Argentina: On How the 1955 Revolution Shaped Military Thought

Under the Aegis of Aries

By Esteban McLaren

During World War II, as in World War I, Argentina maintained an official stance of neutrality for much of the conflict. However, within the armed forces—particularly in the Army—tensions emerged among factions debating what the country’s true position should be. One such faction, aligned with the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United Officers Group - GOU), sympathized with the Nazi regime and, until 1943, advocated for Argentina to join the war on the side of the Axis powers. Following their successful coup d'état that same year, this faction seized control of the government, laying the groundwork for their preferred candidate, Juan Domingo Perón, to ascend to the presidency in the 1946 elections.

Perón, the son of Italian immigrants, initially assumed office as a constitutional president. However, he soon implemented a series of reforms aimed at suppressing opposition and consolidating his grip on power. Leveraging the surplus funds accumulated during Argentina’s wartime trade boom, he garnered support through bribes, subsidies, and other corrupt practices that allowed him to manipulate institutions to his advantage. Mismanagement of public resources became rampant: individuals with no prior wealth amassed fortunes, opposition media outlets were shut down or co-opted, and dissenting voices were systematically silenced—some through torture.

Amid this climate, a marginalized faction of the armed forces, sympathetic to the Allies and sidelined since the 1943 coup, began to regroup. This paper seeks to examine the recurring patterns within the anti-Peronist, or constitutionalist, forces that influenced Argentina's internal political-military dynamics, particularly during the period from 1955 to 1988, when these factions played a pivotal role in shaping the nation’s political landscape.

The Pro-Allied Faction

The earliest manifestations of this faction within the Argentine Army likely became evident during the failed coup attempt of 1951. What defined this group was their unwavering focus on action. These were military professionals trained to view challenges through the lens of the friend-enemy dichotomy. Their approach to any threat was inherently military: once the threat was identified, the enemy was delineated, and operations were executed to attack, pursue, and, if possible, annihilate it.

A prominent example of this ethos is Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, the founder of the Argentine Navy's Marine Infantry Corps (IMARA). Inspired by the U.S. Marine Corps, Gargiulo instilled a spirit of rigorous preparation and combat readiness in his troops. During the failed coup of June 16, 1955, when his efforts were thwarted, Gargiulo chose to commit suicide—an act that shocked many but epitomized his sense of military honor and courage. This same valor would be echoed 27 years later at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, where the Marine Infantry displayed exceptional bravery in the defense of Puerto Argentino during the Malvinas War.

This decisive and action-oriented approach stood in stark contrast to the hesitation shown by Juan Domingo Perón during the Liberating Revolution of 1955 (or 1955 Revolution). Faced with a rebellion in which only 18% of the troops turned against him, Perón faltered. The insurgents, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, stood firm, refusing to negotiate or compromise. Perón, accustomed to the political arena where deals and compromises were standard, seemingly misjudged the rebels’ intentions. Believing they sought a power-sharing agreement, he hesitated to order a decisive assault against their encircled forces. This hesitation allowed the insurgents to regroup and resume their offensive.

Once Lonardi's forces had reorganized, his first act was to order Perón’s arrest. This move, naturally, opened the door to his trial and potentially his execution—bringing Perón’s government to an abrupt end. Only then did Perón fully realize he was facing seasoned military professionals, not the political opportunists he was accustomed to outmaneuvering. His miscalculation sealed his fate, underscoring the stark difference between a military trained for decisive action and a politician unprepared for the harsh realities of armed rebellion.

The Liberating Revolution and the Formation of Army Officers

The Liberating Revolution, which overthrew the government of Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, had a profound impact on the composition and professional trajectory of officers within the Argentine Army. This process began with mass purges of officers deemed loyal to Peronism and the reinstatement of those aligned with anti-Peronist forces. Spearheaded by the Revolución Libertadora between 1955 and 1956, these changes disrupted the Army’s hierarchy, significantly altering its command structure and deeply affecting the careers of numerous officers (Mazzei, 2013).

The purge of Peronist officers resulted in the forced retirement of approximately 500 officers, many of whom were from the 60th to 74th graduating classes of the Military Academy. This affected officers from various branches, including infantry (53%), cavalry, and artillery. The vacancies left by their removal were often filled by less updated or less capable officers, which weakened the Army’s upper ranks.

Simultaneously, the Liberating Revolution reinstated around 180 anti-Peronist officers who had previously been dismissed. Many of these individuals later ascended to high-ranking positions within the military hierarchy, with some achieving the rank of general. The restoration of these officers solidified the influence of a military faction closely aligned with anti-Peronist ideology, significantly shaping the institution's leadership and operational outlook for years to come.na visión conservadora y antiperonista, que jugaría un rol crucial en los años venideros.

