COAN: The Night of the Banzai

 

The Night of the Banzai

Brief Account of a Frustrated Attack on the British Fleet

On 25 April, the British recaptured South Georgia. From that moment, a tense calm settled over the Falkland Islands, as the Argentinians awaited the enemy's arrival. At that time, the Argentine Fleet at Sea was attempting to interdict the movements of the British Fleet. To this end, two Task Groups were deployed: one to the north of the Falklands, the other to the southeast.

The northern group centred around the aircraft carrier A.R.A. 25 de Mayo, from which Tracker aircraft were conducting reconnaissance missions to detect the enemy. By the end of April, authorisation had been given to open fire on enemy forces. On 29 April, with the carrier located approximately 150–200 nautical miles north of San Carlos Strait, long-range reconnaissance flights began. On the night of 30 April, signals intelligence detected British radar emissions to the N-NE of Port Stanley.

In the early hours of 1 May, a British Vulcan bomber carried out an airstrike on Stanley Airport, followed hours later by naval bombardment — the vigil in the Falklands was over. That same morning, a reconnaissance flight from the carrier returned with no radar contacts. However, at 1513 hours, a second flight detected radar contacts with six medium-sized vessels and one large ship — a British task force. The Argentine fleet now knew the enemy’s location. The British, however, were still unaware of Argentina’s position. The tactical advantage was clearly with Argentina.

However, the A-4Q Skyhawks lacked night-time operational and attack capability, preventing immediate offensive action. Reconnaissance efforts continued from the carrier to maintain contact with the British fleet and plan for an attack in the early hours of 2 May, involving six A-4Q aircraft, each carrying four MK82 bombs. The last known position of the enemy was obtained at 2300 hours on 1 May from a Tracker reconnaissance flight.

1. The British commander was aware he had been detected, but did not know the position of the Argentine naval force. His priority was to locate it, and he ordered Harrier reconnaissance flights. One such Harrier intercepted the Tracker mentioned earlier, which managed to evade it by flying low over the sea at night. Nonetheless, the Harrier had likely acquired a reasonably accurate estimate of the Argentine fleet’s location.

This prompted Argentine battle stations to be manned, and the destroyer Santísima Trinidad was authorised to launch missiles at the Harrier, though it never came within range.

During that night, the Argentine Battle Group went to combat alert at least three times, each time Harrier flights approached. Few slept. These incidents gave the British commander a clearer picture of the Argentine fleet’s position and combat capability.

After the conflict, the commander of HMS Invincible would remark:

“The Trackers were a real headache throughout the 45 days of combat. Knowing I had been detected, I launched my Harriers seventeen times to shoot them down, but I never succeeded.”

The tactical situation required maintaining contact with the British fleet. At 0528 on 2 May, a Tracker was launched to confirm enemy presence. Later that morning, a second Tracker would follow the location data of the first and continue surveillance to guide the attack of six A-4Qs.

2. The mission briefing was conducted by the ship’s Operations Department, attended by the Tracker crew and officers of the Third Naval Air Attack Squadron, where all operational details were decided. One unexpected issue delayed the mission: lack of wind, an uncommon condition in those latitudes.

In simple terms, bomb tables determine the number and type of bombs required to hit a target. In this tactical scenario, four bombs per aircraft were necessary. The actual wind was nearly calm, so even at full speed, the ship could only generate enough wind over the flight deck to allow the launch of aircraft carrying just one bomb each.

Although the mission briefing was complete, it was decided to wait for stronger winds to enable a proper launch with full bomb load.

Analysing the British air and anti-air capabilities, it was assessed that of the six A-4Qs to be launched, four could reach the target and drop their bombs, and two could return to the carrier. Of sixteen bombs, about 25% (four) might hit a ship — enough to neutralise an aircraft carrier if struck.

Launching with only one bomb per aircraft would likely cause insignificant damage, while risking loss of life and half of the carrier’s embarked strike and interception force.

3. The Tracker launched at 0528 failed to locate the British fleet, which had turned east, moving away from the Argentine battle group. However, throughout that morning, Harriers repeatedly approached, attempting to pinpoint the Argentine fleet, triggering frequent combat alerts aboard Argentine ships.

It is important to note that the Argentine naval group remained under the constant threat of air attack. This required a pair of A-4Qs to remain on deck, ready to launch within five minutes as interceptors. Each combat alert saw the aircraft launched on time, and in at least one or two instances, a second reserve section was also launched.

