Argentina-Chile Naval Race: 1890-1905 (2/13)

Naval Race between Argentina and Chile, 1890-1905

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What was happening on the other side of the Cordillera?

As in all countries that wanted to emancipate themselves from Spanish power, at the beginning of the War of Independence, Chile did not have any warships, much less suitable crews for them. Given the above, the territorial defense plan did not involve a political policy at all. naval but to defeat the Spanish army on land 1.

Viceroy Abascal highlighted the Warren Frigates in Valparaíso, with the purpose of blocking the port, in order to boycott the insurgents' trade. It should be noted that Chile had declared free trade in its ports for all ships in the world.

José Miguel Carrera wrote to Francisco de La Lastra (governor of Valparaíso), with the aim of putting some ships under arms and lifting the blockade. This request, at the cost of efforts (popular spending, credits, etc.), managed to equip two named ships. like Perla and Potrillo 2, part of the weapons used were from a Portuguese merchant ship, which were seized by the government of Chile 3.

It was thought that once the blockade was broken, the “Chilean Fleet” could join the Argentine corsairs and harass Callao, but this did not happen, once both ships set sail, the Perla joined the Warren and both They attack Potrillo, thus ending the attempts to provide Chile with a squadron, during the Patria Vieja, the above happened on May 2, 1813.

Towards 1813 the United States and England were at war, given the above, the United States sent the frigate Essex to the South Pacific with the mission of harassing the English whalers that operated in this water. Thanks to this, Chile's trade benefited due to that the Essex's prizes were traded in Valparaíso, a situation that ended a year later when the Essex was captured by an English fleet 4.

Thanks to the Argentine privateers, the transportation of cargo from the Viceroyalty of Peru to Chile suffered setbacks, which hindered the military deployments of the Governor of Chile Marco Del Pont. In this way, added to Rodríguez's actions on land, it was possible for the Spanish army to It will be dispersed throughout the territory, facilitating the task of crossing the Andes to San Martín 5.

After the triumph of the Andes Army in Chacabuco, thanks to a stroke of audacity, the then Argentine Ensign Isidoro Suárez, captured the Spanish brig Águila 6 in Valparaíso, being incorporated as the first unit into the nascent Chilean navy, and was armed with 16 cannons and placed in the hands of the Irishman Raimundo Morris rescued the patriotic prisoners imprisoned on Juan Fernández Island. On January 16, 1818, O'Higgins and Minister Zenteno promulgated the decree allowing the promotion of roe deer patents 7.

After the patriotic triumph in the battle of Chacabuco, San Martín as commander in chief of the army of the Andes and O'Higgins as supreme director of Chile together with his minister of war and navy José Ignacio Zenteno dedicated themselves to the task of creating an navy With the objective of disputing the sea with the Spanish crown, for this purpose emissaries were sent abroad and ships and other equipment were acquired. The ships acquired were the Navío San Martín (64 guns), Frigate Lautaro (46 guns), Corvette Chacabuco ( 20 guns), Brigantín Araucano (16 guns), with these ships the capture of the frigate María Isabel and the other transports was carried out, this happened on October 28, 1818 8.

At the end of 1818, Thomas A. Cochrane, a Scot, arrived in Valparaíso to take charge of the nascent squadron. I will not detail the naval actions of this period given its length and because it is not relevant in this part of the forum.

The Chilean squadron then consisted of nine warships; but on August 10, the brig Pueyrredón was dispatched in charge of Captain Don Guillermo Prunier to take the most complicated individuals in the April conspiracy to the coast of New Granada, and the corvette Chacabuco was destined to remain in Valparaíso, under the command of Captain Juan José Tortel. The ships that were on the expedition were the following 9:

Almirante O 'Higgins Frigate

Cannons: 50
Crew: 516
Commander: Tomás Crosby

San Martín Ship

Cannons: 64
Crew: 492
Commander: Guillermo Wilkinson

Frigate Lautaro

Cannons: 50
Crew: 353
Commander: Martín Jorge Guise

Independencia Corvette

Cannons: 28
Crew: 256
Commander: Roberto Forster

Araucano Brigantine

Cannons: 16
Crew: 106
Commander: Tomás Carter

Brig Galvarino

Cannons: 18
Crew: 114
Commander: Juan Spry

Schooner Moctezuma

Cannons: 7
Crew: 87
Commander: Juan Esmonds

 
Cochrane left Chile in January 1823 and the ships of the squadron were demobilized from service. To face the Chiloé campaigns he found it necessary to hastily arm the ships and when Chiloé fell into the hands of Chile (beginning of 1826, last Spanish redoubt in America), the entire squadron was declared disarmed.

