Beagle Crisis: The Planned Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas (v1.5)

Assault on the Chilean Government Buildings

Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas

By Esteban McLaren



On 22 December 1978, known as D-Day, various military actions would have been initiated in a coordinated manner along the borders with Chile within the framework of Operation Soberanía (Sovereignty). It is very difficult to determine with certainty which of all the planned actions would have actually started the war, but it is clear that it would have been a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The main focus would have been the naval battle and the landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) would attempt to land part of its troops on the islands of Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by troops of the Chilean Marine Corps, CIM) and Picton, while other troops would seek to occupy the rest of the islands. This front will be the subject of future analysis. Synchronously, there would be a ground advance on the Southern front setting out from Río Gallegos (with a potential second line of advance from Rospentek Aike), with Punta Arenas as the final objective. The purpose of this article is to essay an alternative-history scenario. The war never happened, but how would it have unfolded if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation? That will be our point of divergence from real history. Let us appeal to rationality and foresight in an exercise that will always be incomplete and whose final outcome belongs to another space–time.

Start of the assault on Chilean positions on the border, with Mount Aymond in the background.

Context and development of the invasion

In the southern winter of 1978, tension between Argentina and Chile over the dispute regarding the Beagle Channel reached its peak. In the early hours of 21 December, Argentine troops stationed in Río Gallegos, Rospentek and other border locations received the order to begin the invasion of Chile. Since July, Chilean forces had been preparing for this confrontation, aware that diplomacy might not be enough to resolve the conflict.

The Argentine Forces

Argentina mobilised a formidable force, including the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade. The X Mechanised Infantry Brigade was deployed in Río Gallegos, ready to cross the border. All units would be reinforced as circumstances required.

In the air, A-4 Skyhawk, Mirage Dagger and Nesher fighter aircraft —as well as up to 14 F-86 Sabres (which had already violated Chilean airspace weeks earlier)— were ready to provide air support, while the Argentine Navy, with its destroyers and frigates, patrolled the nearby waters.

Argentine Forces:

• V Army Corps — General José Antonio Vaquero —. Assigned mission: Strategic offensive starting at 24:00 (H+2), departing from Santa Cruz, with the likely objective of conquering Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas. Thereafter, it would support Army Corps III in its advance through Puyehue towards Chile, cutting communications between the central zone and the south of Chilean territory.
• 1st Infantry Division (with elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade)
• X Mechanised Infantry Brigade (based in Río Gallegos)
• XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade
• Argentine National Gendarmerie: Border guard forces
• Air Force with A-4 Skyhawk, F-86-F Sabre and Mirage III fighter aircraft
• Naval Forces: IMARA together with the T-28 Fennec, with nearly 20 units stationed on the island of Tierra del Fuego.

Urban combat in the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, Punta Arenas

The Chilean Defence

In response, Chile positioned its III Army Division in Punta Arenas, reinforced by the 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros” and the 6th Army Division, with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade. The general in charge of the defence of the Magallanes region, General Nilo Floody Buxton, always stated that at this stage the border guards (Carabineros) would be his troops of choice. The Chilean Air Force, equipped with 12 A-37 Dragonfly aircraft and 6 Hawker Hunters, was on maximum alert, and the Chilean Navy, with its ships and submarine, was ready to intercept any Argentine naval advance.

Chilean Forces:

• III Army Division (based in Punta Arenas)

• 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros”

• 6th Army Division (with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade)

• Carabineros: Border guard who, on this front, had disproportionate importance due to their knowledge of the frontier. The general in charge of the defence of Punta Arenas always stressed their importance in the defence, but as any militarised police force they were not proper infantry, and their only “encounter” with Argentine forces had left them in a very poor position. See further below.

• Chilean Air Force with Hawker Hunter and A-37 combat aircraft (no confirmation of any of them)

• Naval Forces (CIM tasked with the islands of the channel)

The case of the Carabineros as soldiers

One issue that has rarely been discussed with the attention it deserves —and which seems to have obsessed only the author— is Chile’s decision to employ the Carabineros de Chile (CC) as an infantry force, or even as mechanised infantry, during the Beagle conflict. This decision is particularly striking if one considers the institutional nature of the Carabineros: by their own definition, they are a national police force with functions of internal security and border control, making them a hybrid institution but essentially police. Their role is equivalent, in the Argentine case, to a combination of three forces: the Federal Police, the provincial police forces, and the Argentine National Gendarmerie (GNA), the latter indeed being a militarised security force with responsibility in border areas. Within this framework, any reasonable comparison between the CC and armed or military forces should carry strong conceptual reservations.

During the escalation of the Beagle Channel conflict, responsibility for the defence of the Magallanes Region —whose capital is Punta Arenas— fell to General Ernesto Floody Buxton. A singular figure, of British descent, fair-skinned and with manners that his supporters considered charismatic, Floody stood out for public statements as controversial as they were unfortunate, both in content and in form. It is surprising that an officer of his rank repeatedly declared in Chilean media that, if necessary, he would face a potential armed conflict exclusively with “troops” of the Carabineros. This assertion, far from anecdotal, has been corroborated by multiple testimonies and documentary records.

The underlying problem lies in the military planning implicit in this decision. From positions such as Monte Aymond, on the border, the deployment of Argentine armoured means was evident, suggesting that, in the event of hostilities, Argentina would opt for a high-intensity mechanised offensive. In this context arises a legitimate and deeply troubling question: did General Floody really expect to contain an armoured advance with police personnel lacking training in conventional war doctrine, or in combat as light or mechanised infantry?

The most basic military logic questions this disposition. What previous experience did the Carabineros have in high-intensity engagements? What tactical logic supported this choice? It is not only difficult to imagine an Argentine military plan that, for example, placed the GNA in the first line of an assault on Punta Arenas, but even in a counter-offensive situation it would be highly improbable to delegate to a militarised police force the containment of enemy troops.

And yet, that seems to have been exactly the Chilean approach. The official justifications referred to the use of the Carabineros as rearguard elements —for tasks such as control of prisoners of war and surveillance of civilian areas— but the empirical evidence contradicts that explanation. Carabineros were transported on LAN Chile night flights to Magallanes, with the aim of not alerting Argentine intelligence, and were deployed directly on the front line. Although they had received only a few weeks of training at the infantry school, their additional preparation was no more than that. Contemporary photographs and accounts place them armed with anti-tank rocket launchers in Cabeza de Mar, and other records document their transfer from Chabunco to Porvenir, in the heart of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego —all positions within the immediate theatre of operations.

This deployment not only contradicts the official version but also exposes an alarming lack of strategic judgement. Far from being an extraordinary resource in the face of a logistical or tactical emergency, the use of the CC as a military vanguard reflects serious doctrinal disorganisation and, ultimately, an anachronistic view of modern warfare on the part of the Chilean high command. The defence of the country’s southernmost region was left in the hands of a force inadequate for the type of combat that was taking shape. If one also considers that the very same Carabineros had surrendered almost without resistance in the Lago del Desierto incident years earlier, the decision is not only questionable but openly irresponsible. It is true that in war one goes with what one has, but was there really no other ECh infantry available to employ in their place?

