Counterinsurgency War: The Attempted Attack on the ARA "Santiago del Estero" Submarine

In 1971, the Argentine flag was hoisted for the first time on the Guppy IA-class submarine USS "Chivo" as it was renamed ARA "Santiago del Estero" for the Argentine Navy.

Operation Corina: The Attempted Sinking of ARA Santiago del Estero.

On March 4, 1973, in a key operation for national security, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police foiled one of the most dangerous subversive conspiracies of the time: the so-called "Operation Corina." The objective of this extremist group, belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), was to sink the submarine ARA Santiago del Estero at the Mar del Plata Naval Base and carry out coordinated attacks on various strategic points in the city. This attack was part of a broader plan to sow chaos in the country in the days leading up to the general elections on March 11, 1973. However, a meticulous investigation and swift police action dismantled the terrorist cell before it could execute its plan.


The GUPPY IA-class submarine S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, formerly USS Chivo (SS-341), underway. The ARA Santiago del Estero was incorporated into the Argentine Navy and decommissioned in 1981. Nevertheless, it served a wartime role in 1982 during the South Atlantic Conflict, being used as a decoy when it was secretly towed out of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and hidden to create confusion among the enemy, making them believe the submarine was operating in the open sea.

The raid that dismantled the operation took place in a chalet at the corner of Matías Strobel and Blas Parera, in the heart of Parque Luro. There, officers from Regional Unit IV arrested eight FAR members, a group that, despite portraying itself as a defender of the proletariat, was mostly composed of individuals from wealthy families, with university backgrounds and no real connection to the working class. Among the detainees were Jesús María Aguinagale, Daniel Roque Armengol, Osvaldo Alfredo Lenti, María Cristina Bonfiglio de Armengol, and Beatriz Mariana Quiroga de Porfirio, among others. A significant arsenal was seized at the scene, including UZI submachine guns, Browning pistols, Rubí .32 caliber revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, and large quantities of ammunition and explosives. Many of these weapons had been stolen in previous bank robberies and attacks on police facilities, demonstrating the high level of organization within the group.

But the most revealing discovery was the documentation found inside the chalet. Sketches, maps, and blueprints detailed the operation’s targets with precision, including the Mar del Plata Naval Base, the port, and YPF’s fuel depots. Other secondary targets were also identified, such as the 1st Police Station of Necochea, which they planned to seize to obtain police weaponry. The plan was to carry out these attacks simultaneously on March 11, coinciding with the national elections, with the aim of triggering a security crisis and undermining the country’s stability.

In today’s Argentina, the same terrorists whom the government, the judiciary, and the media have turned into "victims," honoring them with monuments and official recognition, were responsible for the murder of Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya. Her only "crime" was being at her newspaper stand working that morning of April 10, 1974, in Rosario. On that busy street, she became the victim of a terrorist ambush aimed at assassinating two Argentine Army officers. While her killers were granted compensation, tributes, and state honors, Elcira and her family were condemned to oblivion, ignored to this day.

On April 10, 1972, in Rosario, a group of approximately 15 FAR extremists ambushed and murdered Major General Juan Carlos Sánchez, head of the Argentine Army’s II Army Corps. That same day, the subversive forces also executed Oberdán Sallustro. Among the attackers were some of the militants who, a year later, would be captured in Mar del Plata on March 4, 1973, while planning to attack the Naval Base and sink the S-22 ARA Santa Fe submarine. During the attack on General Sánchez, Army Sergeant Berneche, who was driving the official vehicle, was seriously wounded, and Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya, an innocent civilian who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, was killed.

The attack on ARA Santiago del Estero was the central objective of the operation. Acquired by the Argentine Navy in 1971, the submarine was a Balao-class vessel, modernized with Guppy IA technology to enhance its combat capabilities. Its destruction would have been a devastating blow to the operational capacity of the Argentine fleet in the context of the Cold War, where the country’s Armed Forces played a key role in the hemisphere’s strategic balance. According to the intelligence gathered, three members of the group had received specialized diving training and were planning to place an explosive charge beneath the submarine’s hull. For months, they had conducted night drills in nearby waters, practicing approach maneuvers with inflatable boats and studying the naval guards’ movements.

The police operation led to the arrest of one of the divers involved in the incursion, Alfredo Ruscio, who confessed that the cell was fully prepared to act and was merely awaiting orders from their superiors. This statement triggered an emergency protocol in Mar del Plata. Security was reinforced at the Naval Base, the port, police stations, and other strategic locations, including the Mar del Plata Golf Club, which had been identified in the seized documents as a potential secondary target. Authorities intensified controls throughout the city, aware that part of the group remained at large and could attempt further attacks.

Thanks to these preventive measures, the attack was completely thwarted. The capture of the group and the confiscation of their weapons and explosives prevented the operation from proceeding, averting what could have been one of the most devastating assaults on the country's military infrastructure. However, the story did not end there.

Just months later, in a decision that exposed the weakness of the state in the face of the terrorist threat, the detainees were released by the government of Héctor Cámpora. This mass pardon, which included hundreds of imprisoned subversive militants, allowed many of them to return to clandestine operations and resume their criminal activities. Several of those involved in “Operation Corina” later participated in further attacks, proving that Argentina’s fight against terrorism was far from over.

The once-glorious Buenos Aires Provincial Police, relentless against the Castro-Guevarist terrorist enemy of the Argentine Nation, has since been corrupted, degraded, disarmed, dismantled, and undermined by Argentine politicians from 1983 to the present through their ideological revenge. It has been reduced to a lifeless security agency, barely capable of serving political demagoguery. However, this does not apply to the vast majority of its members, who still stand strong in defense of the nation, putting their lives on the line against crime every day.

The context in which this terrorist plot was conceived cannot be understood without analyzing the global landscape of the time. During the 1970s, Argentina became a key battleground in the Cold War, with revolutionary groups supported by communist powers and a state that often wavered between repression and permissiveness. Declassified documents years later confirmed that organizations such as FAR and Montoneros operated with funding and training from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Their goal was not merely to fight the government in power but to establish a revolutionary regime through violence and the destruction of republican institutions.

Operation Manuel in the Czechoslovak Service

Copy of the March 1967 report from StB Intelligence (Státní bezpečnost: State Security) of Czechoslovakia A-00921/10-67, written three years after the launch of "Operation Manuel" as an assessment by the First Administration, with a copy sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Eighth Department. The report details the objectives and scope of the operation, including the destruction of all nationalist and democratic movements in Latin America through institutional destabilization, particularly targeting the Armed Forces and Security Forces. It also outlines the recruitment, training, and equipping of subversive agents, their command structure, and financial support.

Additionally, more than 10,000 similar documents have been declassified by the Czech Republic, which acted as an operational intermediary between the USSR and Cuba, from where terrorist operations in Argentina were coordinated. These documents undeniably prove that Argentina was subversively and genocidally attacked by agents of a global superpower and several other nations.

Transcription in Czech

Zpráva 27.10.1966

Akce MANUEL – perspektiva.

V průběhu svého pobytu v Francii SVISTO hovořil v tom smyslu, že nadále bude při vysílání lidí do LA dbát především na kvalitu. Z jeho vysvětlení vyplývá, že ztráta osob, vyslaných v rámci akce MANUEL, bude klesat a navrhl, že v současné a další práci (vyladit po sřízení technické součásti) na přípravu tematické zprávy slova smyslu.

Pokud se týká akce MANUEL, chceme tuto i nadále realizovat co nejlépe v souladu s připomínkami (k časovým) k technice hlášení přechodů a ke kategorii „Mastníků akce“, která se mění na rezidenturu krátkého setonu telegramem č. …, což bylo rozváděné s kádrem jednajícím RICHARD, jenž projevil pro tyto přecházející plně pochopení. Jako pochopitelně všem těm, dočasně termíny hlášení přechodu, za níž se mají i lo. odbor, že v rámci sotva politicky dojdete. Byl v řádu byl dobré vztah ze strany rezidentury na dodržování těchto termínů alespoň u těch nejdůležitějších případů, kteří jsou z hlediska majitelůvání technické dokumentace a tím v Maďarsku poměrně komplikovanější než je normální přechod.

Souvislosti se skora uvedeným prohlášením JURA 1 v souvislosti – podobnými zprávami z rezidentury na další perspektivu hlášení přechodu, které jsme formě pochopitelně, že hlášení přechodu vůbec důležitá násobně přihlášeného počtu osob, které snad obětují několik půl roku nebo 1 roku přejdou Francii a jejich zprávy bude třeba zajistit vratné jako u jako deset.

Závěrem, bude tuto otázku při nejbližší vhodné příležitosti zjemnit, bude o tom především informován, a to hlásit hlavní závady plánů i potřeb technického zabezpečení a pak hlásit na příslušnou akci v centrále a v určitka orgánech.

Translation to English:

Report 27.10.1966

Operation MANUEL – Perspective.

During his stay in France, SVISTO stated that, in the future, when sending people to LA (Latin America), special attention would be given to quality. From his explanation, it follows that the loss of individuals sent under Operation MANUEL will decrease, and he proposed that, in both current and future work (after fine-tuning the technical component), a thematic report be prepared for this purpose.