The "Blues" and the Consolidation of Military Power

Following the coup, the faction known as the "Blues" emerged as the dominant faction within the Army, consolidating its control throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This faction, under the leadership of figures such as Alejandro Lanusse and Alcides López Aufranc, imposed a militaristic and conservative vision that influenced both internal politics and Argentina's participation in territorial conflicts and the anti-subversive war. This faction managed to stay in power through a network of internal loyalties and through control of promotions and retirements within the military institution.

The Ideological and Operational Legacy

The impact of the Revolución Libertadora was not limited to a reconfiguration of the military hierarchy, but established a doctrine that would influence key events in Argentine history, such as the anti-subversive struggle and the conflict in the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The work underlines how this militaristic ideology promoted violent intervention in both internal and external conflicts, in defence of "national sovereignty" and the stability of internal order.

The changes in the composition and profile of Army officers during the Liberating Revolution significantly influenced military decisions in the following decades, particularly in how the Army approached counterinsurgency operations and territorial conflicts. The training and consolidation of these cadres during and after the Liberating Revolution instilled a distinctly aggressive decision-making style, exemplified by the harsh measures employed during the military dictatorship’s counterinsurgency campaign. This period saw the implementation of violent repression strategies against any perceived threat to the established order.

Moreover, the establishment of a high command that favored the use of force and embraced a nationalist perspective played a critical role in decisions such as the escalation of tensions during the Beagle Channel conflict with Chile in the 1970s and the invasion of the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The dominant ideology among these military officers—shaped during the Revolución Libertadora (1955 Revolution) and solidified in the subsequent decades—portrayed the Army as the guardian of national sovereignty against external enemies and as the enforcer of internal order against perceived subversion.

Professional soldiers trained under this doctrine operated with a clear and uncompromising premise: all problems were to be resolved militarily. Ambiguity was not an option. They assessed situations, identified enemies, planned attacks, and executed operations decisively, relying on force or the threat of it. The first major adversary of this philosophy was its ideological nemesis: the dictator Juan Domingo Perón. Subsequently, internal power struggles between factions emerged, including the infamous Azules versus Colorados clashes, leading to decades of military uprisings and internal conflicts.

Magdalena's 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment M4 Sherman Firefly over the Punta Indio Naval Station tarmac in 1965.

Conflict resolution within this faction of the Argentine military was consistently taken to extremes. The failed coup of 1951, the bombing of Plaza de Mayo on June 16, 1955, the decisive coup of September 13, 1955, the executions at León Suárez, and the series of coups throughout the 1960s left no doubt about the faction's uncompromising approach. On April 3, 1965, the 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment from Magdalena brutally attacked the Punta Indio Naval Air Base after being bombarded with rockets and napalm by naval aircraft. This level of unrestrained aggression became the norm.

A mentality shaped by the spirit of blitzkrieg dominated operations during the counterinsurgency campaigns, the near-war territorial disputes with Chile in 1978, and the climactic recovery of the Malvinas Islands. Operations such as Soberanía and Tronador exemplified this mindset. These plans were masterpieces of military strategy, marked by creative approaches and the ability to anticipate Chilean responses several steps ahead. They encapsulated the lessons learned by the officer corps, meticulously applying the most advanced military doctrine of the era.

The reliance on military solutions did not end there. The Carapintada rebellions and the brutal retaking of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment at La Tablada marked the closing chapter of a generation of soldiers forged for war. Often unable to resolve matters through other means, they consistently chose the use of military force as their primary response.

The negative consequences of this approach were evident in the widespread social condemnation of the methods employed during the counterinsurgency campaigns. The defeat in the Falklands War delivered the final blow to this mindset, leaving not only a profound loss of life but also a deep scar on national pride.

From a more positive perspective, the Argentine military approached their profession with uncompromising consistency, making decisions rooted firmly in military doctrine. Despite errors, indecision, and the brutalities committed, their actions often adhered to rigorous operational planning. Notable examples of military precision included Operation Rosario, an amphibious assault brilliantly executed against an enemy garrison with the explicit objective of avoiding casualties. Additionally, Argentina became the first country to simultaneously dismantle two terrorist movements—one urban and one rural—through a decentralized and audacious operation involving all military and police units to neutralize insurgent hideouts.

However, this war was later scrutinized in Argentine civil courts through a judicial process marred by irregularities, including the retroactive application of laws and improper proceedings that remain controversial. One critical misstep in the military’s counterinsurgency method was the disposal of insurgents’ bodies instead of returning them to their families, a decision that continues to fuel contention.

A Reflection on Military Responses and Leadership Failures

Allow me a personal reflection. One expects a military response from the armed forces; otherwise, there is no reason to call on them. When the military is summoned to address a problem, it is understood that the issue will be resolved manu militari. This entails frontal assaults, flanking maneuvers, precision strikes, saturating defenses, and seeking the enemy's surrender. The generation of Aries, guided by the Roman god of war, responded as expected—sometimes with massive errors, but always consistent with how the nation had trained them.

I deeply detest, with significant conviction, when a military officer ventures into political analysis, planning, or implementation for a real-world problem. When a tactician delves into geopolitics instead of focusing on executing orders from their superiors, it reflects a clear lack of professionalism. Such failures have existed, continue to exist, and will likely persist. A case in point was the HMS Shackleton incident, when the British oceanographic vessel intruded into Argentine waters in a blatant affront to national sovereignty. Intercepted by the ARA Rosales, the naval command from Libertad headquarters issued a direct order: "Sink it!" However, the naval officer in charge chose instead to have a coffee—a gesture that not only dishonored his uniform but also assumed roles reserved for the General Staff.

In 1982, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, as Argentina's military governor in the Malvinas, was tasked with designing the defensive plan against a potential British re-invasion. His plan, however, was a static defensive setup devoid of imagination or strategy. It resembled something conceived by a Chilean general—lacking in creativity and more concerned with maintaining good relations with the kelpers (the British-settled population) than defending the territory. When the enemy landing at San Carlos was detected, Menéndez's response was painfully reactive, if it could even be called that.

From that moment, events spiraled downward. There were no ambushes planned, no maneuvers to regroup forces, and no flanking or encirclement strategies implemented. Menéndez left each position commander to act independently, offering no centralized coordination or leadership. What emerged was a general with little intellect and even less courage, paralyzed by mediocrity, passively awaiting the inevitable. He failed to optimize the resources at his disposal, whether abundant or scarce. Instead of leading, Menéndez surrendered to inertia, displaying a complete lack of strategic vision and leadership. This was the cost of nepotism—elevating an officer tied to families associated with the Revolución Libertadora and the counterinsurgency campaigns. Menéndez prioritized geopolitical relations with those who despised him rather than focusing on his troops and crafting the best possible military plan.

A Broader Legacy of Patriotism

Despite the tragic context of Latin America, this generation of Aries left behind a lesson in patriotism that transcends generations. The shameful examples of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—where senior military officers, lacking ethics, morals, and discipline, handed their nations over to petty dictators—stand as cautionary tales of what Argentina could have become. Yet, in Argentina, a cadre of patriotic officers emerged. When a dictator like Perón sought to perpetuate his rule, it was the brave 18% of troops who rose in rebellion to depose him. This is not the cursed Caribbean; this is Argentina. And in Argentina, when the military acts with honor, it does not surrender its homeland to tyrants.

Lessons from the Liberating Revolution

The Liberating Revolution not only restructured the Argentine Army and the entire armed forces in terms of their composition, but it also laid the ideological and operational groundwork for the decisions that would shape the nation’s military history in the decades that followed. From this experience, both positive lessons and critical errors emerge. It is our generation’s duty to learn from both as we shape the doctrine that will restore us to the military power we were destined to be.

1955 Revolution: Plot in motion

The plot is in motion



Dr. Clemente Villada Achával played a crucial role as the intermediary between General Lonardi and a group of conspirators in the province of Córdoba. Underpinning this clandestine collaboration was a secret meeting held at the historic Colegio de La Salle in Buenos Aires. In attendance were key figures including the leader of the coup, General Lonardi, Colonels Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Captain Edgardo García Puló, and Major Juan Francisco Guevara. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy and protected by heavily armed civilian guards.

Villada Achával disclosed that officers from the Artillery School in Córdoba were eager to partake in a potential coup, awaiting the signal to act. This gathering served to clarify doubts and expedite preparations, as State intelligence services had begun to detect suspicious movements, posing a significant risk.

These concerns were validated when General Lonardi faced sanctions and twenty days of house arrest on August 16. Additionally, the CGT called for a strike on August 31, urging the public to assemble in Plaza de Mayo to hear Juan Domingo Perón, whose vehement rhetoric amplified tensions among the military leadership and the public.

On September 4, Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Cornejo Saravia conveyed a crucial message to the Lonardi family, indicating that the planned uprising for September 16 had been postponed by General Aramburu. Lonardi, visibly agitated, insisted that the operation could not be delayed any further. He expressed urgency due to the government's alleged preparations, including arming workers' militias and retiring many involved officers. The situation demanded swift action to avoid potential repercussions.

