Showing posts with label Operation Georgias. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Operation Georgias. Show all posts

Monday, February 2, 2026

Malvinas: Argentine Pumas in Action

The Argentine Pumas At War

By Staff Sergeant (Ret.) and Malvinas War Veteran Carlos Andrés Verón



 

During the conflict, I served in the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion as a helicopter mechanic for Assault Helicopter Company “A”.

It was 27 March 1982 when I arrived at the gates of the 601 Army Aviation Battalion and was told to hurry to the hangar, as there was a mission heading south — El Calafate. At the hangar, First Lieutenants Obregón and Orozco, and Corporal First Class Alfredo Romero, were waiting. We gathered the essential equipment for the journey. Our first stop was Comandante Espora Naval Air Base, in Bahía Blanca.

We arrived around midday. The pilots went to the control tower, while we remained with the aircraft to refuel. At that moment, some Navy non-commissioned officers approached and asked if our helicopter — a SA 330L PUMA (AE-502) — was the one embarking on the icebreaker Almirante Irízar. I responded that it wasn’t, as we were heading to Santa Cruz, and had actually disembarked from the Irízar in February following the 1981/82 Summer Antarctic Campaign. I also pointed out that the Coast Guard’s PUMA, stationed next to us, might be the one assigned to the vessel.

Hours went by with no sign of the pilots. Eventually, they returned and took us to a room — we were put under strict communication blackout. Then Lt. Obregón informed us that he had requested the blade folding kit from our base, as we would in fact be embarking on the ARA Almirante Irízar, bound for the Malvinas. That cleared up the confusion. The Navy issued us a survival vest, typically worn by A-4Q pilots, and a .45 calibre pistol.

By late morning on 28 March, the blade folding kit arrived. We didn’t even get the chance to greet the personnel who delivered it. We collected it and boarded the Irízar. Once on board, Romero and I realised we were missing two shock absorber locking pins, but thought that reinforcing the tie-downs with extra chains would compensate.

At dawn on 29 March, we departed with the fleet as part of Operation Rosario.

Alongside our PUMA in the hangar was a Navy Sea King. The weather was poor; the ship pitched significantly as we sailed under radio silence. We checked on the helicopter sporadically — it seemed stable.

In the early hours of 2 April, we were asleep in a cabin on the red deck when I was suddenly thrown into the air, hitting my head against the bathroom. Romero rolled across the cabin floor. We couldn’t stand because of the heavy rolling. Once we managed to get up, we got dressed and joined the damage control team heading to the hangar. Upon opening the door, we were stunned: JP-1 fuel (used by turbine engines) had flooded the hangar floor, reaching the 40cm-high bulkhead ledges. The main landing gear had collapsed, puncturing the fuel tanks beneath the helicopter’s floor.

The scene was catastrophic. The main rotor blades had broken loose and struck the hangar’s support columns. The drainage system couldn’t handle the 1,500 litres of fuel on board. I put on boots and carefully walked through the spill, as the ship was still rolling. The helicopter rested on its rear struts but was tilted backwards — as mentioned, the gear had snapped and pierced the fuel tanks. Of the twenty tie-down chains, only ten remained — the others had snapped off their anchor points. Using the ship’s blue lifting jacks, typically used for moving cargo, we stabilised the helicopter as best we could and re-secured it.

Fortunately, the Sea King had suffered only minor damage — its right nose had been pierced by a hydraulic test lance, which was easily repaired. Ours, however, was grounded and unable to support the landing operation — the very reason for our presence.

In the early hours, the Navy launched its amphibious assault, together with Marines and the 25th Regiment of the Army. Meanwhile, Corporal Romero and I began a race against time to dismantle the PUMA — salvaging all serviceable components to be used as spares for the other helicopters participating.

We first secured the aircraft, opened the engine bays, removed the main rotor blades, then the tail rotor blades, and then both engines. That was the bulk of the work. After that, we carefully dismantled and packed all radio and navigation systems, and anything else of value. Rumours were circulating that AE-502 would be jettisoned into the sea to make space for other helicopters without returning to port.

