1955 Revolution: A Peronist General's Failed Rebellion and His Succesful Execution

Not even a damn military rebellion can organize a Peronist

Argentina en la Memoria
@OldArg1810






On June 9, 1956, the uprising of General Juan José Valle, and other soldiers and civilians who participated in the Peronist resistance, took place against the government of the Liberating Revolution, chaired by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu.




In adopting its harsh anti-Peronist policies, the government had to take into account the possibility of counterrevolutionary violence. Above all because of the punitive measures he adopted against those whom he considered immoral beneficiaries of the "Peronist regime." The arrest of prominent figures, the investigation of people and companies allegedly involved in illicit profits, and the extensive purges that affected people who held union and military positions contributed to forming a group of disaffected individuals.



It was only logical to expect that some of them, especially those with military training, would resort to direct action to harass the government or overthrow it. Although incidents of sabotage carried out by workers were common in the months that followed Aramburu's inauguration, it was only in March 1956, as a consequence of the decrees that had declared the Peronist Party illegal, prohibiting the public use of Peronist symbols and other political disqualifications, when the conspiracies began.






A contributing factor, although ultimately misleading, may have been the government's decision, announced in February, to remove the death penalty for promoters of military rebellion from the military justice code. This punishment, which had been enacted by the Congress controlled by the Peronist Party, and which represented the interests of Perón, after the coup attempt of September 1951, led by General Menéndez, was eliminated from the military code on the basis that “ “It violates our constitutional traditions that have forever abolished the death penalty for political causes.” The facts would prove that this statement was premature.



The prominent figure in the conspiracy attempts against Aramburu was General (Retired) Juan José Valle, who had voluntarily retired after the fall of Perón and actively participated in the Military Junta of loyal officers that obtained Perón's resignation and handed over the government to General Eduardo Lonardi in September 1955.



Valle tried to attract other officials dissatisfied with the government's measures. One of those who chose to join him was General Miguel Iñiguez, a professional who enjoyed a great reputation and who was still on active duty, although he was on duty, awaiting the results of an investigation into his conduct as commander of the loyal forces in the Córdoba area, in September 1955. Iñiguez had not intervened in politics before the fall of Perón, but with a deep nationalist vocation, General Iñiguez joined General Valle in the reaction against the policies of the Aramburu government.



At the end of March 1956, Iñiguez agreed to act as chief of staff of the revolution, but a few days later he was arrested, denounced by an informer. Held under arrest for the next five months, he was able to escape the fate that awaited his companions.



The Valle conspiracy was, in essence, a military movement that attempted to take advantage of the resentment of many retired officers and non-commissioned officers as well as the unrest among active duty personnel. Although it had the cooperation of many Peronist civilians and the support of elements of the working class, the movement did not achieve the personal approval of Juan Domingo Perón, then exiled in Panama.


The sexual degenerate and his gang

In its preliminary stages, the movement tried to attract nationalist officers dissatisfied with Aramburu who had played key roles during the coup attempt of June 1955, in the coup d'état against Perón in September 1955 and during the Lonardi government, such as the generals Justo Bengoa and Juan José Uranga, who had just retired; but the evident disagreement about who would assume power after the victory ended with their participation. Finally, generals Juan José Valle and Raúl Tanco assumed leadership of what they called the “National Recovery Movement” and they, instead of Perón whose name did not appear in the proclamation prepared for June 9, hoped to be its direct beneficiaries.

The plan provided that military commando groups, mostly non-commissioned officers and civilians, would take over Army units in various cities and garrisons, take over media outlets and distribute weapons to those who responded to the proclamation of the uprising.



This included various terrorist attacks on public buildings, on national and provincial officials, on premises of political parties related to the Liberating Revolution, and on the editorial offices of various newspapers in the country. There was also an extensive list of military and political leaders, government sympathizers, who would be kidnapped and shot by the National Recovery Movement, whose homes were marked with red crosses at that time.



One of them was the one occupied by the socialist leader Américo Ghioldi and the teacher Delfina Varela Domínguez de Ghioldi, on 84 Ambrosetti Street, in the heart of the Caballito neighborhood. Other homes that were marked with red crosses were those of Pedro Aramburu, Isaac Rojas, the relatives of the deceased Eduardo Lonardi, Arturo Frondizi, Monsignor Manuel Tato, Alfredo Palacios, among others.






The government had only recently been aware that a conspiracy was being prepared, although it did not know precisely its scope or date. In early June, several signs, including the appearance of painted crosses, suggested that the uprising was imminent. For this reason, before President Aramburu left Buenos Aires accompanied by the Ministers of the Army and the Navy for a scheduled visit to the cities of Santa Fe and Rosario, it was decided to sign undated decrees and leave them in the hands of Vice President Rojas to to be able to proclaim martial law, if circumstances demanded it.





