Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts

Thursday, November 20, 2025

5th Marine Batallion: The Experience of An NCO

Account of a Marine Non-Commssioned Officer – Company “OBRA” – BIM5 Ec (Part 1)

Extracted from: Revista Desembarco – Volume 12

 

 

Petty Officer Roberto Tejerina recalls:

"I went to Malvinas as part of the Advance Party of BIM5 Ec, assigned to the Forward Platoon. Upon arrival at the airport, the Commander and some members of the Staff went ahead to receive orders; we remained at the airport. Later, we moved forward in a truck to the shearing shed near Moody Brook, where we spent the night.

Early the next day, 9 April, we set out on foot toward tentative zones where we were to take up positions. The Commander accompanied us on foot, gave us our primary fields of fire and the sector to occupy, and ordered us to draft a Tentative Fire Plan, along with requests for fire and logistical support. That same day, the Company Commander arrived. I briefed him on what had been done, and after inspecting the area, he submitted the requests and the Fire Plan. Among other things, he requested additional support weapons, communications equipment and a vehicle — which was never provided, so all equipment and supplies had to be carried on our backs."

Petty Officer Tejerina was the Company Sergeant Major of Company “OBRA” (also referred to as “Oscar” or “O”) of BIM5 Ec. In reality, OBRA, with fewer than 80 men, was closer to a reinforced platoon than a full company.

From its arrival in Malvinas on 8 April until 14 June, this company successfully completed three distinct missions:

  1. First Mission (8–16 April): Defensive position on Wireless Ridge, protecting the northern sector of Puerto Argentino’s initial defences.

  2. Second Mission (17 April – 8 June): Upon arrival of Mechanised Brigade X, the unit was repositioned to the eastern slopes of Mount Tumbledown, serving as the battalion’s reserve. During this phase, it performed all the demanding tasks expected of a reserve unit, including logistical efforts which, while tactically inadvisable, were practically unavoidable.

  3. Third Mission (5–14 June): As an advance combat element, it engaged enemy attacks.

Company OBRA was the smallest rifle company in BIM5 Ec, yet it participated in all unit exercises and was routinely assigned roles as reserve or forward security. It was known for being highly cohesive and close-knit. Its successive company commanders —young and modern— gained considerable experience and developed a strong bond with the unit, shared also by the NCOs.

Years prior, OBRA had been stationed in Ushuaia, specialising in medium and low mountain combat and southern terrain operations. Later, it relocated to Río Grande, becoming a permanent part of the battalion, but retaining its distinctive spearhead spirit.

In 1981, the company conducted numerous live-fire combat exercises with air support. Under the leadership of Sub-Lieutenant Carlos Alberto Calmels, it became a well-trained and highly motivated team. The company specialised in heliborne operations, conducting extensive helicopter training. Their repeated assignments as reserve force, heliborne unit, and security element enabled them to gain solid experience in assault planning, counterattack execution, and independent operations across broad sectors.

At the end of January 1982, Sub-Lieutenant Calmels handed command of “O” Company to Sub-Lieutenant Ricardo Quiroga. From February to late March, the company conducted patrols and field exercises, fostering cohesion and strong camaraderie. During the retaking of Malvinas, they were in the midst of a 15-day campaign.

Marine Petty Officer Second Class Roberto Tejerina, Company Sergeant Major, was in his second year in that role and served as an essential pillar in the company’s leadership. The company was composed of three rifle groups, a weapons section with three 60 mm mortars, two 7.62 mm machine gun teams, and four rocket launchers (only two of which were operational; the rest travelled with the baggage train). In Malvinas, additional reinforcements arrived, including Petty Officer Orozco from the reconnaissance section, who took command of the Support Weapons Section.

"We conducted many foot reconnaissance missions to familiarise ourselves with the terrain since we were the battalion reserve."

On Wireless Ridge – Mount Longdon

Company O / BIM5 Ec deployed on the designated height (1800 metres east of the Royal Marines’ Barracks) and spent 10 April organising its defensive position. The company deployed in an arc formation, with its three groups in the front line. Main fields of fire were directed westward, toward Moody Valley and Mount Longdon (positioned on its reverse slope), and northward toward Murrell Valley. Support fire was to be provided by 106.6 mm mortars, with a detailed white point fire map.

According to Petty Officer Tejerina, the number of dead zones was “countless,” so double listening posts were established at 150 and 300 metres ahead of the main position. On that same day, Petty Officer Second Class Orozco, Corporal Second Class Daniel A. Carrasco, and additional ammunition and field equipment joined the company.

Tejerina celebrated his birthday on 17 April:

“That day, I received —right on time— a parcel from home with a 5 kg chocolate cake, which I shared with everyone, down to the last conscript. It coincided with Easter celebrations, for which the battalion logistics team (N.B.: referring to the ZOSERU – Unit Service Zone) had distributed plenty of chocolates, some Easter pastries, and cigarettes.
Celebrating birthdays wasn’t unusual — the company always celebrated them, at least since I joined. In Río Grande, we grouped birthdays by month, and even the Commander often attended those gatherings.”

 

Life on the Trenches

Tejerina states:

“The period we spent as reserve was active and exhausting. We not only had to establish our primary positions, but also set up two alternate positions, and plan and prepare for counterattacks toward Tumbledown and Sapper Hill.

What drained us most, however, was our proximity to BIM5’s command post — we were constantly assigned extra duties, such as transporting supplies or building positions for other units. That frustrated me, as these logistical burdens were contrary to tactical doctrine, which clearly states that frontline troops should not be used for such tasks.

I raised the issue with the Company Commander and the Battalion Sergeant Major, Petty Officer First Class Hernández, who acknowledged the problem but couldn’t resolve it. Fortunately, these tasks decreased as the battalion’s positions became more consolidated."

