Malvinas: A Study Case (1/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Part 1/3
Sigue en Parte 2 - Parte 3
By Harry Train,
USN Admiral

This analysis covers the Malvinas/Falklands Conflict chronologically, from the preceding incidents to the conclusion of the Battle of Puerto Argentino/Port Stanley. Strategically, it examines the conflict across general, military, and operational levels, taking into account each side’s operational concepts and strategic objectives. This approach provides a balanced view of the strategies and tactics employed, highlighting the complexities faced by both Argentina and the United Kingdom in one of the most pivotal conflicts of the late 20th century in the South Atlantic.

In the Southern Hemisphere, it’s known as the Falklands Conflict; in North America and Europe, the South Atlantic Conflict. The British refer to it as the "South Atlantic War."

At the National Defense University in the U.S., where I teach the Final Course for newly promoted generals and admirals, we cover two case studies of special interest: one is the Grenada crisis, which we study and discuss to learn from the mistakes made by U.S. forces, despite achieving objectives. Many of my students, having fought in Grenada, tend to justify their decisions emotionally, rationalizing choices that, in hindsight, were suboptimal.

For this reason, we teach a second case where the U.S. was merely an observer: the Falklands Conflict. Rich in political-military decisions and full of errors and miscalculations on both sides, this case offers our generals and admirals an opportunity to examine a complex diplomatic framework and see how political factors, some still overlooked, led to the failure of diplomacy and ultimately to war. This conflict also allows for the analysis of an unprecedented military-political phenomenon: one side still operated under crisis management rules while the other was already at war.

This case also lets U.S. generals and admirals consider the benefits of joint defense structures by examining Argentina's new joint command system, which was joint in name only. The conflict also held lessons for the U.S. Congress in organizing our national defense and showed the impact of chance on the outcome of war.

— Would the results have been different if British television had not mistakenly reported the deployment of two nuclear submarines from Gibraltar towards South Georgia on March 26?
— Would the results have been different if the weather had not been calm on May 1?
— Would the results have changed if the 14 bombs that penetrated British warships had exploded?
— Would the outcome have been different if the Argentine Telefunken torpedoes had functioned properly?
— Would the British response have been the same if not for the coal miners' strikes in Britain?

The conflict also provides a retrospective view of crucial decisions, such as Argentina’s failure to extend the Port Stanley runway to accommodate A-4s and Mirages, the lack of heavy artillery and helicopters delivered to the Islands between April 2 and 12, the division of Argentine forces between East and West Falklands, the decision not to exploit British vulnerability at Fitz Roy and Bluff Cove, and the British decision to attack the cruiser General Belgrano.

We also examine how the land war might have unfolded if the Argentine forces from West Falkland had been in San Carlos, forcing the British to establish their beachhead on West rather than East Falkland.

My vantage point during the conflict was as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme NATO Commander in the Atlantic. My role was solely observational, overseeing a conflict between two valued allies. As my friend Horacio Fisher, then an Argentine liaison officer on my staff, can attest, we received little information on the war’s progress at my Norfolk command. There, our assessments foresaw an Argentine victory until the conflict’s final weeks, as we were unaware of certain pivotal decisions that later proved us wrong.

What I’ll share with you is my personal view of the Falklands Conflict, a product of months of studying reports, records, and interviews with the main leaders from both sides. This study has been challenging, as reports and interviews often reflect conflicting perspectives on key political and military events. This is in itself instructive, illustrating the "fog of war." In my research, I’ve had full access to Argentine and British leaders, documents, and post-conflict analyses.

As I recount this painful chapter in history, you will mentally analyze how each side adhered to military principles such as objective, offense, mass, maneuver, simplicity, security, surprise, economy of force, and unity of command.

While the complete study follows a detailed chronology of events based on records from both sides, initial analyses for students are based on a series of essays I’ve written that address various aspects of the conflict. These include the diplomatic prelude, the collapse of deterrence due to perceptions of British defense policy after World War II, initial recognition of the issue, both sides’ initial planning, and the Davidoff incident.

Understanding the Problem

If successive Argentine governments ever considered using military force as a supplement to or substitute for diplomatic efforts to reclaim sovereignty over the Falklands, these actions were discouraged by the perception of British military capabilities and their willingness to use those capabilities to defend their interests. At no time before the deployment of Argentine forces to Port Stanley on April 2, 1982, did the Junta believe the British would respond with military force. Nor did Argentine military leaders at any point before or during the conflict believe that Argentina could prevail in a military confrontation with Great Britain. These two beliefs shaped Argentina’s political and military decision-making process before and during the conflict.

The conflict was the result of Argentina’s longstanding determination to regain sovereignty over the Falklands and Britain’s ongoing commitment to the self-determination of the islanders. For many years, this balance was maintained due to a confluence of personalities and political attitudes on both sides, the Falkland Islands Company’s influence over policy decisions in London, and shifting perceptions of British military power and national interest. These factors set the stage for the decisions that ultimately led to war.

Additionally, Britain’s Conservative Party, facing internal labor unrest and weakened by public discontent, was under pressure. The British Navy’s fear of losing its significance added to this complex decision-making environment. About one thousand lives were lost in the conflict, nearly one for every two island residents. Thirty combat and support ships were sunk or damaged, and 138 aircraft were destroyed or captured. Britain successfully defended the islanders’ "interests," while Argentina’s efforts to regain sovereignty failed. In the aftermath, the British Navy regained prestige in the eyes of political leaders, and Argentina transitioned to civilian governance.

Most writings on Falklands sovereignty devote hundreds of pages to the 150-year diplomatic struggle. Argentines place great emphasis on each step of this process and hold a firm belief in diplomacy, though they recognize the importance of military capabilities as a complement to diplomacy. They see military strength as potentially giving diplomacy a "slight elbow nudge" within certain limits and without crossing the threshold of war. The British, on the other hand, are masters of diplomacy and the use of military force in the classic Clausewitzian sense—as an extension of the political process, regardless of whether or not the threshold of war is crossed.

Argentina’s leadership during the conflict reflected a viewpoint of having “too much history not to act.” In the U.S. and Great Britain, we say that one begins their history with each war, making accounting and decision-making simpler. Whether or not these Argentine viewpoints are historically accurate is irrelevant; what matters is that these criteria had a profound impact on Argentine decisions in the prelude to the conflict.

Of particular interest to military professionals is the gap between the assumptions underpinning British and Argentine decision-making. Between the occupation of the islands on April 2 and the sinking of the Belgrano on May 2, Argentine authorities operated under the belief that they were managing a diplomatic crisis, while the British acted on the conviction that they were at war.