I had taken part in the previous Antarctic summer campaign, and I knew the ship’s captain, Navy Captain Barquín. Since our pilots had returned to the mainland on the first C-130, and I was the senior mechanic, I went to speak to him. I explained that the helicopter had only 20% structural damage and was recoverable. At first, he didn’t want to know about it, but he eventually agreed to unload it in Punta Quilla.

From then on, we devised the safest and fastest way to move the aircraft to the flight deck. Keep in mind: the PUMA stands four metres tall, and we only had the nose gear — no rear struts. No manoeuvre could be attempted until we were in calm waters, so all our plans were theoretical.

On 8 April, as we entered port, we began the operation using ropes, chains, and the ship’s jacks. We removed the tail cone, and the critical step was rolling the aircraft past the hangar threshold up to the main rotor mast, where the starboard crane would lift it — the PUMA weighed about 3,500 kg. After a hard struggle, we succeeded. The aircraft was loaded onto a barge, hauled by a tractor through the city, and taken to a Navy helicopter hangar, where it remained under custody until it was recovered by personnel from Campo de Mayo.

The transit through the city was another story altogether. The PUMA, heavily damaged, looked as if it had been shot down. As you can imagine, onlookers had plenty to say as we moved through the streets.

At the hangar, we parked it to the side to keep it out of the way. Then came the question of our return — we didn’t know how or when.

Around 6 p.m., we were told that an Army Aviation aircraft would collect us from Trelew. We were driven there by Unimog, boarded a G222 FIAT, and flew to Campo de Mayo, landing at the airfield and going to the NCOs’ mess. At around 4 a.m., we were dismissed. It was Holy Week, so we were granted leave until Monday, 12 April.

Let me say clearly: the recovery effort of the SA 330 B PUMA AE-502 was not in vain. It was sent to its original manufacturer — Aérospatiale in France — for repairs the following year, returned to service in 1986, and sadly met its end in a tragic crash in Azul in November 1993.

I was left with a bitter taste — so close to operating in the Malvinas, yet unable due to circumstances. But fate gave me another opportunity. On 22 April, I departed Campo de Mayo to embark on the hospital ship Bahía Paraíso, this time with PUMA AE-506. The aircraft commander was Captain Ezequiel Honorio Luzuriaga, co-pilot 1st Lt. Eduardo López Leguizamón, and the mechanics were Sgt. 1st Class Horacio Luna and myself. (Both officers sadly passed away years later in separate post-war accidents.)

Our mission was to operate under the International Red Cross, using the ship as a base for aerial ambulance missions. Our first assignment was responding to the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano. When we arrived, the Navy vessels Bouchard and Piedrabuena were overloaded with survivors — even on deck. The South Atlantic Ocean, especially in that region, is notoriously rough. Visibility was poor, but time was running out. Hours had passed since the sinking — survival chances were fading.

We began flying, identifying the position of various life rafts, guiding the ships to recover the living — or the dead. I remember one raft had its flashlight still lit. As mentioned, the weather prevented us from flying far from the ship. The urgency to locate rafts made us chase after colourful objects in the sea — but often, they turned out to be nothing.

After this bitter beginning, we sailed to Ushuaia, where survivors and the deceased were disembarked. Sgt. Luna left the ship, and Sgt. 1st Class Oscar Mella joined the crew.

After restocking medicine and provisions, we set course for the Malvinas.

During the crossing, we were intercepted by a British helicopter, which requested to land and inspect the hospital ship to ensure it carried no weapons. Our PUMA bore red crosses on both side doors, the nose, belly, and upper cowling. Before departing, the British pilot told us:

“A Harrier flying at 800 km/h won’t see the red crosses — it’ll just see a green spot. You’ll be shot down, and they won’t know it was an ambulance helicopter.”

That night, with the help of the ship’s crew, we painted the helicopter white, using synthetic paint. It was a wartime necessity. We worked all night — painting and maintaining.

At dawn, we launched our first aeromedical evacuation mission. We flew to the HMS Uganda, the British hospital ship, to retrieve wounded Argentines. The PUMA could carry six stretchers, and we configured it based on the number of patients. Two Navy medics accompanied us — Subofficer Panagiotas and Chief Petty Officer Quiroga.