“Luckily, we had weekly access to showers at SPAC (the Amphibious Group’s logistics unit in Puerto Argentino) until 1 May. Afterwards, we took rest days in Puerto Argentino, also at SPAC’s shed. Not everyone managed to follow this routine, but it was still a relief.

We never lacked food. As reserve, we always had hot meals — even under fire. Oddly enough, everyone was constantly hungry and smoked heavily, perhaps due to tension. Cigarette rations had to be limited, and Charlie rations (combat rations) strictly monitored.

We had no issues with clothing distribution. I had a full reserve of kit for the company, stored in the lower compartment of each soldier’s 2-in-1 backpack, since our unit didn’t receive the TEMPEX backpacks, except for a few NCOs.

For building positions, we used the famous crowbars made in Río Grande, ordered by Sgt. Maj. Hernández, who had the foresight to see that our standard tools wouldn’t work with Malvinas soil.

Using materials to reinforce our positions became problematic. Troops sourced them from nearby structures in the settlement, prompting constant complaints from the Kelpers. The materials included posts, wires, metal sheets, timber, and 220-litre drums."

“As an anecdote: once, Midshipman Accountant Pellegrino, part of the ZOSERU, came to our company’s command post asking us to send a platoon to collect food he’d left 500 metres behind, as he couldn’t advance due to enemy fire. When we fetched the thermal food containers, they were riddled with shrapnel. They’d lost all liquid — but not the food. This sparked a surge of morale among the conscripts, who shouted:

¡Viva la Patria! Viva Midshipman Pellegrino!”



Monday, November 17, 2025

Malvinas: Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Part 1

Background


Consolidation of the British Beachhead at San Carlos

Following the successful attacks carried out by the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) on the afternoon of 21 May, during the night of 21–22 May, the enemy undertook an intense effort to land the bulk of its forces and deploy security elements to the high ground surrounding the beachhead. All available helicopters were used successively for that purpose.

On the same afternoon of 21 May, numerous troop movements were observed, transporting personnel, heavy weapons, and air defence systems to the northwest of Cerro Alberdi, as well as to the heights southeast of San Carlos settlement and Montevideo Hill.

By the afternoon of 22 May, when the FAA resumed its attacks, the enemy had succeeded in consolidating its landing, with an effective ground-based air defence network already established around the beachhead.

On 21 May, the Joint Command Malvinas requested continuation of aerial bombing, which was carried out as mentioned above, although the results could not be assessed. Requests for aerial photography could not be fulfilled due to active enemy air defences.

On 22 May, since the heavy mortars of Regiment 12 (RI 12) had not yet arrived at Puerto Argentino, orders were issued to embark two artillery pieces from the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) with their crews aboard an Argentine Coast Guard vessel. This ship departed for Darwin at first light on 23 May. Near the entrance to Choiseul Bay, the vessel was attacked by British Harrier aircraft, which inflicted severe damage, forcing the ship to run aground on the northern shore.

A fire broke out onboard. The crew managed to disembark and take cover under makeshift shelters along the beach. Later, they were able to recover equipment and supplies from the ship, including materials for treating the wounded. On 24 May, during a risky helicopter operation, the personnel were evacuated, along with the artillery pieces and ammunition, which were transported to Darwin, where they were immediately assigned to defensive positions. The operation was secured by a patrol under the command of an officer dispatched from Darwin. Once the mission was completed, the patrol had to withdraw on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters. Only one of the rescued artillery pieces could be brought back into service; the second had been damaged in the bombing and could not be repaired.

On the morning of 23 May, British aircraft attacked south of Howard a formation of Army helicopters that had departed Puerto Argentino en route to that location. The helicopters were carrying supplies and heavy mortars for RI 12 (received on that date), conducting reconnaissance south of San Carlos, and attempting to extract personnel from 601 Commando Company, who were operating in the area of RI 5 on a previously assigned mission.

In this attack, two Puma helicopters and one Augusta A-209 helicopter were destroyed. A second Puma, piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Alberto Pérez Cometo, managed to evade the enemy strike, returned to the area, and rescued the crews of the downed helicopters — risking a second enemy attack to save his comrades. Subsequently, patrols from RI 5 recovered the heavy weapons and part of the ammunition.

On the same day, 23 May, following intense air attacks, the British seriously damaged the Carcarañá vessel, which was anchored in San Carlos Strait near Soledad Island Bay. Another British air attack hit the Bahía Buen Suceso, anchored in Fox Bay, causing damage. The vessel was later repaired and restored to sailing condition.

On 24 May at 21:00, the Commander of the Coastal Group issued the Commander of Task Force Mercedes (RI 12) the defence operations order, which was received on 25 May at 18:00, followed by an order for a disruption attack, received on 26 May at 08:30.

On 26 May, two 105 mm howitzers from GA Aerot 4, along with their crews, were airlifted to Darwin by Army helicopters to reinforce the guns received the day before. They were assigned fire missions against Cerro Alberdi and Monte Osborne. As previously mentioned, only three artillery pieces were operational.

Operations of Task Force Mercedes from 1 May to 27 May (Darwin Position)

By 30 April, RI 12 had completed the concentration of its forces, except for Company B (still at Monte Challenger under orders of the Joint Command Malvinas), the Signals Section and part of the Service Company in Puerto Argentino, and the Heavy Mortar Section, which had not yet been transported from the mainland. The Commando Company and the remaining elements of the Service Company completed their movement to Darwin on 22 May.

In the afternoon, the RI 12 Commander attended a briefing by the Commander of RI 25 on the situation and deployment of his unit. He also met with the Commander of the Vicecommodore Pedrozo Military Air Base, who briefed him on the deployment of available resources and the measures taken with the local population. Reconnaissance was carried out alongside company commanders and members of the Logistics Planning Team (PL My).

It continued to rain, as it had in previous days. Since arriving in Malvinas, troops and officers had been operating with damp clothing. Nevertheless, overall health conditions remained acceptable, although several cases of frostbite in the lower limbs were reported. The unit was bivouacked near the airstrip.

