Assault on the Chilean Government Buildings
Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas
By Esteban McLaren
On 22 December 1978, known as D-Day, various military actions would have been initiated in a coordinated manner along the borders with Chile within the framework of Operation Soberanía (Sovereignty). It is very difficult to determine with certainty which of all the planned actions would have actually started the war, but it is clear that it would have been a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The main focus would have been the naval battle and the landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) would attempt to land part of its troops on the islands of Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by troops of the Chilean Marine Corps, CIM) and Picton, while other troops would seek to occupy the rest of the islands. This front will be the subject of future analysis. Synchronously, there would be a ground advance on the Southern front setting out from Río Gallegos (with a potential second line of advance from Rospentek Aike), with Punta Arenas as the final objective. The purpose of this article is to essay an alternative-history scenario. The war never happened, but how would it have unfolded if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation? That will be our point of divergence from real history. Let us appeal to rationality and foresight in an exercise that will always be incomplete and whose final outcome belongs to another space–time.
Context and development of the invasion
In the southern winter of 1978, tension between Argentina and Chile over the dispute regarding the Beagle Channel reached its peak. In the early hours of 21 December, Argentine troops stationed in Río Gallegos, Rospentek and other border locations received the order to begin the invasion of Chile. Since July, Chilean forces had been preparing for this confrontation, aware that diplomacy might not be enough to resolve the conflict.
The Argentine Forces
Argentina mobilised a formidable force, including the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade. The X Mechanised Infantry Brigade was deployed in Río Gallegos, ready to cross the border. All units would be reinforced as circumstances required.
In the air, A-4 Skyhawk, Mirage Dagger and Nesher fighter aircraft —as well as up to 14 F-86 Sabres (which had already violated Chilean airspace weeks earlier)— were ready to provide air support, while the Argentine Navy, with its destroyers and frigates, patrolled the nearby waters.
Argentine Forces:
- V Army Corps — General José Antonio Vaquero —. Assigned mission: Strategic offensive starting at 24:00 (H+2), departing from Santa Cruz, with the likely objective of conquering Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas. Thereafter, it would support Army Corps III in its advance through Puyehue towards Chile, cutting communications between the central zone and the south of Chilean territory.
- 1st Infantry Division (with elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade)
- X Mechanised Infantry Brigade (based in Río Gallegos)
- XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade
- Argentine National Gendarmerie: Border guard forces
- Air Force with A-4 Skyhawk, F-86-F Sabre and Mirage III fighter aircraft
- Naval Forces: IMARA together with the T-28 Fennec, with nearly 20 units stationed on the island of Tierra del Fuego.
Urban combat in the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, Punta Arenas
The Chilean Defence
In response, Chile positioned its III Army Division in Punta Arenas, reinforced by the 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros” and the 6th Army Division, with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade. The general in charge of the defence of the Magallanes region, General Nilo Floody Buxton, always stated that at this stage the border guards (Carabineros) would be his troops of choice. The Chilean Air Force, equipped with 12 A-37 Dragonfly aircraft and 6 Hawker Hunters, was on maximum alert, and the Chilean Navy, with its ships and submarine, was ready to intercept any Argentine naval advance.
Chilean Forces:
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III Army Division (based in Punta Arenas)
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4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros”
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6th Army Division (with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade)
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Carabineros: Border guard who, on this front, had disproportionate importance due to their knowledge of the frontier. The general in charge of the defence of Punta Arenas always stressed their importance in the defence, but as any militarised police force they were not proper infantry, and their only “encounter” with Argentine forces had left them in a very poor position. See further below.
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Chilean Air Force with Hawker Hunter and A-37 combat aircraft (no confirmation of any of them)
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Naval Forces (CIM tasked with the islands of the channel)
The case of the Carabineros as soldiers
One issue that has rarely been discussed with the attention it deserves —and which seems to have obsessed only the author— is Chile’s decision to employ the Carabineros de Chile (CC) as an infantry force, or even as mechanised infantry, during the Beagle conflict. This decision is particularly striking if one considers the institutional nature of the Carabineros: by their own definition, they are a national police force with functions of internal security and border control, making them a hybrid institution but essentially police. Their role is equivalent, in the Argentine case, to a combination of three forces: the Federal Police, the provincial police forces, and the Argentine National Gendarmerie (GNA), the latter indeed being a militarised security force with responsibility in border areas. Within this framework, any reasonable comparison between the CC and armed or military forces should carry strong conceptual reservations.