Argentina’s political objective was "a diplomatic solution to regain sovereignty over the islands." Britain’s objectives were "defend the interests of the islanders and punish aggression."

One could argue that Argentina lost the war between April 2 and April 12 by failing to use cargo ships to transport heavy artillery and helicopters for their occupation forces, as well as heavy equipment needed to extend the Port Stanley runway, which would have allowed A-4s and Mirages to operate. The indecision, rooted in Argentina’s preconceived notion that defeating the British militarily was impossible, was a dominant factor in the final outcome.

The Davidoff incident

The Davidoff incident is crucial for understanding the Falklands conflict; it served as the "spark" or, as Admiral Anaya put it, the "trigger." Post-war perceptions of the Davidoff incident in Britain and Argentina differ significantly. Here’s what I believe happened:

In September 1979, Constantino Sergio Davidoff signed a contract with a Scottish company, transferring the equipment and installations of four whaling stations in Leith on South Georgia Island to him. This contract gave him the right to remove scrap metal from the island until March 1983. The Falklands authorities were informed of this contract in August 1980.

The 1971 Communications Agreement allowed travel between the Falklands and Argentina with only a white card. However, in response to UN Resolution 1514, the British registered South Georgia as a separate colony from the Falklands, governed directly from Britain, though administered by the Falklands government for convenience. Argentina rejected this colonial status claim, arguing that South Georgia, like the Falklands, had always belonged to Argentina and therefore could not be anyone's colony.

The problem arose when Davidoff visited Leith for the first time to inspect the installations he had acquired and intended to remove due to their scrap value. British authorities in Port Stanley maintained that no one could disembark in South Georgia without first obtaining permission at the British Antarctic Survey base in Grytviken, also on South Georgia, where passports would be stamped. Argentina, however, argued that the white card sufficed for entry and exit, per the 1971 Agreement.

There remain many unanswered questions regarding the timing, authenticity, and notification to Argentina of Britain’s claim to South Georgia as a separate colony. It is worth noting that both countries interpreted the situation differently. Curiously, Britain chose to enforce rigorous procedures regarding visits to South Georgia just as it was benefiting financially from unrestricted travel enabled by the white card.

The incident formally began when Davidoff left Buenos Aires on the icebreaker Almirante Irizar, which he had chartered, and arrived in Leith on December 20, 1981. Having informed the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his plans, he traveled directly to Leith without stopping in Grytviken for permission—likely unaware of this requirement—and then returned to Argentina.

Governor Hunt of the Falklands apparently learned of the visit through reports that the Almirante Irizar was in Stromness Bay and from people in Grytviken who reported someone had been in Leith. It seems probable that the British Embassy in Buenos Aires did not inform Hunt. Hunt urged action against Davidoff for bypassing the regulations, but London instructed him not to create issues.

The British ambassador protested to the Argentine government over the incident on February 3, warning that it should not happen again. This protest was dismissed on February 18.

Davidoff apologized at the British Embassy for any inconvenience caused and requested detailed guidelines on how to return to South Georgia to dismantle the installations properly. The embassy consulted Governor Hunt, who did not respond until after Davidoff's departure on March 11. On that day, Davidoff formally notified the British Embassy that 41 people were onboard the Bahía Buen Suceso, an Argentine Antarctic supply vessel. Information about their arrival should have been provided before their landing in Leith on March 19, bypassing Grytviken once more. The workers raised the Argentine flag.

 

War Triggers- The Argentine Viewpoint

Argentine authorities describe the events of March 19, 1982, as "the trigger." Although these events in South Georgia were far from forcing the key military episode beyond which there was no way out but war—and therefore do not fall into the category of a war starter—March 19 was certainly the spark for a cascade of confrontations and political-military decisions that set the stage for war to begin.

The British reaction to the Davidoff incident led Argentina to adjust its planning. The British Antarctic Survey's message from South Georgia reporting that "the Argentines have landed" polarized British reaction in London. In Buenos Aires, the Junta began considering the possibility of occupying the Falkland Islands and South Georgia before the British could reinforce them. Vice Admiral Lombardo was ordered to urgently prepare Operation Malvinas. Orders and counter-orders ensued.

The British government deployed HMS Endurance to South Georgia to remove the Argentine workers. The British were unaware that Argentina had canceled its initial plan to include military personnel in Davidoff’s legitimate project, but they did know of the Argentine Naval Operations Commander’s directive for two frigates to intercept HMS Endurance if it evacuated Argentine civilians. However, they were unaware that this order was later rescinded by Argentine political authorities, who feared a military confrontation.

Argentine personnel from the Alpha Group, initially intended to participate in Davidoff’s operation, were now redeployed to South Georgia as events unfolded and landed there on the 24th from the ARA Bahía Paraíso. A brief de-escalation occurred on March 25 when Britain learned of ARA Bahía Paraíso’s presence and authorized it to stay until March 28. During this time, Davidoff presented an explanation of his operation to the British Embassy.

The trigger was a (later proven false) report on British television that two nuclear submarines had departed Gibraltar for the South Atlantic. Argentine authorities took this information as accurate. Not wanting to risk a landing operation in the face of a British nuclear submarine threat, they calculated the earliest possible arrival date for the submarines. They were convinced that, from that point on, these submarines would remain stationed there for several years. Argentine authorities likely did not even know the exact time of the submarines' departure.

The Argentine public's support for what was seen as a valid commercial operation under the 1971 Communications Agreement framed a narrative of strong national interest against what was perceived as waning British interest. In an "now-or-never" mindset, the Junta ordered the execution of Operation Malvinas, setting April 2, 1982, as D-Day.

Operation Rosario 

The occupation of Port Stanley on April 2, without any British bloodshed, was a model operation—well-planned and flawlessly executed. The 700 Marines and 100 Special Forces members landed, achieved their objectives, and re-embarked as they were replaced by Army occupation forces. The Naval Task Force provided both amphibious transport and naval support.

I do not cover Operation Rosario in detail in this study because it was impeccable. What follows, and the absence of a conceptual military plan for subsequent operations, are of greater interest to my students. Here are two notable incidents:

1. On the afternoon of April 2, the Argentine Air Force in the Falklands initially denied landing authorization to an F28 carrying the naval aviation commander. The aircraft was eventually allowed to land after a 45-minute delay.

2. On April 2, the Argentine Air Force requested that the Joint Chiefs transport aluminum sheets to the islands by sea to extend the runway and expand the aircraft parking area for operational planes.

The ARA Cabo San Antonio transported LVTs and members of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion to the islands.