Invasion Routes

The Argentine forces planned their advance towards Punta Arenas using two main routes. The northern route, departing from Río Gallegos, crossed the border through Monte Aymond, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas. This road, although relatively flat, presented natural challenges such as rivers and hills that could slow the advance.

The alternative route, departing from Rospentek, crossed the border following Route CH-40 and then headed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas. This road was more difficult, with mountainous and wooded terrain that would complicate the advance of the armoured formations.

1. Main Northern Route:

• Starting point: Río Gallegos

• Main points: Advance through the Monte Aymond border crossing, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas.

• Characteristics: Relatively flat terrain but with possible natural obstacles such as rivers and hills.

• Open ground in many sections for an armoured battle and for the deployment of forces in line, wedge, or V formation.

2. Alternative Western Route:

• Starting point: Rospentek

• Main points: Border crossing via Route CH-40, then proceed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas.

• Initial objective: Would begin with the capture and securing of Puerto Natales, a concentration point for Chilean forces.

• Characteristics: Mountainous and wooded terrain, more difficult for the advance of large armoured formations. Suitable ground for ambushes.

• Engineering considerations: Bridges along the route would be destroyed (for example, Puente Rubens, Río Pendiente), necessitating engineer units.

• Suitability for armour: Poorly suited to broad armoured formations (only columns or diamond formations feasible).

These are the troops of the Chilean 5th Cavalry Regiment “Lanceros” [Lancers] deployed to defend Puerto Natales. They were going to face an Argentine armoured advance with horse-mounted cavalry, Polish style. No joke.

Chilean population in Argentine Patagonia

In his chronicle Cuando el río no era turbio (“When the river was not murky”), Ramón Arriagada recounts the close relationship between Chilean workers, mainly chilotes, and the Río Turbio coalfield in Argentina during the 1950s to 1970s. According to the 1970 census, Puerto Natales had 13,675 inhabitants, of whom 2,800 worked in the mine. By 1976, around 600 Chilean miners were commuting in shifts, using Natales as a dormitory town due to the lack of housing in Río Turbio.

Arriagada cites the writer Nicasio Tangol, who emphasised that the chilotes were fundamental in shaping Patagonia. In 1961, the newspaper El Austral reported that the mine produced 500 tonnes per day and employed 1,200 miners, mostly Chilean–chilotes. In addition, about 1,800 workers were employed on the surface, 80% of them Chileans as well. Another 600 Chileans worked on the construction of the 270-kilometre railway between Río Turbio and Río Gallegos, and by 1951 there were already 1,200 miners working in the coalfield.

The author highlights how migration from Chiloé to Patagonia increased, especially after the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, and how the 1978 border conflict between Chile and Argentina marked a change, when Chilean miners were replaced by workers from northern Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay.

In his chronicle Sueños de Carbón (“Dreams of Coal”), Arriagada addresses the 2004 mining accident, which left 14 dead, and how retired miners from Natales who had worked in Río Turbio survive on miserable pensions and must cross the border to receive medical care, since they have no access to social security in Chile, making them outcasts in their own country. (El Tirapiedras)

From these population movements, entirely under the sovereign authority of the Argentine Republic, Chilean General Floody would complain, associating them with an act of war. No joke.

Following with the story, both routes converge at Laguna Cabeza de Mar where, if two coordinated invasion forces were to set out, they could regroup and continue on to Punta Arenas. The road to Punta Arenas via CH-9 is a coastal route highly vulnerable to air attacks and ambushes or hit-and-run strikes. The route leads the force to the core of Chilean regional military power: the Chabunco air base and, opposite it, the headquarters of the III Army Division.

Chilean defensive lines

Chile would have adopted a defence-in-depth strategy, as declared by the general in charge of the Army Division (Southern Theatre of Operations). The first line of defence could already have been sited at Monte Aymond and its surroundings, right on the frontier. That line was, from the few photographs gathered, a jumble of foxholes and trenches, with poorly equipped soldiers — undoubtedly cannon fodder to wear down the advance.

When a penetration of this kind occurs, the theory of war leads us to think of three phases for the force facing it:

1. Containment: Hold the penetration in place — that is, stop it or slow it so it cannot continue to advance.
2. Flanking: Begin moving forces to the flanks of the penetration, basically to the sectors close to where the breach began. This is done to operate on those flanks simultaneously and “strangle” the penetration by cutting the enemy’s communications with its rear.
3. Annihilation: The detailed destruction of the encircled troops (death or capture).

Here, Chilean troops would have built forward positions to slow the enemy’s advance. Anti-tank guns and conventional field artillery — not in great quantity or variety — are visible in photographs and documentaries. Probably the best trans-Andean weaponry in this phase was the deployment of anti-tank mines. A second line of defence would be at San Gregorio, with fortifications, minefields and trenches ready to resist an assault. From there to the regional capital, various points could be fortified. The final defence is concentrated around Punta Arenas, where troops, long-range artillery and the best anti-tank defences are assembled.

See below the “Maginot line” that Chilean strategists had developed: simple trenches and foxholes. The soldier in the front line is using an old bolt-action Mauser 1909 rifle from the First World War.

Photo of a “foxhole” with a Chilean infantryman armed with a bolt-action Mauser rifle near Monte Aymond

The Chilean defence-in-depth would probably have included:

• First line of defence: Forward positions at Monte Aymond and surrounding areas.
• Second line of defence: Fortifications and trenches around San Gregorio along Route CH-40, and ambushes from wooded areas between Laguna Arauco and Primavera. Trenches at Laguna Cabeza de Mar (Arancia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano, 2017:164). All bridges were fitted with explosive charges, cavalry units armed with anti-tank rockets were sent forward, and night firing zones were prepared and properly “staked out” and painted to avoid confusion (AC&BS, 2017:141).
• Final defence: Fortifications and troops concentrated near Punta Arenas, including long-range artillery and anti-tank defences (few and outdated in the ECh inventory of that period). Many civilians actively collaborated in the mobilisation. Much of the vehicles and heavy machinery used in the construction of trenches, shelters, watch posts and anti-tank ditches was provided by local businessmen. In turn, ranch owners made available sheds to house troops and store equipment and supplies (AC&BS, 2017:114).

It should be noted that this scenario contained several factors that emerged over time. For example, Chilean forces lacked anti-tank mines and ammunition was scarce. The soldiers in the first line of defence were placed as cannon fodder, with only 80 cartridges per weapon and no resupply. Many — perhaps too many — indicators showed that Chile was very, very poorly prepared for war.

The stalemate of the advance

The Argentine advance faced its first major test at San Gregorio, where Chilean defences would be well prepared and the terrain favoured the defenders. Here, the advance would slow considerably, turning into a battle of attrition. The apparently most fortified area was the road in the lagoon zone of Cabeza de Mar.

From Rospentek, the troops would have to overcome harassment attacks and construct bridges over river crossings where the bridges had been destroyed. Once joined with the forces coming from Río Gallegos, they would need to regroup and assess the damage and the reorganisation of the advance.

There is a key issue to bear in mind throughout this entire campaign: Argentine air superiority. The only Chilean air base in the Area of Operations was Chabunco, in Punta Arenas. That air base was to be attacked by the Argentine Air Force in the early hours of the advance, and finished off later that same afternoon by the Naval Aviation Command. Any resistance put up by Chilean ground forces would then have to endure continued aerial harassment.