During the escalation of the Beagle Channel conflict, responsibility for the defence of the Magallanes Region —whose capital is Punta Arenas— fell to General Ernesto Floody Buxton. A singular figure, of British descent, fair-skinned and with manners that his supporters considered charismatic, Floody stood out for public statements as controversial as they were unfortunate, both in content and in form. It is surprising that an officer of his rank repeatedly declared in Chilean media that, if necessary, he would face a potential armed conflict exclusively with “troops” of the Carabineros. This assertion, far from anecdotal, has been corroborated by multiple testimonies and documentary records.
The underlying problem lies in the military planning implicit in this decision. From positions such as Monte Aymond, on the border, the deployment of Argentine armoured means was evident, suggesting that, in the event of hostilities, Argentina would opt for a high-intensity mechanised offensive. In this context arises a legitimate and deeply troubling question: did General Floody really expect to contain an armoured advance with police personnel lacking training in conventional war doctrine, or in combat as light or mechanised infantry?
The most basic military logic questions this disposition. What previous experience did the Carabineros have in high-intensity engagements? What tactical logic supported this choice? It is not only difficult to imagine an Argentine military plan that, for example, placed the GNA in the first line of an assault on Punta Arenas, but even in a counter-offensive situation it would be highly improbable to delegate to a militarised police force the containment of enemy troops.
And yet, that seems to have been exactly the Chilean approach. The official justifications referred to the use of the Carabineros as rearguard elements —for tasks such as control of prisoners of war and surveillance of civilian areas— but the empirical evidence contradicts that explanation. Carabineros were transported on LAN Chile night flights to Magallanes, with the aim of not alerting Argentine intelligence, and were deployed directly on the front line. Although they had received only a few weeks of training at the infantry school, their additional preparation was no more than that. Contemporary photographs and accounts place them armed with anti-tank rocket launchers in Cabeza de Mar, and other records document their transfer from Chabunco to Porvenir, in the heart of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego —all positions within the immediate theatre of operations.
This deployment not only contradicts the official version but also exposes an alarming lack of strategic judgement. Far from being an extraordinary resource in the face of a logistical or tactical emergency, the use of the CC as a military vanguard reflects serious doctrinal disorganisation and, ultimately, an anachronistic view of modern warfare on the part of the Chilean high command. The defence of the country’s southernmost region was left in the hands of a force inadequate for the type of combat that was taking shape. If one also considers that the very same Carabineros had surrendered almost without resistance in the Lago del Desierto incident years earlier, the decision is not only questionable but openly irresponsible. It is true that in war one goes with what one has, but was there really no other ECh infantry available to employ in their place?
Invasion Routes
The Argentine forces planned their advance towards Punta Arenas using two main routes. The northern route, departing from Río Gallegos, crossed the border through Monte Aymond, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas. This road, although relatively flat, presented natural challenges such as rivers and hills that could slow the advance.
The alternative route, departing from Rospentek, crossed the border following Route CH-40 and then headed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas. This road was more difficult, with mountainous and wooded terrain that would complicate the advance of the armoured formations.
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Main Northern Route:
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Starting point: Río Gallegos
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Main points: Advance through the Monte Aymond border crossing, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas.
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Characteristics: Relatively flat terrain but with possible natural obstacles such as rivers and hills.
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Open ground in many sections for an armoured battle and for the deployment of forces in line, wedge, or V formation.
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Alternative Western Route:
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Starting point: Rospentek
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Main points: Border crossing via Route CH-40, then proceed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas.
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Initial objective: Would begin with the capture and securing of Puerto Natales, a concentration point for Chilean forces.
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Characteristics: Mountainous and wooded terrain, more difficult for the advance of large armoured formations. Suitable ground for ambushes.
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Engineering considerations: Bridges along the route would be destroyed (for example, Puente Rubens, Río Pendiente), necessitating engineer units.
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Suitability for armour: Poorly suited to broad armoured formations (only columns or diamond formations feasible).