Performance of Argentine Transport Authorities

This marked the beginning of Argentina’s struggle to establish effective cooperation among its armed forces. The incident involving landing authorization for the naval aviation commander at Port Stanley symbolized what would soon become a significant coordination issue. The naval transport of runway materials highlighted an inability to set proper logistical priorities for the islands' support.

At that point, the Military Junta was increasingly concerned that resupplying the Falklands would pose a serious risk, as they hoped for a diplomatic solution. With British submarines expected to arrive in the area, any merchant vessel en route to the islands could become a target, risking an escalation they wished to avoid. Thus, resupply had to be limited to what few ships Argentina could load and dispatch before the submarines' estimated arrival.

Giving high priority to artillery and mobility support for the islands—particularly aluminum planks to extend the runway and heavy equipment to facilitate their installation—was crucial. The planks alone were useless without the necessary machinery. Failing to prioritize cargo and maximize the limited transport capacity proved a critical flaw, severely impacting both the naval and land campaigns. It’s worth noting that active U.S. involvement in the conflict became inevitable once extending the Port Stanley runway was no longer feasible.

Triggers of War - The British Perspective

When the South Georgia incident occurred, British Defense Secretary John Nott, Chief of the Defense Staff Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, and Fleet Commander Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse were attending the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Colorado Springs, where I was also present. As the crisis intensified, these key figures were dispersed: Admiral Lewin traveled to New Zealand, Admiral Fieldhouse to the Mediterranean, and Nott to Europe. During their ten-day absence, the UK observed Argentina escalating its claims.

Demonstrations had erupted in Argentina, and the country’s presence in Thule and South Sandwich was public knowledge in London. The Argentine occupation took place on a Friday, and with key members absent, the British War Cabinet set their objective: "Secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces and restore British administration in the islands."

Recognizing political, economic, and military constraints within Britain, the War Cabinet ordered the British Task Force to set sail on Monday. The fleet embarked, and commercial ships were requisitioned, despite uncertainty about the extent of the effort required. The government’s guiding concept for the operation became "deter and repel," forming the foundation of their initial response.

Argentine Naval Strategy

In Buenos Aires, naval authorities established their strategy:

• Carrier-based interdiction of maritime communication lines was considered and discarded.
• The use of docked vessels in the Falklands as mobile batteries was also considered and dismissed.
• Ultimately, Argentina adopted a “fleet in being” strategy, keeping a reserve fleet for potential postwar Chilean aggression. Avoiding direct naval battles, Argentina opted for a war of attrition—a prudent decision in hindsight.
• The Argentine Navy’s main objective was to inflict damage on the British Landing Force during disembarkation, when British forces would have limited freedom of maneuver.
• Additionally, Argentine concerns about fleet survival were heightened by U.S. Admiral Hayward’s assertion that satellites could track the Argentine fleet’s location at all times.

British Naval Strategy

British naval authorities developed a four-phase strategy to ensure an appropriate force structure:

• Phase One began on April 12, with nuclear attack submarines patrolling west of the islands to enforce the Exclusion Zone.
• Phase Two started on April 22 with the arrival of surface units and lasted until the landing at San Carlos on May 21. The mission was to establish air and maritime superiority in preparation for the landing, marked by a “war at sea” period. During this phase, South Georgia was recaptured, and the ARA Belgrano, HMS Sheffield, and Isla de los Estados were sunk.
• Phase Three began with the May 21 landing, lasting until May 30, focusing on establishing a beachhead, supporting ground troops, and providing air defense. HMS Ardent, Antelope, Coventry, and Atlantic Conveyor, as well as the Argentine vessel Río Carcarañá, were sunk during this phase.
• The Final Phase started on May 30, lasting until the ceasefire, with the mission of supporting ground operations and protecting maritime communication lines. During this period, the British landing ship HMS Galahad was sunk.

Sinking of the ARA Belgrano

On May 1, Vice Admiral Lombardo planned an operation to distract the British Task Force, which, according to Argentine intelligence, was preparing a landing on the Falklands that day. Lombardo’s idea was to form a pincer movement with Task Force ARA 25 de Mayo approaching the Exclusion Zone from the north and Task Force ARA Belgrano from the south, both outside the zone, forcing the British Task Force to abandon its support for the landing.

As ARA 25 de Mayo prepared to engage, the winds calmed, and technical issues limited the ship’s speed to 15 knots. Forecasts indicated continued calm for the next 24 hours, forcing Argentine A-4s to reduce their bomb load from four to one per aircraft. Doubts about the effectiveness of an attack with such a limited payload and reports that the British had not landed as expected led to the order for both task forces to retreat westward.

The ARA Belgrano had maneuvered around the exclusion zone, heading east and then north between the Falklands and South Georgia, to divert British attention from the impending landing and the presence of the 25 de Mayo. Sensing a real threat to his forces, Admiral Woodward requested and received authorization from London to attack the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone to neutralize the risk.

When HMS Conqueror attacked and sank the ARA Belgrano, the Argentine cruiser had been heading westward for fourteen hours. With the sinking of the ARA Belgrano, all hopes for a diplomatic solution faded, marking the start of the naval war.

Maritime Exclusion Zones and Other Navigation Restrictions

The concept of a Maritime Exclusion Zone, as imposed by the British during the conflict, is neither new nor fully understood by all military and political leaders. The pros and cons of a “sanitary cordon” have been debated within NATO for years. Similar terms, such as “Maritime Defense Zone,” have been examined legally and analyzed militarily, with significant disagreements among lawyers regarding its legality under international law, as well as its tactical and strategic value.

Declaratory in nature, like its distant relatives the Blockade and Quarantine, a zone must be announced with clear geographic limits, effective dates, and the types and nationalities of ships and aircraft it applies to.

The blockade, a more traditional military term with a solid basis in international law, is typically defined as a wartime action aimed at preventing ships of all nations from entering or leaving specific areas controlled by an enemy.

The terms pacific blockade and quarantine evolved from blockade laws, with the key distinction being that they are not intended as acts of war. Instead, military action is only anticipated if the targeted state resists. The term quarantine gained prominence in October 1962, when the U.S. president proclaimed a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment bound for Cuba.

 

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata: British Preparations for the Invasion of 1806

Preparation of the English Invasions

May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.


William Pitt, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Napoleon, Emperor of France. They dispute the domination of the world. Engraving from 1805

At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Charles IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.


The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

 -Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"

The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, ​​Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is already, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

 -Miranda, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect his pledged word to the end. In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of ​​conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but he refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other bank of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. At the instigation of this directive, in all the ports of the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly on the construction of thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve:

“Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and this is what he states, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English, it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French, who are known to have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.


