Malvinas: 1813 British Acknowledgment

British Acknowledgment

In 1813, the British requested permission from Buenos Aires to go to the Malvinas Islands.

Malvinas: Strategy, Actions, and Investment to Recovery of the Islands

Strategy, Actions and Investment to Recover the Malvinas

✍️ Opinion piece by José Javier Díaz

On 3 September, President Javier Milei announced the implementation of a series of measures aimed at preventing the illegal exploitation of oil in Argentine territory occupied by the United Kingdom. We examine the proposals that have been announced and the role that the Argentine Navy should play in the surveillance and control of our jurisdictional areas and areas of interest in the South Atlantic.

🔹 From Claims to Action

The Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands were unlawfully seized in 1833 and have since remained de facto under British administration, with the exception of the 74 days between 2 April and 14 June 1982, when they were recovered by the Argentine Armed Forces.

In almost two centuries, Argentine diplomacy has failed to recover that part of our territory unlawfully occupied by an extra-continental power which has progressively expanded its area of influence and military projection in the South Atlantic and Antarctica, where the sector claimed by Argentina is also claimed, in whole or in part, by the United Kingdom and Chile.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Argentina conducted diplomatic negotiations with the United Kingdom with the aim of recovering the full exercise of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.

Unfortunately, economic interests — principally those of the monopolistic Falkland Islands Company — together with military and political interests within the Argentine and British governments, escalated into a crisis and subsequently an armed conflict, derailing the preliminary agreement intended to bring about the return of the islands to the Argentine Republic.

No serious State can assert sovereign rights and demand respect for its interests solely through words, while pursuing actions — or omissions — that preserve the status quo or even improve conditions for the occupying country.

From the 1982 war until last week, successive Argentine governments pursued essentially the same implicit strategy regarding the Malvinas, one contrary to the Nation’s vital interests: limiting themselves to ever more speeches and diplomatic claims whilst reducing investment in Defence to a minimum.

For 193 years, Argentines have asserted our sovereignty through hundreds of letters and speeches, resolutions adopted by multilateral organisations (UN, OAS, UNASUR, etc.), services (air connectivity, postal services, healthcare, etc.) and infrastructure (including a paved runway) intended to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of the Malvinas — commonly known as “Kelpers” — even including the delivery of Winnie-the-Pooh teddy bears, among other initiatives.

Against this backdrop, over the past 40 years the Argentine Armed Forces have lost strategic military capabilities essential to the defence of a bicontinental country with a land area of 3,761,274 km² and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 3,146,345 km²; a population of almost 50 million; the capacity to produce food for 400 million people; a GDP of nearly US$700 billion and exports worth US$100 billion; as well as substantial reserves of fresh water, minerals (gold, lithium, copper, silver, etc.), rare earths, oil and gas, among other resources.

For these reasons, it is essential that the noble “Malvinas cause” — one of the few issues on which all Argentines agree — receive the explicit backing of the entire political spectrum. Through a National Law, political leaders should establish a National Strategy and Action Plan aimed at recovering Argentine sovereignty over the southern archipelagos and their surrounding maritime areas, strengthening our Antarctic projection and securing control of the South Atlantic. The ability to control that oceanic space, or deny its use to foreign powers, will be crucial to safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Argentine Republic.

🔹 Actions to Be Implemented

During the nationwide broadcast on Thursday, 3 September, and through Official Communiqués Nos. 157 and 160 issued by the Office of President Javier Milei, the following measures were announced:

• The National Sovereignty Defence Bill will be submitted to Congress. It will establish a National Security Council responsible for defining a national security policy to be implemented across all areas of government. This will lead to the formulation and implementation of a coordinated strategy for the defence of national sovereignty and territory, with the objective of recovering the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. “We will ask Congress to grant the Council the necessary powers so that the State can respond with economic and diplomatic tools to State or non-State actors that threaten our national security,” the President stated.

• A critical infrastructure protection regime, together with an aerospace and maritime protection framework, will be established to strengthen protection against potential attacks of any kind upon our country’s territorial integrity.

• Through Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) 867/2026, the Executive Branch amended budgetary allocations, providing an additional AR$217.959 billion (approximately US$142 million) for the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), an additional AR$30.519 billion for Intelligence (SIDE), and a further AR$117.275 billion for the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE).

• According to President Milei, the increased MINDEF budget will have “the priority objective of building an integrated naval base in Tierra del Fuego and increasing our telecommunications capabilities. This base will turn us into the most important logistics hub in the South Atlantic and will be fundamental to Argentina’s geopolitical projection in a region of strategic importance to the country’s future.” Efforts will also be made to increase capabilities through the recovery and modernisation of existing assets and the incorporation of new equipment for the Armed Forces, as well as completing the Petrel Joint Antarctic Base, which comes under the Armed Forces Joint Staff (EMCO).

President Milei also stated: “This very evening I will sign a decree to expedite the sanctioning procedures established under Law 26,659 against those participating in oil-extraction initiatives in Argentine territory under British occupation.” The companies involved will be prohibited from operating on Argentine soil.

🔹 Other Actions That Should Be Undertaken

Although the President’s decision to announce the aforementioned measures represents a significant step, they are not sufficiently comprehensive in themselves to exert decisive pressure upon an extra-continental actor of the United Kingdom’s stature: an economic and military power possessing nuclear weapons and a veto on the United Nations Security Council.

In order to increase political and diplomatic pressure and make the United Kingdom’s unlawful occupation and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas more difficult and costly, the Argentine Government should undertake the following measures:

• Formally request the Governments of the United States and Israel to exercise their good offices so that Argentina and the United Kingdom resume negotiations concerning the sovereignty dispute.

• Request that all South American countries prohibit the use of their civilian and military airports and ports by British aircraft and vessels — or aircraft and vessels flying other flags — travelling to or from the Argentine islands.

• Reach an agreement with the Chilean Government on cooperation in Antarctic science and logistics, complementing the civilian and military resources and capabilities of both countries and acting in a coordinated and synergistic manner in response to the British claim, which encompasses the entirety of the Argentine Antarctic Sector and part of the sector claimed by Chile.

• Extend the application of commercial, economic, tax and judicial sanctions against companies and individuals exploiting any resources — oil, gas, fisheries, livestock, tourism, etc. — in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.

• Build the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base (BNIU) for the Argentine Navy (ARA) as a matter of utmost urgency; complete the construction and equipment of the Petrel Joint Antarctic Base (BAC); and modernise the facilities of the Marambio Joint Antarctic Base, thereby establishing a multimodal Antarctic logistics system. This would strengthen Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica, improve surveillance and control of the South Atlantic, and allow services — maintenance, supplies, training, etc. — to be offered to companies and governments that recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their maritime areas.