Given the poverty of the national treasury, in April 1826, the frigate María Isabel Maria Isabel (O'Higgins) and the corvettes Independencia and Chacabuco were put up for sale, being acquired by Argentina due to the urgency of the war they were fighting with Brazil over the Banda Oriental (Cisplatina), only the Chacabuco arrived in Buenos Aires but its condition was poor, the others sank in Talcahuano (Independencia), and Cape Horn (Maria Isabel) 10.

It should be noted that given the tremendous economic efforts for Chile to face the liberation expedition of Peru, the maintenance of the ships was deficient and the sailors were unpaid. By mid-1826, the squadron was disarmed and the naval school closed, leaving only the brig Aquiles in operational status.

The navy would only emerge again in 1836 before the war against the Peru-Bolivian confederation (1836-1839), when it began it only had the Brig Aquiles and the Schooner Colo Colo, then this fleet was increased by 5 more ships, given the capture of the boat Santa Cruz, the brig Arequipeño and the schooner Peruviana in Callao, plus the capture of General Freire of the frigate Monteagudo, brig Orbegoso 11.

Once the conflict was over, the squad again declared disarmament, maintaining only a few units for the needs of the service. In 1843, President General Manuel Bulnes Prieto (Who directed the 1838 campaign against the Peru-Bolivia confederation), ordered Captain Juan Guillermos to took possession of the Strait of Magellan, at that time Juan Guillermos was maritime governor of Chiloé, in the city of Ancud, he dedicated himself to the construction of a schooner (which would be named Ancud), to carry out the requested undertaking.

It is not the topic of the present to address the border disputes between Chile and Argentina but, as the topic indicates, to address the arms race between Chile and Argentina between the 19th century until the May Pacts, the above is only due to a very brief historical review of the navies of both countries.

Between the years 1840 and 1863, the Chilean navy experienced a great decline, a powerful ship was commissioned from France but it was built with poor materials so its useful life was short (Chile Frigate).

During that period there were not enough funds to order the construction of steamships. Given the lack, the decision was made to build them in Chile precisely in the Constitución and Valparaíso shipyards. In 1852, the corvette Esmeralda was commissioned in England (which was sunk in the Naval Battle). of Iquique in 1879), in this way at the beginning of the war with Spain (1864-1866), Chile only had the Esmeralda and the Vapor Maipú (strictly speaking, only the Esmeralda was a warship), in the face of this contingency and after the Chinchas Islands were taken in 1863, it was decided to commission the acquisition of the corvettes Chacabuco and O'Higgins, in 1865 the schooner Covadonga was captured and in 1866 two more corvettes were acquired (Abtao and Pampero), only the first of them arriving. , and Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna acquires in the United States 4 wheeled steamers called Poncas (Ñuble), Isabella (Concepción), Shaw Nork (Arauco) and Cheroke (Ancud) all in poor condition 12, this due to the failure of the negotiations for the acquisition of Dundemberg 13.

With the exception of the Abtao, none of these ships arrived for the war. At the end of the war, Chile had 9 naval units, viz.

Corvettes: Esmeralda, Abtao, Chacabuco and O`Higgins (these arrived in 1868).
Schooner: Virgin of Covadonga.
Steamers: Ñuble, Concepción, Arauco and Ancud.

The 4 steamers were lost in accidents or storms, in which their poor integrity was the fundamental cause.

So far I leave this brief review of the navy since its creation. From here on, a process of arms race between the republics of Chile and Argentina begins slowly but steadily, which would end momentarily with the pacts of May 1902.

