Malvinas: Fitz Roy Bridge Demolition

Demolition of the Fitz Roy Bridge by Explosion

2 June 1982 holds a very special significance for the members of the Argentine Army’s Corps of Engineers.
On that day, First Lieutenant Horacio Darío Blanco, of the 601st Combat Engineer Company, detonated the charges placed on the Fitz Roy Bridge. This combat action directly contributed to what the British themselves would later refer to as “the Bluff Cove Disaster”, or in some versions, “the Disaster of Fitz Roy.”

In the book Historias de Soldados, Lieutenant Blanco provides his account of the events that led to this crucial moment. On 18 May 1982, while leading his section in laying a minefield south of Puerto Argentino, he received orders from Captain Dunn (the company’s second-in-command) to report to him. Together, they proceeded to the Company Command Post, where they were informed that the personnel guarding the bridge near the Fitz Roy settlement were withdrawing towards Puerto Argentino.

The bridge, located in an estuary southwest of Puerto Argentino, was a 100-metre-long structure with a wooden deck and thick concrete pilings. It spanned a deep estuary and linked the rural area of Fitz Roy with the capital. The withdrawing troops had been unable to detonate the previously installed charges. Given the strategic importance of the bridge —through which enemy vessels could land troops and shorten the route to Puerto Argentino— the engineers were tasked with its demolition.

Lieutenant Blanco selected personnel, prepared weapons, and loaded the only available explosive —approximately 40 kg of TNT. He, two NCOs, and ten soldiers were airlifted to the area. Upon arrival, they confirmed that the original charges had failed due to damp fuses, affected by the weather. The engineers proceeded to install new charges: a rapid demolition setup with TNT placed on the abutment on the near bank and on the first two bridge supports.

It was difficult to establish adequate security. The lack of vegetation forced them to set up their bivouac in a hollow about 300 metres from the bridge. Night-time radio communications with the Company HQ in Puerto Argentino were unreliable. During the day, one soldier guarded the bridge and another the bivouac. At night, three sentry posts covered the area in 360 degrees. Every three days, the electric detonators were removed, test-fired, and replaced to maintain readiness. Provisions were not lacking —as Blanco recalls, “the diet varied when an unsuspecting sheep wandered too close.”

But the apparent calm was nearing its end. On 30 May, British forces occupied Mount Kent, bypassing the engineers' position from the northwest. Between 30 May and 1 June, British helicopters began to operate around the Fitz Roy Bridge area. To complicate matters, the radio operator, Corporal Luis Ernesto Fernández, triggered a booby trap and suffered shrapnel wounds to the leg.

On 2 June, the Company Commander informed the detachment by radio that, due to enemy air superiority, helicopter evacuation was no longer an option. They would have to return to Puerto Argentino on foot. At 11:00 hours, a vehicle transporting a group of Navy Tactical Divers —heading to Puerto Argentino— became the last to cross the bridge.

The situation worsened. At 14:30 hours on 2 June 1982, Lieutenant Blanco detonated the charges, almost completely destroying the bridge. The demolition equipment was disabled, and the group began their march on foot toward Puerto Argentino, about 25 km away. The journey was arduous and dangerous. Corporal Fernández could barely walk, and after several hours they came under intense naval bombardment near a ridge close to Infantry Regiment 4 positions. At dawn, after enduring what was essentially an odyssey, they found the path to Puerto Argentino and were transported by vehicle to the Malvinas capital.

The consequences of the Fitz Roy Bridge demolition were disastrous for the British.
Two Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships —HMS Sir Galahad and HMS Sir Tristram— had entered the estuary carrying a regiment of Welsh Guards. Unable to disembark due to the destroyed bridge, they were forced to wait. In that vulnerable position, on 8 June 1982, they were attacked by Argentine Air Force aircraft.

The result: nearly fifty British soldiers killed, over one hundred wounded, and both vessels put out of action. The British would remember the event bitterly, referring to it as “the Bluff Cove Disaster” or “the Disaster of Fitz Roy”. On the Argentine side, the action became known as “the English debacle at Bahia Agradable.”

Revista Soldados 7 (2012)

Malvinas: A Critical View of "The Mistake of Marching in Broad Daylight"

Critics to "The Error of Errors"

In the photo, commandos of the 601 operating in the San Carlos area in broad daylight.

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - La otra historia," chapter "Analysis of Operations." written by some Manuel De Remiro Oyón.

We have all read countless times that the great mistake made by the Argentine commandos at Top Malo was entering the house to spend the night. But what would have happened if no one had seen them enter?

...However, if the commandos of the 602 Company committed a mistake worthy of going down in history — one that stands out above all others — it was their decision to start marching immediately after being dropped off by helicopters, in broad daylight, no less. Once on the ground, the grave mistake of flying in during the morning was already irreparable, but to immediately begin moving toward the summit of Mount Simon was, without a doubt, an almost suicidal act. It was certainly a reckless move, and it makes it abundantly clear that these men had no idea what they were doing.

The terrain of the Malvinas, consisting primarily of hills and vegetationless plains, facilitated long-distance observation. This allowed British observers, hidden in advantageous positions within their observation posts (OPs) and equipped with telescopes, to monitor the terrain for many kilometers around them.

Once on the ground, an alternative course of action that Vercesi could have chosen, as a lesser evil, would have been to remain motionless. The men could have hidden as best they could, waiting for nightfall, hoping their infiltration had gone unnoticed or trusting that, if they had been detected, the British would not have time to react.

But moving during daylight? On terrain like the Malvinas? And, on top of that, climbing a height? It was a completely irrational decision that true commandos would never have made, especially in a situation where British dominance was already well established.

But one didn’t need to be a commando to know that. A simple conscript soldier doing his military service, if he had paid attention to his theoretical lessons, would know that you don’t do that. One doesn’t even need to be a soldier. It’s just common sense. An eight-year-old child who regularly plays hide-and-seek would understand that if you don’t want to be seen in an open, well-lit area, you simply don’t move.

To a British observer hidden among the rocks of a hill, scanning the terrain intently, a man loaded with equipment moving across the Malvinas peat bogs, no matter what camouflage he wore, would stand out like a black dot against the predominantly soft hues of the peatlands.

If the distance was too great, the observer wasn’t paying attention, or he was already tired, there was a slim chance the man might not be detected. But if that one man carrying equipment is accompanied by twelve more, and, on top of that, they are made to ascend a mountain or hill — or descend from it — and, to make it even worse, do so over snow, as they did on the 30th, then the march of the commandos of the 1st Section of the 602 became something akin to lighting a match in a dark room. It was as if they were shouting, “Hey guuuuys, we’re heeere!”

This reckless practice was common among the patrols of the GOE, the 601, the 602, the APCA, and the APBT.

Critics to the above story

The presented text attempts to analyze the performance of the Argentine commandos at Top Malo during the Falklands War, but it does so with an excessively emotional approach, rife with oversimplifications and a notable lack of historical or strategic rigor. Instead of offering a balanced and well-founded analysis, it resorts to disproportionate criticism and absurd comparisons, disregarding the complexity of the events.

To begin with, the tone is blatantly scathing, almost offensive, and focuses more on disparaging the Argentine soldiers than on examining the real conditions of their mission. Phrases like "almost suicidal act" or "they had no idea what they were doing" are not only unnecessary but also demonstrate an absolute ignorance of the operational circumstances. It is evident that the decisions made at Top Malo were constrained by external factors: superior orders, time constraints, logistical pressure, and an environment where the British had clear technological and tactical advantages. Criticizing these decisions without considering these limitations reveals a misunderstanding of how war operates in real scenarios.

The author points out that moving during the day was an "irrational" mistake and compares it to something that "even an eight-year-old child playing hide and seek would understand." Such statements are not only insulting but also simplistic. Military operations are not reduced to children's games or basic logic dictated by intuition. Missions are carried out under specific constraints, and in the case of Top Malo, it is likely that the Argentine commandos had no other choice but to advance. Remaining stationary in an exposed terrain, where the British already had advanced observers equipped with telescopes, also did not guarantee success. The text avoids exploring these options and limits itself to ridicule, reflecting a lack of depth in the analysis.

Another serious issue is the historical decontextualization. The author criticizes the Argentine commandos as if they were expected to operate under the standards of British or modern special forces, ignoring that resources, training, and experience were significantly different. It is true that the British had technological, aerial, and logistical superiority, but placing exclusive blame on the Argentine soldiers for questionable decisions in such an unequal environment is unfair and reveals an evident bias.

The terrain of the Falklands, described as "plains without vegetation," is also not as simple as the author portrays. Although the terrain was largely open, it also featured undulations and low-lying areas that could offer limited concealment. The text fails to consider whether the commandos attempted to take advantage of these features or whether the daytime movement was an operational necessity rather than an imprudent choice.

Although the author is correct in pointing out that moving during the day in exposed terrain is extremely risky, the criticism loses strength by failing to analyze why this decision might have been made. It is easy to criticize with the benefit of historical hindsight and the absence of pressure, but in the battlefield, decisions are made with limited information, under extreme stress, and with deadlines that do not always allow for the ideal choice.

Finally, the text not only exaggerates in its criticism of the Argentine commandos but also makes unfounded generalizations. It claims that such practices were "common" among all units, from the GOE to the 602, without providing concrete evidence to support this accusation. Additionally, the use of metaphors like "lighting a match in a dark room" may be striking, but it adds nothing to the tactical understanding of what occurred.

In conclusion, this text is neither a serious nor objective analysis of the events at Top Malo, but rather a critique laden with prejudice and superficiality. It ignores the context, omits operational constraints, and relies more on disdain than on solid strategic analysis. While it raises some valid ideas, such as the importance of avoiding movement in exposed terrain during daylight, these are buried under a torrent of sarcasm and generalizations that trivialize the complexity of war and the sacrifice of the soldiers involved. A true analysis would require empathy, rigor, and a deeper understanding of the facts—something this text, unfortunately, fails to achieve.