During a combat lull, the carrier’s commander spoke with the co-pilot of the lead Tracker aircraft and shared his tactical assessment: both fleets had comparable anti-air and anti-ship missile capabilities. The number of Harriers was assumed to be similar to that of the A-4Qs, and the latter were believed capable of engaging them successfully. When he mentioned the submarine threat, however, he added, "better not to think about it."

Committing six A-4Qs to an attack mission would have reduced the carrier’s interception capacity to zero. The remaining pair of aircraft onboard was intended to support the attack — one in reserve, the other as a tanker for mid-air refuelling of returning aircraft if needed.

4. The delayed reconnaissance flight took off at 1435 hours and conducted a maximum-range mission. It picked up both radar and electronic contacts and landed at 1900 hours. Upon returning, the crew noticed a change in the crew’s expressions on board — the A.R.A. General Belgrano cruiser had been sunk. The submarine threat had now become a grim reality.

In the days and nights that followed, combat stations were manned continuously.

Had the attack on the British fleet been carried out on 2 May 1982, it might be remembered today as the Day of Naval Aviation. But that was not to be. However, just two days later, a section of Super Étendard aircraft, guided by a Neptune patrol plane, sank HMS Sheffield — a clear demonstration of Argentina’s determination to fight.

That day, marking the baptism of fire of Argentine Naval Aviation, was later commemorated as the “Day of Argentine Naval Aviation”.

The night of 1–2 May has remained etched in the memory of its participants as the so-called:
“Night of the Banzai.”

Text: by CL VGM (RE) Rafael L. Sgüeglia
Painting 🖼: Illustrative, by Carlos Adrian Garcia
@aviationart_argentina 🎨

The Well-Deserved Sinking of HMS Sheffield

Malvinas: The Night of the Owls

The “Owls” Flew at Night to Detect the British
Fleet

Prensa OHF

The extraordinary history of the Naval Air Antisubmarine Squadron

Obtained from a note made to the current Captain VGM Naval Aviator (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta . Exploration missions, little-known stories, but no less dangerous for that reason. Operating from the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA 25 DE MAYO first and then from continental bases, in marginal conditions, with slow aircraft, lacking defensive weapons and dangerously close to the enemy. History of the air-naval battle that could not be.

By: (*) Oscar Filippi – For: OHF Press

THE CATAPULT:

South Atlantic, May 1, 1982, aboard the aircraft carrier “ARA 25 DE MAYO” (PAL V-2) at 8:30 p.m., Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot ), along with Second Petty Officer Rodolfo Lencina and First Corporal Néstor Conde, walk on the deck of the aircraft carrier towards their “bird”, an S-2E TRACKER, registration (2-AS-26). The mission of this flight is to confirm the position of the British Task Force located NE (Northeast) of Malvinas by the two previous exploration flights (2-AS-23 and 2-AS-24) aircraft also belonging to the Naval Air Squadron. Anti-submarine, which because of its shield (an owl in flight throwing balls at a submarine) is known and respected as “THE OWLS”.

            It was the last flight of that long and tense day, everything was activity on the deck, the crew carried out the visual inspection of the device in the middle of the cold and wind characteristic of that area of the Argentine Sea. Located in their respective seats, the naval pilots prepare to start the twin-engine that will take them to “sweep” the surface of the sea. A characteristic flight of anti-surface exploration and MAE, but this time, on a war mission.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker on the ARA «25 de Mayo» catapult.

“… – TOCO (control tower) , this is DOS ALFA SIERRA DOS SAIS, authorization to launch.”

“… – TWO SAIS, authorized.”

            Quickly, the two engines are running, the systems are thoroughly verified and especially the navigation system on which the accuracy of the information obtained about the enemy will depend. The “radar alert” system is verified, a spectrum analyzer and a “laboratory” oscilloscope that, with Argentine ingenuity and the help of the Technicians of the Aeronaval Arsenal No. 2, had been recently adapted and was the only “survival” element. that would allow them to receive emissions from English radars, letting them know if they were detected.

Shield of the Naval Antisubmarine Squadron of the Argentine Navy.

“…– TOCO, this is TWO SAIS, ready to catapult.”

“…– TWO SAIS, authorized to catapult.”

The rolling of the aircraft carrier is permanent, it is already facing the wind. With the wings spread and the engine test complete, the TRACKER begins taxiing, carefully the legs gently press the wheelhouse, stick behind, nose lightened. They precisely align with the axis of the catapult.