The RI 12 Commander ordered that the companies bivouacked near the airstrip immediately relocate to the positions reconnoitred the previous afternoon by Company A. By 06:00, the movement was completed, and the elements were positioned 4 km from their original location.

At 08:30, the anticipated British air attack on Darwin began. Four Sea Harrier aircraft struck the area around the airstrip. A Pucará aircraft, with engines running, took an almost direct hit. Two more bombs fell on the runway, and a fourth landed near a Jeep carrying personnel.




At Fanning Head, the SBS accepted the surrender of Argentine soldiers — marking the first encounter between the two infantry forces.

Deployment and Combat Readiness in the Darwin–Goose Green Area

The unit takes up its assigned positions. All light and heavy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and the large field gear bags —impractical for troops in operations— must be transported manually and across open terrain. The transport means belonging to the Military Air Base (helicopters, jeeps, and tractors) cannot be used, as they are reserved for exclusive use by the Air Force.

Digging of positions begins using short-handled shovels — the only available entrenching tools, which are in limited supply. Improvised tools are also used. Only by nightfall are troops able to have a hot meal. Since arrival, it has rained almost constantly.

As of 2 May, Argentine forces deployed in Darwin–Goose Green number 642 men, with 202 from the Air Force (FAA).

On 3 May, reports from the BAM Commander suggest that the 1 May Harrier attack on the airstrip may have been guided from the ground, allegedly with assistance from a local resident. Control measures are adopted over the civilian population, also intended to protect them from renewed British air and naval strikes. The population is gathered inside the local church. This decision provokes significant complaints from the Kelpers.

On 4 May, at first light, a Chinook helicopter from the FAA transports the Deputy Commander of RI 12, one officer, and 18 soldiers from the Commando Company still stationed in the Monte Challenger area to Darwin, along with a food resupply.

Shortly after, a British air raid targets the airstrip from east to west. A Sea Harrier is shot down; the pilot ejects but is found dead, only 20 metres from the runway threshold. He is identified as Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. The wreckage and body show numerous small-calibre bullet impacts, indicating that concentrated light weapons fire can be effective against low-flying aircraft.

During this action, the courageous conduct of Military Chaplain Santiago Mora is noteworthy, as he moves among positions under enemy fire, providing spiritual support to the troops.

Personnel continue to improve their positions and lay mines and obstacles. At 17:30, a formation is held and honours rendered to Lt. Nicholas Taylor, followed by the burial of his remains.

Due to food shortages, sheep begin to be requisitioned for troop rations. The situation is reported by radio to higher command. On 9 May, the food supply situation becomes critical and is reiterated to command. A shipment of provisions for 10 days is arranged and begins arriving on 10 May.

On 11 May, a helicopter delivers food for 7 days. At 23:30, the ship Montsunen arrives carrying 100 drums of JP-1 fuel (helicopter fuel), 97 drums of petrol, and 100 crates of 105 mm ammunition.

On 13 May, the Commander of the Coastal Task Group issues an operations order to detach a reduced-strength company-sized element to occupy the San Carlos area. Urgent allocation of support weapons is requested for this.

On 17 May at 09:00, two air attacks strike anti-air and heavy weapons positions near the airstrip and within the C Company / RI 12 sector. Numerous Beluga-type bomblets are scattered across the terrain. This is the first air raid since 4 May. That night, starting at 23:00, British helicopters once again overfly the area.

On 18 May, the BAM and TF Mercedes Commanders conduct a joint inspection of positions to coordinate use of FAA and Army resources. It is agreed to employ 500 lb bombs as interceptive fire. A request is made to Coastal Task Command for anti-personnel mines and detonators.

Rotationally, troops use designated barns to dry clothing and conduct physical recovery — a system in place since 5 May, yielding satisfactory results despite tactical constraints.

On 19 May, the Signals Section finally arrives from Puerto Argentino, though without its equipment, which remains in Comodoro Rivadavia, awaiting transport. First Lieutenant Ernesto Kishimoto, the Section Commander, reorganises the existing system. Civilian radio equipment is requisitioned for wireless communication, both with higher command and between company and platoon commanders. These sets are mounted on jeeps due to their battery requirements. Company leaders lack both wired and wireless communication with their sections, and sections have no comms with their squads. A wired network is improvised using discarded materials sourced from the local population.

That evening, from 21:00, British helicopters again overfly the area but withdraw under fire.

On 20 May, the health of the troops begins to deteriorate. Officers and soldiers suffer from harsh weather conditions (constant humidity and cold, especially at night) and insufficient food. Measures are taken to prioritise care for the worst affected. Some officers and NCOs, despite illness, refuse to abandon their posts. Twelve soldiers are hospitalised in an improvised infirmary, nine of them due to malnutrition.

On 21 May at 09:00, a 120 mm mortar section (one piece) arrives under an officer. From 09:00 to 11:00, intense naval gunfire is received from the northwest, directed by a British helicopter. Fire is accurate and targets anti-aircraft and heavy weapons positions. One FAA 20 mm cannon is knocked out, though no casualties occur. Between 11:00 and 12:00, enemy aircraft conduct two simulated attack runs.

On 22 May at 09:30, two air strikes target the runway. One enemy aircraft appears damaged and is seen heading out to sea.

Night Attacks, Artillery Movements and Contact with the Enemy

On 24 May, 30 troops previously attacked by Harriers and helicopters 17 km from Goose Green, are airlifted to the position from the Iguazú Coast Guard ship. Patrols are dispatched to recover two 105 mm artillery pieces and ammunition. That night, the enemy launches illumination rounds and conducts naval fire against the position.

During the morning of 26 May, four air raid alerts are issued. Between 04:20 and 12:30, heavy naval shelling hits the position. A Company, ordered to relocate to new frontline positions at the isthmus entrance, becomes pinned down in open terrain.

