1955 Revolution: Aftermath

The people of Bahía Blanca take to the streets to celebrate the triumph of the Revolution.

Aftermath



Joy and happiness in the crowd after Perón resignation

Thus concluded the first Argentine armed conflict of the 20th century, which, in just seven days of fighting, claimed the lives of nearly a thousand people. The casualties included civilians and soldiers—men, women, children, and the elderly. The majority of the deaths occurred on June 16 during the bombing of Buenos Aires, when 229 victims were identified in hospitals, clinics, and public aid facilities. However, the true death toll was far higher, as Dr. Francisco Barbagallo notes in Daniel Cichero's Bombs Over Buenos Aires. The chaos was so overwhelming that tracking the countless bodies transported by ambulances and trucks became impossible.

To grasp the scale of the attack, it is worth noting that 14,000 kilograms (14 tons) of explosives were dropped that day—half the amount used in the bombing of Guernica—yet the death toll was nearly equivalent to that of the Spanish city.

On that day, 43 rebel aircraft carried out the assault: twenty North American AT-6s, five Beechcraft AT-11s, three Catalinas, one Fiat G-55A Centauro reconnaissance aircraft dispatched to Rosario to contact General Bengoa, and ten rebel Gloster Meteors. Additionally, four aircraft initially refused to counter the attack but later joined the rebellion. Including loyalist aircraft, the total number of planes involved exceeded fifty.


Celebrations in Bahía Blanca

On June 16, 1955, the Air Force and Naval Aviation took their first baptisms of fire; the first two shoot-downs in the national aeronautical history occurred when the AT-6s of midshipmen Arnaldo Román and Eduardo Bisso were hit by the enemy, the first by shrapnel from the Gloster Meteor of Lieutenant Ernesto Adradas over the Río de la Plata and the second by anti-aircraft guns from the 3rd Regiment of La Tablada in the town of Tristán Suárez, Buenos Aires, not counting the Gloster that, due to lack of fuel, crashed into the waters of the Plata, between Carmelo and Colonia. That day also saw the first shoot-down carried out by a jet on the American continent (that of midshipman Romás by Lieutenant Adradas) and the entry into action of the tanks when a Sherman of the Motorized Regiment “Buenos Aires” fired on the Ministry of the Navy.


Victorious leaders. From left to right: CN Arturo Rial, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, General Julio A. Lagos, General Eduardo Lonardi, General Dalmiro Videla Balaguer and Commodore Julio César Krausse

Buenos Aires became the first (and so far, only) capital in South America to endure a large-scale aerial bombardment, joining the ranks of only a few cities worldwide to have suffered such an attack. It shares this tragic distinction with Gibara in Cuba, bombed by President Machado's air force in 1931, and Puerto Casado in Paraguay, targeted by the Bolivian Air Force in 1933. However, both of these events pale in comparison to the scale of the bombardment in Buenos Aires.

During the attacks, numerous locations in the city were hit, with the main targets including the Government House, Plaza de Mayo, the National Mortgage Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Army Ministry (Libertador Building), Hotel Mayo, the Central Police Department, the CGT headquarters, the Ministry of Public Works, the Patagonia Import and Export Company, various buildings along Av. Paseo Colón, the service station of the Argentine Automobile Club, and the presidential residence at Unzué Palace.

Additionally, La Tablada suffered heavy damage as the 3rd Infantry Regiment was strafed and bombed on Av. Crovara and Av. San Martín while marching toward the city center. The Ministry of the Navy was also struck during an attack by Army units, and the Banco Nación was hit as revolutionary civilian commandos took refuge on its rooftop.

On September 16, Argentina witnessed its first air-naval battle when the Peronist Air Force engaged the Ríos Squadron. Mar del Plata was also bombed, initially by a lone naval aircraft and later by Navy ships targeting large coastal oil deposits, the Submarine Base, Army positions on a nearby golf course, and the Camet Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.

Three days later, the submarine Santiago del Estero entered combat for the first time, using its 40 mm Bofors cannon to fire on unidentified aircraft near Montevideo. The towns of Saavedra and Río Colorado also fell victim to aerial bombardments during this period.


The Plaza de Mayo is packed, cheering on the Revolution that overthrew the tyrannical president

In that revolution, the greatness and miseries of war were fully exposed: acts of heroism and resolve, reckless actions, brutal deeds, weaknesses, and betrayals.

On June 16, it became evident that a significant portion of the population was willing to fight for Perón to the death. That day, thousands of workers took to the streets to arm themselves and fight for their leader. Dozens died in combat, most during the attack on the Ministry of the Navy. Similarly, on September 21, an unidentified number of fervent members of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista perished during revolutionary troops' assault on their headquarters.

There were soldiers who fulfilled their mission according to the training they had received, such as the much-criticized Lieutenant Adradas, who simply did his duty, or Vice-Commodore Síster, steadfast in his determination to defend the Peronist regime. Others failed to rise to the occasion. Some military figures upheld their honor, like Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, who, like ancient Roman generals, chose to take his own life rather than face disgrace. There were officers willing to die rather than surrender, including General Lonardi, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, Captains Perren and Rial, Commodore Krausse, Majors Montiel Forzano and Juan Francisco Guevara, Colonel Arias Duval, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina, and the somewhat reckless Dalmiro Videla Balaguer, all on the rebel side. Others fell in combat, such as Brigadier General Tomás Vergara Ruzo and numerous aviators, soldiers, and sailors who fought valiantly on both sides.

On the loyalist side, the resolve and professionalism of generals like Franklin Lucero, Miguel Ángel Iñíguez, and José María Sosa Molina, Lieutenant Colonel César Camilo Arrechea, Captain Hugo Crexell, and many others stood out, honoring their respective branches of service. The Argentine honor also shone aboard the destroyers La Rioja and Cervantes, and in the steadfastness of the personnel in Bahía Blanca and Punta Alta, who held firm in their posts against powerful advancing forces.

