Malvinas: Argentine Pumas in Action

The Argentine Pumas At War

By Staff Sergeant (Ret.) and Malvinas War Veteran Carlos Andrés Verón

 

During the conflict, I served in the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion as a helicopter mechanic for Assault Helicopter Company “A”.

It was 27 March 1982 when I arrived at the gates of the 601 Army Aviation Battalion and was told to hurry to the hangar, as there was a mission heading south — El Calafate. At the hangar, First Lieutenants Obregón and Orozco, and Corporal First Class Alfredo Romero, were waiting. We gathered the essential equipment for the journey. Our first stop was Comandante Espora Naval Air Base, in Bahía Blanca.

We arrived around midday. The pilots went to the control tower, while we remained with the aircraft to refuel. At that moment, some Navy non-commissioned officers approached and asked if our helicopter — a SA 330L PUMA (AE-502) — was the one embarking on the icebreaker Almirante Irízar. I responded that it wasn’t, as we were heading to Santa Cruz, and had actually disembarked from the Irízar in February following the 1981/82 Summer Antarctic Campaign. I also pointed out that the Coast Guard’s PUMA, stationed next to us, might be the one assigned to the vessel.

Hours went by with no sign of the pilots. Eventually, they returned and took us to a room — we were put under strict communication blackout. Then Lt. Obregón informed us that he had requested the blade folding kit from our base, as we would in fact be embarking on the ARA Almirante Irízar, bound for the Malvinas. That cleared up the confusion. The Navy issued us a survival vest, typically worn by A-4Q pilots, and a .45 calibre pistol.

By late morning on 28 March, the blade folding kit arrived. We didn’t even get the chance to greet the personnel who delivered it. We collected it and boarded the Irízar. Once on board, Romero and I realised we were missing two shock absorber locking pins, but thought that reinforcing the tie-downs with extra chains would compensate.

At dawn on 29 March, we departed with the fleet as part of Operation Rosario.

Alongside our PUMA in the hangar was a Navy Sea King. The weather was poor; the ship pitched significantly as we sailed under radio silence. We checked on the helicopter sporadically — it seemed stable.

In the early hours of 2 April, we were asleep in a cabin on the red deck when I was suddenly thrown into the air, hitting my head against the bathroom. Romero rolled across the cabin floor. We couldn’t stand because of the heavy rolling. Once we managed to get up, we got dressed and joined the damage control team heading to the hangar. Upon opening the door, we were stunned: JP-1 fuel (used by turbine engines) had flooded the hangar floor, reaching the 40cm-high bulkhead ledges. The main landing gear had collapsed, puncturing the fuel tanks beneath the helicopter’s floor.

The scene was catastrophic. The main rotor blades had broken loose and struck the hangar’s support columns. The drainage system couldn’t handle the 1,500 litres of fuel on board. I put on boots and carefully walked through the spill, as the ship was still rolling. The helicopter rested on its rear struts but was tilted backwards — as mentioned, the gear had snapped and pierced the fuel tanks. Of the twenty tie-down chains, only ten remained — the others had snapped off their anchor points. Using the ship’s blue lifting jacks, typically used for moving cargo, we stabilised the helicopter as best we could and re-secured it.

Fortunately, the Sea King had suffered only minor damage — its right nose had been pierced by a hydraulic test lance, which was easily repaired. Ours, however, was grounded and unable to support the landing operation — the very reason for our presence.

In the early hours, the Navy launched its amphibious assault, together with Marines and the 25th Regiment of the Army. Meanwhile, Corporal Romero and I began a race against time to dismantle the PUMA — salvaging all serviceable components to be used as spares for the other helicopters participating.

We first secured the aircraft, opened the engine bays, removed the main rotor blades, then the tail rotor blades, and then both engines. That was the bulk of the work. After that, we carefully dismantled and packed all radio and navigation systems, and anything else of value. Rumours were circulating that AE-502 would be jettisoned into the sea to make space for other helicopters without returning to port.

I had taken part in the previous Antarctic summer campaign, and I knew the ship’s captain, Navy Captain Barquín. Since our pilots had returned to the mainland on the first C-130, and I was the senior mechanic, I went to speak to him. I explained that the helicopter had only 20% structural damage and was recoverable. At first, he didn’t want to know about it, but he eventually agreed to unload it in Punta Quilla.

From then on, we devised the safest and fastest way to move the aircraft to the flight deck. Keep in mind: the PUMA stands four metres tall, and we only had the nose gear — no rear struts. No manoeuvre could be attempted until we were in calm waters, so all our plans were theoretical.

On 8 April, as we entered port, we began the operation using ropes, chains, and the ship’s jacks. We removed the tail cone, and the critical step was rolling the aircraft past the hangar threshold up to the main rotor mast, where the starboard crane would lift it — the PUMA weighed about 3,500 kg. After a hard struggle, we succeeded. The aircraft was loaded onto a barge, hauled by a tractor through the city, and taken to a Navy helicopter hangar, where it remained under custody until it was recovered by personnel from Campo de Mayo.

The transit through the city was another story altogether. The PUMA, heavily damaged, looked as if it had been shot down. As you can imagine, onlookers had plenty to say as we moved through the streets.

At the hangar, we parked it to the side to keep it out of the way. Then came the question of our return — we didn’t know how or when.

Around 6 p.m., we were told that an Army Aviation aircraft would collect us from Trelew. We were driven there by Unimog, boarded a G222 FIAT, and flew to Campo de Mayo, landing at the airfield and going to the NCOs’ mess. At around 4 a.m., we were dismissed. It was Holy Week, so we were granted leave until Monday, 12 April.

