In 1971, the Argentine flag was hoisted for the first time on the Guppy IA-class submarine USS "Chivo" as it was renamed ARA "Santiago del Estero" for the Argentine Navy.
Operation Corina: The Attempted Sinking of ARA Santiago del Estero.
On March 4, 1973, in a key operation for national security, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police foiled one of the most dangerous subversive conspiracies of the time: the so-called "Operation Corina." The objective of this extremist group, belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), was to sink the submarine ARA Santiago del Estero at the Mar del Plata Naval Base and carry out coordinated attacks on various strategic points in the city. This attack was part of a broader plan to sow chaos in the country in the days leading up to the general elections on March 11, 1973. However, a meticulous investigation and swift police action dismantled the terrorist cell before it could execute its plan.
The GUPPY IA-class submarine S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, formerly USS Chivo (SS-341), underway. The ARA Santiago del Estero was incorporated into the Argentine Navy and decommissioned in 1981. Nevertheless, it served a wartime role in 1982 during the South Atlantic Conflict, being used as a decoy when it was secretly towed out of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and hidden to create confusion among the enemy, making them believe the submarine was operating in the open sea.
The raid that dismantled the operation took place in a chalet at the corner of Matías Strobel and Blas Parera, in the heart of Parque Luro. There, officers from Regional Unit IV arrested eight FAR members, a group that, despite portraying itself as a defender of the proletariat, was mostly composed of individuals from wealthy families, with university backgrounds and no real connection to the working class. Among the detainees were Jesús María Aguinagale, Daniel Roque Armengol, Osvaldo Alfredo Lenti, María Cristina Bonfiglio de Armengol, and Beatriz Mariana Quiroga de Porfirio, among others. A significant arsenal was seized at the scene, including UZI submachine guns, Browning pistols, Rubí .32 caliber revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, and large quantities of ammunition and explosives. Many of these weapons had been stolen in previous bank robberies and attacks on police facilities, demonstrating the high level of organization within the group.
But the most revealing discovery was the documentation found inside the chalet. Sketches, maps, and blueprints detailed the operation’s targets with precision, including the Mar del Plata Naval Base, the port, and YPF’s fuel depots. Other secondary targets were also identified, such as the 1st Police Station of Necochea, which they planned to seize to obtain police weaponry. The plan was to carry out these attacks simultaneously on March 11, coinciding with the national elections, with the aim of triggering a security crisis and undermining the country’s stability.
In today’s Argentina, the same terrorists whom the government, the judiciary, and the media have turned into "victims," honoring them with monuments and official recognition, were responsible for the murder of Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya. Her only "crime" was being at her newspaper stand working that morning of April 10, 1974, in Rosario. On that busy street, she became the victim of a terrorist ambush aimed at assassinating two Argentine Army officers. While her killers were granted compensation, tributes, and state honors, Elcira and her family were condemned to oblivion, ignored to this day.
On April 10, 1972, in Rosario, a group of approximately 15 FAR extremists ambushed and murdered Major General Juan Carlos Sánchez, head of the Argentine Army’s II Army Corps. That same day, the subversive forces also executed Oberdán Sallustro. Among the attackers were some of the militants who, a year later, would be captured in Mar del Plata on March 4, 1973, while planning to attack the Naval Base and sink the S-22 ARA Santa Fe submarine. During the attack on General Sánchez, Army Sergeant Berneche, who was driving the official vehicle, was seriously wounded, and Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya, an innocent civilian who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, was killed.
The attack on ARA Santiago del Estero was the central objective of the operation. Acquired by the Argentine Navy in 1971, the submarine was a Balao-class vessel, modernized with Guppy IA technology to enhance its combat capabilities. Its destruction would have been a devastating blow to the operational capacity of the Argentine fleet in the context of the Cold War, where the country’s Armed Forces played a key role in the hemisphere’s strategic balance. According to the intelligence gathered, three members of the group had received specialized diving training and were planning to place an explosive charge beneath the submarine’s hull. For months, they had conducted night drills in nearby waters, practicing approach maneuvers with inflatable boats and studying the naval guards’ movements.
The police operation led to the arrest of one of the divers involved in the incursion, Alfredo Ruscio, who confessed that the cell was fully prepared to act and was merely awaiting orders from their superiors. This statement triggered an emergency protocol in Mar del Plata. Security was reinforced at the Naval Base, the port, police stations, and other strategic locations, including the Mar del Plata Golf Club, which had been identified in the seized documents as a potential secondary target. Authorities intensified controls throughout the city, aware that part of the group remained at large and could attempt further attacks.
Thanks to these preventive measures, the attack was completely thwarted. The capture of the group and the confiscation of their weapons and explosives prevented the operation from proceeding, averting what could have been one of the most devastating assaults on the country's military infrastructure. However, the story did not end there.