However, there were also ambiguous and wavering actions, such as those of Admiral Olivieri, Generals Bengoa, Lagos, and even Aramburu. Lieutenant Colonel Barto displayed indecision and despair during the regiments’ advance toward southern Buenos Aires. Similarly, First Lieutenant Rogelio Balado, one of the regime’s iconic pilots, switched sides and, during combat, refused to fire on an enemy Avro Lincoln that had just strafed loyalist positions at the Pajas Blancas airfield. Captain Bernardo Benesch did the same when ordered to attack targets in Mar del Plata on June 19. (Before setting sail, he had offered dissenting officers and sailors the opportunity to leave the ship and return to shore, though he himself did not follow through.) Captain Edgardo Andrew also hesitated, asking Captain Rial to revoke the order to bomb the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca, which was refusing to surrender.

During the second phase of the revolution, over 70 combat and patrol sorties were conducted, and the main regiments and military units from Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, and Patagonia were mobilized.

Rear Admiral Toranzo Calderón upon arriving at the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, 1955, as the final acts of the conflict concluded, an atmosphere of anticipation lingered across the country. While government emissaries and representatives of the rebel forces engaged in negotiations, combat units in Córdoba began their gradual return to base.

That same day, news of the revolutionary forces’ victory spread, prompting the people of Córdoba to flood the streets in celebration of the regime’s fall. Crowds gathered at Plaza San Martín, in front of the ruined Cabildo building, adorned with three Argentine flags, cheering for the leading figures of the rebellion. Thousands of men and women entered the adjacent Cathedral to give thanks to the Lord and the Holy Mother for the end of the conflict. Meanwhile, a jubilant procession of cars, motorcycles, trucks, buses, and pedestrians filled the streets, chanting in support of the revolution, its leaders, and the nation’s heroes.

Two days earlier, Bahía Blanca had erupted in similar enthusiasm. Residents filled the streets, cheering, singing, and waving flags while wearing sky-blue and white ribbons and rosettes. Portraits of San Martín, Belgrano, and Our Lord Jesus Christ were prominently displayed. Outside the CGT building, crowds sang the National Anthem, symbolizing the defiance of the fallen regime, and applauded Admirals Toranzo Calderón and Olivieri as they arrived at Bahía Blanca’s municipal headquarters after their release from detention in La Pampa. In front of the burned-out offices of the Democracia newspaper and the Bernardino Rivadavia Public Library, the crowd shouted, “Death to Perón!” and “Long live the Fatherland and Liberty!”

Toranzo Calderon in the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, back in their respective units and after a refreshing hot bath, cadets and conscripts from the Military Aviation and Airborne Troops schools in Córdoba were informed that the next day they were going to participate in the parades that had been held to commemorate the victory.
On the 22nd, very early in the morning, the soldiers formed up in the courtyards of both schools to head into the city to parade with the Army troops and civilian commandos who had taken part in the battle. The Cadet's Diary is graphic in recounting the events.

"The unit remains in the same condition as always... All the officers gathered with General Lonardi at the Cadet Casino, which is why we couldn’t contact F... to request a replacement. When we finally managed to, he told us there was only one tent left with a cadet and 16 soldiers. We worked like mad to take down the tents and move them to the Squadron. Once we finished everything, we went to the unit, and there, among the three group leaders, the 'exciting' draw took place to decide who would stay... If it had been me, I would have had to muster a great deal of willpower to remain, but luck was on my side; of course, it fell to the 'Turk.' Poor guy, he won’t be any better off than I am."

Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderon arrives in Bahia Blanca

Thus, the troops boarded military trucks and buses and headed toward the provincial capital where, upon reaching Av. Vélez Sarsfield, they dismounted to begin the parade. They did so after a long wait, in front of the population who cheered them and threw flowers at them while a shower of papers fell from nearby buildings to the cry of “Freedom! Freedom!” which could be heard everywhere.
After the parade, the troops returned to the barracks to continue their activities during peacetime, unaware that the following day would claim the life of another comrade.
During a patrol and observation flight, the Calquin I.Ae-24 of the 2nd Attack Group, piloted by Second Lieutenant Edgardo Tercillo Panizza, crashed on the outskirts of the city due to mechanical problems.


Officers welcome their boss after his release

Once they had heard of this, cadets and officers headed towards the site, first crossing the Aeronautical District, with the intention of seeing the remains of the aircraft that was still smoking on the field. Once there, they came across the remains, observing them in silence while meditating on the events that had taken place in the previous days and the course that history would take from that moment on.
Mar del Plata also joined in the celebrations with long human columns parading through its streets to the City Hall, to sing the National Anthem and wave flags.
On September 23, the fronts of the city woke up decorated with the colors blue and white; around 10:00 there was a new march to the government palace where rosettes, ribbons and flowers were distributed as in the days of May and the celebrations continued in different places until late at night.
Argentina was beginning a new path; An era had ended and another had begun, but the disagreement between brothers was not going to end there. The country would never find its way again and society would continue to crumble to unsuspected limits.

Notes

[1] Gargiulo was the creator of IMARA (Argentine Marines), infusing the spirit of the US Marines into their training and enlistment..

Photos: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. la Marina se subleva

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

Malvinas: A Study Case (1/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Part 1/3
Sigue en Parte 2 - Parte 3
By Harry Train,
USN Admiral

This analysis covers the Malvinas/Falklands Conflict chronologically, from the preceding incidents to the conclusion of the Battle of Puerto Argentino/Port Stanley. Strategically, it examines the conflict across general, military, and operational levels, taking into account each side’s operational concepts and strategic objectives. This approach provides a balanced view of the strategies and tactics employed, highlighting the complexities faced by both Argentina and the United Kingdom in one of the most pivotal conflicts of the late 20th century in the South Atlantic.

In the Southern Hemisphere, it’s known as the Falklands Conflict; in North America and Europe, the South Atlantic Conflict. The British refer to it as the "South Atlantic War."

At the National Defense University in the U.S., where I teach the Final Course for newly promoted generals and admirals, we cover two case studies of special interest: one is the Grenada crisis, which we study and discuss to learn from the mistakes made by U.S. forces, despite achieving objectives. Many of my students, having fought in Grenada, tend to justify their decisions emotionally, rationalizing choices that, in hindsight, were suboptimal.