Sources

1. El poder Naval y la Independencia de Chile, Donald E. Worcester, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, pagina 3. 
2. Breve Historia Naval de Chile, Carlos López Urrutia, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1976, Argentina, pagina 27. 
3. Donald E. Worcester, obra citada, página 8 
4. Donald E. Worcester, obra citada, página 14 
5. Obras citadas de López Urrutia y Worcester y pagina web de la armada de Chile  
6. Biografías Argentina y Sudamericanas, Capitán de Fragata Jacinto R. Yaben, Editorial Metrópolis, talleres Gráficos Contreras, Argentina pagina 767. 
7. El libertador Bernardo O`Higgins Riquelme, editorial Lord Cochrane, Santiago, paginas 137-138
8. Breve Historia Naval de Chile, Carlos López Urrutia, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1976, Argentina, paginas 36-38. 
9. Tomado textual del Tomo XII, Historia General de Chile, Diego Barros Arana, Editorial Universitaria – Centro de Estudios Diego Barros Arana, Santiago 2005, Página 456, segunda edición. 
10. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo II página 364-365. 
11. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo II página 399-402. 
12. La Guerra Entre España y las Republicas del Pacífico, Alfonso Cerda Catalán, Editorial Puerto de Palos, Chile páginas 219. 
13. 10 Months of Mission to the United States as Confidential Agent of Chile, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, Imprenta de la Libertad, Santiago 1867, Volumes I and II, Volume II There is a report that Mackenna presented to the executive as an account of his mission, This report corresponds to Appendix V, in Volume I some details of the negotiations appear.

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 (1/13)

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 

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Organic Growth and Development of the Argentine Navy: 1810-1902

Although the May Revolution of 1810 marked the end of the colonial era in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, on the opposite bank of the Plata, remained in the hands of the royalists. From this station, a powerful and well-trained squadron under the command of Captain Jacinto de Romarate soon established a blockade of Buenos Aires and threatened to cut the lines of communication along the coast. The patriot authorities reacted quickly and in August acquired three merchant ships, suitable to be transformed into warships. These were: the brig "25 de Mayo", the schooner "Invencible", and the sloop "Americano". An Argentine veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, and former lieutenant of the Spanish navy, Francisco de Gurrucharaga dedicated himself vigorously to equipping this small squadron. The poverty of the treasury, the lack of trained personnel and materials complicated his task. The command of this flotilla was entrusted to Juan Bautista Azopardo, a privateer of Maltese origin, who was supported by two French privateers: Hipólito Bouchard and Angel Hubac. On February 10, 1811, three of the patriot ships set sail from Buenos Aires and headed towards the Paraná River. On March 2, the patriot squadron was intercepted by a powerful royalist squadron. In the fierce combat that took place, numerical and training superiority prevailed. Aboard the "25 de Mayo", 41 crew members out of a total of 50 on board were injured or killed. To the dismay of the patriots, the first Argentine naval squadron was captured and towed to Montevideo, where after being repaired, the ships were incorporated into the royalist fleet (1)

Phoenix Bird

On July 7, a royalist squadron bombed Buenos Aires, although not without being punished. Bouchard, who was in charge of a gunboat armed with a solitary 18-pounder cannon, went out in search of the royalist ships, managed to inflict serious damage on one of them, causing the enemy to retreat. As a result of this attack; The patriot government equipped a second squadron consisting of the schooners "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" and "Santo Domingo", the ketch "Hiena" and four smaller boats. The royalist fleet reappeared again off Buenos Aires on August 19, but when Bouchard directed his ships towards it, the enemy withdrew and tried, ineffectively, to bombard Buenos Aires from a safe distance. On October 20, 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo concluded an armistice that provided for the cessation of hostilities and the end of the blockade. While the national government disarmed its flotilla, the royalists violated the armistice and proceeded to bomb towns on the Argentine coast with impunity, attacking commercial ships at will. This in turn motivated the creation of the third Argentine naval squadron, which was organized by an Irish merchant captain; Buenos Aires resident William Brown, who is very rightly considered the father of the Argentine navy. This squadron was made up of a frigate, four corvettes, a brig, five schooners and other smaller ships. The officers were mostly foreigners, but soon a growing number of Creoles joined the fleet. (2)

 
San Nicolás Battle

In May 1814 Brown defeated the royalist fleet that once dominated the Rio de la Plata. This triumph in turn made possible the blockade and subsequent taking of Montevideo. This magnificent victory deprived Spain of the only base of operations it had in South America and granted control of the waters to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Furthermore, in order to harass and destroy Spanish trade in the region, the government of Buenos Aires began to grant letters of marque to foreign privateers, among whom those of American nationality predominated. The exact number of these privateers is unknown, although it is known that one of these privateer ships was active in 1815, 4 in 1816, 23 in 1819, 10 in 1820 and two in 1821. In 1815 the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata was the only Spanish American nation that the royalists had not managed to subjugate. In Spain, a powerful expedition was organized that would be commanded by General Pablo de Morillo who had been assigned the task of taking Buenos Aires, but the loss of Montevideo forced Spain to consider its strategy and Morillo's expedition was dispatched towards New Granada, the current Republic of Colombia.(3)

Expedition to the Pacific

In 1816 Brown led an Argentine squadron on a cruise to the Pacific. These ships blockaded Lima and Guayaquil, captured California and hit Spanish maritime trade vigorously. The frigate "La Argentina", commanded by Hipólito Bouchard that was part of this flotilla, separated from the other ships and was the first Argentine flag ship to circumnavigate the world. (4)

A Chilean naval historian describes the outcome of Brown's cruise in the following terms:

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5) 

War against Brazil: 1825-1828

At the end of the wars of independence, the ARA was reduced to a minimum and most of its ships were sold to private shipowners. In 1825, when the war with Brazil broke out, the Argentine fleet consisted of four frigates, two corvettes and 12 gunboats built in Bajo, on the banks of Buenos Aires and armed with old 24-piece pieces taken from the fort of that city. Command of the fleet was again entrusted to Brown. In direct contrast, the fleet of the Brazilian Empire, manned by a plethora of high-ranking English officers and subordinates, veterans of the Napoleonic wars; It had 108 warships, of which half were larger units (frigates, corvettes, brigs) and the rest were gunboats and schooners armed in war of various types and sizes. In a rapid series of battles, the Argentine navy managed to defeat the powerful imperial fleet, and although the latter blocked Buenos Aires, the lines of communication between the United Provinces and the Eastern Band of Uruguay, where the Argentine army was located, They were never cut off or even affected. On the other hand, despite the notorious lack of resources and the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, between 1825 and 127 the Argentine navy managed to destroy or capture more than 50 Brazilian warships, many of which were incorporated into the navy. national and employed with great energy and great skill against their former owners. In addition, Argentine warships and corsairs from Buenos Aires captured 445 Brazilian merchant ships (6)

The Era of Rosas (1829-1852)-Fights for Argentine unification: 1852-1862

During the Rosas era (1829-52) the navy became essentially a riverine force, adequate enough to defeat the Uruguayan fleet in a series of battles throughout the year 1841, but not strong or modern enough to confront to the Anglo-French squadron sent to Plata in 1845. A maritime academy in which officers were trained operated until 1830, then naval cadets were assigned to fleet units. The Argentine navy would not enter the age of steam until 1851. The two nation states that emerged in Argentina after the overthrow of Rosas in 1852 established squadrons equipped with war-armed steam merchant vessels, most of which would be incorporated into the national navy after the Argentine reunification that occurs as a result of the Battle of Pavón. However, by mid-1865, the fleet was reduced to a few vessels in service, the rest having been reduced to pontoon status or serving as storage hulls. The navy did not have a land infrastructure, naval bases or even warships themselves. It was painfully evident that the navy had not experienced adequate development, not only in comparison to the fleets of the great powers, but also in comparison to the fleets of neighboring countries such as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay.

The War with Paraguay (1865-1870)

When the Paraguayan War broke out, the Argentine navy was reduced to a handful of armed merchant steamers, sailing cutters and old hulls that served as floating stores of material. There was no infrastructure on land, nor training centers for the training of personnel. Although during the war, the command of the allied armies was entrusted to the president of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre, given the fact that among the allies, only Brazil had a navy worthy of the name, the Viscount of Tamandaré was placed in charge. charge of naval operations. The participation of the Argentine navy in this conflict, due to lack of suitable material, was reduced mainly to transportation and logistical support missions. (7)


 
Crew of the Steamship "25 de Mayo", captured in Corrientes, beginning the Argentine intervention in the Paraguayan War

Development of Institutes and land infrastructure: 1872-1902

The first steps on the long road towards modernization and expansion would be taken during the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74). A figure of extraordinary creativity, whom North American historian Hubert Herring described as "Possibly the only practical genius to emerge from Spanish America," Sarmiento devoted considerable time and thought to the importance of naval power for communications and defense. . Therefore, when Major Clodomiro Uturbey, a graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, proposed the creation of a similar establishment in Argentina, Sarmiento gave his support to this initiative. The necessary legislation was promulgated on October 2, 1872 and three days later the Naval Military School (ENM) was officially established aboard the steamship "General Brown", where it operated until 1877, when as a result of the "gabanes mutiny", The government ordered the closure of the ENM, although this measure did not interrupt the "curriculum" of the cadets who were simply transferred to various units of the navy until the ENM was transferred to a new headquarters in the heart of Buenos Aires. The number of cadets in the ENM grew gradually: 15 in 1872, 50 in 1883 and would exceed the figure of 70 in 1887 although the true growth would not occur until 1893, when the ENM was transferred again, this time to Juan's former residence Manuel de Rosas in Palermo, previously used by the Military College of the Nation. The cadet corps began to grow rapidly from then on: 77 in 1895, 88 in 1896, 110 in 1897 and 140 in 1898 (8)

Initially, the course of study at the ENM lasted six semesters. The first included geometry, rectilinear trigonometry, drawing, foreign languages, ballistics and general education. Spatial geometry, physics, naval astronomy and other academic subjects were studied in subsequent semesters, while practical teaching similarly progressed from the duties of a private seaman to those of a helmsman, from piloting small vessels to the duties and responsibilities of an officer. The later semesters emphasized the teaching of shipbuilding techniques, steam propulsion, international law, naval gunnery, and history. The cadets were then assigned to warships in service on the Patagonian coasts and the recently graduated midshipmen were assigned to a flotilla of sailing cutters that patrolled those latitudes, thus acquiring valuable experience. Long-duration trans-oceanic voyages began in the early 1880s, when the ENM received a new steam corvette specially designed as a training ship, we refer to the corvette "La Argentina". At the end of the 1890s this unit would be replaced by the ARA frigate "Sarmiento", a 2800-ton displacement unit, which in turn inaugurated the era of circumnavigation of the world. At the end of the 19th century, the prestige and efficiency of the ENM transcended the country's borders, and was fully recognized abroad, which is why students from neighboring countries competed in the entrance exams to this institution. (9)

In 1875, the School of Apprentice-Sailors was created aboard the boat "Vanguardia", and the following year, a reformatory for young people was established aboard the pontoon "General Paz", designated "Correccional de Menores", although the practice of sentencing young offenders of the penal code to serve in the army was abandoned soon after. In its replacement, the School of Cabins was established aboard the boat "Cabo de Hornos", a unit that during the period 1879-1884 patrolled the Patagonian coasts until it was removed from service, and replaced by the training ship "La Argentina". The Artillery School was established aboard the monitor "El Plata" in 1877 and the Artillery Apprentice School, where cannon corporals were trained, operated aboard various units since its creation in 1881. Firefighters, machinists and electricians received training at the School of Navy Mechanics, which existed under various names since 1880. Finally, the Torpedo School was established in 1883, aboard a ship incorporated at that time, the ARA torpedo ram "Maipú". (10)

In January 1879, the Central Hydrography Office (OCH) was established, which would be responsible for exploring and charting the coasts and waterways, as well as the construction of lighthouses and beacons. In January 1881, the newly created Naval Observatory was attached to the OCH. In this way, the ARA obtained a valuable wealth of information regarding the Argentine interior rivers and the Patagonian coasts. (11)

As can be seen, the ARA placed special emphasis on the training of officers and junior personnel. In 1883, the ARA had a strength of 2,000 men, which included 1,503 sailors, 320 officers (including 48 cadets from the engineering branch) and 133 ensigns and cadets. During the struggles for national reunification and through the Paraguayan War, the ARA hired Argentine and foreign merchant sailors to complete some of the crews of its ships. The services of Argentine merchant ships were also contracted, including their crews for quarantine tasks and logistical support missions. During the 1880s-1890s the ARA experienced a shortage of specialists and machine personnel, so a substantial number of foreign specialists were hired. The naval ranking of 1891 revealed that of a total of 83 engineering officers, 32 were foreigners. In 1897, of a total of 155 officers in this branch, 97 were natives of the country, and the rest were foreigners. As the fleet grew in number, and the ships that were added were invariably of greater tonnage and technically more advanced than their predecessors, the need to increase personnel became apparent. For example, the four "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers in the late 1890s required an average of 25 officers and 440 men per unit, a total of 109 officers and 1,636 crew. In 1902 the ARA had a strength of 8,336 men, a figure that included 327 line officers, 297 officer-engineers, 7,760 sailors and 450 marines. The growing importance of the navy was tacitly recognized on March 15, 1898, when the navy obtained the status of an independent force, that is, it no longer depended on the Ministry of War and Navy. From now on, it would be regulated by the Ministry of the Navy. (12)

Stations and bases

As the ARA increased its fleet and the ships added were increasingly larger, the ARA had to establish a network of naval stations and bases throughout the republic. Although we must deal with the expansion of the fleet separately, we must mention that the first modern units incorporated were shallow draft ships that could anchor in Rio de la Plata or in the Zárate naval base, but as fleet units were added increased tonnage the need for a deep water port became apparent. The town of Punta Alta, in the south of the Province of Buenos Aires was selected for said installation. A famous Italian engineer, Luigi Luiggi, was assigned to design the plans. Work began in 1898, and in July the first three coastal artillery batteries intended to protect the future base had already been placed. Upon completion of the works, in 1902 this strategic port, called Puerto Militar, would emerge as the largest naval base in South America, with enough space to house 20 "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers. The facilities covered an area of 3000 hectares. A strategic railway connected the base with the city of Bahía Blanca, while batteries of cannons and coastal howitzers protected it against the eventuality of a naval attack. (13)

Coastal Artillery Corps

Coastal artillery did not receive special attention until the 1870s. Until 1879, coastal defense had been the responsibility of the army, whose Plaza Artillery Battalion garrisoned the island of Martín García. The Coastal Artillery Corps, established on November 15, 1879 under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Sellstrom, former professor of ballistics at the ENM and superlative engineer. The Coastal Artillery Corps also provided marine infantry and protection forces, but the only existing fortifications were those of Martín García. During the Paraguayan War, the Ministry of War had ordered the construction of five barbettes of material that would mount 36 pieces of artillery, but in mid-1866 only 18 cannons had been installed, and even these were archaic relics inherited from the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and low caliber. During Sarmiento's government, the first modern artillery pieces: 4 381 mm Rodmans and six 254 mm Parrotts were placed on the island. In 1877 these guns were complemented by a battery of 177 mm (7 in) Armstrong pieces that fired 150-pound anti-armor grenades, giving Martín García a true strategic capability. In the mid-1880s, Martín García's cannons and other installations were already outdated, since models with greater penetration capacity and greater range had appeared. The ARA selected the Krupp mod. 1887 240 mm L.35 as regulatory equipment for its batteries, and pieces of this type were located in Martín García, the Zárate Naval Arsenal and in Puerto Militar. In 1899 they would be complemented with three Krupp mod howitzer batteries. 1899 280mm L.11. Meanwhile, the constant tension with Chile led to an expansion of the ARA, whose fleet would be in 1898 the most powerful and best equipped in South America. (14)

1. Rauch, George , Conflict in the Southern Cone; the Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (Praeger (Wesport, Conecticut and London, 1999).pag. 101-102
2. Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone..Ibid pag.102-103
3. Iid, pag. 103-104
4. Iid pag.104
5. Lopez Urrutia, Carlos, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1969) pag. 26
6. Baldrich, Amadeo J, Historia de la guerra del Brasil: Contribucion al estudio razonado de la historia militar argentina (Imprenta La Harlem, Buenos Aires, 1905) pag.258-70, Rauch, op cit, pag. 104
7. Rauch, op cit, pag 104-105
8. Burzio Humberto, Armada Nacional: Reseña Historica de su origen y desarrollo orgánico (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B, No 1, Buenos Aires, 1960) pag.160 -161, Burzio, Humberto, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B. 1972, Buenos Aires, 3 vols., 1972) I; 246-248,320-321, 352-353, Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
9. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar, I: 236-27 ,337-338, 367.
10. Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
11. Burzio, Armada nacional, pag.1590160, Rauch op cit, pag. 117
12. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar;II: 458-459, 767-
13. Rauch, p cit, pag. 117. Rauch, op it, pag.116-1177
14. Triado, Juan Enrique, Historia de la Base Naval Puerto Belgrano (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Centro Naval, Buenos Aires, 1992) pag.67-8, Rauch pag.117118

Author: André Marois