At 08:30, an order for a disruption attack is received from the Coastal Task Commander. It includes:

  1. Confirm the current defence order.

  2. Conduct a night attack (26/27 May) with one infantry company against potential enemy concentrations south and southwest of Cerro Alberdi, supported by reconnaissance elements in Sussex.

  3. Based on outcomes, launch a second similar attack the following night (27/28 May).

  4. All operations must be conducted at night; other units are to continue improving defences.

Between 12:30 and 13:00, four air attacks are launched from east–west and north–south approaches. One enemy aircraft is shot down.

During the afternoon, reconnaissance of the new position is carried out. Artillery pieces are manually moved due to the Land Rovers being unfit for towing. Fire missions are calculated and executed that night on hills to the north and northeast, using 30% of available ammunition.

A Company advances north of the isthmus, preceded by Reconnaissance Section patrols. The advance is made in wedge formation, with the 1st Section deployed. With extreme effort, they reach the vicinity of Camilla Creek, without encountering enemy forces. From that line, the company commander reports back and is ordered to return. The troops are exhausted.

The rest of the unit continues intense work, constructing new positions and moving equipment and supplies.

At 23:00, a patrol 20 km southeast of the position reports a large vessel sailing in Darwin Bay. One artillery piece is repositioned and opens long-range fire toward the presumed enemy ship. The South Sector Commander is ordered to deploy patrols to the beach to monitor for possible landings.

At 04:00, Coastal Task Command orders the deployment of a reduced section to Saladero (18 km northwest of Goose Green) to verify possible presence of the British ship Uganda and determine its mission.

A patrol under Sergeant First Class Berdugo is launched but subsequently loses all contact. Transported by FAA helicopter, they cannot be retrieved due to lack of air assets. Later, it is learned that after repeatedly evading British forces, the patrol was captured on 7 June following a brief engagement.

Operational Development

General Situation as of 27 May

The Reconnaissance Section, the Combat Advance, and A Company, as well as one section of the Commando Company deployed west of Darwin, have not yet managed to establish their positions or transport their logistical supplies. Notably, A Company and the Reconnaissance Section are exhausted due to the operation carried out during the night of 26/27 May, combined with the hardships, physical strain, and tension of the preceding days.

On the high ground to the north-northeast and east of Boca House, the RI 8 Section (under Second Lieutenant Aliaga) has been positioned, along with a group of service personnel equivalent to two understrength sections. To equip the latter with FAL rifles, it was necessary to withdraw such weapons from the personnel of 4th Airborne Artillery Group and the Section of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group, who were instead issued 11.25 mm pistols.

To the north of Salinas Beach, one section of the Argentine Air Force is operating independently, under the direct command of the BAM Commander (totaling 202 personnel).

The forces of Task Force Mercedes, with the exception of the central sector between Goose Green and the airstrip (where small FAA elements operate independently), are cut off from one another. This situation forces the Regiment Commander to deploy service personnel with limited training in frontline positions. Communications between the Task Force Commander and company commanders, and between them and subordinate levels, are entirely inadequate due to the unit never having received its communications equipment.

With regard to the personnel and materiel situation within Task Force Mercedes, it is important to note that most of the heavy equipment embarked on the ship Córdoba never arrived. The unit has the following support weapons in service:

  • Two 81 mm mortars, each with 126 rounds of standard and high-capacity ammunition

  • One 120 mm mortar, used with limitations, as its base plate had been welded to the tube

  • Two additional 120 mm mortars, left on the mainland, arrived at Puerto Argentino on the night of 27 May, and were redirected to Darwin on the afternoon of 28 May, by which time the battle was essentially over and they did not take part in it

  • One 105 mm recoilless rifle, without a sighting device

  • Ten MAG general-purpose machine guns

  • One 12.7 mm machine gun, mounted on a requisitioned jeep

B Company, detached and deployed to the Monte Kent area under the command of the Joint Command Malvinas, arrived in the combat zone —minus one section that remained in Puerto Argentino— at nightfall on 28 May 1982. It was airlanded 4 km south of Goose Green, at a point when the situation had already become critical.

C Company, formed from a redistribution of NCOs and conscripted soldiers, is organised into two rifle sections, each with four squads. Its only support weapon is a single MAG machine gun. Of the company's 22 NCOs, 16 are acting corporals from the Sergeant Cabral NCO School.

The Service Company has only part of its personnel present, since most members of the Intendance and Ordnance Sections remain in Puerto Deseado (loading and unloading the Córdoba) and in Comodoro Rivadavia (airlifting equipment and supplies), and have not yet arrived in the theatre of operations.




Pucara's Rocket Launcher Transportations

Formation and Composition of Ec Güemes (San Carlos Area)

To form Ec Güemes —operating in the San Carlos area— the following elements have been employed: the Company Commander, the Company Command Group, and 1st Section of C Company / RI 25; along with the Support Section of RI 12, composed of two 81 mm mortars (out of the four available to the unit) and two 105 mm recoilless rifles (out of three available).

As a result, the remaining support weapons available for combat are one 105 mm recoilless rifle, which lacks a sighting device, and two 81 mm mortars.

The A Battery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) is composed of three howitzers, a third of their ammunition having been expended in fire missions between 26 and 27 May. An additional cannon, recovered following the attack on GC Iguazú, could not be repaired and remains out of use.

3rd Battery, 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (3/B GADA 601) is equipped with two 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, integrated into the air defence system established by the Condor Military Air Base (J BAM Cóndor).

Argentine Air Force (FAA) personnel assigned to the BAM are deployed in air defence roles around the runway, in securing installations and deployed equipment, and in forming a section-level defensive position northwest of the airstrip.

The unified command structure under the Task Force Commander —intended to coordinate ground defensive operations— was not ultimately established.