Let me say clearly: the recovery effort of the SA 330 B PUMA AE-502 was not in vain. It was sent to its original manufacturer — Aérospatiale in France — for repairs the following year, returned to service in 1986, and sadly met its end in a tragic crash in Azul in November 1993.

I was left with a bitter taste — so close to operating in the Malvinas, yet unable due to circumstances. But fate gave me another opportunity. On 22 April, I departed Campo de Mayo to embark on the hospital ship Bahía Paraíso, this time with PUMA AE-506. The aircraft commander was Captain Ezequiel Honorio Luzuriaga, co-pilot 1st Lt. Eduardo López Leguizamón, and the mechanics were Sgt. 1st Class Horacio Luna and myself. (Both officers sadly passed away years later in separate post-war accidents.)

Our mission was to operate under the International Red Cross, using the ship as a base for aerial ambulance missions. Our first assignment was responding to the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano. When we arrived, the Navy vessels Bouchard and Piedrabuena were overloaded with survivors — even on deck. The South Atlantic Ocean, especially in that region, is notoriously rough. Visibility was poor, but time was running out. Hours had passed since the sinking — survival chances were fading.

We began flying, identifying the position of various life rafts, guiding the ships to recover the living — or the dead. I remember one raft had its flashlight still lit. As mentioned, the weather prevented us from flying far from the ship. The urgency to locate rafts made us chase after colourful objects in the sea — but often, they turned out to be nothing.

After this bitter beginning, we sailed to Ushuaia, where survivors and the deceased were disembarked. Sgt. Luna left the ship, and Sgt. 1st Class Oscar Mella joined the crew.

After restocking medicine and provisions, we set course for the Malvinas.

During the crossing, we were intercepted by a British helicopter, which requested to land and inspect the hospital ship to ensure it carried no weapons. Our PUMA bore red crosses on both side doors, the nose, belly, and upper cowling. Before departing, the British pilot told us:

“A Harrier flying at 800 km/h won’t see the red crosses — it’ll just see a green spot. You’ll be shot down, and they won’t know it was an ambulance helicopter.”

That night, with the help of the ship’s crew, we painted the helicopter white, using synthetic paint. It was a wartime necessity. We worked all night — painting and maintaining.

At dawn, we launched our first aeromedical evacuation mission. We flew to the HMS Uganda, the British hospital ship, to retrieve wounded Argentines. The PUMA could carry six stretchers, and we configured it based on the number of patients. Two Navy medics accompanied us — Subofficer Panagiotas and Chief Petty Officer Quiroga.

Upon landing on the Uganda, I entered the wards to prioritise the wounded for boarding based on condition. Most had shrapnel wounds, dressed in flight suits, their belongings in plastic bags.
As an anecdote, one patient began shouting aboard the Bahía Paraíso, complaining that the British hadn’t returned his personal effects. Shortly after, a British helicopter landed and returned his belongings.

After several days working with the Uganda, we proceeded to the Malvinas.

Once there, we conducted casualty evacuations, primarily from Puerto Argentino, and flew across the islands collecting injured personnel. At night, we could hear the Royal Navy frigates firing indiscriminately.

From 16 to 18 June, we remained off Puerto Argentino, evacuating as many Argentine soldiers as possible. The PUMA could carry 20 troops, but given the urgency, we kept loading more. As we ran low on fuel, with the 20-minute warning light flashing, we managed three flights. On the final one, we transported 42 soldiers plus 4 crew — 46 people in total.

This was our side of the war — not a face-to-face combat experience, not a single shot fired. But we flew Army Aviation helicopters over our Malvinas. Pilots, mechanics, medics, and nurses — all united by one goal: to fulfil our mission.

On 25 June 1982, after an emotional farewell with those we had shared 65 days aboard the Bahía Paraíso, we lifted off and headed for Campo de Mayo. We landed around 6 p.m., hangared the aircraft, saluted one another, and went home — to our families — with the satisfaction of having done our duty.

Malvinas: The Odysee of the 5th Infantry Regiment at Puerto Howard

Malvinas: The Dramatic Story of the Regiment That Withstood Brutal Isolation and the Dangerous Mission to Resupply Them

They were stationed at Puerto Howard, on West Falkland Island. Resupplying them was an almost impossible task. The soldiers of the 5th Infantry Regiment (RI5) wrote one of the most grueling chapters of the Malvinas/Falklands War. Infobae Docs gathered three veterans who revealed their fierce and uneven battle against an implacable enemy—isolation.
By Adrián Pignatelli || Infobae


The Sea Harrier Shot Down with a 1936-Made Machine Gun. The captured pilot could not believe that he had been downed by such an outdated weapon.

Located on Gran Malvina (West Falkland), Howard was, in 1982, a small port on the San Carlos Strait. A cove provided shelter and allowed ships to dock. The local population was small and primarily engaged in sheep farming and wool shearing, with the final product shipped to Great Britain. The islanders had limited opportunities for development, as the economy assigned married residents a fixed number of sheep, and a single official acted as both the local administrator and the manager of the wool trading company.

It was an extremely remote location where residents stayed informed solely through British radio relays. There was no television, primary school, or secondary school.

This was the site selected for the 5th Infantry Regiment (RI5) to counter a potential enemy landing. This regiment would go down in history as the unit that endured the longest period of isolation during the Malvinas/Falklands War.

On April 25, upon arrival at Port Stanley, RI5 was airlifted to Puerto Howard in three helicopter waves, except for 108 men from Company B, who traveled by ship transporting rations, ammunition, and anti-personnel mines.

Howard was renamed Puerto Yapeyú, as in peacetime, Company C of this regiment was based in the town where General José de San Martín was born.

 
RI5 Soldiers Boarding in Comodoro Rivadavia for the Airlift to the Malvinas

The soldiers carried a single ration of food. It was imperative to supply them with the necessary provisions, along with heavy weapons and ammunition, to endure the harsh weeks of isolation ahead.

They were still unaware that the resupply would never arrive.

The following day, in Howard, two and a half lambs were purchased from the locals to supplement the soldiers' rations. Meanwhile, in Puerto Argentino, the Monsunen, a 30-meter vessel confiscated from the Falkland Company, set sail at night. It was loaded with ten days' worth of supplies, weapons, and ammunition.

The plan was to skirt the island northward and enter the San Carlos Strait. However, strong winds and tides made this route impossible. The only alternative was the longer and far more dangerous southern route—navigating around the island while avoiding mines laid by the Argentine Navy and knowing that, in broad daylight, they would be completely exposed to enemy aircraft. The mission had to succeed, as on the 27th, food rationing had already begun in Puerto Yapeyú.

That night, the Monsunen was forced to take shelter in a small bay after the radar detected what was possibly a submarine. The ship’s only defenses were two MAG machine guns and two rocket launchers. By midday the next day, the vessel finally managed to dock at the pier in Puerto Yapeyú.

 
Alberto Miñones Carrión: Severely Wounded in Malvinas, Lost a Leg—“It Is a Special Honor to Have Been Part of This Campaign” (Santiago Saferstein)

At the time, Alberto Miñones Carrión was a young second lieutenant. He was in charge of the Support Section of Company A, RI5, and his unit was reinforced with two Colt 12.7 mm machine guns. He recalled, “From the moment we arrived, we knew resupply would be difficult—to the point that the provisions we expected the next day never arrived. As the days went by, the situation worsened, and with the arrival of more personnel, it became truly critical.”

The occupation of the area was gradual. Initially, a 130-man company was deployed. Later, the regiment’s other two infantry companies, along with two engineer sections and medical personnel, arrived—bringing the total to nearly 800 men.

 
The Isla de los Estados: Attacked While Carrying Supplies for the Troops—Only Two of 25 Crew Members Survived

On the night of May 10, the frigate HMS Alacrity attacked the transport ship Isla de los Estados in the middle of the San Carlos Strait, as it was en route to Puerto Yapeyú carrying supplies and weapons.

Of the 25 crew members, only two survived.

Hours later, Argentine troops discovered squash floating near the shore—part of the ship’s lost cargo. These were mashed and added to the regiment’s already scarce rations.

 
Hugo Gargano, Quartermaster Second Lieutenant During the War: “We Had Only Two Field Kitchens for 150 Men” (Santiago Saferstein)

"Cooking a lamb was a challenge since we had to use peat as fuel, which has very low caloric value. On top of that, we only had two field kitchens for 150 men. But the ingenuity and skill of the quartermaster personnel led us to clean out 200-liter fuel drums, and that’s how we ended up eating lamb stew with a hint of fuel taste. Heating those drums was extremely difficult, and fires had to remain extinguished for most of the day," explained Hugo Gargano, Quartermaster Second Lieutenant of Regiment 5, the unit’s only officer in that specialty.

When supply issues worsened, Gargano was in Puerto Argentino, trying to find a way to reach Gran Malvina. The RI5 commander, Colonel Juan Ramón Mabragaña, persistently requested a Quartermaster officer from the III Infantry Brigade’s commander.

"I asked every day to go to Howard," Gargano told Infobae. "On the 21st, I ran into a major who told me, ‘You have no idea how much your regiment commander is asking for you,’ but we couldn’t coordinate my transport."

 

 
Today, Juan Ramón Mabragaña, Surrounded by His Soldiers, Who Recognize “A Leader Who Cared for His Men”

"The next day, they came to pick me up in a vehicle. 'You have 15 minutes to be at Moody Brook and board a helicopter heading to Howard with supplies, weapons, and ammunition,' they told me." Hugo Gargano reported to Major Roberto Yanzi from Army Aviation.

At that moment, he had no idea he was about to embark on a journey he would never forget.

Flying to Howard

Major Roberto Yanzi was the second-in-command of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. He had arrived in the islands on April 7. He explained, “We had to make the most of the flight. We loaded ammunition, mortars, and medical supplies. We also took two soldiers from Regiment 5. Three Puma helicopters would fly, with an Augusta in the rear for escort, armed for protection.”

Before takeoff, Yanzi gathered the crews and briefed them on the mission. “I listened as they spoke—we were about to embark on a high-risk flight, as the day before, the British had landed at San Carlos. The 7 or 8 minutes it would take to cross the strait would be crucial.”

The mission launched on May 22.

A stopover was always made at Goose Green, where Task Force Mercedes had a garrison. However, upon arrival, the helicopters were forced to remain grounded—Sea Harriers were constantly patrolling overhead.

Yanzi knew that flying under those conditions meant taking an extreme risk.

 
Roberto Yanzi, Army Aviation: “When We Reached Howard, We Celebrated Because We Were All Still Alive” (Santiago Saferstein)

"The memory of the downing of AE 505 on May 9 was still fresh, when First Lieutenants Roberto Fiorito and Juan Carlos Buschiazzo, along with Sergeant Raúl Dimotta, lost their lives. Additionally, Army Aviation faced a serious limitation: fuel shortages," recalled Major Roberto Yanzi.