These are the troops of the Chilean 5th Cavalry Regiment “Lanceros” [Lancers] deployed to defend Puerto Natales. They were going to face an Argentine armoured advance with horse-mounted cavalry, Polish style. No joke.
Chilean population in Argentine Patagonia
In his chronicle Cuando el río no era turbio (“When the river was not murky”), Ramón Arriagada recounts the close relationship between Chilean workers, mainly chilotes, and the Río Turbio coalfield in Argentina during the 1950s to 1970s. According to the 1970 census, Puerto Natales had 13,675 inhabitants, of whom 2,800 worked in the mine. By 1976, around 600 Chilean miners were commuting in shifts, using Natales as a dormitory town due to the lack of housing in Río Turbio.
Arriagada cites the writer Nicasio Tangol, who emphasised that the chilotes were fundamental in shaping Patagonia. In 1961, the newspaper El Austral reported that the mine produced 500 tonnes per day and employed 1,200 miners, mostly Chilean–chilotes. In addition, about 1,800 workers were employed on the surface, 80% of them Chileans as well. Another 600 Chileans worked on the construction of the 270-kilometre railway between Río Turbio and Río Gallegos, and by 1951 there were already 1,200 miners working in the coalfield.
The author highlights how migration from Chiloé to Patagonia increased, especially after the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, and how the 1978 border conflict between Chile and Argentina marked a change, when Chilean miners were replaced by workers from northern Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay.
In his chronicle Sueños de Carbón (“Dreams of Coal”), Arriagada addresses the 2004 mining accident, which left 14 dead, and how retired miners from Natales who had worked in Río Turbio survive on miserable pensions and must cross the border to receive medical care, since they have no access to social security in Chile, making them outcasts in their own country. (El Tirapiedras)
From these population movements, entirely under the sovereign authority of the Argentine Republic, Chilean General Floody would complain, associating them with an act of war. No joke.
Following with the story, both routes converge at Laguna Cabeza de Mar where, if two coordinated invasion forces were to set out, they could regroup and continue on to Punta Arenas. The road to Punta Arenas via CH-9 is a coastal route highly vulnerable to air attacks and ambushes or hit-and-run strikes. The route leads the force to the core of Chilean regional military power: the Chabunco air base and, opposite it, the headquarters of the III Army Division.
Chilean defensive lines
Chile would have adopted a defence-in-depth strategy, as declared by the general in charge of the Army Division (Southern Theatre of Operations). The first line of defence could already have been sited at Monte Aymond and its surroundings, right on the frontier. That line was, from the few photographs gathered, a jumble of foxholes and trenches, with poorly equipped soldiers — undoubtedly cannon fodder to wear down the advance.
When a penetration of this kind occurs, the theory of war leads us to think of three phases for the force facing it:
- Containment: Hold the penetration in place — that is, stop it or slow it so it cannot continue to advance.
- Flanking: Begin moving forces to the flanks of the penetration, basically to the sectors close to where the breach began. This is done to operate on those flanks simultaneously and “strangle” the penetration by cutting the enemy’s communications with its rear.
- Annihilation: The detailed destruction of the encircled troops (death or capture).
Here, Chilean troops would have built forward positions to slow the enemy’s advance. Anti-tank guns and conventional field artillery — not in great quantity or variety — are visible in photographs and documentaries. Probably the best trans-Andean weaponry in this phase was the deployment of anti-tank mines. A second line of defence would be at San Gregorio, with fortifications, minefields and trenches ready to resist an assault. From there to the regional capital, various points could be fortified. The final defence is concentrated around Punta Arenas, where troops, long-range artillery and the best anti-tank defences are assembled.
See below the “Maginot line” that Chilean strategists had developed: simple trenches and foxholes. The soldier in the front line is using an old bolt-action Mauser 1909 rifle from the First World War.
Photo of a “foxhole” with a Chilean infantryman armed with a bolt-action Mauser rifle near Monte Aymond
The Chilean defence-in-depth would probably have included:
- First line of defence: Forward positions at Monte Aymond and surrounding areas.
- Second line of defence: Fortifications and trenches around San Gregorio along Route CH-40, and ambushes from wooded areas between Laguna Arauco and Primavera. Trenches at Laguna Cabeza de Mar (Arancia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano, 2017:164). All bridges were fitted with explosive charges, cavalry units armed with anti-tank rockets were sent forward, and night firing zones were prepared and properly “staked out” and painted to avoid confusion (AC&BS, 2017:141).
- Final defence: Fortifications and troops concentrated near Punta Arenas, including long-range artillery and anti-tank defences (few and outdated in the ECh inventory of that period). Many civilians actively collaborated in the mobilisation. Much of the vehicles and heavy machinery used in the construction of trenches, shelters, watch posts and anti-tank ditches was provided by local businessmen. In turn, ranch owners made available sheds to house troops and store equipment and supplies (AC&BS, 2017:114).
It should be noted that this scenario contained several factors that emerged over time. For example, Chilean forces lacked anti-tank mines and ammunition was scarce. The soldiers in the first line of defence were placed as cannon fodder, with only 80 cartridges per weapon and no resupply. Many — perhaps too many — indicators showed that Chile was very, very poorly prepared for war.
The stalemate of the advance
The Argentine advance faced its first major test at San Gregorio, where Chilean defences would be well prepared and the terrain favoured the defenders. Here, the advance would slow considerably, turning into a battle of attrition. The apparently most fortified area was the road in the lagoon zone of Cabeza de Mar.
From Rospentek, the troops would have to overcome harassment attacks and construct bridges over river crossings where the bridges had been destroyed. Once joined with the forces coming from Río Gallegos, they would need to regroup and assess the damage and the reorganisation of the advance.
There is a key issue to bear in mind throughout this entire campaign: Argentine air superiority. The only Chilean air base in the Area of Operations was Chabunco, in Punta Arenas. That air base was to be attacked by the Argentine Air Force in the early hours of the advance, and finished off later that same afternoon by the Naval Aviation Command. Any resistance put up by Chilean ground forces would then have to endure continued aerial harassment.
How many examples are there of ground defences being immune to simultaneous air and land attacks? Imagine a pocket of Chilean resistance — perhaps an artillery battery hidden in a ravine, or machine-gun nests strategically positioned along the route of advance. The Argentine military commander would simply need to pass the coordinates to Río Gallegos, to the dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, or to the naval air base at Río Grande, so that aircraft from both air branches could deliver machine-gun fire, bombs or rockets to dismantle the defence.
These same options were not available to the Chilean commander.
Armored Regiment No. 5 "Punta Arenas", deployed in 1978 in the Magallanes region. The Scorpion Detachment advances, in M-41 tanks and M-113 armoured personnel carriers.
Countering the Chilean defence
To overcome this obstacle, Argentina could deploy the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade to penetrate and disrupt the initial defences. Argentine artillery would bombard the Chilean positions, while airborne units and the air force would carry out flanking manoeuvres and provide crucial air support.
- The XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade must penetrate and disorganise the initial defences.
- Artillery forces to bombard defensive positions.
- Airborne units and Air Force for flanking and air support.
- The Chabunco air base would have to be put out of action for the advance to succeed.
Trans-Andean soldiers firing the service SIG rifle
Airborne assault on Punta Arenas
In the context of this conflict, Argentine forces planned a bold airborne assault on Punta Arenas. Accounts from veterans of this crisis, particularly from the 14th Parachute Infantry Regiment based in Córdoba, indicate that an airborne assault was being planned to capture the city of Punta Arenas. For this purpose, BAM Río Gallegos was already hosting DC-3 and C-130 transport aircraft ready for the operation.
The main objectives of this assault included seizing Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport, thereby securing a vital bridgehead for the continuous flow of troops and supplies. It would also focus on destroying Chilean command and control facilities to disrupt their defences, and on capturing the port and key logistical installations, thus cutting off enemy supplies and reinforcements.
This could be achieved following a surprise Air Base Attack (ABA) carried out by the Argentine Air Force using A-4 Skyhawks and BAC Canberras at H+2 of the invasion.
Main objectives:
- Capture Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport to secure a bridgehead and allow the continuous flow of troops and supplies.
- Destroy command-and-control facilities to disorganise Chilean forces.
- Seize the port and principal logistical installations to cut supplies and reinforcements.
Entry into Punta Arenas
Argentine armour and mechanised infantry would move rapidly along Route 9, advancing with lethal precision. Armoured vehicles would adopt line formations to maximise frontal firepower, while infantry units would follow closely, ready to disembark and secure the streets. A secondary column would advance along road Y-505, flanking the Chilean defences and dividing their attention.
Objectives in the city
The Port of Punta Arenas was one of the principal objectives. By the time of the ground assault the actual condition of the airport would need to be assessed, since it would probably already have been put out of action by an initial air attack by the Argentine Air Force (case analysed in this link). Controlling the port would allow Argentine forces to secure a vital supply line and receive maritime reinforcements. Specialised commandos and mechanised infantry units would be deployed to seize the docks and port facilities, facing fierce Chilean resistance.
The Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport and its annex, the Chabunco air base, would also be crucial. Controlling the airport would guarantee an airhead, allowing the continuous transport of troops and supplies. Argentine airborne and rapid-assault units, already familiar with the terrain from their operations at Chabunco, would be launched in a swift offensive to secure the runways and neutralise any resistance. There would be a high probability of runways and facilities being blown up to deny their use to the attackers. It was entirely to be expected that, before falling into the hands of Argentine troops, the locals would demolish all installations crucial to their operation.
Government and communications buildings will be equally strategic. Battle-hardened Argentine forces will infiltrate the city center to capture the Magallanes Intendancy and the police headquarters, seeking to disrupt Chilean defenses and establish administrative control. These will undoubtedly be the most savage scenes imaginable throughout the campaign, due to the very nature of urban combat.
Urban resistance
As Argentine troops pushed into Punta Arenas, they would encounter tenacious resistance at several key points. The Civic Centre area, with its government and commercial buildings, would undoubtedly become a battlefield. Chilean troops, entrenched inside buildings, would mount an organised defence, slowing the Argentine advance.
In the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, a dense residential area of mostly wooden houses, Chilean forces would adopt urban guerrilla tactics. Ambushes, snipers and improvised barricades turned every street and every house into a point of resistance. Fighting intensified, with Argentine troops battling house by house to clear the area. It would also prove an area very easy to destroy with fire, given the predominance of wood in its construction.
The industrial zone north of the city could also be a focus of resistance. Chilean defenses, using industrial equipment and heavy vehicles as barricades, would turn factories and warehouses into makeshift fortifications. Argentine troops should consider deploying specialized assault units to overcome these defenses.
Trans-Andean soldiers armed with SIG rifles parading
Argentine Strategies
To counter Chilean resistance, Argentine forces deployed a combination of tactics and resources. The use of artillery and air support would be crucial to weaken defenses before the ground assault. Precise bombing raids disrupted Chilean lines, facilitating the advance of ground units.
Paratroopers from the Leopardo Company of the 2nd "General Balcarce" Airborne Infantry Regiment, Argentine Army, Ushuaia, November 1978
Commando operations (the newly created Halcón 8 special team) and paratroopers would play a pivotal role. Elite units infiltrated the city to neutralize strategic points, capturing key objectives quickly and with the fewest casualties possible. These commandos would carry out surgical strikes against Chilean defenses, facilitating the advance of the main forces.
Urban warfare would become the main focus. Mechanized patrols, assault teams, and specialized urban combat units would systematically advance, facing fierce resistance but managing to secure key areas. Coordination and communication would be essential to maintain the momentum of the advance.
Population Control and Stabilization
Finally, to maintain control of the city and prevent acts of sabotage, Argentine forces would establish checkpoints and conduct regular patrols. The constant presence of troops would help stabilize the situation and ensure that the city remained under Argentine control after the capture of the main objectives. Acts of guerrilla warfare and resistance would be expected throughout the period.
The Fall
The capture of Punta Arenas would be a complex and bloody operation, testing the capabilities and determination of the Argentine forces. Their numerical and material superiority would give them a significant advantage, but the Chilean resistance, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and well-prepared defenses, would turn each advance into a fierce struggle. The city would eventually fall, but at a significant human cost to both sides.
Probability analysis of success
Argentina’s numerical and material superiority is evident: a ratio of 5:1 in armour, 4:1 in aircraft and 3:1 in infantry. These advantages, together with strategic planning and tactical execution, suggest a high probability of success for Argentina in the capture of Punta Arenas. However, Chile’s preparation and defensive strategy, making use of knowledge of the terrain and defence in depth, also held possibilities of success.
Probability of success for Argentina: 70%
Probability of success for Chile: 40%
Argentina:
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Probability of success: High, due to numerical and material superiority (armour, aircraft and infantry), although it would face significant difficulties in terrain and well-prepared defences.
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Estimated success: 70%
Chile:
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Probability of success: Moderate, considering defence in depth and knowledge of the terrain, although outnumbered and out-equipped.
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Estimated success: 40%
Tanks entering 18 de Septiembre slum
Estimated casualties
Casualties in this conflict would be significant for both sides, reflecting the intensity of the fighting and the well-prepared defences.
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Estimated Argentine casualties: minimum of 15,000–20,000 (including dead, wounded and prisoners)
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Estimated Chilean casualties: minimum of 15,000–40,000 (including dead, wounded, prisoners and civilians depending on their degree of involvement)
These estimates underline the human cost of a conflict which, although hypothetical, reflects the gravity of a military escalation between two neighbouring nations.
Summary
An armoured campaign by the Argentine Army against Chilean forces in the Magallanes region would have been a bloody affair under any consideration. The possibility of success existed, but it was by no means guaranteed. With time and when comparing opposing analyses from each side, it becomes clear that, from the Chilean perspective, many potential Argentine attacks would have been completely surprising and even innovative, despite being drawn straight from doctrinal manuals since the Second World War. The Chilean defensive scheme was classical — one could even say out of yellowed pages of defensive tactics books. A layered tactical and static defence, but with a severe shortage of resources, making them like bricks without mortar. And here I refer to the very comments of the mining explosives producer turned arms magnate in exile, Mr Cardoen. In an interview for a state television programme across the Andes, he himself remarked that the armed forces had requested his services to produce anti-tank mines since the Chilean Army had none at all in its inventory. In other words, the defence of Magallanes was not going to be flooded with AT mines — far from it — perhaps one of the key elements to slow an armoured advance. Not my words, I repeat. Without that, Mr Floody’s defence looks like a giant scarecrow.
On the other hand, it is essential to point out the alarming overestimation that the organiser of the defence, the aforementioned Mr Floody Buxton, gave to the Carabineros. This is, indisputably, a civilian border police force, and under no circumstances should it be considered a combat force. It is possible that this man intended to make use of their vast knowledge as baqueanos of the region or through intelligence with infiltrated farmhands, but did this officer of British descent really think he could successfully face an armoured or airborne assault with Carabineros? Did Floody truly believe he could entrust his life and the defence of Punta Arenas to a militarised police force without any wartime record? Worse still, their only “combat record” had been invading Argentine territory at Lago del Desierto. There, a Carabineros patrol stationed itself for several days with SIG rifles, entrenched in a shed turned checkpoint, defending the position. No need to invoke La Concepción or Prat: at the first burst from the gendarmes, which killed one Chilean soldier, all the Carabineros surrendered. All of them. Was that the force upon which this “majestic” general pinned his hopes? By any analysis, both in terms of function and of record, Floody was completely mistaken.
Finally, and the final blow, Chile lacked air superiority. What would the Chilean infantry or cavalry, even entrenched in a well-planned defensive position, have done when 450- or 500-kilogram bombs fell on their position with impunity? Historical evidence shows that troops in defensive positions have managed to survive air or artillery attacks (Monte Cassino, Stalingrad, among others). However, it is obvious that this is not the side of the battlefield the troops wished to be on, and there is also further evidence that defensive positions have been dismantled by overwhelming air attacks that disarmed and demoralized the resistance.
All analyses lead to an inexorable Chilean defeat in which, at best, a stalemate might have been achieved within current Chilean territory. The damage to local infrastructure would have been in the billions, and human casualties in the tens of thousands. A scenario, in every respect, lamentable. This fear instilled in the Chilean armed forces, together with the Malvinas event in 1982, would shape that country’s entire defence policy up to the present day.
Citations
Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Francisco Bulnes Serrano. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas. Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017. ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0