How many examples are there of ground defences being immune to simultaneous air and land attacks? Imagine a pocket of Chilean resistance — perhaps an artillery battery hidden in a ravine, or machine-gun nests strategically positioned along the route of advance. The Argentine military commander would simply need to pass the coordinates to Río Gallegos, to the dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, or to the naval air base at Río Grande, so that aircraft from both air branches could deliver machine-gun fire, bombs or rockets to dismantle the defence.

These same options were not available to the Chilean commander.

Armored Regiment No. 5 "Punta Arenas", deployed in 1978 in the Magallanes region. The Scorpion Detachment advances, in M-41 tanks and M-113 armoured personnel carriers.

Countering the Chilean defence

To overcome this obstacle, Argentina could deploy the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade to penetrate and disrupt the initial defences. Argentine artillery would bombard the Chilean positions, while airborne units and the air force would carry out flanking manoeuvres and provide crucial air support.

 

• The XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade must penetrate and disorganise the initial defences.
• Artillery forces to bombard defensive positions.
• Airborne units and Air Force for flanking and air support.
• The Chabunco air base would have to be put out of action for the advance to succeed.

Trans-Andean soldiers firing the service SIG rifle

Airborne assault on Punta Arenas

In the context of this conflict, Argentine forces planned a bold airborne assault on Punta Arenas. Accounts from veterans of this crisis, particularly from the 14th Parachute Infantry Regiment based in Córdoba, indicate that an airborne assault was being planned to capture the city of Punta Arenas. For this purpose, BAM Río Gallegos was already hosting DC-3 and C-130 transport aircraft ready for the operation.

The main objectives of this assault included seizing Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport, thereby securing a vital bridgehead for the continuous flow of troops and supplies. It would also focus on destroying Chilean command and control facilities to disrupt their defences, and on capturing the port and key logistical installations, thus cutting off enemy supplies and reinforcements.

This could be achieved following a surprise Air Base Attack (ABA) carried out by the Argentine Air Force using A-4 Skyhawks and BAC Canberras at H+2 of the invasion.

Main objectives:

• Capture Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport to secure a bridgehead and allow the continuous flow of troops and supplies.
• Destroy command-and-control facilities to disorganise Chilean forces.
• Seize the port and principal logistical installations to cut supplies and reinforcements.

Entry into Punta Arenas

Argentine armour and mechanised infantry would move rapidly along Route 9, advancing with lethal precision. Armoured vehicles would adopt line formations to maximise frontal firepower, while infantry units would follow closely, ready to disembark and secure the streets. A secondary column would advance along road Y-505, flanking the Chilean defences and dividing their attention.

Objectives in the city

The Port of Punta Arenas was one of the principal objectives. By the time of the ground assault the actual condition of the airport would need to be assessed, since it would probably already have been put out of action by an initial air attack by the Argentine Air Force (case analysed in this link). Controlling the port would allow Argentine forces to secure a vital supply line and receive maritime reinforcements. Specialised commandos and mechanised infantry units would be deployed to seize the docks and port facilities, facing fierce Chilean resistance.

The Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport and its annex, the Chabunco air base, would also be crucial. Controlling the airport would guarantee an airhead, allowing the continuous transport of troops and supplies. Argentine airborne and rapid-assault units, already familiar with the terrain from their operations at Chabunco, would be launched in a swift offensive to secure the runways and neutralise any resistance. There would be a high probability of runways and facilities being blown up to deny their use to the attackers. It was entirely to be expected that, before falling into the hands of Argentine troops, the locals would demolish all installations crucial to their operation.

Government and communications buildings will be equally strategic. Battle-hardened Argentine forces will infiltrate the city center to capture the Magallanes Intendancy and the police headquarters, seeking to disrupt Chilean defenses and establish administrative control. These will undoubtedly be the most savage scenes imaginable throughout the campaign, due to the very nature of urban combat.

The capture of Punta Arenas

Urban resistance

As Argentine troops pushed into Punta Arenas, they would encounter tenacious resistance at several key points. The Civic Centre area, with its government and commercial buildings, would undoubtedly become a battlefield. Chilean troops, entrenched inside buildings, would mount an organised defence, slowing the Argentine advance.

In the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, a dense residential area of mostly wooden houses, Chilean forces would adopt urban guerrilla tactics. Ambushes, snipers and improvised barricades turned every street and every house into a point of resistance. Fighting intensified, with Argentine troops battling house by house to clear the area. It would also prove an area very easy to destroy with fire, given the predominance of wood in its construction.

The industrial zone north of the city could also be a focus of resistance. Chilean defenses, using industrial equipment and heavy vehicles as barricades, would turn factories and warehouses into makeshift fortifications. Argentine troops should consider deploying specialized assault units to overcome these defenses.


Trans-Andean soldiers armed with SIG rifles parading

Argentine Strategies

To counter Chilean resistance, Argentine forces deployed a combination of tactics and resources. The use of artillery and air support would be crucial to weaken defenses before the ground assault. Precise bombing raids disrupted Chilean lines, facilitating the advance of ground units.


Paratroopers from the Leopardo Company of the 2nd "General Balcarce" Airborne Infantry Regiment, Argentine Army, Ushuaia, November 1978

Commando operations (the newly created Halcón 8 special team) and paratroopers would play a pivotal role. Elite units infiltrated the city to neutralize strategic points, capturing key objectives quickly and with the fewest casualties possible. These commandos would carry out surgical strikes against Chilean defenses, facilitating the advance of the main forces.

Urban warfare would become the main focus. Mechanized patrols, assault teams, and specialized urban combat units would systematically advance, facing fierce resistance but managing to secure key areas. Coordination and communication would be essential to maintain the momentum of the advance.

Population Control and Stabilization

Finally, to maintain control of the city and prevent acts of sabotage, Argentine forces would establish checkpoints and conduct regular patrols. The constant presence of troops would help stabilize the situation and ensure that the city remained under Argentine control after the capture of the main objectives. Acts of guerrilla warfare and resistance would be expected throughout the period.

The Fall

The capture of Punta Arenas would be a complex and bloody operation, testing the capabilities and determination of the Argentine forces. Their numerical and material superiority would give them a significant advantage, but the Chilean resistance, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and well-prepared defenses, would turn each advance into a fierce struggle. The city would eventually fall, but at a significant human cost to both sides.

 

Probability analysis of success

Argentina’s numerical and material superiority is evident: a ratio of 5:1 in armour, 4:1 in aircraft and 3:1 in infantry. These advantages, together with strategic planning and tactical execution, suggest a high probability of success for Argentina in the capture of Punta Arenas. However, Chile’s preparation and defensive strategy, making use of knowledge of the terrain and defence in depth, also held possibilities of success.

Probability of success for Argentina: 70%
Probability of success for Chile: 40%

Argentina:

• Probability of success: High, due to numerical and material superiority (armour, aircraft and infantry), although it would face significant difficulties in terrain and well-prepared defences.

• Estimated success: 70%

Chile:

• Probability of success: Moderate, considering defence in depth and knowledge of the terrain, although outnumbered and out-equipped.

• Estimated success: 40%

Tanks entering 18 de Septiembre slum

Estimated casualties

Casualties in this conflict would be significant for both sides, reflecting the intensity of the fighting and the well-prepared defences.

• Estimated Argentine casualties: minimum of 15,000–20,000 (including dead, wounded and prisoners)

• Estimated Chilean casualties: minimum of 15,000–40,000 (including dead, wounded, prisoners and civilians depending on their degree of involvement)

These estimates underline the human cost of a conflict which, although hypothetical, reflects the gravity of a military escalation between two neighbouring nations.

Summary

An armoured campaign by the Argentine Army against Chilean forces in the Magallanes region would have been a bloody affair under any consideration. The possibility of success existed, but it was by no means guaranteed. With time and when comparing opposing analyses from each side, it becomes clear that, from the Chilean perspective, many potential Argentine attacks would have been completely surprising and even innovative, despite being drawn straight from doctrinal manuals since the Second World War. The Chilean defensive scheme was classical — one could even say out of yellowed pages of defensive tactics books. A layered tactical and static defence, but with a severe shortage of resources, making them like bricks without mortar. And here I refer to the very comments of the mining explosives producer turned arms magnate in exile, Mr Cardoen. In an interview for a state television programme across the Andes, he himself remarked that the armed forces had requested his services to produce anti-tank mines since the Chilean Army had none at all in its inventory. In other words, the defence of Magallanes was not going to be flooded with AT mines — far from it — perhaps one of the key elements to slow an armoured advance. Not my words, I repeat. Without that, Mr Floody’s defence looks like a giant scarecrow.

On the other hand, it is essential to point out the alarming overestimation that the organiser of the defence, the aforementioned Mr Floody Buxton, gave to the Carabineros. This is, indisputably, a civilian border police force, and under no circumstances should it be considered a combat force. It is possible that this man intended to make use of their vast knowledge as baqueanos of the region or through intelligence with infiltrated farmhands, but did this officer of British descent really think he could successfully face an armoured or airborne assault with Carabineros? Did Floody truly believe he could entrust his life and the defence of Punta Arenas to a militarised police force without any wartime record? Worse still, their only “combat record” had been invading Argentine territory at Lago del Desierto. There, a Carabineros patrol stationed itself for several days with SIG rifles, entrenched in a shed turned checkpoint, defending the position. No need to invoke La Concepción or Prat: at the first burst from the gendarmes, which killed one Chilean soldier, all the Carabineros surrendered. All of them. Was that the force upon which this “majestic” general pinned his hopes? By any analysis, both in terms of function and of record, Floody was completely mistaken.

Finally, and the final blow, Chile lacked air superiority. What would the Chilean infantry or cavalry, even entrenched in a well-planned defensive position, have done when 450- or 500-kilogram bombs fell on their position with impunity? Historical evidence shows that troops in defensive positions have managed to survive air or artillery attacks (Monte Cassino, Stalingrad, among others). However, it is obvious that this is not the side of the battlefield the troops wished to be on, and there is also further evidence that defensive positions have been dismantled by overwhelming air attacks that disarmed and demoralized the resistance.

All analyses lead to an inexorable Chilean defeat in which, at best, a stalemate might have been achieved within current Chilean territory. The damage to local infrastructure would have been in the billions, and human casualties in the tens of thousands. A scenario, in every respect, lamentable. This fear instilled in the Chilean armed forces, together with the Malvinas event in 1982, would shape that country’s entire defence policy up to the present day.

Citations

Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Francisco Bulnes Serrano. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas. Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017. ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0

Nahuel DL-43 - When Argentina Made Their Own Better M4 Sherman

Argentine Army: The beginnings of mechanization (1/2)

Half a century ago

Memories of the beginning of mechanization

By Tcnl. José Javier de la Cuesta Ávila. (Chief of the 2nd Section of the Medium Tank Company “Nahuel DL 43 – School of Mechanized Troops – Year 1947)

Part 1/2 

Introduction

“Memory” is a faithful friend that accompanies us in life. She accumulates knowledge and memories in a disordered order that returns as sparks at certain moments or under some circumstances that are difficult to foresee. Memory becomes history when facts and people are organized in it, seeking a coherence in which each one of them has a antecedent and a consequence, however, this intellectual task generally loses the “symphony” of details. which, normally, give “color, flavor and smell” to the development. Memory can also become a “story” when imagination or creativity is added to the facts and characters to “discover” their essence or assume it. These resources, however, only want to be a tribute to a moment in our history in which the Argentine Army began its mechanization process.

     God, Destiny or “Superiority” wanted me to be a participant and spectator of that special time of our Army from the humble situation of the lieutenant who has more responsibility for doing than thinking, trapped between the captains who command him and the sergeants who command him. They obey. On that complicated path, “things” happened that were not understood, there were “issues” that were ignored, and a future that was unknown was being “built.” The center of that process was a new, devastating, attractive and powerful weapon: the tank.

     The General San Martín Military High School made me an “infant”, the National Military College trained me as an “artilleryman” and the Argentine Army outlined my life as an “officer” when my first destination was the Very Heavy Artillery Group 1, the first motorized unit of the Field Artillery, where I encountered “something” that was not in my capabilities, trucks, and I was surprised by the loss of an ideal “companion” that was the horse that I had learned to love. and knew how much he served us to fulfill our task, mission and responsibility. Without knowing it or intending it, a few years later I left the distinction of being an officer of the Artillery School to be assigned to a dream of others that was being built: the School of Mechanized Troops and that, at that time, I never thought I would become part of it. important member of my life and a founding historical element of the changes for our Argentine Army...

    These memories are, in some way, the revitalization of a few years in that center of military structural innovation and, logically, a sincere, although perhaps belated, tribute to all those who, with dedication, effort and, not to mention, patriotism, They were part of it. Like any memory of “things” that happened more than half a century ago, surely, there will be much left unsaid, which, possibly, will move others to fill those gaps, no longer as a memory, but as part of the history of our Argentine Army. .

Generalities

In the first decades of the 20th century, the “motor” that replaced the “equine” as the driver of means of transportation, the driver of mechanisms, and the promoter of changes in life and culture made impressive progress. Civilization began a new era, perhaps without knowing it, but it did feel it because of its effects, because it would modify the ways and means, not only in peace, but also in war. Just as there were civilians who visualized this powerful change, there were military personnel, particularly in Europe, who perceived new scenarios with new weapons that would transform combat and make battles new.

     Humanity suffered, at that time in the past, the problems of the global war between 1914/1918 and 1939/45 and, with it, doctrinal changes, new weapons, innovative strategies and surprising tactics. All of this with so much power that the concept of “nation in arms” fully entered into force and the conflicts left the battlefield to reach all of the belligerents' territories. The taste of war that was perceived only by the soldiers, reached with its anonymous cruelty to all who, without taking up weapons, became part of the conflicts and, consequently, directly suffered its consequences.

   It is edifying and honorable to read the ideas, thoughts and proposals that the military of our Argentina have left in the various books and articles published at that time. The soldiers of our Army carefully followed the episodes and combats, carried out their meticulous analysis and pointed out the lessons. Among the topics discussed by those eminent military scholars was that of mechanization, which, surprisingly, was reissued in our environment in the 1950s/60s, when the ideas of computing (Informatics) entered, which in the present is the driving force of the tomorrow.

     The question was to determine to what extent the new weapons powered by engines, both in the air and on the ground, would have to be adopted and incorporated into such diverse terrains of our country, ranging from the mountains to the jungles and from the rocky lands. to the sandbanks. Therefore, every time combat was fought in these wars in dissimilar places, it aroused attention to discover the modularity and adaptation to the means that was achieved by the skillful leaders of the forces. Foreign military publications, which arrived full of news and comments, were fertile seeds for learning, evaluating and, as far as possible, proposing. As in any innovation process, the proposals were measured as unrealizable utopias and lay dormant in the archives awaiting the dubious moment of their implementation. There was, at its core, an undeclared but real and consistent struggle between those who did not want to abandon the conquests and realities of the past with those who assumed that moving forward was an unavoidable imposition offered by progress and imposed by the future.

    There were two new stars in armaments: the plane and the tank. The decision in battles was closely linked to the timely and effective use of one of them or both together and thus names of soldiers arose, who knew of their effective and timely use, who were indelibly incorporated into military history, emulating the greats of the past. New weapons, new forms and new jobs were born more from the imagination than from creativity and surprise took over the battlefields with positive and negative events that accumulated with the harshness of the experiences.

    The plane, first as the lone combatant, ace of the skies and the courage of the pilots, gave way to the destroyer and the transport, modifying the maneuver, rescuing the value of surprise and bringing the war to all areas of the contenders. The tank, in turn, initially used as a complement to other weapons, acquired its own profile as the basis of actions and appropriated shock, maneuver and surprise on the battlefields.

    The plane grew due to its very power and, militarily, it first became a “weapon” and then a “force”, despite the fact that, later, due to the need for its tactical use, it would be integrated again as it had been at the beginning in the Army and the Navy.

    Just as in the first years of the aviators, their “rebellion” was “removing the ring from the cap” (they said because of the need to put on headphones), in the mechanized ones, it was “removing the spurs” (because they jammed the feet). in the vehicle), but, with these simplicity, this evolved development began.

    It is always difficult to change, since this means abandoning habits and customs, adapting to other situations, challenging the unknown and starting something new. This is all the harder and more difficult the more solid the past is, commitments have been acquired or antecedents are supported, therefore, the military, as members of the armed forces, which as armies are the glories of yesterday, doing so means a enormous responsibility because, if you fail, the future would be exposed, the damage could be irreversible and its consequences impossible to limit, however, innovation and progress defy doing so and mechanization was its consequence and result.

  

Argentine Army

In the society of the early 20th century, the use of the automobile continued the moments in which it was a “sport”, as also happened with the “balloon and the “airplane” and, slowly, it advanced to its general use as a means of transporting people. and/or loads. In the Army, a parallel development occurred, with the incorporation of “civilian” cars and trucks that fulfilled “garrison” functions and were not conceived as means of combat. The few vehicles that were available, due to the lack of drivers specialized, they were managed by non-commissioned officers or soldiers who “knew how to do it” because they had learned it specifically. Motorized vehicles were not considered part of the units' "supply" of war material, they did not appear in the "mobilization depots" and were only a "convenience" for daily life. Only in 1936 was a “Motorcycle School” created as an adequate response to the training of personnel with the ability to handle vehicles.

      In our Army, during the 1930s, “motorized” units were organized and in the organizational charts of 1943 the “Patagonian Group” and elements of Anti-Aircraft Artillery were indicated. It is not specifically mentioned, but there was, a “very heavy cannon battery” at the Artillery School. This subunit is specifically mentioned, since, in 1945, it joined together with another that was in the “Mobilization Depots” of the School, Group 1 of Very Heavy Artillery, which is thus the first motorized unit of that weapon with material for that purpose.

    In those times, the “motorization” of the 8th Infantry and 24th Infantry Regiments and the 8th Artillery Group stands out, all members of the aforementioned “Patagonian Group” but with “civilian” vehicles whose adaptation consisted of painting them in color. "olive green".

    From the “armor” point of view, “Crossley armored cars” and a dozen “Vickers light tanks” had been acquired and were temporarily assigned to some Cavalry and Infantry units as “accompanying weapons,” until, finally, They were deposited in the “Arsenal Esteban de Luca”. The materials did not have a clear use and, in general, were a difficulty because they created problems that were not in the generality of classic and conventional activities of the units.

    In the Army, the plans did not contain provisions for the use of "tanks", since they were practically an unknown weapon, although they spoke of motorization, but everything contained referred to the reality of foot or horse-mobile units. The ideas of motorization had a different effect on personnel according to their weapons. The infantrymen saw it as an improvement in their transportation. Gunners as a better means of movement. The Cavalry considered it an unlikely subject. It is, however, worth noting that the first ones oriented towards mechanization were in the Infantry weapon and, by necessity of the type of weaponry, the Anti-Aircraft Artillery.

    The creation of the “School of Mechanized Troops” in October 1943, and its organization in the following years, was an important fact, transcendent in this adaptation process, which must be clearly highlighted. The provision of “civilian” and “armored” vehicles, which were in the Esteban de Luca Arsenal, made it possible to concretely show the beginning of the activity. The school organically had units or subunits of all arms gathered in a “Troop Group” and a “Technical Subdirectorate” responsible for studies and developments. The existence, within the aforementioned Subdirectorate, of a Regulations Section and a Company of Motorist Drivers, organized to continue the “Motorcycle School” created previously in 1937, stands out due to its application importance. The latter granted the “Military Driver Records” which, to achieve, became an aspiration of all personnel, even those who were unrelated to the respective courses.

   In the years 1945 and 1946, important final exercises and maneuvers were carried out, respectively, with the “Light Tank Squadron” of the School of Mechanized Troops participating in the latter in the provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes as support for the Cavalry units. The torrential rains, which occurred practically all the time, created difficulties of all kinds, particularly for the vehicles, such as those of the aforementioned squadron and those of the Very Heavy Artillery Group 1 that were left on the edges of the roads in their ditches or “buried” in the ground. The experience gathered regarding the difficult, not to say zero, operability of the vehicles in that area was proven when mounted units had to be used to “recover” them. Tanks and trucks “dragged” by the trailers and trunks of a “vantrain”, in which the “noble horses” were its traction, became the certificate of inoperability.

     During 1946, the idea of incorporating the “Nahuel DL 43” medium tanks that were in storage at the Esteban de Luca Arsenal was developed. These dozen tanks had been built in that Arsenal in 1943 by the Chief of the same Tcnl. Alfredo Baisi, presented in 1944, paraded in 1945 and, subsequently, kept in storage. The Tcnl. Emilio Bidone, Chief in these circumstances, carried out the adjustment and recycling of the aforementioned tanks that, in reality, were a challenge to the technique and almost a miracle to their reality. If building them had been a sample of “artisanal” capacity and quality , the mere thought that they could be used meant a risk that could be considered insurmountable, which values ​​such an extreme decision.

     At the beginning of 1947, the creation of a medium tank subunit was resolved in the aforementioned School of Mechanized Troops, as a concrete and experimental means on the use and employment of this material. It must be taken into account that the predominant idea was that a “new weapon” was being initiated, just as had happened with aviation. Based on this, personnel from the different weapons and “motorcycle drivers” graduated from the School's specialized Company were assigned to the “Nahuel DL 43 Medium Tank Company.” This episode must be observed, more than for its antecedents, for its consequences, it meant that, for the first time, in the history of the Argentine Army, it would have a tank unit, that is, the weaponry that stood out in the battles in the North of Africa and had served decisively in the domination of the circumstantial victors in Europe. With the Nahuel Medium Tank Company we entered concretely and materially into the highest dimension of military capabilities and qualities of the time. The emotional value of the Nahuel is reflected in the construction of an altar of materials in the Plaza de Armas of the School as a replica of the original tanks.

    The year 1947 was fruitful in its actions, since the developments in the tank subunit in terms of instruction, use and use of this material show its effective possibility and the promise becomes reality. The sense of pride in what has been achieved overwhelms the School itself and is demonstrated by the presentations, demonstrations and exercises carried out before Argentine and foreign authorities. Yesterday's risky dream had become a true and valid fact. This “pride”, among the various examples, is materialized with the creation of the “specialty” and the delivery of the tank driver “distinctive” to the senior personnel of the School and the Tank Company, including the Light Tank Squadron. Likewise, at the end of the year, a purchase of “war scrap” was achieved in a “covert operation”, the motorization of the 1st Infantry Division and mechanization (Armored) of the 1st Cavalry Division were planned. This situation experienced in 1947 allows us to highlight it as the launch of full mechanization of the Army and should, for historical purposes, have a special appreciation and institutional recognition that until now has been denied...

  In 1948, the School of Mechanized Troops carried out countless courses for officers and non-commissioned officers of all arms that were expected to be destined for mechanized units. Additionally, in a direct agreement with the Army of the United States of America, military personnel were commissioned to attend different courses, including “The Armored School” (Fort Knox) to take courses on “driving” and “maintenance.” ” and the sending of a “Military Mission” that would cooperate with the School was accepted. The courses, the study commissions and the arrival of the advisors constitute the intellectual "link" of formation of this prodigious process of advancing towards Argentine military mechanization. The Argentine Army, in a correctly planned and conducted effort, faced a transcendent task that meant a new philosophy, new doctrines and new weapons and was launched in an organized manner into its future.

In 1949, the units of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, having been equipped with automotive and armored material, respectively, and incorporated cadre personnel who graduated from specialized courses, formed the first superior mechanized units of the Army. and they were the material process of transformation from hypomobile realities to the futures of the military organic structure.

   In 1950, an organic variable was introduced in the commands of the armored units, forming them as “Groups” under the idea that they would be leadership groups to which the units that compose them would be “assigned” according to the mission assigned to them. impose. The aforementioned idea is left without effect in the following year in which the previous organization is returned with the exception of the Armored Artillery Regiment 1 (Armored Group 3) which is annulled from the “Tank Destroyer Group” and is reduced only as “ Armored Artillery Group 1”. Meanwhile, at the Higher War School, knowledge about armored vehicles begins to be taught as a subject due to the presence of personnel returning from specialization courses at The Armored School.

      In 1952, given that the Weapons Schools had already incorporated the topics of mechanization into their educational capabilities, the School of Mechanized Troops was deactivated and the Armored Group School was created, which moved from its barracks in Villa Martelli to Curuzú Cuatia. . With which the initial process of military mechanization in Argentina can be considered completed.

      The Argentine Army, in a little less than five years, had transformed an elementary idea into a certain and concrete fact, for which it put into action the most diverse means in a successful structural coordination, an imponderable challenge activating the creative initiative of its personnel. and showed the spirit, knowledge and quality of his paintings.

Aspects of mechanization

In the aforementioned development of mechanization in the Argentine Army, including the period from the mid-1940s to the beginning of 1952, there are some specific topics that, due to their influence on this evolution, are suitable historical complements, which are detailed below:

a) Conduct and doctrine.

    In the Argentine Army there was no precedent on mechanization except for what came from news and foreign military publications. Although there were concerns, particularly in relation to aviation, the same did not happen with motorization, even less so, armored vehicles and, specifically, tanks.

     The hypotheses for the use of the armed forces referred to theaters of operations whose characteristics and topographies pointed out the difficulties for the use of motor vehicles. The few experiences carried out in final exercises and maneuvers allowed us to deduce that the terrain was its clearest restriction. In addition, it is worth remembering that vehicles from the beginning of the 20th century had limited characteristics for rolling on certain terrain. For example, the “solid” rolling of armored cars required firm, hard terrain to avoid bogging down. . These ideas, it is also worth highlighting, existed in the countries of the Northern Hemisphere and this is reflected in the differential situation under which World War II began in 1939. The tank, intended as a complementary weapon at the beginning of the war, overflows into Germany's attack operations and then acts as the main means of its development, especially in the North African campaigns. This transformation of the tank in its capabilities and use arose during the same war, modifying the existing doctrines of the belligerents, provoking major intellectual confrontations and leading to scenarios in disconcerting environments. The “tank” as a complement to the Infantry and Cavalry gained a position during the battles of World War II only comparable to that of the airplane as a combat weapon in the skies.

   It is evident that the tank units had shock, maneuver, surprise and destruction capabilities that were not the classic ones of the other weapons and reached the situation of direct confrontations between them where they were deprived, regardless of the strength of their armor and the potential of their projectiles, the skill of the drivers and the always forgotten and postponed logistics with its powers of supply and repair emerged as a restriction on their employment.

    Argentina's "neutral" position made its Armed Forces spectators and the lack of materials at the level at which it was being used signaled the impossibility of its action. The few concerns that are presented in this topic are, rather, theoretical concerns, developed for intellectual purposes, but which indicate an adequate appreciation on the part of their authors. It must be kept in mind that there were concerns and efforts to incorporate new weapons, including tanks, carried out before Germany, which although they seemed promising, would fail due to that country's own need for war. We must not forget, furthermore, that the different political position in the conflict, assumed by other countries, particularly those bordering our country, and their participation with the “allies” led us to a situation of foreseeable crisis that could not be ignored.

    Even though Argentina declared war on the Axis countries, given that this took place practically at the end of the war, the relationship situation with the winning “allies” was fragile. Argentina, despite the recognized “humanitarian” action that its contribution with food to the countries of both sides in the war meant, motivated marked distrust, especially in the North Americans, who wanted us to get involved as their allies, especially after the aggression of Japan. It cannot be hidden and must be added to this, a concrete reality, which was that the basis of military doctrines and education in Argentina had been developed with the support of Germany and Italy, and take into account that a high percentage of the population was originally of the latter country. This characterization, at that time, was materialized in details such as the types of military uniforms used, which were evidently inspired by the German Army. If we remember the classic “steel helmets” and the cuts of the equipment that were used, we see an absolute similarity.

   The fortuitous fact of a personal contact in a meeting of high command between the Commander in Chief of the North American and Argentine Army, possibly held in 1946, managed to dissipate the existing distance and facilitated rapprochement. This “understanding” between soldiers opened an educational relationship that preceded formal diplomacy and, as stated before, this led to the commissioning of personnel to study in the United States of America and the reception of a Mission of Advisors.

    Within the idea of education and especially about driving, we remember the then Captain Anibal Peralta (Cavalry) and 1st Lt. Orencio Cesar Anaya (Infantry) who, upon their return, served at the Higher War School and published books and articles on the subject. In the same sense, but as a result of the task of “translation” of regulations, the then Captain Heriberto Kurt Brenner, dependent on the Tcnl, stands out. Enrique Oyharzabal Castro, integrating the regulations Section of the School, where a task of “adequacy” was completed that would later be assumed by the Inspection of Mechanized Troops with the outstanding action of General Benjamin Ratenbach and his assistants..

    Although the role of all the Directors of the School of Mechanized Troops has been fundamental, in this initial time the actions of the Inspection of Mechanized Troops, first shared and then separated, absorb some elements of the direction of the school and continue with the responsibility. to create doctrine and regulations. Possibly the most prominent Director is Colonel (Cavalry) José María Epifanio Sosa Molina and, as Inspector, Brigadier General Benjamin Ratenbach. The first managed, with his drive and personality, to make the most difficult and complicated topics a reality, and the second, organically materialized the knowledge of an activity about which he had no concrete experiences or serious background.

    The Argentine Army managed, in a surprisingly short time, for its personnel to know and train at an unusual level on the new forms and characteristics imposed by military mechanization.  

b)     Materials

   The first steps towards monitoring were taken with “civilian” vehicles that essentially carried out “garrison” activities. The incorporation of automotive material was not among the military equipment priorities and its high costs created natural financial impediments. The few cars and trucks, at the time, were complemented by some motorcycles that were intended for “post office” service and communications. At the time there was a Motorcycle Section, whose Chief was Lieutenant Alberto Moro, who had singular brilliance for his equipment, vehicles and demonstrations of sporting “audacity.”

   The incorporations of the “Crosley armored cars” and the “Vickers light tanks” did not appear well justified and founded, which can be seen by the changing destination given to them and that they end up in an Arsenal warehouse. Added to that is the rejection of the offer of a few Italian “tanks” that, due to their quantity and characteristics, did not seem of final use and that, finally, were acquired by the Brazilian Army.

    The “adventure” of the Nahuel tank is, really, significant in both of its moments. The first, purely international political, when it “surprises” with its presence, in a difficult environment, in which the country is denied weapons and that “neutrality” was not pleasant to one of the belligerents. The second is that it allowed the creation, with complicated and difficult material, of tank personnel bases and the parameters for their education and instruction. The Nahuel tanks were exhibited at the Army Exhibition in 1944. They were two large vehicles with the “look” of a Sherman tank. A person, “disguised” as an officer with the rank of second lieutenant on his shoulder pad with white piping, explained his characteristics and advantages. On the same 9 de Julio avenue, the “Pulque DL” plane was seen mounted on a platform. On July 9, 1945, a group of tanks under the command of Tcnl. Baisi paraded along Avenida Alvear (today the Libertador) accompanied by an escort of motorcyclists. In this way, the tank “fulfilled” the political purpose for which it had been built. Reality shows that the tank had serious unresolved technical problems that ranged from the joints of the track chocks to the heating of its engines, which made it a good test but an impossible practical means for its use. When it is approved its recycling, the Tcnl. Bidone, as Head of the Arsenal, carried out the total disassembly of the units and their rearming, adjusting those aspects that were shown to be necessary, in an exercise of quality and technical capacity as remarkable as the one applied by its creator. In this way, I managed to have vehicles with a certain suitability for their movement and with the possibility of providing them as an endowment to the Medium Tank Company. Along with the delivery of the twelve tanks, five new Willys jeeps were delivered as supplies, which, as a curiosity, carried the first five military identification plates under the numbers 001 to 005.

    A topic, little disclosed and full of confusion, is the "scrap" acquisition operation in Belgium, a covert operation about which much has been said and described. The military attaché in Paris pointed out the possibility of acquiring deactivated and sold material. to “scrap metal dealers” for scrapping, so a general inspection was ordered to know the materials and evaluate their purchaseability, a task that was carried out by Captain Alfredo P. Otheguy. The “reserved” reports indicated in “their written part” its “poor quality” and “unsatisfactory condition” as had been agreed so that its destination as “scrap” and the impossibility of its use as military material was clear. The second commission, under the command of Colonel Héctor Magallanes (Ars.. E. de Luca) and Lieutenant Colonel Lorenzo Tosselli (Ec. Trop. Mec.), was carried out with the aim of “selecting” the lots and those that were chosen were chosen. They presented fewer problems after almost two years of abandonment. The “coverage” of the operation was provided by the IAPI (Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Exchange), an official commercial organization, with the justification of finding cargo back to the ships that carried cereals to Europe and returned empty. In the last months of 1947, the ships of ELMA (Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas) in an “against the clock” and “overloaded” operation brought “scrap” materials to the country. It should be remembered that it was known that there was still a certain control over the possibility of armed equipment from Argentina and, logically, there were fears that the purchase would be intervened or the materials seized. The operation was carried out successfully, highlighting, once again, that some of the ships loaded “overload” in order to speed up shipments. To take into account the real “quality” of the materials, it is enough to say that some, for example the Carriers T 16, were in their original drawers as they were shipped from their factories and the others, dirty and moldy, were “shiny” after washing routines. The “coverage” of this operation is reiterated, reminding once again that it was material sold for scrapping and smelting since, although it had been left behind in the unloading places, the authorities had no “interest” in it being stop at uncertain destinations, as, surely, they would have imagined Argentina. It is to be expected what the military attachés of the United States of America, England and France may have reported in this regard, but the material “was already in the country.” This issue was “handled” in such a way that its development caused reactions even in the National Congress with legislators observing the operation due to the “impossibility” of revealing its reality. It must be taken into account that this material, despite everything that can be attributed to it as negative, was provided for several subsequent decades.

     The vehicles disembarked in the Port of Buenos Aires were transferred and parked on the land surrounding the Mechanized Troops School in Villa Martellí. Almost all of the material was moved “by its own means” and there were cases, such as the Carriers T 16, within their original wooden packaging that were unpacked and prepared in the arsenal. As an observation, it is recalled that the logistical effort of the landing in Normandy carried out by the allies exceeded the demand for material in the combat and, therefore, it was accumulated in temporary warehouses to, finally, be sold to "scrap" merchants, therefore it was material that had not entered the combat and had not suffered from theft or destruction, but had suffered the inclemencies of more than two years of exposure without any coverage.

     The variety and quantity of vehicles, from jeeps to trucks, from tanks of different complete models to punts, were adapted, mounting specific materials, such as cannons and howitzers, to satisfy the needs of the units according to the corresponding weapons. In reality, in many cases, it involved dismantling transports for horse-drawn vehicles and assembling their weapons in new mechanized means. A very particular example was the series of materials that were achieved with the adaptations made to the Crussaders punts that showed effective positive aptitudes for it.