• Redesignate the current BNIU project as a Joint Base and expand its facilities to accommodate units from all three Armed Forces. Its strength should be comparable to, or greater than, that of an Argentine Army (EA) brigade — approximately 3,000 to 4,000 personnel with their weapons, vehicles, support weapons, engineering assets, etc. It should also accommodate supersonic combat aircraft; vessels including the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar, auxiliary vessels, tugs, fast craft and patrol vessels; transport and maritime-patrol aircraft; medium- and long-range drones for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike missions; Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters; and other assets. The capabilities and assets of the Argentine Armed Forces in Ushuaia should provide two or three times the combat power of the British military base in the Malvinas.

• Relocate the Joint Antarctic Command (COCOANTAR), the Argentine Antarctic Institute (IAA) and the Permanent Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty from their present headquarters in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA) to new facilities in Ushuaia.

• Begin construction as soon as possible at the TANDANOR/Río Santiago shipyards of a self-docking floating dock, providing the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base with major maintenance facilities for Argentine Navy vessels and those of other domestic and foreign users.

• Establish, by law or DNU, a National Maritime Surveillance and Control System (SINVYCEM), designating the Argentine Navy as the implementing authority and funding the system through a multi-year budget for 2027–2030. This would support the development or licensed production of coastal and over-the-horizon radars; coastal towers and buoys equipped with electro-optical sensors, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), AIS/LRIT ship-identification systems; satellites; medium- and long-range aerial drones; unmanned surface and underwater systems; telecommunications; command-and-control systems; and other capabilities.

• Seek an agreement whereby France supports Argentina’s sovereignty claim as a prerequisite for signing a contract to re-equip the Submarine Force Command (COFS) with three new submarines — with an option for six, since three would be a very limited number given the size and wealth of Argentina’s coastline — as well as H145 helicopters and other equipment.

• Pursue the acquisition from Italy, Denmark and Norway of between four and eight second-hand frigates to replace the obsolete MEKO 360 destroyers commissioned between 1983 and 1985 — three remain in service and one has been decommissioned — and modernise, in Argentine shipyards, the sensors and weapons of at least four of the Argentine Navy’s six MEKO 140 corvettes.

• Negotiate with Italy for the gradual transfer of its three San Giorgio-class amphibious assault ships, providing the Argentine Navy’s Marine Corps Command (COIM) and Argentine Army units with strategic mobility and force-projection capabilities, particularly to secure communications between the provinces of Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz.

• Restore strategic capabilities to the Argentine Navy’s Naval Aviation Command (COAN) by incorporating at least one squadron of 12 to 18 F/A-18C/D Hornet fighters and eight to twelve SH-60 Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters. AGM-84J-1 Harpoon Block II+ anti-ship missiles should be acquired for the three P-3C Orion aircraft purchased by Naval Aviation and for the F/A-18C/D Hornets that the Argentine Navy should acquire.

• Strengthen Río Grande Naval Air Station, which comes under COAN, through the permanent deployment of manned and unmanned aircraft for ISR, SAR, ASW and ASuW missions, as well as helicopters. Owing to its geographical location, the base has considerable geostrategic value, as it is the Argentine air base closest to the Malvinas.

• Complete and modernise the combat and mobility capabilities — by sea, air and land — of Marine Infantry Battalions (BIM) Nos. 4 and 5, permanently based in Ushuaia and Río Grande respectively.

• Amend specific-service and joint military doctrine so that the Argentine Air Force (FAA) is capable of attacking surface targets at sea. This would require appropriate personnel training and the acquisition of the same anti-ship missiles operated by COAN.

• Increase the National Defence budget to a minimum floor of 1 to 1.5% of GDP. To put these figures into perspective, in 2025 Argentina allocated only 0.56% of GDP to its Armed Forces, compared with a South American average of 1.25% and a global average of approximately 2.5%, according to SIPRI data. With defence expenditure at only 0.56% of GDP, a substantial proportion of Argentine military personnel earn less than the cost of the basic household basket; instruction and training remain at minimal levels, with personnel completing fewer flying hours, days at sea and field-training days each year; the readiness of ships, aircraft, tanks and other equipment falls below desirable minimum levels; and the age of the principal weapons systems of all three Armed Forces has rendered many of them obsolete owing to insufficient modernisation and/or replacement with safer and more capable systems.

• The Argentine Navy, under the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), and the Argentine Naval Prefecture (PNA), under the Ministry of National Security (MINSEG), should make optimal, synergistic and complementary use of their personnel, assets and capabilities. With the exception of the United States, other countries in the Americas generally integrate their coastguard services into the organisational structure of their respective navies. The PNA could transfer assets and responsibilities beyond the territorial sea — outside the 12-nautical-mile limit measured from Argentina’s coastal baselines — to the Argentine Navy, whilst retaining responsibility for security in ports, waterways, binational lakes and other relevant areas.

• Argentina should develop a national capability to place nano- and microsatellites into orbit for observation, telecommunications and geopositioning. Operating a satellite constellation equipped with passive sensors (cameras) and active sensors (L- and X-band radars) would provide greater situational awareness across Argentine territory and maritime areas.

• Connectivity between Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego should be ensured without the need to cross Chilean territory. As a priority, the feasibility of constructing a bridge, an undersea tunnel and/or establishing a ferry system for the transport of people, cargo and vehicles should be assessed.

• A strategic industries promotion regime — covering aerospace, shipbuilding, nuclear technology, AI, Defence, Security and other sovereignty-related sectors — should be implemented. This should include reductions in tax and employer contributions, preferential access to public tenders for Argentine SMEs, and incentives for multinational companies establishing production and/or maintenance facilities in Argentina.

🔹 Conclusions

As President Milei stated during his nationwide address: “National security is not merely the physical defence of our territory. It also means protecting our strategic resources, our economy, our critical infrastructure and our ability to decide our own future.” He emphasised that the areas of “Defence, Security, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and the Economy must act in a coordinated manner”. Finally, the President concluded: “A prosperous Argentina, politically relevant and militarily respected, is in a stronger position to defend its territory, its resources and its sovereignty.”

Following the end of the 1982 war, the Malvinas question returned to the international agenda on 31 August, when President Donald Trump was asked in the Oval Office whether the United States might reconsider its position of neutrality in the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The US President replied that he reviews all his positions every day and that this was “just one of many”. His remarks came against the backdrop of disagreements between Washington and London over the previous two years concerning the lack of British support for Israel and the war against Iran over its nuclear programme and maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Factors favouring Argentina include the close personal relationship between Presidents Trump and Milei; Argentina’s strategic alignment with the United States and Israel; the United Kingdom’s growing economic, military and geopolitical difficulties; calls from Ireland, Scotland and Wales for full independence — which, according to this argument, would result in four independent countries, with Great Britain remaining the only one unwilling to rejoin the European Union — and the precedent of the recent agreement under which Britain returned sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. Among other developments, these factors suggest that the recovery of our Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas may be closer than we might imagine.

Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind President Milei’s statement that: “It is therefore not enough simply to maintain the claim: the Argentine State has an obligation to use every diplomatic, economic, judicial and legal instrument available to defend our sovereignty and our resources. That requires appropriate laws, coordinated State institutions and effective tools to advance an objective that transcends any individual government.”

Referring to the contribution that Defence can make to foreign policy, Defence Minister Lieutenant General Carlos Presti stated: “President Javier Milei’s decision to strengthen Argentina’s presence, capabilities and strategic projection sets a clear direction for National Defence. We have a unique opportunity to build a stronger, more sovereign and more secure country.”

In this column, we endorse General Presti’s words regarding the need to “…turn that vision into the concrete capabilities Argentina needs to defend its strategic interests, exercise its sovereignty and rise to the challenges ahead.” He added: “Argentina has everything it needs to achieve this. And Defence is ready to play its part. The Malvinas are Argentine.”

From the President of the Nation to the last Argentine citizen, we must set aside our ideologies and personal interests and unite behind the constitutional mandate to recover sovereignty over our Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.

By right, by history, by geography, and in honour of and gratitude to the 649 heroes who fell in combat and the Veterans of the Malvinas War, let us do everything we can and everything we must so that the Argentine flag may once again fly proudly over our islands.

May it be so.

Photo: MINDEF

The author serves as Director in Argentina of Colombia’s Aerospace Sector Scientific Corporation and as a consultant to companies and government agencies. He is a former Argentine Navy officer and served as an adviser to the Ministers of Industry, Trade and Technology of Córdoba, and to Argentina’s Ministers of Defence and Security.

Infography: Chronology of Malvinas Sovereignty

Kelper Bullshit: "We discovered them first, then"...

If "we discovered them first"...

Watch the film. Read the sources. Then ask whether the certainty survives the evidence.

If "we discovered them first" is your defence of British ownership of the Malvinas, prove it. Repeating "John Davis, 1592" is not proof.

Davis recorded a sighting of islands generally identified as the Falklands. That supports an English sighting in 1592. It does not establish that nobody had reached them before him. Yet that missing step is precisely what the claim of British discovery priority requires. 

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/davis_john

Davis's voyage and its historical interpretation.

The challenge comes from the Dictionary of Falklands Biography itself. Writing there, Graham Pascoe describes the claim that Davis was the first discoverer as "clearly disproved" by earlier maps. That is his interpretation, rather than a universal scholarly verdict - but it demolishes any pretence that Davis's priority is an undisputed fact. Read Pascoe's argument.

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/discoverers_the

Consider what existed before 1592.

Around 1586, André Thevet's Grand Insulaire included "Les Isles de Sanson ou des Geantz", a map identified by historians with the Falklands. The Bibliothèque nationale de France records that identification. Thevet said his information came from an older Portuguese source. Its origins remain disputed, but a discovery narrative beginning with Davis must explain this earlier evidence, rather than simply omit it. 
https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40618578z

https://falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/discoverers_the

BnF catalogue, discussion of Thevet's source.

The cartographic debate reaches further back. A 2023 study dates Pedro Reinel's polar chart to approximately 1521–1524 and links its geographical information to the San Antonio, which deserted Magellan's expedition in 1520. This does not establish that the ship sighted the islands. It does show why confident discovery claims require careful examination of the earlier charts. 

https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00087041.2023.2216496

Gaspar, The Cartographic Journal.

And the human story may begin centuries before any of these European voyages.

Research published in Science Advances reported marine-animal bone deposits on New Island dated to approximately 1275–1420, alongside charcoal evidence and a locally made stone projectile point. The authors interpret the combined evidence as consistent with visits by Indigenous people from Tierra del Fuego.

The visitors' identity remains uncertain. The point was not directly dated, and the findings do not demonstrate permanent settlement. Those qualifications matter. So does the possibility of a human history that predates Davis by centuries. 
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8550247/


This evidence does not, by itself, resolve sovereignty. It challenges the historical certainty invoked when "Britain discovered them first" is used to justify ownership.

We do not have to identify the first visitor before questioning an unsupported claim of priority. The burden of proof belongs to whoever insists that England was first.

An incomplete historical record is no licence to award first place to Britain.

The 602th Commando Company Was Geared with Our Latest Weapons

Malvinas 1982: Get out of here, you bureaucratic piece of shit!

Like the 601, the second Company received new, pristine weaponry. For some designated marksmen, they secured Weatherby .300 Magnum rifles with telescopic sights and FM K-3 submachine guns equipped with laser sights.
Thompson radios and armor-piercing ammunition were supplied by the Arsenal Command. But as always happens, the Commandos of the 602 Company had to overcome certain unexpected obstacles to secure their individual gear.
When they went to collect the equipment from the School’s armory—with the unit formed up outside—the Lieutenant in charge refused to hand it over without the proper receipt form...
Captain Tomás Fernández explained the urgency of testing the gear, adjusting the sights, checking the aim, and so on. The answer remained a refusal.
"Forgive me, but until Major Rico comes to sign the 2404 form for me, I cannot release the weaponry."
Then, acting impulsively, Fernández opened the door himself, telling him:
"Get out of here, you bureaucratic piece of shit!
We are a Commando Company about to go to war, not a bunch of paper-pushers!"
Immediately, he began tossing the rifles outside—caught in mid-air by the unit members—while Captain Fernández, having achieved his goal, tried to calm the officer down:
"I’ll take responsibility for any problems that might arise later."
At that moment, Sergeant Mario Cisnero—the famous "Perro" (Dog), a fearsome instructor for the trainees—stepped forward and asked to serve as the gunner for the MAG machine gun. He took one of the weapons, went prone, and began inspecting it down to the finest detail.
To the keen observer, this act revealed a great deal about Cisnero and his spirit of self-sacrifice, as it meant carrying extra weight during marches; ...a mindset geared toward the collective effort, given that it is a weapon that supports the others; and, finally, a disregard for danger, since the machine gun draws enemy fire.



It was under these circumstances that Sergeant Cisnero exchanged the aforementioned words with his former student, First Lieutenant Losito.
After Losito had ironically remarked to Cisnero that he still held a grudge over how he had been treated during the course, he added:
"Let's see now, *Perro*, how you handle yourself in war."
The sergeant suddenly turned serious and replied:
"Rest assured, First Lieutenant—now we’ll see who the real good ones are..."
This exemplary NCO donated half his salary before crossing over to the islands. These soldiers certainly had guts—something the British realized very clearly.
Born in Catamarca, he was only twenty-six years old.

From the book: Comandos en acción by Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno

Malvinas: After the British Invasion, Gaucho Was the Main Workforce

Gauchos remain a main population during the initial years of British occupation

An 1856 British engraving in *The Illustrated London News* depicts "Spanish-American gauchos" capturing horses with boleadoras in the Malvinas.
The English press documented the established presence of Rioplatense culture following the 1833 occupation—a history that supports our sovereignty.





The colonial authorities relied on them. In a British Parliament report (1843), Admiral King details the urgent shipment from the Río de la Plata of "trained horses and 6 recados (gaucho saddles)," as Luis Vernet’s own stock was exhausted.



The report highlights Antonina Roxa, a legendary Rioplatense woman who played a key role in taming cattle on East Falkland (Isla Soledad). In 1841, Colonial Lieutenant Tyssen admitted that, to venture into the interior, he was left "alone with an Indian, a boy, and Antonina." They needed her expertise.



Faced with isolation, Tyssen pleaded in his official letters for the urgent hiring of more "gauchos from Buenos Aires or Montevideo who understood the trade." They knew full well that the economy and survival of the islands were impossible without the Rioplatense criollo.



The archive reveals that the British referred to the Argentine governor as “Don Louis Vernet,” thereby acknowledging his prior role de facto.
Sovereignty is not merely a legal claim; it is etched into the land, the place names, and the documents of those who occupied the territory.

Malvinas: 24 May 1982

24 May 1982

24 May 1982: The following ships were damaged: HMS Sir Lancelot, HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Bedivere and HMS Fearless. Twenty casualties.

 

Malvinas: The CITER 155 Opens Fire

The 155 mm Howitzer Opens Fire for the First Time

At about 8 p.m. on Friday, 14 May, the commanding officer of Artillery Group 2 — under whose command the guns of Artillery Group 101 sent to the Malvinas had been placed — called a meeting at his command post. Second Lieutenant Pérez and Sergeant Major Garnica attended. The discussion dealt mainly with the types and quantities of ammunition available. During the meeting, however, an alert was received: echoes detected by the RASIT radar appeared to be British frigates approaching the coast at high speed.

Both men were ordered to return to the gun position and prepare it to fire. They had to walk the four kilometres separating them from the command post. It was very dark, and crossing open ground at night carried the risk of being fired upon accidentally by a sentry. Halfway back, the danger increased when British shells began falling around them, something that had already become routine. They instinctively threw themselves to the ground and waited for the bombardment to stop. As soon as there was a pause, they hurried to the position, arriving at about 11 p.m. The gun commander and his soldiers were ready to fire this Argentine-built weapon’s first shot in anger.

 

Once the firing data had been received, Corporal Juan Manuel Figueroa entered it into the sight and turned the handwheels to lay the gun on the designated target. The rest of the gun crew — soldiers Aguilera, Benítez, Brangeri, Fanín, Ferrer, Potes, Sandoval, Saralegui, Tempio and Velozo — prepared and loaded the ammunition. Fanín was given the honour of pulling the firing lanyard.

According to the records kept by Sergeant Major Garnica, who meticulously logged every round fired by the gun, three rounds were fired that night. Charge 9 was used, and the firing range was 17 kilometres, towards a point south of Elisa Cove. The radar reported the following observations: the first round was ‘400 metres over’, the second fell short and the third landed ‘on the ships’ radar return’.

The best account of the accuracy of this fire came from British naval officer David Tinker (*), who served aboard one of the ships that carried out harassing bombardments on most nights. In letters to his family, Tinker described the accuracy of the Argentine fire, stating that shells had landed within 50 metres of his ship and forced it to leave the area at full speed to avoid being hit.

Firing upon the British ships was made possible by an ingenious fire-control method. The precise locations of the Argentine radars and guns were plotted on a 1:25,000-scale map, with all of them aligned to the same grid north. When a radar detected a target (**), its echo provided the range and bearing required to lay the guns.

The ship’s speed and the shell’s estimated time of flight were also taken into account to improve accuracy. A 155 mm shell, for example, took about 50 seconds to reach an impact point 18 kilometres away. Using this manual and largely improvised method, several rounds landed within 100 metres of the ships — inside what artillerymen considered the ‘effective zone’. In any event, the intended result was achieved: whenever the 155 mm guns replied to the enemy ships, the vessels quickly moved away from the coast.

As Sergeant Major Garnica had observed when he first set foot on the Malvinas, the presence of the 155 mm SOFMA guns also raised the troops’ morale. Seeing these weapons and hearing their powerful muzzle blast had a positive effect on the soldiers in their trenches. Despite the enemy’s technological and numerical superiority, many now felt that the Argentine forces also possessed powerful weapons with which to confront them.

At night, whenever the guns answered the frigates’ fire, the soldiers from Corrientes would celebrate each 155 mm round with a thunderous sapucay, their province’s traditional cry.

Second Lieutenant Esteban Vilgré Lamadrid of the Infantry later described his impressions:

‘The 155s were in a class of their own. The distant sound of them firing and the tremendous force of their shells landing gave us the feeling that “my big brother has arrived”. It lifted our spirits and made us feel that the British were having just as hard a time as we were. During the final two days, it seemed as though the sound of our guns was overpowering the British fire.

‘We also heard that they had opened fire on the British. From the hill, we even saw ships that had been shelling us turning away and heading out to sea.’

On Sunday, several enemy aircraft carried out raids. From the position, the unmistakable sound of an Argentine Tigercat surface-to-air missile could be heard. It had been launched by Air Defence Artillery Group 601 from Mar del Plata. A large explosion was seen in the air, although nobody knew whether the aircraft at which the missile had been fired had been hit. War sometimes provided spectacles of this kind — grim ones, since the men involved were ultimately fighting to save their own lives and those of their comrades.

It was cold. That was the one constant. Throughout the day, the crew of this first gun worked to reinforce and camouflage the position, using local materials to conceal it as effectively as possible and blend it into the surrounding terrain. Keeping busy was the best way to fight the low temperatures, although physical exertion also made them hungrier. One of the soldiers, Miguel Potes, used his ingenuity to build an improvised brazier inside the shelter, burning peat as fuel.

During the afternoon of Sunday, 16 May, several soldiers from Infantry Regiment 3 came over to visit. They occupied neighbouring positions. The artillerymen welcomed the chance to meet other comrades and enjoy a brief period of harmless relaxation.

Everyone was awake by 7 a.m. on Monday, 17 May. The sunrise was particularly beautiful: the sky was clear and, for once, there was no rain. For tactical reasons, the gun had to be moved that morning, a difficult operation that took it about 1,000 metres farther to the rear. The rest of the day was spent improving the new position.

Their new accommodation was a semicircular corrugated-iron shed supported by iron arches and wooden beams. They shared it with Staff Sergeant Raúl Orcasitas and five soldiers from Artillery Group 3 who operated the RASIT radar. As at the previous position, Miguel Potes and Walter Ferrer built an improvised stove from a 200-litre drum, fitting it with a length of pipe that served as a chimney. They burned locally gathered wood and the now familiar Malvinas peat.

They knew how fortunate they were to have a shelter of this kind, particularly compared with the soldiers living in trenches on the front line and enduring the full force of the weather. Their good fortune would not last, however. Later, the artillerymen would also have to sleep in the open.

On Wednesday, 18 May, the radar operator detected another echo on his screen. It was a frigate approaching to within 18 kilometres. The gun fired a round in response, once again using Charge 9. The pressure generated by firing at maximum charge caused a nut to break loose, blowing out the firing pin and its safety spring. The round nevertheless left the barrel and the mission was accomplished: the enemy ship withdrew towards the open sea.

An initial attempt was made to repair the damaged gun at Logistics Battalion 10, the support unit based in Puerto Argentino, but the work could not be completed there. The gun was out of action. Sergeant Major Garnica later recalled:

‘Unfortunately, we had no experience of firing with the maximum charge. I remember that, before the war, during an exercise in La Pampa, I requested permission to fire with Charge 9 so that we could gain experience for the future. We were unable to do so, and now we were suffering the consequences. As an artillery mechanic, I had always been concerned by our lack of information about how the weapon would behave when subjected to extreme demands.’

The gun would soon return to service. Fortunately, its twin was already on the islands and could continue fighting while the damaged weapon was being repaired.

(*) David Tinker was a member of the crew of the destroyer HMS Glamorgan. He was killed in action when the ship was struck by an MM38 Exocet missile launched from the shore. On the night of 12 June, Tinker was on duty on the flight deck, where the missile struck. He later became widely known after his father published a book about his life, The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, which included some of the letters the naval officer had sent home.

(**) Two radars were used: a Cardion air-surveillance radar belonging to Air Defence Artillery Group 601 and a smaller RASIT surveillance radar operated by Artillery Group 3. The latter was operated by the then Staff Sergeant Raúl Armando Orcasitas.

Malvinas: The Real History

An 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment Conscript Story

 

A LITTLE-KNOWN STORY

The regiment was established on 31 January 1907. In 1969, it became the 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment, under the IV Airborne Infantry Brigade. In 1985, it was redesignated the 17th Motorised Infantry Regiment and transferred to the V Motorised Brigade. The 17th Regiment was finally disbanded in 1997.

It is little known that, in 1982, two NCOs and ten soldiers from the 17th Regiment took part in the Malvinas War.

This detachment from the regiment was deployed to the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations and positioned on Two Sisters Mountain.

They went into action when Second Lieutenant Aldo Eugenio Franco and his rifle section, to which these newly arrived paratroopers had been attached, covered the Argentine withdrawal. By then, the planned counter-attack by the Panhard armoured vehicle squadron in support of Major Jaimet had been cancelled, as Captain López Patterson’s men no longer held the summits. The section’s action forced Yankee Company to halt its advance and take cover among the rocks.

Conscript paratrooper Ramón Bustos, of the 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment, recalls:

“I was called up in Catamarca and assigned to the 17th Parachute Regiment. One day we were taken to Comodoro Rivadavia, and only ten soldiers and two NCOs crossed over to the islands. We were in Puerto Argentino, and afterwards they sent us to Two Sisters Mountain to reinforce a section of the 6th Infantry Regiment positioned on the downward slope of the mountain.

My combat role was as a MAG machine-gunner...

On the night of 11 June, from our position we could hear the fighting taking place on Two Sisters. We could also hear fighting in the direction of Longdon and Harriet, but that was some distance away. What concerned us was the battle taking place directly in front of us.

In the early hours of 12 June, it was our turn to go into action. The enemy were coming down towards our positions and were about 200 metres away. We opened fire and they withdrew. Every time they tried to come down again, we fired at them. It was not a sustained attack; it seemed as though they were probing to find out what was behind the mountain.

We fought like that until it was almost dawn. Together with the men of the 6th Infantry Regiment, we held the slope of the mountain. We held out until seven in the morning, after fighting throughout the night. Eventually, we ran out of ammunition and had to withdraw towards the town.”

Malvinas: Corrientes at the War

 

Corrientes Mobilises at the Call of the Bugle

Remarkable account from the newspaper “LA ÉPOCA”

At that time, since our country is not a homogeneous whole, Corrientes was different when it came to military service as well. Personally, I have seen conscripts who had been exempted on health grounds asking the doctors to take them in anyway, even if only as cleaning staff, because they did not want to return to their towns bearing what they felt to be a shameful rejection, a stigma.

After years of working on the history of Corrientes, I have no doubt that such attitudes, and the pride those former Corrientes conscripts took in wearing their uniform, were the product of the province’s past. It was a past shaped by wars, celebrated as Corrientes’ fundamental contribution throughout the nineteenth century, and reinforced by the essentially livestock-based character of a “horse-riding” province isolated by rivers and poor roads. Horsemen, “men of silence”.

In this regard, how did the men of that reinforced Corrientes regiment, the 5th Infantry Regiment of Paso de los Libres, conduct themselves when they fought at Puerto Yapeyú? Does their conduct justify continuing to speak of an epic tradition, regardless of the final outcome? In any event, although those events are now indelibly inscribed in the military history of Corrientes, it is worth remembering that the Corrientes epic was forged through notable victories such as Caá Guazú and Caseros, but also in the mud of harsh defeats at Pago Largo, Arroyo Grande and Vences Rincón. For when the reckoning is done, there are defeats which, deservedly, also grant the vanquished their share of glory and their place in history.

The regiment and the Engineer, Communications and Medical units that reinforced it all belonged to a Corrientes brigade, but the conscripts were not only from Corrientes: there were also men from Chaco, Formosa and the forested wedge of Santa Fe. Many of them were those we affectionately know as menchos: illiterate rural labourers from our countryside who would leave knowing how to read, write and count thanks to the regiment’s primary school, which later disappeared along with conscription.

On 2 April, the response of those who had served there lived up to the great history of Corrientes. One witness recounts:

“Later in the day, dozens of former soldiers began to gather spontaneously... Without knowing exactly what was happening... they crowded around the entrance gate to the barracks at Paso de los Libres. These citizens, who had already fulfilled their obligations under the Compulsory Military Service Law, wanted to enter the barracks and put on the uniform again... Dozens of young men from the 1962 and 1961 classes, and even some from 1960, crowded around the entrance. There were even older volunteers and men who had never received military training. Everyone wanted to take part...”

Many of those who were elsewhere did not wait to be summoned.

A former conscript from Las Breñas who was studying engineering heard the news, travelled home to say goodbye, and his parents took him to Libres:

“...where we cried and said farewell in the face of an uncertain fate. My mother, who was a teacher, said to me: ‘You have to do your duty to the Motherland, son.’ In those days, you did not need a piece of paper to know what was right.”

Another former conscript, from Villa Ángela, who was living in Derqui, in Buenos Aires Province, was attending a computing course in the capital when he heard the news. He informed his parents and took a coach to Paso de los Libres.

A First Corporal from Formosa was married and had a one-year-old baby daughter. Mabragaña gave him the option of staying behind to look after the barracks, but he went home and told his wife:

“Pack your suitcase, because you’re going to Formosa... I’m going south...”

A conscript from the rural area around Goya, who served with the 3rd Engineer Company of Monte Caseros, did not wait either and went to volunteer:

“...I have nothing to lose except my life. My teachers taught me well that the Malvinas were ours. So I’m going to defend what is mine.”

The spirit of those who had to remain behind does not appear to have been any different. A soldier who had been enlisted for only a month recalls that when the regiment departed:

“The whole town was there at the station... two of my friends... were leaving. I felt like joining them and climbing aboard the carriage... I had to make do with watching them leave and then returning to the barracks.

It was very emotional.”

At two o’clock in the morning on 11 April, the first 157 men of the 5th Regiment departed by train, together with all their vehicles, supplies and ammunition. The rest would follow over the next few days.

Malvinas: Inflatable Dolls at Moody Brooks

Inflatable Dolls

Three inflatable dolls were found in the Moody Brook area by Argentine personnel from the 9th Logistics Battalion. They were being used as targets* at a Royal Marines firing range. No dildos were found.

*They may have had other uses...).

Malvinas: Torpedo Problems in the ARA San Luis

Malvinas 1982: The Misunderstood

Mariano Sciaroni

I often read comments about the Navy: the Navy did this, the Navy did that; whether it put to sea, and why it did not. I would like to know whether, after reading this account, the reader would be willing to sail aboard a submarine that could not dive — as in the ordeal of the submarine Santa Fe — or one armed with torpedoes that were effectively useless.

The condition of the SST-4 torpedoes during the Malvinas War

The German SST-4 torpedoes — “Special Surface Target 4”, also nicknamed “Sol Sol Taco Cuatro” — were delivered to the Argentine Navy between 1974 and 1975. At the time, they were among the most modern submarine weapons in the world.

This intelligent, wire-guided weapon remained connected to the launching submarine by a cable, allowing it to be guided remotely. It had a maximum range of 56,000 yards at 23 knots, or 24,000 yards at 35 knots, and carried a 573-pound warhead.

After the torpedoes arrived in Argentina, 19 test firings were conducted as part of the certification process: 15 from submarines and four from surface craft. Only eight were completed without incident. None of the torpedoes used in these trials carried a live warhead.

Despite this poor reliability rate — which, it must be said, was not very different from that of other contemporary submarine weapons — the torpedo was accepted into service.

Between December 1975 and May 1980, no operational firings were conducted. The only exceptions were three very short-range tests carried out in 1977 to take various measurements.

As early as 1975, the Submarine Force Command had asked the Directorate of Naval Weapons to conduct a live-warhead firing. The request was repeated in 1977. On both occasions, it was denied.

Between May 1980 and March 1982, eight SST-4 torpedoes were launched. Only one completed its run without incident. Another was lost, while in the remaining six cases the guidance wire was severed. In light of these results, the weapon was considered non-operational during this period.

During the Malvinas conflict, SST-4 torpedoes were loaded aboard the submarines ARA Salta and ARA San Luis. The latter fired two of them at enemy warships.

As might have been expected from the experience of previous years, however, the torpedoes failed to perform as intended.

For a detailed examination of these incidents, see Ready for Combat? Submarine Weapons in Malvinas, 1982.

Post-war assessments identified several possible causes for the weapon’s failures during the conflict:

• According to the manufacturer, each torpedo required a full overhaul every ten years. As they had been manufactured in 1972 and 1973, they were already approaching the end of their intended service life. That ten-year lifespan, however, applied only when the weapons were stored under specified conditions of humidity, pressure and temperature. A suitable storage facility was not brought into operation until 1981. In practice, therefore, the torpedoes had already exceeded their service life.

• The torpedoes’ gyroscopes were supposed to undergo maintenance every 48 months, but Argentina lacked the equipment required to perform the work. In 1980, six gyroscopes had been declared unserviceable and were sent to Germany for maintenance together with three others. Twenty-two remained in Argentina, but their reliability could not be properly assessed. Neither of the two torpedoes fired by ARA San Luis was fitted with an overhauled gyroscope.

• The torpedoes’ batteries had been manufactured between 1971 and 1972 and were expected to last between seven and nine years. Between 1979 and 1982, thirteen new batteries were purchased, bringing the total number available to forty-three. In February 1981, the Submarine Force Command requested that the batteries be tested, but the tests were never conducted. Of the two torpedoes fired by San Luis, one had a new battery and the other had an expired one.

The maintenance condition of the torpedoes was therefore clearly unsatisfactory. The weapon also suffered from an inherent design problem. In September and October 1982, the manufacturer, AEG, offered the Argentine Navy a large quantity of spare parts free of charge, apparently as a form of compensation. It also offered to maintain and repair the torpedoes already in service.

In 1984, despite the arms embargo, a substantial part of one torpedo was sent to Germany for examination. Once the investigation had been completed, the conclusions were forwarded to Argentina. By then, however, the weapon was already becoming obsolete.

It was a new and poorly understood technology, affected by both design defects and maintenance failures. Given all these problems, the SST-4’s poor performance during the 1982 Malvinas War was hardly surprising.

Even so, the submariners were ordered to put to sea practically unarmed.

Argentine Army: The Discipline of the MechIR 3

DISCIPLINE
Account by Quartermaster Second Lieutenant Dardo José Forti. The second lieutenant took part in the Malvinas campaign as a member of the quartermaster section of Infantry Regiment No. 3 “General Belgrano”.

Malvinas: Historias de Coraje

A delicate issue in war is discipline. From my humble point of view, and without being a specialist, I believe there is one way to maintain it: by example. It is quite easy to write that; the difficult part is putting it into practice. Once again, Colonel Tocagni warns about this matter: “Discipline must be strengthened. A certain limitation of activities, the short duration of the day, the harsh climate, a monotonous landscape, shortcomings in accommodation, failures in equipment and food, all tend to cause a relaxation of discipline and fighting morale, against which timely and energetic measures must be adopted.”

Thanks be to God, I did not find it too difficult to lead my group of men in Puerto Argentino. Without setting out to do so, perhaps because of my personality, I liked to be present in every task, both those related to our work and those involving recreation. Just as I could carry supplies, I would also join in when it came time to tell a joke or recite something. Besides, as I have already said, those soldiers and non-commissioned officers had their own drive; they were committed to the task. Under those circumstances, leadership becomes much easier.

What else is discipline? Jorge Vigón, in Estampas de capitanes, quotes a fitting answer by Bocaccia: “Discipline is solidarity in action for the common purpose.” Even today, so many years after those events, one of my former soldiers will still remind me of some anecdote from those hours of shared conversations. I believe that, should I be able to leave you one piece of advice, it is this: personal example carries people along, mobilises them, enthuses them. Try it, and you will be surprised.

However, as is usually the case, there are exceptions. One night I asked about one of those souls, and he was not there. Still not losing my sense of humour, I mobilised my aide and right-hand man, Gustavo De Vincenzo, so that he could go around the sector and ask whether anyone had seen Private Donda.

—No, my second lieutenant, he is nowhere to be found.

Donda was adding one more ingredient to this war: he had disappeared.

Only when I had exhausted every means of finding him did I have to report the news. I felt a little calmer; that is what always happens when one shares a problem with another person. From another point of view, that person offers a possible solution — and the solution was given to me.

—Forti, find him! —Lieutenant Colonel Comini ordered me.

So, with my jeep and three volunteers, we went out to look for him. It would not be simple; many hours had already passed. We began in the town. Four pairs of eyes examined every place as we moved forward. Every soldier we crossed seemed to be him, but each sighting turned out to be a mirage that vanished when we got closer and saw their faces. We discovered that everyone looks alike from a distance if you put them in a green uniform. The more time we spent searching, the more our anxiety grew, and anxiety manufactured Dondas in every corner of the town.

—Let’s go towards the Sapper Hill area —I told the driver.

We kept moving, now along the road. The time to hand out dinner was approaching, and I wanted to be there. But returning without Donda, and with night falling, would not be good.

—There he is! —shouted one of the searchers.

—Donda! What the hell are you doing here, for f…’s sake?

—I went to see a friend, Sergeant First Class Edgardo Taylor. He needed cigarettes.

—And you crossed half the island for that?

In reality, he had walked a little over ten kilometres.

—Well, yes… I left at dawn.

—Get in the jeep. We’ll talk when we get back to the ranch.

In truth, I did all the talking. Donda paid for his adventure with the much-hated “run to the sea, hit the ground”, breaking the frost every now and then as he crashed against the ground. Much later, when I remember that action, I think of the loyalty of those men: a simple soldier putting himself in danger because a comrade needed something.

As for Private Donda, he stayed with us. The war was not such that we could leave him without work.

Malvinas: The Brazilian Triangulation For Arms and Spare Provision

Declassified Malvinas files: the Brazilian triangulation to bypass European sanctions and supply arms to Argentina

Declassified documents from Brazil’s National Archives revealed a manoeuvre by the authorities to coordinate the arrival in Argentina of military weaponry manufactured in Belgium during the armed conflict. The operation sought to circumvent the European embargo quietly. The unanswered questions that still remain behind Brazilian support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim.
Mariano Sciaroni || Infobae

 

Personnel of the Argentine Army on the islands. The soldier on the right is carrying an FN FAL rifle, while the other two are holding Browning GP-35 pistols.

When Argentine forces landed on the Islas Malvinas on 2 April 1982, the response from the European Economic Community (EEC) was swift. Within days, and at Great Britain’s request, the EEC imposed economic sanctions on Argentina, including, among other measures, the suspension of exports of defence material.

This created a problem for the Argentine armed forces, which saw weapons and equipment that had been ordered — and often already paid for — retained in Europe. The best-known case is that of France and the powerful Exocet missiles.

But the declassified files in Brazil reveal a story that had remained hidden until now: how the highest Brazilian authorities coordinated with a Belgian arms manufacturer so that key weapons components could reach Argentina, bypassing the imposed blockade.

***

Fabrique Nationale Herstal S.A., based in the city of Herstal, in the province of Liège, Belgium, had for years maintained a major series of contracts with Argentina’s armed forces, especially with the Argentine Army and its institutional representative, the Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM).

The main rifle used by Argentine forces was the FAL, the standard-issue machine gun was the MAG — the MAG 60-20 was the infantry section support machine gun and the MAG 60-40 was used in a coaxial configuration in armoured vehicles — and the sidearm was the Browning GP-35 pistol in 9 mm calibre. They are still in use. All were weapons made by Fabrique Nationale (FN) Herstal, and were by then being manufactured or assembled under licence in Argentina, at the Fábrica Militar Fray Luis Beltrán in the Provincia de Santa Fe. These were weapons needed for the war that had already begun.

The situation was critical.

On 3 June 1982, a British Avro Vulcan bomber, registration XM597, had to make an emergency landing in Río de Janeiro after attacking Malvinas and experiencing problems while refuelling in flight. Brazil allowed the bomber to return on the condition that it would not take part in the war again, and retained the AGM-45 Shrike missile it was carrying, which appears covered in the foreground.

***

According to a memo that had reached Belgium, Argentine factories were paralysed by a lack of pistol, machine-gun and rifle parts — “leur fabrique est paralysée par manque de pièces” — and the orders were marked as “super urgence”. Weapons that soldiers needed were only half completed on the production lines.

But FN Herstal could not fulfil the orders. Its government would not allow it.

Faced with that situation, FN Herstal turned to its Brazilian subsidiary. The solution devised was legally ingenious: to import the parts from Belgium under the “drawback” customs regime — which suspends import duties on condition that the material is re-exported after processing — subject them to “um rápido processamento/tratamento final” at the industrial plant of FN do Brasil Ltda. in Valença, State of Río de Janeiro, and then re-export them to the Argentine government.

The operation would allow FN Herstal to circumvent the EEC blockade while serving its client, while FN do Brasil would obtain a “certa margem de lucro” as intermediary. But the cost to the buyer would be minimal, since FN Herstal agreed to reduce the list prices of the goods so as not to affect the amount Argentina had to pay.

It was a deal that suited everyone. Except the British, of course. And it allowed the Brazilian government to lend a hand when its neighbour needed it.



The two Embraer EMB-111 Bandeirante Patrulha aircraft, leased to the Brazilian Air Force on very favourable terms, are the best-known face of Brazilian aid to Argentina during the 1982 conflict. Their lease also required formal approval from that country’s president.

***

The declassified documents from Brazil’s National Archives reveal that the operation was structured around two formally independent requests, processed before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) under the Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Nacional de Exportação de Material de Emprego Militar (PNEMEM).

Both were initiated by the Director General of FN do Brasil Ltda., Kleber Carvalho Rocha, through letters addressed to Ambassador Paulo de Tarso Flecha de Lima, Head of the Commercial Promotion Department at Itamaraty.

The first request, dated 4 May 1982 — internal reference FN-82/055 — comprised:

• 177,500 precision mechanical parts for the 7.62 mm FAL rifle, detailed in six batches: semi-finished rough parts obtained by investment casting, 17,500 units; semi-finished FAL model 50-00 receiver bodies, 23,000 units; complete FAL magazines, 50,000 units; seamless stainless-steel tubes for the gas cylinder, 21,000 units; seamless steel tubes, 31,000 units; and complete FAL-FN.201 tubular bayonets, 35,000 units.

• 16,000 semi-finished frames — “armaduras PB/GP” — for the 9 mm Parabellum Browning GP pistol.

The estimated total value of this first operation amounted to US$5,500,000, payable in cash by irrevocable letter of credit.

The second request, dated 12 May 1982 — internal reference FN-82/057 — covered a different batch consisting of 209,000 precision mechanical parts for the FAL rifle, including 150,000 complete magazines, 21,000 gas-cylinder fixing screws, 9,000 trigger guards, 12,000 external recoil springs, 12,000 internal recoil springs and 5,000 muzzle brakes, plus 5,780 sets of sub-assemblies and parts for the 7.62 mm MAG machine gun in its 60-20 infantry and 60-40 coaxial versions.

The total value of this second batch was estimated at US$2,500,000, also payable in cash.



Secret document dated 31 May 1982, informing the President of Brazil about the triangulation of arms to Argentina. On the first page, at the top right, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo wrote “Aprovo. Em 31/5/82” and added his signature.

***

The operation required express authorisation from the Brazilian State at several levels. The file reveals a bureaucratic circuit involving at least five institutional actors: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE/Itamaraty), the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (CSN), the Ministry of the Army, Banco do Brasil’s Foreign Trade Portfolio (CACEX), and ultimately the Presidency of the Republic.

The MRE processed the requests as SECRET–EXTREMELY URGENT under number DPG/DAM-I/DSI/112/665.16(B46)(B29). In its communication to the CSN on 14 May 1982, Itamaraty — under Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro — issued a favourable opinion on both operations from the standpoint of Brazil’s foreign relations.

On 19 May, Brigadier General Danilo Venturini, Minister of State and Secretary General of the CSN, submitted the consultation to the Minister of the Army, Army General Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, and to CACEX. CACEX replied on 24 May via telex DICEX 82/849, stating that it had no objections to the operation. The Ministry of the Army, for its part, issued a favourable opinion on 28 May.

With all favourable opinions gathered, on 31 May 1982 Venturini submitted Explanatory Statement 043/82, classified as SECRET, to His Excellency the President of the Republic, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, for approval of the first request, dated 4 May. The presidential response, handwritten on the document itself, was terse and definitive: “Aprovo. Em 31/5/82.” Below it was his signature.

The Brazilian government was approving an arms triangulation operation for Argentina.

The second request, dated 12 May 1982, received the same treatment and the same conclusion days later from the Brazilian president: “Aprovo. Em 07/06/82.”



Declassified Malvinas Brazil documents.

***

The file cannot be read without the context provided by an internal memorandum from the CSN itself, dated 19 April 1982 and entitled “A Questão das Malvinas e as Relações Brasil-Argentina”.

That document — exceptionally frank in diplomatic terms — describes Brazil’s position on the conflict as one of “não-engajamento ostensivo”, neither equidistant nor neutral, given Brazil’s historic support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the islands.

Brazil had agreed to represent Argentine interests before His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and President Figueiredo maintained a notably warm personal relationship with President Galtieri.

The April memorandum identified with explicit clarity the opportunities the conflict opened up for the bilateral relationship. It noted that in areas such as military-use material and the aerospace industry, Brazilian commercial penetration had been “básicamente vedada” by Argentina, which had historically turned to extra-continental sources for items that Brazil could have supplied on advantageous terms.

The Malvinas crisis appeared as an opportunity to transform that asymmetric relationship qualitatively, making cooperation between the two countries “íntima e irreversível” across a wide range of areas.

***

The question that inevitably arises is whether these parts reached their destination before the ceasefire on 14 June 1982. The documents analysed allow the authorisation chronology to be reconstructed, but they do not directly prove that the shipments were carried out. Presidential approval was granted on 31 May and 7 June.

The delivery times declared by FN Herstal in its pro-forma invoices ranged from fifteen days to two months, suggesting that at least the fastest-delivery materials may have begun to move before the Brazilian bureaucratic process was completed.

It is one more piece to investigate.

***

The FN Herstal–FN do Brasil triangulation was not the only transfer of military material that Brazil authorised or processed for Argentina’s benefit during the conflict. The Brazilians leased two EMB-111 Bandeirante Patrulha aircraft to the Armada Argentina on very favourable terms. In addition, through Petrobras, they supplied quantities of aviation fuel and other things that remain not entirely clarified — because no one wants them to be entirely clear.

The FN Herstal–FN do Brasil case, however, has a specificity that distinguishes it: it was not a direct export of Brazilian-made material, but Brazil’s deliberate insertion as a node in a supply chain that would otherwise have been severed by the European blockade.

The triangulation was known and accepted as such by all the institutional actors involved. In this context, Figueiredo’s presidential approval was a political decision adopted with full awareness of the role Brazil would assume as facilitator.

Malvinas War – Argentina – Peruvian Air Force – Peru – 25 January.

Brazil’s declassified files revealed a triangulation between FN Herstal, FN do Brasil and Argentina to circumvent the European embargo during Malvinas (NA).

***
The declassified documents from Brazil’s Arquivo Nacional make it possible to reconstruct with remarkable precision an operation that, until now, remained outside the available historiographical record on external support for Argentina during the Malvinas conflict.

The triangulation between FN Herstal of Belgium, FN do Brasil Ltda. and, ultimately, the Argentine Army/DGFM constituted a mechanism for evading the EEC embargo, processed secretly throughout the Brazilian chain of command and finally sanctioned by President Figueiredo himself.

The case illustrates at least three dimensions of historical significance.

First, the real effectiveness of the EEC blockade. Although European sanctions deprived Argentina of direct supplies, the existence of a subsidiary in a third country — Brazil, which did not join the sanctions — was enough to create an effective alternative channel, at least in legal and administrative terms.

Second, the coherence of Brazilian foreign policy during the conflict: diplomatic support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim was consistent with an operational willingness to facilitate the logistical sustainment of its armed forces.

Third, the strategic use of ordinary commercial instruments — the drawback regime, PNEMEM consultations, pro-forma invoices — to channel an essentially political decision with the least possible visibility.

Brazil collaborated more than is officially acknowledged. A strategy, of course, to avoid hindering relations with the United Kingdom, whose officials remained largely in the dark.

In the words of the then United Kingdom Air Attaché in Brazil: “After the war, we were informed that the head of the Armada Argentina, Admiral Anaya, was going to visit the country to ‘thank Brazil for the support it had provided’. Of course, we were not present at the inevitable diplomatic reception, but the Brazilians assured us that, since in reality no help had been given to Argentina, the whole matter was nothing more than a meaningless farce.”

It was not a meaningless farce. Brazilian support did exist. And this top-level arms triangulation is proof of it.

Malvinas: The Damaged Invincible Hidden off Beauchêne Island

The Consequences of the Attack on the HMS Invincible

Following the Argentine attack on HMS Invincible on 30 May 1982, the carrier and her escort, HMS Brilliant, operated near Beauchêne Island, around 30 miles south of the Malvinas Islands. According to this account, the area’s isolation made it a suitable place for the ship to withdraw from the main battle zone, reduce exposure to Argentine air attacks and, possibly, undergo checks or repairs while still supporting operations over the islands.

Beauchêne is the southernmost island of the Malvinas archipelago and is completely uninhabited. Its remoteness may have made it useful as a discreet naval operating area, although there is no evidence that Argentina established a radar or observation post there during the war. Today, the island is an internationally important protected nature reserve, with large colonies of nesting seabirds, including black-browed albatrosses and rockhopper penguins. Access is strictly controlled.

The incident also affected the planned sale of HMS Invincible to Australia. In 1981, Australia had agreed to buy the carrier as a replacement for HMAS Melbourne, with the ship expected to enter service as HMAS Australia. However, after the South Atlantic conflict began, and amid concerns over the ship’s condition and operational importance, the Australian government suspended the purchase. In July 1983, after inspecting the available carrier options, Australia officially cancelled the deal.

The United Kingdom then offered HMS Hermes, together with Sea Harriers, training and support, but Australia rejected the proposal. Hermes remained in Royal Navy service until 1984, was placed in reserve because of her high operating costs, and was later sold to India in 1986, where she became INS Viraat.

In the end, the episode contributed to Australia abandoning carrier-based fixed-wing aviation rather than proceeding with the acquisition of Invincible under uncertain conditions.

Images
1 HMS Invincible
2 HMS Brillante
3 Beauchène Island
4 View of HMS Invincible
5 Artist's rendering of HMAS Australia