On June 8, the police detained hundreds of Peronist union soldiers to discourage mass worker participation in the planned movements. The rebels began the uprising between 11 p.m. and midnight on Saturday, June 9, gaining control of the 7th Infantry Regiment based in La Plata, and temporary possession of radio stations in several cities in the interior. In Santa Rosa, province of La Pampa, the rebels quickly took over the military district headquarters, the police department, and the city center. In the Federal Capital, loyal officers, alerted hours before the imminent coup, were able to thwart in a short time the attempt to take over the Army Mechanics School, and its adjacent arsenal, the Palermo regiments, and the Field Non-Commissioned Officers School of May.




Only in La Plata were the rebels able to take advantage of their initial victory, with the help of the civilian group, to launch an attack against the headquarters of the provincial police and that of the Second Infantry Division. There, however, with reinforcements from the Army and Navy that came to support the Police, the rebels were forced to withdraw from the regiment's facilities where, after attacks by Air Force and Navy planes, they surrendered to 9 in the morning of the 10th. The air attacks on Santa Rosa, capital of La Pampa, also ended in the surrender or dispersion of the rebels, more or less at the same time, therefore the rebellion ended up being a failure.





General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, back in Buenos Aires after his brief visit to Santa Fe and Rosario, gave a speech on the National Network, in which he spoke about the events that occurred during the early hours of June 9.




The June 9 insurrection was crushed with a harshness that was unprecedented in the last years of Argentine history. For the first time in the 20th century, a government ordered executions when repressing an attempted rebellion. Under the provisions of martial law, proclaimed shortly after the first rebel attacks, the government decreed that anyone who disturbed order, with or without weapons, would be subjected to summary trial. Over the next three days, twenty-seven people faced firing squads.

During the night of June 9 to 10, when nine civilians and two officers were executed, the rebels still dominated a sector of La Plata and the possibility of workers' uprisings in Greater Buenos Aires and other places could not be discounted. Those first executions were, according to the government, an emergency reaction to frighten and prevent the rebellion from turning into a civil war. This would explain the government's speed in authorizing and making public the executions, a speed that was demonstrated in the lack of any kind of prior trial, in the inclusion, in those who faced the firing squads, of men who had been captured before proclaiming themselves martial law, and in the confusion of the communiqués during the night of June 9 to 10.




During that night, they began to exaggerate the number of rebel civilians shot and erroneously reported the identity of the executed officers, to instill fear in the rebels and prevent them from taking to the streets to try to participate in the movement.



On the afternoon of the 10th, a massive demonstration took place in the Plaza de Mayo, which gave rise to scenes of joy and relief, as anti-Peronist crowds flocked to the Plaza de Mayo to greet President Aramburu and Vice President Rojas, and ask punishments for nationalist/Peronist rebels.

There, Admiral Isaac F. Rojas gave a speech from the balcony of the Casa Rosada:



Similar scenes, although with the roles reversed, had occurred in the past, when Peronist crowds demanded revenge against the rebels in September 1951 and June 1955. Only this time the government paid more attention than Perón to the cry for blood. After this act in Plaza de Mayo, Vice President Rojas, the entire Military Consultative Board, Aramburu and the three military ministers, made the disastrous decision to shoot the prisoners who had participated in the revolution against the government.





Against the advice of some civilian politicians, including some members of the Advisory Board, who urged an end to the executions, including a delegation formed by Américo Ghioldi and other members of the Advisory Board who went to the Government House, to request clemency and that the executions and attempts of some generals who opposed the executions be put to an end by calling Arturo Frondizi to put pressure on the authorities, and even though officers who made up the martial courts recommended that the rebels be subjected to military justice ordinary, the members of the de facto government resolved to continue applying the punishments provided for in martial law.




By making that decision, they persuaded themselves that they were setting an example that would increase the authority of the government and discourage future attempts at rebellion, thus preventing the loss of more lives. It is not known whether the Military Junta, at the June 10 meeting, took into account the fact that the majority of those already executed were civilians and that if the executions were suspended, the military leaders would suffer lighter punishments than those civilians. The truth is that the Military Junta rejected the suggestion of the commander of Campo de Mayo, Colonel Lorio, in the sense of limiting the pending executions to that of one or two lower-ranking officers.



