Civil War: Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Monument erected on the site of the Battle of Campos de Álvarez, fought on 31 January 1852

Juan Manuel de Rosas and Ángel Pacheco, respectively, facilitated for the Empire of Brazil and for Urquiza the easy success they achieved in their triumphant march into the interior of Buenos Aires Province. Rosas referred all matters to Pacheco, and Pacheco, in turn, failed to take timely or effective action. One need only consider the decisive events that shaped the operations culminating in the Battle of Caseros.

A month before Oribe’s capitulation, Colonel Martiniano Chilavert submitted a memorandum to Rosas in which he presented numerous reasons and favourable prospects for having Oribe move to engage Urquiza and, at the same time, preparing an army to invade Brazil. Rosas approved the memorandum and said he would consult Pacheco—but meanwhile allowed Oribe’s army to be undermined.

When Urquiza was gathering his forces in Gualeguaychú, Chilavert again urged Rosas to defend the Paraná River line, offering to lead the defence himself. Rosas responded that he would consult Pacheco. Soon thereafter, Pascual Echagüe was forced to abandon Santa Fe. When Urquiza moved from Rosario and Pacheco ordered Lucio Norberto Mansilla to withdraw from positions along the Paraná, Mansilla assumed this was to reposition him with infantry and artillery to the northern front dominated by Lagos with 8,000 cavalry, in order to defend the line of the Arroyo del Medio. Pacheco would then reinforce him from Luján, and together they would present battle to Urquiza. In the event of defeat, they could retreat to the barracks at Santos Lugares. This strategy would also buy Rosas time to raise the southern campaign in a unified effort and place Urquiza in a critical position, encircled and cut off from his supply lines. Mansilla presented this logic to Rosas, who again directed him to consult with Pacheco. Urquiza then advanced his vanguard to the Arroyo del Medio.

When Urquiza reached that point, and Pacheco insisted that Hilario Lagos retreat to headquarters, Lagos protested to Rosas, stating that he and his soldiers were determined to stand and defend the invaded land. Rosas responded affirming his confidence in Lagos's patriotism and advised him to harmonise his actions with General Pacheco's orders.

There were moments when Rosas showed signs of reacting—particularly when he sensed the disorganisation of his forces. He summoned Major Antonino Reyes, commander at Santos Lugares, and spoke of convening a war council of senior officers. But the impulse passed quickly. It was Pacheco—his constant reliance on Pacheco—that caused him to waver. Still, he told Reyes: “I’ll need you by my side; we must urgently appoint someone to command your battalion, the coastal battalions, and other units that together would make up about 1,500 men with six artillery pieces.” Reyes proposed Colonel Pedro José Díaz, a seasoned officer residing in Buenos Aires since being captured at Quebracho Herrado (28 November 1840) with the last remnants of Lavalle’s infantry. Díaz responded: “Tell the Governor I appreciate the trust he places in me; though a 'Unitarian', I will fulfil my duty as a soldier under the orders of my country’s government.” This led to the formation of that infantry brigade—the only one that, alongside Chilavert’s renowned artillery, held fire until the very end against the imperial forces.

Pacheco’s decisions, however, consistently cleared the path for the allied advance. On 26 January, as the allies reached Arroyo del Gato and moved on to Laguna del Tigre (near Chivilcoy), he ordered all troops withdrawn from the “Guardia de Luján” (present-day Mercedes), leaving only 600 men under Colonel Lagos—the sole commander actively resisting the enemy. Yet on the 28th, Pacheco wrote to Lagos suggesting he proceed as he saw fit with his forces, referring vaguely to movements supposedly made on the night of the 26th. He claimed that Major Albornoz was withdrawn because Lagos’s division was strong enough on its own.

But Pacheco’s assumptions were false—no such movements had occurred. Moreover, he ordered the withdrawal of all reserves, leaving Lagos isolated with a small division facing the enemy. Lagos replied on 28 January:

“Colonel Lagos, sir, made no movement whatsoever with the divisions encamped at Arroyo de Balta on the night of the 26th. I was informed by Major Albornoz that Your Excellency had ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Guardia de Luján on that same day. If I have been forced to engage the enemy solely on their left flank, it was because I was reprimanded for advancing with my force to Laguna de las Toscas, which I calculated (correctly) would be the enemy’s route.”