Just months later, in a decision that exposed the weakness of the state in the face of the terrorist threat, the detainees were released by the government of Héctor Cámpora. This mass pardon, which included hundreds of imprisoned subversive militants, allowed many of them to return to clandestine operations and resume their criminal activities. Several of those involved in “Operation Corina” later participated in further attacks, proving that Argentina’s fight against terrorism was far from over.
The once-glorious Buenos Aires Provincial Police, relentless against the Castro-Guevarist terrorist enemy of the Argentine Nation, has since been corrupted, degraded, disarmed, dismantled, and undermined by Argentine politicians from 1983 to the present through their ideological revenge. It has been reduced to a lifeless security agency, barely capable of serving political demagoguery. However, this does not apply to the vast majority of its members, who still stand strong in defense of the nation, putting their lives on the line against crime every day.
The context in which this terrorist plot was conceived cannot be understood without analyzing the global landscape of the time. During the 1970s, Argentina became a key battleground in the Cold War, with revolutionary groups supported by communist powers and a state that often wavered between repression and permissiveness. Declassified documents years later confirmed that organizations such as FAR and Montoneros operated with funding and training from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Their goal was not merely to fight the government in power but to establish a revolutionary regime through violence and the destruction of republican institutions.
Operation Manuel in the Czechoslovak Service
Copy of the March 1967 report from StB Intelligence (Státní bezpečnost: State Security) of Czechoslovakia A-00921/10-67, written three years after the launch of "Operation Manuel" as an assessment by the First Administration, with a copy sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Eighth Department. The report details the objectives and scope of the operation, including the destruction of all nationalist and democratic movements in Latin America through institutional destabilization, particularly targeting the Armed Forces and Security Forces. It also outlines the recruitment, training, and equipping of subversive agents, their command structure, and financial support.
Additionally, more than 10,000 similar documents have been declassified by the Czech Republic, which acted as an operational intermediary between the USSR and Cuba, from where terrorist operations in Argentina were coordinated. These documents undeniably prove that Argentina was subversively and genocidally attacked by agents of a global superpower and several other nations.
Transcription in Czech
Zpráva 27.10.1966
Akce MANUEL – perspektiva.
V průběhu svého pobytu v Francii SVISTO hovořil v tom smyslu, že nadále bude při vysílání lidí do LA dbát především na kvalitu. Z jeho vysvětlení vyplývá, že ztráta osob, vyslaných v rámci akce MANUEL, bude klesat a navrhl, že v současné a další práci (vyladit po sřízení technické součásti) na přípravu tematické zprávy slova smyslu.
Pokud se týká akce MANUEL, chceme tuto i nadále realizovat co nejlépe v souladu s připomínkami (k časovým) k technice hlášení přechodů a ke kategorii „Mastníků akce“, která se mění na rezidenturu krátkého setonu telegramem č. …, což bylo rozváděné s kádrem jednajícím RICHARD, jenž projevil pro tyto přecházející plně pochopení. Jako pochopitelně všem těm, dočasně termíny hlášení přechodu, za níž se mají i lo. odbor, že v rámci sotva politicky dojdete. Byl v řádu byl dobré vztah ze strany rezidentury na dodržování těchto termínů alespoň u těch nejdůležitějších případů, kteří jsou z hlediska majitelůvání technické dokumentace a tím v Maďarsku poměrně komplikovanější než je normální přechod.
Souvislosti se skora uvedeným prohlášením JURA 1 v souvislosti – podobnými zprávami z rezidentury na další perspektivu hlášení přechodu, které jsme formě pochopitelně, že hlášení přechodu vůbec důležitá násobně přihlášeného počtu osob, které snad obětují několik půl roku nebo 1 roku přejdou Francii a jejich zprávy bude třeba zajistit vratné jako u jako deset.
Závěrem, bude tuto otázku při nejbližší vhodné příležitosti zjemnit, bude o tom především informován, a to hlásit hlavní závady plánů i potřeb technického zabezpečení a pak hlásit na příslušnou akci v centrále a v určitka orgánech.
Translation to English:
Report 27.10.1966
Operation MANUEL – Perspective.
During his stay in France, SVISTO stated that, in the future, when sending people to LA (Latin America), special attention would be given to quality. From his explanation, it follows that the loss of individuals sent under Operation MANUEL will decrease, and he proposed that, in both current and future work (after fine-tuning the technical component), a thematic report be prepared for this purpose.
Regarding Operation MANUEL, we intend to continue executing it in the best possible way, in accordance with the comments on the timing and technique of crossing reports, as well as with the category of "Operation Mastníků," which is being modified in the residency through a short telegram No. …, a matter that was discussed with agent RICHARD, who expressed full understanding for these crossings. As is clear to all involved, the temporary crossing reporting deadlines must be coordinated with the relevant department, as political conditions will barely allow for any progress. There was good cooperation from the residency in adhering to these deadlines, at least in the most crucial cases, which, from the perspective of technical documentation management in Hungary, are considerably more complicated than a normal crossing.