    Although there are no exact numbers of the amount of material received, it is noted that almost 400 tanks were received. around 200 half-tracks, 100 trucks, more than 130 Crussader punts in addition to jeeps, front command vehicles and almost 2,500 radio equipment, that is, a very large supply in quantities that did not exist in the past.

  The Vickers light tanks, the Crossley armored cars and the Nahuel medium tanks were removed from service and, unfortunately, scrapped, with the sole exception of the Nahuel 125, which had its front fascia removed and rebuilt as an altar in the Plaza de Armas. from the Armored Artillery Group 1, in Campo de Mayo, which was subsequently taken by the unit to Curuzú Cuatiá and, finally, disappeared when that unit was transferred to Azul. It is interesting to remember that efforts have been made to “rescue” some of the aforementioned vehicles for their historical value, all of them reaching negative results.

c) Instruction

    The mechanized units incorporated some variables linked to their means of transportation to their classical instruction. This variation was relatively small in Infantry units, somewhat greater for Artillery units and very important in Cavalry units.

    The mounted units dedicated a significant amount of their work hours to the care and rationing of livestock, as well as exercises related to horseback riding and taxiing. These percentages of time occupied practically 40% of the schedules in the education and instruction plans; since they did not have livestock, it became “free” time for other uses. In most units, a totally unusual practice began: the “siesta”, that is, a time dedicated to resting the personnel after lunch was established, an unthinkable form of “improvement” of life in the barracks.

    “Formal instruction” was introduced in the training plans, which is similar to the “piece service” of the Artillery with similar command voices and signals of the same type. The motorcyclists of the tanks and armored vehicles were non-commissioned officers of that specialty, however, for the motor vehicles, soldiers were designated who received the corresponding instruction until the arrival of new personnel achieved the required completion.
   
    The “sand table”, for practicing the exercises, became important so that the personnel could practice “under control” the movements and activities during marches and combat. It was a way to “economise” fuel and to make activities that the new dimensions of the media made difficult, if not impossible, a reality under control.

d) Maintenance.

   Although the “care and cleaning” routines of the weapons were carried out before mechanization, the “maintenance” actions of the vehicles reached a new significant value about which there was no history or experience.

    Initially, inexperienced officers who were assisted by mechanical non-commissioned officers or motor drivers were responsible for maintenance tasks. Although there were “military engineers” in the “automotive” specialty who graduated from the Higher Technical School, their orientation did not coincide with what was required.
This issue was resolved with the commission of officers within the plan agreed with the North American Army to “The Armored School” (Fort Knox). In total, seven junior officers were sent in three courses between 1948 and 1950. Upon their return, they were appointed Chiefs of the Maintenance Section of the different units that made up the Mechanized Corps.

     These sections of the units complied with the regulated maintenance echelons and formed a system with the maintenance units of the higher echelons. The operation of the entire system, which was initially “copied” from North American manuals and regulations, was modified due to the high cost that it entailed and the peculiar characteristic of the Argentines of finding solutions to problems by avoiding the replacement of materials.

    The Arsenal Service was created based on this background, incorporating not only the attention of vehicles, but also that of materials and weapons, years later. This set of “maintenance officers” should be considered the predecessors of later Arsenal officers.

e) Barracks.

    A no minor issue was the adaptation of the barracks to mechanization. The units counted on their parade grounds, accommodation, warehouses, stables, training fields, etc. designed according to use, that is, they were not prepared for heavy vehicles, they did not have sheds for parking, 2nd tier workshops or “fuel pumps” or oil tanks, etc. Nor did they have accounting standards for the acquisition of spare parts. , fuels, paints, etc. nor provisions or rules for its safekeeping and custody.

      There were special cases, such as Cavalry units, that did not have “magazine magazines” for tank cannon projectiles and those they had for portable weapons ammunition did not satisfy the regulated safety requirements.

     The first experiences were destroyed streets, collapsed stable columns and some gardens with their grass and flowers ruined. It was necessary to mark the circulation, place traffic signs, set speed limits or determine “no-access” sectors, all of which gave rise to what would later become the “military police.”

 

f) Culture y society.

  Mechanization, especially in mounted units, since its connection with the horse, equestrian sports and social groups related to them, meant a series of modifications to behaviors and customs.

    For Argentines, the horse is part of the “national identity” like the “mate” or the “asado”, it was no longer present in military activities and disappeared from the barracks. The characteristics of the animals, the performance in each activity and the examples of behaviors were frequent topics at all times and, suddenly, they were no longer in the conversations. Equestrian sports, particularly jumping for all and “polo” essentially for the Cavalry and “duck” for the artillerymen, apart from the activity itself, meant direct contact with the civilians of the society and the community that They were also dedicated to them. The social relations of the personnel of the mounted units had the horse as one of its axis and the same was its justification that, when it disappeared, was equal to a violent break with certain groups or people.

    While the topic of cars, car racing, their characteristics, etc. They were valid, the “romanticism” that includes the horse, was irreplaceable. This issue, to address it and as a sign of the importance of the skill involved in the use of the horse, has resulted in the creation of “mounted sections” with the provision of some horses to continue with equestrian sports practices in the units of Chivalry.

g) Spiritual

  The issue of mechanization, that is, the abandonment of the horse in military units around the world, found emotional reactions among their personnel. This issue is not minor, particularly in those early days. The officer felt “devastated” at not “having the crop in his hand.” The staff longed for the “smells” of the horses and resented the smell of “gasoline.” There was a new kind of silence as neighing was missing. The lack of “risk” of riding, jumping or playing on a horse was felt. The sheds were cold and dark before the stables with heat and sounds.

     It seemed like a “betrayal” to take off the spurs, then even the boots or to modify the “breeches” by a diver or to say that the “fuel load” was going to be controlled instead of the “scraping”.

     Although the spiritual issue seems to be a materialist issue, its effect and reality should and should be considered. It is noted that Armies that have advanced irreversibly in mechanization, such as the English, German and French, still have horses as a means of instruction and sport.

h) New weapon

   When the Nahuel arrived at the School of Mechanized Troops and the Medium Tank Company was created in 1947, the general idea was that a weapon was being born that would follow a path similar to that of aviation.

    Everything indicated that the Infantry would be “motorized”, the Cavalry would be “armored” and the Artillery in its self-propelled and towed form would be both. The presence of the T 16 Carriers and the half-tracks gave the indication that “Armored Shooters” would be the name for the Cavalry.

    Tanks were different from other weapons. They were designed for a mixture of actions that added to those of the Infantry, the Cavalry and the Artillery. They even had an essence of “adventure” that led to thinking about aviation.

    This general idea found materialization in the designation of the personnel that would make up the Medium Tank Company, which came from different arms and found justification when the instructional materials were distributed since they adjusted to the origin of the instructors.

    When the material was incorporated in 1948 and the 1st Armored Division was transformed, personnel from all arms were assigned to the Cavalry units (C 8 and C 10). This relationship continued until 1962 with the majority presence of Cavalry and Infantry personnel, at which time it was decided that it would be only the first weapon.

       It should be noted, as an example, the fact that the Chilean Army created the new tank weapon and it was only “absorbed” by the Cavalry a few years ago. Let us remember that in Spain, tanks are Infantry units.

To Be Continued...