BIM 5: Argentine Marines Arrives in the Malvinas

 

The Legendary BIM 5 Arrives in the Malvinas

Account taken from the book Batallón 5
This concerns the arrival in the Malvinas of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (School) and the loyalty of its members to the battalion.

C̲a̲p̲t̲a̲i̲n̲ ̲(̲t̲h̲e̲n̲ ̲a̲ ̲f̲r̲i̲g̲a̲t̲e̲ ̲c̲a̲p̲t̲a̲i̲n̲)̲ ̲R̲o̲b̲a̲c̲i̲o̲ recounts:

On 8 April, at nine in the morning, I received a telephone call from the command of Marine Infantry Force No. 1, based in Río Gallegos. The commander, Captain Manuel Tomé, who had replaced Captain Jorge Ranni, told me: “Robacio, I’m going to set up over there. You’re coming with me.” Two hours later I was already at the Battalion.

Around midday I called in my subordinates and ordered a general formation, in which I addressed them.

“I want to make it absolutely clear that we are going to fight, with everything that entails,” I said in an energetic tone. “We are going to fight, and we are going to do it well, as we have practised it a thousand times over here. No one is obliged to go, but whoever does not wish to be part of the Battalion should say so right now. Later will be too late.”

No one moved. Everyone stayed in place, motionless and silent—an eloquent silence indeed. As soon as the conscripts from the cohort that had been discharged heard the news, they tore up the tickets that would have taken them back home and immediately rejoined their companies. None of them wanted to remain on the mainland. None wanted to miss the chance to give themselves to the Battalion that had become part of their lives—even with the possibility of never returning, of dying far away on land that belonged to them, yet which they did not know.

Those who were not fit to go, because they were not operational, asked to be authorised to form part of the Battalion all the same. Those who were rejected did not hesitate for an instant to protest and to express their anger. Petty Officer Julio Saturnino Castillo, in charge of the Battalion’s maintenance group, had to remain at the barracks for organisational reasons. He became very upset and asked again and again—almost to the point of exhaustion—to be allowed to travel. In the end this petty officer went to the islands and was killed fighting on Mount Tumbledown, together with many of his soldiers from the maintenance group, who had also volunteered and joined the now legendary 4th Section of Nacar Company.

A particularly special case was that of the conscript Roberto Silva, from the province of Misiones. He had suffered an accident with a mortar and was therefore hospitalised while awaiting a decision, as he would have to be discharged. Once recovered, Captain Robacio placed him under the orders of Senior Petty Officer Jorge Hernández, so that he could serve as a messenger. Being illiterate, in the afternoons he attended the school, while in the mornings Hernández’s daughter gave him two hours of lessons and helped him with his homework. In a short time he had become one more member of that family. (The 5th Marine Infantry Battalion carries the abbreviation “ESC”, meaning “school”; illiterate soldiers learned to read and write.)

But then came the recovery of the Malvinas and, without hesitating for an instant, he asked to go. The senior petty officer refused authorisation, so the conscript resolutely went to Captain Robacio. He insisted so much that he finally obtained permission.

Before leaving for the islands, Silva said goodbye to Mrs Hernández. “Please, I want you to keep this,” he said, moved, handing her his civilian clothes, letters, money and some personal effects. Mrs Hernández could not hold back her tears. “This is my mother’s address. If I die, please write to her.” “Are you sure you want to go?” Mrs Hernández stammered. “Yes. It’s what I want most.”

As the Battalion began arriving in Puerto Argentino on several aircraft, the airfield was a hell. Aircraft arriving, others departing; loads being unloaded; people trying to find their groups. “Everyone to work,” Captain Robacio ordered, and he said to Lieutenant Commander Ponce (the Battalion’s second-in-command): “I want the ammunition crates here, and let’s get away from this chaos.” Robacio had not taken the entire Battalion, as some people had to stay behind to maintain the minimum functioning of it, and to assist the personnel who would be sent to cover the post they were leaving in Río Grande.

But his surprise was great when he saw that many of those men were arriving as stowaways, having slipped onto the aircraft. Such was the spirit of belonging among his people that they did not want to remain there on the mainland. Men from the reconnaissance squadron, conscripts from other sections, began to appear. Robacio counted them: forty men! But he would not stop being surprised there. At a certain moment he heard, behind him, a familiar voice. He turned at once and found himself face to face with his driver, the conscript Ricardo Khouri, whom he had also left on the mainland.

“What are you doing here?”
“Sir, I’m not going to stay with the Battalion while you’re here.”
“You’re going back,” Robacio said, trying to muster an anger he did not feel.
“No, sir, please. I’ve accompanied you everywhere; this time I’m not leaving you.”

Robacio looked into those eyes, shining with the mischief of someone who knows he is up to something. “All right, stay—but I’m going to have you locked up,” he replied jokingly.

“Sir,” the conscript said, pointing to the steps of an aircraft, “is that not…?”
“No! Him as well?” Robacio interrupted, clutching his head.

Grispo, “the fat one”, a civilian technician (the Navy has civilian personnel who work in certain areas such as workshops, offices, etc.), responsible for the Battalion’s electrical repairs, had also slipped onto a plane and there he was, as bold as brass.

“I’d better head into town,” Robacio said, and he started walking, then boarded a Jeep towards Puerto Argentino to report to his superior and receive orders.

War of Paraguay: Battle of Humaitá

Battle of Humaitá

Battle of Humaitá – 18 February 1868

During the War of the Triple Alliance, Marcos Paz, Vice President of the Argentine Republic, died in Buenos Aires from a cholera epidemic brought back from the front, which spread like a curse throughout the summer of 1867–68. The truth is that the Brazilians—by then almost the sole owners of the war, as only the Empire was sending reinforcements and arms—grew serious with Mitre after the disastrous defeat at Tuyú-Cué, and pressured him into returning to Buenos Aires. Constitutionally, his presence was not required, even after Paz’s death, since the Cabinet continued functioning (there was no law governing presidential vacancy), and only eight months remained in the presidential term. But Brazil was eager to hasten the end of the war.

With Mitre removed (never to return), prospects brightened for Brazil. Marshal Caxias resumed command of the allied forces. Perhaps he had never read Frederick the Great, but unlike Mitre, he knew how to win battles.

With the Commander-in-Chief out of the way, things moved swiftly. On 19 January, Admiral Inácio forced the passage at Humaitá; by the 24th, two Brazilian monitors reached Asunción and bombarded the Paraguayan capital. With the river now under Brazilian control, it became impossible for Marshal Solano López to hold the fortifications at Humaitá and Curupaytí. On 10 March, he began withdrawing the bulk of his army via the Chaco route, leaving behind just 4,000 men at Humaitá to cover the retreat. In dugouts, barges, and rafts, the decimated Paraguayan troops—who had defended the Curupaytí–Humaitá line with heroism beyond imagination—crossed the Paraguay River and headed north through the Chaco. At Monte Lindo, they crossed the river again and finally camped at San Fernando. This operation was a feat of leadership and courage: an entire army, with its supplies, wounded, and sick, evacuating a compromised position in the presence of the enemy. They crossed the river twice without, as Arturo Bray notes, “the Brazilian fleet even realising the bold double manoeuvre”.

Colonel Martínez remained in Humaitá as a decoy, to tie down the allied army. But by then the once-impenetrable fortress had lost its strategic purpose. In July, Martínez received orders to abandon it with his remaining men, spiking the 180 cannons that could not be transported. Yet the impatient Marshal Osório was determined to seize the fortress by force and launched an attack with 8,000 men. Martínez responded in Humaitá much as Díaz had in Curupaytí: he let the attackers approach and then unleashed a deadly storm of artillery fire. Osório paid dearly for his ambition to storm the fortress and was ultimately forced to withdraw. Thus ended the last great Paraguayan victory of the war. But unlike Mitre, Osório had the foresight to order a timely retreat and managed to save most of his men.

The cambá (Black Brazilian troops) would enter Humaitá and Curupaytí only after the last Paraguayan soldier had evacuated them on 24 July. On the night of the 23rd, Martínez had sent out the final detachments—men and women—by river. At dawn on the 24th, the Brazilians raised the imperial flag over the now-legendary fortress; shortly beforehand, they had done the same at Curupaytí.

Martínez’s retreat through the Chaco was far from successful. The heroic defenders of the fortress had sacrificed themselves to protect the withdrawal of the main army. As they made their way through the Chaco, they were harassed by vastly superior enemy forces and bombarded from the river by the fleet. Inácio and Osório were determined to exact revenge on Martínez for the three years during which Humaitá had resisted them. Eventually, the depleted Paraguayan garrison was encircled at Isla Poi. They held out for ten days, but hunger and overwhelming numbers forced their surrender. These were the last Paraguayan troops remaining in that theatre of war. Moved by the scene, General Gelly y Obes had the Argentine forces march past “the great heroes of the American epic.” A noble gesture that should fill us with pride.

For a Paraguayan, surrender was unthinkable—even if starvation made it impossible to move, and the lack of ammunition rendered any response to enemy fire futile. Solano López, by now the frenzied “soldier of glory and misfortune”, as Bray puts it, was merciless with those who did not share his unwavering resolve. Victory was no longer possible, and attempts to secure an honourable peace had come to nothing. Thus, for Paraguayans, the only path remaining was death—a chance to give the world a lesson in Guaraní courage.

Colonel Martínez had conducted himself as a hero in the defence of Humaitá and in his doomed retreat through the Chaco. But he had surrendered. It did not matter that he had only 1,200 men and women, lacking uniforms, most with only tattered trousers and military caps, no gunpowder for their flintlocks, and no food—facing a force twenty times their size. The Marshal had surrendered, and that was forbidden for a Paraguayan. The word “surrender” had been erased from the national vocabulary. López declared the defender of Humaitá a traitor.

Three years of unjust and unequal war had transformed the refined Francisco Solano López into a wild beast. He was resolved to die with his country and could neither understand nor forgive any other course of action—not even from his closest friends, his most capable commanders, or his own family. Paraguay came before all else, and for it, he would sacrifice his dearest affections. His actions were certainly not “humane”, but in that final agony, López was no longer a man bound by conventional morality. He had become the very symbol of a Paraguay determined to die standing—like a jaguar of the forest, relentlessly pursued by its hunters.

It was in this final stage of the war that the legend of the monster, the bloodthirsty tyrant, and the great executioner took shape—a narrative that would fuel half a century of Paraguayan liberal historiography. He was accused of terrible acts—and not all were inventions of the enemy. Some accounts are deeply disturbing, but we must place ourselves in the land and time to judge them—amid the tragedy-shrouded Paraguay of the war’s final days. Think of the thousands of Paraguayans who died in battle defending their land, or who perished of hunger or disease behind the lines. Only then can one begin to judge a leader who could not forgive those who showed weakness, who spoke of surrender, or who harboured thoughts other than dying in battle. To understand him, one would need the heart of a Paraguayan and a soul torn by the looming collapse of their homeland.

Terrible things would follow: the execution of Bishop Palacios; the flogging and execution of Colonel Martínez’s wife; the death of López’s own brothers, accused of conspiracy; the imprisonment and whipping of his siblings—even his mother. In this tragic atmosphere, the figure of the implacable Marshal looms large, convinced that for the Paraguayans, under his command, there remained only one path: to contest every inch of their beloved soil—or die.

Source:

• César Díaz – Memorias Inéditas, published by Adriano Díaz – Buenos Aires (1878)

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

• Portal: www.revisionistas.com.ar

• Adolfo Saldías – Historia de la Confederación Argentina – Ed. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires (1951)

Reproduction permitted with citation: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Captured Land Based Exocet Launch System (ITB) Trial in 1985

Argentine Confederation: Embargos on Unitarians in Flores

Embargo on the Unitarians of Flores

The Jueces de Paz (Peace Judges) replaced the former Alcaldes de Hermandad (Brotherhood Majors) when the Cabildo of Buenos Aires was officially dissolved in 1821. To the traditional rural lower-court powers held by their predecessors, new responsibilities were gradually added—especially during the Rosista era—turning them into central figures in the machinery established by Juan Manuel de Rosas to control life in the countryside, thereby consolidating their role as an effective instrument of rural population control.

Between 1832 and 1852, only four men held the office in the Partido de San José de Flores: Martín Farías, Vicente Zavala, Eustaquio Martínez, and Isidro Silva. The years 1841–1842 imposed an even heavier burden on these Justices of the Peace, beyond their usual judicial and policing functions, as they were tasked with enforcing the decree of 16 December 1841, which ordered the seizure of property from the opposition known as the “Savage Unitarians”:

“All movable and immovable property, rights, and claims of any kind, located in the city or countryside, belonging to the savage Unitarian traitors, are to be used to compensate for the damages inflicted on the fortunes of loyal Federalists by the hordes of the unnatural traitor Juan Lavalle; for the extraordinary expenses incurred by the public treasury in resisting the barbaric invasion of this execrable murderer; and for the rewards granted by the government to the regular army, the militias, and the other brave defenders of the freedom and dignity of our Confederation and that of America.”

Estates in Flores belonging to the “Savage Unitarians” that were seized:

• Achaval, José

• Blanco, Francisco

• Borches, José

• Carabajal, José María

• Castro, Joaquín

• Cortés, Alejo

• Díaz, Fermín

• Florete, Manuel

• Mainuetas, Manuel

• Mayoral, Regina

• Ramos de Lastra, Josefa

• Ramos Mexía, Francisco

• Ramos, Ramón

• Ruvino, Ignacio

• Zurita, Francisco de Paula

The same decree required the Justice of the Peace to submit a monthly report detailing the condition of the animals and properties that had been confiscated. These reports, titled “Monthly report showing the status of the animals that belonged to the Savage Unitarians, kept in winter pasture, specifying location, condition, and quantity”, were accompanied by correspondence sent to Santos Lugares, which was the General Regiment. They reveal compliance with the decree through records such as:

• Notes on animals in winter pasture

• Tree maintenance

• Firewood dispatches

• Wages for firewood cutters

• Transfers of money from firewood sales

• Sale of seized livestock

• Requests for wages for firewood cutters

• Funds for caretakers of winter pastures

• Funds to repair carts

• Funds for the construction of sheds

• Hiring of labourers

This measure was a response to one of the most severe crises faced during Rosas’s long rule, which included the French blockade of the port of Buenos Aires (1838–1840). The blockade severely disrupted the province’s foreign trade and, as a result, its public revenues. This period also saw the 1839 rural uprising in the southern campaign of Buenos Aires, known as the Libres del Sur. Finally, in 1840, Rosas was confronted with an invasion from the north of the province led by General Juan Lavalle, his old rival.

The principle behind the measure was not unprecedented, neither before nor after Rosas. In our civil wars or major social upheavals, confiscation and embargo have consistently been employed by governments to punish opponents or secure funding. Consider, for example, the confiscations during the French Revolution, or in the early 20th century during the Russian Revolution. It is, at first glance, logical that the material damages of war or revolution should be paid by those who seemingly provoked them; for the state, or peaceful citizens, ought not to bear the burden of conflicts they did not seek.

In the 1840 annual address, Arana justified the measure in unequivocal terms, which confirm this interpretation of what had become an almost codified custom:

“The government found itself faced with the choice of either passively allowing the wealth of the enemies of the Republic to support the barbarian invaders, or depriving them of every means of hostility. It could not hesitate in its choice.”

And, indeed, it did not.

Source

Deppeler, Néstor R. – Los embargos en la época de Rosas -, Ed. La Facultad, Buenos Aires (1936).
Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
Gavilán Enciso, Digna – Pueblo y campaña en la época de Rosas: San José de Flores, 1832-1852 – UNAM, San Justo (2018).
Gelman, Jorge y Schroeder, María Inés – Los embargos a los “unitarios” de la campaña de Buenos Aires – Duke University Press, (2003).
Heras, Carlos – Confiscaciones y embargos durante el gobierno de Rosas – UNLP, La Plata (1921).
Portal revisionistas.com.ar

Malvinas: Call Sign Fortin 1

Call Sign Fortín 1

In 1982, he was an experienced squadron leader in the VI Air Brigade. Assigned with his squadron to the San Julián Military Air Base, on May 1st he answered the bugle call and climbed into the aircraft. The FORTIN fighters were to cover the attack and subsequent return of the TORNO squadron on a bombing mission. After takeoff, as a precaution, he ordered the cannons tested. He pulled the trigger several times and checked the fuses: his cannons weren't working. Perhaps he should return, but... how could he leave his comrade alone? "It doesn't matter," he thought, "the British don't know my weapons aren't working." While the TORNO fighters were successfully attacking the ships shelling the Malvinas runway, a British patrol began to pursue them. The Malvinas radar operator, who also didn't know that FORTÍN 1 lacked cannons, ordered it to position itself between the two squadrons. The pilot ordered the jettisoning of its auxiliary fuel tanks and dove toward the Harriers. The sun in its face jammed its missiles, preventing them from launching, but "the British probably don't know that either," he figured, and continued accelerating, trying to impress the enemy. The false signal of the ace of spades worked. Alerted by a ship's radar, the British broke off the pursuit.



On May 21, dozens of ships invaded the San Carlos Strait. In a small bay, they began their landing, and only the air force was there to try and stop them. This time, FORTÍN 1 was ordered to load bombs. It took off at the head of three M-5s, hoping to hit the target. Formed in line, about two hundred meters apart, they approached the area. Ears, attentive to instructions; eyes, searching for the distant silhouette of the enemy. Suddenly, a number sounded the alert: “Aircraft to the right.” Going against orders to jettison the bombs and return, the hunter's spirit of FORTÍN 1 prepared to engage them. He lightened the aircraft, traded speed for altitude, a Harrier below his Dagger, and he dove. Without tracer ammunition, guided by instinct, he predicted the opponent's trajectory and angrily squeezed the trigger. It was a hypnotic instant, an instant in which he imagined that one of his shots would hit the Harrier, an instant in which he had to react and recover the aircraft plummeting to only thirty or forty meters above the ground. He initiated a turn, attempting to engage again, but abruptly lost control. A missile had mortally wounded his Dagger, and the only option was to abandon it. He reached the ejection seat; the explosive charges ripped the cockpit apart, then his seat was ejected, the wind buffeted him, and he quickly deployed his parachute. One push and he was suspended in mid-air. As he fell, Captain Guillermo Donadille tried to recall the instructions from the survival course, those given to hunters for when the fate of combat abruptly clips their wings... but not their spirit.

 

Argentine Civil War: Letter from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Juan Facundo Quiroga

Letter from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Juan Facundo Quiroga, stained with his blood after being assassinated in Barranca Yaco

Figueroa Estate in San Antonio, December 20, 1834

My dear comrade, Mr. Juan Facundo Quiroga,

In accordance with our agreement, I begin by informing you that I have come to believe that the disputes between Tucumán and Salta, and the dissatisfaction between their governments, may have been caused by former Governor Mr Pablo Alemán and his associates. This man fled to Tucumán, where I believe he was received cordially and treated with friendship by Mr Heredia. From there, he orchestrated a revolution against Latorre, but when he returned to the Rosario frontier to carry it out, his plans failed and he was apprehended and taken to Salta. There, he was released on bail on the condition that he not return to the province, and while passing through Tucumán, it seems he maintained good relations with Mr Heredia.

All this, understandably, would have angered Latorre and emboldened Mr Alemán’s faction. In such a context, the Unitarians—who are ever watchful like wolves lying in wait for a lapse in vigilance—sought to exploit this situation, perhaps through the notorious student López who was held on the Pontón, using these developments to reassert their influence.

However, regardless of how this came about, I find Mr Heredia’s request for damages and compensation to be unjust. He himself admits in official notes to this government and to Salta’s, that his grievances are based on indications and conjecture, not on certain and undeniable facts that would eliminate all doubt regarding Latorre’s allegedly hostile conduct.

In this case, the law of nations would only permit Mr Heredia to request explanations and guarantees, but certainly not reparations. Affairs between States cannot be resolved under the laws governing private disputes, for such laws are dictated by particular circumstances only relevant in the State where they are enacted. Furthermore, it is not customary to sentence a party to indemnify another based solely on signs and suspicions.

Even if this demand for indemnity were not repugnant to justice, it surely is to politics. First, it would foster an eternal hatred between the provinces, which, sooner or later, would bring great harm to the Republic. Second, such a precedent would open the door to intrigue and bad faith, allowing factions to provoke disputes that would serve as a pretext to force some provinces to sacrifice their fortunes for the benefit of others.

In my view, we must not lose sight of how carefully Mr Heredia avoids addressing the charges Latorre makes about his handling of Alemán, who, according to Latorre’s own complaints, incited a revolution from Tucumán using that province’s resources with Mr Heredia’s knowledge and tolerance—a matter mentioned in Latorre’s proclamation published in Thursday’s Gazette, which you will have read.

Justice has two ears, and in order to find it, you must uncover matters from their very origin. If it should become evident, based on indisputable facts, that one of the two disputants has openly betrayed the national cause of the Federation, in your place, I would advocate that he be removed from office.

As I consider it unnecessary to dwell on some other points, which the Governor has already well explained in his instructions, I shall now proceed to the matter of the Constitution.

It seems to me that in your efforts to restore the peace and order that have been so unfortunately disturbed, the most powerful argument and the strongest reason you must convey to these Governors and other influential figures—whenever you have the opportunity—is the retrograde step the Nation has taken by pushing further away the long-desired day of our great National Constitution.

What is the current state of the Republic but the consequence of this delay? You and I deferred to the provinces, allowing them to focus on drafting their own constitutions so that, once proclaimed, we might then lay the groundwork for the great National Charter. We acted not because we were convinced the time had truly come, but because the Republic was at peace and the need for a Constitution had become widespread. We felt it prudent to proceed as we did to avoid greater evils.

The results are painfully evident: the succession of scandals and the truly dangerous state in which the Republic now finds itself, a sombre picture that extinguishes any hope of remedy.

And after all this, after what experience so clearly teaches us, can anyone still believe that rushing into a national Constitution is the solution?

Permit me a few observations on this matter, for although we have always been in agreement on such an elevated topic, I wish to leave in your hands, well in advance and for whatever use it may have, a small portion of what I think must be said.

No one more than you and I is persuaded of the necessity for the organisation of a general government, and that it is the only way to give substance and responsibility to our Republic. But who can doubt that such a government must be the happy result of all means properly aligned for its creation? Who aspires to an end by marching in the opposite direction? Who, when building a structured and compact whole, does not first organise and solidify the parts that are to comprise it?

Who attempts to form an orderly army from groups of men lacking officers, discipline, or subordination, who are in constant conflict with each other, dragging the rest into their disarray? Who forms a living and robust body from dead, torn, or gangrenous limbs, when it is evident that the life and strength of the whole must come from the vitality of its parts?

A bitter and costly experience has shown us that a federal system is absolutely necessary in our case, primarily because we completely lack the elements required for a unified government.

Consider how the dominance of a faction deaf to this reality has destroyed the resources once available to us. It has incited animosity, corrupted public opinion, pitted private interests against each other, spread immorality and intrigue, and fractured society into factions to such a degree that almost no ties remain. Even the most sacred bond—the one that could restore the others, religion itself—has not been spared. In this deplorable state, everything must be created anew, beginning with small efforts, fragment by fragment, until we can establish a general system that encompasses all.

A Federal Republic is the most disastrous illusion if not composed of well-organised States. When each State retains its sovereignty and independence, the general government’s internal power is virtually non-existent. Its primary role is purely representative—to speak on behalf of the Confederated States in dealings with foreign nations. Thus, if individual States lack the means to maintain internal order, the creation of a general representative government merely risks spreading disorder across the Republic at each local crisis.

This is why the United States of America did not admit new territories or provinces into the Confederation until they were able to govern themselves. In the meantime, they remained unrepresented, considered as territories attached to the Republic.

In our current state of unrest, with populations corrupted by Unitarians, lodge members, aspirants, secret agents of other nations, and the major lodges that disturb all of Europe, what hope can there be for calm when drafting a federal pact, the first step a Federative Congress must take? In our current poverty, brought on by political upheaval, who will fund the assembly and maintenance of this Congress, let alone a general administration?

[Due to length, the translation continues in the next message.]

Continuation – Translation of Juan Manuel de Rosas’s Letter to Juan Facundo Quiroga (Part 2):

How shall we fund the national foreign debt, incurred for the benefit of the entire Republic, which will immediately become a pressing concern upon the establishment of a general administration?

Furthermore, when we can barely find capable men to govern individual provinces, from where will we draw those who are to govern the entire Republic? Are we to hand over the general administration to the ignorant, the ambitious, the Unitarians, and every kind of opportunist?

Did we not witness how the so-called constellation of wise men could find no better candidate for general government than Don Bernardino Rivadavia, and how he was unable to form a cabinet except by taking the priest from the Cathedral (1) and bringing Dr Lingotes (2) from San Juan to serve as Minister of Finance—though he understood that department no better than a man born blind understands astronomy?

Finally, when we look upon the Republic’s pitiful condition, which of the heroes of the Federation will dare take on the general government? Who among them could gather a body of federal representatives and ministers, possessing the intelligence and cooperation necessary to perform their duties with dignity, succeed in office, and not ruin their reputation?

There is so much to say on this matter that even a volume written over the course of a month would barely cover the essentials.

The general Congress must be conventional, not deliberative. Its purpose must be to negotiate the bases of the Federal Union, not to resolve them by vote. It must be made up of deputies paid and supported by their own people, without expectation that one province will subsidise another. Buenos Aires once might have done so, but that is now entirely impossible.

Before the assembly is convened, the governments must unanimously agree upon its location and upon the formation of a common fund to cover the official expenses of Congress, such as premises, furnishings, lighting, clerks, assistants, porters, attendants, and other necessary services. These are significant costs—much greater than generally believed.

The place chosen for the meeting must offer guarantees of safety and respect for the deputies, regardless of their views. It must be hospitable and comfortable, as the deputies will require a long time to conduct business. Failing this, many of the most capable individuals may decline to attend or resign after arriving, and the Congress will be reduced to a group of incompetents—lacking talent, knowledge, judgment, or experience in state affairs.

If you were to ask me today where such a place might be, I would say: I do not know. And if someone were to propose Buenos Aires, I would reply that such a choice would be a certain sign of the most unfortunate and disastrous end—for this city and for the entire Republic.

Only time—time alone, under the shadow of peace and the people’s tranquillity—can provide and indicate such a place.

The deputies must be proven federalists, men of respect, moderation, circumspection, prudence, and administrative knowledge, who thoroughly understand the internal and external situation of our country—both domestically and in relation to neighbouring states and the European nations with which we trade. These matters involve complex and significant interests. If two or three deputies lack such qualifications, disorder will follow—as it always has—if not outright corruption by those who, finding themselves in such a position and unable to accomplish any good for the country, seek only their personal gain. That is precisely what our past Congresses have done—ending in dissolution, leaving only gossip, lies, intrigues, and plunging the country into a chaos of calamities from which it may never recover.

The first matter to be addressed in the Congress is not, as some believe, the establishment of the general government or the appointment of the supreme head of the Republic. That is the last step. The first is to decide whether the Congress will continue its sessions in the same location or relocate elsewhere.

The second matter is the General Constitution, beginning with the structure of the general government: how many officials it will comprise—both the supreme head and ministers—and what their powers will be, ensuring that the sovereignty and independence of each federated State remain intact. It must outline the election process, eligibility criteria, the seat of government, and the size of the permanent land and sea forces during peacetime—essential for maintaining order, security, and national dignity.

The question of the location of the government seat is particularly sensitive, often provoking jealousies and rivalries among provinces, and resulting in a complicated overlap between national and local authorities. These issues were so serious that the Americans chose to found Washington, D.C., a federal capital belonging to no State.

Once the structure, powers, and location of government are agreed upon, the Congress must proceed to establish a permanent national fund to cover all ordinary and extraordinary general expenses and the repayment of national debt—both foreign and domestic, regardless of the justice or injustice of its causes or the management of State finances. Creditors are not concerned with these matters; they are to be addressed separately.

Each federated State must contribute to this fund (as with military contingents for the national army) in proportion to its population, unless an alternative arrangement is agreed upon. There is no fixed rule; all depends on mutual agreements.

The Americans agreed to fund this via customs duties on overseas trade, because all their States had seaports. If not, such a system would not have been feasible. Additionally, their geographic conditions are largely maritime, as evidenced by their active commerce, large number of merchant and war ships, and the high cost of maintaining their naval power—hence the logic of funding the government with revenues from foreign trade.

Included in these discussions should be the National Bank, paper currency, all part of the national debt owed to Buenos Aires, the British debt incurred during the war with Brazil, the millions spent on military reforms, and payments made toward the recognised debt dating from the War of Independence. Also to be accounted are all expenditures made by this province in support of previous general congresses—on the understanding they were to be reimbursed.

Once these financial and organisational matters are resolved, and mechanisms established for each State to generate its own revenue without harming national interests, only then should the appointment of the head of the Republic and the creation of the general government take place.

[Final portion of the letter continues in the next message.]

Continuation – Translation of Juan Manuel de Rosas’s Letter to Juan Facundo Quiroga (Part 3 – Final Part):

And can anyone truly believe that, in the sad and lamentable condition in which our country now finds itself, it is possible to overcome such vast difficulties and bring to completion an enterprise so immense and arduous—one that, even in times of peace and prosperity, with the most capable and patriotic men at our disposal, could scarcely be realised in two years of constant labour?

Can anyone who understands the federal system honestly believe that creating a general government under such a structure will resolve the internal disputes of the provinces? This mistaken belief, sadly held by some well-meaning individuals, is exactly what fuels the ambitions of others—perfidious and treacherous men who stir unrest in the provinces with cries of "Constitution!" not in pursuit of peace, but to ensure chaos endures—for it is in disorder that they find their opportunity to thrive.

The general government in a federative republic does not unite the member states—it represents them as united. Its function is not to create unity, but to represent existing unity before other nations. It neither involves itself in the internal matters of any single state, nor resolves disputes between them. The former is handled by the local authorities, and the latter is addressed by provisions already included in the Constitution itself.

In short, unity and peace create the general government; disunity destroys it. It is a result, not a cause. If its absence is painful, its collapse is even more catastrophic, for it never falls without taking the entire Republic down with it.

Since we currently lack unity and peace—as we undeniably do—it is a lesser evil that no such general government yet exists, than to suffer the devastation of its collapse.

Are we not witnessing how every province struggles to overcome immense difficulties just to establish its own constitution? And if we cannot even resolve those isolated problems, how could we possibly hope to overcome them in addition to the greater discord between provinces—a discord that remains dormant only so long as each tends to its own affairs, but which erupts like a storm the moment a general Congress is convened?

Certain men must be disabused of the grave error in which they live. For if they succeed in their endeavour, they will drag the Republic into a catastrophe the likes of which it has never known.

And I, for my part, believe that if we wish to preserve our reputation and honour our past glories, we must under no circumstance lend our support to such madness—at least not until the proper moment arrives and we can be sure the result will be the genuine happiness of the Nation.

If we are unable to prevent them from going ahead with such a plan, then let them proceed—but we must make it clear to the public that we had no part in such folly, and that our failure to prevent it is due to our inability, not our will.

The maxim that one must place oneself at the head of the people when one cannot change their course is indeed a sound one—but only when their path is rightly directed, albeit with excessive haste. It is also valid when one seeks to gently change their course through practical reasoning, rather than force. In that sense, we have fulfilled our duty. But subsequent events have shown, in the clearest light, that among us, there is no other path than to give time—time for the elements of discord to be exhausted and die out, by encouraging, in each government, the spirit of peace and tranquillity.

When that spirit becomes visible everywhere, then the groundwork will begin—with peaceful and friendly missions, through which the governments may, quietly and without noise or agitation, negotiate among themselves—one day, one base; another day, another—until all are so well established that, when the Congress is finally formed, nearly all of its work is already laid out, and it need only proceed smoothly along the path that has been prepared.

This may be slow—indeed, it must be—but I believe it is the only approach possible for us, now that everything has been destroyed and we must rebuild from the very void.

Farewell, my comrade.
May Heaven have mercy on us, and grant you health, success, and happiness in the fulfilment of your mission; and to both of us, and our friends, the strength and unity to defend ourselves, to foresee and prevent, and to save our fellow countrymen from the many dangers that threaten us.

Juan M. de Rosas

Notes:

(1) Julián Segundo de Agüero
(2) Salvador María del Carril

Source: Collection of Adolfo Saldías, folios 179–184.
Room VII, Nº 229. Department of Written Documents. Buenos Aires. Argentina. (AGN│General Archive of the Nation)

Argentina: The Rise of the Peronist Guerrilla

Genesis and Evolution of the Revolutionary Process in Argentina

  

Preliminary Considerations

Several articles have been written about the genesis and evolution of the Revolutionary War in our country, and it would seem redundant to revisit them, given that they all generally mention the same sequence of causes and effects. However, it is never superfluous, as it will always be possible to incorporate new information into what is already known regarding dates, organizations, events, people involved, etc.

Some define the stages of the revolutionary process within the political timeframes of the governments that emerged from electoral processes or military coups; others analyze the process marked by the attitudes and events generated by subversive organizations, or by the outcome achieved by the regular forces that confronted them. Personally, I believe, as have several others, that the analysis to determine the stages should be based on those episodes or events that represent a change or a significant situation between what has occurred and its continuation with the new events that are unfolding. The work to be developed here aims to fall within this framework.


OUTLINE
1. Introduction
2. Origins of the Guerrilla Movement (1955-1965)
3. Creation and Development of the Revolutionary Armed Organizations (1965-1970)
-Revolutionary Workers' Party-People's Revolutionary Army (PRT-ERP)
-Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
-Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
-Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)
-Montoneros (currently in government)
4. Evolution of the Revolutionary Process – Periods of the War
a. First period (1970 – May 1973)
b. Second period (May 25, 1973 – end of 1974)
c. Third period (1975-1978) d. Fourth period (1978-80).
e. Last period (1980-88).
f. Current situation.

Development

1. Introduction
The Argentine Republic was the theatre of a revolutionary war (RW) that began to take shape in 1956, showed its first signs of guerrilla activity in 1959, escalated in 1970, and reached its peak intensity between 1973 and 1976.

Signs of a military defeat could be seen before May 1973. However, political and legal circumstances turned the successes achieved—through the application of precise and specific justice—into failure, as the relevant legislation was repealed. Revolutionary activity then re-emerged with greater force. Despite this, its annihilation was completed by 1980. However, the military success was not matched politically, and developments in that sphere extended until 1988, persisting in distorted forms to this day.

The objective of this revolutionary process was to seize state power in order to impose a political, economic, and social system—and indeed an entire way of life—that was foreign to our traditions, alien in nature, and opposed to our national values. Fortunately, this ideology ultimately garnered support from only a small minority of the population. Amid a fratricidal conflict, Argentina was able to escape that situation, though to this day, true pacification has not been achieved.

This revolutionary process was not born in Argentina. It was imported, infiltrated, adopted, and developed in the context of a world shaken by ideological movements first proclaimed by Marx and Engels, and later expanded in the 20th century by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and other communist theorists who aimed to establish a proletarian world through unlimited violence, national liberation movements, and the unified action of communist countries. These aims constituted the true objectives of the global revolution of that time—a revolution from which Argentina could not escape, due to the actions of both domestic ideologues and others known as “useful idiots.” These actors formed various revolutionary organisations, which will be discussed later, and took part in waging the war on the internal front.

These organisations had complex and clandestine structures, based primarily on a political apparatus for leadership, propaganda, and indoctrination, and an armed-military apparatus responsible for overtly violent, terrorist, and revolutionary actions, forming a true irregular army.

In response to these realities, it became necessary to deploy the armed forces and security services to confront these political and military organisations—this being the only way to prevent them from seizing power, which they could not achieve through legal or democratic means due to their lack of representation.

This course of action was not aimed at achieving a social goal, but rather a political-ideological-revolutionary one—namely, the seizure of power—regardless of the means or methods used, in accordance with their own revolutionary philosophy.

2. Origins of the Guerrilla (1955–1965)
Revolutionary war in Argentina had its genesis immediately after the fall of Perón. Beginning in September 1955, a group of activists known as the "Peronist Resistance", organised and led by John William Cooke—originally a nationalist, later turned Marxist-Leninist—carried out numerous acts of terrorism during the governments of the “Revolución Libertadora”, President Arturo Frondizi, and President Arturo Illia.

In 1959, in the province of Tucumán, several individuals were arrested while operating in the hills, attempting to launch “rural guerrilla” actions. This marked the emergence of a Peronist-aligned guerrilla group called the "Union of Andean Guerrillas", led by a former military officer named Ciro Ahumada. Another similar group, known as the “Uturuncos” (Tigers of the Sierra), operated under the command “17 de Octubre” and its “National Liberation Army”. Lacking support, these groups eventually dissolved but served as precursors to future organisations.

With Fidel Castro’s rise to global prominence, revolutionary momentum spread through Latin America, prompting agitation and violence in Argentina. In 1961, a revolutionary apparatus began forming in Santiago del Estero through the “Popular Indo-American Revolutionary Front” (FRIP), which later became a foundation for the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), based on Trotskyist factions.

Che Guevara’s presence in Bolivia extended the revolutionary process in Latin America. In Orán, Salta, reports from locals and attacks against national gendarmerie personnel led to the discovery of an armed group equipped with automatic weapons, anti-tank weaponry, and explosives. In an abandoned camp, a "war diary" was found, in which guerrilla fighter Hermes Peña Torres (killed in a clash with the gendarmerie) described in detail the ambush of security forces—Orán Squadron—and the execution of two of their own members for violations of internal revolutionary discipline.

In 1964, another guerrilla camp was uncovered in Icho Cruz, Córdoba, named “Camilo Cienfuegos”. It was composed of seven young men with various weapons and explosives. The group, communist in orientation, was led by Juan Enrique Saleme, who had been trained in Cuba.

This period also saw numerous attacks and murders, such as:

• The attack on Captain Cabrera’s home, resulting in the death of his daughter and serious injury to one of his sons.

• The armed robbery of the banking polyclinic in Buenos Aires.

• The bombing of Shell Mex in Córdoba, which killed thirteen workers and injured several others.

• The discovery on 24 February 1964 of a new guerrilla camp in La Toma, Salta, operated by members of the “People’s Revolutionary Army” (ERP), aligned with Castroist-communist ideology.

• A major explosion in July 1964 on Posadas Street, Buenos Aires, where a guerrilla was killed while handling explosives. A terrorist cell was discovered, and documents revealed both past actions and planned operations.

These events—and many more—marked the first expressions of armed guerrilla warfare and laid the groundwork for what, in the 1970s, became the revolutionary war in Argentina. During this period, revolutionary organisations carried out more than 1,500 attacks. As a result, President Frondizi implemented the “Conintes Plan” (Internal Commotion), under which the armed forces were tasked—by executive order—with taking direct control of counter-terrorism efforts.

3. Creation and Development of Armed Revolutionary Organisations (1965–1970)
Between 3 and 13 August 1966, a meeting was held in Cuba named the “Tricontinental Conference of Havana”, attended by representatives of revolutionary movements and radical groups from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. At its conclusion, Latin American delegates met separately and, on 31 July 1967, established the “Latin American Solidarity Organisation” (OLAS), with the following main objectives:

• To promote armed revolutionary struggle in Latin America

• To coordinate strategy among revolutionary movements

• To foster solidarity among the peoples of the Americas, defending the Cuban revolution and similar movements across the region

As a result, clandestine armed organisations began forming across Latin America, including preparations for guerrilla warfare in Bolivia, led by Che Guevara and involving both foreign and local fighters.

To meet these goals, OLAS mandated the creation of a military apparatus in each country. In Argentina, the “National Liberation Army” (ELN) was established with the mission of operating in the north to support Che’s campaign in Bolivia. It was divided into three politically independent sectors—1, 2, and 8—which initially engaged in urban guerrilla actions.

With Che Guevara’s death in 1967 and Inti Peredo’s in 1969, guerrilla activity in Bolivia came to an end. The ELN was dissolved, and its three sectors returned to their respective organisations:

• Sector 1 joined the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), which, in addition to terrorism, promoted classist activity in factory unions such as SITRAM and SITRAC.

• Sector 2 formed the Armed Revolutionary Forces (FAR).

• Sector 8 split into two: one faction created the Montoneros trade union organisation via the group “Christianity and Revolution”; the rest joined the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP).

Meanwhile, a split in the Communist Party in 1967 gave rise to the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), whose armed wing became the Argentine Liberation Forces (FAL).

Within the PRT, two distinct factions emerged:

• El Combatiente, supporting armed struggle

• La Verdad, favouring a political solution

At its 5th Congress in 1970, the El Combatiente line prevailed, resulting in the formation of the armed wing: the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP).

In 1973, the original Montoneros group and the FAR merged into a new organisation retaining the name Montoneros, chosen for its nationalistic appeal to the Peronist base.

4. Evolution of the Revolutionary Process – War Periods

a) First Period (1970 – May 1973)
The year 1970 clearly marked the beginning of a widespread and coordinated assault on the country’s institutions, social groups, and through specific acts of systematic and selective violence.

The three most powerful organisations emerged publicly, each committing major crimes:

• Montoneros: Kidnapped, tortured, and murdered former President General Pedro E. Aramburu on Army Day, 29 May 1970.

• FAR: Took over the town of Garín, Buenos Aires Province, on 30 July 1970.

• ERP: Raided Police Station No. 24 in Rosario, Santa Fe Province, killing two officers in September 1970.

During this period, the ERP’s terrorist activities were largely conducted by smaller cells focused on propaganda, recruitment, training, and strengthening logistical capacity.

Montoneros and FAR were meanwhile in talks to merge, aiming to infiltrate the political base loyal to Peronism and planning long-term strategies. Both were responsible for high-impact terrorist operations such as:

• The armed takeover of La Calera on 1 July 1970

• The attack, weapons theft (70 FAL rifles), and murder of Lieutenant Asúa in Pilar, Buenos Aires Province, on 29 April 1970

• The kidnapping and murder of FIAT Argentina president Oberdán Sallustro in Buenos Aires on 21 March 1972

• The ambush and assassination of the deputy commander of the army, General Juan Carlos Sánchez, on 10 April 1972

• The armed assault and theft of military materials from Communications Battalion 141 in Córdoba Province on 19 February 1973

 

From the perspective of the actions taken by the legal forces and the government, this period was highly significant, as it saw the drafting and implementation of special criminal legislation tailored to this type of activity. Through the work of the National Federal Criminal Court, the main leaders of terrorist organisations, along with nearly all subversive elements, were identified and prosecuted. This resulted in the imprisonment of six hundred terrorists and criminals, and the initiation of legal proceedings against more than one thousand individuals for similar offences. This could have marked the beginning of the end of the armed struggle.

However, that was not the case, as with the arrival of the constitutional government of Dr Cámpora, all these legal measures were repealed.

It is also worth noting that during this period, the fight against armed criminal activity was primarily carried out by police forces, with the support of certain elements from the security services.

b) Second period (25 May 1973 – late 1974)

On 25 May 1973, Dr Cámpora assumed the constitutional presidency and repealed the existing anti-subversive legislation, declaring a total amnesty for all individuals imprisoned for "political reasons".

This period was marked by intense urban guerrilla activity, including numerous attacks, assassinations, and takeovers of towns, largely carried out by the many criminals who had been released from prison. In addition, subversive infiltration penetrated most levels of the state, as well as various social sectors and organisations (including trade unions, student groups, and other intermediary bodies).

Cámpora’s resignation, the elections of 12 September, and the subsequent presidency of General Perón marked a turning point in the relationship between the ruling party—the Justicialist Party—and the subversive organisations. These groups found their political paths blocked and intensified their armed actions, returning to clandestine operations.

The actions carried out during this period reached such a level of magnitude and aggression that they seriously disrupted social order and shocked the population. 

Among the most significant events during this period were:

• The assassination of the Secretary-General of the CGT, José Ignacio Rucci, on 25 September 1973.

• The armed assault on the 10th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armoured Artillery Group in Azul, Buenos Aires Province. This involved the murder of Colonel Camilo Gay, his wife, and a soldier, as well as the kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ibarzábal, who was later killed after a prolonged captivity (19 January 1974).

• The assassination of Federal Judge Jorge Quiroga—formerly a judge on the National Federal Criminal Court who had presided over trials of subversives—on 27 April 1973.

• The assassination of former Minister of the Interior, Dr Arturo Mor Roig, on 15 July 1974.

• The armed takeover, theft of weapons, kidnapping, and subsequent murder of Major Argentino del Valle Larrabure, at the Military Gunpowder and Explosives Factory in Villa María, Córdoba, on 12 August 1974.

• The kidnapping and extortion of Juan and Jorge Born, executives of the Bunge & Born company, who were released following the payment of a $60 million ransom, on 19 September 1974.

• The murderous attack on the Chief of the Federal Police, Commissioner General Alberto Villar, and his wife, in Tigre, on 1 November 1974.

 

At the same time, in Tucumán, the reconnaissance of the south-western area was completed in preparation for launching a rural guerrilla campaign. The ultimate goal was to declare the province—and its surrounding area—a “liberated zone”, which could potentially lead to international recognition. Beginning on 30 May 1974, with the takeover of the town of Acheral by the ERP company “Ramón Rosa Giménez”, the ERP began its open operations in Tucumán.

c) Third period (1975–1978)

On 9 February 1975, the Army launched “Operation Independence”, with the mission of neutralising and/or annihilating rural subversive activity in Tucumán. This was carried out under Presidential Decree 261/75, and the mission was accomplished after just over a year and a half.

On 23 December 1975, the ERP’s Ramón Rosa Giménez Company attempted to seize Arsenal Battalion 601 in Monte Chingolo. This operation, the most ambitious ever undertaken by the urban guerrilla movement, ended in defeat for the insurgents. It marked a serious blow to the PRT-ERP, leading to the beginning of the dissolution of that company.

The year 1975 represented the peak of revolutionary activity, with significant material and financial resources—largely obtained through foreign support, ransom payments, and robberies carried out within the country. Social unrest deepened as the population faced growing insecurity due to a wave of indiscriminate attacks.

Following the military’s assumption of power, the Armed Forces, Security Forces, and Police Forces intensified counter-revolutionary actions to restore order and bring about the definitive defeat of the irregular forces.

Among the most significant events during this period were:

• Attack on a C-130 Hercules aircraft in Tucumán, on 28 August 1975.

• Assault, killings, and theft of weapons from Infantry Regiment 29.

• Bombing of the Federal Security Superintendency in Buenos Aires on 2 July 1976, resulting in 22 deaths and 60 injuries.

• Bomb attack at the Military Circle cinema on 17 October 1976, injuring 50 people.

• Explosion at the Undersecretariat of Planning of the Ministry of Defence on 15 December 1976, which left 14 dead and several injured.

 

The actions of the regular forces in control, intelligence gathering, identification, and prevention led to a decline in revolutionary activity. By late 1976 and throughout 1977, the terrorist organisations began to disintegrate—initially the PRT-ERP, and later the Montoneros. The leaders of these organisations either fled abroad, were killed in open combat with legal forces (as was the case with Mario Roberto Santucho, head of the ERP, in July 1976), or committed suicide to avoid capture.

d) Fourth period (1978–1980)

In 1978, the main focus of the Montoneros was to interfere with preparations for and the hosting of the FIFA World Cup, through an intensive campaign carried out in Western Europe aimed at discrediting Argentina and deterring tourism.

At the same time, the PRT-ERP formed the so-called "ERP Support Command", which re-entered the country to carry out acts of sabotage. However, it was completely neutralised.

That same year, the Montoneros also began preparing what they called the “Counteroffensive Maneuver”. Between January and April 1979, specialised groups arrived clandestinely in Argentina to conduct shock operations, agitation, and propaganda. These groups, known as TEA and TEI, were responsible for three major attacks:

• The attack and destruction of the home of Dr G. W. Klein, injuring members of his family, on 29 September 1979

• An attack on Dr Juan Alemán, on 7 November 1979

• The assassination of engineer Guillermo Soldatti, on 13 November 1979

At the same time, a psychological campaign was launched abroad, aimed at achieving international isolation of the Argentine Republic.

e) Final period (1980–1988)

After the failure of the Counteroffensive campaign, the Montoneros—like the PRT-ERP—decided to abandon armed struggle and pursue their goals through political means.

Following the decision in July 1982 to restore constitutional order in Argentina, the Montoneros resolved to reintroduce their militants into the country, seeking to infiltrate the Justicialist Party (PJ). Their aim was to represent their organisation within the party by appealing to the idea of Peronist unity. This involved a shift in strategy, with a deliberate effort to rebrand themselves from a guerrilla force to a political group.

Despite this repositioning, the PJ maintained a place within its internal structure for revolutionary Peronism, regarding it as the vanguard of a mass movement.

Meanwhile, the PRT reorganised its ranks and entered a period of party reconstruction, which it declared complete during its 7th Congress, held in Argentina in April 1987. From that point on, the PRT aligned itself with the Broad Front for National Liberation (FRAL), led by the Communist Party.

f) Current situation

Analysing the current situation requires a separate and specialised study, as it falls outside the immediate context of this work—not only because of the changes experienced by society itself, but also due to the influence of international forces in the internal affairs of individual countries.

Nevertheless, it can be stated that within the national and political sphere, there is a clear tendency among radical and subversive groups, including so-called front organisations, to seek legal recognition. This would allow them to keep their activity alive, placing them in the best possible position to resume the struggle should conditions permit.

On the international level, this strategy reflects the doctrine of “non-armed approximation”, which in Argentina is being pursued primarily through labour and trade union groups, considered the most likely sectors to initiate armed struggle in the form of a mass urban insurrection.


O. E. Guerrero (Brigadier General, Ret.)

Malvinas: Bombs Away! (Part 2)

Bombs Away! (Part 2)

The second part of An intimate, marvellous and moving account by Mr Captain JOSÉ NICOLÁS PAGANO
(Navigator of a Canberra aircraft)
ACCOUNT DATE: 4 June 1982

The story continues...

We were flying on a bombing mission.
Above the clouds, there was a huge moon and a dark blue sky; we levelled out.
I was tracking the navigation minute by minute, occasionally "drifting" to thoughts of my wife and kids.

— N: Oxygen.
— P & N: Sufficient, two lines flowing normally.
— N: Electrics.
— P: 28 volts, all dark, generator lights off.
— N: Engines.
— P: RPM, pressure, and temperatures all normal.

After the silence that followed the checks, the radar from Puerto Argentino, operated by Major SILVA, called us. He would be our guide to the target and would alert us if we were intercepted.
— No hornets (enemy fighters).



One less worry — only the Sea Dart missiles from the frigates remained a threat. Perhaps the absence of “hornets” was thanks to the tireless work of the beloved “FÉNIX” Squadron.
We flew over the cushion of clouds far below. We entered the island via the Federal Peninsula.

— Open bomb bay doors.
— PUMA - RADAR, confirm heading for final run, looks like they’re spreading slightly.
— Affirmative, final run heading 140°.
— LINCES - RADAR, stand by... 1 and 2, fire range... NOW! ... Number 3, correct 5° to the right, perfect ... standby ... NOW!

Eighty seconds of flight — and the eighteen bombs from the “LINCE” were released. The “PUMA” bombs followed right behind.
Below us, the thick cushion of clouds lit up with the glare of the explosions.

— LINCES and PUMAS - RADAR: GOOD HIT!!! Stay calm, no hornets, and thank you.
— Thanks to you for the support. (A Quechua accent)
— Let’s thank the Lord God!!!



I began to entrust the fallen enemies and their families to God — for we truly dropped those bombs without hatred — when the calm, battle-hardened voice of the radar operator warned us:
— Attention “LINCES” and “PUMAS”, hornets on the tail of the “PUMAS”, 25 miles... 23... go full throttle and try to climb if you can.
— “PUMAS” going full throttle.
— 20 miles... 19... stay calm, I think they’re turning back... 18 miles... they’re no longer closing in... they’re turning back.

Ten relieved sighs echoed inside our oxygen masks.
From their baptism of fire, our noble birds had cleansed their “Original Sin” of having been born in the land of the usurpers (the Canberra aircraft is of British origin).

Again, the alarmed voice!
— Attention, the returning “LINCE” is alone, it has a radar echo ahead at 15 miles, turn immediately to starboard, heading 290°.

We all turned hastily. I miscalculated nervously and dropped the chaff (a rudimentary electronic countermeasure) and a flare — which exploded and made the pilot think it was a missile. I earned quite a few "congratulatory" remarks (they remembered my mother) for not giving prior warning.



Once more, the radar chimed in during those tense moments:
— It’s disappeared — must’ve been a missile.

We kept flying, now more relaxed.
— LINCE “ONE” to “TWO”, I’ve lost an engine.

Due to power loss, we all overtook him — he fell to the rear of the formation, but he was still flying.

We landed...
The Canberras had completed yet another mission!
I embraced Warrant Officer LUIS SÁNCHEZ, an old armourer, as the night filled with cheers and caps flying through the air.

Before falling asleep with the rosary between my fingers, I thought about those fighting, those giving what little they had, the pride of the families of those who fought with honour, and a friend’s home where their children prayed each night for our dead — and theirs — and asked God “so the English wouldn’t steal the Malvinas from us again.”