Pucará rocket launcher installed on top of a tin shed

Company Leadership and Logistical Situation – Task Force Mercedes

The company commanders of RI 12 assigned to lead these detachments are not the unit’s original organic officers, as they were replaced in order to complete the organisational structure. The appointed commanders are senior in rank to the original company commanders, who now remain with their respective elements as executive officers.

Logistical Situation of Task Force Mercedes

Rations:
Since 15 May, food has been reduced to one ration per day due to the shortage of supplies. Distribution has been severely hampered by the lack of transport, thermal containers, and the long distances involved. At the start of the British ground assault, the force had autonomy for 3 to 5 days.

Although airdrops of food supplies were carried out on 25 and 26 May to extend this autonomy, part of the cargo was lost, and another portion was retained by the FAA detachment for its own needs. As a result, only a limited amount of provisions reached Task Force Mercedes.

Personnel have, in general, lost a significant amount of weight due to the imposed restrictions since 1 May, compounded by prior shortages since the unit left its home garrison. This situation, combined with accumulated physical strain, has had a clear impact on morale.

Equipment and Materials:

No spare parts, replacement materials, or equipment are available. Of particular concern is the lack of cleaning equipment for weapons, which has had a very negative impact on their performance — especially under the prevailing climatic conditions.

Ammunition:

The ammunition allocation for personal weapons is sufficient for 3 to 5 days of combat. The quantity of available rounds for 81 mm and 120 mm mortars is very limited. Ammunition stocks for the 105 mm guns are satisfactory (3 to 5 days of combat). The FAA garrison maintains its own supply depots.



Argentine soldiers surrender at Goose Green


Infanteria.mil.ar

Friday, November 14, 2025

Fénix Squadron: Fénix Aircraft Simulating In-Flight Refuelling

FÉNIX SQUADRON



Even Civilian Aircraft from the Fénix Squadron Simulated Aerial Refuelling to Further Mislead the British

The image corresponds to a diversionary mission carried out on Tuesday, 11 May 1982, involving two Learjet 35 aircraft with OF 2058, callsign “Conde”, which took off from Río Grande, and a KC-130H, registration TC-70, callsign “Ñato”. The latter also conducted electronic reconnaissance, taking off from Río Gallegos at 07:00 (local) and landing at 11:00 (local).

To increase the likelihood of triggering a British air alert, the mission simulated an in-flight refuelling operation. The KC-130H flew at the same altitude, with the same flight profile and refuelling duration as would have been typical for an A-4 Skyhawk or Super Étendard, mimicking a real replenishment.

Fragmentary Order: 2058

Date: Tuesday, 11 May 1982
Mission: Execute a diversionary operation simulating an aerial refuelling (REV), verify enemy reaction and number of combat air patrols (CAPs) in flight.

Tanker Aircraft

  • Type: KC-130H

  • Registration: TC-70

  • Callsign: ÑATO

  • Crew:

    • Major Roberto BRIEND

    • Captain Eduardo SENN

    • Captain Osvaldo BILMEZIS

    • Warrant Officer Class 1 Modeste CUFRÉ

    • Senior Corporal Carlos GOLIER

    • Auxiliary Warrant Officer Héctor SOSA

    • Chief Warrant Officer Julio LASTRA

  • Take-off from Río Gallegos: 07:00 (local)

  • Landing at Río Gallegos: 11:00 (local)

Jet Aircraft – Learjet 35 (x2)

  1. Aircraft: Learjet 35

    • Registration: LV-OFV

    • Callsign: CONDE 1

    • Crew:

      • Captain Antonio BUIRA

      • Captain Carlos PANE

      • Corporal First Class Dardo ROCHA

  2. Aircraft: Learjet 35

    • Registration: T-24

    • Callsign: CONDE 2

    • Crew:

      • First Lieutenant Eduardo BIANCO

      • Lieutenant Luis HERRERA

  • Take-off from Río Grande: 07:50 (local)

  • Landing at Río Grande: 10:40 (local)

This highly coordinated operation is a clear example of the ingenuity of Argentine air strategy during the South Atlantic conflict, using non-combat aircraft to sow confusion and provoke reactions from British forces — a cost-effective, high-impact psychological and operational tactic.



Tuesday, November 4, 2025

Malvinas: Operation Georgias

Operation Georgias 




Satellite Image of South Georgia Islands Taken by NASA

Date: 3 April 1982
Location: Grytviken, South Georgia Islands
Outcome: Argentina takes control of Leith Harbour and Grytviken

Belligerents:
Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Commanders:
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills

Forces Engaged:
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
United Kingdom: 22 Royal Marines and HMS Endurance

Casualties:
Argentina: 3 killed, 9 wounded, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
United Kingdom: 1 wounded, 22 taken prisoner

Operation Georgias was the codename used by the Argentine Armed Forces for the operation to occupy the South Georgia Islands at the start of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on 3 April 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed Isla San Pedro) after forcing the surrender of a small contingent of British Royal Marines in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on 19 March 1982, when a group of civilian workers arrived at Leith Harbour aboard the transport vessel ARA Bahía Buen Suceso (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated the group, posing as civilian scientists.




Polar Ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata, February 1982, shortly before its involvement in South Georgia

Argentine Workers in South Georgia

The Davidoff Contracts

In September 1979, Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and a scrap metal dealer, signed a contract with the Edinburgh-based firm Christian Salvesen Co. The agreement granted him the right to remove the remains of the abandoned whaling stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik on the South Georgia Islands.
Davidoff approached the British Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting the use of the polar ship HMS Endurance to transport personnel and equipment necessary for dismantling the facilities. When the British authorities refused permission to use HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff sought approval from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy to book passage aboard Antarctic transport vessels.
Aware of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating a possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Argentine Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed him to travel to the islands at least twice a year.

Project and Operation Alfa

In September 1981, the Argentine Navy developed a plan to use Davidoff's salvage operations in South Georgia as a cover for establishing a covert base in the disputed territory. This initiative was given the codename Project Alfa. The plan involved infiltrating military personnel among the workers, posing as scientists. Once HMS Endurance had left the South Atlantic (from April onwards), they would be joined by 14 marines aboard a ship assigned to Antarctic base support, who would then establish a permanent military outpost on South Georgia. The base would benefit from the onset of winter, which would hinder any British attempt to remove it.

Parallel to this project, in October 1981, the commander of Antarctic naval operations received an order from the Chief of Operations of the Navy General Staff to study the possibility of establishing a scientific base on one of the disputed islands with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base would be set up during the 1981–1982 Antarctic campaign. This operation was designated Operation Alfa.
In early December, a decision was made that the base would be manned by military personnel rather than civilians, due to the need for secrecy. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to assign 1 officer and 6 NCOs. The same instruction applied to an equal number of tactical divers.

On 29 January 1981, training began for the selected commandos and divers, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz. The team included Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diver NCO, 1 medic NCO, 5 diver corporals, and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On 28 February, they boarded the Antarctic campaign vessel ARA Bahía Paraíso in Ushuaia.
To avoid interfering with planned operations in the Malvinas, the Military Committee cancelled Operation Alfa on 16 March. However, the commandos remained onboard as a precaution and departed on 18 March towards the South Orkney Islands, accompanying the vessel’s Antarctic campaign.



ARA Almirante Irízar

Davidoff’s Journeys

The Argentine businessman informed the British Embassy of his trip but did not request permission to travel aboard the icebreaker. On 16 December 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5) to carry out an inventory of the facilities to be dismantled at Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and departed a few days later.
On 23 December, the British magistrate in South Georgia discovered evidence of Argentine presence at Leith Harbour and reported it to Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, who relayed the information to London on 31 December. The British government instructed its embassy to issue a formal note of protest against the unauthorised landing, considered a breach of sovereignty. However, Argentina’s Foreign Minister claimed ignorance of the incident. A second formal protest was issued on 9 February but was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 February.

Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a commercial rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unplanned visit to Leith Harbour. Marchessi arrived at the site aboard the Caimán, a yacht registered in Panama, having sailed from Mar del Plata. He reported in at Grytviken, claiming to be part of Davidoff’s team, and provided the local British authorities with details of Davidoff’s December inspection as well as information on previous Argentine visits to the area during the 1970s.

Raising of the Argentine Flag

On 18 March 1982, the transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Leith Harbour, disembarking Davidoff’s workers and their equipment without first reporting at Grytviken, as required by the British government. At that time, the only British presence at Leith Harbour was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
On 19 March, four BAS members en route to Carlita Bay discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment at Leith Harbour, with the Argentine flag flying. Around 100 people had disembarked and occupied a BAS shelter. The BAS team leader, Trevor Edwards, approached Captain Briatore to inform him that their presence was unauthorised and that they were required to report at Grytviken. Edwards then informed the British magistrate at King Edward Point.
The BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Rex Hunt, who consulted with London. The British authorities demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the re-embarkation of the workers. Captain Briatore responded that the mission had the approval of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag lowered, but he still did not comply with the order to report at Grytviken.

On 20 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of the events. As the Argentines had failed to follow proper diplomatic procedures, the British government decided to respond with a limited intervention. The Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to sail to the area to ensure the removal of the Argentine flag and prevent any further landings. The ship had departed from Port Stanley on 16 March, carrying 22 Royal Marines.
On 21 March, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires issued a diplomatic protest, requesting that the Argentine government withdraw the workers.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to de-escalate the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official backing.

On the morning of 22 March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith Harbour. However, later that day, a BAS observation post detected the continued presence of Argentine personnel and relayed the information to London. As a result, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia.



 

Operation Georgias

On 23 March, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, Captain César Trombetta, aboard ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) and stationed in the South Orkney Islands, received orders from the Argentine Naval General Staff to proceed at full speed to the South Georgia Islands. His mission was to prevent HMS Endurance—which had departed from the Malvinas—from removing Davidoff’s Argentine workers from Leith Harbour.

In response to British movements, Argentina deployed several countermeasures. The corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were positioned between the Malvinas and South Georgia, ready to intercept HMS Endurance and recover any Argentine personnel on board.

On 24 March, the Argentine government publicly confirmed the presence of the workers on South Georgia. That same day, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz received orders to “disembark at Leith Harbour at 00:15 on 25 March to protect the Argentine workers.”
That night, ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Leith and disembarked 14 armed military personnel (Group Alfa) under Astiz’s command, using weapons supplied by the ship. The vessel remained in the area, patrolling with its helicopters. News from the region reported unusual Argentine naval activity in the South Atlantic.

When HMS Endurance reached Leith Harbour, it found ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored there. The two ships then shadowed each other around the islands until they lost contact on 31 March.

In anticipation of a possible armed clash, the British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate a compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that the workers at Leith Harbour be granted amnesty and provided with documentation—possibly temporary entry permits instead of passports, a significant concession to the Argentine position.
However, Argentina insisted that the arrival of its nationals in South Georgia should be governed by the 1971 Communications Agreement. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected extending that agreement—valid only for the Malvinas—to South Georgia and expressed his concerns to London.

The British plan was that BAS commander Steve Martin would remain in control until Argentine forces displayed hostile intent, at which point Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would assume command.

On 28 March 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as flagship of Task Force 40, carrying both the Task Force Commander and the Malvinas Theatre Commander, Major General Osvaldo García. This marked the beginning of Operation Rosario, which would lead to the surrender of the British governor in the Malvinas on 2 April.

That same day, 40 marines under Lieutenant Guillermo Luna boarded the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2, now P-32) at Puerto Belgrano, bound for South Georgia. The journey was harsh and overcrowded, as the vessel was not suited for troop transport and faced poor weather during the four-day voyage.

On 30 March, with the invasion clearly imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface vessels and three nuclear submarines, to proceed to South Georgia to reinforce HMS Endurance. The rest of the Royal Navy was placed on four-hour alert.

On 1 April, the Argentine Naval General Staff issued Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”, instructing forces to “occupy Grytviken and hold Leith to secure control of the South Georgia Islands.”
Missile corvette ARA Guerrico, under Commander Carlos Alfonso, was ordered to rendezvous with ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was equipped with two helicopters (a Puma from the Argentine Army and an Alouette from the Navy Air Command). The 40 marines under Luna’s command joined Astiz’s troops already stationed at Leith.

Up to that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.



Insignia of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed under the command of Captain César Trombetta. The group was composed of the following elements:[22]

  • 60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by Frigate Captain Ismael J. García

  • 60.1.2. Corvette ARA Guerrico, commanded by Frigate Captain Carlos Alfonso

  • 60.1.3. A detachment from Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4), consisting of 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna

  • 60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: one Puma (Argentine Army) and one Alouette (Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy)

  • 60.1.5. A group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz

In response to these developments, a series of high-level meetings and diplomatic discussions took place in an attempt to prevent an Argentine invasion. On the night of 1 April, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he would speak directly with the Argentine Junta to avert an attack.

However, Reagan's phone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri proved unsuccessful.[23]

British Resistance



Cumberland Bay, including King Edward Cove and the Grytviken Peninsula

2 April

On 2 April, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz informed the Argentine personnel at Leith Harbour that Argentina had recovered the Malvinas, and he received the order to execute Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”.

Upon learning of the fall of Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), British Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills acted quickly. His men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, using barbed wire and landmines, and set up defensive positions around the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) buildings. HMS Endurance, positioned a few miles offshore, maintained communications between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorised to open fire in self-defence after issuing a warning. A subsequent statement from the British government instructed the Royal Marines “not to resist beyond the point where lives would be needlessly lost.”[24]

Due to severe weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on 2 April. As a result, Argentina’s planned operations in South Georgia had to be postponed by Commander César Trombetta to the following day. The original plan had called for Astiz’s special forces to land at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to secure the arrival zone for the main ground troops, who would be flown in by helicopter. ARA Guerrico was to provide naval gunfire support from outside the bay, but her delayed arrival due to the storm forced a revised plan for 3 April.

Under the new plan:

  • The first landing would be carried out by an Alouette helicopter from ARA Guerrico.

  • This would be followed by three waves of marine infantry aboard a Puma helicopter from ARA Bahía Paraíso.

  • A radio message demanding British surrender would be sent before any landing.

  • After the warning, ARA Guerrico would move toward Caleta Capitán Vago (where Grytviken’s port is located), opposite King Edward Point.

The corvette was only authorised to fire upon request from the ground forces. Astiz’s troops were to remain in reserve aboard Bahía Paraíso, and all units were instructed to avoid enemy casualties as long as possible.[25]

Historian Lawrence Freedman believes that Trombetta’s assumption of minimal resistance was based on the belief that only BAS personnel were present. This was apparently due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which led Trombetta to underestimate the British military presence.
Trombetta ordered ARA Guerrico to approach the shore, dispatch the Alouette for reconnaissance, and use the Puma to transport the first marine detachment.[26]

During the night, both Argentine ships made contact and remained in nearby waters, with ARA Guerrico anchored in Stromness Bay.

3 April

At 05:00 on 3 April, Lieutenant Guillermo Luna received a naval message indicating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 Royal Marines. However, Commander Trombetta believed that the landing zone would be clear, with any British personnel remaining aboard the polar ship.

At 07:35, with improved weather, ARA Guerrico arrived at Leith Harbour, where it transferred the marines to ARA Bahía Paraíso. Astiz’s commandos were re-embarked, and the workers left ashore under protection of forces from Bahía Paraíso, led by Lieutenant Cortez.

At 11:10, a surrender demand was transmitted from ARA Bahía Paraíso in English, and repeated three minutes later. The message falsely claimed that Governor Rex Hunt had surrendered not only in the Malvinas but also in all dependencies, including South Georgia.[13]
Lieutenant Mills received the message and relayed it to HMS Endurance to buy time. He also advised BAS personnel to take shelter in the local church. The British soldiers refused to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter was flying over Grytviken, reporting no signs of visible resistance. ARA Guerrico began entering the inlet.
According to Argentine Admiral Rubén Oscar Mayorga, the corvette’s commander, Captain Carlos Alfonso, hesitated to bring the ship into such confined waters. Mayorga supports Freedman’s view that Trombetta’s assumptions about British military presence were incorrect. He cites an official report indicating that Trombetta underestimated the situation, also expressing concerns about ARA Guerrico’s readiness for combat.[28] The ship had only recently returned to active service after being in dry dock until just days before departing from Puerto Belgrano.[29]

 


Wreckage of the Argentine Puma Helicopter

Helicopter Downing

At 11:25, the Argentine command ordered the personnel at Grytviken to move into the open, announcing that a landing by marine infantry would take place. Ten minutes later, the ARA Guerrico reported the presence of armed personnel on the ground.

At 11:41, the first wave of 15 Argentine marines, including Lieutenant Luna, was deployed by a Puma helicopter at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the British Royal Marines were entrenched. By then, the crew aboard Guerrico had confirmed that the British were positioned along the northern shore of the inlet.

A second wave of marines departed ARA Bahía Paraíso at 11:47, on the Puma, carrying Lieutenant Giusti, 14 marines, and a machine gun. However, Lieutenant Luna, already on the ground, had requested via Guerrico—as he had no direct communication with Bahía Paraíso—that the second wave be delayed and replaced with a third group carrying 60mm mortars. But the second wave was already airborne.

The landing took place east of Luna's position and in full view of the British defenders. The Puma came within effective range of British automatic weapons. It was immediately hit by heavy fire, but the pilot managed to cross the bay and conduct an emergency landing on the southern shore, opposite King Edward Point (known in Argentina as Punta Coronel Zelaya).

Two Argentine conscripts, Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila, were killed. Four others were wounded, and the rest were left disorganised and out of combat position. Despite the setback, the marines opened fire with their machine gun on the hospital building, wounding one British marine in the arm.

At the same time, Luna’s troops began to advance toward Shackleton House, but after the Puma was downed, the British responded with heavy fire.[13] In response, Luna requested fire support from ARA Guerrico.

Attack on ARA Guerrico

At 11:55, Guerrico began its second approach to the inlet and opened fire. However, her 20mm guns jammed after the first shot. The 40mm cannons managed only six bursts, and the 100mm main gun became inoperable after a single round. Now fully exposed, the corvette had no choice but to turn within the cove and fire with weapons mounted on the opposite side.

At 11:59, British forces opened fire on the ship. The corvette was struck by small arms and a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[31] According to Mills, his men fired from a distance of approximately 550 metres.

The attack killed Petty Officer Patricio Guanca, wounded five sailors, and damaged multiple systems: electrical cables, one 40mm gun, an Exocet missile launcher, and the 100mm turret mount. As Guerrico passed again in front of the British position to retreat, she was hit by another intense wave of fire.
Argentine sources acknowledged that the vessel sustained over 200 hits during the engagement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter—a reconnaissance aircraft—was used to transport the remaining 10 marines, landing them outside the range of British weapons.[13]

As the damaged Guerrico withdrew from the bay, the Argentine ground troops resumed small arms exchanges with Mills’ Royal Marines.[13] Once beyond the range of British weapons—near Hobart RockGuerrico resumed firing with her repaired 40mm guns.[33] This convinced Lieutenant Mills that the situation was untenable. He ordered his men to cease fire at 12:48, according to Admiral Mayorga.[33]

At 13:00, Mills approached the Argentine lines waving a white flag and surrendered. He was instructed to have his men surrender one by one. Mills and his marines were taken into custody by Astiz’s group, which had remained in reserve during the battle.[13]
At 13:35, the British flag was reported lowered.

HMS Endurance dispatched one of its Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The aircraft detected the Argentine corvette and the transport vessel in the cove but observed no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in South Georgia waters until 5 April.[34]

That afternoon, 13 BAS civilian personnel who had been scattered in the surrounding area were captured. At 23:00, Group Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in securing the workers at Leith Harbour.




ARA Guerrico

Consequences

Following the engagement at Grytviken, the corvette ARA Guerrico, which had lost approximately 50% of its firepower due to battle damage, departed Grytviken alongside ARA Bahía Paraíso at 03:15 on 4 April, bound for Río Grande.[35]

The ARA Bahía Paraíso transported the captured British Royal Marines to Río Grande, from where they were flown to Montevideo. They returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April.[13]

The Argentine forces chose not to attack the BAS station on Bird Island, where 15 British BAS personnel remained out of Argentine control. These individuals also remained active in other areas such as Schlieper Bay, the Lyell Glacier, and Saint Andrews Bay, avoiding capture until the islands were retaken by British forces.

The Argentine Navy left behind a garrison of 55 marines on the islands, along with 39 civilian scrap workers who remained stationed at Leith Harbour.[34]

The South Georgia Islands were retaken by British forces on 25 April 1982 during Operation Paraquat.[36]

Medals

  • Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

  • Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance received the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).[13]

  • Chief Gunner Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Medal for Valour in Combat (La Nación Argentina al Valor en Combate).[37]


Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

Referencias


1. "They infiltrated aboard, posing as scientists, but were in fact members of an Argentine naval special forces unit". Nick van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, London, Leo Cooper P.8 as reported in Lawrence Freemdman, The Official History of the Falklands Camapign: Vol I The Origins of the Falklands War
2. "Bahia Buen Suceso set sail for South Georgia on 11 March carrying Argentine Marines" Rowland White, Vulcan 607, London, Bantam Press, p30.
3. Freedman-Gamba, p. 74.
4. El Proyecto Alfa
5. Freedman-Gamba, p. 75
6. Freedman-Gamba, p. 76
7. The first visit of Davidoff
8. Insight Team Sunday Times, p. 67
9. Freedman, p. 172
10. Freedman-Gamba, p. 81
11. Segunda visita de Davidoff
12. Freedman-Gamba, p. 85
13. Britain Small Wars
14. Freedman-Gamba, p. 86
15. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 87-88
16. At that time, the Antarctic Naval Group was concluding the 1981/1982 summer campaign. By the second half of March 1982, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar had returned to its home port at the Naval Station of Buenos Aires (Apostadero Naval de Buenos Aires). Meanwhile, the polar transport ship ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1), under the command of Frigate Captain Ismael J. García, departed from the Naval Base Ushuaia bound for Base Esperanza in Antarctica, transporting the families who would be overwintering there. Following this mission, the ship continued to the South Orkney Islands, where it embarked the personnel of the Naval Construction Battalion, who had just completed construction of a new building for the local Antarctic detachment.
17. La perla austral, cronología
18. Freedman, pp. 183 and 184
19. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 98-99
20. Freedman, p.187
21. Héroes Salteños Caidos en la Guerra de las Malvinas
22. Mayorga, p. 94
23. Cf. Jonh O'Sullivan, op. cit., págs. 229-230.
24. Freedman, pp. 11-13
25. Mayorga, p. 97
26. Freedman, p. 13
27. Freedman, pp. 13-14
28. Mayorga, p. 98
29. Mayorga, p. 48
30. Mayorga, pp. 99-100
31. Mayorga, p. 100
32. Malvinas: Georgias del Sur
33. Mayorga, p. 101
34. Freedman, p. 14
35. Mayorga, p. 102
36. Freedman, p. 222
37. www.armada.mil.ar


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