-General –said Cornejo a bit embarrassed- I am only passing on some information that Colonel Zerda has just given me[1].

In view of such news, Lonardi believed it necessary to confirm the information and for this, he entrusted his son Luis Ernesto to arrange a meeting with Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, destined to discuss the issue in depth. This was done and that same afternoon, the general went to the residence of his friend, in order to update him on the latest events.

-General –said the owner of the house after hearing his words- take things in your hands because otherwise, this won't work.

-Ossorio –answered his interlocutor- I have already decided and be sure that I will spare no effort to carry out the movement [2].

On September 8 at 9:00 p.m. a new meeting was held in which Colonel Eduardo Señorans, chief of operations of the Army General Staff, was present. The same, organized by Alfredo Rodríguez García, a relative of Major Juan Francisco Guevara, was carried out in the car of Dr. Eugenio Burnichon and four fundamental points were agreed upon that should be taken into account when organizing the plot.

1. Because of General Videla Balaguer's impulsive and rash actions in Río Cuarto, the authorities in Córdoba remained vigilant and had implemented stringent security measures.
2. The coastal contacts were deemed both unreliable and inadequate, as only the IV Cavalry Division was available, and it would only pledge its support 72 hours after the uprising commenced.
3. No units in Greater Buenos Aires had shown any signs of allegiance or support for the cause.
4. General Aramburu was continuously monitored, and his aide, Major San Martín, had been apprehended.

During the conversations, Colonel Señorans said that the best thing to do was to wait and not rush because the conditions were not right to start a revolution. Lonardi expressed his total disagreement with this position because the discharge of the troops was imminent and also because, as he had raised it with Ossorio Arana in the previous meeting, the government was organizing popular militias that were going to endanger national security. In his opinion, continuing to wait would only lead to the total disaster of the operation because the latest arrests of officers seemed to show that the authorities knew something.
In this way, the command of the revolution passed from the indecisive General Aramburu to his peer who, in order to know the prevailing situation in the military units of the interior, dispatched his sons Luis Ernesto and Eduardo, in the direction of Córdoba and Cuyo, respectively.
The Lonardi brothers left Buenos Aires on Friday the 9th at night and arrived in the Mediterranean province at 08:30 the following day. Once there, they went to the house of their uncle, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, where they were informed of the latest news. Villada had organized a meeting for 4:00 p.m., at his private home, to which he had invited Captains Daniel Correa and Sergio Quiroga, Brigadier Jorge Landaburu, his brother-in-law, engineer Calixto de la Torre, and Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia. (h).
It was held at the agreed time and during the course of the talks, the situation of the revolutionary forces in the province, the contribution of civilians and the government's reaction were thoroughly analyzed.
To the satisfaction of the Lonardi brothers, the results of that meeting were better than they had expected since, according to what was said, the younger officers were ready to fold, except for the powerful Infantry School, which seemed to remain loyal. To this must be added the participation of the revolutionary civilian commandos that Commander Landaburu and Captain Basilio Arenas Nievas organized in those days, together with Mr. Damián Fernández Astrada and Edmundo Molina, who would constitute an essential element of support when the wars began. operations.
Captain Correa placed special emphasis on the urgent need to start the actions before September 16 because on that day the Artillery School finished its annual activities and had to deliver the weapons for maintenance tasks. All those present supported the motion, for which Luis Ernesto Lonardi stated that it would be among the first points that he would raise with his father when it came to imposing the news.
That night, at 9:00 p.m., Luis Ernesto boarded an Aerolíneas Argentinas plane and began his return to Buenos Aires while his brother continued his journey to Mendoza, in order to update Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, officer of the Cuyo Mountain Association.

Luis Ernesto arrived shortly before 12:00 p.m. and as soon as he got off the plane, he went to his father's apartment, on Juncal street, to inform him of the latest news. The general, wearing a robe over his pajamas, listened carefully to his son and when he finished, he told her that he needed a few hours to meditate and that the next day he would have an answer.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, the general sent for his son and once face to face, he told her that he was determined to lead the revolution and that it would begin in Córdoba, early on the 16th. ; therefore, it was necessary to take the necessary steps to start the operation.
Lonardi asked his son to establish urgent contact with Major Guevara because he was thinking of using his services as a liaison between the Army and the Navy. Wasting no time, Luis Ernesto went to the home of Captain (RE) Ezequiel Federico Pereyra Zorraquín, who was in charge of organizing the revolutionary civilian commandos of the Federal Capital for the defense of the always threatened Barrio Norte and Recoleta, and asked him about Guevara's whereabouts. The owner of the house told him that the aforementioned official had left his home because the government intelligence services were constantly watching him and that, for this reason, he did not know where he was hiding.

At that same moment, Lieutenant Colonel Eleodoro Sánchez Lahoz arrived, bringing with him news from Corrientes where, apparently, the commanders of the VII Division had declared themselves in favor of the plot. In view of this, Luis Ernesto Lonardi, believing an urgent meeting between the newcomer and his father was necessary, began to pull the strings so that the pamper would take place that same afternoon.

Around noon, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro A. Pujol and First Lieutenant Florencio A. Pareja Ortiz established contact with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to inform him that there were fifty officers at the Superior War College and the Superior Technical School willing to fold and that Captain Oscar F. Silva, belonging to that last unit, had organized a sabotage operation against the tanks at Campo de Mayo.

Two hours later, the son of General Lonardi received a communication from Captain Pereyra Zorraquín, who put him in contact with Alfredo Rodríguez García, who at that time was in a country house in the town of Pilar in the company of Captain Edgardo García Puló. They agreed to meet in Buenos Aires at 5:00 p.m. and that's how it happened. Luis Ernesto showed up punctually at the agreed place and they picked him up there (in Pereyra Zorraquín's car) to go to the home of Mr. Román María Bourdieu, located in the town of Olivos, where they had been staying for several days. Major Guevara and his family.
At a time when the vehicle was parked in front of the aforementioned house, Major Guevara arrived who, seeing them, hurried them to enter the residence because he did not want to be exposed for too long on the street. The owner of the house received them and once they were seated in the living room, Luis Ernesto referred to what he had discussed with his father and the answer he had given him. It was what those present expected to hear and for that reason, an undisguised but discreet jubilation was perceived among them. Immediately afterwards, he explained that the postponement requested by General Aramburu was inadmissible and that he himself had left no other path than the one adopted, that is, that General Lonardi assume command of the uprising, since if he did not do so, the plot would be left to nothing. your luck. In addition, it was known that the Navy was drawing up plans to carry out a new bombardment of the Government House, on September 17, in case the Army did not make a statement[3].

While these bustles were going on, the Navy was making its own moves.
On the night of September 2 to 3, a secret meeting was held at the home of Dr. Héctor Bergalli, attended by the ship captains Arturo H. Rial and Ricardo Palma, the frigate captain Aldo Molinari and on behalf of the Army, General Juan José Uranga with Colonel Eduardo Señorans. During the same, the latter asked for the floor to request to postpone the actions pending more opportune moments but the owner of the house was strictly opposed.

-To make the revolution, it is enough for a regiment to rise up, because the radicals of the province of Buenos Aires will form a wave that will cover the country.

To those words Señorans responded that he preferred to trust the Army and the Armed Forces rather than the radicals and the silence of the rest of those present seemed to agree with him. Wanting to know the position of the Navy, General Uranga asked Captain Arturo Rial about it and he, fully confident, replied:

-General, you can be absolutely sure of that.

"Then, gentlemen," said General Uranga, "the revolution is made."

To which Colonel Señorans added:
 

I hope to be with you that night.

The meeting continued at Captain Rial's house, where General Uranga was strict when referring to the political purposes of the uprising and the need to have the support of the Navy. He went on at length about it and immediately afterwards, he gave his word of honor regarding the revolt of the Military College.
On Monday morning, the 5th, revolutionary civilian commandos that were operating in Bahía Blanca under the command of Captain Edgardo García Puló, were informed by Navy officials that the outbreak was going to take place early on September 8. However, on the evening of the 7th, Captain Molinari informed García Puló that he had been suspended.
The head of the commandos expressed his concern about that decision because the arrest of engineer Jorge P. Estarico, liaison between the Navy and the civilian commandos, was an indication that something strange was happening, but Molinari explained to him that the Navy could do nothing without Army support.
A new meeting at Captain Rial's failed when it was learned that Major Dámaso Pérez, head of the cadet corps of the Military College, denied his support for the coup.
On the morning of Friday the 9th, a naval officer arrived at Comandante Espora to inform García Puló that it was imperative to establish contact with the rebel command of the Navy since the drastic decision had been made that if the uprising did not take place before the 17th September, the base on its own, would attack Government House. When García Puló asked why such a firm determination was due, the newcomer replied that by that date, the Ministry of the Navy had agreed to an inspection of the unit and that if it were carried out, the conspiracy would be exposed and numerous arrests would be made.
That day, in the afternoon, a new meeting took place between the base delegate and Captain Molinari in which the latter requested 24 more hours to give an answer. The following day, at night (it was Saturday), Molinari met again with García Puló and Guevara so that the Navy would join the uprising as long as at least one Army regiment did so. Guevara listened attentively and asked for 48 hours to respond and it was at that meeting that the name of General Bengoa, detained at the Directorate of Mechanical Traction, was once again considered, so that he personally led the coastal forces.
Once contact was established with Bengoa, he sent word that although he accepted the command of those troops, it should be taken into account that his escape from the military unit in which he was confined was going to put the government on alert.
Colonel Señorans did not believe that choice was prudent and so he informed Major Guevara, asking him to find another officer immediately. The idea of appointing Colonel Eduardo Arias Duval then arose, since he was more than sure that once notified, he would enthusiastically accept the responsibility.
On the afternoon of September 11, Major Guevara met again with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to agree on a new meeting with the command of the uprising. This was done and in addition to General Lonardi, Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Lahoz attended to listen very carefully to the action plan drawn up by his superior.
It consisted of five points that established:

1. Simultaneous uprising of the garrisons of Córdoba, Cuyo, the Litoral and Neuquén.
2. Uprising the naval bases of Río Santiago, Puerto Belgrano, Punta Indio and Comandante Espora together with the Sea Fleet and the Ríos Squad.
3. Uprising of the air garrisons of Paraná, Córdoba, Mendoza and Mercedes, province of San Luis.
4. March on Santa Fe in support of the crossing of the Paraná River by the Litoral forces, with the protection of the Escuadra de Ríos.
5. Ships from the Flota de Mar (Sea Fleet) would establish the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires and in case the government persisted in the defense, they would bombard the riverside area, mainly the Government House, the Ministry of War, the Central Post Office and other positions.

After the presentation, Sánchez Lahoz gave his word of honor that he would do everything possible to revolt the Corrientes garrison the same morning of the 16th and Guevara promised to organize new meetings with Captain Palma, Colonel Arias Duval and General Uranga at effects of transmitting the plan to the officers involved.
The meeting ended at 10:30 p.m. and immediately afterwards, Luis Ernesto Lonardi met with Captain Juan José Pierrestegui to entrust him with a conversation behind closed doors between General Lonardi and Colonel Víctor Arribau. It was held in the Belgrano neighborhood, on Monday the 12th at 10:00 a.m. and in it the second man expressed his support. For this reason, the leader of the uprising ordered him to go to Curuzú Cuatiá to help Colonel Juan José Montiel Forzano to revolt the armored regiments of that unit and he left immediately.
Then Lonardi decided to say goodbye to his family, starting with his grandchildren, the children of Dr. José Alberto Deheza and his daughter Marta, while his son-in-law[5], left quickly for the study of Dr. Teófilo Lacroze to ask him to send him to the colonel Ossorio Arana the following message: “The revolution is underway. He must get his things ready to go to Córdoba that very night” and he informed him that in the last hours of the afternoon, the general himself would give him the tickets with the latest instructions.
At 3:00 p.m. that same day, the meeting between General Lonardi, Colonel Arias Duval, and Major Guevara took place in Alfredo Rodríguez García's car. Once everyone was on board, the first one went straight to the point: Arias Duval had to go to the Litoral to start the uprising as soon as it broke out in Córdoba. The colonel listened to the call with a serious expression and when his superior had finished speaking, he asked her for 24 more hours to carry out the orders since, according to his point of view, on Saturday the 17th it would be easier to surprise the units. Lonardi flatly refused because, as he had stated on other occasions, the situation in Córdoba was extremely dangerous.
After the meeting, Guevara announced that that same morning, Colonel Señorans had told him at the Ministry of the Army that he was willing to place himself without hesitation under the orders of General Lonardi. On the other hand, the meeting with captain Palma agreed for 5:00 p.m. could not be carried out and he had been postponed until 11:00 p.m. that same day. At 6:00 p.m., the notary public Juan Carlos Soldano Deheza gave General Lonardi the two bus tickets that he was to bring to Colonel Ossorio Arana and half an hour later, the leader of the uprising contacted Captain Pereyra to order him and Captain Daniel Uriburu, moved to Córdoba in order to meet with him (Lonardi) at the house of Dr. Berrotarán. The meeting with General Uranga, scheduled for 7:00 p.m., did not materialize either, so it had to be postponed until 1:00 a.m. the following day.
At 9:00 p.m., Major Guevara and Luis Ernesto Lonardi accompanied the general to Dr. Lacroze's house where they were to meet with Colonel Ossorio Arana. Once there, Lonardi explained the situation chart to him and immediately afterwards explained the operations plan, which he followed with extreme attention. When he finished speaking, they hugged and immediately left the place quickly with his companions.
At 10:30 p.m., Colonel Ossorio Arana and his wife boarded the bus that would take them to Córdoba in Plaza Once. Upon arriving at his destination, the officer had to contact Dr. Villada Achaval so that he could take him immediately to the home of Dr. Calixto de la Torre where a new meeting had been planned that same morning. In the interim, he was to inform the chiefs and officers of the garrisons of the facts and organize a meeting at night with the heads of each unit.
From the Once bus terminal, Lonardi, his son, and Guevara (who had accompanied Ossorio Arana and his wife there), set out to meet Captain Palma.
Luis Ernesto was behind the wheel, with his father next to him and Guevara behind him. At the corner of Guido and Ayacucho streets, a man wearing a hat and coat was waiting for them, standing with his hands in his pockets. It was Colonel Arias Duval who, as soon as the vehicle stopped, quickly boarded it, shaking hands with those present once the son of the leader of the coup had resumed his march. Not far from there, Captain Palma, also dressed in a gray overcoat, was waiting for them. When he saw that the vehicle was approaching, he slowly approached the curb of the sidewalk and when it stopped him, he opened the rear door and entered it.
Once inside the car, the sailor was introduced to General Lonardi, to whom he shook hands while telling him that he was there representing Captain Arturo Rial.
The leader of the uprising went straight to the point explaining the reasons why he had taken command of the revolution and why it should take place on September 16. Next, he brought him up to date on the plan of operations and told him about the role that the Navy should play alongside the Army.
Palma listened attentively and when his interlocutor finished speaking, he said that it was imperative to take Martín García Island because air-naval attacks could be launched from it to neutralize the Morón Air Base. Immediately afterward, he referred to the role of the revolutionary civil commandos, who were thought to be assigned to take over the radio stations, and then he asked Lonardi what his opinion was.
The general gave his approval but clarified that civilians should not intervene until after 01:00 on September 16, since it was imperative to prevent information leaking that would destroy the surprise factor. Palma agreed and then the following dialogue was established between the two:

Capt. Palma: I understand that the movement is headed by General Aramburu and that he has decided to postpone it until a better opportunity. Who is the leader of the revolution?
Gen. Lonardi: I am the leader of the revolution.
Capt Palma: Understood, sir.
Gen. Lonardi: General Aramburu appreciated that the elements he had were not enough to launch a movement with chances of success. I understand that the conspiracy has reached a stage in which it tends towards its own disintegration due to the arrests that have occurred and any postponement will mean its complete annulment. In addition, the government is organizing armed groups whose mission is to oppose any subversive movement. We have entered into an honorary commitment with the young officers of the three armed forces that we must comply with, since they have assumed attitudes that any investigation will reveal and the sanctions will be severe. I have verified the number of units willing to participate in the movement and I consider them sufficient for there to be a chance of success. I think that the regime's own collaborators will welcome the elimination of Perón, which means that if the revolution succeeds in a single garrison in the interior for more than 48 hours, added to the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires, we cannot fail, always that we act with the firmest decision to win.
Captain, I want to know if I have the unconditional support of the force that you represent!
Capt. Palma: The Navy is willing to support you with all determination as long as you assure us that the Army will initiate hostilities.
Gen. Lonardi: You have already heard our action plan that will not be postponed in any case: on September 16 the revolution will be launched. Take my word for it. So it will be done.
Capt. Palma: On behalf of the Navy, I assure you of your participation and I wish you success in the operation.

After the conversation, the sailor and Colonel Arias Duval got out and the vehicle continued its journey to where General Uranga was waiting. The handshake that Lonardi and Palma gave each other before saying goodbye was the seal of the alliance between the Army and the Navy, an inescapable commitment that from that moment on, no one could break.
The car, always guided by Luis Ernesto Lonardi, arrived at the home of Captain Garda where the occupants of it quickly descended.
The owner of the house ushered them in and led them to the living room, where General Uranga was sitting waiting. The meeting began at 1:00 am sharp when Lonardi began to explain the revolutionary plan and the situation that Córdoba was going through at that time. As soon as he finished, he ordered him along with him to lead the Military College and the 1st Infantry Regiment to march on Rosario and annul the 11th Infantry Regiment and take the Arsenal. Once these objectives were achieved, he should continue towards Santa Fe with the mission of reducing his military forces and establishing the bridgehead that would allow the troops from the Litoral to cross the Paraná River.
Uranga expressed his reservations regarding the Military College since at that point it was known that his commitment was null but that even so, he would advance on Rosario with the elements that he could gather. Taking this detail into account, Major Guevara was entrusted with establishing contact with his peer, Dámaso Pérez or Captain Genta, an officer from the Military College, to try to convince them to join the uprising and locate First Lieutenant Gastón Driollet so that he could go to to the home of Captain Garda to receive the instructions that General Uranga had to send urgently to the 1st Infantry Regiment.
The meeting at the Garda home ended at 03:00, when those present stood up and General Uranga enthusiastically declared:

-Look, General, even if it's alone, I'm going to go out and shoot at Government House.

Back in his apartment, General Lonardi learned from Major Guevara that General Lagos had been conducting some polls among officers and high-ranking military commanders, and for that reason, he ordered him to contact him as soon as possible at his home in San Isidro to tell him that he had to urgently move to Mendoza to take charge of the forces in that region. In addition, he ordered him to send an urgent message to General Bengoa indicating that the presence of a general was more than necessary there, especially that of Bengoa, because not long ago he had commanded the III Army Division stationed there.
In these conditions they separated and took different directions. They were to meet at 4:30 p.m. that same day, at the Plaza Once bus terminal, before Lonardi left for Córdoba6.
A fact that no one had taken into account facilitated the last movements of the leader of the uprising in Buenos Aires: his birthday and that of his daughter Susana, on September 15, the date that the young woman planned to take advantage of to announce her engagement to Ricardo Quesada. By then, the invitations had already been distributed and for a week the family had been preparing a reception. Unexpectedly, the general asked his daughter and his future son-in-law to change the date to September 17 and shortly after advised them to purchase tickets to travel to Córdoba before the 14th.
Thus came the day of departure. That morning, Lonardi and his wife began packing, knowing that the building where they lived was heavily guarded.

To all this, in the bases of the south, the conspiracy reached borders of proportions when starting a covert operation, destined to alleviate the lack of weapons.
As has already been said, after what happened on June 16, the government had decided to remove the armed bombs from the naval planes and send them under strong custody to the Zárate Naval Arsenal. Consequently, the Navy was practically out of action and unable to start operations, and this greatly compromised the success of the uprising. In a word, there were plenty of planes but no bombs.
What there was, and many, were empty casings and a good supply of trotyl, stored in the magazines of the naval bases, a fact that led a group of officers to evaluate the possibility of using this material to replace weapons. confiscated.
After a series of meetings, the construction of homemade projectiles was resolved using the trotyl loaves and available casings, hence, always with the utmost caution and in absolute silence, the first steps were taken to start the operation. . The idea was to have everything ready for September 15 and when hostilities broke out, to have equipped planes.
To achieve the task, it was necessary to melt the loaves in steam pots, at a temperature of 80º C and compress their content inside the casings, so it was necessary to find trained personnel and a suitable place to carry out the task. Someone suggested the kitchens of the Workers' Dining Room at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, which had a capacity of one thousand people, and an officer recalled that the person in charge of them was an Italian who had some experience in handling explosives.
A Frigate Captain was commissioned to establish contact with him and almost at the same time, the aforementioned facilities began to be conditioned so that everything would be ready when the appropriate personnel arrived on the scene.
The officer in question went to a house in the Arroyo Parejas neighborhood, located within the perimeter of the base, where that individual had lived since 1952, the year he arrived in the country. The man ushered him into a small room that he used as a living room and once inside, always adopting the appropriate precautions, the newcomer asked him if he was up to doing the job. After a brief analysis of the situation, the Italian replied that he was, and thus, without wasting time, he was led to the Dining Room building, in whose kitchen he immediately got to work.
The subject worked diligently, practically without rest, under the close supervision of superior personnel who prevented access to anyone who did not have proper authorization. In this way, giving power to the pots, he melted the first loaves of trotyl, whose mixture of nitric acid based on hydrocarbons was placed well pressed inside one of the casings and with it an initial test was carried out, the results of which were satisfactory. .
The Italian worked for six days, assisted by very few personnel since the mass production of that material was considered a risky task. During all this time, he was prevented from leaving the Great Hall except on one occasion, when it was necessary to accompany him to his home to pick up a medication he was taking and that is how, by the end of the week, he had hundreds of bombs ready.
After an arduous task, the work was finished and in this way, it was possible to equip the naval planes with the appropriate weapons that would allow them to operate once the hostilities had begun.

Notes

1. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es Justo, Francisco A. Colombo Editor, Buenos Aires, 1958.
2. Ídem.
3. The planes would depart from Comandante Espora.
4. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit. Luis Alberto Deheza, son-in-law of General Lonardi, was Minister of Defense during the last days of María Estela Martínez de Perón (1976)..
5. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit.
6. That same morning, after resting for a few hours, Lonardi spoke with Dr. Rogelio Driollet, as had been agreed..

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón