Argentine Navy: Submarine ARA Santa Fé

 

Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe

The submarine ARA Santa Fe (S-21) hoisted her Argentine flag on 2 July 1971. At the end of 1978, as a result of the disagreement over sovereignty of the three islands, Lennox and Nueva in the Beagle Channel, tensions rose between Argentina and Chile.

On 22 December 1978, Argentina launched Operation Sovereignty to militarily occupy the islands. When conflict seemed inevitable, the timely intervention of Pope John Paul II prevented the start of hostilities. On 30 March 1982, she was incorporated into Task Force 40, Task Group 40.4, carrying on board part of the landing force of Operation Rosario. From her, the tactical divers departed who enabled the landing of Argentine forces that recapture the Malvinas Islands. She was assigned a new mission for which she was resupplied with fuel and provisions to transport a detachment of marines towards South Georgia Islands. She managed to evade the British blockade and entered San Pedro Island, penetrating Captain Vago Cove in National Guard Bay (Grytviken), disembarking personnel and materials. At 05:50 hours (local time), she departed to return to her assigned patrol zone, but was detected and attacked by a Wessex helicopter. The vessel returned to Grytviken. Resistance was offered by firing at the enemy helicopters from the sail, led by Corporal Héctor O. Feldman. At 07:30 she moored, listing to port and with the stern submerged. Faced with British superiority in troop numbers, the Argentine garrison surrendered along with the submariners. On 27 April, an attempt was made to change her position; during the manoeuvre, Petty Officer First Class Félix O. Artuso was fatally wounded when a British marine shot him, indicating that he had made movements that led him to believe he was about to operate a valve to scuttle the vessel. During the austral summer of 1984/1985, the United Kingdom ordered the salvage of the former ARA Santa Fe (S-21) in order to remove her from the anchorage at Vago Cove, to free the pier for use by active vessels. The S-21 began to be towed to deeper waters. Finally, the veteran vessel sank definitively in the South Atlantic, settling on the seabed at 196 metres depth.

Class: Balao Class (modified to GUPPY II) Diesel-electric attack submarine.

Launched:
19 November 1944 – Shipyard: Electric Boat Company (Groton, Connecticut, USA).

Power:
3 General Motors 278A 16-cylinder diesel engines
2 General Electric electric motors
2 main Exide batteries of 126 cells • 2 propellers.
Surface speed: 20–25 knots – 37.5 KM/Hour.
Submerged speed: 8.75 knots – 16 KM/Hour.

Armament:
10 Torpedo tubes of 533 mm (21 in) (6 forward, 4 aft, 24 torpedoes)
1 deck gun of 127 mm/25 calibre (5 in)
1 20 mm AA gun
2 12.7 mm (0.5") machine guns
1 40 mm AA gun

The elements for constructing the model parts are entirely made with recyclable materials respecting the measurements according to plans.
SCALE: 1/100 – Model built in 2008 by LEANDRO CISNEROS.

Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe

Force Navy 

Length 95 mts.

Beam 8.31 mts.

Draught  4.65 mts.

Crew 80 – 85 personnel

Malvinas: Operation Uka Uka

Operation Uka Uka (ITB)

On 12 June 1982, members of the Argentine Navy installed an Exocet missile in Puerto Argentino, brought in by a C-130 Hercules aircraft of the Argentine Air Force, to be launched from land.
It was an Argentine invention that put a British warship out of action in the final days of the Falklands War.

This “ingenuity under pressure” (as it was described at an international military history congress in Europe) led two civilian Navy technicians and a naval engineer to develop a previously unthinkable land-based Exocet missile launcher. It was successfully used during one of the fiercest battles of the conflict with Britain, on 12 June 1982, at Mount Two Sisters.

They called it the ITB: Instalación de Tiro Berreta (makeshift firing installation).
“Because it was ugly, improvised… a makeshift job,” recalled Antonio Shugt and Luis Torelli, who devised it in just three days, alongside Navy Captain Julio Pérez.
Antonio and Luis were 22 and 24 years old when Captain Pérez, their superior in the Missile Division at Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal, assigned them a mission that seemed impossible: to launch an MM38 Exocet anti-ship missile from land to counter the British bombardment of Puerto Argentino’s defences.
“Yes, it can be done,” they replied.
“It’s urgent!” the captain warned them.
Luis had been a civilian employee of the Navy for six years and had worked as an electronics technician in the Missile Division for three. Alongside Pérez and Shugt, he had visited France when Argentina purchased the Exocet missiles, giving him valuable knowledge of the system.
In total secrecy, they locked themselves in the workshop at the beginning of May, sketching ideas, drawing up plans, laying cables...
“There was nothing like it in the Navy or anywhere else,” Luis explained. “The missile alone is useless; it needs a launch system, which consists of a set of equipment that gives the missile launch orders, target data, firing conditions, flight situation... We had to build something like that, but it had to be portable, mobile, and transportable.”



“The captain wanted to design an entirely new circuit, but we didn’t have time. So we thought it more practical to use what already existed: a ship’s fire control system, which is a large room full of equipment that takes a year to install. We used one from an old destroyer. It had to be dismantled and downsized,” said Antonio.
By the third day, they emerged from the workshop with a plan: keep the most vital components and manufacture the rest more simply.
It was a gamble — and it worked. They tested the system with a missile simulator on the destroyer Seguí. A tent was erected on the deck to shield them from enemy satellites, but even with the system and missile, they still needed a launch ramp.
“Someone came up with the idea of putting it on a trailer. So they took the ramps from the ship and mounted them on a cart. The electronics were powered by a portable system from old Marine Infantry arc spotlights. The launcher and a separate control and command unit were interconnected,” Luis recounted.
It was built at top speed, with the entire workshop working two shifts around the clock: 6 a.m. to 7 p.m., and 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. The General Workshops took care of the mechanical parts. And it was ready.
It was all extremely urgent. At 4 p.m. the system was tested, and by 6 p.m. it was loaded onto a Hercules aircraft at Base Espora for deployment to the Malvinas.



