Malvinas: Blood Over The Murrell River

Blood on the Murrell River: The Commandos Who Fought in the "Death Zone" and Escaped an Ambush

"They're going to kill us all," muttered the Army and Gendarmerie men as they faced off against British paratroopers in the Falklands. They were trapped in the strip of land where a soldier’s chances of survival are nearly nonexistent—but they fought back. The bullets shattering the rocks, the shrapnel that tore into them, and how they ultimately forced the British to retreat when all seemed lost.
Nicolás Kasanzew || Infobae




Captain Figueroa (center), Lieutenant Anadón (right) y First Lieutenant García Pinasco (back), planifying the mission, June 6th, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)


Through freezing cold and sleet, they navigated a sector battered by naval gunfire and riddled with their own minefields. Leading them was Lieutenant Marcelo Anadón, who knew the terrain well. Advancing cautiously along the riverbank, spaced about fifty meters apart, they suddenly found themselves bathed in the glow of a massive, radiant moon.

Sergeant Guillén, scanning the far side of the Murrell, noticed a faint glimmer. At first, he assumed it was just the moonlight reflecting off the water. Only later would he realize—it had been the sheen of a plastic poncho worn by a British soldier.


"They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

As they reached the bridge—a simple wooden structure with no railings—Anadón and his men prepared to cross. That was when the British opened fire.

Figueroa, along with Non-Commissioned Officers Poggi and Tunini, was making his way back from the far side of the river, where they had gone to set up a post-ambush blockade. Just then, an explosion ripped through the air, followed by gunfire. Instinctively, all the commandos flattened themselves against the ground.

The British were about 80 meters away, positioned on a rocky high ground across the river.

"We're exposed. They're going to kill all three of us," Figueroa thought. In trying to set an ambush, they had walked straight into one. Without hesitation, he opened fire toward the flashes of enemy gunfire. His blood felt like it was bubbling in his veins, and his nostrils were flooded with the sharp scent of adrenaline.

The Argentine commandos had landed in what soldiers call the "death zone"—a stretch of battlefield where survival is almost impossible.


Figueroa: "We're Exposed. They're Going to Kill All Three of Us."

The British fired both in single shots and rapid bursts. Figueroa saw streaks of red and orange whipping through the darkness, writhing toward him like demonic ribbons, hunting for his life. They were tracer rounds—illuminated bullets the British loaded every five shots to guide their fire in the night.

"It was the most magnificent sight I’ve ever witnessed in my life," he tells me.

Bullets slammed into the nearby rocks, shattering them into a storm of dust and shrapnel. The acrid scent of gunpowder filled his lungs, leaving him lightheaded, almost intoxicated. The fear of death dulled, swallowed by

• "Captain, I'm hit!"
• "Where did they get you?"
• "In the leg, but I can crawl back."
• "Fall back, we’ll get to you soon."

"I'll help him and pull back with him," Tunini interjected.

The round had pierced Poggi’s calf, passing clean through without hitting bone.

Figueroa kept firing until his rifle jammed. Fortunately, his comrades—especially Sergeant Guillén—were scattered beyond the bridge, taking cover behind the rocks. Their relentless fire on the hill forced the British machine guns and rifles to divide their attention, shifting some of the incoming fire away from Figueroa.

Guillén recalls: "They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

"Cheto" (Handsome) Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to charge the British, but the section leader held him back, telling him to wait until daylight.

As Figueroa fell back, he heard several explosions—then silence. The British machine guns had gone quiet. It was the fearless Anadón, standard-bearer of Commando 601, who, with deadly precision, had launched FAL-mounted PDF grenades directly into the enemy’s position. Only their riflemen were still firing now.

Once again, "Cheto" Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to attack. Again, the lieutenant denied him, insisting they wait. But as Figueroa reached their position, he roared, "Let’s go get these bastards!" The adrenaline and fury coursing through him made it impossible to hold back.

Despite his reservations, García Pinasco relented. Figueroa took command, and the unit stormed across the bridge to launch their assault. Anadón quickly organized his men into a staggered formation: Vergara, Suárez, Quinteros, and two gendarmes from the elite Alacrán group—Natalio Figueredo and Miguel Puentes.

A faint light was beginning to creep over the battlefield. The attack was about to begin.

"The objective was to sprint forward, surround them from both sides of the ridge, and wipe them out—leave no one behind," recalls Captain Figueroa.

Once everything was set, he raised his right arm and gave the order: "Charge, damn it! Let’s wipe these bastards out!"

The commandos stormed ahead, firing from the hip in fully automatic bursts, mimicking the cadence of a machine gun. Their shouts and insults tore through the night, meant to unnerve the British troops.

The first to reach the enemy position was the fearless Lieutenant Anadón. But as he scanned the area, he realized the British paratroopers had already fled in haste, dragging their wounded with them.

In their retreat, the enemy had left behind a trove of abandoned equipment—firearms, radios, rucksacks, tents, communication codes, berets, gloves, a camera, and even a small Union Jack. That flag would soon be displayed as a trophy at the Commando 601 headquarters in Puerto Argentino/Stanley.

García Pinasco had been ordered to strike the enemy with a swift raid and set up an ambush.

The sheer speed of the assault forced the British paratroopers into a chaotic retreat. In their haste, they left behind an active radio—still transmitting—used to communicate with their high command. Bloodstains pooled on the ground, grim evidence of their casualties.

Later, the Argentine troops intercepted enemy radio chatter: urgent requests for helicopters to evacuate the wounded. Not long after, about four kilometers away, they spotted a flare piercing the sky—followed by the descent of a Sea King helicopter, marked with the white insignia of a medical evacuation unit.

After the battle, Guillén helped Indio Poggi to his feet. Poggi looked at him and said, "Wash my wound."

Guillén reached into his pack and pulled out a Margaret River triangle-shaped bottle. He raised it to his lips, pretending to take a swig.

"You bastard!" Poggi roared. "Don’t drink my medicine!"

Spoils of Battle: British Paratroopers’ Abandoned Gear – June 7, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)

Needless to say, the commandos eagerly devoured the gourmet rations abandoned by the men of the 3rd Parachute Battalion—dried apple compote, chocolate, nuts, biscuits, and raisins.

A bitter blow for the Brits; a feast fit for kings for the Argies.

But not all rewards were sweet. The Gendarmerie generously decorated its two men for their role in the battle. The Army, however, completely ignored the commandos of 601—the very unit that had handed them victory at the Murrell River.

Malvinas: Soldier Horacio Balvidares and the Camaradie of War

Camaraderie and commitment in the fight for Mount Tumbledown

The little-known story of soldier Horacio Balvidares

On the night of June 13, the battle for Tumbledown, an Argentine defensive position in the path of the British advance towards Puerto Argentino, began. It was a battle that both sides remember as very hard, fierce, with a lot of automatic weapons fire and hand-to-hand combat.


View from Mount Tumbledown

The troops of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, the 4th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Infantry Regiment gave ample evidence of their determination and bravery in the face of an equally determined and brave enemy. For two days the Army men had been fighting at close range, and under the cover of their own Artillery they tried to recover physically while perfecting their positions.


English drawing about Tumbledown combat

The remnants of Company "B" of the 6th Infantry Regiment were waiting on Wireless Ridge for their turn to engage. They could not determine where the enemy would come from, but the sounds of the increasingly violent fighting made it clear that action would soon begin. They were ordered to block the flank of a Marine section on Tumbledown Mountain and began to advance in the darkness broken by flares.

A soldier is wounded in the legs and Private Adorno bravely goes forward to help him. Before reaching the position he is shot and seriously wounded in the arm, falling onto the rocks.

Private Horacio Balvidares assists him and carries him to the rear, on foot and with his companion on his shoulder, he travels kilometers from Tumbledown to the entrance of the town of Puerto Argentino. There they are met by a nurse who had gone ahead.

After handing over his wounded comrade and despite having reached an area far from the combat, with greater safety, he turned around and began to return to his section's positions, knowing the danger of crossfire and hand-to-hand combat, so it was that while returning he was mortally wounded by an enemy artillery shell.

A brave man who rescues another brave man. A soldier who returns with determination to the place of danger. Soldier Balvidares left an indelible mark among his comrades and saved a life that is still remembered, thanked and paid tribute to.



Brave, generous, good comrades and, above all, respectful of the oath to the flag of their country; that is what our men were like in Malvinas.

Argentine government

Malvinas: Tumbledown Night

Tumbledown: Blood and Courage

The Battle of Mount Tumbledown: A Nocturnal Clash in the Malvinas War

The Battle of Mount Tumbledown took place on the night of June 13–14, 1982, as part of the British campaign to recapture Puerto Argentino, the capital of the Malvinas Islands. It was a brutal, close-quarters fight in freezing, rugged terrain, pitting the Argentine 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5) against a British force comprising the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, the 1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles, elements of 42 Commando Royal Marines, and supporting units like the Welsh Guards and Blues and Royals. The battle’s savagery stemmed from its nocturnal setting, the rocky landscape, and the desperate stakes for both sides.

The Setting: A Dark, Hostile Landscape

Imagine a moonless night, the Malvinas’ winter wind slicing through the air, temperatures hovering near freezing. Mount Tumbledown, a jagged, 750-foot-high ridge of crags and boulders, looms west of Stanley. Its slopes are slick with wet peat and frost, littered with rocks perfect for defensive positions. The Argentine 5th Marines, under Commander Carlos Robacio, are dug into trenches and sangars (stone shelters), their positions fortified with machine guns, mortars, and snipers. They’re cold-weather trained, hardened, and determined to hold this key height overlooking the capital. On the British side, soldiers huddle in the darkness near Goat Ridge, their breath visible as they prepare for a silent advance, weighed down by packs, rifles, and anti-tank weapons.

The Opening Moves: Diversion and Stealth

Picture the battle starting at 8:30 p.m. local time. A diversionary attack kicks off south of Tumbledown—four light tanks from the Blues and Royals (two Scorpions, two Scimitars) rumble forward, their engines roaring, accompanied by a small Scots Guards detachment. Their muzzle flashes light up the night, drawing Argentine fire. Meanwhile, the main assault begins from the west: three companies of Scots Guards—Left Flank, Right Flank, and G Company—move silently in phases, bayonets fixed, under cover of darkness. Mortar teams from 42 Commando set up behind, ready to rain shells, while naval gunfire from HMS Active’s 4.5-inch gun booms offshore, its explosions illuminating the horizon in brief, eerie flashes.

The Clash: Savage Close-Quarters Fighting

Visualize the moment the Scots Guards hit the Argentine lines. Left Flank Company, leading the assault, creeps undetected to the western slopes—then a Guardsman spots an Argentine sniper. A single shot rings out, followed by a volley of 66mm anti-tank rockets streaking through the dark, their fiery trails briefly exposing the enemy. The Guards charge, machine-gunners and riflemen firing from the hip, a chaotic line of muzzle flashes advancing over open ground. Argentine marines of N Company, entrenched with FAL rifles and MAG machine guns, return fire—tracers arc across the night, ricocheting off rocks. Grenades explode, showering shale and dirt; bayonets clash in brutal hand-to-hand combat. The air fills with shouts, screams, and the metallic clatter of weapons.

Halfway up, Left Flank’s 15 Platoon, under Lieutenant Alasdair Mitchell, takes heavy casualties—two men fall dead, others wounded, their blood staining the rocks. Right Flank Company, under Major John Kiszely, pushes east, meeting fierce resistance from Marine Sub-Lieutenant Carlos Vázquez’s 4th Platoon. Phosphorous grenades burst, casting a ghastly white glow, revealing Argentine defenders fighting from crag to crag. The Scots Guards lose eight dead and 43 wounded in this relentless grind, their red tunics (in spirit, if not literal uniform) soaked in sweat and blood.

The Gurkhas and Mount William: A Parallel Struggle

Now shift your gaze south to Mount William, a sub-hill held by the Argentine O Company. The 1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles, held in reserve initially, moves in after Tumbledown’s summit is secured. Picture Gurkhas in camouflage, kukris gleaming faintly, advancing across a shell-pocked saddle under Argentine mortar fire from Sapper Hill. Eight are wounded as shells burst in the soft peat, muffling some blasts but not the chaos. They take Mount William by 9:00 a.m., their disciplined advance a stark contrast to the earlier melee, yet no less determined. Robacio would say "We're not afraid of them, they fell like flies". They were humans after all.

 

The Welsh Guards and Sapper Hill: Delayed but Deadly

Imagine the Welsh Guards, paired with Royal Marines, stuck in a minefield en route to Sapper Hill. Their frustration mounts as Argentine mortars pound them from above, one man killed earlier on a motorbike dispatch. They’re meant to follow the Gurkhas but are bogged down, their silhouettes barely visible in the pre-dawn murk, cursing the delay as shells whistle overhead.

 

The Argentine Retreat: A Final Stand

See the Argentine 5th Marines’ resolve crack as dawn nears. A sniper—perhaps Private Luis Bordón—fires at a British Scout helicopter evacuating wounded, injuring two Guardsmen before being cut down in a hail of Scots Guards gunfire. By 9:00 a.m., the Scots Guards hold Tumbledown’s eastern high ground, and the Gurkhas secure Mount William. Commander Robacio plans a counterattack from Sapper Hill, but his men—16 dead, 64 wounded—begin a disciplined retreat toward Puerto Argentino, marching in parade order, colors high, defiant even in defeat. Thirty Argentine bodies lie scattered across the battlefield, a testament to the fight’s ferocity. As soon as Robacio arrives, ask the Militar Governor Menéndez to send all of his men to the front. He was disregarded.

The Aftermath: A Hard-Won Victory

Envision the scene at sunrise: British troops, exhausted, consolidate their positions. The Scots Guards’ Pipe Major James Riddell stands atop Tumbledown, his bagpipes wailing “The Crags of Tumbledown Mountain,” a haunting tribute to the fallen. A Volvo BV-202 lies wrecked by a mine, its crew dazed. The British tally: 10 dead (8 Scots Guards, 1 Welsh Guard, 1 Royal Engineer), over 60 wounded. Medals—DSOs, Military Crosses, Distinguished Conduct Medals—will follow, but for now, the survivors catch their breath, the road to Puerto Argentino open at last.

Malvinas: The Fall of Gazelle XX-411 Under Güemes Team’s Fierce Fire

A Unique Photo… and Why It Matters

This photo is unique because the British NEVER show their dead—by law. In stark contrast, we have been bombarded with images of our fallen, displayed as trophies by them. To put it into perspective, the contingent of journalists embedded with British forces during the war was strictly forbidden from photographing bodies—unless they were already inside a body bag.

Now, let’s analyze this moment: May 21, 1982.

The wreckage belongs to the Gazelle helicopter of 3BAS, shot down by the brave men of Equipo Güemes (Güemes Combat Team), stationed in San Carlos. That day, they didn’t just take down this aircraft—they brought down three more helicopters. After the battle, they managed to break through the British encirclement and reached an estancia called Douglas, in the center of the island. There, on May 25, they formed up to honor Argentina’s national day before being airlifted to Puerto Argentino. Legendary footage by Eduardo Rotondo captures their arrival, where they were greeted with chocolates by Colonel Seineldín himself.

That same day, May 21, as British troops were landing, Sea King helicopters were transporting components of a Rapier surface-to-air missile launcher. One of these Sea Kings came under concentrated Argentine fire from a hill defended by Lieutenant Esteban (RI-25) and Sub-Lieutenant Vázquez (RI-12). The aircraft was forced into an emergency landing.

Then came the Gazelle XX-411, piloted by Sergeants Andy Evans (Royal Marines) and Eddy Candlish, rushing to assist. But as it approached, it was met with a relentless storm of Argentine gunfire. It crashed into the water—Evans perished, while Candlish managed to swim to shore, where kelpers helped him.

The British response was immediate. Another Gazelle, XX-402, armed with rocket pods, was dispatched to the battlefield. Lieutenant Ken D. Francis RM and his co-pilot, Corporal Brett Giffin, were at the controls. But once again, the Argentine riflemen struck with precision. The helicopter was torn apart by FAL fire, crashing at Punta Camarones, killing both men on board.

And that’s what we see in the photo: the shattered XX-402, guarded by a sentry. The lifeless bodies of the pilots lie on the ground.

Approaching rapidly, with his back to the camera, is Dr. Rick Jolly, the British medic who was later decorated by Argentina for saving the lives of countless soldiers—a true man of honor.

This image holds countless details of significance: the rocket pods, the antennas, the helmets… every element a silent witness to that day.

And there was yet another Gazelle—XX-412—that came in for a direct attack on our troops. It, too, was hit by Argentine fire. According to British reports, it managed to withdraw and was later repaired.

That afternoon, four British helicopters were knocked out of combat—by just a handful of brave men.

This isn’t just history. This is the untold story of courage, strategy, and sacrifice.

Source: Pucará de Malvinas

Malvinas: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

The Longest Day: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

On May 15, a British commando raid, supported by naval gunfire from a frigate, left the T-34 Mentor, IA-58 Pucará, and Skyvan aircraft stationed at Calderón Naval Air Station on Borbón Island completely inoperable. With no possibility of repair, the Naval Aviation personnel integrated with Marine Infantry units, assuming new roles in ground defense, combat air patrol (PAC) observation, naval and meteorological reconnaissance, and pilot rescue operations.


The Two Sea Kings on Malvinas soil, in the photo From left to right: SI Montani, TF Brandenburg, TN Iglesias Osvaldo, CC Barro, TN Iglesias Guillermo and SI Giqueaux

The Sea Kings on Malvinas

The British landing at San Carlos forced the Command of Naval Aviation to reassess the situation of the ten aviation personnel stranded on the island, weighing the possibility of their evacuation.

Since Marine Infantry units were also still stationed there, coordination was sought with the Marine component commander to evacuate all personnel to Puerto Howard on Gran Malvina (West Falkland), where they could regroup with the Argentine Army detachment stationed there.

The only way to accomplish this was to cross the three-mile-wide strait between the islands using two outboard motor boats. However, the Marine Infantry commander decided his troops would remain at Calderón, leading the Naval Aviation commander to opt for an aerial extraction of his men.

Mission Orders: A High-Risk Operation

The Commander of Naval Aviation immediately issued orders to:

• Captain Rivero, Commander of Naval Air Force No. 2, to prepare SH-3D “Sea King” helicopters and the necessary support personnel for the mission from Río Grande.
• Captain Martini, Commander of Task Group 80.1, to provide coordination, control, communications, and search-and-rescue support.

The Second Naval Helicopter Squadron, then deployed in Viedma, conducting anti-submarine operations in the Gulf of San Matías, received what was effectively a suicide mission: an extraction operation in British-controlled airspace.

On the night of May 28, all planned flights were canceled, and the squadron began preparing the only three available SH-3D Sea Kings (2-H-231, 2-H-233, and 2-H-234).

The rescue zone was dangerously close to enemy lines at San Carlos, where the Royal Navy’s Harrier jets maintained total air superiority. The helicopters would operate with complete vulnerability, lacking any weapons, sensors, or countermeasures, and being easily detectable due to their large radar cross-section and the unmistakable roar of their engines.

Mission Challenges: A Deadly Gauntlet

From the outset, planners identified critical risks:

• Extreme vulnerability: The helicopters were easy prey for any enemy interceptor.
• Zero defensive capability: They carried no weapons to counter aerial threats.
• High detectability:
  • Radar signature: The large rotor provided an excellent reflective surface, ensuring detection.
  • Acoustic signature: The Sea King’s powerful engines could be heard from miles away.
• Limited speed for evasion: Factory-restricted top speed of 120 knots.

.

Sea King painted by Arsenal Aeronaval N° 2 for the rescue mission on Isla Borbón (photo: Frigate Lieutenant Antonio Urbano -in the photo- via Claudio Meunier).

• Operational range exceeded: The extraction point was far beyond their maximum combat radius.
• Return flight under extreme conditions:
  • Night operations at low altitude, navigating through mountainous terrain.
  • Possible need for instrument flying due to deteriorating weather.
• Icing hazard: The Sea King was not certified for flight in icing conditions.
• Navigation accuracy issues:
  • Unreliable equipment for long-range overwater flight.
  • Potential errors of 10-15 nautical miles per hour.
  • High failure rate of onboard systems.
• Lack of radar: No meteorological or navigation radar available.
• No electronic countermeasures (ECM): The helicopters had no means of jamming or evading enemy radar or missiles.
• Evacuation from a highly contested zone: The North San Carlos Strait, a key area occupied by British forces, was dangerously close to the extraction site.