The weather conditions were also poor, with constant fog and mist. “At 10:30 on the 23rd, we took off, flying just one meter above the ground to avoid detection by enemy radar and maintaining radio silence. When we reached the strait, we saw the Río Carcarañá billowing smoke” (the vessel had been disabled by two Sea Harriers on May 16).

“It’s an Honor to Die with You”

As they were about to finish crossing the strait, the armed escort helicopter issued a warning:

• “Aircraft! Aircraft! Hit the deck!”

Two Sea Harriers were approaching. The first helicopter was piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Pérez Cometto, the second by First Lieutenant Enrique Magnaghi, and the third by Major Roberto Yanzi, who later recounted to Infobae:

 

The Arrival of the Río Carcarañá Crew

"Pérez Cometto, in an outstanding maneuver, managed to evade the enemy aircraft, while Magnaghi and I crossed the channel and landed. Almost immediately, I saw a fireball coming from Magnaghi’s helicopter, which had flipped over—he had lost control as the aircraft spun on its axis. At the same time, the Sea Harriers opened fire on me with their 30mm cannons, hitting the tail of my helicopter, which still had its rotors spinning. That’s when I ordered Gargano to disembark as fast as possible."

"It was a moment of intense adrenaline. I opened the hatch, jumped out first… we ran and threw ourselves flat on the ground as the Sea Harriers strafed us," recalled Gargano.

The three of them lay prone as enemy rounds impacted all around them. At that moment, Yanzi spoke:

• "Take my hand, don’t look back—it’s an honor to die in war with you."

"That’s when I fully realized the situation we were in. Once the aircraft had passed, we ran and moved away from the helicopter," the officer recounted.

Yanzi had no idea what had happened to the rest of the crews until he heard the distinctive whistle of Private Elvio Nis, a skilled tracker from Paso de los Libres, which helped reunite the personnel.

"You can imagine our joy when we realized that not a single crew member had died. Magnaghi had a fractured clavicle, and Godino, one of the mechanics, had suffered a severe head injury," Yanzi explained.

"We Were All Alive"

Determined to complete the mission, Yanzi burned his Puma AE 500 to prevent it from falling into British hands, salvaging only the machine gun. The remaining crews and part of the cargo were loaded onto the only operational helicopter—Pérez Cometto’s Puma.

They took off, hoping to avoid enemy aircraft en route to Howard, as Radio Colonia had reported that three helicopters had already been shot down by Harriers.

Yanzi recalled, "When we arrived, it was an overwhelming joy. We hugged each other—we were all alive."

On the morning of May 26, the helicopter crews embarked on the risky return flight to Puerto Argentino, departing at 0500 hours. They transported members of Compañía Comando and a captain who had ejected from his aircraft.

"It was a gamble," admitted Yanzi. "We were packed in tight. We flew at extremely low altitude and managed to land. Without realizing it, we had just completed the last flight to Gran Malvina."

Years later, Gargano connected via social media with one of the Sea Harrier pilots, David Morgan, who had long wondered about the fate of the Puma crews. "He felt great relief upon learning that we had survived," Gargano shared.

Fighting in Howard

Now retired Lieutenant Colonel Miñones described the precarious situation the regiment faced in the event of a British attack:

"The heavy equipment couldn’t be transported. We lacked artillery pieces. When we crossed, I managed to bring short-range 81mm mortars, which served as our heavy weaponry for a long time. That’s why we kept requesting 120mm mortars. The 4th Artillery Battery never arrived."

RI5 Soldiers in a Trench at Puerto Howard

They had to fight with whatever was available.

Using Colt 12.7mm machine guns manufactured in 1936, they managed to shoot down a Sea Harrier and repel an attack from a Sea King helicopter. Miñones recalled, "When we captured the pilot, he told us he felt a rain of bullets striking the fuselage; he couldn’t believe we had taken him down with that machine gun."

Gravely Wounded

On the night of May 27, Miñones was severely wounded. He survived to tell the story.

*"A shell from a frigate conducting exploratory fire hit me while I was at the bottom of a trench. I was between First Lieutenant Daniel Stella and Orderly Soldier Felipe Fernández. The blast threw me 20 meters, flipping me in the air before I landed on my back, arms crossed over my chest. I entrusted myself to the Virgin Mary and prayed an Ave María, thinking I was dying.

In the darkness, I reached for my right leg—it was still there. When I checked the left, I felt a bare bone. I felt no pain. That’s when I realized I was alive and had another chance."*

During that same attack, soldiers Fernando Damián Francolino, Francisco Manuel Machado, and Ricardo Manuel Herrera were also wounded.

 

The Rescue of British Lieutenant Jeff Glover After Ejecting

"I was evacuated to a very rudimentary field hospital, run by Major Dr. Reale, a brilliant trauma surgeon. In addition to my leg wound, I had a puncture in my hip and another in my chest. With the limited supplies he had, he operated on me and sutured my femoral artery."

Given the severity of his injuries, a rapid evacuation would have been the norm, but Miñones recounted:

"For ten days, I lay on a wooden door propped up on two apple crates. There were no painkillers, no plaster, yet the doctors managed to make do."

 

Jeff Glover’s Arrival at Puerto Howard

On May 29, it snowed for the first time in Puerto Yapeyú. The temperature dropped to -18°C, and the overall condition of the troops was critical.