            The mechanical chocks in front of the main landing gear wheels are raised, the throttles are reduced and a group of six men jumps on the plane to check various elements. They secure the plane to the deck of the aircraft carrier (tail hold) using a fuse that is cut by giving steam pressure to the catapult.

Captain VGM (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta, as president of the Aeronaval Institute.

            With everything secured, the mechanical chocks are lowered. Full throttle (full throttle) on both engines. Everything trembles and shakes, the control systems and instruments are verified and checked, with everything in order, by signs, they give the OK to the deck officer. The crew tenses in their seats, the momentum of the catapult will immediately put them into flight.

            The two R-1820-82C radial engines roar and the plane shakes even more, still clinging to the deck..., the tail fuse is cut and the takeoff run begins, approximately 30 meters that are covered in just over a second, obtained The takeoff speed of the TRACKER is dependent on the 3,050 HP of its two “fans”. It was exactly 9:00 p.m. of that historic May 1st.

IN FLIGHT:  

The reference of this story is the current Captain AN (RE) Daniel MARINSALTA, co-pilot in this mission that he tells us aboard the TRACKER registration 2-AS-26. An “OWL” from the NAVAL AIR flying in its element, at night and over the sea.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft aft of the ARA «25 de Mayo» aircraft carrier along with the A-4Q «Skyhawk» aircraft of the Third Naval Air Fighter and Attack Squadron (EA33).

            “…– Already in flight heading east, we headed towards the last verified point of presence of the enemy naval units, the tactic used was simple and dangerous. Flying low, in the middle of the dark night and over an even blacker sea. We rose and turned on the search radar, just two turns of the antenna, thus trying to prevent the British ships from picking up our broadcast. The first two times it swam, we watched the screen and stuck to the water again. We continue firmly towards the East (E), the third time was the charm. Around 11:00 p.m. we ascended, two turns of the antenna and obtained a large contact and three medium ones at latitude 50º00'(S), longitude 56º25'(W), simultaneously obtaining a MAE signal, distance to the contact, only 38 nautical miles ( NM), about 68.4 kilometers. A chill ran through all of us, we knew that they had detected us, we dived back into the water, at ground level we began to carry out evasive maneuvers. The pilot was flying instruments and I was looking out, the water was splashing on the windshield, that's how low we were flying. The silence was total, like the adrenaline in our bodies.”

         “… – We stayed like this for about fifteen minutes, thinking that we had evaded, we rose to 1,500 feet (ft) about 450 meters, we turned on the radar in search of our fleet, the radio silence had to be absolute, we had to find the aircraft carrier and deliver vital information. We detected the presence of a large fleet of Russian and Polish fishing vessels, then our radar screen began to receive interference (cart wheel), we could no longer do radar search and our fleet continued on its course. We decided to contact the “Air Controller” of the aircraft carrier. Twice and nothing, on the third attempt the “Air Controller” only limited himself to saying: …”

British Aerospace Sea Harrier FRS.1 aircraft like the one that chased the Grumman S-2E Tracker 2-AS-26.

“… – You have two Lobos (enemy aircraft) on the tail, continue heading west (W)”. Again we pointed the nose of the TRACKER at the water and we stuck level again.”

“… – Obviously, the British Task Force had intercepted our radar emission and decided to investigate, they had sent a section (2 planes) of “SEA HARRIER” that, under the command of Captain Mórtimer, took off from the aircraft carrier “HMS INVINCIBLE” shortly after the midnight from May 1st to May 2nd.”

            “The two “SEA HARRIER” were approaching us at 450 knots (Kts), about 810 kilometers per hour, we could barely get away at 135 Kts, about 243 kilometers per hour. Fortunately, the “Wolves” were emitting on a radar frequency very close to ours and we both suffered the same interference. We change the radio frequency to listen to our fleet's communications. The anti-aircraft radar of the Destroyer (D-2) “ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD” had detected and “illuminated” the two “Wolves”, consequently on our radio we heard that the Destroyer requested “Free Birds” (authorization to launch the SEA anti-aircraft missiles). DART). Praying that they wouldn't get the wrong white, we stuck even closer to the water, everything outside appeared even blacker."

The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456.

            “But Captain Mortimer, seeing himself illuminated and knowing that it came from Radar 909 of the Type 42 destroyers, did not risk entering within shooting range and put his “wings on the ground.” “We could return to the aircraft carrier, but the English had also detected us.”

            The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456. Our respect goes to a fallen warrior. (N of R).

THE HOOK:

Captain Marinsalta continues : “We had been flying for some time with both low fuel lights on, under the stress of a prolonged night flight and in contact with the enemy, we were facing the last challenge of this long day, the final of Attachment to the aircraft carrier, it was 01:10 am. from May 2nd. We could not fail, we had to deliver the precious information.”

            “We had fewer visual references, the deck lights were minimized, communications had to be minimal, already on the final approach, we made a brief flash with the landing beacon to indicate to the aircraft carrier's “signalman” that we had the reference in sight. visual, “ball” at the center of the mirror (light that materializes the slope of approach to the deck).

Returning to the aircraft carrier ARA «25 de Mayo».

“Gear down… flaps down… hook down…, everything down and locked. Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía flew with absolute precision the 18 seconds that took us to see the line of green lights that indicate, reduce the accelerators to minimum to hook into one of the four arresting cables on the deck. The pressure of the safety harnesses on the torso, the helmet that seems to push on the back of our neck, everything indicates that... WE ARE HOOKED! We were back home. When we checked the tanks, the remaining fuel was not enough for another approach attempt.”

Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot on the right), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot on the left)

WINDLESS DAWN: Captain Marinsalta ends his story: “Unfortunately, at dawn, when the six A-4Q SKYHAWK aircraft of the 3rd. Naval Air Hunting and Attack Squadron were loaded with three 500 lb bombs. (250 Kg.) each, ready to launch on the British fleet, unusually for the time, the absence of wind was total. The enemy fleet was less than 150 NM (270 km), but the wind component (sum of the relative wind speeds and the aircraft carrier's navigation speed) was not enough to make the launch safe with a full war load. The attack was given up, as were the British. The air-naval battle that perhaps would have changed the course of events in the conflict could not take place.”

            It should be noted that the Naval Aviation during the conflict, totaled 1,000 hours of exploration flight of the Argentine Sea in search of the enemy, making contact on 180 occasions, allowing the subsequent action of the attack aircraft and in others certifying their absence and facilitating security. of flights and logistics navigation. No aircraft were lost on these missions.

            Regarding the Aeronaval Antisubmarine Squadron “LOS BUHOS” , during the conflict it was made up of 79 men, of which 18 were pilots and only 12 system operators. There were four “S-2E TRACKER” aircraft embarked on the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA “25 DE MAYO” , 2-AS-22, 23, 24 and 26, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Héctor SKARE.

Malvinas: Sea Skua hit but not sunk the ARA Sobral

… And they couldn't sink it

by Rubén Durán

The May 3 marks the 30th anniversary of the attack by Royal Navy ships against a small Argentine ship, which despite having been hit by devastating missiles and having lost its commander, was able to stay afloat and sail back to the continent, in against all odds.

The ARA Aviso “Alférez Sobral” is a small ship destined for support missions for the fleet of the Argentine Navy that during the beginning of the Malvinas War was in the area of operations carrying out patrol, rescue and salvage missions in the northwest of the archipelago.

In that area he was surprised by the start of hostilities on May 1, 1982, when British aviation and navy attacked the Argentine troops stationed in Puerto Argentino and provoked the reaction of the Argentine Air Force (FAA), which launched several raids. against the enemy, some of them successful, but at the cost of several losses.

One such casualty was a Canberra MK 62 bomber which was shot down by the Royal Navy's Se Harriers and whose crew were seen ejecting from their burning aircraft over the British Exclusion Zone.

Assuming that these aviators were alive in the middle of the icy waters of the Atlantic, the alert “Alférez Sobral” received the order to go to the area of the fall to attempt a rescue.

In command of that unit was Lieutenant Commander Daniel Gómez Roca, a 39-year-old man from Salta who immediately headed towards the indicated sector, despite knowing that part or the bulk of the Task Force dispatched by London to invade the Malvinas again.

The chances of survival of the ship were not the best, since it was a ship built in 1944, armed with a 40 mm cannon and two 20 mm cannons and without the necessary electronics to face a combat with any naval or air unit. modern.

The ARA Alférez Sobral arrived in the assigned area only on the night of May 2, when it was already known what happened to the ARA cruiser General Belgrano, another venerable memory of World War II that served under the Argentine flag.

Although they sensed that they could be close to the British fleet, Gómez Roca and his crew were unaware that the radar of the destroyer HMS Coventry had already detected them and had given the alert to the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, flagship of the Task Force, which dispatched a helicopter. Sea King transport to verify the presence of the intruder.

In the middle of the southern darkness, the Sobral crew heard the approach of the aircraft and Gómez Roca immediately ordered everyone to take their combat positions, while he arranged the change of course to leave the danger zone.

The Sea King did not represent a serious threat to the Argentine ship, but its reconnaissance flyover anticipated an armed reaction from the English.

Indeed, a pair of Sea Linx attack helicopters, armed with the still experimental Sea Skua missiles, left the destroyers HMS Coventry and Glasgow to hunt down the Sobral.

Sea Linx HAS.2 helicopter with Sea Skua missile. Malvinas 1982 (Imperial War Museum)

On board the Argentine warning, each and every one of its crew members were at their posts, waiting for the enemy's next step. Unfortunately, the absence of a modern detection system forced them to take on combat almost blindly.

The first blow came around 2 in the morning, when lights similar to flares were seen on the starboard side: they were the first Sea Skua that the Royal Navy had fired in combat.

One of the projectiles hit one of the rescue boats, destroying it and projecting a shower of shrapnel that injured part of the crew and damaged the ship's communications system. Another missile passed a few meters from the bridge, causing the person in charge of one of the 20 mm cannons to fire at it, believing that it was an airplane.

In the brief moment of calm that ensued, Gómez Roca ordered his second, Lieutenant Sergio Bazán, to go down to the radio station to report on the attack, while he arranged the reversal of course to stabilize the ship and offer a better firing range for your few weapons.

Lieutenant Commander Sergio Gómez Roca and Navy Captain Sergio Bazán, commander and second officer, respectively, of the ARA Sobral.

The maneuver and the prevailing waves in the area confused the English radars, which saw the ship disappear from their screens, so they assumed that it had been sunk. However, the helicopters remained in the area, due to the possible presence of another ship.
The Sea Linx sensors detected the Sobral again a few minutes later and opened fire again.

It is not known if Commander Gómez Roca or any of those who were on the bridge could see the approach of the missile, that is information that they took with them to eternity.

A violent explosion shook the warning and destroyed the entire bridge, causing the instant death of the captain and seven other crew members. Bazán was saved because the doctor had stopped him on the way to check the wound suffered during the first attack.

In this way, Lieutenant Commander Sergio Gómez Roca became the first Argentine commander of the Navy to die in combat.

The radio room had also been affected by the impact of the Sea Skua, and only one survivor, Corporal Enríquez, who was seriously injured, could be rescued.

Objective: Save the ship and return home

Bazán managed to climb to the bridge and discovered a devastating image:

"There was no one. Everything was destroyed. In one sector I saw fire, only fire. Then I realized that everyone in that place was dead.”

  The deaths were not the ship's only problem, since it had been left without steering and the fire generated by the fire threatened to spread throughout the superstructure.

There was no time to cry for the fallen, Bazán assumed command of that floating wreckage and the damage control teams engaged in a tough fight against the flames, while the engineering staff managed to precariously reestablish a system of government.

Once the fire seemed to be controlled, a new problem arose: The explosion had destroyed all the navigation instruments, so vital for orienting oneself on the high seas and so necessary to return to the continent.

The survivors had to manage to solve this problem by resorting to basic seamanship knowledge, taking into account the direction of the waves, which before the second attack came from the north. To calculate the speed, the machinists relied on the turns made by the propeller shaft.

Precisely towards the north the Sobral headed with its 52 living crew members, who awaited the arrival of the final blow of the British that never came. After sailing for a day on that course, Bazán ordered a detour to the west, towards the continent.

From among the remains of the bridge, the magnetic compass rose could be rescued, inexplicably intact, which was placed on the bow between the two anchor chains and which, together with two marine infantry compasses, became the improvised instrument that would guide them. to his destiny.

At that difficult time and in the midst of constant outbreaks of fires on board, Lieutenant Juan Carlos Casal and three crew members requested permission to raise the war flag. As the mainmast had been knocked down by the attack, the sailors hoisted it on the boom and formed in front of it, paying honor to the fallen and the national insignia, in a gesture that many assumed was an act of farewell.

The Air Force to the rescue

In this way, the ship began to approach continental Argentina, without knowing that a search and rescue operation had been organized from there that involved Navy and Air Force aircraft, as well as civilian vessels.

On May 4, Air Force First Lieutenant Miguel Lucero, at the controls of a Bell 212 helicopter, left a base in Comodoro Rivadavia to participate in the search for the ARA Alférez Sobral notice, who had been declared missing. by the Navy, believing that it only had flaws in its communication system.

Fixed-wing planes, with greater autonomy than helicopters, extended their exploration area in search of Sobral, but with negative results, due to adverse weather conditions. For this reason they were ordered to return to base.

Meanwhile, on board the wounded notice things did not seem to be going better, as doubts began to arise about the accuracy of the navigation, fearing that the ship was in a position very different from the calculated one. To make matters worse, new fires broke out among the ruins of the bridge, forcing the exhausted crew to continue fighting so that the flames do not end up devastating the fragile vessel.

On May 5, Lucero and his team took off from Puerto Deseado at 08:30 in the morning and headed south. After an hour they crossed paths with the Argentine Navy ship Cabo San Antonio and some fishing boats.

Another Air Force aircraft, a Fokker F-27, had detected a vessel that was not responding to radio messages, so it communicated the news to the continent.

Lucero's helicopter headed towards the place indicated by the F-27, which was about an hour and a half away. After that time, the aviator was able to see through the haze a small point lost in the sea that was drifting.

It was around noon when the tired eyes of the Sobral survivors saw a helicopter appear in the distance approaching them.

Two flares were immediately sent out and were spotted by Lucero, who accelerated in the direction of the ship.

The ARA Alférez Sobral seen from the air (Revista Gente Nº 878)

As the helicopter approached, its crew members could see the destroyed upper deck of the warning, and they only became aware of what had happened.

“From above I could see the joy of the crew. They began to flutter the blankets, greet us and hug each other,” recalled auxiliary non-commissioned officer Horacio Raúl Deseta, an FAA pararescue jumper who participated in that encounter.

Deseta was precisely the first to descend on the Sobral, suspended from the crane cable of the helicopter that remained in hover at twelve or fifteen meters high.
The operation was not easy at all, since there were many cables and antennas scattered around the deck of the ship. Deseta motioned to his companions to deposit him in a small area above the stern.

When the rescuer was deposited in that place, the sailors approached to help him take off his harness and hug him with tears in their eyes. But there was no time to waste, Deseta asked Bazán about the wounded, and he pointed out that the most serious was First Corporal Enríquez, so he should be rescued first.

Air Force Assistant Warrant Officer Horacio Deseta (Revista Gente Nº 878)

The aeronautical non-commissioned officer asked the helicopter to send him a stretcher for evacuation, but another problem arose: strong gusts of wind hit the deck and made it impossible for the injured man to ascend. Using some ropes, Deseta improvised a lifting harness for the stretcher, where Enríquez had already been placed.

In this way he was able to be put on the helicopter, and then the same was done with two other injured people, all of whom were transferred to the Puerto Deseado hospital. Deseta would stay with the less seriously injured, the dead, and the rest of the Sobral's crew.

Later, the transfer of the injured and the bodies would be completed to the ARA Cabo San Antonio, a Navy tank landing ship that was in the area and that would also tow the Sobral to Puerto Deseado, where it would arrive during the afternoon of that day, with its entire crew formed on the deck and with the flag waving defiantly on its improvised mast.

The Malvinas War would not mean the end of the ARA Alférez Sobral's career, since it would be rebuilt at the Navy facilities in Puerto Belgrano and would return to serve in the South Atlantic. Later, in 2010, she would receive the Mar del Plata Naval Base station as her new destination.

El  ARA Alférez Sobral se despide de Ushuaia para dirigirse a Mar del Plata, en febrero de 2010 (Gaceta Marinera Digital)

Sources:

. Historia de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina- Tomo VI- Vol. 1- Dirección de Estudios Históricos- 1998.-

. La Guerra de las Malvinas- Versión Argentina- Ed. Fernández Reguera- 1987.

. La Batalla por las Malvinas- M. Hastings y S. Jenkins- Ed. Emecé Editores- 1984.

. Revista Gente Nº 878- 1982- Ed. Atlántida.

. Biografía del Capitán de Fragata Sergio Gómez Roca- Lic. Benicio Oscar Ahumada- Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales de la Armada Argentina.

. Gaceta Marinera Digital