Upon landing on the Uganda, I entered the wards to prioritise the wounded for boarding based on condition. Most had shrapnel wounds, dressed in flight suits, their belongings in plastic bags.
As an anecdote, one patient began shouting aboard the Bahía Paraíso, complaining that the British hadn’t returned his personal effects. Shortly after, a British helicopter landed and returned his belongings.

After several days working with the Uganda, we proceeded to the Malvinas.

Once there, we conducted casualty evacuations, primarily from Puerto Argentino, and flew across the islands collecting injured personnel. At night, we could hear the Royal Navy frigates firing indiscriminately.

From 16 to 18 June, we remained off Puerto Argentino, evacuating as many Argentine soldiers as possible. The PUMA could carry 20 troops, but given the urgency, we kept loading more. As we ran low on fuel, with the 20-minute warning light flashing, we managed three flights. On the final one, we transported 42 soldiers plus 4 crew — 46 people in total.

This was our side of the war — not a face-to-face combat experience, not a single shot fired. But we flew Army Aviation helicopters over our Malvinas. Pilots, mechanics, medics, and nurses — all united by one goal: to fulfil our mission.

On 25 June 1982, after an emotional farewell with those we had shared 65 days aboard the Bahía Paraíso, we lifted off and headed for Campo de Mayo. We landed around 6 p.m., hangared the aircraft, saluted one another, and went home — to our families — with the satisfaction of having done our duty.


Tuesday, November 4, 2025

Malvinas: Operation Georgias

Operation Georgias 




Satellite Image of South Georgia Islands Taken by NASA

Date: 3 April 1982
Location: Grytviken, South Georgia Islands
Outcome: Argentina takes control of Leith Harbour and Grytviken

Belligerents:
Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Commanders:
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills

Forces Engaged:
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
United Kingdom: 22 Royal Marines and HMS Endurance

Casualties:
Argentina: 3 killed, 9 wounded, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
United Kingdom: 1 wounded, 22 taken prisoner

Operation Georgias was the codename used by the Argentine Armed Forces for the operation to occupy the South Georgia Islands at the start of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on 3 April 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed Isla San Pedro) after forcing the surrender of a small contingent of British Royal Marines in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on 19 March 1982, when a group of civilian workers arrived at Leith Harbour aboard the transport vessel ARA Bahía Buen Suceso (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated the group, posing as civilian scientists.




Polar Ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata, February 1982, shortly before its involvement in South Georgia

Argentine Workers in South Georgia

The Davidoff Contracts

In September 1979, Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and a scrap metal dealer, signed a contract with the Edinburgh-based firm Christian Salvesen Co. The agreement granted him the right to remove the remains of the abandoned whaling stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik on the South Georgia Islands.
Davidoff approached the British Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting the use of the polar ship HMS Endurance to transport personnel and equipment necessary for dismantling the facilities. When the British authorities refused permission to use HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff sought approval from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy to book passage aboard Antarctic transport vessels.
Aware of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating a possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Argentine Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed him to travel to the islands at least twice a year.

Project and Operation Alfa

In September 1981, the Argentine Navy developed a plan to use Davidoff's salvage operations in South Georgia as a cover for establishing a covert base in the disputed territory. This initiative was given the codename Project Alfa. The plan involved infiltrating military personnel among the workers, posing as scientists. Once HMS Endurance had left the South Atlantic (from April onwards), they would be joined by 14 marines aboard a ship assigned to Antarctic base support, who would then establish a permanent military outpost on South Georgia. The base would benefit from the onset of winter, which would hinder any British attempt to remove it.

Parallel to this project, in October 1981, the commander of Antarctic naval operations received an order from the Chief of Operations of the Navy General Staff to study the possibility of establishing a scientific base on one of the disputed islands with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base would be set up during the 1981–1982 Antarctic campaign. This operation was designated Operation Alfa.
In early December, a decision was made that the base would be manned by military personnel rather than civilians, due to the need for secrecy. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to assign 1 officer and 6 NCOs. The same instruction applied to an equal number of tactical divers.