"Those days were terrible. The wounded were housed in a wooden shack that shook with every bombardment. I felt completely exposed since I couldn't move. As shrapnel pierced the wooden walls—on one occasion, two fragments passed right by my head—I asked my comrade, Eduardo Gassino, for a helmet."

But Miñones’ hardships didn’t end there.

"Food was extremely scarce, and due to my condition, I couldn’t eat lamb. It was Eduardo Gassino who, every day, brought me a sort of broth with bustard meat—a local bird—using an empty soda can."

Finally, on June 6, he was evacuated to the Bahía Paraíso, which had been converted into a hospital ship. Also evacuated were soldiers Exequiel Vargas, Eduardo Rubiolo, Mariano Leiva, and Fernando Francolino.

 

 

The Hospital Ship Bahía Paraíso

"When I arrived on the mainland, I weighed 42 kilos, down from my normal 68. I hadn’t even realized how much weight I had lost. I needed to recover before undergoing a major surgery. For two months, my prognosis was poor due to an infection in my leg, but I was given another chance—and I survived."

Both Gargano and Miñones hold Colonel Juan Ramón Mabragaña, their regimental commander, in the highest regard.

"He stood out for his humility and prudence, for the precision of his decisions. Beyond the war, he was a model soldier and a remarkable person. He took veterans’ needs seriously—securing jobs, medicine, and even medical evacuations, often out of his own pocket. He reaped what he sowed."

The three veterans also paid tribute to the 23 crew members of the Isla de los Estados, who died while attempting to deliver supplies.

What Does Malvinas Mean?

For Yanzi: “A feeling and a great pride to have been part of it.”

For Gargano: “It remains a daily battle—to ensure recognition for the veterans who fought there.”

For Miñones: “It is a very special honor to have participated in this campaign and to have lost a leg. It helps me emotionally. What I carry deep inside—and hope to pass on to my children—is something that changed my life for the better.”

Operation South Georgias

Operation Georgias

Satellite image of South Georgia Islands taken by NASA

Date April 3, 1982
Place Grytviken , South Georgia Islands
Result Argentina takes control of Port Leith and Grytviken
Belligerents
Argentina vs. United Kingdom
Commanders
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills
Forces in combat
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
UK: 22 Marines and HMS Endurance
Casualties
Argentina: 3 dead, 9 injured, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
UK: 1 injured, 22 prisoners

Operation Georgias was the code name used by the Argentine Armed Forces to designate the occupation operations of the South Georgia Islands at the beginning of the Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on April 3, 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed San Pedro Island) after surrendering a small group of United Kingdom Marines. in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on March 19, 1982 when a group of civilian workers arrived in Port Leith aboard the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso transport (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated among the workers, presenting themselves as civilian scientists.


Polar ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata in February 1982, shortly before its intervention in the Georgias.

Argentine workers in South Georgia

Davidoff contracts
In September 1979, the Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and specialized in scrap metal business, signed a contract with the Christian Salvensen Co. of Edinburgh, by which it acquired the right to remove the remains of the old abandoned whaling facilities in the ports: Leith, Stromness and Husvik, on the Georgian islands. from the south.
Davidoff managed the service of the polar ship HMS Endurance at the British embassy in Buenos Aires in order to transport the personnel and equipment necessary to dismantle the facilities to the islands. As the British did not accept the request to use the HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff requested permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Navy to hire passage on the Antarctic transport ships. Knowing of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating the possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed it to arrive at the islands at least twice a year.

Proyecto y Operación Alfa

In September 1981 the Navy conceived a plan to take advantage of Davidoff's business in South Georgia and thus establish a secret base in that disputed territory. This action was code-named Project Alpha.5 The plan consisted of infiltrating the military among the workers, with the excuse that they were scientists. Once HMS Endurance had withdrawn from the South Atlantic, starting in April it would be joined by 14 marines embarked on a ship destined to reestablish Argentine Antarctic bases, which would establish a permanent military base in South Georgia. That base would have the help of winter, which would prevent the measures that the British could take for its removal.
Parallel to the project, in October 1981 the Antarctic naval commander received the order from the chief of operations of the General Staff of the Navy to study a possible establishment of a scientific base on one of the islands in dispute with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base could be installed in the 1981-1982 Antarctic campaign. That operation was called Operation Alpha. At the beginning of December it was decided that the base would be occupied by the military and not by civilians as had been planned, due to the need to keep it secret. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to enlist 1 officer and 6 non-commissioned officers. The same measure was taken with the same number of tactical divers.
On January 29, 1981, the training of the commandos and designated divers began, with Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz as their leader. The rest were Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diving non-commissioned officer, 1 nursing non-commissioned officer, 5 diving corporals and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On February 28 they were embarked in Ushuaia on the Antarctic campaign ship ARA Bahía Paraíso. So that it would not interfere with their plans for the Falklands, on March 16 the Military Committee canceled Operation Alpha, but the commandos remained on board preventively and left on March 18 for the South Orkneys accompanying the ship's Antarctic campaign.


ARA Almirante Irízar. 