Regarding Operation MANUEL, we intend to continue executing it in the best possible way, in accordance with the comments on the timing and technique of crossing reports, as well as with the category of "Operation Mastníků," which is being modified in the residency through a short telegram No. …, a matter that was discussed with agent RICHARD, who expressed full understanding for these crossings. As is clear to all involved, the temporary crossing reporting deadlines must be coordinated with the relevant department, as political conditions will barely allow for any progress. There was good cooperation from the residency in adhering to these deadlines, at least in the most crucial cases, which, from the perspective of technical documentation management in Hungary, are considerably more complicated than a normal crossing.

In connection with the recent declaration by JURA 1 and similar reports from the residency on the future perspective of crossing reports, it is evident that the importance of these reports increases proportionally with the number of registered individuals. It is estimated that some of these individuals will be able to cross into France within a period of six months to a year, and it will be necessary to ensure their reporting in a manner similar to previous cases.

In conclusion, this issue will be clarified at the earliest appropriate opportunity. The main objective will be to report on the major planning issues and technical support needs and subsequently report the corresponding action to headquarters and the responsible authorities.

Operation Corina

The case of Operation Corina is merely a reflection of the undeclared war that was being waged in Argentina at the time. The struggle between state forces and armed organizations intensified over time, leading to a spiral of violence that left thousands dead and disappeared. The release of those responsible for this failed attack was not only an act of impunity but also set a dangerous precedent that weakened the country's ability to confront the terrorist threat.

At Dock No. 2 of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal—the largest dry dock in all of Latin America—we observed the presence of the Argentine Navy’s Guppy-class submarines, ARA *Santiago del Estero* and ARA *Santa Fe*, both undergoing maintenance.  

As the 1970s progressed, attacks on military and civilian targets became increasingly frequent. Kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings dominated the country’s agenda, creating a climate of insecurity that led to stricter security policies and open confrontation between the State and insurgent organizations. By 1976, Argentina would enter a new phase, where the fight against subversion would be led by the Armed Forces in a conflict that would forever change the country's history.

Today, the failed attempt to sink the ARA Santiago del Estero remains a symbol of a time when the nation was torn between order and chaos, between democracy and political violence. The story of Operation Corina is not only a reminder of the danger posed by these extremist groups but also a warning about the consequences of impunity and the lack of a clear policy to combat terrorism.

The submarine Santiago del Estero enters the Naval Base. In the background, the facilities of the Mar del Plata Golf Club can be seen—both were targets of the genocidal Castro-Guevarist organization FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) in March 1973. (Photo from La Nación newspaper.)

Many questions remain unanswered. To what extent did the political decisions of that era contribute to prolonging the conflict? What role did foreign interests play in the radicalization of armed groups? Has Argentina learned from its past, or is it still repeating the same mistakes?

What is certain is that, five decades later, the scars of that struggle remain in the country's memory. Operation Corina was just one of many episodes in an internal war that left an indelible mark on Argentine history, a legacy that continues to spark debate today.

The Attack on ARA Santísima Trinidad

The ARA Santiago del Estero submarine was the first strategic target of extremist forces, preceding the ARA Santísima Trinidad destroyer. However, in 1973, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police successfully prevented that attack. The destroyer D-2 ARA Santísima Trinidad, commissioned in 1969 by the Argentine Navy and AFNE for construction in Argentina, was the most advanced warship of its kind at the time. At a moment when few believed Argentina could achieve such a technological leap, the country became the first in Latin America to build a missile-launching, helicopter-carrying warship.



Built between 1972 and 1977, the ship's completion was delayed by a Castro-Guevarist terrorist attack. While it was in its final assembly stages, a sabotage operation severely damaged it and partially sank it in 1975. On August 22, 1975, Montonero terrorists attempted to destroy the ARA Santísima Trinidad. Although they failed to do so by force at the time, they ultimately succeeded 28 years later by infiltrating Argentina's political sphere under the guise of Peronism. Additionally, an Argentine Navy officer involved in the project, Commander Bigliardi, was assassinated by the same extremist organization that sought to prevent the project from ever coming to fruition.



Despite these setbacks, the destroyer officially entered service in 1977, just in time to participate in naval operations during the near-war conflict with Chile in 1978. In 1982, the ARA Santísima Trinidad served as the flagship of the Argentine Navy during "Operation Rosario," the mission to reclaim the Malvinas Islands. Throughout the conflict, it also acted as an escort vessel for the ARA 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier, which, on May 1–2, 1982, pursued the British Task Force, forcing it to evade combat. The destroyer continued patrolling the Argentine Sea throughout the war, prepared for a planned Argentine naval counteroffensive in late June or early July—an operation that never materialized due to the fall of Puerto Argentino and the subsequent overthrow of President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri.



The vessel remained operational until 1987, when maintenance difficulties arose due to its British origin and the arms embargo imposed on Argentina. As a result, some of its components were cannibalized to provide spare parts for its sister ship, the ARA Hércules. Decommissioned and placed in reserve, the destroyer awaited a modernization and reactivation that never came.