A Desperate Gamble in Enemy Territory

To enhance their chances of survival, one Sea King was repainted by Naval Arsenal No. 2 specifically for this mission, applying camouflage modifications to reduce visibility.

The pilots and crew fully understood the odds were against them—they would be flying directly into the jaws of the British forces, with little hope of returning unscathed. However, the Argentine Navy was not willing to abandon its men.

With courage as their only advantage, the Sea King crews prepared to embark on one of the most perilous rescue operations of the Malvinas War.

Would they succeed, or were they flying to certain death?

 

 

Original sketch published in the book History of Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini.

The Longest Day: The Countdown to a Daring Rescue

With orders to exhaust every resource to ensure the mission’s success, it was deemed essential to deploy two helicopters for mutual support. Operating in pairs provided greater payload capacity, improved navigation accuracy, and redundancy in case of failure. Additionally, at least one of the helicopters needed to be equipped with a VLF OMEGA navigation system to compensate for severe navigational limitations, preventing an inaccurate landfall on the islands—or worse, an unintended and disastrous descent into enemy territory.

Critical Mission Requirements

To mitigate the extreme risks, the following were requested:

• Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) to detect enemy presence, particularly in concealed inlets where British forces might be stationed.
• Meteorological or navigation radar to improve flight precision and safety.
• Intelligence on enemy activity in the operating area.
• Communications support for coordination and potential emergency responses.
• Confirmation of fuel availability at Borbón and its operational condition.
• Weather updates for both the target area and flight route.
• Night vision goggles to facilitate the low-altitude nocturnal approach.
• Camouflage paint to reduce visual detection—however, due to time constraints, only one helicopter could be repainted.

Mission Preparations: Engineering a Survival Plan

At dawn on May 29, with weight calculations adjusted to the last possible pound, logistical work began to modify the helicopters to match the planned configurations. All anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment and non-essential components were systematically removed to maximize fuel and payload capacity.

Among the first items discarded were the seats, followed by the bomb racks, which each saved 14 pounds. This seemingly minor adjustment underscored the desperate need to maximize available load capacity, primarily for carrying 200-liter fuel drums—a crucial move to extend the operational range as far as possible.

Since in-flight refueling was impossible, the fuel transfer solution was brutally simple yet effective: the floor panel above the main fuel tank was removed, and a manual clock-style pump was used to transfer fuel from the drums as the internal tanks emptied.

A final operational check revealed that the Sea Kings’ flight envelope had to be pushed beyond its limits. Torque limits were reassessed, allowing for a maximum speed of 135 knots—15 knots above the factory limit, a dangerous increase that risked blade detachment but was necessary to improve survivability.

Final Modifications and Crew Deployments

On May 30, the Sea King 2-H-234 (crew: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux) was deployed to Comandante Espora Naval Air Base (BACE) for the installation, testing, and calibration of the VLF OMEGA navigation system.

By May 31, the calibration was completed, but the crew had just two hours of training to operate the system before taking off. That night, 2-H-234 (now crewed by Commander Raúl Lorenzo, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani) departed BACE for Río Grande, arriving at 23:45 hours.

Meanwhile, the two other helicopters, which had remained in Viedma for final preparations, departed for Río Grande on June 1, arriving at 17:00 hours:

• 2-H-231 (Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux).
• 2-H-233 (Lieutenant Commander **Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Hernán Verdugo).

That night, with all three helicopters and their crews finally assembled in Río Grande, the final mission details were reviewed. Takeoff was scheduled for 14:00 hours the next day, ensuring arrival at Borbón by twilight to reduce exposure to enemy detection and interception.

Mission Greenlight: Last-Minute Adjustments

Upon arrival in Río Grande, the following mission-critical elements were confirmed:

✔ Fuel at Borbón: The exact quantity remained uncertain, but estimations suggested a sufficient margin to complete the mission. However, its condition was unknown.
✔ Night Vision Goggles: Secured and distributed among the crew.
✔ Camouflage Painting: The crew managed to paint only one helicopter overnight due to time constraints.
✔ Aerial Reconnaissance Request: Task Group 80.1 formally requested that Task Force 80 conduct a scouting flight along the planned route to detect potential threats and assess enemy activity.

With all available resources exhausted, three unarmed Sea Kings, pushing beyond their operational limits, prepared to fly directly into one of the most hostile airspaces in the South Atlantic.

The clock was ticking.

Original sketch of the base in Malvinas published in the book History of the Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini

The Longest Day: Into the Storm

Green Light for the Mission

On June 1, reconnaissance aircraft reported the area was clear of enemy forces—the green light was given.

The helicopter commanders conducted a final weather check, but poor visibility over the target area delayed takeoff. A second report from the Meteorological Center confirmed low cloud ceilings at the objective but also assured clear conditions at Río Grande for the return. This finalized the decision to return to Río Grande instead of San Julián, which had also been considered as an alternative.

That morning, preflight checks were completed, and the crews gathered one last time before heading to the aircraft platform, where their helicopters stood ready. Around them, pilots and personnel from various squadrons operating out of Río Grande wished them good luck. The final piece of advice was clear: fly low and be extremely cautious when transitioning from land to sea, as enemy naval units were known to hide in inlets and along irregular coastlines.

Mission Crew Assignments

• 2-H-233: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani.
• 2-H-234: Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux.

At 14:17 hours, the two SH-3D Sea Kings lifted off, joined by a Super Puma from the Naval Prefecture. Ten minutes later, the third Sea King (2-H-231) departed for Río Gallegos, where it would remain on standby as a search-and-rescue asset.

• 2-H-231 Crew: Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class José Ponce.

The Super Puma PA-13 had a critical role:

• Verifying the functionality of the only VLF OMEGA navigation system installed.
• Guiding the SH-3Ds to their pre-designated release point, 120 nautical miles from Río Grande.

Everything proceeded as planned—low altitude, smooth conditions, and maximum cruising speed maintained.

A Critical Malfunction and Freezing Conditions

Shortly into the flight, a strong fuel odor flooded the cabin of 2-H-234. The crew immediately opened the forward windows and partially unlatched the cargo door to allow airflow to clear the vapors. The risk of fire or explosion now became a constant concern. From that moment on, they were forced to fly with the heating system turned off, enduring freezing temperatures for the remainder of the flight.

At 15:24 hours, a Beechcraft B-200 (4-G-44), piloted by Commander Santiago Barrios, took off from Río Grande to provide communications support. Since the helicopters were flying low, radio transmissions were deliberately minimized to avoid enemy detection. The 4-G-44 maintained an orbit at mid-distance between the departure point and the objective, acting as a relay while using deception techniques to mask transmissions.

Despite the extreme conditions, the helicopters pressed forward, flying at 5 meters (16 feet) above the ocean, pushing their airframes beyond their operational limits.

A Dangerous Approach to Malvinas

As they neared the islands, the weather deteriorated—low cloud ceilings, rain, and reduced visibility made navigation more difficult. However, as they closed in, the rain ceased, and the cloud cover began to lift, revealing clear skies and bright sunlight—a disastrous development for a mission dependent on darkness for concealment.

The initial landfall occurred exactly as planned, between San José and San Rafael Islands, southwest of West Malvina. From there, the final approach to the objective began, flying along the terrain contours or skimming the water’s surface to avoid detection.

With visibility still low, the helicopters inadvertently passed over a house, increasing concerns about compromising the mission. They pressed on, crossing San Francisco de Paula Bay, then over the Trinidad, Vigía, and Borbón Islands, finally reaching the Elephant Seal Bay Isthmus, where Naval Aviation units had previously operated.

At 17:25 hours, both SH-3Ds touched down in the middle of the settlement. To avoid the catastrophic risk of engine failure, they kept the rotors turning rather than shutting down completely—especially given the lack of maintenance tools, which could complicate any restart attempt.

Unexpected Delays: A New Threat Emerges

A new problem arose immediately: the officer in charge of the stranded personnel was only expecting one helicopter. This miscommunication delayed refueling operations, a setback further aggravated by the sudden failure of the VLF OMEGA system—the only reliable navigation aid for the return flight.

Without it, the extraction became far more dangerous, particularly during the low-altitude, nighttime departure through a maze of islands and enemy-controlled waters.

The Extraction and a New Crisis

At 18:35 hours, the two Sea Kings lifted off, carrying:

• Lieutenant Marcelo Félix Batllori
• Chief Petty Officer José Sabat
• Chief Petty Officer Rubén Laureiro
• Petty Officer Second Class César Bogado
• Petty Officer Second Class Federico Leus
• Petty Officer Second Class Pablo Chiodini
• Petty Officer Second Class Osvaldo Gutiérrez
• Petty Officer Second Class Héctor Gauna
• Petty Officer Second Class Ricardo Telaina
• Corporal First Class Nelson Talone
• Corporal Second Class Marcelo Iturbe

Heading northwest, the pilots carefully navigated a pre-planned return route designed to avoid detection and natural obstacles.

However, a catastrophic failure in one of the night vision goggles forced one helicopter to ascend to 300 meters (984 feet) for safety—exposing them to enemy radar detection.

Nearing Isla Blanca, west of Borbón, the worsening weather forced them into instrument flight conditions. Torrential rain lashed against the windshields, while salt deposits from the ocean spray completely obscured visibility. The pilots, unable to rely on their instruments, were forced to lean out of the side windows, using their night vision goggles to navigate through the storm.

Meanwhile, the control aircraft continued attempting radio contact. Unable to break radio silence, the helicopters maintained strict radio discipline, refusing to respond.

After a sufficiently long silence to ensure they were clear, they clicked their microphones once—a signal confirming to Task Group 80.1 that they had successfully lifted off.

Out of the Fire—But Not Yet Home

The most dangerous part of the mission was still ahead. The storm, failing equipment, and exposure to British radar meant their return to Río Grande was anything but certain.

Would they make it back?

Helicóptero Sikorsky S-61D4 Sea King 0678/2-H-234 participante del rescate. (Foto: Archivo MUAN)

The Longest Day: Against All Odds

A Final, Deadly Challenge

As the two Sea Kings made their way back, both helicopters experienced a critical fuel system warning—the fuel filter obstruction alarm lit up, signaling a high risk of imminent engine shutdown. The crews knew they were flying on borrowed time.

British Response: The Enemy Was Watching

Just thirty minutes after takeoff, reports came in from the Marine Infantry personnel who had remained behind on the island:

A section of British Sea Harriers had swept over the extraction site, illuminating the area with flares.

This confirmed the crew’s suspicions—British forces had eyes on them the entire time. There were enemy observers nearby, and the helicopters had narrowly escaped detection.

Navigating Through a Frozen Hell

The return flight was a battle for survival:

• Unreliable instruments that malfunctioned intermittently.
• Windshields obstructed by frozen salt deposits, forcing the pilots to lean out of the side windows to see.
• Icing conditions worsening, despite the Sea Kings not being certified for such environments.

At Río Grande, the Second-in-Command of the Squadron anxiously followed the mission’s progress. A new crisis emerged—dense fog had unexpectedly formed over the airbase.

For a moment, a diversion to Río Gallegos was considered. But the crews pressed on, determined to complete their journey.

Mission Accomplished—But Barely

When the two helicopters finally reached Río Grande at 21:55 hours, they were barely holding together:
✔ No heating—crews frozen to the bone.
✔ No functioning navigation system—they had flown entirely on skill and instinct.
✔ Landing gear malfunctions—risking a dangerous touchdown.
✔ Contaminated fuel—threatening engine shutdown at any moment.

Yet, despite every obstacle, they had done it.

After over seven hours of flying in marginal conditions, they had rescued ten men and lived to tell the tale.

The Impossible Victory

When the war ended, a detailed analysis was conducted at the Naval Air Force No. 2 Training Center, reviewing all operations conducted by the Second Naval Helicopter Squadron—including the Isla Borbón rescue.

The statistical probability of success?

🔴 Only 8% in their favor—92% against.

And yet, they made it home.

The Heroes of the Mission

Sea King 2-H-234

• Pilot: Commander Norberto Ignacio Ramón Barro (Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Oscar Iglesias
• Mechanic: Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux

Sea King 2-H-233

• Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias (Deputy Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Osvaldo Brandeburgo
• Mechanic: Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani

The Legacy of the Longest Day

They returned cold, battered, and exhausted, but with an unbreakable conviction:

💬 They would do it again—if duty called.

🔻 End of Mission.

Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)