Davidoff Travels

The businessman informed the British embassy of his trip, without requesting permission to do so on the icebreaker, and on December 16, 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), to carry out a inventory of facilities to be dismantled in Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and left a few days later.6 On December 23, the British magistrate of South Georgia discovered traces of the Argentine presence in Port Leith and reported it to the governor of the Falkland Islands Rex Hunt, who relayed it to London. December 31st. The British government ordered its embassy to present a note of protest for the violation of its sovereignty by the unauthorized landing, but the Foreign Minister claimed to be unaware of the incident and on February 9 there was a new formal protest that was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on the 18th.
Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a business rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unscheduled visit to Port Leith. Marchessi arrived at the Port Leith facility aboard the Caiman, a Panama-registered yacht, with which he had sailed from Mar del Plata.8 He reported to Grytviken, saying he was part of Davidoff's scheme and gave British authorities local details from the inspection made by Davidoff in December and even from other Argentine trips in the 1970s.

The raising of the Argentine flag

On March 18, 1982, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Port Leith, disembarking Davidoff's workers and his equipment, without passing through Grytviken as required by the British government. On that date, the only British presence in Port Leith was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). On March 19, 4 members of the BAS heading to Bahía Carlita discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment in Puerto Leith, with the Argentine flag flying. About 100 people were disembarked and had occupied a BAS shelter. The leader of the BAS team, Trevor Edwards, addressed Captain Briatore to inform him that his presence was illegal and that they must pass through Grytviken, then notified the British magistrate at King Edward Point. The senior BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Hunt, who consulted with London. The commander demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the reembarkation of the workers. The commander of the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso responded that the mission had the approval of the British embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag to be lowered, but it did not appear in Grytviken as the British demanded.
On March 20, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of what happened. As the Argentines had not complied with the diplomatic formalities, the British government decided to intervene on a small scale and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Foreign Office) ordered the sending of the HMS Endurance with the aim of forcing the operators to lower the flag. and prevent the disembarkation of personnel. The ship departed Port Stanley on 16 March with a complement of 22 marines.
On March 21, the British embassy held a diplomatic protest in Buenos Aires, requesting the Argentine government to evict the workers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to clear up the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official consent.
On the morning of March 22, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso departed from Port Leith. However, in the afternoon, a BAS observation post detected the presence of Argentine personnel and passed the information to London. Consequently, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any Argentine personnel remaining on South Georgia.

Operation Georgias

On March 23, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, 16 Captain César Trombetta, in command of the ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) that was in South Orkney, received orders from the General Naval Staff to head to maximum speed to the South Georgia Islands, with the mission of preventing the eviction of Davidoff's group of Argentine workers by the HMS Endurance, left for this purpose from the Malvinas Islands.
The British movements were met with a series of Argentine countermeasures: the corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were deployed between the Falklands and South Georgia, being in position to intercept HMS Endurance and rescue any Argentine personnel he had on board.
On March 24, the Argentine government informed the press of the workers' presence in South Georgia, while Astiz received the order to "disembark on March 25 at 00:15 in Port Leith in order to protect Argentine workers. "
The ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Port Leith on the night of March 24 and disembarked the group of 14 soldiers commanded by Astiz (Grupo Alfa), with individual weapons belonging to the ship. The ARA Bahía Paraíso remained in the area and patrolled the area with its helicopters during the following hours. News from the south reported an unusual movement of Argentine Navy warships in the South Atlantic Ocean. Upon arriving at Port Leith, HMS Endurance found the ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored, then both ships were chasing each other and hiding around the islands until they lost contact with each other on March 31.
Faced with the prospect of possible military conflict, the Foreign Office sought to achieve some form of compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to his counterpart Costa Méndez that he pardon the workers present at Port Leith and give them the appropriate documentation, which could include the stamping of temporary permits instead of passports, which was a crucial concession for the Argentine position. Argentina's claim, however, was that the arrival of any of its citizens to South Georgia should follow the procedures agreed in the 1971 communications treaty. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected this extension of the agreement, valid only for the Falkland Islands, and conveyed his concern to the British government.
The British plan was that BAS commander Martin would be responsible until the Argentine forces demonstrated any hostile intent, if that occurred Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would take command.
On March 28, 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as the flagship of the commander of Task Force 40, embarking its commander and the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations, General of division Osvaldo García, starting Operation Rosario that concluded with the surrender of the British governor of the Malvinas on April 2. That same day, 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna were embarked in Puerto Belgrano heading to the South Georgia, in the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2) (currently P-32), traveling precariously and overcrowded for 4 days as it is not a ship with the capacity to transport troops and due to the weather conditions.
On 30 March, when it became obvious that invasion was imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface ships and three nuclear submarines, to South Georgia to support HMS Endurance. . The rest of the British naval units were placed on four-hour alert.
On April 1, the General Naval Staff received Operations Order No. 1/82 "S" to "occupy Grytviken and hold Leith in order to ensure control of the Georgia Islands", for which it ordered the missile corvette ARA Guerrico , under the command of frigate captain Carlos Alfonso, join the ARA Bahía Paraíso, equipped with two helicopters from the Antarctic Group (1 Puma from the Argentine Army, 1 Alouette (from the Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy) and a group of 40 infantrymen of marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna who joined Astiz's forces in Puerto Leith. Until that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theater of Operations.




Badges of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London.

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed, with César Trombetta as commander, made up of the units:
60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by frigate captain Ismael J. García.
60.1.2. ARA Guerrico corvette, commanded by frigate captain Carlos Alfonso.
60.1.3. Fraction of the Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4) with 40 men, commanded by Lieutenant Guillermo Luna.
60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: 1 Puma from the Army and 1 Alouette from the Navy's Naval Aviation Command.
60.1.5. Group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz.

As a consequence of the above, a series of high-level meetings and conversations took place in order to prevent the Argentine invasion. On the night of April 1, the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, promised Thatcher to speak with the military junta to prevent the attack. However, his telephone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri was fruitless.

British resistance

Cumberland Bay with King Edward Peninsula and Inlet and Grytviken.

The 2nd of April

On April 2, Astiz announced to the Argentines who were in Port Leith that his country had recovered the Malvinas.[13] Receiving the order to execute Operations Order No. 1/82 "S".
After learning of the fall of Port Stanley, Mills took urgent action: his men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, with wire and landmines and prepared defenses around the BAS buildings. HMS Endurance, which was a few miles offshore, provided communication between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorized to open fire in self-defense after issuing a warning. A later statement from the British government instructed the marines "not to resist beyond the point where lives might be needlessly lost."
Due to inclement weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on April 2, so the plans of the Argentine forces for that day in South Georgia were frustrated and Trombetta postponed them until on April 3. These plans consisted of the landing of Astiz's special forces at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to ensure the arrival of the ground forces teams, transported by helicopter. The ARA Guerrico was to provide naval fire outside the bay, but the corvette's arrival was delayed by a storm, so a new course of action was decided for the next day. According to the new plan, the first landing was to be made by the Alouette helicopter from the ARA Guerrico, followed by three waves of marines in the Puma from the ARA Bahía Paraíso. After sending a radio message demanding the surrender of the British, Trombetta had to order the ARA Guerrico to make an advance on the Capitán Vago cove where the port of Grytviken is located, just opposite King Edward Point. The corvette was only authorized to use its firearms at the request of ground forces. Astiz's men had to remain in the rearguard aboard the ARA Bahía Paraíso. All forces involved had to avoid enemy deaths for as long as possible. Freedman believes Trombetta made those provisions thinking he would meet only the BAS team. Apparently, the oversight at that point was due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which made him think that he would only deal with the BAS people, Trombetta ordered the corvette ARA Guerrico to approach the coast, send the Alouette helicopter on reconnaissance, and transport the first group of Marines in the other helicopter, a Puma.
During the night, the two Argentine ships established contact and remained in nearby waters, with the corvette in Stromness Bay.

April 3

On April 3 at 5:00 Luna received a naval message stating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 marines. However, Trombetta thought that the landing area would be free of enemies, which they would find on the polar ship. At 7:35, with better weather conditions, the corvette arrived at Puerto Leith and transferred the marines to the ARA Bahía Paraíso, while the Astiz commandos were reembarked, leaving the workers protected on land by men from the ARA Bahía Paraíso under the orders of Lieutenant Cortez.
At 11:10 from the ARA Bahía Paraíso the surrender of Grytviken was demanded with a message in English, repeated 3 minutes later. The message stated that Rex Hunt had surrendered, not only in the Falklands, but also in his quarters, which was false.13 Lieutenant Mills received and then relayed the message to HMS Endurance, with the intention of buying time. . At the same time, he invited the BAS personnel to take cover inside the church premises. The British soldiers did not accept the surrender. By then, the Alouette was flying over Grytviken reporting that no possible resistance was observed and the ARA Guerrico made its first entry into the inlet. According to Mayorga, Captain Carlos Alfonso, commander of the corvette, was hesitant to expose it to such narrow waters. Mayorga also validates Freedman's speculation about Trombetta's incorrect assumptions regarding British military presence around the port, citing an official report. Trombetta also had some reservations about the corvette's adequate combat readiness, since she had been in dry dock until just a few days before leaving her home base in Puerto Belgrano.


Remains of the Argentine Puma helicopter.

Helicopter shoot down

At 11:25 Grytviken was ordered for the base personnel to go out to a visible place, warning that there would be a marine infantry landing and 10 minutes later from the corvette they noticed the presence of armed personnel.
The Puma grounded the first group of 15 Argentine marines (including Lt. Luna) with a machine gun at 11:41 at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the Royal Marines were entrenched. . By then, the corvette knew that the Marines' deployment area was on the north shore of the mouth of the inlet. The second wave of marines left from the ARA Bahía Paraíso aboard the Puma at 11:47, formed by Lieutenant Giusti with 14 other marines and a machine gun. The commander of the Argentine group already on the ground, Lieutenant Luna, requested via the ARA Guerrico - he did not have direct communication with the ARA Bahía Paraíso - that the second wave be the one that should arrive third equipped with 60 mm mortars, but the Marines were already in flight. The landing took place to the east of Luna's position, well within sight of the British detachment.30 The helicopter was within gun range of Mills and his men at that time. The aircraft was hailed by intense fire from automatic weapons, but the pilot was able to cross the bay and made an emergency landing on the southern coast of the bay, on the shore opposite King Edward Point (or Punta Coronel Zelaya). The conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila died and four others were wounded, the rest were out of combat position, but machine gun fire was opened on the hospital, wounding a marine in the arm. At the same time, Luna's troops began their march towards the Shackleton house, but once the helicopter was shot down, the British fired heavy fire on them. In view of that, Luna requested fire support from the ARA Guerrico.