Captain Pérez travelled to the islands. He was to operate the ITB with Lieutenant Commanders Edgardo Rodríguez and Mario Abadal. Luis and Antonio, being civilians, were not deployed.
The ITB reached the Falklands on 31 May, after several radar-evading flights.
Each of the two trailers weighed 5,000 kg. Moving them around the islands was extremely difficult. They could only be transported via the road to the airport, as they would sink in the tundra.
A site was designated 300 metres from the sea, facing the airport at Puerto Argentino, in the southern part of the archipelago (see map). The components were dispersed, with the launcher positioned separately to avoid detection. They would begin setup around 6 p.m. when darkness fell. It took two hours to install the ITB, and they remained in position until 3 or 4 a.m. In daylight, the system was dismantled to avoid satellite detection. For 12 days they repeated this cycle, waiting for the ideal moment.
Using an Army radar operated by retired officer Carlos Ríes Centeno —who had travelled as a documentarian— ship movements were tracked. It was an anti-personnel radar, requiring data conversion to be useful to the Exocet’s systems. Combined with input from another surveillance radar, they identified the route taken by British ships each night.
One early morning, Captain Pérez and his team attempted the first launch, but a connection issue prevented the missile from firing.
“The only British component in the ITB failed: a worthless diode. Luckily, the Marine Infantry’s Anti-Air Artillery had the exact one we needed,” Captain Pérez recounted.
A second attempt the next day failed due to a human error in radar data calculations.
By the third or fourth night, British ships had stopped passing. The radars showed nothing nearby.
“It was almost dawn when one of the lieutenants suggested doing something they used to do during training — dancing around a tree like natives to summon rain. ‘Shall we try a spin?’ he asked. Imagine two lieutenants and a captain doing that. If anyone had seen us…” Pérez laughed.
But at one point, Pérez said: “Now, while no one’s watching.” And in the dark, they danced twice around the trailer, chanting like indigenous warriors. Believe it or not, half an hour later, they were informed that a British warship had appeared in the area.
They readied the system and fired. Third time lucky — the Exocet hit its target.

The Attack
12 June 1982. British artillery was bombarding the Argentine defences at Puerto Argentino, and that same early morning, Argentina fired an Exocet missile from land at a warship — a global first. Argentine ingenuity, devised by two civilian technicians from Punta Alta in Puerto Belgrano, was now playing its part in the heat of battle on the islands.



At 3:30 a.m., HMS Glamorgan, supporting the British advance on Mount Two Sisters from offshore, had already fired nearly four tonnes of explosives. The Royal Marines welcomed the support. But as the destroyer shifted to a new position, it entered the ITB radar’s range.
“Our radar only reached 30,000 metres,” Captain Pérez explained. “We had very little time to input the data and fire. But we managed it!”
A flash in the early morning, followed by a snaking trail and the sound of a turbine disappearing into the dark horizon.
That brilliant light approaching caught the attention of everyone on the Glamorgan’s bridge. It was also seen from the coast.



It was 3:36 a.m., and it took no time for Glamorgan’s radar operators to realise they were under Exocet attack. Their evasive manoeuvres came too late — the missile struck the stern.
“3:37 — Boom! The ship jolted as if hitting a dock. We lost all power. It was chaos,” said a crew member.
The MM38 Exocet, launched via the ITB, had hit its mark.

Gaceta Marinera

Independence War: The Last Day of Güemes

The Last Day of Güemes Among Us

On the night of June 7, 1821, at the corner of Belgrano and Balcarce streets in the city of Salta, Martín Miguel de Güemes was wounded and fled with his gauchos in search of shelter. Despite his injury, the hero did not fall from his saddle and, mounted on his horse, crossed the Campo de la Cruz. Entering the Chachapoya ravine, he headed east to a post located about 8 km from the city of Salta, in La Lagunilla, known as the house of Doña Pancha Luna.

Colonel Eusebio Mollinedo, who was with him that fateful day, wrote in his accounts:

“...Seriously wounded in the spine by a gunshot from an enemy patrol, and after enduring excruciating pain with the fortitude forged by the hardships of war, we reached the post at La Lagunilla... There he was assisted and could rest.”

From that location, a message was sent to Commander Ríos, who was waiting with the rest of the escort at Tincunaco, to inform the troops encamped at Campo de Velarde about the situation and join the group. Additionally, Father Francisco Fernández was notified of the general’s condition.

Commander Ríos and his soldiers, along with Father Fernández, improvised a stretcher to carry the wounded Güemes and continued the journey toward the “Las Higuerillas” estate. The path included only a few mild hills that were easily crossed, followed by flat terrain leading to the estate house.

They arrived without major issues and waited for a large contingent of patriot troops and the party led by Captain Cabral, who was bringing the physician Dr. Antonio Castellanos. There, General Güemes received initial medical attention.

Dr. Castellanos diagnosed the severity of the wound and began to suspect a very poor prognosis.

With better organization and supplies, those present realized the need to protect the wounded General from enemy forces, so they resumed the march through the "Cañada de la Higuera", heading toward the "Higuera" outpost.

“...At the spot known as La Higuera, four leagues southeast of the starting point, he was extremely weak due to blood loss...”

This outpost’s location was highly secure and strategic, as it was close to the estates La Cruz and La Quesera, where Güemes had burial grounds for his gauchos.

However, in his critical condition, the hero could go no further. Under the shade of a cebil tree, he awaited his inevitable fate with the dignity of one who gives his life for the Fatherland.
Thus, the martyr of our Nation began his journey toward immortality.

Source: Illustrated Güemesian Ephemerides and Others
Image: Güemes wounded.

Malvinas: The Actions of BIM 5 Obra Company

Account of a Naval Infantry Petty Officer – OBRA Company – BIM 5 Ec (Part 2)

Change of Mission

On 5 June, the company received orders from the Commander of BIM 5 Ec to occupy a Forward Combat Post in the Pony's Pass area. Commander Robacio had long requested that the High Command cover the approach to Port Stanley via the only road connecting Fitz Roy to the town. Without a response from his superiors, he ultimately decided to assign OBRA Company to this mission. This decision impacted the battalion during the Tumbledown engagement, as it lacked a reserve force for a swift counterattack.

We were to position ourselves in the Pony's Pass area. Initially, a reconnaissance was conducted, and the findings were reported to Commander Robacio. He realised that Pony's Pass was not ideal for a Forward Combat Post due to its small hillock surrounded by lagoons and semi-permanent watercourses, all easily fordable by foot troops. Consequently, Lieutenant Miño (of the Amphibious Engineers) was ordered to install a minefield ahead of the future positions, and Sub-Lieutenant Quiroga was instructed to move after reconnaissance and to bring the troops as late as possible, as we were certain the enemy was observing us, and the position needed to remain concealed.

During the night of 11 to 12 June, from OBRA Company's positions, we observed the battles for Mount Harriet. The marines watching the combat could do little, as the British attacks occurred beyond the range of their weapons, 2000 to 3000 metres away, except for an enemy unit attempting a rear assault on Harriet, which came within 800 to 1000 metres of OBRA's weapons.

Petty Officer Tejerina recounts: "On the night of 11 June, after intense naval and land artillery fire, between approximately 2200 and 2300 hours, the enemy launched an assault on the positions at Harriet with machine guns, rocket launchers, and artillery. British artillery fell immediately in front of the first assault line. We saw this clearly from our position, as the tracer rounds from the machine guns indicated the attackers' positions, and occasional flares lit up the area. It was a cold, clear night with a full moon that rose before the attack (21:25). The Company Commander continuously reported the situation to BIM 5 Ec Command. We were ordered to prepare for a potential counterattack. At 0100, combat intensified at the top of Harriet. By 0145, the fighting subsided, with only sporadic machine-gun fire heard. At that time, we recovered two conscripts from the RI 4 Service Section (Conscripts Ibañez and Vallejos), provided them with dry clothing, weapons, ammunition, and Charlie rations; they joined the Company and remained with us until the end of the fighting. Our artillery targeted the attackers; the fire was directed by TCIM Quiroga and GUIM Bianchi of the 1st Section of BIM 5 Ec stationed at William, even firing upon RI 4's own positions east of the mountain. Our commander continuously reported enemy troop movements in the Port Harriet area and their manoeuvre northward towards Mount Harriet. He was particularly concerned about an enemy unit moving northwest."

Petty Officer Tejerina continues: "At dawn on 12 June, enemy troops were seen assembling prisoners on the southern slope of Harriet, then marching them westward. Helicopters were also observed evacuating the wounded. For the rest of the day, we had to remain in our positions to avoid detection. At 1400, enemy artillery shelled our positions with timed ammunition for 30 minutes. (Note: Timed ammunition explodes before hitting the ground, causing a shower of shrapnel.) In this bombardment, a fragment slightly wounded Dragoneante Orlando Garcia, the Rifle Platoon Leader, in the back; he was treated by Second Corporal Medic Angelossi. Dragoneante Garcia refused to leave his position and be evacuated. At 1830, enemy artillery again shelled our area for 30 minutes. I was caught inspecting positions and had to make several dashes to reach the rocket launcher position. Accompanying me was Dragoneante Ariel Bustamante (rocket launcher loader); during one of the bursts, I was hit by the blast wave of a grenade and fell stunned into a water-filled hole, from which Dragoneante Bustamante rescued me instead of seeking cover; he had a habit of accompanying me on my rounds, even under fire."

On 13 June, we detected movements ahead of us, approximately a company of Welsh troops approaching. Artillery fire was requested but fell short; Lieutenant Quiroga made corrections, and then it hit the Welsh troops. We heard screams as they tried to retreat, but the artillery continued to inflict casualties. After a while, they were subjected to heavy fire until Lieutenant Quiroga suspended the fire due to the lack of standing enemy soldiers. I was impressed by the efficiency of the British medical personnel. They wore a type of short white poncho with a red cross on the back, tied at the waist. Some wounded had inflatable splints applied to their limbs, possibly to stop bleeding or fractures. The medics marked the location of the wounded, and then helicopters evacuated them.

Lieutenant Quiroga's Injury

Between 1815 and 1900 hours, while moving between positions, the Company Commander stepped into a hole approximately 20 centimetres in diameter and 50 centimetres deep while taking cover from a nearby grenade explosion, dislocating his ankle. The intense pain immobilised Lieutenant Quiroga, who was quickly attended to by SSIM Orosco and CSEN Angelossi. The latter bandaged Lieutenant Quiroga but suspected a fracture due to rapid swelling and advised him to seek further medical attention at the BIM 5 Ec Aid Post for proper treatment.

After evacuating Lieutenant Quiroga, command was assumed by Lieutenant Calmels. Fog began to form gradually. During twilight, via radio, Petty Officer Tejerina repeatedly instructed his men on the retreat procedure, which theoretically consisted of:

1. Movement: Withdrawal of Corporal Agüero's group (the most forward) through the bunker, then past the Company CP to a rear assembly point. There, the two groups would occupy positions to cover the retreat of the rest.

2. Movement: Withdrawal of the 1st Group.

3. Movement: Withdrawal of the 2nd Group.

Final Movement: Machine guns and 60 mm mortars.

Lieutenant Calmels assumed command around 2200 hours, about fifteen minutes before the attack began. The attack caught him by surprise; he was unaware of the exact situation of his Company. The night, the fog that had begun to lift, enemy fire, and conflicting reports from Group Leaders painted a grave picture; he knew the British were numerous, everywhere, and advancing almost openly, shouting. In reality, the enemy unexpectedly encountered OBRA positions, not anticipating resistance there due to the marines' effective concealment. However, for the Argentinians, the British appeared suddenly, as the fog and artillery noise prevented detection. Combat began when the enemy engaged Corporal Agüero's group, which, as mentioned, was slightly forward, practically on the road, 150 metres from the CP. It's evident that the enemy vanguard was moving along the road, as the group was attacked from the front and right flank (north), threatening its rear. From that moment, combat became generalised. The machine gun left by Corporal Alvarez to Corporal Agüero, previously moved to the northern flank, opened fire. Even from the Company CP, Lieutenant Calmels, Petty Officer Tejerina, Corporal Carrasco, and the Company Platoon Conscripts fired their rifles at the enemy to the north of the position. Grenade explosions were heard. The other two Rifle Groups (1 and 2) prepared for combat, but the British attack did not press on them, receiving only sporadic fire. At that time, it was snowing. The British advanced, supported by a high rate of machine-gun fire—about six or seven—clearly located by their tracer rounds. The enemy gained ground, nearly two companies against a reinforced section.

The Retreat

The retreat could not be executed as planned. In reality, Groups 1 and 2, along with Petty Officer Tejerina, moved towards the Quarry. When the retreat was ordered, the Group Leaders began the movement, but Agüero, who was to initiate it, reported he couldn't move. At that point, the Company Commander ordered his 60 mm mortars to fire on the White Points ahead of the 3rd Group. Some conscripts from this group were seen retreating, but Agüero no longer responded on the radio. By 2300 hours, with the movement underway, Groups 1 and 2 fought their way past the immediate depression behind them and then marched towards the Quarry. Subsequently, the Company Commander withdrew with the Company Platoon and mortar personnel. Petty Officer Orosco remained at the rear, covering the retreat with a machine gun. Briefly illuminated by three flares (two and one), they were forced to "hit the deck." In reality, the illumination was over William. The rest of the Company's retreat occurred in darkness. At 0100 hours, they reached the Quarry, where the Company regrouped. The Company Commander had a mission to fulfil as the Battalion Reserve and immediately marched north towards the Subunit's previous position near the BIM 5 Ec CP. Due to poor terrain information, Lieutenant Calmels expected to find Company RI 3 immediately east of the Quarry, but Captain EA Varela's Company was actually further northeast of William, leaving a gap between Sapper Hill and William.

We returned to our old positions south of the BIM 5 Ec CP. Around 0900 hours, Lieutenant Calmels received orders to retreat to Sapper Hill, where the Battalion was to concentrate for continued combat from that area. Once the Battalion regrouped at Sapper Hill, at 1115 hours, it received orders to retreat to the town. From that moment, the Company joined the rest of the Unit, packed their equipment, and entered Port Stanley. By 1430 hours, the Battalion was already assembled near the Naval Station, and at 1900 hours, OBRA Company, with the bulk of the Battalion, settled in the Naval Station's Carpentry, remaining there until the morning of 16 June when they received orders to move to the Concentration Camp being set up on the airport peninsula. Before entering the area, they had to pass through British control posts, where their weapons were finally confiscated.

Mistery in the South Atlantic

Source: GUARDACOSTA Magazine – No. 08 – Year 1966
Author: Jorge M. Montañez Santiago

• Uncharted Depths in the South Atlantic: A vast region between 42°S–48°S latitude and 30°W–50°W longitude remains largely unsurveyed, with surrounding depths reaching 4,500–5,400 metres, and containing anomalous shallow areas unusual for such a deep seabed.
• The Enigmatic Discovery by La Roche (1675): French navigator La Roche claimed to have discovered a "large and pleasant island" with a good harbour on its eastern side—an assertion that sparked a long-lasting maritime mystery.
• Centuries of Unsuccessful Searches: Between the late 17th and early 19th centuries, France and Britain sent numerous expeditions—including by Halley, La Pérouse, Colnett, and Vancouver—in an effort to locate the so-called "Great Island," all without success.
• Official Removal from Nautical Charts (1825): After a final, fruitless search by British Captain Dott in 1824–1825, the island was officially declared non-existent and was removed from international nautical maps.
• Enduring Mystery and Speculation: Despite its removal, questions remain: Was La Roche lying, mistaken, or truthful? His detailed description of a harbour on the island’s eastern side suggests he may have indeed seen something real—adding fuel to the mystery’s persistence over time.

Anyone examining a nautical chart of the South Atlantic will notice a vast area, located between parallels 42°S and 48°S and meridians 30°W and 50°W, that lacks soundings. One will also observe that the nearby depths range from 2,500 to 3,000 fathoms (approximately 4,500 to 5,400 metres).

In the western section of this oceanic region—closer to our coasts than to those of any other nation—certain events have taken place over the past three centuries which, collectively, form the subject of this article. As intriguing as the enigma itself is the connection that the mystery seems to bear with our own past. The chart reveals that the referenced region is extremely deep; yet, within it lie some peculiar shallow areas, anomalies in such an abyssal seabed. Located far from current shipping lanes, these waters have remained devoid of maritime traffic, which was redirected following the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914.

Time has once again cast a veil of solitude over the area. The mystery will remain such until a new act unfolds—perhaps the final one. Let us now follow, in chronological order, the acts and actors that take part in the slow unfolding of events on a seabed 5,000 metres deep.

The story begins three centuries ago, in 1675, when the French navigator La Roche reported having discovered a large island in the South Atlantic, describing it as "a large and pleasant island, possessing a good harbour near its eastern side."

Following La Roche’s claim, the second act unfolded over a century and a half of vigorous searching for the fabled Great Island. France and Great Britain competed eagerly, both driven by the pursuit of colonial and strategic holdings. Numerous navigators from both nations—including Halley, La Pérouse, Colnett and Vancouver—explored the region where La Roche had indicated the island’s existence: 45°S latitude, and an uncertain longitude between 37°W and 50°W.

Failure after failure turned the fame and legend of the island into a source of disrepute for its presumed discoverer. At best, the more generous assessments suggested that La Roche may have mistaken an advanced promontory of the South American coast—possibly our own Cabo Dos Bahías, situated at 45°S latitude—for an island.

Nonetheless, maritime powers continued to mark this famous Great Island on their charts. The third act unfolded with the determined search conducted by British Captain Dott in the years 1824 and 1825, which yielded negative results. It was then that the island was officially declared non-existent, and it disappeared from nautical charts around the world. Apparently, the matter ended there.

From what has occurred, three possible conclusions can be drawn:

1. La Roche lied.

2. La Roche was mistaken.

3. La Roche did not lie.

The first hypothesis, while it could be considered a strategic bluff, should only be entertained as a last resort. The second is unlikely. A distant sighting from the west might, perhaps, explain it—yet this possibility must be dismissed when considering La Roche’s description: "possessing a good harbour near its eastern side."
It is reasonable to assume that such a description could only be given by a sailor who had observed—or even explored—the harbour at close quarters.

Source

Malvinas: A Tribute to the Heroes of BIM 5

Commander Carlos Robacio leads the 5th Marine Batallion 5 in Tumbledown

The 5th Marine Infantry Battalion from Río Grande stood alone against the onslaught of the Scots Guards at Mount Tumbledown, writing a glorious page in history.


 


During the 74 days of the Malvinas War, British forces were taken aback by the professionalism and fighting spirit of the Argentine troops. There is extensive British literature on the conflict, and all of it acknowledges the courage and resilience of our forces. One particular unit earned, from the British themselves, the nickname “Battalion from Hell” due to its valour and combat effectiveness. These men were the Marines of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5).

On 7 April 1982, the personnel of BIM 5, based in Río Grande, arrived in the Malvinas under the command of Commander Carlos Robacio. The troops were deployed in the defensive system around Puerto Argentino, together with the Infantry Regiments RI 25 and RI 8. To reinforce the naval forces, Company C of RI 3 and Company B of RI 6 were also added. This integration of Army and Navy units was unprecedented and proved highly effective thanks to the professionalism and commitment of their officers.

From 1 May, the enemy began an aerial and naval bombardment campaign that severely affected the daily life of the Argentine soldiers. During the day, Harrier jets attacked the nearby airstrip and trench lines; at night, the Royal Navy carried out shelling. Despite this, the Marines maintained strong morale and continued to improve their defensive positions, preparing for the ground battle they knew was drawing near.

They endured 44 days of relentless siege. When fighting around Puerto Argentino began on 12 June, the marines of BIM 5 were ready to enter history. The British attack started at dusk and continued through the night. The first unpleasant surprise for the attackers was the presence of heavy machine gun nests equipped with infrared sights, which stalled their advance. Artillery exchanges followed, with the British enjoying an advantage thanks to their longer-range guns and greater mobility. Nevertheless, Argentine artillerymen fought with bravery and professionalism, firing until their last rounds, with barrels glowing red-hot.



On 13 June, the British launched their final offensive. They concentrated all their forces—paratroopers and Royal Marines—achieving a 3-to-1 numerical superiority over our Marines at the main breach. The artillery fire was intense, and naval artillery joined the barrage. Our own artillery, undeterred, responded at a rate of 1,000 rounds per hour, choosing to die on their feet rather than abandon their comrades.

In the late afternoon, the British attempted a flanking manoeuvre via Mount Harriet to distract the Argentine command. Robacio did not take the bait and instead set a deadly trap: he ambushed the enemy, pinning them between a minefield and artillery fire, while positioning Marines at their rear to block retreat. The outcome was heroic. The British were crushed by our artillery and infantry fire. Two hours later, the British company commander requested a ceasefire, citing the harrowing cries of the wounded as demoralising his troops. This ceasefire allowed the arrival of helicopters to evacuate the injured. No shots were fired at the helicopters, which were unarmed and clearly only conducting medical evacuation.

In the early hours of 14 June, the Scots Guards moved to the centre of the assault on Puerto Argentino. The firefight was intense. So many tracer rounds filled the sky that it seemed like daylight. In the final moments of the assault, the fighting became hand-to-hand. Argentine forces repelled the attack with fixed bayonets and requested artillery and mortar fire directly on their own positions, as the enemy had reached them. Second Lieutenant Silva and NCO Castillo called for a counterattack after being overrun. They left their positions and launched a bayonet charge until they were killed.

Commander Robacio personally led the counterattack, retaking lost positions and pushing the Scots Guards back to their original lines. By 3 a.m., amid a heavy snowfall, the Marines prepared another counteroffensive against the British paratroopers and requested authorisation as their forward units engaged the enemy. The order from Puerto Argentino was to withdraw, as it had become impossible to resupply 105 mm howitzers and mortars. Despite this setback, morale remained high, and it was difficult to convince the Marines to abandon their positions. With iron discipline, they withdrew from Mount Tumbledown and fell back.

A well-executed withdrawal under enemy pressure is one of the most difficult manoeuvres in military doctrine. History offers many examples of such withdrawals turning into deadly routs. But with pride, the Marines of BIM 5 took up new positions on the outskirts of Puerto Argentino, still determined to fight. Gurkha troops were dispatched to pursue the Argentines to make up for the Scots' poor performance, but they were halted and counterattacked—even though our men had run out of ammunition.

At dawn on Monday, 14 June 1982, BIM 5 had no ammunition left. In 36 hours, they had fired 17,000 artillery shells and all their mortar rounds. At 10 a.m., the ceasefire order came from Puerto Argentino. The battalion was still in combat formation. Commander Robacio requested confirmation of the order. His unit entered the capital of the islands in full marching formation, carrying all their personal weapons. Tragically, a section of the Navy Company that had been separated did not receive the order and at 12:30 engaged a landing of six British helicopters, shooting down two and suffering the loss of the last three Argentine soldiers in combat.

In military history, few units have endured 44 hours of bombardment without relief and then faced the enemy with such courage and determination. The Argentine forces at Tumbledown included 700 Marines and 200 soldiers, who confronted 3,000 of the best-trained troops of the British Armed Forces. Seventy-five per cent of our heroes were conscripts. BIM 5 suffered 30 killed and 105 wounded, inflicting an estimated 360 casualties on the enemy (a figure never officially recognised, though many British officers have acknowledged it privately).

How did they endure such hardship and fight with such determination? BIM 5 and RI 25 were the only units acclimatised to the Malvinas. They were well equipped, and their officers were professional and competent. They also shared a remarkable esprit de corps. As an example: on 14 June at 10:30, during the retreat to Sapper Hill, Commander Daniel Ponce collapsed from exhaustion. Amid gunfire, two conscripts rushed to carry him. Ponce ordered them to leave him and flee. Their reply: “Captain, if we die, we die together.” They lifted him and withdrew. That was the spirit of the marines of BIM 5, who gave everything for their country.

Pulqui II: A Prototype Betrayed by Politics

The Day When The Pulqui Became Pulquiría

On 31 May 1951, the fate of the IA-33 Pulqui II was definitively sealed. Rather than investing decisively in its development and mass production, the Peronist government chose to relegate it to the role of a technological demonstrator, effectively dismantling Argentina’s opportunity to position itself at the forefront of global military aviation. This decision, ultimately the responsibility of President Juan Domingo Perón, was critical to the project's failure.

That day, during a test flight of the second prototype, Captain Vedania Adriel Mannuwal was killed while attempting to eject from the aircraft. The crash exposed severe structural deficiencies: one wing detached mid-flight due to faulty welding of its anchor bolts, and the ejection system failed owing to its overly complex operation. Yet the most alarming aspect was that this was an unapproved prototype, being recklessly used for pilot training manoeuvres, exposing personnel to unacceptable risks.



El Pulqui II fue fruto de una coyuntura histórica excepcional. Argentina, al finalizar la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se encontraba entre las pocas naciones con acceso a tecnología de propulsión a chorro. Esta situación fue facilitada, paradójicamente, por su relación con el Reino Unido, que le proveyó motores y repuestos militares sin restricciones. El Instituto Aerotécnico —posteriormente Fábrica Militar de Aviones— ya tenía experiencia en diseño y producción, pero nunca alcanzó una escala industrial significativa. Los modelos IAe-22 y Calquín, diseñados antes del peronismo, son prueba de ello.



The Pulqui II emerged during an exceptional historical juncture. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Argentina found itself among the few nations with access to jet propulsion technology. This was largely thanks to its relationship with the United Kingdom, which supplied engines and military parts without restrictions. The Aerotechnical Institute—later the Military Aircraft Factory—had a background in design and production, but had never reached industrial-scale output. Earlier aircraft such as the IAe-22 and the Calquín, both conceived prior to the Peronist period, demonstrate this limitation.

With the arrival of German engineer Kurt Tank, a specialist in advanced aircraft design, Argentina hoped to capitalise on his expertise. In collaboration with local engineers, Tank led the development of the Pulqui II—a swept-wing fighter jet powered by a Rolls Royce Nene II engine, capable of speeds around 1,080 km/h. At its inception, it was not far behind its contemporaries, such as the American F-86 Sabre and Soviet MiG-15. However, while these foreign aircraft were already being mass-produced and deployed, the Pulqui II remained a prototype in an early development phase, hampered by delays, redesigns and a series of serious accidents.



The programme faced recurring technical issues: structural failures, landing gear malfunctions, instability during certain manoeuvres, and an underpowered engine. These challenges were not insurmountable, but overcoming them required sustained funding, highly skilled personnel, and, above all, political will. None of these factors were sufficiently present.



Between 1950 and 1953—a period crucial for industrial transition—the Peronist government failed to provide the necessary support. The tragic death of Captain Mannuwal, followed by the fatal crash of German test pilot Otto Bherens in 1952, were not isolated incidents but direct consequences of a political approach that prioritised symbolism over technical maturity. Most egregiously, the prototype was used for combat training purposes before it had even completed its flight testing phase—a grossly irresponsible act.



In 1953, a fourth prototype was flown, featuring several improvements including a pressurised cockpit and mounted cannons. But by then, global aviation had already moved on. While Argentina was still trying to perfect a subsonic prototype, major powers were entering the era of supersonic flight with aircraft like the F-100 Super Sabre and MiG-19.



By the time of the 1955 military coup, the Pulqui II was still unapproved for service. Only one prototype remained operational, and its development was far from complete. Although a small group of engineers attempted to keep the project alive, including undertaking ambitious long-distance flights with full weapon loads, the technological gap had become unbridgeable. One such flight nearly ended in disaster when pilot Rogelio Balado suffered from hypoxia due to faulty oxygen equipment, highlighting once more the unresolved safety issues.



In 1956, Brigadier Ahrens met with engineer Guillot, head of planning at the Military Aircraft Factory, and was informed that only enough materials remained to build roughly a dozen aircraft. Despite a proposal to manufacture 100 units, the infrastructure inherited from the Peronist era could not support such output. While the Air Force held a licence to produce the Nene II engine, it would have taken five years to build those twelve aircraft—an unviable timeline for a design already technologically outdated.



Faced with an urgent need to replace ageing IA-24 Calquín aircraft, Ahrens pointed to an alternative: an offer of 100 F-86 Sabres, available immediately. Ultimately, only 28 second-hand F-86F-NA-30s were acquired—without the Orenda engine variant initially considered—but these were delivered in 1960. Despite the delay, the aircraft proved cost-effective, logistically supportable, and operationally viable—something that the Pulqui II, even in the best-case scenario, could never have achieved with just a dozen units and no production infrastructure.



The sole Pulqui II prototype continued limited test flights under the post-coup government, eventually receiving formal approval but never progressing to series production. Its final flight occurred around 1961, with the last prototype flown in 1959. By then, the aircraft was obsolete. The critical investment period had passed, and by 1955 the project remained unapproved, unfinished, and incapable of fulfilling any real strategic role. Its fate was sealed back in 1951, when combat pilots were ordered to fly an untested prototype still deep in its experimental phase—a criminally negligent decision. Blaming the 1955 coup ignores the real issue: the failure to act when it truly mattered. Pilots ended up nicknaming it 'Pulquiría' — a play on words resembling porquería (meaning 'rubbish' in Spanish) — due to its poor performance.



Today, both the Pulqui I and Pulqui II are preserved in the National Aeronautics Museum in Morón, following years of neglect in open air. They serve as relics of a missed opportunity—symbols of a time when Argentina could have broken into the elite of aerospace nations, but failed to do so through indecision, political vanity, and a lack of genuine strategic commitment.



Captain Vedania Adriel Mannuwal, of the 4th Interceptor Fighter Regiment of the Argentine Air Force, acted with a profound sense of duty and national service. His sacrifice, made in pursuit of institutional advancement and national greatness, remains unquestionable—a noble Argentine who gave his life for an ideal that, sadly, others failed to uphold. 

Argentine Navy: Lighthouse Beauvoir

Lighthouse Beauvoir

Opening: 23 October 1980

The most notable feature of this beacon is that it is installed atop the tower of the Church of Our Lady of the Watch (Nuestra Señora de la Guardia), in the city of Puerto Deseado, Province of Santa Cruz.

Geographical location: Lat. 47°45' S, Long. 65°53' W

It is a rotating lighthouse connected to the church’s municipal electricity supply, with a range of 19 nautical miles. The tower stands 27 metres tall.

Origin of the name:
The name of this lighthouse honours Reverend Father José María Beauvoir, a tireless Salesian missionary who travelled extensively throughout Patagonia between 1881 and 1924.

Nautical Chart Sector No. 60
“From Cape Tres Puntas to Cape San Francisco de Paula”
Published by the Naval Hydrographic Service.

Source: www.hidro.gov.ar

Argentine Navy: ARA Hércules (D-28 / D-1 / B-52)

ARA Hércules (D-28 / D-1 / B-52)

ARA Hércules (D-28) was the only air-defence vessel operating in the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations (TOA). Equipped with four Exocet missiles and twenty-two Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles — which also had a secondary anti-ship capability — under ideal conditions, it alone could potentially have neutralised the entire Chilean Squadron.

The fast transport ship ARA Hércules (B-52) (TRHE) was a multipurpose rapid transport vessel of the Argentine Navy. It was built in the 1970s as a Type 42 destroyer and, following a refit in the 1990s, was reclassified as a fast transport. It was officially decommissioned and the national ensign was finally lowered on 20 June 2024, after 48 years of service.

Armed with Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, its mission — along with its sister ship, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) — was to provide area air-defence for the light aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2), operating via data link.

Flag
History
Shipyard	Vickers Shipbuilding, Barrow-in-Furness, UK
Class	Type 42
Type	Guided-Missile Destroyer
Operator	Argentine Navy
Authorized	May 18th, 1970
Keel Laying	June, 7th 1973
Launched	May 10th, 1976, Barrow
Commissioned	June 1976 (Affirmation of the Argentine Ensign) July 1977 (incorporated to the Sea Fleet)
Decommissioned	March 22, 2024 (decommissioned)​ June 20, 2024 (Final lowering of the ensign)
Faith	Decommissioned, she is moored at Puerto Belgrano
General Specifications
Displacement	4100 tonnes at full load
Length	125,6 m
Beam	14,3 m
Draught	5,8 m
Armament	1 twin launcher for 22 GWS-30 Sea Dart Mk30 surface-to-air missiles 1 Vickers 115 mm (4.5")/55 Mk 8 automatic naval gun 2 Oerlikon 20 mm Mk 7 machine guns 4 MM-38 Exocet (SSM) missile launchers 2 triple 324 mm ILAS 3 torpedo tube launchers (firing Whitehead AS-244 torpedoes: 6 km range at 30 knots)
Propulsion	COGOG (Combined Gas or Gas) 2 Rolls-Royce Olympus TM38 gas turbines 2 Rolls-Royce Tyne RM1A gas turbines 2 propeller shafts
Powerplant	• Olympus TM38: 50 000 HP • Tyne RM1A: 9900 HP
Velocidad	• 30 knots  (Olympus) • 18 knots (Tyne)
Endurance	4500 nautical miles at 18 knots
Crew	166
Troops	238 full-geared marines
Aircraft	2 Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King helicopters
Aircraft facilites	Hangar

History

The vessel was originally built as a Type 42 destroyer, similar to the units of the same class commissioned by the British Royal Navy. It was constructed at the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness, United Kingdom, concurrently with the HMS Sheffield, the lead ship of the British series, which was sunk during the Malvinas War.

Following an irreparable fire that destroyed the stern of HMS Sheffield, a complete stern section from ARA Hércules was used in the British vessel. As a result, the Vickers 4.5" (115 mm)/55 Mk 8 automatic naval gun mounted on the British ship originally belonged to the Argentine destroyer.



F

The vessel was built as a Type 42 destroyer, similar to those commissioned by the British Royal Navy. It was constructed at the Vickers Shipbuilding yards in Barrow-in-Furness, United Kingdom, concurrently with HMS Sheffield, the lead ship of the British class, which was later sunk during the Falklands War. After an irreparable fire destroyed the stern of HMS Sheffield, a full stern section from ARA Hércules was used to repair her. As a result, the Vickers 4.5" (115 mm)/55 Mk 8 automatic gun mounted on the British ship originally belonged to the Argentine vessel.

She was delivered to the Argentine Navy and entered service on 19 September 1977. Upon commissioning, she was assigned to the 1st Destroyer Division as the guided missile destroyer ARA Hércules (D-28), DEHE, with Puerto Belgrano Naval Base as her home port. When her sister ship ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) joined the fleet, Hércules was redesignated as D-1, under which she operated until her conversion into a fast transport.

Several Argentine Navy ships have carried the name “Hércules”, but the most iconic remains the flagship of Admiral Guillermo Brown during the wars of independence — the famous “Black Frigate”, so named for her dark sails. The legacy of the name Hércules lives on today through this troop transport vessel.

Beagle Conflict

In December 1978, as part of Operation Soberanía, ARA Hércules formed part of Task Group 2 alongside the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2), with the mission to militarily occupy Lennox, Nueva and Picton Islands and Cape Horn, then in dispute with Chile. The operation was ultimately not carried out, and the Argentine Fleet began its withdrawal to Puerto Belgrano.


Malvinas War

In 1982, together with her sister ship ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2), ARA Hércules took part in escorting ARA Veinticinco de Mayo during the Malvinas War. She participated in the initial landings to recover the islands, and her embarked helicopter operated for several hours at Puerto Argentino Airport.

In early May, the Argentine Task Force anticipated a naval air engagement with the British Royal Navy’s Task Force. At one point, Hércules’ early warning radar detected a Sea Harrier from HMS Invincible being vectored to intercept a Grumman S-2 Tracker launched from Veinticinco de Mayo, which was attempting to locate the British fleet for a coordinated strike. However, favourable conditions for such an attack never materialised, and the Argentine ships withdrew to shallower waters, beyond the threat range of British nuclear submarines. Hércules continued operating in coastal patrol zones near the Argentine mainland.

Post-war

Following her service in the 1st Destroyer Division and later her reassignment to the Amphibious Naval Command, ARA Hércules regularly participated in naval exercises — known as “Etapas de Mar” — alongside other vessels of the Sea Fleet, the Maritime Patrol Division, the Submarine Force, as well as aircraft and helicopters of Naval Aviation, and in amphibious exercises with the Marine Corps. She also took part in joint naval operations with foreign forces.

In 1988, she visited the port of Buenos Aires along with most ships of the Sea Fleet, including her sister ship D-2.

In 1993, she carried out her final live-fire exercise with a GWS-30 Sea Dart missile. From that point, she began operating with spare parts salvaged from ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2), which had been inactive since 1989 and was progressively cannibalised.

In 1994, she was transferred to the Amphibious and Logistics Naval Command (COAL), and by 1999, she underwent a major conversion into a fast transport vessel, with substantial modifications to her flight deck and helicopter hangar to accommodate two Sea King medium helicopters. These works were carried out at the Chilean Navy’s ASMAR shipyard in Talcahuano, with final completion between 2004 and 2006 at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal in Argentina.

In 2009, her Sea Dart missile launcher was removed, and the space was converted to house four MKV assault boats for the Argentine Marine Corps.

Among her deployments, she took part in the 1998 edition of the combined exercise “UNITAS”, and the amphibious phase of Exercise “Fraterno” in 2006. As a troop transport unit, she continues to participate in amphibious operations and all phases of fleet manoeuvres. In 2009, she underwent a major overhaul at CINAR (Argentine Naval Industrial Complex), rejoining the fleet in April of that year after maintenance of her hull, valves, and systems. That same year, she participated in a maritime control patrol and the search for survivors of the fishing vessel Atlantic, lost during a storm.

Between 2004 and 2012, she took part in all amphibious training exercises of the Sea Fleet, including the “Inalaf” exercises with embarked Marine Corps personnel from the Chilean Navy. During the same period, she also hosted training voyages for cadets of the Argentine Naval Academy (ESNM) along the national coastline, visiting ports such as Ushuaia and Puerto Madryn.

2010s

The vessel continued its annual live-fire training, amphibious exercises, and fleet manoeuvres, as well as port visits along the Argentine coast (such as Necochea) and training cruises with cadets from the Naval Academy and midshipmen from the Petty Officers’ School of the Navy.

Conversion

The ship underwent an initial conversion process in Chile (at ASMAR, the Chilean Navy’s shipyard) and later in Argentina (at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, ARPB) during the late 1990s. Modifications included an expanded flight deck and hangar to accommodate and operate two Sea King helicopters armed with Exocet AM39 missiles, and an upgrade of its electronic systems, with INVAP, Argentina’s state technology company, contributing to additional systems reengineering.

Subsequently assigned to the Amphibious Naval Command, the ship began operating as a multipurpose fast transport under its new permanent designation: B-52. Its redesign allowed it to function as a fast troop landing ship. Interior spaces were converted into troop berths for embarked Marine Corps (IM) personnel.

The two radar domes (Type 909) and the Sea Dart missile launcher on the foredeck were removed. The vessel is equipped with a fully Argentine-developed Automated Command and Control System (SITACC), implemented through the SIAG-2006 platform. These upgrades also allowed the integration of a Combat Information Centre (CIC) for the KFD General Staff when embarked, and the installation of eight external mountings for safely securing MK V assault boats used by the Marine Corps.

The hangar doors were once again overhauled and modified by INVAP, and currently operate without major issues. For surface-to-air defence, RBS-70 missiles are deployed on an elevated aft platform with internal communications, where they are mounted during training voyages that include live-fire exercises.

Decommissioning

The vessel had been held in reserve status since 2013. It was officially decommissioned on 22 March 2024, and the final lowering of the ensign took place at Puerto Belgrano on 20 June 2024. The ship now awaits its final disposition.

Specifications

Original

Engines

• 2 Olympus TM38 gas turbines, 50,000 HP

• 2 Tyne RM1A gas turbines, 9,900 HP

• 2 propellers

Colours

• Hull and superstructure, including launchers, domes, lower mast sections, flight deck, and other surfaces painted in matte Admiralty grey

• Underwater hull (anti-fouling) in red anti-rust coating

• Waterline, mast tops, and funnel in matte black

• Flight deck marked with a white circle and white identification number with black shadow

General Characteristics

• Sister ship of the HMS Sheffield, which was destroyed and sunk at 53°04′S 56°56′W

• Standard displacement: 3,150 tonnes

• Full load displacement: 4,100 tonnes

• Length between perpendiculars: 119.50 metres

• Beam: 14.63 metres

• Maximum draught: 6.8 metres
  
  

Propulsion system

• COGOG configuration:

  • 2 Rolls-Royce Olympus MM3B gas turbines delivering 54,900 HP for maximum speed

  • 2 Rolls-Royce Tyne gas turbines providing 8,200 HP for cruising speed

Crew

• Between 300 and 312 personnel

Additions from the Conversion

The cantilevered flight deck and stern openings allow for the rapid deployment or recovery of inflatable boats ("Zodiacs") used by special forces. The ship is capable of carrying 238 fully equipped marines without any reduction in her maximum speed of 30 knots.

INVAP redesigned the hangar door system as well as made certain modifications to the stern section of the vessel. The door is operated both electromechanically and manually, with a minimum opening width on each side of 6.2 metres and a height clearance of 5.4 metres. It is weatherproof and blocks exterior light radiation. The minimum opening/closing speed is 10 cm/s, and the maximum manual opening time is 5 minutes, under conditions of rolling, pitching, permanent list, and extreme wind pressure (with lateral inclination up to 30° and frontal inclination up to 10°, simultaneously).

The ship also features expanded accommodation capacity to transport a reinforced Marine Infantry Company, a dedicated operations room for the embarked Marine General Staff, and two fully equipped classrooms.

Its two 909 radomes and the Sea Dart missile launcher were removed. The deck has since been fitted with metal racks and electric winches for transporting MK-V landing craft, as well as a cargo hold for storing equipment.

Electronics

Navigation

• 2 GPS systems, integrated with the digital chart system and providing cartographic display both on the bridge and in the Combat Information Centre (CIC) via LCD screens

• 1 digital log

• 1 echo sounder

• 3 VHF radio units for maritime safety

Command and Advisory System

• Command and Advisory System – SITAC 2006

• Integrated consoles with visual interface

• Designed and installed domestically by SIAG – Puerto Belgrano (2006)

Communications

• HF - UHF y VHF (Low Band) Equipment
• Datalink- LINK ARA.

Radars

• Long-range Air Search - Marconi 965 (IFF).
• Surface Search - Marconi 992.
• Kelvin Hughes 1006 Helicopter Control.
• DECCA 1229 Navigation.