For this reason, we teach a second case where the U.S. was merely an observer: the Falklands Conflict. Rich in political-military decisions and full of errors and miscalculations on both sides, this case offers our generals and admirals an opportunity to examine a complex diplomatic framework and see how political factors, some still overlooked, led to the failure of diplomacy and ultimately to war. This conflict also allows for the analysis of an unprecedented military-political phenomenon: one side still operated under crisis management rules while the other was already at war.

This case also lets U.S. generals and admirals consider the benefits of joint defense structures by examining Argentina's new joint command system, which was joint in name only. The conflict also held lessons for the U.S. Congress in organizing our national defense and showed the impact of chance on the outcome of war.

— Would the results have been different if British television had not mistakenly reported the deployment of two nuclear submarines from Gibraltar towards South Georgia on March 26?
— Would the results have been different if the weather had not been calm on May 1?
— Would the results have changed if the 14 bombs that penetrated British warships had exploded?
— Would the outcome have been different if the Argentine Telefunken torpedoes had functioned properly?
— Would the British response have been the same if not for the coal miners' strikes in Britain?

The conflict also provides a retrospective view of crucial decisions, such as Argentina’s failure to extend the Port Stanley runway to accommodate A-4s and Mirages, the lack of heavy artillery and helicopters delivered to the Islands between April 2 and 12, the division of Argentine forces between East and West Falklands, the decision not to exploit British vulnerability at Fitz Roy and Bluff Cove, and the British decision to attack the cruiser General Belgrano.

We also examine how the land war might have unfolded if the Argentine forces from West Falkland had been in San Carlos, forcing the British to establish their beachhead on West rather than East Falkland.

My vantage point during the conflict was as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme NATO Commander in the Atlantic. My role was solely observational, overseeing a conflict between two valued allies. As my friend Horacio Fisher, then an Argentine liaison officer on my staff, can attest, we received little information on the war’s progress at my Norfolk command. There, our assessments foresaw an Argentine victory until the conflict’s final weeks, as we were unaware of certain pivotal decisions that later proved us wrong.

What I’ll share with you is my personal view of the Falklands Conflict, a product of months of studying reports, records, and interviews with the main leaders from both sides. This study has been challenging, as reports and interviews often reflect conflicting perspectives on key political and military events. This is in itself instructive, illustrating the "fog of war." In my research, I’ve had full access to Argentine and British leaders, documents, and post-conflict analyses.

As I recount this painful chapter in history, you will mentally analyze how each side adhered to military principles such as objective, offense, mass, maneuver, simplicity, security, surprise, economy of force, and unity of command.

While the complete study follows a detailed chronology of events based on records from both sides, initial analyses for students are based on a series of essays I’ve written that address various aspects of the conflict. These include the diplomatic prelude, the collapse of deterrence due to perceptions of British defense policy after World War II, initial recognition of the issue, both sides’ initial planning, and the Davidoff incident.

Understanding the Problem

If successive Argentine governments ever considered using military force as a supplement to or substitute for diplomatic efforts to reclaim sovereignty over the Falklands, these actions were discouraged by the perception of British military capabilities and their willingness to use those capabilities to defend their interests. At no time before the deployment of Argentine forces to Port Stanley on April 2, 1982, did the Junta believe the British would respond with military force. Nor did Argentine military leaders at any point before or during the conflict believe that Argentina could prevail in a military confrontation with Great Britain. These two beliefs shaped Argentina’s political and military decision-making process before and during the conflict.

The conflict was the result of Argentina’s longstanding determination to regain sovereignty over the Falklands and Britain’s ongoing commitment to the self-determination of the islanders. For many years, this balance was maintained due to a confluence of personalities and political attitudes on both sides, the Falkland Islands Company’s influence over policy decisions in London, and shifting perceptions of British military power and national interest. These factors set the stage for the decisions that ultimately led to war.

Additionally, Britain’s Conservative Party, facing internal labor unrest and weakened by public discontent, was under pressure. The British Navy’s fear of losing its significance added to this complex decision-making environment. About one thousand lives were lost in the conflict, nearly one for every two island residents. Thirty combat and support ships were sunk or damaged, and 138 aircraft were destroyed or captured. Britain successfully defended the islanders’ "interests," while Argentina’s efforts to regain sovereignty failed. In the aftermath, the British Navy regained prestige in the eyes of political leaders, and Argentina transitioned to civilian governance.

Most writings on Falklands sovereignty devote hundreds of pages to the 150-year diplomatic struggle. Argentines place great emphasis on each step of this process and hold a firm belief in diplomacy, though they recognize the importance of military capabilities as a complement to diplomacy. They see military strength as potentially giving diplomacy a "slight elbow nudge" within certain limits and without crossing the threshold of war. The British, on the other hand, are masters of diplomacy and the use of military force in the classic Clausewitzian sense—as an extension of the political process, regardless of whether or not the threshold of war is crossed.

Argentina’s leadership during the conflict reflected a viewpoint of having “too much history not to act.” In the U.S. and Great Britain, we say that one begins their history with each war, making accounting and decision-making simpler. Whether or not these Argentine viewpoints are historically accurate is irrelevant; what matters is that these criteria had a profound impact on Argentine decisions in the prelude to the conflict.

Of particular interest to military professionals is the gap between the assumptions underpinning British and Argentine decision-making. Between the occupation of the islands on April 2 and the sinking of the Belgrano on May 2, Argentine authorities operated under the belief that they were managing a diplomatic crisis, while the British acted on the conviction that they were at war.

Argentina’s political objective was "a diplomatic solution to regain sovereignty over the islands." Britain’s objectives were "defend the interests of the islanders and punish aggression."

One could argue that Argentina lost the war between April 2 and April 12 by failing to use cargo ships to transport heavy artillery and helicopters for their occupation forces, as well as heavy equipment needed to extend the Port Stanley runway, which would have allowed A-4s and Mirages to operate. The indecision, rooted in Argentina’s preconceived notion that defeating the British militarily was impossible, was a dominant factor in the final outcome.

The Davidoff incident

The Davidoff incident is crucial for understanding the Falklands conflict; it served as the "spark" or, as Admiral Anaya put it, the "trigger." Post-war perceptions of the Davidoff incident in Britain and Argentina differ significantly. Here’s what I believe happened:

In September 1979, Constantino Sergio Davidoff signed a contract with a Scottish company, transferring the equipment and installations of four whaling stations in Leith on South Georgia Island to him. This contract gave him the right to remove scrap metal from the island until March 1983. The Falklands authorities were informed of this contract in August 1980.

The 1971 Communications Agreement allowed travel between the Falklands and Argentina with only a white card. However, in response to UN Resolution 1514, the British registered South Georgia as a separate colony from the Falklands, governed directly from Britain, though administered by the Falklands government for convenience. Argentina rejected this colonial status claim, arguing that South Georgia, like the Falklands, had always belonged to Argentina and therefore could not be anyone's colony.

The problem arose when Davidoff visited Leith for the first time to inspect the installations he had acquired and intended to remove due to their scrap value. British authorities in Port Stanley maintained that no one could disembark in South Georgia without first obtaining permission at the British Antarctic Survey base in Grytviken, also on South Georgia, where passports would be stamped. Argentina, however, argued that the white card sufficed for entry and exit, per the 1971 Agreement.

There remain many unanswered questions regarding the timing, authenticity, and notification to Argentina of Britain’s claim to South Georgia as a separate colony. It is worth noting that both countries interpreted the situation differently. Curiously, Britain chose to enforce rigorous procedures regarding visits to South Georgia just as it was benefiting financially from unrestricted travel enabled by the white card.

The incident formally began when Davidoff left Buenos Aires on the icebreaker Almirante Irizar, which he had chartered, and arrived in Leith on December 20, 1981. Having informed the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his plans, he traveled directly to Leith without stopping in Grytviken for permission—likely unaware of this requirement—and then returned to Argentina.

Governor Hunt of the Falklands apparently learned of the visit through reports that the Almirante Irizar was in Stromness Bay and from people in Grytviken who reported someone had been in Leith. It seems probable that the British Embassy in Buenos Aires did not inform Hunt. Hunt urged action against Davidoff for bypassing the regulations, but London instructed him not to create issues.

The British ambassador protested to the Argentine government over the incident on February 3, warning that it should not happen again. This protest was dismissed on February 18.

Davidoff apologized at the British Embassy for any inconvenience caused and requested detailed guidelines on how to return to South Georgia to dismantle the installations properly. The embassy consulted Governor Hunt, who did not respond until after Davidoff's departure on March 11. On that day, Davidoff formally notified the British Embassy that 41 people were onboard the Bahía Buen Suceso, an Argentine Antarctic supply vessel. Information about their arrival should have been provided before their landing in Leith on March 19, bypassing Grytviken once more. The workers raised the Argentine flag.

 

War Triggers- The Argentine Viewpoint

Argentine authorities describe the events of March 19, 1982, as "the trigger." Although these events in South Georgia were far from forcing the key military episode beyond which there was no way out but war—and therefore do not fall into the category of a war starter—March 19 was certainly the spark for a cascade of confrontations and political-military decisions that set the stage for war to begin.

The British reaction to the Davidoff incident led Argentina to adjust its planning. The British Antarctic Survey's message from South Georgia reporting that "the Argentines have landed" polarized British reaction in London. In Buenos Aires, the Junta began considering the possibility of occupying the Falkland Islands and South Georgia before the British could reinforce them. Vice Admiral Lombardo was ordered to urgently prepare Operation Malvinas. Orders and counter-orders ensued.

The British government deployed HMS Endurance to South Georgia to remove the Argentine workers. The British were unaware that Argentina had canceled its initial plan to include military personnel in Davidoff’s legitimate project, but they did know of the Argentine Naval Operations Commander’s directive for two frigates to intercept HMS Endurance if it evacuated Argentine civilians. However, they were unaware that this order was later rescinded by Argentine political authorities, who feared a military confrontation.

Argentine personnel from the Alpha Group, initially intended to participate in Davidoff’s operation, were now redeployed to South Georgia as events unfolded and landed there on the 24th from the ARA Bahía Paraíso. A brief de-escalation occurred on March 25 when Britain learned of ARA Bahía Paraíso’s presence and authorized it to stay until March 28. During this time, Davidoff presented an explanation of his operation to the British Embassy.

The trigger was a (later proven false) report on British television that two nuclear submarines had departed Gibraltar for the South Atlantic. Argentine authorities took this information as accurate. Not wanting to risk a landing operation in the face of a British nuclear submarine threat, they calculated the earliest possible arrival date for the submarines. They were convinced that, from that point on, these submarines would remain stationed there for several years. Argentine authorities likely did not even know the exact time of the submarines' departure.

The Argentine public's support for what was seen as a valid commercial operation under the 1971 Communications Agreement framed a narrative of strong national interest against what was perceived as waning British interest. In an "now-or-never" mindset, the Junta ordered the execution of Operation Malvinas, setting April 2, 1982, as D-Day.

Operation Rosario 

The occupation of Port Stanley on April 2, without any British bloodshed, was a model operation—well-planned and flawlessly executed. The 700 Marines and 100 Special Forces members landed, achieved their objectives, and re-embarked as they were replaced by Army occupation forces. The Naval Task Force provided both amphibious transport and naval support.

I do not cover Operation Rosario in detail in this study because it was impeccable. What follows, and the absence of a conceptual military plan for subsequent operations, are of greater interest to my students. Here are two notable incidents:

1. On the afternoon of April 2, the Argentine Air Force in the Falklands initially denied landing authorization to an F28 carrying the naval aviation commander. The aircraft was eventually allowed to land after a 45-minute delay.

2. On April 2, the Argentine Air Force requested that the Joint Chiefs transport aluminum sheets to the islands by sea to extend the runway and expand the aircraft parking area for operational planes.

The ARA Cabo San Antonio transported LVTs and members of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion to the islands.

Performance of Argentine Transport Authorities

This marked the beginning of Argentina’s struggle to establish effective cooperation among its armed forces. The incident involving landing authorization for the naval aviation commander at Port Stanley symbolized what would soon become a significant coordination issue. The naval transport of runway materials highlighted an inability to set proper logistical priorities for the islands' support.

At that point, the Military Junta was increasingly concerned that resupplying the Falklands would pose a serious risk, as they hoped for a diplomatic solution. With British submarines expected to arrive in the area, any merchant vessel en route to the islands could become a target, risking an escalation they wished to avoid. Thus, resupply had to be limited to what few ships Argentina could load and dispatch before the submarines' estimated arrival.

Giving high priority to artillery and mobility support for the islands—particularly aluminum planks to extend the runway and heavy equipment to facilitate their installation—was crucial. The planks alone were useless without the necessary machinery. Failing to prioritize cargo and maximize the limited transport capacity proved a critical flaw, severely impacting both the naval and land campaigns. It’s worth noting that active U.S. involvement in the conflict became inevitable once extending the Port Stanley runway was no longer feasible.

Triggers of War - The British Perspective

When the South Georgia incident occurred, British Defense Secretary John Nott, Chief of the Defense Staff Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, and Fleet Commander Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse were attending the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Colorado Springs, where I was also present. As the crisis intensified, these key figures were dispersed: Admiral Lewin traveled to New Zealand, Admiral Fieldhouse to the Mediterranean, and Nott to Europe. During their ten-day absence, the UK observed Argentina escalating its claims.

Demonstrations had erupted in Argentina, and the country’s presence in Thule and South Sandwich was public knowledge in London. The Argentine occupation took place on a Friday, and with key members absent, the British War Cabinet set their objective: "Secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces and restore British administration in the islands."

Recognizing political, economic, and military constraints within Britain, the War Cabinet ordered the British Task Force to set sail on Monday. The fleet embarked, and commercial ships were requisitioned, despite uncertainty about the extent of the effort required. The government’s guiding concept for the operation became "deter and repel," forming the foundation of their initial response.

Argentine Naval Strategy

In Buenos Aires, naval authorities established their strategy:

• Carrier-based interdiction of maritime communication lines was considered and discarded.
• The use of docked vessels in the Falklands as mobile batteries was also considered and dismissed.
• Ultimately, Argentina adopted a “fleet in being” strategy, keeping a reserve fleet for potential postwar Chilean aggression. Avoiding direct naval battles, Argentina opted for a war of attrition—a prudent decision in hindsight.
• The Argentine Navy’s main objective was to inflict damage on the British Landing Force during disembarkation, when British forces would have limited freedom of maneuver.
• Additionally, Argentine concerns about fleet survival were heightened by U.S. Admiral Hayward’s assertion that satellites could track the Argentine fleet’s location at all times.

British Naval Strategy

British naval authorities developed a four-phase strategy to ensure an appropriate force structure:

• Phase One began on April 12, with nuclear attack submarines patrolling west of the islands to enforce the Exclusion Zone.
• Phase Two started on April 22 with the arrival of surface units and lasted until the landing at San Carlos on May 21. The mission was to establish air and maritime superiority in preparation for the landing, marked by a “war at sea” period. During this phase, South Georgia was recaptured, and the ARA Belgrano, HMS Sheffield, and Isla de los Estados were sunk.
• Phase Three began with the May 21 landing, lasting until May 30, focusing on establishing a beachhead, supporting ground troops, and providing air defense. HMS Ardent, Antelope, Coventry, and Atlantic Conveyor, as well as the Argentine vessel Río Carcarañá, were sunk during this phase.
• The Final Phase started on May 30, lasting until the ceasefire, with the mission of supporting ground operations and protecting maritime communication lines. During this period, the British landing ship HMS Galahad was sunk.

Sinking of the ARA Belgrano

On May 1, Vice Admiral Lombardo planned an operation to distract the British Task Force, which, according to Argentine intelligence, was preparing a landing on the Falklands that day. Lombardo’s idea was to form a pincer movement with Task Force ARA 25 de Mayo approaching the Exclusion Zone from the north and Task Force ARA Belgrano from the south, both outside the zone, forcing the British Task Force to abandon its support for the landing.

As ARA 25 de Mayo prepared to engage, the winds calmed, and technical issues limited the ship’s speed to 15 knots. Forecasts indicated continued calm for the next 24 hours, forcing Argentine A-4s to reduce their bomb load from four to one per aircraft. Doubts about the effectiveness of an attack with such a limited payload and reports that the British had not landed as expected led to the order for both task forces to retreat westward.

The ARA Belgrano had maneuvered around the exclusion zone, heading east and then north between the Falklands and South Georgia, to divert British attention from the impending landing and the presence of the 25 de Mayo. Sensing a real threat to his forces, Admiral Woodward requested and received authorization from London to attack the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone to neutralize the risk.

When HMS Conqueror attacked and sank the ARA Belgrano, the Argentine cruiser had been heading westward for fourteen hours. With the sinking of the ARA Belgrano, all hopes for a diplomatic solution faded, marking the start of the naval war.

Maritime Exclusion Zones and Other Navigation Restrictions

The concept of a Maritime Exclusion Zone, as imposed by the British during the conflict, is neither new nor fully understood by all military and political leaders. The pros and cons of a “sanitary cordon” have been debated within NATO for years. Similar terms, such as “Maritime Defense Zone,” have been examined legally and analyzed militarily, with significant disagreements among lawyers regarding its legality under international law, as well as its tactical and strategic value.

Declaratory in nature, like its distant relatives the Blockade and Quarantine, a zone must be announced with clear geographic limits, effective dates, and the types and nationalities of ships and aircraft it applies to.

The blockade, a more traditional military term with a solid basis in international law, is typically defined as a wartime action aimed at preventing ships of all nations from entering or leaving specific areas controlled by an enemy.

The terms pacific blockade and quarantine evolved from blockade laws, with the key distinction being that they are not intended as acts of war. Instead, military action is only anticipated if the targeted state resists. The term quarantine gained prominence in October 1962, when the U.S. president proclaimed a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment bound for Cuba.

 

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Beagle Crisis: The Scenario of Tierra del Fuego Battleground

Beagle Crisis: Analysis of the Scenario of Local Response

 

Updated Analysis of Scenario: Argentina Took the Islands and Chile Responded in the Area

Given the updated information about the deployment and conditions of the forces involved, we can refine the analysis of the conflict scenario where Argentina seizes Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, and Chile responds directly in the area.

Initial Argentine Assault on the Islands

Argentine Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: The Argentine navy would use its surface fleet, including the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, to establish naval superiority in the Beagle Channel.
• Naval Aviation: Argentine aircraft such as the T-28 Fennec, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326 light-attack trainers, based at the Rio Grande naval station, would provide air support for the operation.
• Ground Forces: Amphibious forces, including marine infantry, would be deployed to assault the islands. The objective would be to quickly secure the islands, especially Nueva island, where Chilean marines are fortified.

Updated Operational Plan

1. Naval Bombardment and Blockade:

   • Argentine naval forces would begin with a coordinated bombardment of Chilean positions on Nueva island to soften defenses.
   • Surface ships would establish a blockade around the islands to prevent Chilean reinforcements from arriving by sea.

2. Air Superiority and Support:

   • Argentine T-28 Fennecs, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326s would conduct air strikes on Chilean fortifications and provide close air support for the landing forces.
   • A-4Q Skyhawk were deployed in the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier.
     
   • Efforts would focus on maintaining air superiority over the channel, leveraging the compromised state of Chilean submarines and the absence of significant Chilean air assets in the immediate area.

3. Amphibious Assault:

   • Argentine marine infantry would land on Picton and Lennox islands first, securing them quickly due to the lack of significant Chilean presence.
   • The main effort would then focus on Nueva island, where 150 Chilean marines are entrenched. The initial bombardment and air strikes would aim to weaken Chilean defenses, followed by a multi-pronged amphibious assault to overwhelm the defenders.

4. Defensive Preparations:

   • Once the islands are secured, Argentine forces would establish fortified positions and prepare for a potential Chilean counteroffensive.
   • The Argentine navy would maintain the blockade and continue patrolling the area to detect and deter any Chilean naval movements.

Río Grande Naval Station (BARG) (SAWE)

Chilean Response in the Area

Chilean Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: With the submarine Simpson compromised, Chile's surface fleet would have to engage the Argentine navy directly. This includes deploying destroyers and frigates to challenge the blockade and attempt to retake the islands.
• Air Force: With F-5Es concentrated in Santiago, Chile's immediate air response would be limited. They would need to mobilize whatever air assets were available in the south, possibly using older aircraft or redeploying F-5Es, though this would take time.
• Ground Forces: Chilean marines on Nueva island would be the first line of defense. Any reinforcements would likely come from nearby bases but would face significant logistical challenges due to the Argentine blockade.

Potential Course of Action and Engagements

Chilean Naval Response:

• Immediate Naval Engagement: Chile would mobilize its surface fleet to engage the Argentine navy in the Beagle Channel. The objective would be to break the blockade and provide support for the marines on Nueva island.
• Tactical Challenges: The compromised state of the submarine Simpson would limit Chile's underwater capabilities, making the naval engagement primarily a surface battle. Argentine submarines Santiago del Estero and Salta, aware of Simpson's issues, would likely play a significant role in disrupting Chilean naval movements.

Air Engagements:

• Initial Air Strikes: Argentine air assets would continue to provide close air support and target any Chilean reinforcements attempting to reach the islands.
• Chilean Air Mobilization: Chile might redeploy F-5Es from Santiago, but this would take time. In the short term, they would rely on whatever air assets are available in the region, potentially utilizing older aircraft for immediate support.

Ground Counteroffensive:

• Defense of Nueva Island: The 150 Chilean marines on Nueva island would mount a determined defense. However, they would face overwhelming Argentine firepower from both naval and air strikes.
• Reinforcement Efforts: Chile would attempt to send reinforcements by sea, but the Argentine blockade and naval presence would make this difficult. Small-scale infiltration and supply missions might be attempted, but larger reinforcements would be unlikely to succeed without breaking the blockade.

A-4Qs participated in Operation "Defense and Affirmation of Sovereignty" in 1978, during the border conflict with Chile over the Lennox, Picton, and Nueva Islands (Beagle Channel crisis) deployed aboard the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, from where they carried out air patrols of armed combat, intercepting Chilean aircraft.

Outcome and Strategic Implications

Short-Term Outcome:

• Argentine Success: Given the overwhelming firepower and logistical advantages, Argentina is likely to succeed in securing the islands initially. The compromised state of Chilean submarine assets and the limited immediate air response from Chile would contribute to this success.
• High Casualties: The battle for Nueva island, in particular, would be intense and result in high casualties on both sides, especially among the entrenched Chilean marines.

Long-Term Strategic Implications:

• Prolonged Conflict: Even if Argentina secures the islands, the conflict would not necessarily end there. Chile would likely continue to seek ways to retake the islands or open new fronts elsewhere.
• Regional Tensions: The conflict would significantly heighten regional tensions, drawing in international attention and potentially involving other countries diplomatically or militarily.
• Military Readiness: Both nations would continue to mobilize and prepare for extended engagements, potentially escalating the conflict into a broader war involving multiple fronts.

In conclusion, the updated scenario analysis indicates that Argentina, leveraging its superior naval and air power and the compromised state of Chilean submarine assets, would likely succeed in its initial objective of securing the islands. However, the conflict would likely escalate, leading to prolonged engagements and heightened regional tensions. Two aspects to be taken into account: Argentine developed a complex military industry, so ammunition and small arms can be guaranteed to be provided to troops jointly with food and clothes. Chile, empoverished through decades of economical mismanagement especially during Allende's administration, was far to even compared to its neighbor.

Esteban McLaren compilation

AA: Prospective of Argentine Armored and Mechanized Forces

The prospective role of our armored and mechanized forces

Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Horacio Eduardo Lafferriere.


The Persian Gulf conflict of 2003, as well as the ongoing actions of allied forces in Iraq up to the time of this writing, provide valuable insights into how we should envision employing our armored and mechanized troops (referred to as TBM) in future combat operations. This necessitates a comprehensive analysis that draws from recent conflict experiences and involves the formulation of scenarios wherein our TBM units could be effectively utilized. Crucially, this analysis must be conducted with complete impartiality to ensure that our insights contribute meaningfully to the overall effectiveness of our armed forces, rather than merely reinforcing pre-existing institutional beliefs.



Allow us to provide a brief observation that will lay the foundation for our forthcoming discussion on the operational role of TBM (armored and mechanized troops). The events during the Iraq operations in 2003 once again underscored a recurring phenomenon in conflicts since World War II. It has become increasingly evident that on today's modern battlefield, the utilization of large-scale airborne forces for combat operations with a reasonable chance of success is no longer feasible. For instance, in Iraq, we witnessed the deployment of a military force comprising nearly a thousand personnel in the northern region. However, this deployment starkly contrasted with the massive actions undertaken by the Allies in North Africa and Western Europe during World War II[1]. The primary reason behind this shift is the vulnerability of airborne forces to enemy aircraft and missile threats when attempting the type of operations that were once commonplace in earlier conflicts.

This shift doesn't negate the necessity of having infantry units capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory; it merely necessitates a change in the approach to achieve this objective. What we aim to convey here is that the landscape has evolved for TBMs, requiring them to reevaluate their doctrine to ensure efficient operations in future combat scenarios.

How do we traditionally see the use of TBMs?

We believe that in the environment of TBMs, the use of them continues to be glimpsed, in a similar way to what was put into practice in the Second World War in different German and allied campaigns; Israel Defense Force operations carried out in Sinai in their various campaigns from independence to 1973; or what the allies did in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 and recently in Iraq at the beginning of the campaign. This image, so deeply rooted, sometimes seems not to adequately perceive the changes that were taking place even in the aforementioned conflicts, and it seems that all that remains is the somewhat romantic idea of masses of TBMs, moving at high speed, over flat and uncovered terrain. , in the direction of a vulnerable point of the enemy.

This idea, unfortunately, has suffered the same attack as the massive airborne operations. It is not viable to even be conceived if the enemy we must face has a minimum and sufficient command of the air, so that its vectors can severely affect the huge target that the TBMs make up, both in their concentration places and in displacements. towards your goals. When we look closely at history, we clearly perceive that Israel and the allies in the two versions of the Gulf War acted with masses of TBMs, with total impunity, since they were able to suppress the enemy air threat[2]. With absolute honesty, we can mention that it is at least very risky to think that in the event of a conflict, we will be able to count on the necessary aptitude to achieve control of the air even similar to the one that served as the framework for the operations that we previously referred to[ 3]. Of course, those who work at TBM are fully aware of this problem, however, we believe that we have not made an effort to find ways to move positively in this regard.

On the other hand, we continue to have certain precautions regarding the use of TBMs in terrains that are not those that are naturally best suited to their abilities. Thus, we continue to refuse urban combat[4], despite the fact that it offers TBMs a propitious field for the exploitation of many of the skills they possess, as has also been demonstrated by the Israelis in Ramallah and the allies in Iraq. . All of this, we consider, makes us lose the enormous potential of our TBMs, which is shaped in the first place by decades of experience in the training of personnel and in the maintenance and use of the means.

The predominantly urban nature of the future battlefield

The world population tends to live more and more in urban conglomerates, which means that armies must prepare for the inevitability of having to fight in them[5]. Traditionally, the doctrine tries to avoid urban combat, and recommends going around large population centers, in order to keep TBMs out of them, and thus take advantage of empty spaces, where maneuvering skills can be exploited to the maximum. . This doctrine is not consistent with the reality of these times, since the impossibility that certain enemies have of fighting in open terrain against regular forces, makes them resort to the concept of "asymmetric warfare" as a procedure for the development of its operations[6]. The urban terrain, due to its compartmentalization, presents greater possibilities for a force to remain on the defensive for extremely long periods, with the capacity to inflict significant damage on the attackers. The TBM have been used marginally up to now in this environment, since it is thought that the constricted spaces make them easily targets for actions where anti-tank ambush procedures are carried out. To reinforce this belief, the Russian experience in Grozny seems to be a kind of reminder of the serious dangers that operating in urban environments entails for a TBM force. The Russians lost hundreds of armored vehicles in urban operations in the Chechen capital, but the cause was probably the use of them in an unintelligent way, while the Russian fire support agencies were destroying the city, and therefore Of course, they created dozens of new sectors for the Chechens to more appropriately combat the Russian TBN.

This example has been conveniently analyzed in the armies of the West, and credit must be given to the Israel Defense Forces, which in its operations in Palestinian urban territory, make continuous use of TBM elements, even using military vehicles. infantry combat in prototype stage. Likewise, the allies in Iraq, in 2003 and currently, make intense use of TBM in their urban operations, both in those that were carried out against regular troops and today that operate mainly against irregulars. What did they find in the TBMs? They found in them an immense ability to carry out urban combat with some protection against the enemy, while having a vast menu of variants that TBMs offer for urban combat. Likewise, they applied the old concept of more or less transitory groupings of armored and mechanized troops that for many years governed our doctrine for combat in open terrain, but brought to the compartmentalized conditions of urban combat. Let's move on in this regard. If a fraction of mechanized infantry troops is given the mission of fighting in urban terrain, they will surely use their dismounted troops, advancing ahead of the infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). This disembarked troop will be able to apply combat techniques in localities that are characteristic of any infantry, and would have the IFV that advance further back as direct fire support, to face a strong point that must be eliminated. However, that mechanized fraction will lack the heavier firepower in case of facing a threat that is protected against the action of the IFV's main weapon. That fire, traditionally, was provided by heavy infantry weapons or field artillery. This type of fire is counterproductive, since as we mentioned in the case of the Russians in Grozny, what happens in practice is that they end up working to improve the enemy's defense possibilities, since the margin of error of the projectiles, added to the link problems that forward observers normally have in a compartmentalized terrain, are the cause that favors the reinforcement of the enemy, as well as contributing to further compartmentalize the terrain that the city presents. Faced with this panorama, armored troops are added to the mechanized infantry fraction, which, marching as close as possible to the troops on foot, provides them with the necessary direct and precise support fire; without creating insurmountable restrictions on traffic through the town[7]. The combination of armored troops towards mechanized ones in urban combat, reverts, when in certain urbanizations, there are open spaces of relative importance, which mainly favor the use of armored vehicles. In this case, it is the mechanized troops that are added to the armored factions, so that the latter have the possibility of fighting anti-tank elements that could hinder the combat of the armored vehicles. It is worth asking ourselves, what level of integration can occur? We believe that it should in no way be restricted to those established by our doctrine, which are Task Forces or Combat Teams, since there will be situations where integration must be achieved at the section level. In this way, a IFV can be added to four dams, or a IFV to four tanks; Without this, more balanced groupings can be formed, which will depend on the circumstances, level of prior instruction achieved, and so on.

Obviously, the TBMs that we currently have present a design that is appropriate for combat in open terrain, and we can hardly expect to have in the foreseeable future TBMs mounted on combat vehicles that present a design specifically conceived for this very difficult environment. complex. However, we believe that even today, it would be important that in the event of fighting in urban areas, at least the following provisions could be made available:

• Armored Troops: The ammunition of the main weapon should be mostly of the explosive type, although each tank would have to have specific ammunition to beat tanks, since it can meet enemy armored vehicles, incapable of fighting on the move, but located in specific locations as a strong point. It will be important for the tower machine gun to have a relevant number of tracing and piercing ammunition, so as to allow the tank to beat anti-tank weapon positions, at least while the mechanized infantry troops are in position to attack the enemy emplacement. The external telephone of the tanks must be in very good working conditions, since very high frequency communications will have a significant tendency to be hampered by the compartmentalization of the land. The phone will facilitate fire support in difficult circumstances, but highly likely to happen.
• Mechanized Troops: They must have a reinforced amount of ammunition for anti-tank weapons, not so much for their use in this role, but to attack enemy strong points and to open passages in buildings, which allow groups of shooters the possibility of to "wrap" in the urban terrain. Likewise, explosive charges must be available to complement the use of anti-tank weapons. On the other hand, elements such as ropes, small ladders, paint and brushes will be useful when it comes to overcoming obstacles, as well as to identify buildings cleaned by the troop itself. The ammunition of the main weapon of the VCI must have a greater preponderance of the perforating type, and applies to external machine guns, a criterion that is the same as that expressed for the same type of tank weapons.

It is here that we make a brief comment on the night combat of TBMs in urban terrain. In principle, we believe that it should be avoided, since although we can count on different types of visors, the particularities of the urban terrain do not allow us to trust that the aforementioned devices can be useful in the development of an advance. Rather, we believe that acts of fratricide could very easily take place, as well as there would be a significant margin for high collateral damage to occur in the actions. The night should serve to establish a security perimeter for the TBM, which would take advantage of these circumstances to resupply, maintain the vehicles and rest. However, particular situations may impose combat in this type of conditions, and in this regard, the exercises carried out at the section level in the Infantry School in 2002 seem to indicate that with difficulties and with the use of precise coordination measures it is feasible. fight at night in urban terrain. Basically, the weight of the action would be carried by the landed mechanized infantry troops, with the armored vehicles advancing relatively closer than during the day, so that their fire can be more precise. The disembarked troop must be divided into two. One of them dedicated to the execution of the corresponding operation, and another, to the protection of the tanks. The latter must also serve as a guide in the execution of displacements, depending to a significant extent on radio communications and simple and precise light signals. We reiterate, the latter is not a recommended job, but it may be unavoidable.

Should we forget about combat in open terrain? No way. Between the cities there is land that must be conquered or defended, according to the type of operation in question, and there all the knowledge that our TBMs possess must be exploited. Fundamentally taking into account the serious threat that the different air vectors of the enemy pose for any more or less massive grouping of TBMs. What we have tried to promote in this work is the urgent need for TBMs to assimilate the idea that the battlefield is changing at a speed that even exceeds the technological development at our disposal. If we don't face the challenge that the changing operating environment presents, we run the risk of being tied down to doctrinal considerations that will in no way be useful in environments where combat may occur in the future. We have the knowledge and the ideal personnel to face urban combat in very good conditions, it only remains for us to think of it not as an eventuality in the course of a campaign, but rather as something routine; so that in this way we face the adjustments in the procedures that allow us to face this type of actions with a significant chance of being victorious.

[1] My I Alejandro AGOGLIA, a deep connoisseur of everything related to airborne operations, has published in the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra (Nro 550, Pag 105), a very interesting work on the use of what is known as "Light Infantry".
[2] In the case of massive airborne assaults, it should be remembered that when they are carried out at low altitudes, transport planes are not a profitable target only for enemy aviation, but for troops on the ground, both artillery and artillery. anti-aircraft, such as those that can make use of portable AA missiles.
[3] In the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 538, Pag 99, we present a paper where we mention a scenario where our military instrument could operate.
[4] Lt. Lt. (US Army / Retired) Ralph Peters has written extensively on the subject of urban combat, as well as the characteristics of the combat field in the future. In this regard, it is recommended to consult his work in Parameters magazine (US Army War College) at the following address: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/a-index.htm.
[5] See the article “Urban warfare and urban warfighter of 2025”, written by R. Hahn II and B. Jezior in volume XXIX, No. 2, page 74 of PARAMETERS.
[6] In a work titled "The Asymmetric War of the XXI Century" (Published in the Army Magazine of Spain in No. 730), we have extensively expatiated on this
issue.
[7] In 2002, during the development of the Basic Weapons Course, exercises of Mechanized Shooters Section level groups were carried out in urban terrain, practicing offensive, defensive and even retrograde operations in the Infantry School. that environment; both day and night; obtaining important experiences.