Attack on the ARA Guerrico

The corvette then made its second advance on the inlet and at 11:55 opened fire. To his commander's disappointment, the 20mm guns jammed after his first shot, and with the 40mm he could only fire six volleys. The 100 mm cannon was disabled after the first shot. Completely exposed, the ship had no other option but to move away and turned into the cove, opening fire with its weapons located on the other side of it. The British directed their fire on the ship at 11:59. The corvette was hit by small arms fire and by a Carl Gustav 84 mm anti-tank rocket launcher. According to Mills, his men opened fire from a distance of 550 m. The attack killed Lance Corporal Patricio Guanca and wounded five other sailors, damaging power lines, a 40 mm cannon, an Exocet rocket launcher, and the 100 mm gun mount. When the corvette passed in front of the enemy position again to move away, it again received intense fire. Argentine sources acknowledge that more than 200 projectiles hit the corvette.
Meanwhile, the Alouette had been transporting the other 10 marines, out of range of British guns, even though it was a reconnaissance helicopter and not a troop transport.13 As the damaged ARA Guerrico headed out of the bay , the Argentine troops resumed the exchange of fire with Mills' marines. Once out of range of the British guns, from the vicinity of Hobart Rock, the corvette resumed fire with its 40-millimeter guns, repaired and back in service.33 This convinced Mills that everything was finished and ordered his marines to cease fire. This happened at 12:48, according to Mayorga. At 1:00 p.m. Mills approached the Argentine positions waving a white cape and surrendered, receiving the order to have his subordinates leave individually. Mills and his men were taken into custody by Astiz's group, who had remained in reserve during the battle. At 1:35 p.m. it was reported that the British flag had been lowered. HMS Endurance dispatched one of her Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The helicopter landed there and detected the Argentine corvette and the transport ship in the inlet, but found no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in the waters off South Georgia until 5 April. In the afternoon, 13 BAS civilians who were scattered in the vicinity were arrested. At 11 p.m., Grupo Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in protecting the workers in Port Leith.


ARA Guerrico.

Consequences

The corvette ARA Guerrico, with a loss of 50% of its firepower due to combat, departed Grytviken together with the ARA Bahía Paraíso at 3:15 on April 4, heading for Río Grande.35 The latter transported British marines to Río Grande, from where they were sent by plane to Montevideo,13 arriving in the United Kingdom on April 20. The Argentine forces desisted from attacking the BAS base on Bird Island, remaining there and in Schlieper Bay, Lyell Glacier and Saint Andrews Bay, 15 British BAS who remained outside Argentine control until the British recovery of the islands. . The Argentine Navy left a detachment of 55 marines on the islands, along with the 39 scrap metal dismantling workers who remained in Port Leith.34 South Georgia was retaken by British forces on April 25, 1982, in the course of Operation Paraquat.

Awards

• Lieutenant Mills received the Distinguished Service Cross.
• Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance was awarded the Order of the British Empire in the rank of Commander.
• The main artillery corporal Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Nation medal for Valor in Combat.
  

Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

 

Wikipedia.es

Argentine Aviation Army: The Grumman OV-1C/D AE-021

The Grumman OV-1C/D AE-021 In conjunction with a re-equipment program of the Argentine Army Aviation, as a result of the lessons left by the war over the Malvinas Islands, the Mohawk SDARM (Weapons System) was gradually withdrawn from the US ARMY, giving the possibility of acquiring a batch of 23 aircraft of the OV-1C and D type to this country in order to supply this weapon. Thus, in 1992, the affected cells in the United States began to be selected, for which purpose a group of troops was commissioned with the then Major Horacio Sabin Paz in charge. Of these aircraft, the first to arrive in the country would be those registered AE-020 and AE-021, the first of which had (and has) dual command. The aircraft that concerns us today is the one that carried Bu/No 68-15932, which saw the light for the first time when it left the Grumman factory in January 1969, its original standard being that of OV-1C, converted to the D model in December 1974, carrying the Motorola AN/APS 94 SLAR radar, which was removed before its delivery to our army. After a brief stint at NASA in 1983, he was sent to the 224Th MI BN, where he remained stored for a long period, his last Criew Chief in the US being Lt (Lieutenant) Mathewson. He was permanently discharged in the United States in April 1993, despite which his administrative discharge was some time earlier, since his shipment by ferry flight to our country ended in December 1992, with a North American crew. It enters in service in the "Escuadrón de Aviación Exploración y Reconocimiento 601" in December 1992, a unit in which he remained during his brief career in our country, being the first OV-1 with simple command to arrive in the country (the AE- 020 had it originally). In 1999 he was transferred to reserve status in the "Batallón de Abastecimiento y Mantenimiento de Aeronaves 601", and his discharge was decided that same year. Finally, it was destined as a monument, for which it was thoroughly cannibalized, preserving the engines and propellers, remaining since August 1999 in the "Historical Museum of the Argentine Army", located in the town of Ciudadela in fair condition. (Carlos Pellegrini and Father Elizalde Ciudadela) The AE-021 in NASA  The OV-1D Mohawk number 67-15932 was used in 1983 as a test bed for tests carried out jointly between NASA and the US Army within the framework of the USAAEFA program in order to develop and evaluate a new loss warning system. , and dangerous excess or decrease in speed. The system designed by NASA presented both the indicated speed and the stall speed in the same integrated instrument, it also incorporated a voice synthesizer that produced a verbal alert that indicated possible risk situations. Visual information of an imminent stall was presented to the pilot as a cursor or pointer located on the conventional speedometer. The indicated speed and the stall speed were computed in real time, taking various parameters of the airplane's aerodynamics. When the system was ready, it was installed on the Mohawk and tested for less than 20 flight hours, enough time to calibrate the system and determine the aircraft's loss coefficients. Then these data obtained during the tests were uploaded into the system software and another 10 hours of flight were carried out where the device was satisfactorily evaluated. All flights were carried out by US Army pilots, not from the Dryden base where NASA normally conducts its tests but from a US Army base. Hangar Digital