At the same time, serious accusations circulated against General Pacheco—some alleged that between 26 and 27 January he had established secret contact with General Urquiza, even removing Colonel Bustos’s aides from the area around Luján to that end. Bustos relayed the matter to Rosas through Major Reyes. Rosas simply replied: “He’s mad, sir.” The same was said of a Justice of the Peace who travelled from his post to confirm the rumour, and even of a prominent member of the legislature who echoed the report: “He’s mad,” Rosas repeated.

The allied army advanced from Chivilcoy to Luján, arriving on the morning of 29 January. By the 30th, its vanguard was positioned at Campos de Álvarez, just over two leagues from some of Buenos Aires’ forward divisions, located along the left bank of the Río de las Conchas (today the Reconquista River), defending the Márquez Bridge. Pacheco had just crossed the bridge without issuing orders and took the road to his estancia at El Talar.

Upon hearing of the enemy’s approach, Rosas instructed Lagos to engage them in battle, assuring him that General Pacheco would defend the Márquez Bridge with superior forces. With his own division and those of Colonels Domingo Sosa and Ramón Bustos (son of the Córdoba caudillo Juan Bautista Bustos), Lagos gathered approximately 2,500 men. At dawn on 31 January, he organised three parallel columns, deployed light cavalry to the front, and advanced to confront the enemy.

The allied army had formed in an extended line on the left flank, matching Lagos’s direction. General Juan Pablo López held the left; Colonel Galarza commanded the Entre Ríos cavalry in the centre; Colonels Aguilar and Caraballo positioned their divisions on either side. The allied force numbered about 5,000. The elite Buenos Aires squadrons clashed with the seasoned cavalry of Entre Ríos. These initially wavered when Lagos personally led charges that earned him lasting renown in Argentine military history. But the allied regiments, reinforced by López’s timely support and flanking manoeuvres, overwhelmed Lagos’s inexperienced squadrons. He then regrouped his best troops, led a final charge to stall the enemy, and withdrew in good order to the Márquez Bridge, losing around 200 men—including Commander Marcos Rubio—and several officers, weapons, and horses.

Allied reports and General César Díaz’s “Unpublished Memoirs” (pp. 265–267) claimed Lagos had 6,000 of the finest cavalry, and inconsistently reported both a lack of resistance and 200 casualties among Lagos’s forces, while stating the allies lost only 26 men. General Díaz had no direct knowledge, as he was two leagues from the battlefield and only joined the allied vanguard the next day. It was assumed Lagos still commanded the same force with which he had withdrawn from the northern line, but in reality, at Álvarez he had:

• His own division, militia from Bragado, and veteran detachments: 600 men

• Sosa’s division: 1,300 men

• Bustos’s division: 600 men

Echagüe’s and Cortina’s divisions did not participate. The bulk of Lagos’s Bragado division had been redirected by Pacheco across the Márquez Bridge.

Lagos expected to find Pacheco at the bridge with infantry and artillery, as instructed. But Pacheco was not there—he had left not a single man. Lagos requested orders, reporting he was still skirmishing with the enemy’s advance units. From Santos Lugares came the reply: “Hold your position.” On 11 February, the entire allied army assembled at Álvarez. Lagos informed Santos Lugares, and only late that day was he told that if the enemy attempted to cross the river, he should retreat to headquarters.

In this context, Pacheco resigned as General-in-Chief, stating Rosas was already at Santos Lugares in command of the army. Rosas took it as a personal blow. Showing the resignation to Major Reyes, he said: “Don’t you see, sir? Pacheco is mad, sir.” Yet, as Pacheco had informed all commanders of his resignation and urged them to report directly to Rosas, Rosas responded that he had “not accepted General Pacheco’s request; and given the importance of his role and his distinguished performance, the illustrious general continues in command.”

Rosas, however, flew into a rage when told Pacheco had failed to defend the Márquez Bridge with the troops withdrawn from Luján, as previously ordered: “It cannot be—surely the General Pacheco could not have disobeyed the orders of the Governor of the Province!” On the night of 31 January, Benjamín Victorica arrived at Santos Lugares on Pacheco’s behalf. Rosas dismissed him without hearing the message. The following afternoon, Pacheco himself arrived. Reyes announced him and returned to speak with Colonel Bustos. Moments later, both men were astonished to see Pacheco leave Rosas’s quarters, head down, without speaking, mount his horse, and ride to Witt’s estate, from where he witnessed the subsequent military events.

The victory at Álvarez was naturally celebrated in Urquiza’s camp and boosted allied morale. In light of the ease of their progress, they began to believe—perhaps rightly—that they would soon enter Buenos Aires with weapons in hand. In Rosas’s camp, although the defeat was keenly felt, it produced no outward sign. On the night of 1 February, some 400 men deserted from the allies and joined Santos Lugares, greeted by cheers from their former comrades.

Among the Buenos Aires population, strong support for Rosas persisted, rooted in a cultural loyalty reinforced by shared adversity and struggle. Many soldiers believed they were defending national honour against a foreign invasion. Was that merely poetic? Perhaps, but it was the poetry of honour—an inner truth resonating within individual conscience. The rural population saw only the astonishing fact of the Brazilian Empire’s invasion and rallied around Rosas as the personification of national salvation.

General César Díaz, commander of the eastern division of the allied army, observed:

“The people of Luján displayed the same studied indifference as those of Pergamino; and to the outward signs of sympathy for Rosas, they added actions clearly reflecting their sentiments. They exaggerated the size and quality of Rosas’s forces, recalled the many political storms he had weathered, and were convinced he would once again emerge victorious.”

Upon the full allied army’s arrival at Álvarez, Díaz recounts Urquiza’s thoughts:

“I went to visit the General and found him in the Major General’s tent. He spoke of the bitter disappointment in the spirit we had expected from Buenos Aires. Until then, we had not faced any resistance. The General said, ‘If it were not for my interest in promoting the Republic’s organisation, I should have remained allied to Rosas, for I am persuaded that he is a very popular man in this country.’”
And Díaz concludes:
“If Rosas was so publicly hated, or no longer feared, as was claimed, why did the people not seize this opportunity to realise their long-held desires? Why did they show such exaggerated zeal in defending their own servitude? From what I witnessed, I am deeply convinced that Rosas’s authority in 1852 was as strong—perhaps stronger—than it had been a decade earlier, and that neither popular submission nor confidence in his leadership had ever abandoned him.”

Sources:

• César Díaz – Unpublished Memoirs – Adriano Díaz Publications – Buenos Aires (1878)

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

• Portal: www.revisionistas.com.ar

• Adolfo Saldías – Historia de la Confederación Argentina – Ed. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires (1951)

Reproduction permitted with citation: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Chaco War: The Argentine Support to the Paraguay War Effort

Argentine Support for Paraguay in the Chaco War

 


"No one dies on the eve, but on the appointed day (Nha ña mano bay i víspera – pe sino ghiarape)." I want to evoke these harsh words in Guaraní to describe the chilling photographic "Archive" of Dr. Carlos De Sanctis, compiled during the months he spent on the front lines of the Chaco Boreal battlefield. As he himself affirms, he was "…the first foreign doctor that Paraguay allowed to reach the front line…". "Chilling" is an appropriate term, as in my previous note, Facebook's intellectual censorship mechanism selectively blocked part of the content, which was taken precisely from the archive of the doctor from Rosario.

The astounding De Sanctis document captures in photographs, with annexed explanations as brutal as they are succinct (I would say "clinical"), what healthcare was like in the jungle, as seen by a "civilian" who served Paraguay in a war where Argentine public opinion was mostly inclined in favor of Paraguay and against Bolivia.

Other civilians, but with weapons in hand, served in the 7th General San Martín Regiment, formed in the Argentine House in Asunción and composed of a large number of Argentines—many from Goya, it seems—who played a distinguished role. We cannot forget the Argentine army officers who lost their careers due to the events of 1930, several of whom honorably served under the Paraguayan flag in the Chaco.

In terms of psychosocial support from Argentina, perhaps the most potent was the exaltation of Paraguay’s image, promoted by the media, which portrayed it as a small country under attack, a victim of unjust ambitions.

The other side of the coin is daringly presented in Buenos Aires in 1933, during the height of the conflict, by Bolivian diplomat Eduardo Anze Matienzo, under the auspices of the Engineering Students' Center, to a decidedly "pro-Paraguay" audience, as he put it.



Who is Anze Matienzo? A Bolivian who reached the highest position as a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea and who served his diplomatic mission in Asunción in the years 1930 and 1931.

Anze gives a lecture titled "Bolivia in the Continent and in the Chaco Conflict." Extensive, substantial, and sharp, he laments the ignorance about his country, attributing it to "a prejudice that entails injustice," "…a subjective vision…".

I omit all the propositions about the rights of the parties he raises, ignore his arguments denying that Standard Oil subsidized Bolivia, and focus on "The Responsibilities of the War," where he argues against "Paraguay's 'gadfly' policy, which has weakened our governments and our people like an infectious and harmful disease for more than half a century." Anze postulates that Paraguay was a nation "burdened since the War of the Triple Alliance," which made it warlike because "López's madness, which led his people to collective suicide in the War of the Triple Alliance, had the virtue of creating a 'legend of heroism' whereby 'every Paraguayan considers himself an unparalleled hero, and the Paraguayan people form a cluster of heroes capable of making the world tremble'." He exemplifies this with the words spoken by his Paraguayan driver on the way to the legation: "I advise you, Secretary, to warn your compatriots that every Paraguayan soldier can fight ten Bolivians and defeat them." He concludes by stating that "when I left Asunción in 1931, Paraguay was already morally at war."

How does this situation, which this author perceives as a collective inheritance permeated by "the toxins of distrust, fear, and suspicion," this "hereditary poison," fit as a continuation of the historical process of the Francia and López dictatorships? Is it credible? Did Argentine literature play any role? I think it’s enough to recall Alberdi for reflection.



There are authors who believe they see in the former partners of the Triple Alliance a sort of guilty conscience for what happened in Paraguay, just as others see in the Chaco War an attempt at redemption, to heal the wounds of both belligerents. Paraguay with the "Guerra Guasú," and Bolivia with the Pacific War. I see a certain analogy between that historical moment and Paraguay’s struggle for the Chaco Boreal, claiming to be the victim, but quietly mobilizing, buying weapons on behalf of third parties, and being in a position to crush Bolivian forces in Boquerón and nearby forts by sheer numerical strength. And this against a world, perhaps due to its proximity to the disputed area, more inclined to see Paraguay as the attacked and Bolivia as the attacker, the aggressor, an image that the country to the west fueled not a little with the bravado and arrogance displayed by its military and politicians.

I have in my archive images circa 1931, of Paraguayan soldiers stationed in the remnants of the Curupaytí trenches, their greatest success against the allies, where I imagine seeing a ghostly wait for an enemy they hope will appear to be defeated. I see how the legend of Lopismo has not only turned the "marshal" into an eponymous hero but also portrayed Paraguay as a defenseless dove, unjustly crushed by the might of three nations. On the other hand, that Paraguay of despotism is presented as a developing nation, incomparable for its time. The similarities are abundant: López was also already preparing for war long before the allies; he was the one who attacked first, in Matto Grosso against Brazil and in Corrientes against Argentina. However, just a quick search on the web shows the proliferation of fabrications, which through repetition, have convinced not only Argentines but the world of the "justice" of the Lopista cause in that war. Argentine intellectuals, writers, and authors, especially those on the left, have played a significant role in this construction. Today, there are "scholars" who never tire of apologizing, sometimes seemingly just in case, to anyone who claims to have a score to settle with their own country. It’s worth noting that Brazilians, judging by their expressions on social media, display a very different attitude and don’t hesitate to proclaim themselves the victors, and rightly so. They haven’t even returned to Paraguay, despite repeated requests, war trophies like the "Cristiano" cannon, which remains in the Historical Museum of Rio de Janeiro.

Paraguayan networks post it as "Paraguayan historical heritage residing in Brazil."

Regarding Argentine support for Paraguay, I refer to the words of Paraguayan historian Julia Velilla de Arréllaga, who calls it an "essential aspect of the conflict," asserting that it was "decisive." She notes that this collaboration is spoken of very little in Paraguay because there was a pact of silence between the Paraguayan and Argentine leaders, because pressures from the Paraguayan press prevented leaders from confiding the help they received, because Argentina had proclaimed itself neutral, and because of the "subsequent partiality of the pro-Brazilian ruling sectors." Velilla concludes that "the truth is that Argentine aid was decisive and significant, even if it was (Admiral Casal)," because "how could Paraguay have continued the fight if it had not had Argentine support? It’s better not to consider such a scenario (José Fernando Talavera)."

Contributing to this, it is worth mentioning the supply of fuel, gasoline, and diesel throughout the war, as well as flour, since the Paraguayan soldier's ration was meat and hardtack, or at least something similar.

There is much more to say, but I will simply pay tribute to another of the Argentines who, when it came time to choose, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Paraguayans, and I do so with the words of ABC Revista, which speaks of "A Condor in the Chaco," referring to Riojan Vicente Almandos Almonacid, whose name is engraved on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris for his exploits as a combat pilot in the First World War. He was the one who organized the Paraguayan Air Force and flew the first missions. To be able to join the fight, he had to "sell his belongings and decorations."

I must also mention Colonel Abraham Schweizer, from Corrientes, who was stationed in Paraguay between 1931 and 1934. He became a legend, reportedly the one who designed the military strategy that Estigarribia implemented. Schweizer, reputed to be the most brilliant officer in the Argentine Army, founded the Paraguayan War School.

Finally, regarding Argentine intelligence support for Paraguay: When I was a first lieutenant, during a course, they brought in a very elderly colonel to honor him. We were told he was a sort of mathematical genius who, every morning with just paper and pencil, deciphered Bolivian—and Paraguayan—codes and delivered the clear messages to Minister Saavedra Lamas so he could proceed accordingly.



Source: Diario Epoca

Military Intervention to Banda Oriental: Battle of India Muerta

Battle of India Muerta

At the beginning of 1845 the fight was going to resume in the Argentine territory, but the war has never been interrupted. In Uruguay three armies of the Confederation are fighting and in Oribe's there are Argentine battalions. There has also been some insignificant meeting in Entre Ríos, promoted by the governor of Corrientes. But now Rosas will have before him the most notable of our soldiers, General Paz, who has just been appointed chief of the Allied Pacifying Army in Corrientes, and who has already begun to organize his troops. This appointment is not the only skill of the Corrientes government. His trade treaty with Paraguay, which Rosas considers a betrayal, because a province cannot agree with a foreigner, is the first step towards military collaboration.

Manuel Oribe defeated Fructuoso Rivera in Arroyo Grande (December 6, 1842). He lost all his army, and even his pistols and sword of honor, which he threw away in order to flee. This act of arms meant the end of the Federation of Uruguay that Rivera presided over. After that battle, the Rosas troops commanded by General Oribe crossed Uruguay, while Rivera's troops fled towards Montevideo without offering resistance. After that, Oribe with almost the entire country in his power. He set out to besiege Montevideo, in a siege that would last nine years and would be remembered by Uruguayan histography as the “Big Site”. And establish his seat of government in what is now known as the Cerrito de la Victoria neighborhood, in what was then the outskirts of Montevideo.

Fructuoso Rivera, who had not exercised acts of government except as he passed, at the points he occupied with his arms, was followed by the army under the command of Urquiza, who caught up with him in the Sierra de Malbajar, and forced him to cross the border and take refuge in Rio Grande. On behalf of the eastern government, Rivera addressed the Marquis de Caxias, Commander-in-Chief of the Empire's forces in that province, with whom he had had negotiations through his secretary, José Luis Bustamante. There he was able to reorganize with the help of weapons, clothing and horses that he received. The last days of January 1845 he passed to the eastern frontier. His divisions, under the command of Colonels Flores, Freire and Silveira, had minor clashes with those of Urquiza; but as he passed in mid-February from the north to the south of the Negro River and laid siege to the town of Melo, Urquiza gathered his forces and on the 21st moved from Cordobés in the direction of Cerro Largo. Rivera hid in the Sierra del Olimar and Cebollatí. Urquiza countermarched the 23rd of the Dead Fraile, and headed for the path of the blade, with the design of putting himself on the right flank and leading the way. But it was useless. Rivera, knowing the terrain, made Urquiza march and countermarch in order to ruin his horse and fall on him at a propitious moment. They remained like this until March 31, when Urquiza moved from his Los Chanchos camp, upon learning that Rivera, at the head of 3,000 men, was going to take the town of Minas. Urquiza was able to prevent him from reaching the San Francisco bar on time, but he had to remain at this point to give his horses a rest. On the 21st Rivera gathered his entire army and headed for Urquiza. On the 25th both armies sighted each other, and on the 26th he took up positions in the fields of India Muerta.