In connection with the recent declaration by JURA 1 and similar reports from the residency on the future perspective of crossing reports, it is evident that the importance of these reports increases proportionally with the number of registered individuals. It is estimated that some of these individuals will be able to cross into France within a period of six months to a year, and it will be necessary to ensure their reporting in a manner similar to previous cases.
In conclusion, this issue will be clarified at the earliest appropriate opportunity. The main objective will be to report on the major planning issues and technical support needs and subsequently report the corresponding action to headquarters and the responsible authorities.
Operation Corina
The case of Operation Corina is merely a reflection of the undeclared war that was being waged in Argentina at the time. The struggle between state forces and armed organizations intensified over time, leading to a spiral of violence that left thousands dead and disappeared. The release of those responsible for this failed attack was not only an act of impunity but also set a dangerous precedent that weakened the country's ability to confront the terrorist threat.
At Dock No. 2 of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal—the largest dry dock in all of Latin America—we observed the presence of the Argentine Navy’s Guppy-class submarines, ARA *Santiago del Estero* and ARA *Santa Fe*, both undergoing maintenance.
As the 1970s progressed, attacks on military and civilian targets became increasingly frequent. Kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings dominated the country’s agenda, creating a climate of insecurity that led to stricter security policies and open confrontation between the State and insurgent organizations. By 1976, Argentina would enter a new phase, where the fight against subversion would be led by the Armed Forces in a conflict that would forever change the country's history.
Today, the failed attempt to sink the ARA Santiago del Estero remains a symbol of a time when the nation was torn between order and chaos, between democracy and political violence. The story of Operation Corina is not only a reminder of the danger posed by these extremist groups but also a warning about the consequences of impunity and the lack of a clear policy to combat terrorism.
The submarine Santiago del Estero enters the Naval Base. In the background, the facilities of the Mar del Plata Golf Club can be seen—both were targets of the genocidal Castro-Guevarist organization FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) in March 1973. (Photo from La Nación newspaper.)
Many questions remain unanswered. To what extent did the political decisions of that era contribute to prolonging the conflict? What role did foreign interests play in the radicalization of armed groups? Has Argentina learned from its past, or is it still repeating the same mistakes?
What is certain is that, five decades later, the scars of that struggle remain in the country's memory. Operation Corina was just one of many episodes in an internal war that left an indelible mark on Argentine history, a legacy that continues to spark debate today.
The Attack on ARA Santísima Trinidad
The ARA Santiago del Estero submarine was the first strategic target of extremist forces, preceding the ARA Santísima Trinidad destroyer. However, in 1973, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police successfully prevented that attack. The destroyer D-2 ARA Santísima Trinidad, commissioned in 1969 by the Argentine Navy and AFNE for construction in Argentina, was the most advanced warship of its kind at the time. At a moment when few believed Argentina could achieve such a technological leap, the country became the first in Latin America to build a missile-launching, helicopter-carrying warship.
Built between 1972 and 1977, the ship's completion was delayed by a Castro-Guevarist terrorist attack. While it was in its final assembly stages, a sabotage operation severely damaged it and partially sank it in 1975. On August 22, 1975, Montonero terrorists attempted to destroy the ARA Santísima Trinidad. Although they failed to do so by force at the time, they ultimately succeeded 28 years later by infiltrating Argentina's political sphere under the guise of Peronism. Additionally, an Argentine Navy officer involved in the project, Commander Bigliardi, was assassinated by the same extremist organization that sought to prevent the project from ever coming to fruition.
Despite these setbacks, the destroyer officially entered service in 1977, just in time to participate in naval operations during the near-war conflict with Chile in 1978. In 1982, the ARA Santísima Trinidad served as the flagship of the Argentine Navy during "Operation Rosario," the mission to reclaim the Malvinas Islands. Throughout the conflict, it also acted as an escort vessel for the ARA 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier, which, on May 1–2, 1982, pursued the British Task Force, forcing it to evade combat. The destroyer continued patrolling the Argentine Sea throughout the war, prepared for a planned Argentine naval counteroffensive in late June or early July—an operation that never materialized due to the fall of Puerto Argentino and the subsequent overthrow of President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri.
The vessel remained operational until 1987, when maintenance difficulties arose due to its British origin and the arms embargo imposed on Argentina. As a result, some of its components were cannibalized to provide spare parts for its sister ship, the ARA Hércules. Decommissioned and placed in reserve, the destroyer awaited a modernization and reactivation that never came.
Ironically, in the early 2000s, when members of the same Castro-Guevarist terrorist organization that had tried and failed to destroy the ship in the 1970s gained control of the Ministry of Defense, they finally succeeded—not through sabotage, but through deliberate political neglect. The destroyer, which neither Cold War subversion nor one of the world’s most powerful navies could sink in open war, was ultimately destroyed by Argentine politicians—former members of the very terrorist group that had once fought against it.
