovereignty. However, Argentina’s Foreign Minister claimed ignorance of the incident. A second formal protest was issued on 9 February but was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 February.

Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a commercial rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unplanned visit to Leith Harbour. Marchessi arrived at the site aboard the Caimán, a yacht registered in Panama, having sailed from Mar del Plata. He reported in at Grytviken, claiming to be part of Davidoff’s team, and provided the local British authorities with details of Davidoff’s December inspection as well as information on previous Argentine visits to the area during the 1970s.

Raising of the Argentine Flag

On 18 March 1982, the transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Leith Harbour, disembarking Davidoff’s workers and their equipment without first reporting at Grytviken, as required by the British government. At that time, the only British presence at Leith Harbour was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
On 19 March, four BAS members en route to Carlita Bay discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment at Leith Harbour, with the Argentine flag flying. Around 100 people had disembarked and occupied a BAS shelter. The BAS team leader, Trevor Edwards, approached Captain Briatore to inform him that their presence was unauthorised and that they were required to report at Grytviken. Edwards then informed the British magistrate at King Edward Point.
The BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Rex Hunt, who consulted with London. The British authorities demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the re-embarkation of the workers. Captain Briatore responded that the mission had the approval of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag lowered, but he still did not comply with the order to report at Grytviken.

On 20 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of the events. As the Argentines had failed to follow proper diplomatic procedures, the British government decided to respond with a limited intervention. The Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to sail to the area to ensure the removal of the Argentine flag and prevent any further landings. The ship had departed from Port Stanley on 16 March, carrying 22 Royal Marines.
On 21 March, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires issued a diplomatic protest, requesting that the Argentine government withdraw the workers.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to de-escalate the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official backing.

On the morning of 22 March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith Harbour. However, later that day, a BAS observation post detected the continued presence of Argentine personnel and relayed the information to London. As a result, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia.

 

Operation Georgias

On 23 March, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, Captain César Trombetta, aboard ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) and stationed in the South Orkney Islands, received orders from the Argentine Naval General Staff to proceed at full speed to the South Georgia Islands. His mission was to prevent HMS Endurance—which had departed from the Malvinas—from removing Davidoff’s Argentine workers from Leith Harbour.

In response to British movements, Argentina deployed several countermeasures. The corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were positioned between the Malvinas and South Georgia, ready to intercept HMS Endurance and recover any Argentine personnel on board.

On 24 March, the Argentine government publicly confirmed the presence of the workers on South Georgia. That same day, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz received orders to “disembark at Leith Harbour at 00:15 on 25 March to protect the Argentine workers.”
That night, ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Leith and disembarked 14 armed military personnel (Group Alfa) under Astiz’s command, using weapons supplied by the ship. The vessel remained in the area, patrolling with its helicopters. News from the region reported unusual Argentine naval activity in the South Atlantic.

When HMS Endurance reached Leith Harbour, it found ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored there. The two ships then shadowed each other around the islands until they lost contact on 31 March.

In anticipation of a possible armed clash, the British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate a compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that the workers at Leith Harbour be granted amnesty and provided with documentation—possibly temporary entry permits instead of passports, a significant concession to the Argentine position.
However, Argentina insisted that the arrival of its nationals in South Georgia should be governed by the 1971 Communications Agreement. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected extending that agreement—valid only for the Malvinas—to South Georgia and expressed his concerns to London.

The British plan was that BAS commander Steve Martin would remain in control until Argentine forces displayed hostile intent, at which point Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would assume command.

On 28 March 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as flagship of Task Force 40, carrying both the Task Force Commander and the Malvinas Theatre Commander, Major General Osvaldo García. This marked the beginning of Operation Rosario, which would lead to the surrender of the British governor in the Malvinas on 2 April.

That same day, 40 marines under Lieutenant Guillermo Luna boarded the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2, now P-32) at Puerto Belgrano, bound for South Georgia. The journey was harsh and overcrowded, as the vessel was not suited for troop transport and faced poor weather during the four-day voyage.

On 30 March, with the invasion clearly imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface vessels and three nuclear submarines, to proceed to South Georgia to reinforce HMS Endurance. The rest of the Royal Navy was placed on four-hour alert.

On 1 April, the Argentine Naval General Staff issued Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”, instructing forces to “occupy Grytviken and hold Leith to secure control of the South Georgia Islands.”
Missile corvette ARA Guerrico, under Commander Carlos Alfonso, was ordered to rendezvous with ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was equipped with two helicopters (a Puma from the Argentine Army and an Alouette from the Navy Air Command). The 40 marines under Luna’s command joined Astiz’s troops already stationed at Leith.

Up to that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.

Insignia of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed under the command of Captain César Trombetta. The group was composed of the following elements:[22]

• 60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by Frigate Captain Ismael J. García

• 60.1.2. Corvette ARA Guerrico, commanded by Frigate Captain Carlos Alfonso

• 60.1.3. A detachment from Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4), consisting of 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna

• 60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: one Puma (Argentine Army) and one Alouette (Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy)

• 60.1.5. A group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz

In response to these developments, a series of high-level meetings and diplomatic discussions took place in an attempt to prevent an Argentine invasion. On the night of 1 April, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he would speak directly with the Argentine Junta to avert an attack.

However, Reagan's phone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri proved unsuccessful.[23]

British Resistance

Cumberland Bay, including King Edward Cove and the Grytviken Peninsula

2 April

On 2 April, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz informed the Argentine personnel at Leith Harbour that Argentina had recovered the Malvinas, and he received the order to execute Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”.

Upon learning of the fall of Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), British Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills acted quickly. His men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, using barbed wire and landmines, and set up defensive positions around the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) buildings. HMS Endurance, positioned a few miles offshore, maintained communications between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorised to open fire in self-defence after issuing a warning. A subsequent statement from the British government instructed the Royal Marines “not to resist beyond the point where lives would be needlessly lost.”[24]

Due to severe weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on 2 April. As a result, Argentina’s planned operations in South Georgia had to be postponed by Commander César Trombetta to the following day. The original plan had called for Astiz’s special forces to land at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to secure the arrival zone for the main ground troops, who would be flown in by helicopter. ARA Guerrico was to provide naval gunfire support from outside the bay, but her delayed arrival due to the storm forced a revised plan for 3 April.

Under the new plan:

• The first landing would be carried out by an Alouette helicopter from ARA Guerrico.

• This would be followed by three waves of marine infantry aboard a Puma helicopter from ARA Bahía Paraíso.

• A radio message demanding British surrender would be sent before any landing.

• After the warning, ARA Guerrico would move toward Caleta Capitán Vago (where Grytviken’s port is located), opposite King Edward Point.

The corvette was only authorised to fire upon request from the ground forces. Astiz’s troops were to remain in reserve aboard Bahía Paraíso, and all units were instructed to avoid enemy casualties as long as possible.[25]

Historian Lawrence Freedman believes that Trombetta’s assumption of minimal resistance was based on the belief that only BAS personnel were present. This was apparently due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which led Trombetta to underestimate the British military presence.
Trombetta ordered ARA Guerrico to approach the shore, dispatch the Alouette for reconnaissance, and use the Puma to transport the first marine detachment.[26]

During the night, both Argentine ships made contact and remained in nearby waters, with ARA Guerrico anchored in Stromness Bay.

3 April

At 05:00 on 3 April, Lieutenant Guillermo Luna received a naval message indicating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 Royal Marines. However, Commander Trombetta believed that the landing zone would be clear, with any British personnel remaining aboard the polar ship.

At 07:35, with improved weather, ARA Guerrico arrived at Leith Harbour, where it transferred the marines to ARA Bahía Paraíso. Astiz’s commandos were re-embarked, and the workers left ashore under protection of forces from Bahía Paraíso, led by Lieutenant Cortez.

At 11:10, a surrender demand was transmitted from ARA Bahía Paraíso in English, and repeated three minutes later. The message falsely claimed that Governor Rex Hunt had surrendered not only in the Malvinas but also in all dependencies, including South Georgia.[13]
Lieutenant Mills received the message and relayed it to HMS Endurance to buy time. He also advised BAS personnel to take shelter in the local church. The British soldiers refused to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter was flying over Grytviken, reporting no signs of visible resistance. ARA Guerrico began entering the inlet.
According to Argentine Admiral Rubén Oscar Mayorga, the corvette’s commander, Captain Carlos Alfonso, hesitated to bring the ship into such confined waters. Mayorga supports Freedman’s view that Trombetta’s assumptions about British military presence were incorrect. He cites an official report indicating that Trombetta underestimated the situation, also expressing concerns about ARA Guerrico’s readiness for combat.[28] The ship had only recently returned to active service after being in dry dock until just days before departing from Puerto Belgrano.[29]

 

Wreckage of the Argentine Puma Helicopter

Helicopter Downing

At 11:25, the Argentine command ordered the personnel at Grytviken to move into the open, announcing that a landing by marine infantry would take place. Ten minutes later, the ARA Guerrico reported the presence of armed personnel on the ground.

At 11:41, the first wave of 15 Argentine marines, including Lieutenant Luna, was deployed by a Puma helicopter at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the British Royal Marines were entrenched. By then, the crew aboard Guerrico had confirmed that the British were positioned along the northern shore of the inlet.

A second wave of marines departed ARA Bahía Paraíso at 11:47, on the Puma, carrying Lieutenant Giusti, 14 marines, and a machine gun. However, Lieutenant Luna, already on the ground, had requested via Guerrico—as he had no direct communication with Bahía Paraíso—that the second wave be delayed and replaced with a third group carrying 60mm mortars. But the second wave was already airborne.

The landing took place east of Luna's position and in full view of the British defenders. The Puma came within effective range of British automatic weapons. It was immediately hit by heavy fire, but the pilot managed to cross the bay and conduct an emergency landing on the southern shore, opposite King Edward Point (known in Argentina as Punta Coronel Zelaya).

Two Argentine conscripts, Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila, were killed. Four others were wounded, and the rest were left disorganised and out of combat position. Despite the setback, the marines opened fire with their machine gun on the hospital building, wounding one British marine in the arm.

At the same time, Luna’s troops began to advance toward Shackleton House, but after the Puma was downed, the British responded with heavy fire.[13] In response, Luna requested fire support from ARA Guerrico.

Attack on ARA Guerrico

At 11:55, Guerrico began its second approach to the inlet and opened fire. However, her 20mm guns jammed after the first shot. The 40mm cannons managed only six bursts, and the 100mm main gun became inoperable after a single round. Now fully exposed, the corvette had no choice but to turn within the cove and fire with weapons mounted on the opposite side.

At 11:59, British forces opened fire on the ship. The corvette was struck by small arms and a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[31] According to Mills, his men fired from a distance of approximately 550 metres.

The attack killed Petty Officer Patricio Guanca, wounded five sailors, and damaged multiple systems: electrical cables, one 40mm gun, an Exocet missile launcher, and the 100mm turret mount. As Guerrico passed again in front of the British position to retreat, she was hit by another intense wave of fire.
Argentine sources acknowledged that the vessel sustained over 200 hits during the engagement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter—a reconnaissance aircraft—was used to transport the remaining 10 marines, landing them outside the range of British weapons.[13]

As the damaged Guerrico withdrew from the bay, the Argentine ground troops resumed small arms exchanges with Mills’ Royal Marines.[13] Once beyond the range of British weapons—near Hobart Rock—Guerrico resumed firing with her repaired 40mm guns.[33] This convinced Lieutenant Mills that the situation was untenable. He ordered his men to cease fire at 12:48, according to Admiral Mayorga.[33]

At 13:00, Mills approached the Argentine lines waving a white flag and surrendered. He was instructed to have his men surrender one by one. Mills and his marines were taken into custody by Astiz’s group, which had remained in reserve during the battle.[13]
At 13:35, the British flag was reported lowered.

HMS Endurance dispatched one of its Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The aircraft detected the Argentine corvette and the transport vessel in the cove but observed no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in South Georgia waters until 5 April.[34]

That afternoon, 13 BAS civilian personnel who had been scattered in the surrounding area were captured. At 23:00, Group Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in securing the workers at Leith Harbour.

ARA Guerrico

Consequences

Following the engagement at Grytviken, the corvette ARA Guerrico, which had lost approximately 50% of its firepower due to battle damage, departed Grytviken alongside ARA Bahía Paraíso at 03:15 on 4 April, bound for Río Grande.[35]

The ARA Bahía Paraíso transported the captured British Royal Marines to Río Grande, from where they were flown to Montevideo. They returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April.[13]

The Argentine forces chose not to attack the BAS station on Bird Island, where 15 British BAS personnel remained out of Argentine control. These individuals also remained active in other areas such as Schlieper Bay, the Lyell Glacier, and Saint Andrews Bay, avoiding capture until the islands were retaken by British forces.

The Argentine Navy left behind a garrison of 55 marines on the islands, along with 39 civilian scrap workers who remained stationed at Leith Harbour.[34]

The South Georgia Islands were retaken by British forces on 25 April 1982 during Operation Paraquat.[36]

Medals

• Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

• Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance received the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).[13]

• Chief Gunner Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Medal for Valour in Combat (La Nación Argentina al Valor en Combate).[37]

Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

Referencias

1. "They infiltrated aboard, posing as scientists, but were in fact members of an Argentine naval special forces unit". Nick van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, London, Leo Cooper P.8 as reported in Lawrence Freemdman, The Official History of the Falklands Camapign: Vol I The Origins of the Falklands War
2. "Bahia Buen Suceso set sail for South Georgia on 11 March carrying Argentine Marines" Rowland White, Vulcan 607, London, Bantam Press, p30.
3. Freedman-Gamba, p. 74.
4. El Proyecto Alfa
5. Freedman-Gamba, p. 75
6. Freedman-Gamba, p. 76
7. The first visit of Davidoff
8. Insight Team Sunday Times, p. 67
9. Freedman, p. 172
10. Freedman-Gamba, p. 81
11. Segunda visita de Davidoff
12. Freedman-Gamba, p. 85
13. Britain Small Wars
14. Freedman-Gamba, p. 86
15. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 87-88
16. At that time, the Antarctic Naval Group was concluding the 1981/1982 summer campaign. By the second half of March 1982, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar had returned to its home port at the Naval Station of Buenos Aires (Apostadero Naval de Buenos Aires). Meanwhile, the polar transport ship ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1), under the command of Frigate Captain Ismael J. García, departed from the Naval Base Ushuaia bound for Base Esperanza in Antarctica, transporting the families who would be overwintering there. Following this mission, the ship continued to the South Orkney Islands, where it embarked the personnel of the Naval Construction Battalion, who had just completed construction of a new building for the local Antarctic detachment.
17. La perla austral, cronología
18. Freedman, pp. 183 and 184
19. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 98-99
20. Freedman, p.187
21. Héroes Salteños Caidos en la Guerra de las Malvinas
22. Mayorga, p. 94
23. Cf. Jonh O'Sullivan, op. cit., págs. 229-230.
24. Freedman, pp. 11-13
25. Mayorga, p. 97
26. Freedman, p. 13
27. Freedman, pp. 13-14
28. Mayorga, p. 98
29. Mayorga, p. 48
30. Mayorga, pp. 99-100
31. Mayorga, p. 100
32. Malvinas: Georgias del Sur
33. Mayorga, p. 101
34. Freedman, p. 14
35. Mayorga, p. 102
36. Freedman, p. 222
37. www.armada.mil.ar


Wikipedia.es

Malvinas: Cover Operation on Cow Beach, 1966

Secret Landing at Cow Bay/Playa Vaca

Operation Cow Beach was conceived in the shadows of a turbulent era—an epic chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy, where determination and stealth combined to confront a challenge that had lingered for over a century. The year was 1966, and Argentina, ruled by a military junta following the overthrow of President Arturo Illia, was growing weary of its diplomatic claims over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The shadow of British incursion, cast over the islands since 1833, loomed heavily in the minds of naval strategists.




The incident involving Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648, hijacked by a group of extremists and diverted to the archipelago, had stirred already turbulent waters. It was a stark reminder that the situation in the Falklands could escalate without warning, and that Argentina needed to be prepared for a confrontation scenario. Thus, in the shadowy offices of Buenos Aires, a plan was drawn up involving one of the fleet’s most veteran submarines—the ARA Santiago del Estero, a former USS Lamprey from the Second World War, repurposed as the guardian of a secret mission.



Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648 was hijacked by Argentine extremists on 28 September 1966 and diverted to the Falklands, where they meekly surrendered to the British colonial authorities.


On 28 October 1966, with its diesel engines roaring beneath the waves, the ARA Santiago del Estero silently navigated the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Under the command of Frigate Captain Horacio González Llanos and Corvette Captain Juan José Lombardo, the submarine stealthily approached the coast of East Falkland, just 40 kilometres from Port Stanley, the capital of the British colony. On board, twelve Navy men—including Sub-Lieutenant Oscar Héctor García Rabini—waited tensely for the moment to act.


Diagram of the Navigation Route Taken by Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero of the Argentine Navy During Operation "Cow Beach", Late October 1966




Cow Bay, Soledad Island/East Falkland (Argentine Republic)

The plan was clear: they were to land on a remote beach, just a few kilometres north of the British position, to gather vital intelligence for future landings. The beach had to be thoroughly surveyed—its gradient, potential underwater obstacles, approach routes—everything needed to be charted without leaving a trace. In the dimness of night, the men assembled their kayaks on the deck of the barely surfaced submarine, and the silence was broken only by the gentle lapping of the waves.


Crew and Command Staff of Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero – Argentine Navy.

Arrival of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero (SS-372 USS Lamprey) at Mar del Plata Naval Base from the United States, 1960
(Photograph by Enrique Mario Palacio)


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy between 1960 and 1971, should not be confused with the later submarines of the same class modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22—which replaced them from 1971 onwards and carried the same names. In this image, the veteran S-11 and S-12 can be seen at the end of their service life at the Mar del Plata Naval Base, while in the background lies the new S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, their replacement, ready to take on the duties left behind by its predecessors. The S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero was retired after a decade of service, having taken part in important missions such as Operation Cow Beach, which became a notable chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy.



S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero Moored at its Home Pier, Mar del Plata Naval Base.

The First Incursion and an Unexpected Encounter

The first incursion was a success. The men landed and explored the coastline, mapping every detail. However, the second night brought an unexpected twist. In the darkness, García Rabini spotted a kelper—a local island settler—watching them from atop a cliff. They knew that being discovered could spark an unprecedented diplomatic crisis. Acting swiftly, they captured the islander and tied him up as they debated their next move. Killing him was not an option—the mission was one of intelligence gathering, not combat. But they also couldn’t risk the man alerting the British authorities.

Then, an idea emerged—both bold and unusual. Some crew members returned to the submarine to fetch a bottle of whisky from the captain’s cabin. They went back to the cliff and forced the kelper to drink until he was semi-conscious, leaving him behind at the very spot where they had found him. With the mission aborted to avoid further complications, the group returned to the submarine, carrying with them the valuable intelligence they had collected.

Born on 19 March 1927 in Salto, Buenos Aires Province, Juan José Lombardo was a key figure in the history of the Argentine Navy. As a Sub-Lieutenant, he served as Second-in-Command aboard submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero during the successful Operation Cow Beach in the Falkland Islands on 28 October 1966—a mission that would become a landmark in Argentina's intelligence operations in the South Atlantic. On 15 December 1981, by then holding the rank of Vice Admiral, he was summoned by the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, to receive a mission that would alter the course of Argentine history: the Falklands.

The Return to Mar del Plata
The journey back to Mar del Plata was as silent as the outbound voyage. Upon arrival, absolute silence was ordered regarding the events that had taken place. None of the participants—not even to their families—were to speak of what had happened in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Despite the unforeseen developments, the mission was deemed a success. The data gathered was handed over to the Navy General Staff—a strategic asset that could have proved critical had diplomatic negotiations failed.


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy from 1960 to 1971, should not be confused with later submarines of the same class—modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22, which replaced them from 1971 and bore the same names. In this image, one of the original submarines is seen underway shortly after its arrival in Argentina, already without the forward gun that had been removed as part of its adaptation and modernisation for new missions in the South Atlantic.

Legacy of a Silent Mission
Years later, Commander García Rabini would recall those days with quiet pride, fully aware of the significance of the mission. Although the Cow Beach operation report was not directly used during the 1982 Falklands conflict, it stood as a testament to the commitment and audacity of those sailors who defied history to keep the flame of Argentine sovereignty alive.

The Story of Operation Cow Beach

Interwoven with both legend and fact, the story of Operation Cow Beach remains a hidden episode within the broader struggle over the Falklands—a moment when a small group of men faced the sea, the darkness, and the looming shadows of a war that, though not yet begun, echoed with the weight of the inevitable. It stands as a reminder that the fight for sovereignty is not waged solely on battlefields, but also in silences, in the waves, and in the whisper of the wind on a lonely South Atlantic beach.


Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini. Now aged 83, retired Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini is the Argentine naval officer who, in 1966 as a Sub-Lieutenant, led one of the most daring missions in the history of the Argentine Navy. At the head of a special forces incursion, he landed on the shores of East Falkland on 28 October of that year, during the secret Operation Cow Beach. Launched from the depths of the ocean by the submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, the mission was cloaked in silence and darkness, aimed at collecting vital intelligence to support Argentina’s sovereignty claims over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.


Cow Beach/Playa Vaca, Southern Tip – Photograph Taken from ARA Santiago del Estero by Miguel Salvatierra, 28/10/1966


Balao-Class Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. The Balao-class submarine, formerly the US Navy’s SS-372 USS Lamprey, served the United States from 1944 until 1960, when it was transferred to the Argentine Navy and renamed S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. In the photograph, the submarine is seen departing from the Mar del Plata Naval Base, home to Argentina’s Submarine Force Command. It operated from this base until 1971, when it was replaced by the S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero—a submarine of the same class but modernised to the GUPPY IA standard. The arrival of this updated vessel marked the end of an era for the veteran S-12, which had taken part in key operations such as Cow Beach, demonstrating the Navy’s steadfast commitment to national sovereignty.


ASW Frigate P-36 ARA Piedrabuena in the Periscope Crosshairs of ARA Santiago del Estero During Combat Exercises


Cargo Transfer Between Submarine ARA Santiago del Estero and Destroyer D-10 ARA San Luis


Surface Navigation of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero en Route to Its Objective. As a Balao-class submarine that had not undergone the GUPPY IA modernisation, the vessel lacked a snorkel and high-capacity batteries. Consequently, it still had to operate like a Second World War-era submarine—navigating mostly on the surface, at least at night and in low-risk areas.

Nacar Section: A Story of a Marine

 

A Story of a Marine Infantryman

Account taken from the Gaceta Malvinense

My name is Fernando Claudio Martín. I was CC/61 (I joined with the class of ’62 due to a study deferment). I belonged to BIM 5, Company “Nácar”, 3rd Section, under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Jorge “Pechito” Lucero.

As I begin to write these lines, I can’t help but feel a touch of nostalgia. I’ve heard countless stories about the Malvinas campaign — thanks to my friend, veteran Pascual Distefano, I’ve had the privilege for several years to take part in his radio programme “Malvinas Hoy… Historia de una Guerra”. That’s why telling my own story feels harder — I’m far more comfortable listening than speaking.

I joined the Naval Infantry Service on 1 April 1981. After completing my first training period at the Naval Infantry Training Centre (CIFIM), I was posted to BIM No. 5, based in Río Grande (Tierra del Fuego). I arrived at the end of May 1981, and from then began an intense but essential period of formation and training as a Marine infantryman.

Time would prove our commander right in pushing us to the limit — our performance in Malvinas would later justify his demands. On 2 April 1982, we were already in the field when we heard on the radio about the recovery of our Malvinas Islands. We were overjoyed, without imagining what was to come next. Everything happened so fast that, if memory serves, by 8 April we were already flying to the islands aboard a Navy aircraft.

Upon arrival, we were first stationed near the airfield, and later transferred to our final defensive position on Mount Tumbledown. I was in the 3rd Section of Company Nácar, and our position was established on the northern slope of the mountain.

Life in the islands became increasingly difficult. The weather grew harsher and the terrain more hostile, but we managed to endure thanks to constant work improving our defences and training. Generally, we didn’t suffer much from shortages — food wasn’t abundant, but it was sufficient, and our equipment was in good condition and suited to the environment (we came from a region with similar conditions).

I’d like to recall a small anecdote about two remarkable conscripts from my section, Miguel Fernández and Jorge Ponce. Every time they went down to the settlement, they came back well supplied — drinks and chocolate mostly — which we’d later trade for yerba, flour, and other goods.

Days passed until 1 May, when the first British attack took place. From that day onwards, everything became much tougher. The fighting had begun, and with it, the uncertainty of what would happen to us, and how we’d respond under such pressure. We learnt to live with bombardments, watched from afar the attacks on the airfield, witnessed the battles of Longdon, Two Sisters, and Wireless Ridge, and awaited with determination the British assault on our positions.

In the final days of the battle, we came under a devastating artillery barrage that wounded my comrade Vicente Zurzolo in the back. In my desperation to get him out of our partially collapsed shelter, I didn’t realise that I, too, had been wounded. I carried him as best I could to the aid post near the service area, where both of us received medical attention.

Now, so many years later, with the experience and perspective that time brings, I sometimes think I might have handled things differently. Not out of regret, but simply as a reflection on the choices one has in those moments.

By the end of the war, I was in the hospital at Port Stanley. Watching the British troops enter the town was deeply painful. The war was over — but I could never have imagined that the post-war period would prove even harder than the conflict itself.

I can’t finish this account without expressing my thanks — first, to all the conscripts of BIM 5, especially those of Company Nácar; to Captain (Ret.) Carlos H. Robacio, our guide and mentor who taught us to be good soldiers and honourable men; to Sub-Lieutenant Jorge Lucero, our section commander; to all the officers and NCOs who trained us throughout our service in the Marine Infantry; to Commander (Ret.) Guillermo Botto for his friendship and wise advice; and to my family, for their patience and love.

All that remains for me to say is that, as an Argentine, I am proud to have defended the sovereignty of our Malvinas Islands, and I will always continue to uphold the honour of our fallen heroes and the justice of our national cause.

VGM Fernando Claudio Martín

 

Logistic Battallion 3: Quartermaster Corps also Fought

The Quartermaster Corps in the Malvinas also Fought

Malvinas 1982

Account by Corporal First Class Víctor Schwindt, who lived his whole life in Pilar, Buenos Aires Province. He tells us: “My father greatly influenced my decision to enter the academy. He had served in the Marine Corps, and I had an adventurous spirit like any 15- or 16-year-old. I found that adventure in the Armed Forces. The year 1981 was very demanding, both in the classrooms where I studied the quartermaster speciality and in combat training. We underwent intense physical and mental training, during which we gained knowledge and adapted to military doctrine, ‘to live by the chain of command’. It was all very unexpected. On 2 April we were at the shooting range in Campo de Mayo. That’s where we learned that we had recovered our islands. I felt immense joy. Although at that time there was not much information about the Malvinas circulating in the media, from that deed onwards the existence of, and sense of belonging to, that territory took root across Argentine society. We were just starting the second year of the course and we did not expect to graduate so abruptly.”

In general terms they had an early graduation, something that has not happened again since. After graduating and receiving their corporal insignia, they swore loyalty and respect to the national flag dressed in combat uniform—something that would ordinarily be done in dress uniform, with a military parade and family present. Once they graduated, they joined the institution and immediately received their unit postings, already as junior non-commissioned officers.

Regarding his own experience, Corporal First Class Schwindt told us: “I went with a group of 12 quartermaster mates to Curuzú Cuatiá, to Logistic Battalion 3. When we arrived in the Malvinas we spent a couple of nights at Puerto Argentino airport and were then moved to some depots in a remote area. After a few days I was separated and assigned to the guard of General Daher until 26 May. From there I moved to the front line with my comrades Albarracín, Mansilla and Labalta, who were already there. The three of us joined a section that had been formed to reinforce the 4th Infantry Regiment. We were quartermaster men—drivers, signallers—the only one from the infantry arm was Sergeant Montellano. Our assigned sector was on Mount Harriet. We stayed there until the final British attack, when we were taken prisoner. I remember the constant siege and harassment from frigates, aircraft and British artillery. Their aim was to weaken us morally and physically. On the front line we were going full tilt all the time. We were tired, physically affected by the cold and rain, but mentally prepared to face all those situations. The position was held at all times, even though we were at a major disadvantage, because the situation was completely dominated by the British.

“I was one of the last to reach the front line. When troop movements ceased, positions across the mountain were occupied and I found a position about 30 metres away from my group on the mountainside. When they began to attack and due to the way they infiltrated, my position ended up forward and very separated from my section mates. I was caught in the middle of the crossfire between my comrades and the British as they advanced. Given where I was, I had two options: get out and try to climb in the middle of that chaos, or stay put and fight from there. I looked back and thought that retreating in those circumstances was riskier than holding where I was, so I fought from there. When I ran out of ammunition, that was when I felt most afraid, because I was defenceless and could not leave my position with the enemy so close. I decided to squeeze in between two rocks where I had set up a shelter and stay there in the dark, trying to survive.

“When I decided to leave, I fell back towards Puerto Argentino. I crawled for a stretch, in the dark and unarmed, trying to find something to defend myself with, when suddenly two British soldiers appeared. They were surprised; they saw I was unarmed, pointed their weapons at me and asked if I spoke their language. I was so taken aback that I froze, so I raised my arms and surrendered. I was unarmed, there was nothing I could do, and they took me prisoner. After a while I saw a column with other prisoners, among whom were my friends. Oscar Labalta was not there because he had died on the morning of 10 June from artillery fire—he was 17 years old. But I met up with Alejandro Albarracín and Carlos Mansilla. I joined the group of prisoners and they took us to Fitz Roy, where we were searched and interrogated. The questioning was very demanding on their part, but I never experienced or saw physical violence. We fought with great ethics and honour, and they recognised that. They were surprised by our attitude—our defence of our territory, all the values instilled in our training, our love for the Fatherland. From there we were moved to a cold-store in San Carlos and then embarked on the Canberra (the ocean liner) to Puerto Madryn.

“Corporal First Class Schwindt told us something heartening about the return. ‘The welcome and affection of the people of Puerto Madryn were extraordinary. It was the feeling of being back home; people hugged us—they truly showed us great warmth. That was when I began to realise that the war was over. Afterwards, they took us back to Curuzú Cuatiá by train.’”

A Practical Guide to Detect Anglophilia in Argentina

Anglophilia: A Practical Guide to Detecting It

 

Demalvinisation refers to the systematic process of minimising, silencing, or discrediting Argentina’s narrative, memory, or national sentiment around the Falklands/Malvinas War and its claim to the islands—particularly after 1982.

After the Battle for the Malvinas, the United Kingdom faced the challenge of constructing an "exportable" doctrine—tailored specifically for Argentina and designed to penetrate the Argentine psyche in order to diminish any sense of national pride that might once again ignite the powerful will to resist, as was shown in 1982.

That experience became the UK's greatest military disaster since the Second World War. London, aware that there can be no defence without first possessing the determination and will to claim what Argentinians know to be rightfully theirs—as demonstrated in the Malvinas—found that the most effective long-term strategy was to suppress Argentina’s will and determination. To that end, they set about engaging Argentine organisations, public figures, and politicians who would actively work to erode national self-esteem while simultaneously convincing the public that the "Malvinas issue" wasn’t so serious or important as to hinder other potential areas of development or cooperation with the UK.

The processes of demalvinisation and the dismantling of Argentina’s Armed Forces were just the tip of the iceberg, the visible portion of a much broader ideological infrastructure that was encouraged, promoted, and even financed by the United Kingdom. Often left out of view are the legislators, businessmen, and high-ranking military officers who silently (and increasingly less so) make up this powerful structure, whose brain operates both from across the Atlantic and from within Argentina itself.

A major triumph of this British strategy—promoted in Argentina by many compatriots—has been the continual downplaying of the Malvinas Conflict, and the construction of a language that, passively and almost unconsciously, has been absorbed by anglophile citizens who have become repeaters of narratives crafted by the British establishment.

Today, we offer a practical guide for recognising an anglophile—whether they are an active participant in that British-built skeleton operating in Argentina, or simply a citizen who dreams of belonging to the "Anglo world" due to national self-esteem issues (proof, if any were needed, that the British plan worked) or a disconnection from their own national identity.

An anglophile, be they civilian, military, or political, is easily identified because, lacking authentic arguments, they always resort to the same language as their "brothers", to favour, promote, and defend British interests in Argentina. Here are some of their most common expressions:

🇬🇧 “The war was a desperate manoeuvre by the Military Junta. A meaningless war.”
(Denies the historical background, legal precedents, and international law supporting Argentina’s sovereignty claim.)

🇬🇧 “The only way to recover the Malvinas is through peaceful means.”
(In practice, advocates for military dismantling, deliberately ignoring the concept of deterrence. This sort of anglophile would probably consider San Martín merely a murderer for taking up arms in the cause of independence.)

🇬🇧 “We must cooperate with the British in all other areas without jeopardising the sovereignty issue.”
(A dangerous anglophile: effectively proposes postponing sovereignty discussions—when they should be a top priority—while encouraging us to “burn through” tools of pressure and cooperation that could strengthen our negotiation stance.)

🇬🇧 “It’s impossible to manufacture national weapons systems—it would take 20 years to develop deterrent technology.”
(A mentally colonised anglophile relying on arguments from the 1990s. Well, over 30 years have passed and there’s still been no will to produce anything. The Cóndor II missile took under a decade from design to launch readiness. This kind of anglophile seeks to turn national defence development into a utopia in order to maintain dependency.)

🇬🇧 “The Malvinas would be ours today if we hadn’t started the war in 1982.”
(A malicious anglophile who falsely blames Argentina for starting the war and ignores the UK’s original aggression in 1833. This specimen denies Argentina’s right to legitimate self-defence under international law.)

🇬🇧 “We’ll recover the Malvinas when we convince the kelpers (Falklanders) to want to be Argentinian.”
(A servile anglophile: not only accepts British occupation, but insists we must “seduce” a population implanted by force—granting them a right to self-determination they do not possess. The kelpers have no legitimate say, being a population settled by an occupying power.)

🇬🇧 “We’ll recover the Malvinas when it becomes too costly for the UK to maintain their defence.”
(A sophisticated neo-anglophile: this logic delays urgent action, ignoring that no cost in history has ever deterred the UK from its imperial foothold. In 1982, during a major economic crisis, Britain still dispatched a fleet over 13,000 km. A statement of naïveté or outright irresponsibility.)

🇬🇧 “The Malvinas war was pointless.”
(One of the most harmful kinds of anglophiles. This argument was central to demalvinisation and has driven many veterans to take their own lives, believing their fight was meaningless. This type denies all historical, legal, and international support for Argentina’s claim, and supports dismantling the Armed Forces by suggesting they are unnecessary. Also ignores the basic principles of Defence and deterrence.)

🇬🇧 “There are no longer any conflict hypotheses.”
(A foolish anglophile: It’s not a hypothesis—there is a conflict. An Argentine province remains under foreign occupation, yet this mantra helps pave the way for disarmament, perfectly aligned with British interests.)

Know other anglophile expressions we missed? Let us know in the comments.

Text: Eric Torrado – Malvinas en la Mira