Rivera had just over 4,000 men; Urquiza had 3,000, most of them veterans. At sunrise on March 27, Urquiza led two strong guerrillas through the Sarandí stream, and behind them he advanced his columns, extending his line within Rivera's cannon shot, and made up the right: from the Entre Ríos division under the command of Colonel Urdinarrain ; center: three companies of the Entre Ríos battalion and three artillery pieces under the command of Major Francia; left: eight cavalry squadrons, two infantry companies and the eastern division commanded by Colonel Galarza. The Entre Ríos squadrons carried out a tremendous charge with saber and spear on the left and center of Rivera, the first made up of recently incorporated militias from the departments of Río Negro, and the second of an infantry battalion and two artillery pieces, respectively commanded by Colonels Baez, Luna, Silva and Tavares. The federal charges were irresistible, and very soon the battle on Rivera's right was reduced, where his best forces were under the command of General Medina, leader of the vanguard. Faced with the danger of being outflanked and encircled, Rivera personally went to his left to redo it, which he was able to accomplish by bringing some squadrons into combat. But Urquiza then launched his reserves, and after an hour of fierce fighting he completely defeated him, killing more than 400 men, among whom there were thirty-odd chiefs and officers; taking about 500 prisoners, the park, horses, all
to his correspondence, and even his sword with shots and balls.

“I notified you of the unfortunate event of the 27th –Rivera writes to his wife- unfortunately I suffered another contrast that forced us to cross the Yaguarón in a bit of a hurry. I lost part of the mount and since that day we have been under the protection of the imperial authorities”.

This victory forever destroyed the military influence of the director of the war against Rosas.

In Buenos Aires, where the news arrives on the last day of March, the triumph is celebrated with great parties: fireworks, downloads, lighting, flagging and street demonstrations with music. A column of four to five thousand people arrives in Palermo. There are deputies, judges, officials. Rosas does not show up to receive his tribute and they are attended by Manuelita.

At the end of January, Admiral Brown, by order of Rosas, has restored the blockade. No longer the partial blockade, like the previous year, to certain merchandises and the exemption for England and France, but the absolute one. But Admiral Lainé does not know. Converted since the previous year into an enemy of Rosas, into another Purvis, he applauds the legionnaires and says he cannot dissolve them because they are no longer French. At the same time, he harasses Oribe, ignores his rights and does not allow other Frenchmen to go to Buenos Aires. He has established in Montevideo, an undoubted intervention. He is the one who now rules there. Very little is missing for the city to be occupied by France. Rosas then decreed, to the indignation of the representatives of France and England, that the ships that had landed in Montevideo should not enter Buenos Aires, the true port of destination.

After India Muerta, the fall of Montevideo seemed inevitable. The government itself even declared that the city could not sustain itself for forty days with its own resources. Oribe convened in May for the renewal of the legislative assembly and elections for the president of the Republic, and proposes the surrender. Repulsed, he prepares to attack. Lainé and Inglefield declare that they will not allow the fall of the city. And that is when they provide it with weapons, ammunition and food and when troops land. And the government of Montevideo writes to the government of Brazil some infamous and shameful words according to which Uruguay, almost having to surrender to a foreign power, "rather than succumb under the blade of Rosas" -words verbatim- "would lie down with preference in the arms of an American power”. That is to say, that before being governed by their compatriot Oribe, hero of Uruguayan independence, one of the "33" and head of Ituzaingó, those bad Uruguayans prefer to be Brazilians, they prefer to hand over their homeland to Brazil, the only and perpetual enemy of Their independence.

Once again, foreigners prevent the fall of Montevideo. Now only four hundred and nine Orientals defend it. The rest of the troops are slaves, mostly belonging to foreigners and in number of six hundred and eighteen; and 2,500 foreigners, including 1,554 French. What have the remaining thousand Frenchmen done? The most serious, as well as others who never formed in the legion, have taken refuge in Buenos Aires. From here they address a petition to the French government, where these significant words are read: "Mr. Lainé, has he been sent to protect the dying party that dominates in Montevideo, or to protect us?" That dying party, those four hundred and nine men, now that Rivera's army does not exist, represent the Eastern State for France and England. And in the name of that handful of individuals, France and England come to get involved in the politics of La Plata, to rule as owners, to impose themselves with their cannons.

And the emigrants? The number of Argentines who defend the plaza is barely one hundred and thirty. Very few more are those who carry weapons. The rest are in Buenos Aires or in Brazil. But those few Argentines are the owners of the Montevideo government, mainly Florencio Varela. Varela must be happy, seeing the result of his mission to Europe, seeing his homeland about to go to war against the two great powers of the world, in danger of being destroyed and devastated.

Source

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado (2008).
• Gálvez, Manuel – Vida de Don Juan Manuel de Rosas – Ed. Tor – Buenos Aires (1954).
• Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar
• Saldías, Adolfo – Historia de la Confederación Argentina.

Source: www.revisionistas.com.ar