Admiral Rojas strongly opposed making exceptions for the most senior officers, considering that this was a violation of ethics that “history” would not forgive; He preferred to suspend all executions rather than take any measure that would allow military leaders to escape the punishment imposed on those who had followed them. Ultimately, the Military Junta assumed direct responsibility for ordering the execution, over the next two days, of nine officers and seven non-commissioned officers.




On June 12, Manrique went to look for Valle, convinced that the shootings would be interrupted, and took him to the Palermo Regiment, where they interrogated him and sentenced him to death. Aramburu was convinced of doing so and said that "if after we have shot non-commissioned officers and civilians we spare the life of the person most responsible, a general of the Nation who is head of the movement, we are creating a terrible precedent; it will seem that the law It is not the same for everyone and that nothing happens between friends or similar hierarchies; the idea that the law applies only to the unhappy will be consolidated.




At eight at night they told Valle's relatives that he would be executed at 10. His daughter went to ask Monsignor Manuel Tato, deported to Rome in June 1955 during the conflicts between Perón and the Catholic Church and who was targeted for Valle's movement, to do something. Tato spoke with the Apostolic Nuncio, who telegraphed the Pope to ask Aramburu for clemency. But the request was denied. Valle said goodbye to his daughter and gave her some letters, including one addressed to Aramburu in which he said "You will have the satisfaction of having murdered me (...) I retain all my serenity in the face of death. Our material failure is a great moral triumph (...) As a Christian, I stand before God, who died executed, forgiving my murderers."



Shortly after, several sailors took him to an internal courtyard and shot him there. Moments after Valle's execution, the government suspended the application of martial law, bowing to increasing pressure from civilians and the military demanding an end to executions.




The political parties grouped in the National Advisory Board supported the government against the uprising. There was a secret meeting of the Advisory Board, on June 10, in which everyone said that they agreed with what was decided and what was resolved was support for the government. There was nothing related to the executions. Only Frondizi demanded to Aramburu, the next day and in his personal capacity, that civilians not be shot.




Américo Ghioldi, who had sought to stop the executions, wrote an article for the newspaper La Vanguardia in which he developed a justification for them, after learning that General Valle's uprising sought the execution of the socialist leader himself, saying: "The milk of mercy. Now everyone knows that no one will try, without risking life, to alter the order because it means preventing the return to democracy. It seems that in political matters, Argentines need to learn that the letter in blood enters.



Juan Domingo Perón, in a letter to John William Cooke from his exile, was highly critical of the Valle uprising and blamed several of the members of the attempted revolution for betraying him during the events of September 1955, saying: "The frustrated military coup It is a logical consequence of the lack of prudence that characterizes the military. They are in a hurry, we do not have to be in a hurry. Those same soldiers who today feel plagued by the injustice and arbitrariness of the dictatorial scoundrel did not have the same decision. September 16, when I saw them hesitate before every order and every measure of repression of their comrades who today put them to death (...) If I had not realized the betrayal and had remained in Buenos Aires, they themselves "They would have killed me, if only to make merit with the victors."



The first to promote the memory of "the martyrs of June 9" would be the different neo-Peronist groups, such as the Popular Union of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, who would campaign in 1958 against Perón's order to vote for Arturo Frondizi in the presidential elections of this year.

1955 Revolution: Plot in motion

The plot is in motion



Dr. Clemente Villada Achával played a crucial role as the intermediary between General Lonardi and a group of conspirators in the province of Córdoba. Underpinning this clandestine collaboration was a secret meeting held at the historic Colegio de La Salle in Buenos Aires. In attendance were key figures including the leader of the coup, General Lonardi, Colonels Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Captain Edgardo García Puló, and Major Juan Francisco Guevara. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy and protected by heavily armed civilian guards.

Villada Achával disclosed that officers from the Artillery School in Córdoba were eager to partake in a potential coup, awaiting the signal to act. This gathering served to clarify doubts and expedite preparations, as State intelligence services had begun to detect suspicious movements, posing a significant risk.

These concerns were validated when General Lonardi faced sanctions and twenty days of house arrest on August 16. Additionally, the CGT called for a strike on August 31, urging the public to assemble in Plaza de Mayo to hear Juan Domingo Perón, whose vehement rhetoric amplified tensions among the military leadership and the public.

On September 4, Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Cornejo Saravia conveyed a crucial message to the Lonardi family, indicating that the planned uprising for September 16 had been postponed by General Aramburu. Lonardi, visibly agitated, insisted that the operation could not be delayed any further. He expressed urgency due to the government's alleged preparations, including arming workers' militias and retiring many involved officers. The situation demanded swift action to avoid potential repercussions.

-General –said Cornejo a bit embarrassed- I am only passing on some information that Colonel Zerda has just given me[1].

In view of such news, Lonardi believed it necessary to confirm the information and for this, he entrusted his son Luis Ernesto to arrange a meeting with Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, destined to discuss the issue in depth. This was done and that same afternoon, the general went to the residence of his friend, in order to update him on the latest events.

-General –said the owner of the house after hearing his words- take things in your hands because otherwise, this won't work.

-Ossorio –answered his interlocutor- I have already decided and be sure that I will spare no effort to carry out the movement [2].

On September 8 at 9:00 p.m. a new meeting was held in which Colonel Eduardo Señorans, chief of operations of the Army General Staff, was present. The same, organized by Alfredo Rodríguez García, a relative of Major Juan Francisco Guevara, was carried out in the car of Dr. Eugenio Burnichon and four fundamental points were agreed upon that should be taken into account when organizing the plot.

1. Because of General Videla Balaguer's impulsive and rash actions in Río Cuarto, the authorities in Córdoba remained vigilant and had implemented stringent security measures.
2. The coastal contacts were deemed both unreliable and inadequate, as only the IV Cavalry Division was available, and it would only pledge its support 72 hours after the uprising commenced.
3. No units in Greater Buenos Aires had shown any signs of allegiance or support for the cause.
4. General Aramburu was continuously monitored, and his aide, Major San Martín, had been apprehended.

During the conversations, Colonel Señorans said that the best thing to do was to wait and not rush because the conditions were not right to start a revolution. Lonardi expressed his total disagreement with this position because the discharge of the troops was imminent and also because, as he had raised it with Ossorio Arana in the previous meeting, the government was organizing popular militias that were going to endanger national security. In his opinion, continuing to wait would only lead to the total disaster of the operation because the latest arrests of officers seemed to show that the authorities knew something.
In this way, the command of the revolution passed from the indecisive General Aramburu to his peer who, in order to know the prevailing situation in the military units of the interior, dispatched his sons Luis Ernesto and Eduardo, in the direction of Córdoba and Cuyo, respectively.
The Lonardi brothers left Buenos Aires on Friday the 9th at night and arrived in the Mediterranean province at 08:30 the following day. Once there, they went to the house of their uncle, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, where they were informed of the latest news. Villada had organized a meeting for 4:00 p.m., at his private home, to which he had invited Captains Daniel Correa and Sergio Quiroga, Brigadier Jorge Landaburu, his brother-in-law, engineer Calixto de la Torre, and Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia. (h).
It was held at the agreed time and during the course of the talks, the situation of the revolutionary forces in the province, the contribution of civilians and the government's reaction were thoroughly analyzed.
To the satisfaction of the Lonardi brothers, the results of that meeting were better than they had expected since, according to what was said, the younger officers were ready to fold, except for the powerful Infantry School, which seemed to remain loyal. To this must be added the participation of the revolutionary civilian commandos that Commander Landaburu and Captain Basilio Arenas Nievas organized in those days, together with Mr. Damián Fernández Astrada and Edmundo Molina, who would constitute an essential element of support when the wars began. operations.
Captain Correa placed special emphasis on the urgent need to start the actions before September 16 because on that day the Artillery School finished its annual activities and had to deliver the weapons for maintenance tasks. All those present supported the motion, for which Luis Ernesto Lonardi stated that it would be among the first points that he would raise with his father when it came to imposing the news.
That night, at 9:00 p.m., Luis Ernesto boarded an Aerolíneas Argentinas plane and began his return to Buenos Aires while his brother continued his journey to Mendoza, in order to update Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, officer of the Cuyo Mountain Association.

Luis Ernesto arrived shortly before 12:00 p.m. and as soon as he got off the plane, he went to his father's apartment, on Juncal street, to inform him of the latest news. The general, wearing a robe over his pajamas, listened carefully to his son and when he finished, he told her that he needed a few hours to meditate and that the next day he would have an answer.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, the general sent for his son and once face to face, he told her that he was determined to lead the revolution and that it would begin in Córdoba, early on the 16th. ; therefore, it was necessary to take the necessary steps to start the operation.
Lonardi asked his son to establish urgent contact with Major Guevara because he was thinking of using his services as a liaison between the Army and the Navy. Wasting no time, Luis Ernesto went to the home of Captain (RE) Ezequiel Federico Pereyra Zorraquín, who was in charge of organizing the revolutionary civilian commandos of the Federal Capital for the defense of the always threatened Barrio Norte and Recoleta, and asked him about Guevara's whereabouts. The owner of the house told him that the aforementioned official had left his home because the government intelligence services were constantly watching him and that, for this reason, he did not know where he was hiding.

