Why Didn't the Bombs Explode? (Part 1)
Guillermo Poggio || Poder AéreoParte 1 || Parte 2 || Parte 3 || Parte 4 || Parte 5 || Parte 6 || Parte 7 || Parte 8
Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (known as "Falklands" to the British). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The following text recounts the story of what was the FAA's most important mission: to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. Taken by surprise, the FAA carried out its missions despite lacking proper training, adequate vectors, and the right armament for the task. This is a story of overcoming challenges, rapid adaptation, and ingenuity. In the end, the results went far beyond what was initially expected.
Introduction
In early June 1944, the Allies were rushing to launch Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing in Normandy, which promised to change the course of World War II. Off the coast of Lyme Bay in the English Channel, HMS Boadicea (H65), a veteran B-class destroyer launched in 1930, was escorting a convoy of merchant ships. On June 13, the convoy fell victim to German aviation. Two torpedoes launched by Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck Boadicea. With the explosion of the ammunition magazine, the British ship quickly sank.Boadicea was the last Royal Navy ship lost to enemy air action in that conflict. However, considering the use of free-fall devices ("dumb bombs"), the last British loss to enemy aviation was the HMS Panther, a P-class destroyer. The ship was hit by bombs dropped by German Junkers Ju. 87 “Stuka” dive bombers during the Dodecanese campaign in the Aegean Sea on October 9, 1943.
The British cruiser HMS Gloucester being attacked by German Ju-87 'Stuka' aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea on May 22, 1941. The ship would sink that same day after being hit directly by at least four 250 kg bombs. The photo was taken by one of the German aircraft at mid-altitude. If the Argentines were to use this same attack profile, the chances of success would be very small.FOTO: archivo
Since then, naval aviation warfare has undergone profound changes. Forty years later, using aircraft to drop free-fall bombs against escorts equipped with aerial surveillance systems and guided missiles was no longer considered a viable option for naval air attacks, unless the system of the targeted ship was overwhelmed. In 1982, the Argentines demonstrated that old weapons and new tactics could be combined to surprise the Royal Navy, and once again warships would be lost to free-fall bombs.
Caught by Surprise
All the military planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands was carried out confidentially by the high command of the Argentine Navy, with Admiral Anaya, the commander of the force, as the mastermind. By the end of 1981, the Argentine military government considered the possibility of retaking the Malvinas Islands through military action if diplomatic negotiations failed. This option was discussed with President Leopoldo Galtieri.
The military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. In the center, President Galtieri. To his left is Anaya, the architect of the Malvinas recapture, and to his left is the FAA commander, Brigadier Lami Dozo. Dozo learned of the plan to retake the islands shortly before the new year. Most of his subordinates only became aware of the events on April 2, 1982, the date of the Argentine landing on the islands. Dozo passed away two months ago at the age of 88. FOTO: archivo
It turns out that at the same time, the Strategic Air Command (CAE) of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had completed an update to the strategic planning of the Force, which did not include military actions against the British to retake the Malvinas Islands. The commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, was the last of the three commanders to learn about the existence of the military plan, being informed of it two days before the end of 1981.
The strategists of the Argentine Air Force had never considered the possibility of getting involved in a conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. There were two major reasons for this, one legal and the other geopolitical.
From a legal standpoint, Resolution 1/69, issued by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, helped resolve some disputes between the three branches and better defined each of their roles. Based on this resolution, by the end of 1969, Law No. 18.416 was enacted, which established the specific responsibilities of each branch.
In this way, the Navy had specific responsibilities over Argentina's territorial waters and coastline. It was tasked with acquiring all necessary assets, including naval and maritime resources, whether onboard ships or not. Regarding naval operations, the FAA was only required to provide indirect support without the need to acquire specialized assets different from those used in air operations.
Therefore, by April 1982, the FAA lacked the necessary assets and doctrines to engage in naval air warfare. None of the FAA pilots had ever dropped a single device into the sea. Most of them did it for the first time in combat.
From a geopolitical standpoint, the FAA was configured to face a continental enemy in the Southern Cone. Its assets, tactics, and training were all oriented towards a potential border conflict, particularly with Chile, with whom Argentina almost went to war in 1978. Even the Argentine deployment airfields had been defined based on a hypothetical battle against the Andean neighbor.