William Pitt Portrait

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

 -Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.

Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805. The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.


Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, ahead of the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.

June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the reduced invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach the knowledge of Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in La Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and with the arrival of new reports that indicate the appearance tion of the English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree summoning all men capable of bearing arms to join the militia corps within three days. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and set course towards the southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this small force is made up of professional combatants, for whom war is nothing more than a job. Veterans of a hundred battles, they are determined, like their boss, to take by storm a city whose population exceeds 40,000 inhabitants. That is the order, and they will have to comply with it, facing any risk.

With the arrival of day, Beresford orders his troops to prepare for the attack. At eleven o'clock the drums begin their roll, and the flags are displayed in the wind. From the top of the ravine facing the beach, the deputy inspector general of the troops, Colonel Pedro de Arce, sent by Sobremonte to contain the English, observes the movement of the enemy forces. With a measured step, and accompanied by the martial airs of the bagpipers, the British advance towards the swamp that separates them from Arce and his 600 militiamen. The latter, armed with a few carbines, swords and chuzas, grouped behind the three cannons with which they intended to repel the British assault.


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat inland.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that moment he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.

Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrived at the Fort, with a Parliament flag. He expressed that his boss demanded the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the inhabitants.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:

-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses considers the company to be finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.

Historiador del País

Malvinas: The Argentine Marines' Reconnaissance Mission at San Carlos Landing

An Unnecesary Recce

Revised version, 8/2/11



On May 26, 1982, an Amphibious Commando patrol arrived in the San Carlos area, departing from Puerto Argentino on the 24th of the same month. Their approach took them through terrain predominantly controlled by the enemy, resulting in significant casualties. Nevertheless, they valiantly accomplished their mission. In this anecdote, I aim to underscore a particular episode from this patrol's actions, highlighting the exceptional professionalism and sacrifice exhibited by these brave Marines.

Amid the Malvinas Conflict, the British executed a large-scale landing on May 21 in the vicinity of the San Carlos settlement on Soledad Island. After securing the beachhead, they launched a dual-pronged advance. One branch moved eastward with the objective of retaking Puerto Argentino, our primary base, while the other moved southward in the direction of Darwin.

In Puerto Argentino, located 75 km east of San Carlos, the knowledge regarding the British landing was minimal. This included uncertainty about whether it represented their principal effort or if additional operations were in progress. The Argentine leadership grappled with significant challenges in obtaining information about the enemy's movements. Multiple factors contributed to this complexity, including limited daylight hours – just 8 hours and 30 minutes at the end of May – coupled with extensive cloud cover and morning fog. Furthermore, the British held almost complete control over the airspace. Added to these issues was the severe constraint on land mobility, as vehicles couldn't be employed, and foot travel was restricted to a mere 1 km/h during daylight hours and a slower 0.5 km/h at night. In stark contrast, enemy patrols enjoyed unrestricted movement supported by their dominance in the air and at sea.

Nevertheless, despite these adversities, the military command in Puerto Argentino made the decision to dispatch three land patrols to San Carlos with the mission of "clarifying operational activity in the area."

One of these patrols was composed of Navy Amphibious Commando Non-Commissioned Officers stationed in Puerto Argentino.

In a reconnaissance mission, a faction known as the "Pereyra" was established under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander Dante Camiletti, alongside First Corporal IM Pablo Alvarado and Second Corporals IM Omar A. López and Pedro C. Verón.

Amphibious Commando Jesús Pereyra

Guided by Marine Lieutenant Commander Dante Juan Manuel Camiletti, who volunteered to lead the patrol despite not being an Amphibious Commando, the "Pereyra" Patrol was established. This decision arose because the rest of the Amphibious Commandos were in Rio Gallegos (Santa Cruz), preparing for a possible Malvinas incursion as part of "Operation Vulture."

On May 24, the patrol boarded two Argentine Army helicopters and were transported to Chata Hill, approximately 50 km west of Puerto Argentino. This strategic move aimed to minimize the patrol's overland journey, considering the proximity of the enemy.

Upon reaching Chata Hill, they set up a Reduced Patrol Base (BPR) and concealed a portion of their equipment and supplies to reduce their load. This base served as a rendezvous point after the completion of their mission. They retained only essential items such as sleeping bags, a substantial quantity of ammunition, and easily transportable supplies, including chocolates, cigarettes, cookies, candy, broth, and alcohol pills.

They waited for nightfall to initiate their movements. On the night of May 24 to 25, under a light drizzle, they embarked on their journey towards Bombilla Hill, a prominent elevation that provided a vantage point overlooking the eastern end of the San Carlos estuary and Montevideo Hill, their ultimate destination.

From the vicinity of Bombilla Hill, they observed intense enemy activity already present on Montevideo Hill. It was apparent that the height was occupied, with the sounds of machinery audible and enemy helicopters engaged in cargo transport and patrol missions. Therefore, they decided against establishing a Patrol Base and Observatory on Montevideo Hill and instead chose to head towards Cerro Tercer Corral, a significant height located further southwest, from which they believed the mission could be effectively carried out.

Already in these first movements, the need to maintain the marching discipline typical of the Amphibious Commandos was noted and that the speed that Captain Camiletti wanted to impose, which threatened some of the unnecessary friction between the boss and his subordinates, threatened this procedure. when they understand and put into practice different doctrines.

The most senior Commando Non-Command Officer (Basualdo) demands adherence to procedures given the evident proximity of the enemy "who was everywhere" according to one of the Commando Corporals.

On their march to Tercer Corral they were overflown several times by 2 Harriers.

During the fording of a branch of the San Carlos River, they lost part of their equipment and lightened the rest, while at the same time they were completely soaked. They continued their brand practically with what they had.

On Wednesday, May 26, Cerro Tercer Corral was reached and a BPR was established. The Observation Post was located with a good view of Cerro Montevideo and Puerto San Carlos. Until now, it had not been possible to establish radio communications with Puerto Argentino.

Captain Camiletti moved forward to complete the table of information they were obtaining. Enthusiastic, he possibly exposed himself a little more than necessary, a fact that led to strong changes of opinion with the more senior Commandos.

Based on the analysis of the general situation (to which is added the situation previously explained) it was decided to divide the Patrol.

A part ("Basualdo Fraction", made up of the Marine Infantry Non-Commissioned Officers Miguel Ángel Basualdo and Ramón López and the Marine Corps Chiefs Juan Héctor Márquez, Osvaldo César Ozán, Juan Carrasco and Pedro Baccili) would return to Puerto Argentino with the important information collected and the rest with Captain Camiletti ("Pereyra Fraction": Chief Nurse Corporal Jesús A. Pereyra, First Corporal of the Marine Infantry Pablo Alvarado and the Second Corporals of the Marine Infantry Omar A. López and Pedro C. Verón) , will remain in the area trying to further expand the picture of the enemy.

The return of the Basualdo Patrol was marked by a series of significant events. During one of their movements, Chief Corporal Juan Carrasco was captured in Teal Inlet. Basualdo had to carefully navigate around the British columns heading in the same direction. This situation forced the patrol to virtually trail behind the British units while successfully avoiding direct contact with the enemy, despite the British's awareness of the presence of our commandos in their area following Carrasco's capture.

Their paramount concern was to reestablish contact with their own lines, which remained unaware of this patrol's existence. Fortunately, they encountered Argentine Army commandos who were operating ahead of their frontlines. Sergeant Cisneros served as the crucial connection that allowed them to re-enter their own defensive lines without incident, and this occurred on Sunday, May 30.

Subsequently, things proceeded relatively smoothly, and they could relay their invaluable collected information to the higher command. Tragically, Sergeant Cisneros later fell into an enemy ambush.

The remaining commandos who stayed in Tercer Corral under the leadership of Captain Camileti began their march on May 26 toward Montes Verdes, which was approximately 300 meters to the west, bringing them closer to the San Carlos settlement. The following day, they ascended the height at dawn and established a Reduced Patrol Base (BPR).

Using night scopes, they observed the enemy positioned on the topographic ridge of that same height. The decision was made to leave the patrol in that location while Captain Camiletti and Chief Corporal Pereyra advanced to gain a better vantage point to monitor the enemy's movements. Corporal Pereyra pointed out the danger to Camiletti if they were discovered, and following this, Captain Camiletti ordered Pereyra to rejoin the rest of the patrol. He then tried to advance further in the early morning light.

The remaining members of the patrol, along with Corporal Pereyra, clearly witnessed the enemy's actions on the heights and soon heard gunfire. They correctly assumed that Captain Camiletti had been detected and promptly initiated their return as previously agreed upon with the Captain.



Moment of capture of Cap. Camiletti (IMARA)

As they marched back, they noticed that the enemy forces were positioned in a chain, cautiously advancing and remaining highly alert.

Within our patrol, three commandos concealed themselves in a waterlogged well. They huddled together with freezing water up to their waists, using some tufts of grass that they had fortunately managed to place over themselves for cover. Pereyra, Alvarado, López, and Verón were the four fighters who remained hidden in the watery wells. The first three positioned themselves in a row, squatting low inside a flooded well with water up to their waists and concealed beneath tufts of grass they had arranged over their heads. Corporal Verón, having no opportunity to enter the well, lay on his back with his rifle resting on his chest in a shallow, 20-centimeter-deep depression within a stream. He, too, was hidden beneath grass and branches. The enemy forces virtually passed right over them without discovering their presence.

As darkness fell and they had spent several hours in these concealed positions, their bodies had gone numb from the frigid water. Suddenly, a rifle shot rang out from the right, followed by a volley of gunfire directed towards the valley where our men were hidden. Fortunately, the enemy's rounds sailed over the heads of the Amphibious Commandos. Were they conducting a suppressive fire operation? This was followed by around 30 minutes of eerie silence, broken by the constant movement of helicopters in the area.

For the Amphibious Commandos, nightfall presented the most favorable opportunity to disengage from their concealed positions.

Only with the darkness of the night and after spending many hours in the icy water were they able to get out of the position, first crawling because their legs were numb from the cold, then crawling to regain movement, then finally crouching to continue the escape. They also marched among British troops heading to Puerto Argentino.

The following is a personal conversation I had with Jesús Pereyra, a resident of Pehuen Có, a beach located 80km from Bahía Blanca. Pereyra had been in the Malvinas since Operation Rosario, and he and his fellow soldiers were seasoned personnel. In contrast, Camiletti was a recently commissioned officer who lacked any practical field experience. However, due to his officer status, he was assigned to lead the forward observation mission.

Pereyra recounted that the mission seemed purposeless from the outset. Its objective was to confirm the British landing, even though the BBC had already reported it and had subsequently aired live images. Owen Grippa had, in fact, flown over the area in an MBB326 and attacked HMS Argonaut, thus confirming the British presence. Nevertheless, naval commanders approved the mission. Upon learning of this, Pereyra realized it was essentially a suicide mission. As a result, he refrained from seeking volunteers and instead enlisted all the group members. No one wanted to be individually responsible for leading someone to certain death; they preferred to face the risk together.

Camiletti was inadequately prepared, even carrying his provisions in a conspicuous fluorescent orange Antarctic backpack. Shortly after the mission began, Pereyra and his comrades informed Camiletti that they would "interpret" his orders due to his lack of combat experience, as they were unwilling to unquestioningly follow commands they deemed ill-suited. The patrol covertly reached the San Carlos beaches and verified the British presence, subsequently sending a report to Puerto Argentino. Despite this confirmation, Camiletti insisted on approaching the British forces more closely. This is why he was captured alone, while the non-commissioned officers were not. The image of Camiletti, hooded with a jacket and a Sterling submachine gun aimed at his head, became widely known around the world.



Capture of Cap. Camiletti (IMARA)

Captain Camiletti's account, as conveyed to this author, contradicts the assertion that he volunteered for the mission. Instead, he states that he assumed command of the patrol for nearly two months. During this time, he arranged their lodgings, secured a vehicle for their transportation, and motivated the team to overcome their reluctance, as some were hesitant about embarking on daily missions. His objective was to engage in daily exploratory excursions along the coastline, search for potential infiltrators in areas near the sea, and prepare nighttime ambushes in locations conducive to English patrol landings. Concerning his capture and the rationale behind his solo advancement towards the English positions, he explained, "The members who returned did so due to exhaustion and their unwillingness to continue the advance. Those who remained behind were only those with relatively better physical condition, and I had to insist that they stay" (personal communication, 03/24/11).



Following the capture of the Argentine officer and the heightened state of alert among English troops, a remarkable incident occurred: British forces passed within inches of the Argentine soldiers without detecting them. Their concealment was a crevice in the earth from which a shallow, 40 cm-deep spring emerged. The three of them remained there from 8 AM one day until 2 AM the following day, enduring the wet conditions of the Malvinas' climate.

On that very day, they embarked on a journey toward Two Sisters Hill, which served as the re-entry point into the Argentine-controlled territory. Progress was painstakingly slow as they were closely trailed by patrols from the SAS and RM.

Upon reaching Two Sisters Hill, Pereyra had a premonition that "something was amiss." Despite an eerie calm and a lack of troop movements in the elevated terrain, they proceeded. When they were just a few meters away, British forces, who had recaptured the hill the day before, opened fire. A bullet struck Pereyra's backpack, penetrating through and lodging in his back. Pereyra was taken captive, while Camiletti, upon his return to the mainland, was discharged and subsequently faded from the public eye.

Their journey took them halfway on Monday, May 31, when, in the southeastern vicinity of Monte Estancia, they fell into an ambush. Pereyra and López sustained severe injuries, while Alvarado and Verón remained unscathed but were captured. Thus began a new chapter, one that revolved around their lives as prisoners. This phase was particularly challenging, as they endured harsh treatment owing to their classification as special forces.

Subsequently, he was embarked in the HMS Canberra to get back to the continent and resumed active duty. The Navy, however, never requested that he share his combat experiences with the new generations of amphibious commandos. There was always a sense of shame associated with recounting them. This led to a profound depression, prompting his participation in the 1984 voyage of the Frigate Libertad, where he was the sole war veteran on board. In each North American and European port visited by the frigate, he was honored by fellow naval peers. In Annapolis, for instance, both marines and naval officers extended invitations for him to share his experiences over a drink. Similar receptions occurred in France, Spain, and Italy, with foreign naval officers eager to hear his accounts, even when their own national colleagues did not share the same enthusiasm.

He wasn't the sole one grappling with the aftermath. His fellow patrol members sank into severe depressions. Verón, hailing from Misiones, requested leave but, in a simultaneous twist, was arrested due to disruptive behavior. Pereyra, using his own funds, traveled to Posadas to secure Verón's release. When he found him in jail, Verón was clad in just a T-shirt, swim trunks, and flip-flops. Pereyra settled his fine, secured his freedom, and helped him regain his footing. Through his own marriage, Pereyra bore the costs of the traumas inflicted by the Malvinas War.

Presently, Pereyra is on leave and imparts nautical safety lessons. He resides in Pehuen Co, a quaint beach town located 80km from Bahía Blanca. I had the privilege of crossing paths with him two years ago when, unbeknownst to me, I rented his house. He goes by the moniker "El Brujo" Pereyra, as he's renowned for his knack for solving any problem that comes his way. He's an exceptionally modest and amiable individual, one of those people you can instantly identify by the way he talks. From time to time, he still reunites with Robacio, another unassuming hero of our nation, who served as the commander of BIM 5 in Tumbledown. Together, they ponder the purpose of that ill-fated patrol, a question to which nobody seems to hold the answer.

Source

La Nación, 14 Aug 1999
Clarín, 17 Aug 1999
Personal chat with Jesús Pereyra, February, 2007
Forum member APCA of foro Batallas

Malvinas: Landing in San Carlos

Combat at San Carlos (1982)

 
Camp of the 3rd British Parachute Battalion in Puerto San Carlos shortly after the landing

The San Carlos combat was a confrontation between the British landing forces and a small group of Argentine infantry soldiers, which occurred on May 21, 1982 during the Falklands War in the context of Operation Sutton. The scene of this combat was the western coast of Soledad Island, in the area of Puerto San Carlos, on the strait of the same name (Falkland Sound).

Background

The conflict in mid-May
Around mid-May in 1982, the intensity of military operations in the Malvinas archipelago had diminished. While diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, both sides were gearing up for the next phase of the campaign. The British aimed to land troops and remove the Argentine forces, yet they lacked information about when or where this operation would occur. The Argentine strategy focused on defending Puerto Argentino (Stanley), assuming it was the primary target of the British. Consequently, most of the Argentine ground forces were concentrated in that area.

Despite the British not rushing into action, they initiated the first combat actions using their aircraft carrier group, consisting of HMS "Hermes" and "Invincible" and their escort ships. Air strikes and naval bombardments began targeting Puerto Argentino on May 1. Meanwhile, British special forces like the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) conducted covert reconnaissance missions across the archipelago. Argentina had withdrawn its Sea Fleet to port following the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, leaving only its aviation (Southern Air Force Command) capable of engaging the Royal Navy.

On May 18, 1982, the Amphibious Task Group, responsible for the landing operation under the codename "Operation Sutton," joined forces with the Aircraft Carrier Group. All available resources were dedicated to this critical phase of the campaign.

San Carlos, the scene


British landing on Soledad Island and subsequent fighting (May 21, 1982). 

The selected location was the western region of Soledad Island, situated along the San Carlos Strait near its northern tip. At this location, two waterways extended inland, offering shallow waters and soft beaches conducive to a landing operation. To the north of the water entrance lay San Carlos Port, and to the south was the San Carlos Establishment. These places were sparsely populated, with only a few houses, and Puerto San Carlos even had a school. To the northwest of Puerto San Carlos, on the Fanning Head peninsula, stood a small elevated landmass known as "Height 234." East of Establecimiento San Carlos, there were other elevated areas, while to the south lay the Sussex Heights, obstructing the road to Darwin.

The British selected this site after a thorough analysis and after discarding other options. In the first half of May, they dispatched special units to conduct reconnaissance in the area and reported the absence of defenders. However, despite the absence of a permanent Argentine garrison in San Carlos, their patrols discovered evidence of British incursions, prompting them to deploy a Combat Team to the Puerto San Carlos and Fanning Head region on May 15th. The British only became aware of the presence of these troops upon their own landing.

Conflicting plans

British landing plan
The choice of location, as already mentioned, was due to the consideration of several factors.

• The place was not defended (even though the British did not expect to find any Argentine soldiers there, there was no garrison capable of preventing a landing)
• The series of heights that surrounded the place offered the possibility of setting up a defense line and would prevent Argentine aviation from using the Exocet missiles. At the same time, the fighter-bombers would be forced to gain altitude before attacking, thus exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire.
• Argentina's chances of rejecting the landing were complicated if it took place in San Carlos. This was very far from the main garrison in Puerto Argentino (80 kilometers), which would delay the intervention of a heliborne counterattack force. * Darwin's garrison was 35 kilometers away and if an advance against the beachhead was attempted, it could be stopped by naval fire from the Strait and by positions established on the Sussex heights.
• Complete control of the sea and air cover could protect the landing, while the large number of helicopters available could speed up the transfer of troops to land.
  

 

Argentine Defense Plan
Argentine planning for the defense of the Malvinas archipelago postulated as a basis the defense of a strong position in the island capital (Puerto Argentino Army Group), where the enemy landing was expected. As for the rest of the islands, garrisons of different strengths were installed, but it was impossible to keep the entire coastal perimeter of the Malvinas defended. The Argentine commanders anticipated several possible points for a British landing, but they could not cover them all. British control of the sea gave them the initiative, which is why they were granted the ability to feign diversionary maneuvers in one place and make the main effort in another.
The movement of troops by land to reject a landing carried out far from Puerto Argentino was ruled out for the following reasons:1 

• This movement would be detected by the English and they would suffer heavy losses due to their air and naval fire.
• There was no possibility that the Southern Air Force would achieve the air coverage necessary to execute said maneuver.
• The Malvinas soil did not allow the march of armor or the transport of artillery and heavy equipment. A soldier could only cover 2 kilometers per hour marching by day in such terrain, and one kilometer per hour marching at night.
• The time spent on the march would fatigue the troops, who would arrive tired, not to mention giving the enemy enough time to prepare their defenses.
• Carrying out a helicopter movement to the site was also considered very risky, given the British's dominance of the air.
• The number of helicopters available made it impossible to concentrate the force necessary for combat on the beachhead in a short time.

Due to these factors, the Argentine strategy involved continuous coastal monitoring. If an enemy landing was detected as the primary offensive, the aviation forces were assigned the crucial task of obstructing the establishment of a secure beachhead.

The region around Puerto San Carlos fell under the jurisdiction of the Litoral Army Group. They made the decision to dispatch portions of the Darwin garrison to this area with a specific mission: to "alert and prepare for a counterattack." 2

Conflicting forces


Argentine soldiers in an event, before the English landing. Lieutenant Esteban marches next to the flag bearer.

Argentine Forces
The Litoral Army Group defended the western part of Soledad Island and also Gran Malvina Island. Its main garrisons were Darwin, Howard and Bahía Fox. Precisely from the Darwin garrison, a group of soldiers belonging to the 12th and 25th Infantry Regiments were drawn. The troop was organized as follows:

• Equipo de Combate Güemes (Lieutenant Esteban): 42 strong (riflemen). Located at Puerto San Carlos. 
• Support Section (Second Lieutenant Reyes): 20 strong, 2 mortairs 81 mm y 2 105 mm recoilless guns. Located in Fanning Head (Height 234). 

British Forces
The British forces possessed a significantly larger contingent, which was commensurate with the scale of the operation. The 3rd Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, bolstered by additional paratroopers from the British Army, had the primary objective of securing the beaches to facilitate the arrival of other units. The naval vessels were responsible for delivering artillery support, while the helicopter squadrons played a crucial role in the landing process. Simultaneously, the Sea Harrier fighters were deployed to provide aerial protection. All these components worked together in a coordinated effort for the operation.

• 3ª Commandos Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson 
• Comando 40 Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Hunt) 
• Comando 42º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Vaux) 
• Comando 45º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Whitehead) 

Additional Units Assigned

• 2 Para (Lieutenant colonel Jones) 
• 3 Para (Lieutenant colonel Pike) 
• Special Air Service 22 Regiment (Lieutenant colonel Rose) 
• 3ª Commando Brigade Air Squadron (Major Cameron) 

The order of battle arranged for the landing was as follows:

• Primera oleada: 2º Batallón de Paracaidistas y 40 Comando de Marines en San Carlos (Playa Azul).El 2º de Paracaidistas debía ocupar las montañas Sussex, al sur, para bloquear un eventual avance argentino desde Darwin. 
• Segunda oleada: 45º Comando de Marines en Ajax Bay (Playa Roja) y 3º Batallón de Paracaidistas en Puerto San Carlos (Playa Verde) 
• Reserva: 42º Comando de Marines (a bordo del buque Canberra) 

Landing Preparations

The Fanning Head Engagement
On Thursday night the British Amphibious Group entered the San Carlos Strait to begin the landing operation.
The first action was against the Argentine faction under the command of Second Lieutenant Reyes, located in Fanning Head.
At dawn (2:30) an Argentine patrol sent heard noises and voices from the Strait to the beach, perceiving at the same time the silhouette of the English ships. The Argentines then launched flares and fired their heavy weapons against the canal area, although without being able to appreciate the results due to darkness. The English ships opened fire, guided by the glare of the Argentine guns firing. This exchange of fire lasts several hours.
SBS men were sent in helicopters from the destroyer HMS Antrim. These forces landed east of Fanning Head, cutting off this Argentine faction from their comrades at Puerto San Carlos. Immediately afterwards (around 5:00) infantry combat began. In the following fight the British declared that they had killed several Argentines and captured others; while the Argentine report of the action denies fatal casualties although it confirms the loss of several men who were captured; It also says that three seriously wounded people were left behind with a non-commissioned medical officer, being treated and saved by the British.
However, the majority of the Argentine soldiers, led by Reyes, managed to break the British encirclement and retreat, although they did not join Lieutenant Esteban's faction. It is not clear where this force was located, but the Argentine version says that the Reyes Support Section remained there without being discovered throughout May 21.
The capture of Fanning Head assured the British possession of a sensitive area to cover the northern flank of the landing. While the Fanning Head fight was happening, the horrible Team Güemes remained in their positions.





Secondary Actions
The British report reports a blocking action carried out by Squadron D of the Special Air Service (SAS) in the Darwin-Goose Green area, to prevent the Argentine troops located there from moving north to repel the landing. . This blocking action was supported by naval fire from the frigate HMS “Ardent” from the waters of the Strait.
On the other hand, Royal Air Force Harrier planes carried out attacks at various points: an English fighter was shot down over Howard, while other planes managed to destroy three Argentine helicopters in the Monte Kent area, 20 kilometers from Puerto Argentino. This last coup pursued the objective of denying aeromobility to the Argentines to prevent them from transferring counterattack forces to San Carlos.

Landing
The first wave of landings reached the beach without opposition in the early morning hours. The frigate HMS Plymouth provided close cover, and four Scimitar and Scorpion light tanks reached the beach in the first wave, to provide firepower. It was the first British landing in war since the Suez Crisis in 1956.
Fulfilling the planned plan, the 2nd Battalion occupied the Sussex Heights, while the 40th Commando did the same with the Green Mountains. The southern flank, facing Darwin's Argentine position, was secured. The barges then returned to the canal to pick up and transport the second wave.
Meanwhile, the Güemes Combat Team observed the English movement in the canal. Communications with the Support Section had been cut during the early morning, but the Argentines in Puerto San Carlos could hear the noise of the combat taking place at Fanning Head. Lieutenant Esteban transmitted the information about the situation to his immediate boss in Darwin, who relayed it to Puerto Argentino.
At dawn the barges with the second wave of landings were arriving at the beach in the assigned sectors. The 45th Command took positions in a refrigerator in Ajax Bay (western sector of the landing) and the 3rd Parachute Battalion landed near Puerto San Carlos, in the vicinity of the main Argentine position.

