Showing posts with label UN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UN. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

Diplomacy: José María Ruda at the UN in 1964

José María Ruda Action at the NU in 1964




In 1964, an Argentine diplomat succeeded in placing the question of the Malvinas at the heart of world politics. It was not a symbolic gesture, nor a rhetorical exercise designed merely to place a protest on record. It was a legal and diplomatic intervention of remarkable precision, conceived to demonstrate before the United Nations that the British presence in the Islas Malvinas was not the product of some natural or uncontested historical development, but the consequence of a colonial act of force carried out in 1833.

On 9 September 1964, Ambassador José María Ruda appeared before the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation and set out Argentina’s case with clarity, discipline and firmness. His argument was straightforward in form, yet profound in its legal implications: the Islas Malvinas formed part of Argentine territory and had remained under unlawful British occupation since the expulsion of the Argentine authorities established there in 1833. In presenting the matter in those terms, Ruda did more than restate a national claim. He framed the dispute within the language of international legality, stripped it of imperial narrative, and restored it to its true character as an unresolved question of sovereignty.

The force of his address lay not only in the historical account of the British seizure, but in the legal consequences that flowed from it. Ruda argued that, following the occupation, the Argentine presence on the islands was displaced and a new population was established under British colonial authority. That point was fundamental. It meant that the present-day population of the islands could not be treated, in strict legal terms, as though it existed independently of the original act of force. To do so would be to convert the effects of occupation into a source of legal entitlement.

It was precisely on this ground that Ruda rejected any attempt to present the case as one of self-determination in the ordinary colonial sense. His position was that this principle could not properly be invoked to validate a demographic and political situation created by the very act whose legality was in dispute. The governing principle, he maintained, was that of the territorial integrity of states, a principle no less central to the post-war international legal order. In juridical terms, his reasoning was compelling: self-determination cannot be detached from the circumstances in which a population came to be constituted, nor can it be used to sanctify the consequences of territorial dispossession brought about by force.

The international climate of the time gave his intervention even greater significance. The world was in the midst of decolonisation, and the United Nations had already adopted Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, calling for the speedy and unconditional end of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. Ruda’s achievement was to place the question of the Malvinas within that great historical current while also distinguishing its specific legal character. He showed that this was not a conventional colonial case, but a singular and serious dispute involving the occupation by a colonial power of part of the national territory of Argentina.

The result was historic. In 1965, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065, formally recognising the existence of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom and calling upon both governments to pursue negotiations. That was a decisive development. The United Nations did not treat the matter as settled, nor did it reduce it to a question of local preference. It acknowledged, instead, that there was a bilateral dispute requiring a negotiated solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In legal and diplomatic terms, this remains one of the most important achievements ever secured by Argentina in the international arena.

More than six decades later, Ruda’s address still stands as a central point of reference because it united patriotism with legal discipline, national conviction with international argument. The Malvinas are not merely a matter of memory, nor a relic of past grievance. They represent a question of sovereignty that bears directly upon the South Atlantic, its natural resources, its maritime routes, and Argentina’s strategic projection towards Antarctica. At a time when the region is once again attracting growing geopolitical attention, the Argentine position demands seriousness, continuity and a firm sense of state policy. The strength of the national case has never rested on improvisation, sentimentality or passing formulas, but on a coherent legal foundation sustained across time. That is why Ruda’s intervention endures: not simply as an eloquent speech, but as one of the clearest juridical defences ever made of Argentina’s rights over the Islas Malvinas.


Thursday, April 18, 2024

Malvinas: The Diplomatic Efforts of April

The diplomatic efforts of April



April 3: - The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 502, which demanded Argentine withdrawal and the initiation of negotiations. Voting in favor of the resolution against Argentina were: USA, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire and Great Britain. The Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain abstained. Only Panama voted against. General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was appointed Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands and an extraordinary session of the OAS was requested.
April 5: - The Argentine action caused the resignation of the English chancellor, Lord Carrington. The British Task Force left Portsmouth. The European Economic Community supported the English decision to apply economic sanctions to Argentina and Peru defined its determined support in favor of Argentina.




April 6: - Designated by President Reagan as mediator, General Alexander Haig conferred with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, in Washington.
April 7: - Haig traveled to London. The English ordered a naval blockade of the Falklands. Argentina called up its reserves and Costa Méndez returned to Buenos Aires.
April 8: - Alexander Haig met with the intransigent Margaret Thatcher. Argentina began the airlift to reinforce and supply the troops in Puerto Argentino. The English naval force was already sailing off the Azores Islands. Via the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires, the United Kingdom reported that, as of 04:00 a.m. GMT on April 12, in a circle of 200 NM, a maritime exclusion zone would be established around the Islands. The novelty came at a time when General Menéndez took office as governor of the Malvinas. Squares, streets, public buildings and numerous private homes in practically the entire country had been flagged with the light blue and white emblem.
April 10: - President Galtieri held a meeting with Haig, recently arrived from London. Meanwhile, another popular demonstration in support of the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was taking place. Galtieri, from the balconies of the Casa Rosada, addressed the protesters.
April 11: - While it was announced that the talks were bogged down, John Paul II urged both countries to abandon extreme attitudes. General Haig returned to London. Dr. Costa Méndez affirmed that the dialogue continued.
April 12: - Haig informed Costa Méndez by telephone, from London, that Great Britain is irreducible. That morning, the Task Force ships had blocked the islands, while the Argentine Sea Fleet remained in its stations.
April 14: - Galtieri informed Reagan by telephone that there was a willingness to find a peaceful solution, Haig returned to Buenos Aires from London. Thatcher's action had received the support of the House of Commons.
April 16: - Haig spoke with Argentine authorities. As if to discourage this second round of talks, the United Kingdom communicated that any ship or aircraft that affected the Task Force, whether civil, commercial or military, would be considered hostile and attacked.
April 17: - In Buenos Aires, Secretary of State Haig emphasized to Argentines that they should trust that the US would achieve a satisfactory solution to national aspirations. He insisted on maintaining an ambiguous political framework that made it clear that the final intention would be the return of the islands to Argentina. General Haig gave the impression of being truthful and sincere, although events conspired against his good intentions.
April 19: - Dr. Costa Méndez requested the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) before the OAS and General Haig returned to the United States.
April 20: - By 17 votes in favor, none against and four abstentions (USA, Colombia, Trinidad Tobago and Chile), Argentina managed to convene the XX Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 21 signatory nations of the Treaty of Rio, set for April 26. Meanwhile, the Argentine Air Force planes detected the Task Force entering the TIAR area adopting favorable positions for the battle.
April 22: - General Galtieri inspected the troops stationed in Malvinas. Chile, meanwhile, at the request of the British ambassador in Santiago, agreed to deploy military forces in the south of the country and dispatch its Navy in radio silence to sea, in particular its two Oberon-class submarines. These events worried the Argentine military commanders and affected, to a certain extent, the allocation of forces. Added to this was the collaboration in intelligence and the operation from Chilean territory of Canberra PR-9 photographic reconnaissance aircraft and two C-130 SIGINT communications intelligence aircraft. The Argentine government promulgated Decree No. 757 by which the capital of the Malvinas Islands was designated "Argentine Port."
April 25: - Great Britain declared a total exclusion zone around the Task Force, already in the TIAR area, and attacked the Argentine garrison on San Pedro Island. Argentina firmly protested both attacks before the Security Council.
April 26: - The Military Junta reported that the Argentine forces were ready for combat, up to the last defensive capacity. On this day, five MK-62 Canberra aircraft from Paraná Bombing Group 1 flew from their deployment base, Trelew, to Río Grande on the island of Tierra del Fuego before the start of hostilities. From there, with the callsign “Libra”, they set out for Georgia to repel the British frigates that were attacking the Argentine marines. The squadron was formed by: the B-105, crewed by Major Ramón Vivas and Aldo Escudero; the B-
108, first lieutenants Ricardo Papavero and Hugo Moreno; and B-109, first lieutenants Mario Baeza and Jorge Cardo; all, supported by a KC-130 and a Boeing 707 from El Palomar Transport Group 1, as relays and mission control respectively. This risky operation at the limit of the Canberra's range of action reached the outskirts of Cumberland Bay. At that point, the Control Officer traveling on the B-707 decided to suspend it when he verified, due to the change in the vessels' device, that they had been detected and lost their surprise.

April 30: - Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced the definitive failure of the negotiations. Argentina presented a note to the UN informing that it would make use of the right of self-defense if attacked and, shortly afterwards, President Reagan publicly declared US support for Great Britain in the conflict, followed by the dramatic imposition of an embargo on arms exports and credit operations to the Argentine Republic. Simultaneously, the Chilean Armed Forces completed a deployment in the Southern Zone of the country with similar - or even greater - characteristics than in 1978, when both nations were on the brink of war over the issue of the Beagle Channel. The war was about to begin and no one had seriously tried to prevent it. Late on the southern night of April 30, a Vulcan bomber, registration to Puerto Argentino.