At that same moment, Lieutenant Colonel Eleodoro Sánchez Lahoz arrived, bringing with him news from Corrientes where, apparently, the commanders of the VII Division had declared themselves in favor of the plot. In view of this, Luis Ernesto Lonardi, believing an urgent meeting between the newcomer and his father was necessary, began to pull the strings so that the pamper would take place that same afternoon.

Around noon, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro A. Pujol and First Lieutenant Florencio A. Pareja Ortiz established contact with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to inform him that there were fifty officers at the Superior War College and the Superior Technical School willing to fold and that Captain Oscar F. Silva, belonging to that last unit, had organized a sabotage operation against the tanks at Campo de Mayo.

Two hours later, the son of General Lonardi received a communication from Captain Pereyra Zorraquín, who put him in contact with Alfredo Rodríguez García, who at that time was in a country house in the town of Pilar in the company of Captain Edgardo García Puló. They agreed to meet in Buenos Aires at 5:00 p.m. and that's how it happened. Luis Ernesto showed up punctually at the agreed place and they picked him up there (in Pereyra Zorraquín's car) to go to the home of Mr. Román María Bourdieu, located in the town of Olivos, where they had been staying for several days. Major Guevara and his family.
At a time when the vehicle was parked in front of the aforementioned house, Major Guevara arrived who, seeing them, hurried them to enter the residence because he did not want to be exposed for too long on the street. The owner of the house received them and once they were seated in the living room, Luis Ernesto referred to what he had discussed with his father and the answer he had given him. It was what those present expected to hear and for that reason, an undisguised but discreet jubilation was perceived among them. Immediately afterwards, he explained that the postponement requested by General Aramburu was inadmissible and that he himself had left no other path than the one adopted, that is, that General Lonardi assume command of the uprising, since if he did not do so, the plot would be left to nothing. your luck. In addition, it was known that the Navy was drawing up plans to carry out a new bombardment of the Government House, on September 17, in case the Army did not make a statement[3].

While these bustles were going on, the Navy was making its own moves.
On the night of September 2 to 3, a secret meeting was held at the home of Dr. Héctor Bergalli, attended by the ship captains Arturo H. Rial and Ricardo Palma, the frigate captain Aldo Molinari and on behalf of the Army, General Juan José Uranga with Colonel Eduardo Señorans. During the same, the latter asked for the floor to request to postpone the actions pending more opportune moments but the owner of the house was strictly opposed.

-To make the revolution, it is enough for a regiment to rise up, because the radicals of the province of Buenos Aires will form a wave that will cover the country.

To those words Señorans responded that he preferred to trust the Army and the Armed Forces rather than the radicals and the silence of the rest of those present seemed to agree with him. Wanting to know the position of the Navy, General Uranga asked Captain Arturo Rial about it and he, fully confident, replied:

-General, you can be absolutely sure of that.

"Then, gentlemen," said General Uranga, "the revolution is made."

To which Colonel Señorans added:
 

I hope to be with you that night.

The meeting continued at Captain Rial's house, where General Uranga was strict when referring to the political purposes of the uprising and the need to have the support of the Navy. He went on at length about it and immediately afterwards, he gave his word of honor regarding the revolt of the Military College.
On Monday morning, the 5th, revolutionary civilian commandos that were operating in Bahía Blanca under the command of Captain Edgardo García Puló, were informed by Navy officials that the outbreak was going to take place early on September 8. However, on the evening of the 7th, Captain Molinari informed García Puló that he had been suspended.
The head of the commandos expressed his concern about that decision because the arrest of engineer Jorge P. Estarico, liaison between the Navy and the civilian commandos, was an indication that something strange was happening, but Molinari explained to him that the Navy could do nothing without Army support.
A new meeting at Captain Rial's failed when it was learned that Major Dámaso Pérez, head of the cadet corps of the Military College, denied his support for the coup.
On the morning of Friday the 9th, a naval officer arrived at Comandante Espora to inform García Puló that it was imperative to establish contact with the rebel command of the Navy since the drastic decision had been made that if the uprising did not take place before the 17th September, the base on its own, would attack Government House. When García Puló asked why such a firm determination was due, the newcomer replied that by that date, the Ministry of the Navy had agreed to an inspection of the unit and that if it were carried out, the conspiracy would be exposed and numerous arrests would be made.
That day, in the afternoon, a new meeting took place between the base delegate and Captain Molinari in which the latter requested 24 more hours to give an answer. The following day, at night (it was Saturday), Molinari met again with García Puló and Guevara so that the Navy would join the uprising as long as at least one Army regiment did so. Guevara listened attentively and asked for 48 hours to respond and it was at that meeting that the name of General Bengoa, detained at the Directorate of Mechanical Traction, was once again considered, so that he personally led the coastal forces.
Once contact was established with Bengoa, he sent word that although he accepted the command of those troops, it should be taken into account that his escape from the military unit in which he was confined was going to put the government on alert.
Colonel Señorans did not believe that choice was prudent and so he informed Major Guevara, asking him to find another officer immediately. The idea of appointing Colonel Eduardo Arias Duval then arose, since he was more than sure that once notified, he would enthusiastically accept the responsibility.
On the afternoon of September 11, Major Guevara met again with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to agree on a new meeting with the command of the uprising. This was done and in addition to General Lonardi, Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Lahoz attended to listen very carefully to the action plan drawn up by his superior.
It consisted of five points that established:

1. Simultaneous uprising of the garrisons of Córdoba, Cuyo, the Litoral and Neuquén.
2. Uprising the naval bases of Río Santiago, Puerto Belgrano, Punta Indio and Comandante Espora together with the Sea Fleet and the Ríos Squad.
3. Uprising of the air garrisons of Paraná, Córdoba, Mendoza and Mercedes, province of San Luis.
4. March on Santa Fe in support of the crossing of the Paraná River by the Litoral forces, with the protection of the Escuadra de Ríos.
5. Ships from the Flota de Mar (Sea Fleet) would establish the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires and in case the government persisted in the defense, they would bombard the riverside area, mainly the Government House, the Ministry of War, the Central Post Office and other positions.

After the presentation, Sánchez Lahoz gave his word of honor that he would do everything possible to revolt the Corrientes garrison the same morning of the 16th and Guevara promised to organize new meetings with Captain Palma, Colonel Arias Duval and General Uranga at effects of transmitting the plan to the officers involved.
The meeting ended at 10:30 p.m. and immediately afterwards, Luis Ernesto Lonardi met with Captain Juan José Pierrestegui to entrust him with a conversation behind closed doors between General Lonardi and Colonel Víctor Arribau. It was held in the Belgrano neighborhood, on Monday the 12th at 10:00 a.m. and in it the second man expressed his support. For this reason, the leader of the uprising ordered him to go to Curuzú Cuatiá to help Colonel Juan José Montiel Forzano to revolt the armored regiments of that unit and he left immediately.
Then Lonardi decided to say goodbye to his family, starting with his grandchildren, the children of Dr. José Alberto Deheza and his daughter Marta, while his son-in-law[5], left quickly for the study of Dr. Teófilo Lacroze to ask him to send him to the colonel Ossorio Arana the following message: “The revolution is underway. He must get his things ready to go to Córdoba that very night” and he informed him that in the last hours of the afternoon, the general himself would give him the tickets with the latest instructions.
At 3:00 p.m. that same day, the meeting between General Lonardi, Colonel Arias Duval, and Major Guevara took place in Alfredo Rodríguez García's car. Once everyone was on board, the first one went straight to the point: Arias Duval had to go to the Litoral to start the uprising as soon as it broke out in Córdoba. The colonel listened to the call with a serious expression and when his superior had finished speaking, he asked her for 24 more hours to carry out the orders since, according to his point of view, on Saturday the 17th it would be easier to surprise the units. Lonardi flatly refused because, as he had stated on other occasions, the situation in Córdoba was extremely dangerous.
After the meeting, Guevara announced that that same morning, Colonel Señorans had told him at the Ministry of the Army that he was willing to place himself without hesitation under the orders of General Lonardi. On the other hand, the meeting with captain Palma agreed for 5:00 p.m. could not be carried out and he had been postponed until 11:00 p.m. that same day. At 6:00 p.m., the notary public Juan Carlos Soldano Deheza gave General Lonardi the two bus tickets that he was to bring to Colonel Ossorio Arana and half an hour later, the leader of the uprising contacted Captain Pereyra to order him and Captain Daniel Uriburu, moved to Córdoba in order to meet with him (Lonardi) at the house of Dr. Berrotarán. The meeting with General Uranga, scheduled for 7:00 p.m., did not materialize either, so it had to be postponed until 1:00 a.m. the following day.
At 9:00 p.m., Major Guevara and Luis Ernesto Lonardi accompanied the general to Dr. Lacroze's house where they were to meet with Colonel Ossorio Arana. Once there, Lonardi explained the situation chart to him and immediately afterwards explained the operations plan, which he followed with extreme attention. When he finished speaking, they hugged and immediately left the place quickly with his companions.
At 10:30 p.m., Colonel Ossorio Arana and his wife boarded the bus that would take them to Córdoba in Plaza Once. Upon arriving at his destination, the officer had to contact Dr. Villada Achaval so that he could take him immediately to the home of Dr. Calixto de la Torre where a new meeting had been planned that same morning. In the interim, he was to inform the chiefs and officers of the garrisons of the facts and organize a meeting at night with the heads of each unit.
From the Once bus terminal, Lonardi, his son, and Guevara (who had accompanied Ossorio Arana and his wife there), set out to meet Captain Palma.
Luis Ernesto was behind the wheel, with his father next to him and Guevara behind him. At the corner of Guido and Ayacucho streets, a man wearing a hat and coat was waiting for them, standing with his hands in his pockets. It was Colonel Arias Duval who, as soon as the vehicle stopped, quickly boarded it, shaking hands with those present once the son of the leader of the coup had resumed his march. Not far from there, Captain Palma, also dressed in a gray overcoat, was waiting for them. When he saw that the vehicle was approaching, he slowly approached the curb of the sidewalk and when it stopped him, he opened the rear door and entered it.
Once inside the car, the sailor was introduced to General Lonardi, to whom he shook hands while telling him that he was there representing Captain Arturo Rial.
The leader of the uprising went straight to the point explaining the reasons why he had taken command of the revolution and why it should take place on September 16. Next, he brought him up to date on the plan of operations and told him about the role that the Navy should play alongside the Army.
Palma listened attentively and when his interlocutor finished speaking, he said that it was imperative to take Martín García Island because air-naval attacks could be launched from it to neutralize the Morón Air Base. Immediately afterward, he referred to the role of the revolutionary civil commandos, who were thought to be assigned to take over the radio stations, and then he asked Lonardi what his opinion was.
The general gave his approval but clarified that civilians should not intervene until after 01:00 on September 16, since it was imperative to prevent information leaking that would destroy the surprise factor. Palma agreed and then the following dialogue was established between the two:

Capt. Palma: I understand that the movement is headed by General Aramburu and that he has decided to postpone it until a better opportunity. Who is the leader of the revolution?
Gen. Lonardi: I am the leader of the revolution.
Capt Palma: Understood, sir.
Gen. Lonardi: General Aramburu appreciated that the elements he had were not enough to launch a movement with chances of success. I understand that the conspiracy has reached a stage in which it tends towards its own disintegration due to the arrests that have occurred and any postponement will mean its complete annulment. In addition, the government is organizing armed groups whose mission is to oppose any subversive movement. We have entered into an honorary commitment with the young officers of the three armed forces that we must comply with, since they have assumed attitudes that any investigation will reveal and the sanctions will be severe. I have verified the number of units willing to participate in the movement and I consider them sufficient for there to be a chance of success. I think that the regime's own collaborators will welcome the elimination of Perón, which means that if the revolution succeeds in a single garrison in the interior for more than 48 hours, added to the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires, we cannot fail, always that we act with the firmest decision to win.
Captain, I want to know if I have the unconditional support of the force that you represent!
Capt. Palma: The Navy is willing to support you with all determination as long as you assure us that the Army will initiate hostilities.
Gen. Lonardi: You have already heard our action plan that will not be postponed in any case: on September 16 the revolution will be launched. Take my word for it. So it will be done.
Capt. Palma: On behalf of the Navy, I assure you of your participation and I wish you success in the operation.

After the conversation, the sailor and Colonel Arias Duval got out and the vehicle continued its journey to where General Uranga was waiting. The handshake that Lonardi and Palma gave each other before saying goodbye was the seal of the alliance between the Army and the Navy, an inescapable commitment that from that moment on, no one could break.
The car, always guided by Luis Ernesto Lonardi, arrived at the home of Captain Garda where the occupants of it quickly descended.
The owner of the house ushered them in and led them to the living room, where General Uranga was sitting waiting. The meeting began at 1:00 am sharp when Lonardi began to explain the revolutionary plan and the situation that Córdoba was going through at that time. As soon as he finished, he ordered him along with him to lead the Military College and the 1st Infantry Regiment to march on Rosario and annul the 11th Infantry Regiment and take the Arsenal. Once these objectives were achieved, he should continue towards Santa Fe with the mission of reducing his military forces and establishing the bridgehead that would allow the troops from the Litoral to cross the Paraná River.
Uranga expressed his reservations regarding the Military College since at that point it was known that his commitment was null but that even so, he would advance on Rosario with the elements that he could gather. Taking this detail into account, Major Guevara was entrusted with establishing contact with his peer, Dámaso Pérez or Captain Genta, an officer from the Military College, to try to convince them to join the uprising and locate First Lieutenant Gastón Driollet so that he could go to to the home of Captain Garda to receive the instructions that General Uranga had to send urgently to the 1st Infantry Regiment.
The meeting at the Garda home ended at 03:00, when those present stood up and General Uranga enthusiastically declared:

-Look, General, even if it's alone, I'm going to go out and shoot at Government House.

