Malvinas: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

The Longest Day: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

On May 15, a British commando raid, supported by naval gunfire from a frigate, left the T-34 Mentor, IA-58 Pucará, and Skyvan aircraft stationed at Calderón Naval Air Station on Borbón Island completely inoperable. With no possibility of repair, the Naval Aviation personnel integrated with Marine Infantry units, assuming new roles in ground defense, combat air patrol (PAC) observation, naval and meteorological reconnaissance, and pilot rescue operations.


The Two Sea Kings on Malvinas soil, in the photo From left to right: SI Montani, TF Brandenburg, TN Iglesias Osvaldo, CC Barro, TN Iglesias Guillermo and SI Giqueaux

The Sea Kings on Malvinas

The British landing at San Carlos forced the Command of Naval Aviation to reassess the situation of the ten aviation personnel stranded on the island, weighing the possibility of their evacuation.

Since Marine Infantry units were also still stationed there, coordination was sought with the Marine component commander to evacuate all personnel to Puerto Howard on Gran Malvina (West Falkland), where they could regroup with the Argentine Army detachment stationed there.

The only way to accomplish this was to cross the three-mile-wide strait between the islands using two outboard motor boats. However, the Marine Infantry commander decided his troops would remain at Calderón, leading the Naval Aviation commander to opt for an aerial extraction of his men.

Mission Orders: A High-Risk Operation

The Commander of Naval Aviation immediately issued orders to:

• Captain Rivero, Commander of Naval Air Force No. 2, to prepare SH-3D “Sea King” helicopters and the necessary support personnel for the mission from Río Grande.
• Captain Martini, Commander of Task Group 80.1, to provide coordination, control, communications, and search-and-rescue support.

The Second Naval Helicopter Squadron, then deployed in Viedma, conducting anti-submarine operations in the Gulf of San Matías, received what was effectively a suicide mission: an extraction operation in British-controlled airspace.

On the night of May 28, all planned flights were canceled, and the squadron began preparing the only three available SH-3D Sea Kings (2-H-231, 2-H-233, and 2-H-234).

The rescue zone was dangerously close to enemy lines at San Carlos, where the Royal Navy’s Harrier jets maintained total air superiority. The helicopters would operate with complete vulnerability, lacking any weapons, sensors, or countermeasures, and being easily detectable due to their large radar cross-section and the unmistakable roar of their engines.

Mission Challenges: A Deadly Gauntlet

From the outset, planners identified critical risks:

• Extreme vulnerability: The helicopters were easy prey for any enemy interceptor.
• Zero defensive capability: They carried no weapons to counter aerial threats.
• High detectability:
  • Radar signature: The large rotor provided an excellent reflective surface, ensuring detection.
  • Acoustic signature: The Sea King’s powerful engines could be heard from miles away.
• Limited speed for evasion: Factory-restricted top speed of 120 knots.

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Sea King painted by Arsenal Aeronaval N° 2 for the rescue mission on Isla Borbón (photo: Frigate Lieutenant Antonio Urbano -in the photo- via Claudio Meunier).

• Operational range exceeded: The extraction point was far beyond their maximum combat radius.
• Return flight under extreme conditions:
  • Night operations at low altitude, navigating through mountainous terrain.
  • Possible need for instrument flying due to deteriorating weather.
• Icing hazard: The Sea King was not certified for flight in icing conditions.
• Navigation accuracy issues:
  • Unreliable equipment for long-range overwater flight.
  • Potential errors of 10-15 nautical miles per hour.
  • High failure rate of onboard systems.
• Lack of radar: No meteorological or navigation radar available.
• No electronic countermeasures (ECM): The helicopters had no means of jamming or evading enemy radar or missiles.
• Evacuation from a highly contested zone: The North San Carlos Strait, a key area occupied by British forces, was dangerously close to the extraction site.

A Desperate Gamble in Enemy Territory

To enhance their chances of survival, one Sea King was repainted by Naval Arsenal No. 2 specifically for this mission, applying camouflage modifications to reduce visibility.

The pilots and crew fully understood the odds were against them—they would be flying directly into the jaws of the British forces, with little hope of returning unscathed. However, the Argentine Navy was not willing to abandon its men.

With courage as their only advantage, the Sea King crews prepared to embark on one of the most perilous rescue operations of the Malvinas War.

Would they succeed, or were they flying to certain death?

 

 

Original sketch published in the book History of Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini.

The Longest Day: The Countdown to a Daring Rescue

With orders to exhaust every resource to ensure the mission’s success, it was deemed essential to deploy two helicopters for mutual support. Operating in pairs provided greater payload capacity, improved navigation accuracy, and redundancy in case of failure. Additionally, at least one of the helicopters needed to be equipped with a VLF OMEGA navigation system to compensate for severe navigational limitations, preventing an inaccurate landfall on the islands—or worse, an unintended and disastrous descent into enemy territory.

Critical Mission Requirements

To mitigate the extreme risks, the following were requested:

• Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) to detect enemy presence, particularly in concealed inlets where British forces might be stationed.
• Meteorological or navigation radar to improve flight precision and safety.
• Intelligence on enemy activity in the operating area.
• Communications support for coordination and potential emergency responses.
• Confirmation of fuel availability at Borbón and its operational condition.
• Weather updates for both the target area and flight route.
• Night vision goggles to facilitate the low-altitude nocturnal approach.
• Camouflage paint to reduce visual detection—however, due to time constraints, only one helicopter could be repainted.

Mission Preparations: Engineering a Survival Plan

At dawn on May 29, with weight calculations adjusted to the last possible pound, logistical work began to modify the helicopters to match the planned configurations. All anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment and non-essential components were systematically removed to maximize fuel and payload capacity.

Among the first items discarded were the seats, followed by the bomb racks, which each saved 14 pounds. This seemingly minor adjustment underscored the desperate need to maximize available load capacity, primarily for carrying 200-liter fuel drums—a crucial move to extend the operational range as far as possible.

Since in-flight refueling was impossible, the fuel transfer solution was brutally simple yet effective: the floor panel above the main fuel tank was removed, and a manual clock-style pump was used to transfer fuel from the drums as the internal tanks emptied.

A final operational check revealed that the Sea Kings’ flight envelope had to be pushed beyond its limits. Torque limits were reassessed, allowing for a maximum speed of 135 knots—15 knots above the factory limit, a dangerous increase that risked blade detachment but was necessary to improve survivability.

Final Modifications and Crew Deployments

On May 30, the Sea King 2-H-234 (crew: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux) was deployed to Comandante Espora Naval Air Base (BACE) for the installation, testing, and calibration of the VLF OMEGA navigation system.

By May 31, the calibration was completed, but the crew had just two hours of training to operate the system before taking off. That night, 2-H-234 (now crewed by Commander Raúl Lorenzo, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani) departed BACE for Río Grande, arriving at 23:45 hours.

Meanwhile, the two other helicopters, which had remained in Viedma for final preparations, departed for Río Grande on June 1, arriving at 17:00 hours:

• 2-H-231 (Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux).
• 2-H-233 (Lieutenant Commander **Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Hernán Verdugo).

That night, with all three helicopters and their crews finally assembled in Río Grande, the final mission details were reviewed. Takeoff was scheduled for 14:00 hours the next day, ensuring arrival at Borbón by twilight to reduce exposure to enemy detection and interception.

Mission Greenlight: Last-Minute Adjustments

Upon arrival in Río Grande, the following mission-critical elements were confirmed:

✔ Fuel at Borbón: The exact quantity remained uncertain, but estimations suggested a sufficient margin to complete the mission. However, its condition was unknown.
✔ Night Vision Goggles: Secured and distributed among the crew.
✔ Camouflage Painting: The crew managed to paint only one helicopter overnight due to time constraints.
✔ Aerial Reconnaissance Request: Task Group 80.1 formally requested that Task Force 80 conduct a scouting flight along the planned route to detect potential threats and assess enemy activity.

With all available resources exhausted, three unarmed Sea Kings, pushing beyond their operational limits, prepared to fly directly into one of the most hostile airspaces in the South Atlantic.

The clock was ticking.

Original sketch of the base in Malvinas published in the book History of the Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini

The Longest Day: Into the Storm

Green Light for the Mission

On June 1, reconnaissance aircraft reported the area was clear of enemy forces—the green light was given.

The helicopter commanders conducted a final weather check, but poor visibility over the target area delayed takeoff. A second report from the Meteorological Center confirmed low cloud ceilings at the objective but also assured clear conditions at Río Grande for the return. This finalized the decision to return to Río Grande instead of San Julián, which had also been considered as an alternative.

That morning, preflight checks were completed, and the crews gathered one last time before heading to the aircraft platform, where their helicopters stood ready. Around them, pilots and personnel from various squadrons operating out of Río Grande wished them good luck. The final piece of advice was clear: fly low and be extremely cautious when transitioning from land to sea, as enemy naval units were known to hide in inlets and along irregular coastlines.

Mission Crew Assignments

• 2-H-233: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani.
• 2-H-234: Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux.

At 14:17 hours, the two SH-3D Sea Kings lifted off, joined by a Super Puma from the Naval Prefecture. Ten minutes later, the third Sea King (2-H-231) departed for Río Gallegos, where it would remain on standby as a search-and-rescue asset.

• 2-H-231 Crew: Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class José Ponce.

The Super Puma PA-13 had a critical role:

• Verifying the functionality of the only VLF OMEGA navigation system installed.
• Guiding the SH-3Ds to their pre-designated release point, 120 nautical miles from Río Grande.

Everything proceeded as planned—low altitude, smooth conditions, and maximum cruising speed maintained.

A Critical Malfunction and Freezing Conditions

Shortly into the flight, a strong fuel odor flooded the cabin of 2-H-234. The crew immediately opened the forward windows and partially unlatched the cargo door to allow airflow to clear the vapors. The risk of fire or explosion now became a constant concern. From that moment on, they were forced to fly with the heating system turned off, enduring freezing temperatures for the remainder of the flight.

At 15:24 hours, a Beechcraft B-200 (4-G-44), piloted by Commander Santiago Barrios, took off from Río Grande to provide communications support. Since the helicopters were flying low, radio transmissions were deliberately minimized to avoid enemy detection. The 4-G-44 maintained an orbit at mid-distance between the departure point and the objective, acting as a relay while using deception techniques to mask transmissions.

Despite the extreme conditions, the helicopters pressed forward, flying at 5 meters (16 feet) above the ocean, pushing their airframes beyond their operational limits.

A Dangerous Approach to Malvinas

As they neared the islands, the weather deteriorated—low cloud ceilings, rain, and reduced visibility made navigation more difficult. However, as they closed in, the rain ceased, and the cloud cover began to lift, revealing clear skies and bright sunlight—a disastrous development for a mission dependent on darkness for concealment.

The initial landfall occurred exactly as planned, between San José and San Rafael Islands, southwest of West Malvina. From there, the final approach to the objective began, flying along the terrain contours or skimming the water’s surface to avoid detection.

With visibility still low, the helicopters inadvertently passed over a house, increasing concerns about compromising the mission. They pressed on, crossing San Francisco de Paula Bay, then over the Trinidad, Vigía, and Borbón Islands, finally reaching the Elephant Seal Bay Isthmus, where Naval Aviation units had previously operated.

At 17:25 hours, both SH-3Ds touched down in the middle of the settlement. To avoid the catastrophic risk of engine failure, they kept the rotors turning rather than shutting down completely—especially given the lack of maintenance tools, which could complicate any restart attempt.

Unexpected Delays: A New Threat Emerges

A new problem arose immediately: the officer in charge of the stranded personnel was only expecting one helicopter. This miscommunication delayed refueling operations, a setback further aggravated by the sudden failure of the VLF OMEGA system—the only reliable navigation aid for the return flight.

Without it, the extraction became far more dangerous, particularly during the low-altitude, nighttime departure through a maze of islands and enemy-controlled waters.

The Extraction and a New Crisis

At 18:35 hours, the two Sea Kings lifted off, carrying:

• Lieutenant Marcelo Félix Batllori
• Chief Petty Officer José Sabat
• Chief Petty Officer Rubén Laureiro
• Petty Officer Second Class César Bogado
• Petty Officer Second Class Federico Leus
• Petty Officer Second Class Pablo Chiodini
• Petty Officer Second Class Osvaldo Gutiérrez
• Petty Officer Second Class Héctor Gauna
• Petty Officer Second Class Ricardo Telaina
• Corporal First Class Nelson Talone
• Corporal Second Class Marcelo Iturbe

Heading northwest, the pilots carefully navigated a pre-planned return route designed to avoid detection and natural obstacles.

However, a catastrophic failure in one of the night vision goggles forced one helicopter to ascend to 300 meters (984 feet) for safety—exposing them to enemy radar detection.

Nearing Isla Blanca, west of Borbón, the worsening weather forced them into instrument flight conditions. Torrential rain lashed against the windshields, while salt deposits from the ocean spray completely obscured visibility. The pilots, unable to rely on their instruments, were forced to lean out of the side windows, using their night vision goggles to navigate through the storm.

Meanwhile, the control aircraft continued attempting radio contact. Unable to break radio silence, the helicopters maintained strict radio discipline, refusing to respond.

After a sufficiently long silence to ensure they were clear, they clicked their microphones once—a signal confirming to Task Group 80.1 that they had successfully lifted off.

Out of the Fire—But Not Yet Home

The most dangerous part of the mission was still ahead. The storm, failing equipment, and exposure to British radar meant their return to Río Grande was anything but certain.

Would they make it back?

Helicóptero Sikorsky S-61D4 Sea King 0678/2-H-234 participante del rescate. (Foto: Archivo MUAN)

The Longest Day: Against All Odds

A Final, Deadly Challenge

As the two Sea Kings made their way back, both helicopters experienced a critical fuel system warning—the fuel filter obstruction alarm lit up, signaling a high risk of imminent engine shutdown. The crews knew they were flying on borrowed time.

British Response: The Enemy Was Watching

Just thirty minutes after takeoff, reports came in from the Marine Infantry personnel who had remained behind on the island:

A section of British Sea Harriers had swept over the extraction site, illuminating the area with flares.

This confirmed the crew’s suspicions—British forces had eyes on them the entire time. There were enemy observers nearby, and the helicopters had narrowly escaped detection.

Navigating Through a Frozen Hell

The return flight was a battle for survival:

• Unreliable instruments that malfunctioned intermittently.
• Windshields obstructed by frozen salt deposits, forcing the pilots to lean out of the side windows to see.
• Icing conditions worsening, despite the Sea Kings not being certified for such environments.

At Río Grande, the Second-in-Command of the Squadron anxiously followed the mission’s progress. A new crisis emerged—dense fog had unexpectedly formed over the airbase.

For a moment, a diversion to Río Gallegos was considered. But the crews pressed on, determined to complete their journey.

Mission Accomplished—But Barely

When the two helicopters finally reached Río Grande at 21:55 hours, they were barely holding together:
✔ No heating—crews frozen to the bone.
✔ No functioning navigation system—they had flown entirely on skill and instinct.
✔ Landing gear malfunctions—risking a dangerous touchdown.
✔ Contaminated fuel—threatening engine shutdown at any moment.

Yet, despite every obstacle, they had done it.

After over seven hours of flying in marginal conditions, they had rescued ten men and lived to tell the tale.

The Impossible Victory

When the war ended, a detailed analysis was conducted at the Naval Air Force No. 2 Training Center, reviewing all operations conducted by the Second Naval Helicopter Squadron—including the Isla Borbón rescue.

The statistical probability of success?

🔴 Only 8% in their favor—92% against.

And yet, they made it home.

The Heroes of the Mission

Sea King 2-H-234

• Pilot: Commander Norberto Ignacio Ramón Barro (Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Oscar Iglesias
• Mechanic: Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux

Sea King 2-H-233

• Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias (Deputy Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Osvaldo Brandeburgo
• Mechanic: Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani

The Legacy of the Longest Day

They returned cold, battered, and exhausted, but with an unbreakable conviction:

💬 They would do it again—if duty called.

🔻 End of Mission.

Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Malvinas: Owen Crippa Attacked the Fleet All Alone

Malvinas: The Counter Attack of the "3 de Oro" at Wireless Ridge

The Counterattack of the "3 de Oro" (Golden 3) (Part 1)

By Lt. Col. (R) (Malvinas War Veteran) Víctor Hugo Rodríguez

The author served in the Malvinas as a First Lieutenant, Chief of the 1st Section of Company "A" of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment "Gral. Belgrano," nicknamed "3 de Oro" (Golden 3) during the Triple Alliance War, due to the yellow breastplate that adorned their blue jackets.





June 13, 1982, 22:00 hours — Tumbledown Hill, overlooking Moody Brook Valley. To the left was Longdon; in front, the 7th Infantry Regiment of La Plata was enduring relentless fire for two days, June 11th and 12th. It was hell. Positioned 100 meters above them and 5 kilometers away, we witnessed how the British enemy left no centimeter unscathed by naval, artillery, and mortar fire. It was clear they were preparing an assault on the regiment's heights. Occasionally, they turned their attention to us, a forewarning of their advance towards Tumbledown.

Below Longdon, Captain Soloaga—a war hero who carried his Sanmartinian values into peace—"clung like an oyster" to the rocks. His men were already fighting, enduring an infernal bombardment day and night. From our vantage point, we watched, both awestruck and helpless, as their resilience unfolded. Occasionally, patrols emerged—but only to retrieve their fallen and place them in an abandoned ambulance stuck in the valley's mud before returning to combat. Watching them march back into that artillery barrage was profoundly moving.
At 22:00 hours on June 13th, Captain Zunino, commander of Company A "Tacuarí" of the "3 de Oro," summoned us. A remarkable officer for wartime, Zunino convened 2nd Lt. Dobrovevic (support group leader), 2nd Lt. Mones Ruiz (2nd rifle section), Sub-Lt. Aristegui (3rd section leader), and me (1st section leader).

“We need to support the 7th Regiment, which is under attack on those heights,” he said.”. 

We knew the terrain only by sight—no reconnaissance had been done. The day before, we had deployed to Tumbledown, abandoning previous positions. Defending our spot against the expected assault the next day was our sole focus. Our positions consisted of low rocks; our aluminum screw-shovel “Tempex” tools had broken within a week, unable to withstand the greda soil. Digging foxholes was impossible. Equipment? Just a blanket, a shared tent cloth, and only five magazines per soldier. Night vision? Only the captain had one. Radios? None. Batteries were dead, leaving us with no communication within or outside the company. To supplement ammo, I ordered rounds carried in socks tied around our necks.



Aristegui, a 4th-year cadet serving as a "commissioned sub-lieutenant" in the Malvinas, was barely older than his soldiers. Yet, he was an example of leadership. I said,

“Aristegui, form up. You take the right, and I'll take the left. Let's cross the valley quickly and head for the heights.”. 

The battlefield was chaos—roaring, blazing, hellish. Longdon, the valley, Wireless Ridge where the 7th Regiment was positioned, Port Argentino, Mount Williams—all were alight with tracer rounds and rocket fire. It was full-on war, the final assault. We waded through a freezing brook, soaked to the waist. Snow fell. The cold? I can’t remember. The adrenaline heated our bodies.

From the valley, we realized the heights, where the 7th Regiment was supposed to meet us, were instead occupied by British forces, firing rifles and rockets at the abandoned Royal Marines barracks. Without communication, we had to resolve it on our own. I turned to Aristegui:

“The enemy’s up there. Let’s surprise them. Don’t advance straight—move to the right, gain the height advantage.”

Moments later, I heard, 

“The sub-lieutenant’s been hit in the neck!” 

I ran to him, blood pouring from his neck, when one of his men, slapping his cheek, shouted:

"You’ve been good to us, kid. We’ll get you out of here."

They carried him back to safety. Today, Aristegui, nicknamed “Nono,” is an exemplary Malvinas officer, earning the respect of his soldiers at just 19 years old. The bullet had pierced his neck, narrowly missing his spine..

Still in the valley, the enemy illuminated us with flares. Forty of Aristegui’s men and forty of mine were exposed. Knowing artillery fire was imminent, I ordered an assault on their positions, 100 meters above us on Wireless Ridge’s heights. Seconds later, an artillery barrage rained down where we had stood moments earlier. The shells exploded 50 meters overhead, showering us with lethal fragments.

“Charge!” I yelled. There was no other option to reach the heights and support the 7th Regiment. What a sight—my soldiers and Aristegui’s, running uphill, driven by sheer determination. “Cata” Carballo, my speedy aide; “Mono” Paz, my radioman without a radio; Aumasane, Izaguirre, “Bombón” Díaz, Juan Fernández—young men from Buenos Aires, cold, hungry, yet filled with love for their country, surging from the valley to claim that piece of Malvinas soil.

They were just 18 years old. They had little food, no communications, yet an unyielding spirit. To think the tabloids later dismissed them as mere “boys of war”...

Argentina: On How the 1955 Revolution Shaped Military Thought

Under the Aegis of Aries

By Esteban McLaren

During World War II, as in World War I, Argentina maintained an official stance of neutrality for much of the conflict. However, within the armed forces—particularly in the Army—tensions emerged among factions debating what the country’s true position should be. One such faction, aligned with the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United Officers Group - GOU), sympathized with the Nazi regime and, until 1943, advocated for Argentina to join the war on the side of the Axis powers. Following their successful coup d'état that same year, this faction seized control of the government, laying the groundwork for their preferred candidate, Juan Domingo Perón, to ascend to the presidency in the 1946 elections.

Perón, the son of Italian immigrants, initially assumed office as a constitutional president. However, he soon implemented a series of reforms aimed at suppressing opposition and consolidating his grip on power. Leveraging the surplus funds accumulated during Argentina’s wartime trade boom, he garnered support through bribes, subsidies, and other corrupt practices that allowed him to manipulate institutions to his advantage. Mismanagement of public resources became rampant: individuals with no prior wealth amassed fortunes, opposition media outlets were shut down or co-opted, and dissenting voices were systematically silenced—some through torture.

Amid this climate, a marginalized faction of the armed forces, sympathetic to the Allies and sidelined since the 1943 coup, began to regroup. This paper seeks to examine the recurring patterns within the anti-Peronist, or constitutionalist, forces that influenced Argentina's internal political-military dynamics, particularly during the period from 1955 to 1988, when these factions played a pivotal role in shaping the nation’s political landscape.

The Pro-Allied Faction

The earliest manifestations of this faction within the Argentine Army likely became evident during the failed coup attempt of 1951. What defined this group was their unwavering focus on action. These were military professionals trained to view challenges through the lens of the friend-enemy dichotomy. Their approach to any threat was inherently military: once the threat was identified, the enemy was delineated, and operations were executed to attack, pursue, and, if possible, annihilate it.

A prominent example of this ethos is Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, the founder of the Argentine Navy's Marine Infantry Corps (IMARA). Inspired by the U.S. Marine Corps, Gargiulo instilled a spirit of rigorous preparation and combat readiness in his troops. During the failed coup of June 16, 1955, when his efforts were thwarted, Gargiulo chose to commit suicide—an act that shocked many but epitomized his sense of military honor and courage. This same valor would be echoed 27 years later at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, where the Marine Infantry displayed exceptional bravery in the defense of Puerto Argentino during the Malvinas War.

This decisive and action-oriented approach stood in stark contrast to the hesitation shown by Juan Domingo Perón during the Liberating Revolution of 1955 (or 1955 Revolution). Faced with a rebellion in which only 18% of the troops turned against him, Perón faltered. The insurgents, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, stood firm, refusing to negotiate or compromise. Perón, accustomed to the political arena where deals and compromises were standard, seemingly misjudged the rebels’ intentions. Believing they sought a power-sharing agreement, he hesitated to order a decisive assault against their encircled forces. This hesitation allowed the insurgents to regroup and resume their offensive.

Once Lonardi's forces had reorganized, his first act was to order Perón’s arrest. This move, naturally, opened the door to his trial and potentially his execution—bringing Perón’s government to an abrupt end. Only then did Perón fully realize he was facing seasoned military professionals, not the political opportunists he was accustomed to outmaneuvering. His miscalculation sealed his fate, underscoring the stark difference between a military trained for decisive action and a politician unprepared for the harsh realities of armed rebellion.

The Liberating Revolution and the Formation of Army Officers

The Liberating Revolution, which overthrew the government of Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, had a profound impact on the composition and professional trajectory of officers within the Argentine Army. This process began with mass purges of officers deemed loyal to Peronism and the reinstatement of those aligned with anti-Peronist forces. Spearheaded by the Revolución Libertadora between 1955 and 1956, these changes disrupted the Army’s hierarchy, significantly altering its command structure and deeply affecting the careers of numerous officers (Mazzei, 2013).

The purge of Peronist officers resulted in the forced retirement of approximately 500 officers, many of whom were from the 60th to 74th graduating classes of the Military Academy. This affected officers from various branches, including infantry (53%), cavalry, and artillery. The vacancies left by their removal were often filled by less updated or less capable officers, which weakened the Army’s upper ranks.

Simultaneously, the Liberating Revolution reinstated around 180 anti-Peronist officers who had previously been dismissed. Many of these individuals later ascended to high-ranking positions within the military hierarchy, with some achieving the rank of general. The restoration of these officers solidified the influence of a military faction closely aligned with anti-Peronist ideology, significantly shaping the institution's leadership and operational outlook for years to come.na visión conservadora y antiperonista, que jugaría un rol crucial en los años venideros.

The "Blues" and the Consolidation of Military Power

Following the coup, the faction known as the "Blues" emerged as the dominant faction within the Army, consolidating its control throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This faction, under the leadership of figures such as Alejandro Lanusse and Alcides López Aufranc, imposed a militaristic and conservative vision that influenced both internal politics and Argentina's participation in territorial conflicts and the anti-subversive war. This faction managed to stay in power through a network of internal loyalties and through control of promotions and retirements within the military institution.

The Ideological and Operational Legacy

The impact of the Revolución Libertadora was not limited to a reconfiguration of the military hierarchy, but established a doctrine that would influence key events in Argentine history, such as the anti-subversive struggle and the conflict in the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The work underlines how this militaristic ideology promoted violent intervention in both internal and external conflicts, in defence of "national sovereignty" and the stability of internal order.

The changes in the composition and profile of Army officers during the Liberating Revolution significantly influenced military decisions in the following decades, particularly in how the Army approached counterinsurgency operations and territorial conflicts. The training and consolidation of these cadres during and after the Liberating Revolution instilled a distinctly aggressive decision-making style, exemplified by the harsh measures employed during the military dictatorship’s counterinsurgency campaign. This period saw the implementation of violent repression strategies against any perceived threat to the established order.

Moreover, the establishment of a high command that favored the use of force and embraced a nationalist perspective played a critical role in decisions such as the escalation of tensions during the Beagle Channel conflict with Chile in the 1970s and the invasion of the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The dominant ideology among these military officers—shaped during the Revolución Libertadora (1955 Revolution) and solidified in the subsequent decades—portrayed the Army as the guardian of national sovereignty against external enemies and as the enforcer of internal order against perceived subversion.

Professional soldiers trained under this doctrine operated with a clear and uncompromising premise: all problems were to be resolved militarily. Ambiguity was not an option. They assessed situations, identified enemies, planned attacks, and executed operations decisively, relying on force or the threat of it. The first major adversary of this philosophy was its ideological nemesis: the dictator Juan Domingo Perón. Subsequently, internal power struggles between factions emerged, including the infamous Azules versus Colorados clashes, leading to decades of military uprisings and internal conflicts.

Magdalena's 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment M4 Sherman Firefly over the Punta Indio Naval Station tarmac in 1965.

Conflict resolution within this faction of the Argentine military was consistently taken to extremes. The failed coup of 1951, the bombing of Plaza de Mayo on June 16, 1955, the decisive coup of September 13, 1955, the executions at León Suárez, and the series of coups throughout the 1960s left no doubt about the faction's uncompromising approach. On April 3, 1965, the 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment from Magdalena brutally attacked the Punta Indio Naval Air Base after being bombarded with rockets and napalm by naval aircraft. This level of unrestrained aggression became the norm.

A mentality shaped by the spirit of blitzkrieg dominated operations during the counterinsurgency campaigns, the near-war territorial disputes with Chile in 1978, and the climactic recovery of the Malvinas Islands. Operations such as Soberanía and Tronador exemplified this mindset. These plans were masterpieces of military strategy, marked by creative approaches and the ability to anticipate Chilean responses several steps ahead. They encapsulated the lessons learned by the officer corps, meticulously applying the most advanced military doctrine of the era.

The reliance on military solutions did not end there. The Carapintada rebellions and the brutal retaking of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment at La Tablada marked the closing chapter of a generation of soldiers forged for war. Often unable to resolve matters through other means, they consistently chose the use of military force as their primary response.

The negative consequences of this approach were evident in the widespread social condemnation of the methods employed during the counterinsurgency campaigns. The defeat in the Falklands War delivered the final blow to this mindset, leaving not only a profound loss of life but also a deep scar on national pride.

From a more positive perspective, the Argentine military approached their profession with uncompromising consistency, making decisions rooted firmly in military doctrine. Despite errors, indecision, and the brutalities committed, their actions often adhered to rigorous operational planning. Notable examples of military precision included Operation Rosario, an amphibious assault brilliantly executed against an enemy garrison with the explicit objective of avoiding casualties. Additionally, Argentina became the first country to simultaneously dismantle two terrorist movements—one urban and one rural—through a decentralized and audacious operation involving all military and police units to neutralize insurgent hideouts.

However, this war was later scrutinized in Argentine civil courts through a judicial process marred by irregularities, including the retroactive application of laws and improper proceedings that remain controversial. One critical misstep in the military’s counterinsurgency method was the disposal of insurgents’ bodies instead of returning them to their families, a decision that continues to fuel contention.

A Reflection on Military Responses and Leadership Failures

Allow me a personal reflection. One expects a military response from the armed forces; otherwise, there is no reason to call on them. When the military is summoned to address a problem, it is understood that the issue will be resolved manu militari. This entails frontal assaults, flanking maneuvers, precision strikes, saturating defenses, and seeking the enemy's surrender. The generation of Aries, guided by the Roman god of war, responded as expected—sometimes with massive errors, but always consistent with how the nation had trained them.

I deeply detest, with significant conviction, when a military officer ventures into political analysis, planning, or implementation for a real-world problem. When a tactician delves into geopolitics instead of focusing on executing orders from their superiors, it reflects a clear lack of professionalism. Such failures have existed, continue to exist, and will likely persist. A case in point was the HMS Shackleton incident, when the British oceanographic vessel intruded into Argentine waters in a blatant affront to national sovereignty. Intercepted by the ARA Rosales, the naval command from Libertad headquarters issued a direct order: "Sink it!" However, the naval officer in charge chose instead to have a coffee—a gesture that not only dishonored his uniform but also assumed roles reserved for the General Staff.

In 1982, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, as Argentina's military governor in the Malvinas, was tasked with designing the defensive plan against a potential British re-invasion. His plan, however, was a static defensive setup devoid of imagination or strategy. It resembled something conceived by a Chilean general—lacking in creativity and more concerned with maintaining good relations with the kelpers (the British-settled population) than defending the territory. When the enemy landing at San Carlos was detected, Menéndez's response was painfully reactive, if it could even be called that.

From that moment, events spiraled downward. There were no ambushes planned, no maneuvers to regroup forces, and no flanking or encirclement strategies implemented. Menéndez left each position commander to act independently, offering no centralized coordination or leadership. What emerged was a general with little intellect and even less courage, paralyzed by mediocrity, passively awaiting the inevitable. He failed to optimize the resources at his disposal, whether abundant or scarce. Instead of leading, Menéndez surrendered to inertia, displaying a complete lack of strategic vision and leadership. This was the cost of nepotism—elevating an officer tied to families associated with the Revolución Libertadora and the counterinsurgency campaigns. Menéndez prioritized geopolitical relations with those who despised him rather than focusing on his troops and crafting the best possible military plan.

A Broader Legacy of Patriotism

Despite the tragic context of Latin America, this generation of Aries left behind a lesson in patriotism that transcends generations. The shameful examples of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—where senior military officers, lacking ethics, morals, and discipline, handed their nations over to petty dictators—stand as cautionary tales of what Argentina could have become. Yet, in Argentina, a cadre of patriotic officers emerged. When a dictator like Perón sought to perpetuate his rule, it was the brave 18% of troops who rose in rebellion to depose him. This is not the cursed Caribbean; this is Argentina. And in Argentina, when the military acts with honor, it does not surrender its homeland to tyrants.

Lessons from the Liberating Revolution

The Liberating Revolution not only restructured the Argentine Army and the entire armed forces in terms of their composition, but it also laid the ideological and operational groundwork for the decisions that would shape the nation’s military history in the decades that followed. From this experience, both positive lessons and critical errors emerge. It is our generation’s duty to learn from both as we shape the doctrine that will restore us to the military power we were destined to be.