San Carlos Frays

Argentine Perspective

By then the Argentines had occupied new positions to the east of Puerto San Carlos, from where they opened fire on the paratroopers. The San Carlos combat then took place, when the soldiers of the Güemes Team damaged a “Sea King”3 helicopter with the fire of their portable weapons (7.62 mm FAL assault rifles), which withdrew smoking from the area. The combat continued and a second helicopter arrived to attack the Argentine position with rockets, but was shot down with the same rifle fire by the defenders. The machine fell into the water in the canal, but then a third helicopter opened fire on Esteban's troop and they, with the same tactic, shot him down. The device fell to the ground and the Argentines verified that the three crew members had died. A fourth helicopter was damaged by rifle fire and managed to withdraw. According to Esteban, this combat lasted an hour, while the disembarked enemy fired mortar fire uninterruptedly. Furthermore, he verified that the Falkland Islands civilians, through signs, indicated to the English soldiers the position of the Argentine forces.



British Perspective
When the other beachheads had already been established, the amphibious ships entered the San Carlos channel and disembarked the 3rd Parachute Battalion. But the rush to establish anti-aircraft defenses led the English to move along the beach head without it being definitively secured. In such circumstances, a Sea King helicopter was maneuvering east of Puerto San Carlos without realizing that the vanguard elements of the 3rd Parachute Battalion were still west of the position. Under these circumstances he was hit by Argentine fire but was able to escape, but his escort, a Gazelle helicopter from the 3rd Commando Brigade, was shot down and fell into the water, killing one crew member. A few minutes later another Gazelle was hit and fell to the ground, killing its two crew members.



The British version does not mention infantry combat in the positions east of Puerto San Carlos and suggests that the helicopters were not intended to attack the Argentine troops, but rather fell into enemy fire due to carelessness and had to open fire to defend themselves. He also says that the helicopters hit by the Argentines were three and not four, although he agrees that two of them were destroyed.

To Dawn

The Landing Continous

The English landed the reserve (42nd Command) in Puerto San Carlos to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, the other light tanks and field artillery were disembarked, along with the anti-aircraft defenses.
The two Argentine factions remained in their positions, without their presence being able to prevent the British landing. Esteban's report mentions continuous naval and mortar fire on his position, but the basic objective of his mission was accomplished, since he had raised the alarm about the enemy's landing operation.
As a result of this alarm, the Argentines sent an Aermacchi MB-339 fighter plane from Puerto Argentino on a reconnaissance mission, which (around 10:00) confirmed the magnitude of the British landing and carried out a daring attack against the frigate “HMS Argonaut”. which caused some damage. The Argentine pilot, Lieutenant Crippa, was decorated for this reconnaissance and attack mission.
Once the information about the landing was confirmed by Crippa, the Argentine aviation launched all its available potential against the beach head, but this is part of what is known as the Battle of the Strait of San Carlos.
Meanwhile, the landing perimeter had its first victory by shooting down an Argentine Pucará attack plane. This had been sent from Darwin and was shot down by SAS D Squadron over the Sussex Mountains in the morning.


Situation at the end of the day (May 21, 1982)

Consolidation

The two Argentine factions, cut off from each other, remained in the area until the hours of darkness, when it would be easier for them to break contact with the enemy. Esteban's men left Puerto San Carlos marching through Cerro Bombilla and arrived at Douglas Paddock on May 24. There they managed to reestablish communication with Puerto Argentino, from where helicopters were sent to pick them up. They were then sent back into combat at Darwin-Goose Green, where they were taken prisoner when the garrison capitulated.
As for the Support Section, a group of 11 soldiers managed to evade the British encirclement, while the rest were captured. Those who managed to leave the area marched through the northern part of Soledad Island, avoiding British airmobile patrols and also contact with the islanders. On June 14, this faction, under the command of Reyes, learned the news of the Argentine capitulation in the archipelago and came out into the open, surrendering to the British.
Thompson ordered the general landing to continue at a sustained pace, and a field hospital was established and the Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries were deployed. The landing continued even after the Argentine air attacks began, and the English marines and paratroopers did not stop patrolling and reinforcing their perimeter. At the end of the day some 3,000 English soldiers were already on the ground.

 

Aftermath

The British forces commanded by Brigadier Thompson managed to establish a firm beachhead to prevent Argentine ground counterattacks, but these did not occur. The Argentine strategy of rejecting the landing with aviation transferred the fight to the air-naval level, allowing the English troops to be permanently reinforced.
The San Carlos combat was small in magnitude and significance. The Argentines had no means to defend the beach or prevent the landing, but instead presented a determined but formal resistance, in accordance with their main mission, which was to raise the alarm if an enemy landing occurred. The casualties caused to the British meant an extra moral victory, but did not affect the landing operation; However, the combat that occurred showed the English that the defenders could be tenacious, and convinced them of the need to reinforce the perimeter because an Argentine ground operation was not ruled out. The British decided not to underestimate the enemy.
The English landing in San Carlos was carried out with great precision and organization, even when combat was ongoing east of Puerto San Carlos and also when the air attacks began. The losses of helicopters during this action affected their mobility to a certain extent, but overall the casualties suffered in combat were not significant.
The British beachhead at San Carlos was consolidated and on May 26 the 2nd Parachute Battalion began the breakout to the south, leading against the Argentine garrison of Darwin-Goose Green. From there San Carlos stopped being a beachhead.

Notes 

1. These considerations were presented by the head of the Puerto Argentino Group, General Oscar Jofre, in his book “Malvinas, the defense of Puerto Argentino”, Editorial Sudamericana 1987
2. Cited in Kasanzew's book "Mavinas a Blood and Fire" (see bibliography).
3. In a combat situation it was normal for soldiers to confuse aircraft. On the other hand, Argentine troops had become accustomed to identifying all British helicopters with the Sea King and Sea Lynx models.

References

• Gambini, Hugo: Crónica Documental de las Malvinas, (incluye muchos documentos sobre la visión inglesa del conflicto). Editorial Redacción, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Kasanzew, Nicolás: Malvinas a Sangre y Fuego. Editorial Abril, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Jofre, Oscar: La defensa de Puerto Argentino (cita fuentes británicas en el relato de las acciones). Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires 1987. 
• Burden, Royden et al: Malvinas, la guerra aérea (edición argentina). Ediciones Open, Buenos Aires 1989. 

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