Back in his apartment, General Lonardi learned from Major Guevara that General Lagos had been conducting some polls among officers and high-ranking military commanders, and for that reason, he ordered him to contact him as soon as possible at his home in San Isidro to tell him that he had to urgently move to Mendoza to take charge of the forces in that region. In addition, he ordered him to send an urgent message to General Bengoa indicating that the presence of a general was more than necessary there, especially that of Bengoa, because not long ago he had commanded the III Army Division stationed there.
In these conditions they separated and took different directions. They were to meet at 4:30 p.m. that same day, at the Plaza Once bus terminal, before Lonardi left for Córdoba6.
A fact that no one had taken into account facilitated the last movements of the leader of the uprising in Buenos Aires: his birthday and that of his daughter Susana, on September 15, the date that the young woman planned to take advantage of to announce her engagement to Ricardo Quesada. By then, the invitations had already been distributed and for a week the family had been preparing a reception. Unexpectedly, the general asked his daughter and his future son-in-law to change the date to September 17 and shortly after advised them to purchase tickets to travel to Córdoba before the 14th.
Thus came the day of departure. That morning, Lonardi and his wife began packing, knowing that the building where they lived was heavily guarded.

To all this, in the bases of the south, the conspiracy reached borders of proportions when starting a covert operation, destined to alleviate the lack of weapons.
As has already been said, after what happened on June 16, the government had decided to remove the armed bombs from the naval planes and send them under strong custody to the Zárate Naval Arsenal. Consequently, the Navy was practically out of action and unable to start operations, and this greatly compromised the success of the uprising. In a word, there were plenty of planes but no bombs.
What there was, and many, were empty casings and a good supply of trotyl, stored in the magazines of the naval bases, a fact that led a group of officers to evaluate the possibility of using this material to replace weapons. confiscated.
After a series of meetings, the construction of homemade projectiles was resolved using the trotyl loaves and available casings, hence, always with the utmost caution and in absolute silence, the first steps were taken to start the operation. . The idea was to have everything ready for September 15 and when hostilities broke out, to have equipped planes.
To achieve the task, it was necessary to melt the loaves in steam pots, at a temperature of 80º C and compress their content inside the casings, so it was necessary to find trained personnel and a suitable place to carry out the task. Someone suggested the kitchens of the Workers' Dining Room at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, which had a capacity of one thousand people, and an officer recalled that the person in charge of them was an Italian who had some experience in handling explosives.
A Frigate Captain was commissioned to establish contact with him and almost at the same time, the aforementioned facilities began to be conditioned so that everything would be ready when the appropriate personnel arrived on the scene.
The officer in question went to a house in the Arroyo Parejas neighborhood, located within the perimeter of the base, where that individual had lived since 1952, the year he arrived in the country. The man ushered him into a small room that he used as a living room and once inside, always adopting the appropriate precautions, the newcomer asked him if he was up to doing the job. After a brief analysis of the situation, the Italian replied that he was, and thus, without wasting time, he was led to the Dining Room building, in whose kitchen he immediately got to work.
The subject worked diligently, practically without rest, under the close supervision of superior personnel who prevented access to anyone who did not have proper authorization. In this way, giving power to the pots, he melted the first loaves of trotyl, whose mixture of nitric acid based on hydrocarbons was placed well pressed inside one of the casings and with it an initial test was carried out, the results of which were satisfactory. .
The Italian worked for six days, assisted by very few personnel since the mass production of that material was considered a risky task. During all this time, he was prevented from leaving the Great Hall except on one occasion, when it was necessary to accompany him to his home to pick up a medication he was taking and that is how, by the end of the week, he had hundreds of bombs ready.
After an arduous task, the work was finished and in this way, it was possible to equip the naval planes with the appropriate weapons that would allow them to operate once the hostilities had begun.

Notes

1. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es Justo, Francisco A. Colombo Editor, Buenos Aires, 1958.
2. Ídem.
3. The planes would depart from Comandante Espora.
4. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit. Luis Alberto Deheza, son-in-law of General Lonardi, was Minister of Defense during the last days of María Estela Martínez de Perón (1976)..
5. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit.
6. That same morning, after resting for a few hours, Lonardi spoke with Dr. Rogelio Driollet, as had been agreed..

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón