Argentine Support for Paraguay in the Chaco War
"No one dies on the eve, but on the appointed day (Nha ña mano bay i víspera – pe sino ghiarape)." I want to evoke these harsh words in Guaraní to describe the chilling photographic "Archive" of Dr. Carlos De Sanctis, compiled during the months he spent on the front lines of the Chaco Boreal battlefield. As he himself affirms, he was "…the first foreign doctor that Paraguay allowed to reach the front line…". "Chilling" is an appropriate term, as in my previous note, Facebook's intellectual censorship mechanism selectively blocked part of the content, which was taken precisely from the archive of the doctor from Rosario.
The astounding De Sanctis document captures in photographs, with annexed explanations as brutal as they are succinct (I would say "clinical"), what healthcare was like in the jungle, as seen by a "civilian" who served Paraguay in a war where Argentine public opinion was mostly inclined in favor of Paraguay and against Bolivia.
Other civilians, but with weapons in hand, served in the 7th General San Martín Regiment, formed in the Argentine House in Asunción and composed of a large number of Argentines—many from Goya, it seems—who played a distinguished role. We cannot forget the Argentine army officers who lost their careers due to the events of 1930, several of whom honorably served under the Paraguayan flag in the Chaco.
In terms of psychosocial support from Argentina, perhaps the most potent was the exaltation of Paraguay’s image, promoted by the media, which portrayed it as a small country under attack, a victim of unjust ambitions.
The other side of the coin is daringly presented in Buenos Aires in 1933, during the height of the conflict, by Bolivian diplomat Eduardo Anze Matienzo, under the auspices of the Engineering Students' Center, to a decidedly "pro-Paraguay" audience, as he put it.
Who is Anze Matienzo? A Bolivian who reached the highest position as a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea and who served his diplomatic mission in Asunción in the years 1930 and 1931.
Anze gives a lecture titled "Bolivia in the Continent and in the Chaco Conflict." Extensive, substantial, and sharp, he laments the ignorance about his country, attributing it to "a prejudice that entails injustice," "…a subjective vision…".
I omit all the propositions about the rights of the parties he raises, ignore his arguments denying that Standard Oil subsidized Bolivia, and focus on "The Responsibilities of the War," where he argues against "Paraguay's 'gadfly' policy, which has weakened our governments and our people like an infectious and harmful disease for more than half a century." Anze postulates that Paraguay was a nation "burdened since the War of the Triple Alliance," which made it warlike because "López's madness, which led his people to collective suicide in the War of the Triple Alliance, had the virtue of creating a 'legend of heroism' whereby 'every Paraguayan considers himself an unparalleled hero, and the Paraguayan people form a cluster of heroes capable of making the world tremble'." He exemplifies this with the words spoken by his Paraguayan driver on the way to the legation: "I advise you, Secretary, to warn your compatriots that every Paraguayan soldier can fight ten Bolivians and defeat them." He concludes by stating that "when I left Asunción in 1931, Paraguay was already morally at war."
How does this situation, which this author perceives as a collective inheritance permeated by "the toxins of distrust, fear, and suspicion," this "hereditary poison," fit as a continuation of the historical process of the Francia and López dictatorships? Is it credible? Did Argentine literature play any role? I think it’s enough to recall Alberdi for reflection.
There are authors who believe they see in the former partners of the Triple Alliance a sort of guilty conscience for what happened in Paraguay, just as others see in the Chaco War an attempt at redemption, to heal the wounds of both belligerents. Paraguay with the "Guerra Guasú," and Bolivia with the Pacific War. I see a certain analogy between that historical moment and Paraguay’s struggle for the Chaco Boreal, claiming to be the victim, but quietly mobilizing, buying weapons on behalf of third parties, and being in a position to crush Bolivian forces in Boquerón and nearby forts by sheer numerical strength. And this against a world, perhaps due to its proximity to the disputed area, more inclined to see Paraguay as the attacked and Bolivia as the attacker, the aggressor, an image that the country to the west fueled not a little with the bravado and arrogance displayed by its military and politicians.
I have in my archive images circa 1931, of Paraguayan soldiers stationed in the remnants of the Curupaytí trenches, their greatest success against the allies, where I imagine seeing a ghostly wait for an enemy they hope will appear to be defeated. I see how the legend of Lopismo has not only turned the "marshal" into an eponymous hero but also portrayed Paraguay as a defenseless dove, unjustly crushed by the might of three nations. On the other hand, that Paraguay of despotism is presented as a developing nation, incomparable for its time. The similarities are abundant: López was also already preparing for war long before the allies; he was the one who attacked first, in Matto Grosso against Brazil and in Corrientes against Argentina. However, just a quick search on the web shows the proliferation of fabrications, which through repetition, have convinced not only Argentines but the world of the "justice" of the Lopista cause in that war. Argentine intellectuals, writers, and authors, especially those on the left, have played a significant role in this construction. Today, there are "scholars" who never tire of apologizing, sometimes seemingly just in case, to anyone who claims to have a score to settle with their own country. It’s worth noting that Brazilians, judging by their expressions on social media, display a very different attitude and don’t hesitate to proclaim themselves the victors, and rightly so. They haven’t even returned to Paraguay, despite repeated requests, war trophies like the "Cristiano" cannon, which remains in the Historical Museum of Rio de Janeiro.
Paraguayan networks post it as "Paraguayan historical heritage residing in Brazil."
Regarding Argentine support for Paraguay, I refer to the words of Paraguayan historian Julia Velilla de Arréllaga, who calls it an "essential aspect of the conflict," asserting that it was "decisive." She notes that this collaboration is spoken of very little in Paraguay because there was a pact of silence between the Paraguayan and Argentine leaders, because pressures from the Paraguayan press prevented leaders from confiding the help they received, because Argentina had proclaimed itself neutral, and because of the "subsequent partiality of the pro-Brazilian ruling sectors." Velilla concludes that "the truth is that Argentine aid was decisive and significant, even if it was (Admiral Casal)," because "how could Paraguay have continued the fight if it had not had Argentine support? It’s better not to consider such a scenario (José Fernando Talavera)."
Contributing to this, it is worth mentioning the supply of fuel, gasoline, and diesel throughout the war, as well as flour, since the Paraguayan soldier's ration was meat and hardtack, or at least something similar.
There is much more to say, but I will simply pay tribute to another of the Argentines who, when it came time to choose, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Paraguayans, and I do so with the words of ABC Revista, which speaks of "A Condor in the Chaco," referring to Riojan Vicente Almandos Almonacid, whose name is engraved on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris for his exploits as a combat pilot in the First World War. He was the one who organized the Paraguayan Air Force and flew the first missions. To be able to join the fight, he had to "sell his belongings and decorations."
I must also mention Colonel Abraham Schweizer, from Corrientes, who was stationed in Paraguay between 1931 and 1934. He became a legend, reportedly the one who designed the military strategy that Estigarribia implemented. Schweizer, reputed to be the most brilliant officer in the Argentine Army, founded the Paraguayan War School.
Finally, regarding Argentine intelligence support for Paraguay: When I was a first lieutenant, during a course, they brought in a very elderly colonel to honor him. We were told he was a sort of mathematical genius who, every morning with just paper and pencil, deciphered Bolivian—and Paraguayan—codes and delivered the clear messages to Minister Saavedra Lamas so he could proceed accordingly.
Source: Diario Epoca