Commandos in Malvinas: Lack of Technique and Doctrine in Reconnaissance Missions

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - The Other Story," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

Without a doubt, it can be said that within the Argentine Army (EA), the Argentine Navy (ARA), and the Argentine Air Force (FAA), there was no clear doctrine regarding the use of commando units for reconnaissance tasks. Incredibly, reconnaissance missions were considered secondary and even looked down upon within the different units and in the commando training course itself. In this course, barely any time was devoted to such missions, when, as we all know, any technique is mastered by precisely dedicating time to it and practicing it repeatedly.

The problem in the Argentine case was that many of these techniques were simply unknown. A reflection of the perception of reconnaissance operations within Argentine units can be seen in comments made by Major Rico in several interviews. The commander of the 602 Commando Company stated that his men were wasted on reconnaissance missions when they should have been used for raids against high-value targets. According to Rico's exact words, exploration missions were not worth the effort and could be carried out by other units.

This outdated mindset among the Argentines regarding reconnaissance patrols, along with its resulting consequences, was in complete contrast to the practices followed at the time by units in countries with experience and ongoing conflicts, such as Israel, South Africa, and NATO nations. In these countries, reconnaissance missions occupied a large portion of training hours and unit resources, and they were valued by general headquarters as force multipliers and a high-value resource for the development of subsequent operations.

NATO countries had even established an international training school for deep reconnaissance patrols in 1979 in Weingarten, Germany. This center aimed to improve procedures, standardize protocols, and reduce training costs. The Soviet Union also placed great importance on reconnaissance patrols.

After the Malvinas conflict, the operations carried out by Argentine commandos were studied in many training centers and military schools worldwide, serving as a model of "what not to do." For example, at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, U.S.A., the errors committed by Argentine patrols were part of the curriculum from 1984 until at least 1992. But it was especially at Weingarten, thanks in part to British instructors assigned there, that the serious mistakes of Argentine commando units were widely disseminated and known at the international level. From then on, these errors were used in commando schools and training courses in many countries as examples of the mistakes to avoid.

An old military adage says, "Time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted time," a principle that the Argentine Armed Forces and their commando units did not seem to have internalized — and had to learn the hard way.