On 29 January 1981, training began for the selected commandos and divers, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz. The team included Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diver NCO, 1 medic NCO, 5 diver corporals, and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On 28 February, they boarded the Antarctic campaign vessel ARA Bahía Paraíso in Ushuaia.
To avoid interfering with planned operations in the Malvinas, the Military Committee cancelled Operation Alfa on 16 March. However, the commandos remained onboard as a precaution and departed on 18 March towards the South Orkney Islands, accompanying the vessel’s Antarctic campaign.



ARA Almirante Irízar

Davidoff’s Journeys

The Argentine businessman informed the British Embassy of his trip but did not request permission to travel aboard the icebreaker. On 16 December 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5) to carry out an inventory of the facilities to be dismantled at Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and departed a few days later.
On 23 December, the British magistrate in South Georgia discovered evidence of Argentine presence at Leith Harbour and reported it to Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, who relayed the information to London on 31 December. The British government instructed its embassy to issue a formal note of protest against the unauthorised landing, considered a breach of sovereignty. However, Argentina’s Foreign Minister claimed ignorance of the incident. A second formal protest was issued on 9 February but was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 February.

Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a commercial rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unplanned visit to Leith Harbour. Marchessi arrived at the site aboard the Caimán, a yacht registered in Panama, having sailed from Mar del Plata. He reported in at Grytviken, claiming to be part of Davidoff’s team, and provided the local British authorities with details of Davidoff’s December inspection as well as information on previous Argentine visits to the area during the 1970s.

Raising of the Argentine Flag

On 18 March 1982, the transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Leith Harbour, disembarking Davidoff’s workers and their equipment without first reporting at Grytviken, as required by the British government. At that time, the only British presence at Leith Harbour was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
On 19 March, four BAS members en route to Carlita Bay discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment at Leith Harbour, with the Argentine flag flying. Around 100 people had disembarked and occupied a BAS shelter. The BAS team leader, Trevor Edwards, approached Captain Briatore to inform him that their presence was unauthorised and that they were required to report at Grytviken. Edwards then informed the British magistrate at King Edward Point.
The BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Rex Hunt, who consulted with London. The British authorities demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the re-embarkation of the workers. Captain Briatore responded that the mission had the approval of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag lowered, but he still did not comply with the order to report at Grytviken.

On 20 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of the events. As the Argentines had failed to follow proper diplomatic procedures, the British government decided to respond with a limited intervention. The Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to sail to the area to ensure the removal of the Argentine flag and prevent any further landings. The ship had departed from Port Stanley on 16 March, carrying 22 Royal Marines.
On 21 March, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires issued a diplomatic protest, requesting that the Argentine government withdraw the workers.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to de-escalate the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official backing.

On the morning of 22 March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith Harbour. However, later that day, a BAS observation post detected the continued presence of Argentine personnel and relayed the information to London. As a result, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia.



 

Operation Georgias

On 23 March, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, Captain César Trombetta, aboard ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) and stationed in the South Orkney Islands, received orders from the Argentine Naval General Staff to proceed at full speed to the South Georgia Islands. His mission was to prevent HMS Endurance—which had departed from the Malvinas—from removing Davidoff’s Argentine workers from Leith Harbour.

In response to British movements, Argentina deployed several countermeasures. The corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were positioned between the Malvinas and South Georgia, ready to intercept HMS Endurance and recover any Argentine personnel on board.

On 24 March, the Argentine government publicly confirmed the presence of the workers on South Georgia. That same day, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz received orders to “disembark at Leith Harbour at 00:15 on 25 March to protect the Argentine workers.”
That night, ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Leith and disembarked 14 armed military personnel (Group Alfa) under Astiz’s command, using weapons supplied by the ship. The vessel remained in the area, patrolling with its helicopters. News from the region reported unusual Argentine naval activity in the South Atlantic.

When HMS Endurance reached Leith Harbour, it found ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored there. The two ships then shadowed each other around the islands until they lost contact on 31 March.

In anticipation of a possible armed clash, the British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate a compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that the workers at Leith Harbour be granted amnesty and provided with documentation—possibly temporary entry permits instead of passports, a significant concession to the Argentine position.
However, Argentina insisted that the arrival of its nationals in South Georgia should be governed by the 1971 Communications Agreement. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected extending that agreement—valid only for the Malvinas—to South Georgia and expressed his concerns to London.

