The Malvinas War: Forty Years On—A Struggle for Sovereignty and Dignity
By Manuel Remira Oyón| Reflections | 14 May 2025
Preface
As a Chilean, writing about the Malvinas War is no small undertaking, especially given the historical tensions between Chile and Argentina. In April 1982, when Argentina reclaimed the Malvinas Islands—territory unquestionably part of its continental shelf and its sovereign rights—Chile’s military regime under Pinochet chose the wrong side of history, aligning itself with Britain and providing covert support to the colonial power. This shameful episode underscored the deep divisions sowed by dictatorship and the betrayal of Latin American unity in the face of imperialism.
It must be clear: the complicity of Pinochet’s regime in undermining Argentina’s rightful claim does not reflect the will of the Chilean people, who have long harboured a sense of solidarity with their Argentine brothers and sisters in their quest to end the last vestiges of colonial rule in our region.
A Fight Rooted in Principle
The Malvinas War was not a random clash, nor was it a folly of the moment. It was the culmination of nearly 150 years of Argentina’s steadfast insistence on the return of territory that had been seized by force. The Malvinas were recognised as part of Spanish South America, and after Argentina’s independence, as part of its national territory. Britain's occupation in 1833 was a flagrant act of imperial aggression, displacing Argentine settlers and establishing an outpost that has remained, to this day, a colonial relic.
This was not a marginal grievance. The Malvinas became a symbol of Argentina’s ongoing struggle for sovereignty and self-determination—a cause enshrined in international law and recognised by numerous United Nations resolutions calling for dialogue and resolution between the two parties. The islands’ strategic location in the South Atlantic and their proximity to Antarctica have always been of immense geopolitical significance, a fact long obscured by those who dismiss the conflict as over “barren rocks.”
The injustice of colonial occupation weighed heavily on the Argentine people, who, regardless of the shifting sands of political leadership, never relinquished their claim. The 1982 conflict, therefore, was not merely a military manoeuvre but the physical manifestation of a centuries-old demand for justice.
The Dictatorship’s Double Crime
It is undeniable that Argentina’s military dictatorship was a brutal regime, responsible for grave human rights violations. But the Malvinas cause stands apart from the crimes of the junta. The junta’s opportunistic timing—seizing on a noble cause to shore up its crumbling legitimacy—should never be confused with the righteousness of Argentina’s claim. If anything, the dictatorship’s mishandling of the conflict and its betrayal of the soldiers it sent to war only deepened Argentina’s national trauma.
Thousands of young conscripts, many from impoverished provinces in northern Argentina, were sent ill-prepared and under-equipped into battle. These were not seasoned soldiers; they were boys thrust into the freezing winds of the South Atlantic, bearing the weight of their nation’s hopes and the burden of their leaders’ incompetence. Their courage, in the face of overwhelming odds, was nothing short of heroic.
The British forces, equipped with superior technology and backed by one of the world’s most powerful navies, faced fierce resistance. The Argentine Air Force, despite limited resources, mounted daring attacks that resulted in significant British losses—ships sunk, aircraft destroyed, and lives lost. These victories on the battlefield were a testament to the valour and resilience of Argentine forces, who fought not for conquest but for liberation.
A War That Echoed Far Beyond the Battlefield
The consequences of the Malvinas War extended well beyond its 74 days of combat. For Argentina, the war precipitated the fall of the dictatorship and the return to democracy—a profound transformation that reshaped the nation’s trajectory. For Britain, it reinvigorated a government facing domestic unpopularity, entrenching policies of neoliberal austerity that would have lasting repercussions.
Yet the most enduring legacy is the wound that remains open: the unresolved sovereignty dispute. Decades on, the British government continues to maintain its colonial hold over the Malvinas, defying international calls for negotiation and dialogue. The islanders' right to self-determination, often cited by London, must be understood within the context of a population settled by the colonial power itself, a factor that complicates but does not nullify Argentina’s legitimate claim.
Honouring the Fallen and the Forgotten
The soldiers who returned from the Malvinas—victims of both war and neglect—were met not with the honour they deserved, but with silence and marginalisation. Many have since succumbed to the invisible wounds of war, their struggles largely ignored by successive governments. It is estimated that hundreds of veterans have taken their own lives, a silent testament to the deep scars left by the conflict.
The sacrifice of these men demands remembrance, not only as a chapter in Argentina’s history but as a reminder of the broader fight against colonialism. Their courage stands as a rebuke to the complacency of the international community, which has too often turned a blind eye to the persistence of imperial claims in our hemisphere.
The Path Forward
The Malvinas question is far from resolved. While military conflict must never again be the means, Argentina’s claim remains as valid today as it was in 1833. The road to justice lies in persistent diplomacy, international advocacy, and the unwavering resolve of the Argentine people to see their sovereign rights respected.
To dismiss the Malvinas as a relic of the past is to ignore the living legacy of colonialism—a legacy that continues to shape geopolitics in the South Atlantic and beyond. The cause of the Malvinas is not merely Argentina’s cause; it is the cause of all who stand for sovereignty, self-determination, and the end of imperial dominion.
Forty years on, the memory of the Malvinas War endures as a solemn reminder of what was lost and what remains to be reclaimed. It is a testament to a nation's dignity—a dignity that no war, no defeat, and no occupation can extinguish.
Operation Fingent: the radar the British sold to Chile to spy on Argentine movements during the Malvinas War
In a rushed move, Great Britain devised plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases — a reminder of how, even in wartime, they were willing to involve neighbouring countries to monitor and undermine Argentine efforts in defending the Malvinas.
Based on Mariano P. Sciaroni || Infobae
As the British fleet set sail toward the Malvinas, the British high command was well aware it would face a serious problem if confronted by Argentina’s Air Force and Naval Aviation. At that time, the Royal Navy was designed to operate in the North Atlantic, under the protection of aerial cover and early warning systems provided both by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the U.S. Navy.
Operating outside that zone, with only the limited number of carrier-based aircraft aboard the Invincible and Hermes, the British would lack the advance warning needed to ready their missiles and position interceptors to counter any aerial threat.
Without such anticipation, every Argentine attack would effectively become a surprise, detected only when it was already mere miles from its target — something the British simply could not afford.
In a scramble, they rushed to design plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases. The core idea was that no plane should be able to lift off from Argentine soil without being noticed, giving the British fleet at least 45 minutes’ warning of an incoming airstrike — just enough time to call a “Yellow Alert” for planes in the air and prepare for bombs or missiles.
First, special forces (possibly the famed Special Air Service) would be deployed on the continent to report movements at the Río Grande, Río Gallegos, and Comodoro Rivadavia bases (this fell under the so-called “Operation Shutter”; the commandos were only present from late May to early June, and it remains a mystery how they got there or how they left, as details on the matter are still classified).
Naval Station “Almirante Hermes Quijada” in Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, during the war
They also considered that nuclear submarines would approach the Argentine coast to report on aerial movements, detecting them either through their periscopes or with electronic surveillance equipment.
Finally, arrangements were made with the “friendly” Chilean Air Force, whose Thomson-CSF radar located near Punta Arenas would provide alerts about takeoffs from Ushuaia, Río Grande, and Río Gallegos.
However, there remained a large gap: the entire province of Chubut and the Comodoro Rivadavia base were beyond radar coverage. That was a serious problem.
Luckily for the British, Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, the Royal Air Force’s delegate in Chile, had already secured from General Fernando Matthei, commander of the Chilean Air Force, a “blank check” to move forward in solving such inconveniences.
But the Chileans had no radar stationed there — nor did they have a mobile radar system.
To overcome this, the British had to urgently sell them a radar. The operation was quickly agreed upon: the price was set at under one British pound (and, for the same token, they also received six Hawker Hunter fighter jets, three Canberra bombers, and anti-aircraft missiles). An entire air force for less than 60 Argentine pesos at today’s exchange rate — a bargain, to put it mildly.
With political approval secured, the military phase began moving. Thus, the so-called “Operation Fingent” was designed and took shape. It was decided that the radar to be transferred (or rather, sold) would be a Marconi S259 transportable unit, part of the British Royal Air Force’s Mobile Reserve.
A S259 radar operating at RAF Saxa Vord in the 70s in the Shetland Islands, North Scotland. Possibly this very same radar has been sold to Chile in 1982,
The radar would be accompanied by a so-called “sales team” — which, in reality, was nothing more than British Royal Air Force military personnel dressed in civilian clothes, tasked with operating the radar and training the supposed new “owners.”
This “sales team” was made up of four officers and seven non-commissioned officers, who would carry no weapons and would formally be working under the Chilean armed forces. They were instructed to buy warm civilian clothing and ensure their passports were in order. They were also informed that their mission was absolutely secret and that they were to behave at all times as civilian contractors.
They were forbidden from speaking about this matter to anyone — neither in Great Britain nor in Chile.
The deployment location was ultimately decided by General Matthei: it would be set up in Balmaceda, positioned at the latitude of Comodoro Rivadavia, and would be protected by the Chilean Army. A strategic spot, ideal for monitoring Argentine movements.
With the mission in place, on May 5, 1982, a Boeing 747 from the Flying Tigers airline departed RAF Brize Norton (not far from London), loaded with the radar equipment and personnel, heading for Santiago de Chile. The route included a stop in San Juan, Puerto Rico, making it a long journey.
Upon landing, a military transport plane — a C-130 Hercules — appeared to carry them to their final destination. The issue was that this aircraft bore camouflage very similar to British military planes, and painted on its fuselage were the words FUERZA AREA (not AÉREA) DE CHILE — in short, it was a British plane.
A British plane, carrying British military personnel and British radar, to just a few kilometers from the Argentine border.
A Chilean C-130 Hercules and another from the British Royal Air Force (RAF) wait on the tarmac, photographed from an RAF VC-10. The photo was taken on April 24, 1982, on Easter Island (Chile).
Soon after, the radar reached its final destination and was swiftly installed. The British put it to good use, while Chilean troops guarded the area to prevent any issues.
The information gathered by the radar was securely transmitted to the headquarters of the Chilean Air Force’s intelligence service. From there, a special British team operating a satellite communication system would relay the data to their fleet.
It was a well-oiled system that ultimately worked very effectively — and, as mentioned earlier, it was complemented by reports from ground commandos, another radar, and finally the nuclear submarines near the coast (for example, the submarine HMS Valiant, operating near Río Grande, alone provided 300 alerts of aircraft in the air).
When it was all over, as General Matthei later explained, “we kept the radars, the missiles, and the planes, and they were satisfied because they received the information they needed on time. The deal was over, and Sidney Edwards was dismissed the next day.”
“Argentina has its back well covered,” said Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Chile’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, not long before. A peculiar statement, considering that right in the middle of Argentina’s back, a British radar was operating — helping foreign forces monitor and strike at Argentine defenses in the Malvinas.
Proposal for Changes to Toponymy in Argentina: Restoring the Authentic Indigenous Peoples in the Face of Araucanian/Mapuche Appropriation
Abstract
This report analyses the proposal to modify place names in Argentina by replacing those of Mapuche or Araucanian origin with names in the languages of peoples who were ancestrally settled to the east of the Andes, such as the Tehuelches or Aonikenk. The proposal is based on historical and linguistic evidence demonstrating that the Mapuche are indigenous to the western slopes of the Andes, in what is now Chile, and that their presence in Argentine Patagonia is the result of a relatively recent expansion, beginning in the seventeenth century. The work of anthropologist Rodolfo Casamiquela on this phenomenon will be reviewed, as well as the influence of foreign organisations, such as Mapuche International Links, which promote claims lacking solid historical foundations and exhibiting notable ideological bias.
1. Introduction
Toponymy in Argentina reflects the history of the peoples who have inhabited its territory. However, in recent decades, a movement has emerged seeking to impose a narrative portraying the Mapuche as the sole indigenous people of Patagonia, a claim that contradicts archaeological, anthropological, and linguistic research. Given the importance of historical and territorial identity, this report argues for the need to restore traditional names linked to the truly pre-existing peoples of Argentine Patagonia, primarily the Tehuelches (Aonikenk and Güŋüna Küne) and the Pampas, displacing place names imposed by the Mapuche expansion from Chile.
2. The Trans-Andean Origin of the Araucanians and Their Eastward Expansion
2.1 Historical and Anthropological Evidence
Archaeological and ethnohistorical evidence indicates that the Mapuche did not inhabit eastern Patagonia prior to the seventeenth century. In his work Who Were the Tehuelches? An Ethnicity on the Verge of Extinction (1969), Rodolfo Casamiquela refutes the notion that the Mapuche are the original inhabitants of Argentine territory, documenting their advance from Chile through a process of acculturation and subjugation of the indigenous peoples who had lived there. Casamiquela notes that the term "Araucanisation" refers to the cultural, linguistic, and political imposition of Mapuche influence over the Tehuelches and other groups east of the Andes.
The Tehuelches, comprising groups such as the Aonikenk and Güŋüna Küne, occupied vast areas of Argentine Patagonia from pre-Hispanic times. Their presence has been confirmed through archaeological studies in the central and southern plateaus of the country. In contrast, the Mapuche only appear in the region during relatively recent times, as a result of migrations and interethnic conflicts.
2.2 Linguistic and Cultural Evidence
Casamiquela also highlights the progressive disappearance of the Tehuelche languages due to the process of Mapuchisation. Prior to the seventeenth century, Argentine Patagonia was inhabited by groups who spoke languages distinct from Mapudungun. However, with the Mapuche expansion, these languages were replaced, and today only vestiges remain in toponymy and ethnographic records.
Linguist Viegas Barros (1998) reinforces this view by pointing out that the Tehuelche (Aonikenk) language has its own distinctive roots, separate from Mapudungun, further evidencing that the Aonikenk were the original inhabitants of the region prior to the arrival of the Mapuche.
2.3 The Historical Presence of the Aonikenk and the Late Arrival of the Mapuche
The Aonikenk, commonly referred to as Tehuelches or Patagonians, were the original inhabitants of Argentine Patagonia. Their presence is recorded from the time of European expeditions, such as Magellan’s in 1520 and FitzRoy and Darwin’s explorations in the nineteenth century. Anthropological and linguistic studies have confirmed their existence in the territory since pre-Columbian times.
Anthropologist and historian Rodolfo Casamiquela (1978) was a leading figure in demonstrating the prior presence of the Tehuelches in eastern Patagonia. In his work The Techno-Cultural Areas of Southern Argentina and Chile, he argues that the Mapuche migration eastward across the Andes was a relatively recent phenomenon, and that the Araucanisation of the Tehuelches was a forced process of cultural and linguistic assimilation (Casamiquela, 1978).
Casamiquela maintains that the Mapuche originated from the western side of the Andes and crossed into Argentine territory in search of new resources and trading opportunities, spurred by the introduction of horses brought by the Spanish. This process, which intensified between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, led to a linguistic and cultural replacement that eventually gave rise to the mistaken belief that the Mapuche were Patagonia’s ancestral inhabitants.
Moreover, colonial records and accounts by European travellers confirm that until the mid-eighteenth century, there is no documented Mapuche presence in the Pampas or Patagonia. In contrast, Tehuelche settlements are well documented across vast areas of modern Argentine territory (Bridges, 1948; Borrero, 2001).
3. Toponymy and the Need for Change
Toponymy in Argentina has been profoundly altered by Mapuche expansion. Many names of Tehuelche origin have been replaced by Mapudungun terms as a result of the cultural imposition suffered by these peoples. Clear examples include:
Chubut, originally Tchubut, an Aonikenk word meaning "transparent", although later reinterpreted through a Mapuche phonetic lens.
Neuquén, a Mapuche term that superseded previous names used by the indigenous peoples of the area.
Río Negro, a region originally populated by the Pampas and Güŋüna Küne before the Mapuche arrival.
A process of restoring ancestral place names would be an act of historical justice, allowing the true identity of the peoples who inhabited Argentina prior to Mapuche expansion to be reclaimed.
Cities and Regions in the Province of Buenos Aires with Araucanian Names That Could Be Changed to Their Corresponding Aonikenk (or Spanish) Equivalents
4. External Interference: Mapuche International Links and Its Role in Historical Distortion
4.1 Origin and Composition of the Organisation
One of the main sources supporting the narrative of Mapuche ancestral presence in Patagonia is the organisation Mapuche International Links, whose website (https://www.mapuche-nation.org/) promotes a biased version of history. Strikingly, this organisation is headquartered in the United Kingdom and funded by British sources, raising questions about its true interests in the region.
Moreover, its composition is highly irregular: although it presents itself as an organisation defending the Mapuche people, only one of its members is of Chilean origin, while the rest are British citizens. This imbalance suggests that the organisation may be operating with a covert geopolitical agenda rather than a genuine interest in indigenous rights.
4.2 Lack of Evidence Behind Their Claims
Mapuche International Links bases its claims on oral tradition without archaeological or documentary support. Historical sources from Argentina and Chile, including the chronicles of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century missionaries and travellers, confirm that the Mapuche did not inhabit eastern Patagonia prior to the process of Araucanisation. Their arrival resulted from a series of migratory movements that, in many cases, involved the conquest and assimilation of local peoples.
The insistence on an alleged "ancestral" Mapuche presence in Argentine Patagonia lacks foundation and appears to be driven more by political and economic interests than by historical reality.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
The revision of toponymy in Argentina is a matter of historical justice for the peoples who are truly indigenous to the territory. Given that the Mapuche presence in Argentine Patagonia is the result of a recent expansion rather than an ancestral occupation, it is necessary to restore names of Tehuelche, Aonikenk, and Pampa origin, replacing those imposed through Mapuche influence.
It is also crucial to highlight the interference of foreign organisations such as Mapuche International Links, whose agenda appears more aligned with external interests than with the historical reality of Argentina's indigenous peoples. Identifying and studying these actors will provide a clearer understanding of the political background behind the attempted manipulation of historical narratives.
The restoration of authentic toponymy not only corrects a historical distortion but also reinforces national identity and preserves the memory of the true indigenous peoples of Argentine Patagonia. Unfortunately, the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires — misleadingly presenting itself as a private institution under the name Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) — strengthens this cultural invasion by offering courses in the language of the invading group. The Universidad Nacional del Comahue is also involved in this cultural and indigenist invasion, promoting the hoisting of the Araucanian flag and endorsing absurd pre-Columbian festivities.
In light of the analysis presented, it is reasonable to propose a review of the current toponymy in Argentina with the aim of restoring names that more accurately reflect the historical and cultural identity of the region. This would involve:
Replacing Mapuche names with Aonikenk/Tehuelche denominations, recognising their earlier presence in Patagonia and the Pampas.
Promoting historical and linguistic research to recover the original names of rivers, mountains, and localities prior to Araucanisation.
Raising public awareness of the true history of Argentina's indigenous peoples, avoiding ideological manipulation or foreign interests in the construction of artificial identities.
References
Borrero, L. (2001). Los Tehuelches: Historia y Arqueología de un Pueblo Nómade.
Bridges, L. (1948). Uttermost Part of the Earth.
Casamiquela, R. (1969). ¿Quiénes eran los Tehuelches? Una etnia en vías de extinción. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
Viegas Barros, J. (1998). Estudios sobre la lengua tehuelche. Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Mandrini, R. (2006). Los pueblos originarios de la Argentina: su historia desde los primeros pobladores hasta la conquista europea. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
Crónicas de viajeros y misioneros del siglo XVIII y XIX sobre los tehuelches y mapuches.
This report proposes a concrete action for the recovery of Patagonia’s historical identity, based on available archaeological, linguistic, and historical evidence. Below is a list of locations named using terms from the Araucanian/Mapuche language under the "Mapuche" column, with approximate translations into English and Aonikenk provided in the corresponding columns. It is proposed that Araucanian toponyms be replaced with their equivalents in either Spanish or Aonikenk.
As part of the cultural battle against false indigenism, which portrays the Araucanian people as victims, it is necessary to follow the path of historical evidence to restore the cultural heritage of the peoples who genuinely inhabited Patagonia.
Places with Araucanian Toponymy and Their Translation, Where Feasible, into the Aonikenk Language
"Our country will, I believe, sooner forgive an officer for attacking an enemy than for letting it alone." Admiral Horatio Nelson
On December 22, 1978—D-Day—various military operations would have been launched in a coordinated manner along the Chilean border as part of Operation Soberanía. It is exceedingly difficult to determine with absolute certainty which of the planned actions would have formally initiated the war; however, it is evident that hostilities would have commenced with a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The primary engagement would have been a naval battle and amphibious landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy’s Marine Corps (Infantería de Marina de la Armada de la República Argentina, IMARA) would have deployed troops on Lennox, Nueva, and Picton Islands—the latter already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps (Cuerpo de Infantería de Marina, CIM) forces.
The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative historical scenario. The war never took place, but what might have transpired had Argentina refused papal mediation?
In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over sovereignty of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both nations were preparing for an armed confrontation. The Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR), with its formidable combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was poised to face the Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)—a well-equipped force but one at a numerical and technological disadvantage.
Chilean authors speculate that, in terms of infantry, Argentine forces outnumbered Chilean troops by nearly two to one. In armored vehicles, the disparity was estimated at 5:1; in aircraft, at 3:1. In naval power, Argentina was somewhat superior in surface combatants, decisively inferior in operational submarines in the region, and qualitatively unmatched in aircraft carriers.
Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978
Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)
Main Warships:
Tre Kronor-class light cruiser:Almirante Latorre
Brooklyn-class light cruiser:Capitán Prat
Almirante-class destroyers:Almirante Riveros, Almirante Williams
SS Simpson (Balao-class, without Guppy modernization), the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.
Naval Aviation:
AS-326 Alouette B helicopters
The Almirante Condell frigate was painted in a World War I-style camouflage pattern to break its silhouette and make it more difficult for FLOMAR air attacks to accurately target the vessel.
Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978
Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)
Main Warships:
Colossus-class aircraft carrier:ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
Brooklyn-class cruiser:ARA General Belgrano
Type 42-class destroyer:ARA Hércules
Gearing-class destroyer:ARA Py
Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers:ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, ARA Piedrabuena
Fletcher-class destroyers:ARA Almirante Brown (D-20), ARA Espora (D-21), ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), ARA Almirante Storni (D-24)
A69-class corvettes:ARA Drummond, ARA Guerrico
Submarines:
Guppy-class submarines:ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Santa Fé
Type 209-class submarines:ARA Salta, ARA San Luis
Naval Aviation:
8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft deployed on the carrier, with one on 24/7 combat air patrol alert. The interceptor aircraft on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft from Puerto Williams twice.
SH-3 Sea King ASW helicopters and SA-316 Alouette utility helicopters.
2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets
Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)
Qualitative:
High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
Limited submarine capability with only one operational submarine.
Good coordination between surface and air units.
Quantitative:
2 light cruisers
4 frigates
5 destroyers
1 operational submarine
Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)
Qualitative:
Air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
Greater submarine capability with four operational submarines.
High force projection capability with missile-armed destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.
Quantitative:
1 aircraft carrier
1 light cruiser
10 destroyers
2 missile corvettes
4 operational submarines
Conflict Expansion
The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it intensified. FLOMAR decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso, heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles southwest of Cape Horn (some sources cite 193 miles), as it prepared to support Operation Soberanía. The primary objective of this operation was the amphibious landing and capture of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands.
Capabilities Analysis
Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)
The Chilean Navy possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a crucial disadvantage in modern naval warfare.
Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)
FLOMAR, on the other hand, held a key advantage with the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority through its A-4Q Skyhawks. The presence of modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines granted FLOMAR a robust defensive and offensive capability.
Key Advance Points and Refuge Locations of the Chilean Navy (ACh)
To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before proceeding toward its final destination.
In the event that refuge was required, Chilean fjords would serve as strategic locations for concealment and counterattacks. Among these, the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, and Comau Fjord were particularly well-suited for such operations.
Quintupeu and Comau Fjords
Última EsperanzaFjord
Final Approach the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)
The upper map illustrates the route taken by the Chilean fleet, as documented in both official Chilean and Argentine sources. Notably, the fleet's course passed directly over the last known position of the submarine ARA Santa Fé—a direct consequence of the submarine having detected it in the days leading up to December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been located and tracked by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS).
The Chilean fleet was advancing south of Cape Horn, positioning itself in combat anchorages, with two ships moored side by side awaiting the order to attack. This arrangement allowed for crew rotation and social interaction while they remained on standby (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017).
These anchorages were nothing more than natural harbors near islands in the region, where dense vegetation and additional camouflage made the vessels difficult to detect from the air. Just as camouflage paint had been used, the fleet also employed World War I and World War II concealment tactics to evade Argentine aerial reconnaissance. A remarkable level of ingenuity—a point to which we shall return later.
Detection and Engagement Strategies
FLOMAR would deploy its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions—a strategy that would prove highly effective four years later in the Falklands War. Meanwhile, A-4Q Skyhawks would be used for airstrikes, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical chokepoints in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR's destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to safeguard amphibious and heliborne assault operations.
Once again, a review of the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017) offers insight. According to this source, Chilean naval officers trained on a land-based simulator (surprisingly, this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles mimicking warships. These exercises took place in the basement of the Tactical Training Center at the Chilean Naval War Academy in Valparaíso.
Using this analog simulator, Admirals Merino and López tested various attack scenarios against FLOMAR and reached the conclusion that "command of the sea" had to be established through a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. Their final tactical formation dictated that "all missile ships should advance first, while artillery ships followed behind" (p. 86).
One might question why the Redifon simulator was necessary to devise such an obvious strategy. Would it not have been logical to position gun-armed ships (Prat, Latorre) at the front and place missile-armed vessels (Almirante-class, Leander-class) behind them? In fact, this did have a rationale, as later explained by Chilean naval officers. The gunships were meant to act as decoys, absorbing the first Exocet missile strikes, under the assumption that they could withstand the hits without sinking. In other words, the gunships were being sacrificed, yet this aspect is poorly articulated in the official account.
In contrast, FLOMAR had no need for a simulator, as its crews spent the majority of the year at sea, conducting real-life naval maneuvers in real tactical conditions, facing real operational challenges in real time. On average, Argentine crews spent approximately two-thirds of the year embarked, something verifiable by anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at the time. Many Argentine sailors from this "golden age" of the Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their constant deployments prevented them from visiting sooner.
Thus, the gap between the two navies was not merely geographical but profound in terms of operational experience. This makes it particularly bizarre to find claims on blogs and online forums suggesting that the ACh had superior training. The reality was the exact opposite, and we will revisit this issue later.
Analysis of the Clash of Forces
During the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile escalated to a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Soberanía, planned by Argentina, aimed to execute an amphibious landing and seize Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be carried out under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Sea Fleet (FLOMAR).
Preparations and Force Composition
By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo was a key asset, carrying A-4Q Skyhawks for air interception and S-2 Trackers for maritime patrol missions.
The fleet also included modern destroyers, such as ARA Hércules, along with frigates like ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina maintained a significant submarine force, composed of ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis.
Although smaller in size, the Chilean Navy (ACh) maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat, along with the still-formidable Almirante Latorre, supported by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles.
The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance. Notably, one of them, SS-23 Hyatt, was suspected of having been hit by ASW depth charges launched by ARA Rosales in a prior encounter.
The ARA Hércules (D-28) was the only dedicated air defense vessel operating in the Theater of Operations (TOA). Equipped with four Exocet missiles and twenty-two Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, which also had a secondary anti-ship capability, the destroyer possessed formidable firepower. Under ideal conditions, it alone could have potentially neutralized the entire Chilean Squadron.
Operation Development
The Argentine landing operation was primarily focused on Isla Nueva, where approximately 150 entrenched Chilean Marines were known to be stationed. The Argentine strategy involved executing a landing on the island’s northern coast, supported by naval and aerial fire from Río Grande or Ushuaia.
To accomplish this, the amphibious transport ship ARA Cabo San Antonio would be deployed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection. However, before the landing could proceed, there was a crucial prerequisite—the Chilean fleet had to be neutralized first.
The Chilean forces anticipated a conventional amphibious landing scenario on the islands. However, the most probable course of action was that the occupation would be executed through a vertical assault using heliborne troops.
Final Approach Phase of FLOMAR
The final approach phase of FLOMAR was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, toward the east, closing in on the Beagle Channel. Three Task Groups (GT 42), under the command of Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi, had been organized:
GT 42.1: Aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, guided-missile destroyer ARA Hércules, missile corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.
GT 42.2: Cruiser ARA General Belgrano, destroyers ARA Rosales, ARA Bouchard, ARA Piedrabuena, amphibious landing ship ARA Cándido de Lasa, landing ship tank ARA Cabo San Antonio.
GT 42.3: Destroyers ARA Py, ARA Almirante Storni, ARA Espora, ARA Almirante Domecq García.
Chilean Naval Response
Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) was mobilizing from its secret wartime bases, heading toward the Beagle Channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Two simultaneous courses of action were being executed:
The main fleet advanced into the Drake Passage, aiming to engage FLOMAR in open waters.
Smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) were deployed from Puerto Williams to confront the Argentine landing force.
Chilean Squadron Formation
The Chilean squadron assigned to face FLOMAR was under the command of Rear Admiral López Silva, organized into two combat formations:
Formation "Acero" ("Steel"): Light cruisers Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat (the gunships).
Formation "Hierro" ("Iron"): The missile ships, including destroyers Almirante Riveros, Almirante Williams, Blanco Encalada, Cochrane, Ministro Portales, and frigates Almirante Condell, Almirante Lynch, Zenteno, Baquedano.
According to Redifon simulations, this was considered the optimal formation for engagement.
In any case, landing ships were stationed at the Ushuaia Naval Base (BNU), ready to deploy troops to secure the islands or reinforce occupied sections once the initial assault had been successfully carried out.
Submarine Warfare
The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political aspects of the conflict, with a particular focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text lacks technical details regarding the assets involved, it provides a valuable overview of squadron operations in southern Chile.
According to this account, the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of:
The Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21)
The British-built Oberon-class submarines Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22)
However, operational setbacks significantly limited Chile's submarine capabilities:
The O'Brien was in dry dock and unavailable for combat.
The Hyatt, which had been moving south, was forced to return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure, officially reported near Puerto Edén, deep within Chilean fjords.
This claim, however, is contested by Argentine accounts. Around the same date, the destroyer ARA Rosales launched depth charges (hedgehogs) against a detected contact near Isla de los Estados, confirming at least one direct impact. It is possible that this target was the Hyatt, which subsequently returned damaged to Talcahuano.
The other Balao-class submarine, Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned in the book, suggesting that it had already been decommissioned due to obsolescence. Indeed, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their Balao-class submarines in the early 1970s, following the acquisition of Guppy-class submarines.
Despite its technological inferiority, the Simpson managed to reach and patrol the area. However, the aging submarine was severely disadvantaged, as it lacked a snorkel system, forcing it to surface for up to eight hours at a time to recharge its batteries—a highly vulnerable position that exposed it to Argentine radar and periscopes.
At least twice, the Simpson was photographed by Argentine submarines while surfaced. Given its deteriorating condition, it is likely that these surfacing intervals became more frequent than usual. On both occasions when the Simpson was detected, Argentine submarines opted not to fire their torpedoes.
Nonetheless, it remains possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, may have attempted an attack, despite his severe technological disadvantage.
Patrol Areas Assigned to Argentine Submarines. (Source: Deyseg)
Near Engagement of the Guppy-Class Submarines
Although the exact dates remain uncertain, the Argentine Guppy-class submarines came very close to engaging in combat. However, their commanders exercised sound judgment in interpreting their orders.
By mid-December, the submarine ARA Santa Fe was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters when its sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of S-21 immediately called for battle stations, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were readied.
As the sounds intensified, it became evident that this was not a single vessel, but rather an entire fleet. The Chilean squadron was passing directly above S-21, moving toward the open waters of the South Pacific.
Sonar operators counted three, four, six… up to thirteen ships. Some had "heavy propellers," resembling cruisers, while most had "lighter propellers," similar to those of destroyers.
However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals—meaning its escort vessels were not using active sonar.
A task force commander’s decision to navigate without emissions can be based on several strategic considerations:
They were not actively searching for submarines.
They sought to maintain a low acoustic profile.
They wanted to avoid revealing their course and position, as active sonar transmissions travel long distances, making them detectable by submarine countermeasure systems.
This is the 13-ship Squadron Detected by the ARA Santa Fé
It is not difficult to imagine the intense tension experienced by the crew of ARA Santa Fe. Suspended in absolute silence, dozens of meters beneath the Pacific, they waited for the Chilean fleet’s next move, their weapons primed, ready to launch if the right tactical opportunity presented itself.
Ultimately, the Chilean fleet veered into open waters, moving away from S-21. Following his orders, the commander of Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean squadron’s maneuver as a hostile act, particularly given that no formal declaration of war had been made at that moment.
This episode underscores a crucial fact: the ARA Santa Fe had pinpointed the position of the Chilean fleet. Had war broken out, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean squadron.
Point of Engagement and Battle
The anticipated meeting point of the Argentine and Chilean fleets would have been near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to contend with the threat posed by the Chilean Navy’s (ACh) MM-38 Exocet missiles, which had a range of 35–40 km.
A recurring theme in discussions and debates—whether among experts or laypersons—is the overestimation of Chile’s Exocet capability, leading to the assumption that a naval battle would have "clearly" favored the ACh. Based on a simple count of missile launchers, Chile would have four to eight more Exocet-firing platforms than Argentina at that time.
However, this selective analysis conveniently omits the Argentine Navy’s most decisive assets:
The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
Four operational submarines
Furthermore, beyond this already disastrous outlook for the ACh, the Chilean Air Force (FACh) faced an even more dire situation:
Chabunco Air Base was a catastrophe waiting to happen.
The exact number of operational aircraft was uncertain, but Chile’s entire air defense rested on just three F-5E Tiger IIs and nine Hawker Hunters, all of which were stationed at Cerro Moreno Air Base in northern Chile—far from the theater of operations.
By contrast, the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a decisive advantage, enabling strikes from over 200 nautical miles (370 km) away.
Additionally, in contrast to the Malvinas War, where many Argentine bombs failed to detonate, the Argentine Naval Aviation had already mastered anti-ship strike operations, and their bomb fuzes were correctly calibrated to explode on impact.
Had the Chilean fleet been detected by S-2 Tracker or P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would have been relayed to Argentine Air Force (FAA) bases and to the Submarine Force (CFS). From that moment, it would have been only a matter of time to see who reached the "hunt" first.
For further insight into FLOMAR’s capabilities against a fleet like the Royal Navy in the Malvinas, one can listen to Vice Admiral Benito Rótolo’s account (García Enciso & Rótolo, 2021).
In the video below, in Spanish, the now Vice Admiral Benito Rótolo (ret.) recounts how, by late April 1982, the Argentine fleet, led by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, approached a Royal Navy squadron composed of seven warships, headed by the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.
FLOMAR remained undetected, as it relied on its own reconnaissance assets, particularly the S-2 Tracker aircraft. This meant that Argentina could have launched a decisive strike on the British squadron unopposed, as the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarines (SSNs) were operating farther south at the time.
The planned A-4Q Skyhawk attack was not executed for a purely meteorological reason—the wind suddenly died down in that region of the South Atlantic, preventing the carrier-based aircraft from taking off. The fleet had to wait 12 hours for the wind to return.
However, before the attack could be carried out, an order arrived from Buenos Aires to suspend all combat operations due to the progress of peace negotiations. This diplomatic effort was later revealed to have been a delaying tactic orchestrated by Margaret Thatcher, allowing the United Kingdom to initiate the conflict under more favorable conditions.
Did the Chilean Squadron truly believe it could attack and sink FLOMAR? Without effective air support or submarine cover? Seriously? Was Rear Admiral López Silva really the Chilean Navy’s expert in naval-air warfare? And was he planning to engage FLOMAR head-on with missiles and cannons? Even more absurdly, was he in a hurry to seek battle? The entire concept seems like a poorly conceived plan—if not an outright bad joke.
Landing and Engagement Scenarios
1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Halt the Landing
The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from its covert combat anchorages toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Chilean fast attack boats would also be used to disrupt landing operations and attack support vessels.
The ACh’s strategy relied on launching Exocet missiles and employing naval artillery to harass Argentine landing craft. Additionally, they would attempt to coordinate airstrikes from Punta Arenas, using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft—provided any were actually operational at that base.
However, entering the Beagle Channel would have been a losing strategy for either fleet due to:
Severely restricted maneuverability
Sensor disruption from terrain clutter
Decreased weapon system effectiveness
2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Move
Upon detecting the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would have deployed its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier, conducting preemptive strikes on ACh vessels. Argentine submarines would patrol key strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships, while FLOMAR’s air defense systems would engage incoming aircraft.
Unlike the Chilean fleet, which relied solely on ship-based weapons, the Argentine Navy possessed an external strike element—carrier-based aviation. The confined waters of the channel would have played directly into Argentina’s hands, enabling aerial attacks followed by rapid rearming and re-engagement cycles.
Evidently, Rear Admiral López Silva was deeply concerned about being trapped within the channels (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017, p. 87).
3. ACh Actively Seeks Out FLOMAR for a Decisive Engagement
Based on available literature, this was the course of action chosen by the Chilean fleet.
If the ACh had actively sought a decisive confrontation with FLOMAR, it would have maneuvered around Navarino Island or advanced through the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast approach). The Chileans would have coordinated with the submarine Simpson and air patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missile and artillery strikes as soon as contact was made.
However, according to historical sources, ARA Santa Fe had already detected the Chilean fleet as it moved into open waters. The Argentine Naval Aviation would have intercepted the ACh squadron en route, subjecting it to successive waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks.
By the time what remained of the Chilean fleet reached FLOMAR, it would have been severely weakened. Check.
4. FLOMAR Seeks Out the ACh for a Decisive Engagement
If FLOMAR had instead pursued and engaged the Chilean Navy, it would have advanced northeast from its position south of Cape Horn. Using its carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, its battle plan would have unfolded in the following phases:
Repeated airstrikes to sink or disable Chilean surface assets
Anti-ship missile barrages from destroyers and frigates
Coordinated submarine attacks to eliminate any remaining threats
At this point, the Chilean fleet’s combat anchorage ("apostadero de combate") becomes relevant. Chilean warships were moored in pairs, allowing crews to socialize and exchange supplies while awaiting orders.
If ARA Veinticinco de Mayo launched A-4Q Skyhawks while the Chilean formation was still anchored, it would have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the bombing runs.
A single pass by three aircraft, each carrying three 450 kg bombs, could have hit two ships at once, doubling the attack’s efficiency. Checkmate.
Roles of Naval and Air Forces
Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation
A-4Q Skyhawk: Conducted interception, air superiority missions, and anti-ship strikes to protect landing forces (8 units deployed).
S-2 Tracker: Carried out maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks (2 units deployed).
P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these aircraft had very long-range capabilities, with highly trained crews conducting year-round operations over the Argentine Sea.
Argentine Land-Based Naval Aviation (Río Grande)
T-28 Fennec: Close air support and ground attack missions to cover landing troops (19 units, dispersed between Río Grande and Estancia La Sara).
MB-326 Aermacchi: Interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (number unknown).
T-34C Turbo Mentor: Light attack, logistical support, and supply transport missions (more than 12 units).
Chilean Air Force (FACh) at Chabunco Air Base
Hawker Hunter: Interception, air combat, anti-ship strikes, and ground support (at most 2 operational units).
A-37 Dragonfly: Ground attack, close air support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (at most 6 operational units).
The operational state of Chabunco Air Base was extremely poor, according to the FACh’s own commander.
Argentine Air Force (FAA) at Río Gallegos
A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: Anti-ship strikes, ground support, interception, and air combat (12 units).
Mirage IIIEA / Mirage 5 Dagger / IAI Nesher: More than 30 units across all three models.
F-86 Sabre: Pure interceptor, deployed specifically to counter Hawker Hunters, based on experiences from the Indo-Pakistani Wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot testimonies suggest more than 4 units and less than 14.
Primary FAA Objectives:
Bombing military targets in Punta Arenas (Chabunco Air Base) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú Airfield).
Destruction of the Chilean Air Force, using tactics similar to Israel’s preemptive air strikes during the Six-Day War (1967).
Implementing these air strike strategies across all open fronts.
An A-4Q Skyhawk, launched from the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, successfully strikes the Chilean Navy’s APD-29 Uribe.
Planned Argentine Offensive Against Chile (Wikipedia)
The Argentine offensive against Chile was set to unfold in the following sequence:
20:00 (H-2), December 22, 1978 (D-Day):
FLOMAR and the Marine Corps (Battalion No. 5) would seize control of Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos Islands (see map below).
22:00 (H-Hour):
FLOMAR and Marine Corps Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 would occupy Picton, Nueva, and Lennox Islands, securing full control over the Beagle Channel (see map below).
24:00 (H+2):
The land offensive would commence, led by the V Army Corps, advancing from Santa Cruz Province into Chilean Patagonia, with the goal of capturing as much territory as possible.
Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would initiate strategic bombing operations.
06:00 (H+8), December 23, 1978:
The destruction of the Chilean Air Force (FACh) on the ground would be carried out.
A naval conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a highly complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and land forces within a challenging geographic environment.
Argentina’s air and submarine superiority would have provided a significant advantage, yet Chile’s coastal defenses and tactical coordination would have posed a formidable resistance.
The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness with which both nations executed their planned operations.
Airpower Distribution and Tactical Considerations
In this specific scenario, it is important to note that the Argentine Armed Forces had three operational airbases along the front:
A mobile airbase—the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
Two land-based airbases—Río Grande and Río Gallegos, both of which would later prove highly effective during the Falklands War (1982).
In contrast, Chile relied solely on Chabunco Air Base in Punta Arenas, which would have been responsible for an overwhelming number of missions, including:
Attempting to halt Argentine amphibious landings.
Conducting anti-ship strikes against FLOMAR.
Intercepting air raids from the northeast (Río Gallegos) and east-northeast (Río Grande).
Planning and executing airbase attack (ABA) operations against Argentine airbases.
Would a single runway have been capable of handling such an extensive combat workload?
Meanwhile, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would have focused exclusively on anti-ship strikes and close air support (CAS), while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would have been tasked with:
Supporting the armored assault on Punta Arenas.
Executing an ABA operation against Chabunco Air Base.
Establishing air superiority over Punta Arenas.
Providing air support to amphibious operations upon request from the Argentine Navy (ARA).
Situation Report
The Chilean Fleet’s Strategy and Its Flaws
Regarding a potential Argentine amphibious landing, the Chilean Navy (ACh) was already deployed in the area under a strategy led by Rear Admiral López Silva. However, this strategy appears questionable, as some sources indicate it was based on sequential engagements in open waters against FLOMAR’s Task Groups (GTs).
This plan unrealistically assumed that each individual attack would be decisive enough to destroy an entire Argentine task group, while the rest of FLOMAR—including the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo—would not retaliate in any meaningful way.
Furthermore, some Chilean officers placed their hopes on bad weather, which could ground COAN’s carrier-based aircraft. Other Chilean analysts have suggested a prolonged, phased naval battle over several days, under the assumption that Argentine sailors would passively watch their fleet being destroyed (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017).
This borderline magical realism suggests a lack of rigorous military planning—one wonders if basic calculations were ever conducted to test the feasibility of such assumptions.
Deceptive Task Force Composition: Was an Amphibious Landing the True Plan?
At first glance, FLOMAR’s division into three task groups seemed to indicate a coordinated amphibious assault. However, this may not have been the actual plan.
The assault on the Cape Horn islands was designed to be executed via heliborne operations. Only one section of Marine Battalion No. 4 (BIM4) was embarked on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, while the amphibious transports Cándido de Lasala and Cabo San Antonio were reportedly empty.
Thus, dividing FLOMAR into three groups made little strategic sense—unless it was intended as a feint to lure the Chilean Squadron into expending its MM-38 Exocet missiles prematurely.
Even this hypothesis, however, seems improbable, as the Argentine Navy (ARA) was unlikely to sacrifice ships and crews in the manner that the ACh was seemingly willing to do with its "Acero" and "Bronce" formations (a contradiction present in Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano book).
A far more plausible scenario is that, by December 22, FLOMAR was organized into an optimal formation for naval-air warfare, with the primary objective of neutralizing the Chilean Squadron in open waters.
The Argentine plan likely involved:
Luring the Chilean Squadron into revealing all its ships.
Launching persistent aerial attacks from 200–350 nautical miles away to weaken or destroy Chilean vessels.
Engaging in a decisive surface battle once Chile’s fleet had been degraded.
This theory is reinforced by the positioning of Argentine submarines at the exits of Chilean fjords, suggesting they were tasked with tracking the Chilean Squadron’s movements—which, in fact, they successfully accomplished. These submarines would then attack any surviving Chilean vessels during their retreat.
The Argentine strategy was logically sound, given that Chilean forces had anticipated a direct attack on Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands. As a result, Chile had concentrated significant manpower and equipment on these islands, immobilizing these units and leaving them vulnerable to aerial strikes before an actual amphibious assault took place.
Additionally, these troops were unable to defend Tierra del Fuego, where four Argentine Marine battalions were scheduled to land.
This approach aimed to maximize the operational effectiveness of Argentine forces while gradually eroding Chilean defensive positions.
Challenges of Carrier Operations: Why Was FLOMAR Divided?
The Argentine Navy (ARA) could not operate as a single formation due to the design limitations of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which cruised at 20 knots and needed to stay at a safe distance from missile and artillery engagements.
Once the carrier launched its A-4 Skyhawks, whether for naval strikes or to neutralize Chilean maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), it remained vulnerable until their return.
Out of eight available A-4Q Skyhawks:
Two were configured for interception.
Three were designated for naval strikes.
Three were assigned to logistical support, with one acting as a tanker (all of which could be quickly converted into attack aircraft if necessary).
Additionally, the carrier’s speed limitations—with a maximum of 28 knots for short bursts but an operational cruising speed of 20 knots—necessitated the division of FLOMAR into three operational groups.
Operational Constraints and Strategic Fleet Distribution
FLOMAR was traditionally trained to operate in two groups but was not accustomed to maneuvering as three separate forces. The shortage of modern warships had been partially mitigated by the acquisition of two A-69 frigates in 1978, which arrived in August and October of that year.
The fleet was structured as follows:
The carrier battle group (PAL) was centered around ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and included the Type 42 destroyer ARA Hércules.
One task group was designed to simulate an amphibious force, luring the Chilean Squadron into a direct engagement, drawing it away from the carrier.
The third group, composed of destroyers, functioned as a blockade force, positioned to intercept any Chilean fleet movements toward the carrier battle group. If Chile’s fleet failed to split its forces, this group was prepared to maneuver and attack from the flank.
This strategy maximized Argentine naval effectiveness while protecting high-value assets like the carrier and its air wing in a high-risk combat environment.
Speed Considerations and Closing Rates
It is important to note that FLOMAR was a 20-knot fleet, but so was the Chilean Navy, given that its two cruisers were also limited to 20 knots.
Thus, the approach speed was:
20 knots for both the Chilean fleet and the Argentine amphibious groups (ARA General Belgrano) and the PAL (carrier battle group).
The central destroyer group, however, could exceed 20 knots, giving it a maneuverability advantage.
Probability of Success
Argentine Forces
With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, as well as a modern surface fleet and an operational submarine force, Argentina held a significant advantage.
The joint air-sea-submarine operations conducted by FLOMAR would have further increased the likelihood of success, enabling:
Preemptive aerial strikes against Chilean naval assets.
Coordinated submarine ambushes at key maritime chokepoints.
Surface fleet maneuvers to exploit vulnerabilities in Chile’s defensive positioning.
The comparison between the Chilean Navy (ACh) and FLOMAR highlights a clear asymmetry in capabilities. The pink bands represent the effective range of primary weapons, specifically the MM38 Exocet missiles (35–42 km range). The ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is depicted with an A-4Q Skyhawk fully loaded with bombs and fuel, capable of executing a low-altitude (Lo-Lo) flight profile with a strike radius of 350 km—a tactic designed to evade radar detection during approach. These zones define the critical areas that each fleet needed to control before posing a legitimate threat to its adversary. From an analytical perspective, it is difficult to see even a semblance of parity between the two forces. Argentina’s carrier-based aviation and submarine warfare capabilities provided a substantial strategic advantage, making a balanced engagement highly unlikely.
Before analyzing Chile’s overall position, it is crucial to assess the Chilean Navy’s (ACh) ability to repel an aerial attack, which was expected to be the primary offensive strategy of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean Almirante-class destroyers were equipped with the British Short Sea Cat SAM system. This was a small, subsonic missile, powered by a solid-fuel, two-stage rocket motor. It featured a cruciform wing structure for in-flight stability and was command-line-of-sight (CLOS) guided via a radio link. This meant that a remote operator manually directed the missile while keeping both the missile and the target within their field of vision. The same system was mounted on the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano and, in its land-based Tigercat version, was deployed by the Argentine Marine Corps (IMARA) in Tierra del Fuego and the Army (EA) in Río Gallegos.
Short Sea Cat’s Effectiveness in Combat
During the Malvinas War (1982), the Sea Cat proved highly inaccurate, primarily due to its lack of autonomous guidance. Its effectiveness was limited by the human operator’s ability to track a fast-moving target, a task complicated by:
Depth perception issues at long range.
Difficulties in accurately judging distances and spatial positioning.
As a result, the estimated probability of a successful interception with the Sea Cat was only 10%.
Best-Defended Chilean Naval Units
The most capable Chilean warships for anti-aircraft self-defense were likely the light cruisers Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat, each equipped with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom installations. These cruisers would have been the most challenging targets to approach and attack. However, if communications and targeting coordination had allowed it, the task of neutralizing these ships may have been delegated to Argentine submarines rather than aircraft.
Critical Strategic Analysis: The Chilean Fleet’s Fatal Vulnerability
The most crucial intellectual exercise, which no previous analysis has seemingly considered, is the following:
Chilean Approach Timeline and Limitations
The Chilean fleet would advance toward FLOMAR at a speed of 21–28 knots, assuming that its CASA C-212 maritime patrol aircraft successfully located the Argentine fleet (as Chile had no other reconnaissance assets). According to Chilean sources, the distance to be covered was between 120 and 193 nautical miles. This means that the Chilean fleet would take between 5 and 8 hours to reach within 20 miles of the Argentine fleet—the minimum range required to launch an MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive naval weapon. For 5 to 8 hours, the Chilean fleet would be completely unable to fire upon or damage the enemy.
Argentine Air Superiority: FLOMAR’s Window of Opportunity
During this 5 to 8-hour approach period, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 full combat sorties of its Carrier Air Group (GAE).
Assuming:
Each strike package flew at 400 knots round-trip.
Aircraft were refueled and rearmed in 25 minutes between missions.
Each A-4Q Skyhawk would be armed with three 458 kg (1,000 lb) bombs, equipped with naval impact fuzes. Thus, in the first strike alone, the Argentine aircraft would drop 24 bombs on the Chilean Squadron (Escuadra). However, the A-4Q could also be configured to carry six 227 kg (500 lb) bombs, effectively doubling the number of bombs per sortie.
Assuming:
No Argentine aircraft losses, 96–120 bombs would be dropped on the Chilean fleet by the fourth or fifth wave.
Even in a worst-case scenario, where up to four Argentine aircraft were shot down per sortie, the Chilean fleet would still be hit by a minimum of 36 bombs before it could launch a single Exocet missile.
Chilean High Command’s Critical Miscalculation
This means that, before any Chilean combat operator could press the launch button of a single Exocet, their fleet would have already been subjected to between 36 and 120 bomb strikes. Does this fundamental flaw in Chile’s battle plan become clear? Was Formation "Acero" truly as "armored" as its name suggested? What exactly was the Chilean command thinking? Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi, commanding FLOMAR, would not have believed his luck.
Approach Time to 20 Nautical Miles, Number of Attack Waves, and Bombs Delivered (Including Losses)
Desperation Breeds Creativity: The Chilean "Decoy Helicopters"
As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention, though in this case, it appears more like desperation disguised as innovation.
Rear Admiral López Silva, seemingly convinced that FLOMAR’s greatest threat was its MM-38 Exocet anti-ship missiles, devised a rather unconventional countermeasure. In what can only be described as a bold act of ingenuity, he ordered Chilean technicians to modify their SA-316B Alouette helicopters, which were embarked on their Leander-class frigates.
The "Floating Decoy Fleet" Plan
What modifications were made?
Large steel cages (3x3x3 meters) were suspended beneath the helicopters’ fuselages.
What was the goal?
These helicopters would take off from their motherships and fly parallel to them at 20–25 knots, aiming to simulate additional ships on radar.
The hope was that Argentine Exocets would lock onto these "phantom ships" instead of actual Chilean vessels, wasting valuable Argentine missiles.
While this approach deserves credit for creativity, it raises three serious questions:
1. What if an Exocet Actually Hit One of These Helicopter Decoys?
If an Exocet locked onto one of these "floating decoys", the resulting explosion would have been nothing short of spectacular. A 1,100 kg missile striking a lightweight helicopter would have created an aerial fireball unlike anything seen in naval warfare.
2. What if These Helicopters Encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk at 300 Knots?
A more probable and horrifying scenario:
If one of these low-speed helicopters encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk screaming in at 300 knots, its crew wouldn’t have a chance to react.
At best, the Skyhawk’s twin 20mm Colt Mk 12 cannons would shred the helicopter to pieces.
At worst, the Skyhawk could fire an AIM-9B Sidewinder, ensuring an even more catastrophic end.
3. López Silva’s Flawed Assumption: A "Missile-Only" Naval Battle
This entire strategy further confirms that López Silva expected a naval battle akin to the 1973 Battle of Latakia—where two opposing fleets engaged each other exclusively with long-range missiles. His reliance on bad weather as his only real air defense, much like Hitler’s dependence on winter storms during the Ardennes Offensive, highlights the lack of a viable anti-air strategy. "Sail south and win the war..." Admiral Merino had told López Silva, in what now seems like an attempt to manufacture a legendary naval hero for Chilean morale. Instead, López Silva sailed south armed with nothing but a wish, a prayer, and a squadron of "decoy helicopters."
The Chilean Squadron’s "Trump Card": Alouette Helicopters with Radar-Reflecting "Chicken Coops"
Chilean Forces: A Doomed Fleet at the Mercy of FLOMAR
Once the Chilean fleet entered open waters, it would have been at the complete mercy of:
Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN), initially.
Argentine submarines, subsequently.
As previously analyzed, distance overwhelmingly favored FLOMAR.
If the Chilean fleet were detected at 190 miles, successive bombing waves from A-4Q Skyhawks would have inflicted devastating damage, even when factoring in potential aircraft losses.
It is almost tragic to imagine a fleet accelerating to engage the enemy, only to be progressively bombed over and over again—with no support from the air or from below the surface.
Furthermore, if the Chilean Squadron attempted to close the distance, FLOMAR would:
Detect it first (via S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, followed later by shipborne radar).
Simply sail in the opposite direction, extending the engagement further into the Argentine Sea—a fundamental matter of physics and naval maneuvering.
The "Pursuit" Scenario: A Tactical Absurdity
If we remove the slow-moving "Acero" formation and only consider the faster "Hierro" formation (capable of 28 knots), the following scenario unfolds:
If a CASA C-212 patrol aircraft successfully located FLOMAR at 190 miles, the Chilean fleet would begin pursuit.
FLOMAR, restricted to 20 knots due to ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, would continue maneuvering.
Time required for the Chilean fleet to close to 20 miles (Exocet firing range): 21 hours and several minutes—covering nearly 600 nautical miles.
This hypothetical pursuit would place both fleets north of the Malvinas Islands—a completely ridiculous outcome.
Conclusion: There was no realistic scenario in which Chilean warships could approach within Exocet range of the Argentine fleet.
Probability of success: Zero.
Alternative Strategy: Luring FLOMAR into the Fjords
The alternative strategy that Rear Admiral López Silva failed to consider was:
Abandoning the defense of the islands, instead retreating into Chile’s interior fjords and channels.
This option had serious political consequences, as Admiral Merino would never have forgiven him for "ceding" the islands. However, it would have significantly increased the Chilean fleet’s chances of survival.
Even so, this approach had severe limitations:
With over 50 Argentine naval aviation aircraft patrolling the area, a successful anti-ship strike on FLOMAR was only a matter of time.
While this plan prioritized the survival of the Chilean fleet, it failed to prevent the Argentine amphibious landings—which was its primary mission.
The Harsh Reality: The Chilean Navy Lacked "Decisive Weapons"
The Chilean Navy (ACh) was a serious opponent but entirely lacked definitive offensive weapons:
No combat aviation to challenge the enemy in the third dimension (altitude).
No operational submarines to strike from below with full stealth.
Had the war lasted just one week, it is not unreasonable to assume that the entire Chilean fleet would have been sunk—or, for all practical purposes, rendered combat ineffective.
Probability of success: Zero.
Defeat Scenario: The Inevitable Fate of the Chilean Navy (ACh)
Had the Chilean Navy (ACh) suffered defeat, the most likely outcome would have been the sinking or neutralization of its primary combat assets.
Priority Targets:
First priority: The Leander-class and Almirante-class frigates, given their modern capabilities and strategic value.
Second priority: The light cruisers Capitán Prat and Almirante Latorre, as their naval artillery posed a direct threat to Argentine amphibious operations.
Other targets would have been engaged as tactical circumstances dictated.
López Silva’s Blind Spot: The Malvinas War as a Case Study
Rear Admiral López Silva, supposedly the ACh’s leading expert in naval-air warfare, failed to recognize a fundamental reality—one that became undeniable just four years later.
In 1982, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) proved that a fleet confined to a narrow waterway (such as the San Carlos Strait) or operating close to the coast (as the southern Cape Horn islands would have forced the Chilean fleet to do) was highly vulnerable to low-altitude jet attacks.
The Royal Navy, which possessed far superior air-defense missile systems compared to the Chilean fleet, only managed limited aerial kills.
The only reason the Royal Navy’s surface fleet was not crippled was due to faulty bomb fuzes on Argentine ordnance, which often failed to detonate upon impact.
Could Chile Have Fared Any Better?
The Chilean fleet would have faced sustained attacks from:
These aircraft had proven devastatingly effective in anti-ship operations, even against a technologically superior fleet like the Royal Navy.
Did the Chilean high command truly believe they would achieve a different outcome?
Was this an operational miscalculation or sheer wishful thinking?
ACh in the Beagle Channel: A Guaranteed Defeat
If the Chilean Navy (ACh) attempted to maneuver through the Beagle Channel, its destruction would have been assured.
The fleet would be trapped in confined waters or forced to sail close to the southern coast of the islands, which would severely limit maneuverability and provide no escape routes.
This positioning would have made it significantly easier for Argentine aircraft to approach undetected by flying below radar coverage, using terrain masking—exactly as was done in the San Carlos Strait during the Falklands War.
Tactical Breakdown of the Attack on ACh
Argentine airstrikes would systematically neutralize the ACh’s main warships.
Once these primary targets were out of action, Argentine destroyers and missile corvettes would finish off the remaining vessels using Exocet missiles.
However, this was not the scenario the Chilean Navy envisioned, according to the account provided by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.
FACh: The Last Hope That Would Never Arrive
With no viable naval escape, the ACh would have been forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), operating from Chabunco Air Base.
Unfortunately for Chile:
At 06:00 AM on December 23, Chabunco was scheduled to be the primary target of a massive preemptive strike by all combat aircraft from BAM Río Gallegos.
Even if Chilean fighters managed to take off, their situation would be even worse upon their return:
The Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) had a dozen T-28 Fennecs stationed just under 200 km from Chabunco, waiting to ambush landing Chilean fighters with machine-gun and rocket attacks.
The result? Any remaining Chilean air assets would be decimated before they could rearm and refuel.
The Last Resort: A Retreat to the Fjords
If any remnants of the Chilean fleet survived the battle in the Fuegian channels, they would have been forced to retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau.
If Argentina retained air superiority, the Chilean forces would have no realistic chance of survival, as FLOMAR could conduct continuous, precision airstrikes against the trapped fleet.
If Chile somehow managed to contest air superiority, the fleet might have had a better chance of defending itself, but it would still face overwhelming Argentine naval and air attacks.
Final Assessment: The Chilean fleet, whether trapped in the Beagle Channel or forced into the fjords, was ultimately doomed to destruction or irrelevance.
The Ship "Avoided" in the Chilean Narrative: The Best Aircraft Carrier in Latin American History—ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
Summary: FLOMAR’s Overwhelming Technological and Operational Superiority
The technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted Argentina a decisive advantage in any direct engagement with the Chilean Navy (ACh). Carrier-based air power, modern submarines, and advanced reconnaissance capabilities ensured that FLOMAR would dictate the terms of battle. The Chilean fjords could serve as a natural refuge, but they would not change the fundamental strategic imbalance.
Without the means to counter Argentina’s air and naval dominance, Chilean forces would have faced insurmountable challenges—ultimately leading to a one-sided defeat.
Runawat to the Fjords, perhaps the best end for the ACh...
Final Assessment: ACh’s Best Efforts Were Simply Not Enough
This analysis does not seek to discredit the efforts or planning of the Chilean Navy (ACh). They did the best they could with the resources available. Or did they?
That said, it simply wasn’t enough. Submarine operations were doomed from the start:
The SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while Chile’s more capable Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.
Even if all Chilean submarines had been operational, Argentina had more than a dozen NATO-trained ASW aircraft, meaning the outcome would not have changed.
Air support was non-existent:
Chile lacked a dedicated naval strike aviation force.
FACh’s air assets would have been targeted before they could contribute.
Chabunco Air Base was a lost cause:
By the early morning of December 23, Chabunco would have been rendered inoperative, either by:
Pre-dawn strikes from A-4 Skyhawks and Mirage jets of the FAA.
Sustained attacks throughout the day from T-28 Fennecs and MB-326s.
In the end, no amount of strategic improvisation could compensate for the overwhelming material and operational disadvantage Chile faced.
One of the most significant flaws in López Silva’s planning was his insistence on seeking a decisive fleet engagement—a Mahanian naval battle—despite leading a force that was crippled both strategically and tactically.
He committed his entire fleet (all-in) to an engagement where it would suffer heavy losses long before even detecting the enemy on radar—if it ever did at all.
Once the Chilean fleet revealed itself, its fate was sealed for the remainder of the conflict. López Silva’s plan essentially gifted the precise location of his forces to FLOMAR, allowing Argentina to dictate the battle on its own terms.
Alternative Strategies: What Chile Could Have Done Differently
When a smaller fleet faces a larger, more capable one, it should avoid direct confrontation and instead rely on naval guerrilla tactics or attritional skirmishes.
Historical Precedents:
Argentina’s naval history was built on using smaller forces to wear down much larger enemies—whether Spanish fleets or the Brazilian Imperial Navy.
The Norwegian fjords in World War II provided the perfect defensive environment for hit-and-run naval operations, proving that well-positioned warships could survive under enemy air superiority if protected by layered defenses.
Instead of rushing into open waters to engage an aircraft carrier battle group without air cover and with only one compromised submarine, Chile’s best option would have been:
Using the fjords as defensive strongholds for ambush attacks.
Preserving naval assets for prolonged resistance rather than immediate destruction.
Exploiting geographic cover to increase survivability and counterattack opportunistically.
López Silva’s Misjudgment: Quality Over Quantity
In this conflict, the "larger fleet" wasn’t determined solely by numbers but by combat capability.
FLOMAR wasn’t just bigger—it was exponentially more effective.
The Chilean fleet had almost no air support and was operating with minimal submarine capability.
Argentine naval aviators were elite pilots trained annually in ship-killing tactics, with world-class proficiency in anti-ship strikes.
Sending the Chilean fleet "solo" into battle, without meaningful support from submarines or airpower, was not just a strategic oversight—it was a catastrophic miscalculation.
Did López Silva truly believe that the Argentine Navy (ARA) would willingly bring its key naval assets within Exocet range, allowing for some chivalrous missile duel? Did he expect a Jutland-style battleship engagement or perhaps a 1973 Latakia-like missile exchange, all while unknowingly sailing into a Midway-style ambush? Did the Chilean naval command seriously assume that the ARA would not exploit its overwhelming air and submarine advantage by deploying its carrier-based fighters and submarines before the Chilean fleet even detected FLOMAR on radar?
Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks wouldn’t be used against his ships?
Long before a Chilean officer could press the launch button on an MM-38 Exocet, the Chilean fleet would have already been under attack—
First by COAN (Argentine Naval Aviation)
Then by CFS (Argentine Submarine Force)
Potentially by both at the same time
History never placed López Silva’s reckless plan to the test, but in retrospect, he sold a purely suicidal strategy as if it were a winning battle plan.
Across the Andes, some Chilean perspectives claim that the Chilean Navy’s presence "forced" FLOMAR to retreat. According to this version, López Silva and Admiral Merino’s decisions "deterred" Argentina, as FLOMAR chose not to engage, supposedly out of fear.
However, a more logical perspective emerges:
Who says FLOMAR’s withdrawal wasn’t part of its assigned mission?
With all available evidence, how could FLOMAR possibly feel inferior to the Chilean Navy?
Why would FLOMAR engage in an unnecessary battle when it had already achieved its strategic objectives?
Chile had already taken on the massive diplomatic cost of rejecting an arbitration ruling (a blunder originally committed by the Lanusse government) and then accepting Vatican mediation under pressure. Would Chile have agreed to this had Argentina not placed a knife to its throat militarily? Probably not (Madrid Murúa, 2003). Yet, Argentina’s passivity in 1978 continues to have geopolitical consequences today.
Just like in May 1982, when FLOMAR had the opportunity to strike HMS Invincible undetected but failed to act (García Enciso & Rótolo, 2021), a similar opportunity was lost four years earlier—the chance to destroy the Chilean fleet when it was fully exposed.
That is why this article begins with a quote from Nelson—because in both 1978 and 1982, Argentina failed to act at the decisive moment. And that hesitation still carries geopolitical weight today.
Sources
Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg
García Enciso, José y Rotolo, Benito (2021), Malvinas: Cinco días decisivos, Editorial SB, ISBN: 09789878384535.
Madrid Murúa, Ruben (2003), "La estrategia nacional y militar que planificó Argentina, en el merco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile, año 1978", Memorial del Ejército de Chile 471: 50-70.