The British plan was that BAS commander Steve Martin would remain in control until Argentine forces displayed hostile intent, at which point Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would assume command.

On 28 March 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as flagship of Task Force 40, carrying both the Task Force Commander and the Malvinas Theatre Commander, Major General Osvaldo García. This marked the beginning of Operation Rosario, which would lead to the surrender of the British governor in the Malvinas on 2 April.

That same day, 40 marines under Lieutenant Guillermo Luna boarded the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2, now P-32) at Puerto Belgrano, bound for South Georgia. The journey was harsh and overcrowded, as the vessel was not suited for troop transport and faced poor weather during the four-day voyage.

On 30 March, with the invasion clearly imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface vessels and three nuclear submarines, to proceed to South Georgia to reinforce HMS Endurance. The rest of the Royal Navy was placed on four-hour alert.

On 1 April, the Argentine Naval General Staff issued Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”, instructing forces to “occupy Grytviken and hold Leith to secure control of the South Georgia Islands.”
Missile corvette ARA Guerrico, under Commander Carlos Alfonso, was ordered to rendezvous with ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was equipped with two helicopters (a Puma from the Argentine Army and an Alouette from the Navy Air Command). The 40 marines under Luna’s command joined Astiz’s troops already stationed at Leith.

Up to that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.



Insignia of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed under the command of Captain César Trombetta. The group was composed of the following elements:[22]

  • 60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by Frigate Captain Ismael J. García

  • 60.1.2. Corvette ARA Guerrico, commanded by Frigate Captain Carlos Alfonso

  • 60.1.3. A detachment from Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4), consisting of 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna

  • 60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: one Puma (Argentine Army) and one Alouette (Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy)

  • 60.1.5. A group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz

In response to these developments, a series of high-level meetings and diplomatic discussions took place in an attempt to prevent an Argentine invasion. On the night of 1 April, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he would speak directly with the Argentine Junta to avert an attack.

However, Reagan's phone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri proved unsuccessful.[23]

British Resistance



Cumberland Bay, including King Edward Cove and the Grytviken Peninsula

2 April

On 2 April, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz informed the Argentine personnel at Leith Harbour that Argentina had recovered the Malvinas, and he received the order to execute Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”.

Upon learning of the fall of Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), British Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills acted quickly. His men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, using barbed wire and landmines, and set up defensive positions around the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) buildings. HMS Endurance, positioned a few miles offshore, maintained communications between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorised to open fire in self-defence after issuing a warning. A subsequent statement from the British government instructed the Royal Marines “not to resist beyond the point where lives would be needlessly lost.”[24]

Due to severe weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on 2 April. As a result, Argentina’s planned operations in South Georgia had to be postponed by Commander César Trombetta to the following day. The original plan had called for Astiz’s special forces to land at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to secure the arrival zone for the main ground troops, who would be flown in by helicopter. ARA Guerrico was to provide naval gunfire support from outside the bay, but her delayed arrival due to the storm forced a revised plan for 3 April.

Under the new plan:

  • The first landing would be carried out by an Alouette helicopter from ARA Guerrico.

  • This would be followed by three waves of marine infantry aboard a Puma helicopter from ARA Bahía Paraíso.

  • A radio message demanding British surrender would be sent before any landing.

  • After the warning, ARA Guerrico would move toward Caleta Capitán Vago (where Grytviken’s port is located), opposite King Edward Point.

The corvette was only authorised to fire upon request from the ground forces. Astiz’s troops were to remain in reserve aboard Bahía Paraíso, and all units were instructed to avoid enemy casualties as long as possible.[25]

Historian Lawrence Freedman believes that Trombetta’s assumption of minimal resistance was based on the belief that only BAS personnel were present. This was apparently due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which led Trombetta to underestimate the British military presence.
Trombetta ordered ARA Guerrico to approach the shore, dispatch the Alouette for reconnaissance, and use the Puma to transport the first marine detachment.[26]

During the night, both Argentine ships made contact and remained in nearby waters, with ARA Guerrico anchored in Stromness Bay.

3 April

At 05:00 on 3 April, Lieutenant Guillermo Luna received a naval message indicating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 Royal Marines. However, Commander Trombetta believed that the landing zone would be clear, with any British personnel remaining aboard the polar ship.

At 07:35, with improved weather, ARA Guerrico arrived at Leith Harbour, where it transferred the marines to ARA Bahía Paraíso. Astiz’s commandos were re-embarked, and the workers left ashore under protection of forces from Bahía Paraíso, led by Lieutenant Cortez.

At 11:10, a surrender demand was transmitted from ARA Bahía Paraíso in English, and repeated three minutes later. The message falsely claimed that Governor Rex Hunt had surrendered not only in the Malvinas but also in all dependencies, including South Georgia.[13]
Lieutenant Mills received the message and relayed it to HMS Endurance to buy time. He also advised BAS personnel to take shelter in the local church. The British soldiers refused to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter was flying over Grytviken, reporting no signs of visible resistance. ARA Guerrico began entering the inlet.
According to Argentine Admiral Rubén Oscar Mayorga, the corvette’s commander, Captain Carlos Alfonso, hesitated to bring the ship into such confined waters. Mayorga supports Freedman’s view that Trombetta’s assumptions about British military presence were incorrect. He cites an official report indicating that Trombetta underestimated the situation, also expressing concerns about ARA Guerrico’s readiness for combat.[28] The ship had only recently returned to active service after being in dry dock until just days before departing from Puerto Belgrano.[29]

 


Wreckage of the Argentine Puma Helicopter

Helicopter Downing

At 11:25, the Argentine command ordered the personnel at Grytviken to move into the open, announcing that a landing by marine infantry would take place. Ten minutes later, the ARA Guerrico reported the presence of armed personnel on the ground.

At 11:41, the first wave of 15 Argentine marines, including Lieutenant Luna, was deployed by a Puma helicopter at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the British Royal Marines were entrenched. By then, the crew aboard Guerrico had confirmed that the British were positioned along the northern shore of the inlet.

A second wave of marines departed ARA Bahía Paraíso at 11:47, on the Puma, carrying Lieutenant Giusti, 14 marines, and a machine gun. However, Lieutenant Luna, already on the ground, had requested via Guerrico—as he had no direct communication with Bahía Paraíso—that the second wave be delayed and replaced with a third group carrying 60mm mortars. But the second wave was already airborne.

The landing took place east of Luna's position and in full view of the British defenders. The Puma came within effective range of British automatic weapons. It was immediately hit by heavy fire, but the pilot managed to cross the bay and conduct an emergency landing on the southern shore, opposite King Edward Point (known in Argentina as Punta Coronel Zelaya).

Two Argentine conscripts, Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila, were killed. Four others were wounded, and the rest were left disorganised and out of combat position. Despite the setback, the marines opened fire with their machine gun on the hospital building, wounding one British marine in the arm.

At the same time, Luna’s troops began to advance toward Shackleton House, but after the Puma was downed, the British responded with heavy fire.[13] In response, Luna requested fire support from ARA Guerrico.

Attack on ARA Guerrico

At 11:55, Guerrico began its second approach to the inlet and opened fire. However, her 20mm guns jammed after the first shot. The 40mm cannons managed only six bursts, and the 100mm main gun became inoperable after a single round. Now fully exposed, the corvette had no choice but to turn within the cove and fire with weapons mounted on the opposite side.

At 11:59, British forces opened fire on the ship. The corvette was struck by small arms and a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[31] According to Mills, his men fired from a distance of approximately 550 metres.

The attack killed Petty Officer Patricio Guanca, wounded five sailors, and damaged multiple systems: electrical cables, one 40mm gun, an Exocet missile launcher, and the 100mm turret mount. As Guerrico passed again in front of the British position to retreat, she was hit by another intense wave of fire.
Argentine sources acknowledged that the vessel sustained over 200 hits during the engagement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter—a reconnaissance aircraft—was used to transport the remaining 10 marines, landing them outside the range of British weapons.[13]

As the damaged Guerrico withdrew from the bay, the Argentine ground troops resumed small arms exchanges with Mills’ Royal Marines.[13] Once beyond the range of British weapons—near Hobart RockGuerrico resumed firing with her repaired 40mm guns.[33] This convinced Lieutenant Mills that the situation was untenable. He ordered his men to cease fire at 12:48, according to Admiral Mayorga.[33]

At 13:00, Mills approached the Argentine lines waving a white flag and surrendered. He was instructed to have his men surrender one by one. Mills and his marines were taken into custody by Astiz’s group, which had remained in reserve during the battle.[13]
At 13:35, the British flag was reported lowered.

HMS Endurance dispatched one of its Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The aircraft detected the Argentine corvette and the transport vessel in the cove but observed no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in South Georgia waters until 5 April.[34]

That afternoon, 13 BAS civilian personnel who had been scattered in the surrounding area were captured. At 23:00, Group Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in securing the workers at Leith Harbour.




ARA Guerrico

Consequences

Following the engagement at Grytviken, the corvette ARA Guerrico, which had lost approximately 50% of its firepower due to battle damage, departed Grytviken alongside ARA Bahía Paraíso at 03:15 on 4 April, bound for Río Grande.[35]

The ARA Bahía Paraíso transported the captured British Royal Marines to Río Grande, from where they were flown to Montevideo. They returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April.[13]

The Argentine forces chose not to attack the BAS station on Bird Island, where 15 British BAS personnel remained out of Argentine control. These individuals also remained active in other areas such as Schlieper Bay, the Lyell Glacier, and Saint Andrews Bay, avoiding capture until the islands were retaken by British forces.

The Argentine Navy left behind a garrison of 55 marines on the islands, along with 39 civilian scrap workers who remained stationed at Leith Harbour.[34]

The South Georgia Islands were retaken by British forces on 25 April 1982 during Operation Paraquat.[36]

Medals

  • Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

  • Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance received the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).[13]

  • Chief Gunner Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Medal for Valour in Combat (La Nación Argentina al Valor en Combate).[37]


Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

Referencias


1. "They infiltrated aboard, posing as scientists, but were in fact members of an Argentine naval special forces unit". Nick van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, London, Leo Cooper P.8 as reported in Lawrence Freemdman, The Official History of the Falklands Camapign: Vol I The Origins of the Falklands War
2. "Bahia Buen Suceso set sail for South Georgia on 11 March carrying Argentine Marines" Rowland White, Vulcan 607, London, Bantam Press, p30.
3. Freedman-Gamba, p. 74.
4. El Proyecto Alfa
5. Freedman-Gamba, p. 75
6. Freedman-Gamba, p. 76
7. The first visit of Davidoff
8. Insight Team Sunday Times, p. 67
9. Freedman, p. 172
10. Freedman-Gamba, p. 81
11. Segunda visita de Davidoff
12. Freedman-Gamba, p. 85
13. Britain Small Wars
14. Freedman-Gamba, p. 86
15. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 87-88
16. At that time, the Antarctic Naval Group was concluding the 1981/1982 summer campaign. By the second half of March 1982, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar had returned to its home port at the Naval Station of Buenos Aires (Apostadero Naval de Buenos Aires). Meanwhile, the polar transport ship ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1), under the command of Frigate Captain Ismael J. García, departed from the Naval Base Ushuaia bound for Base Esperanza in Antarctica, transporting the families who would be overwintering there. Following this mission, the ship continued to the South Orkney Islands, where it embarked the personnel of the Naval Construction Battalion, who had just completed construction of a new building for the local Antarctic detachment.
17. La perla austral, cronología
18. Freedman, pp. 183 and 184
19. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 98-99
20. Freedman, p.187
21. Héroes Salteños Caidos en la Guerra de las Malvinas
22. Mayorga, p. 94
23. Cf. Jonh O'Sullivan, op. cit., págs. 229-230.
24. Freedman, pp. 11-13
25. Mayorga, p. 97
26. Freedman, p. 13
27. Freedman, pp. 13-14
28. Mayorga, p. 98
29. Mayorga, p. 48
30. Mayorga, pp. 99-100
31. Mayorga, p. 100
32. Malvinas: Georgias del Sur
33. Mayorga, p. 101
34. Freedman, p. 14
35. Mayorga, p. 102
36. Freedman, p. 222
37. www.armada.mil.ar


Wikipedia.es