Ironically, in the early 2000s, when members of the same Castro-Guevarist terrorist organization that had tried and failed to destroy the ship in the 1970s gained control of the Ministry of Defense, they finally succeeded—not through sabotage, but through deliberate political neglect. The destroyer, which neither Cold War subversion nor one of the world’s most powerful navies could sink in open war, was ultimately destroyed by Argentine politicians—former members of the very terrorist group that had once fought against it.

Peronism: Origins of "Taty Almeida"'s Claims

The origins of Taty Almeida and the Truth about the dissapearance of her Son

By Jorge Tisi Baña via TotalNews




Taty Almeida is actually called Lidia Estela Mercedes Miy Uranga and this year she will turn 94 years old. She is the daughter of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Vidal Miy and Alicia Uranga, sister of Raúl Uranga, who was governor of Entre Ríos during the presidency of Dr. Arturo Frondizi.
The Miy – Uranga couple also had three other daughters, all married to Air Force officers, and a son, Carlos Vidal Miy Uranga, a soldier like his father, who became a colonel in the Engineer branch of our army. Taty graduated as a teacher and married Jorge Almeida, a fellow teacher with whom she had 3 children: Jorge, Alejandro and Fabiana. Of them, only Alejandro, who was an active member of the ERP-22 de Agosto, a faction that split in 1973 from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), is missing.
Alejandro Martín Almeida was 20 years old, he studied medicine at the UBA, he worked at the Télam agency and in the cartography area of ​​the Military Geographic Institute. He was kidnapped by “Triple A” in June 1975, almost a year before the coup d'état. Taty found out about her son's militancy after being kidnapped, because she was too busy to realize that her son was part of a terrorist organization.
Since then she has been a member of “Mothers of Plaza de Mayo – Línea Fundadora but, curiously, she is an active militant against the military dictatorship.



She knows perfectly well that the Military Process that began on March 24, 1976 had nothing to do with the disappearance of her son that occurred a year earlier at the hands of Triple A.
In short, one of the ladies who most virulently attacks the Armed Forces and the military dictatorship, she comes from a military family, she had a brother and three military brothers-in-law. Her missing son was an ERP activist and was kidnapped in democracy by a parapolice organization organized from power during a Peronist government, a party to which she belongs.
Thankfully, she is dead now.

Antiterrorist War: Courageous Conscripts in Formosa

1975, Formosa: When "El Negro" Luna and his little soldiers defeated Montoneros
Soldier Luna's sister, Jovina, managed to get the State to open its files to find out if the guerrillas who killed Hermindo received compensation. What was the attack called “Operation Scoop” like?
By Ceferino Reato - Infobae




Soldier Hermindo Luna (left of the photo) with two companions

Hermindo Luna is considered the hero of the resistance with glory of the 21-year-old Formosa soldiers who on October 5, 1975, in the midst of the constitutional government of President Isabel Perón, rejected the attempt to take over an Army barracks by Montoneros, one of the two most powerful guerrilla groups of the seventies.

Now, Jovina Luna, one of his sisters, has just gotten the government to open all its files and indicate the names of those who have been compensated as Victims of State Terrorism, political prisoners and exiles. A historic decision, as Infobae anticipated. A request that was systematically denied by Kirchnerism with the argument that this data had to be protected.


The attack left 24 casualties: 12 guerrillas and 12 defenders of the barracks (10 conscripts, a second lieutenant and a sergeant)

The scene seems straight out of a movie: "El Negro" Luna, a Creole born in the countryside of Formosa, was sitting in an armchair with his rifle on his legs; He had the mission of guarding the bedroom where his classmates were taking a nap that hot Sunday.

They were all in custody; that is, in reserve, ready to act in an unforeseen event, for example if the guerrillas decided to attack them, something unlikely because they were fulfilling their mandatory military service in the forgotten periphery of the country, in a barracks in the suburbs of the capital of the province.


Drafted Hermindo Luna

However, at four thirty in the afternoon Luna saw that two young men like him, dressed in blue, also armed with FAL, entered kicking the gate and shouted at him: "Surrender, give me the weapon, the thing is not with you." ". That was when Luna uttered a phrase destined to last: "Nobody gives up here, shit!" He jumped to the side and prepared his rifle. He didn't manage to use it: some FAL shots split him in two. His gesture, however, served to alert the rest of his companions, who woke up from the sound of those gunshots and were able to flee to the back of the block, where the bathrooms and showers were.

“No one gives up here, shit!” Luna managed to shout before being fatally wounded by a FAL shot.

Luna was left lying on the ground, his body cut in two, his viscera draining through the bullet holes. He died little by little, screaming in pain to be killed once and for all. Surely, he had time to think about his parents, those poor peasants from Las Lomitas, who were "Peronists of Perón and Evita," as his conscript son said.

All this occurred during the so-called "Operation Primicia" [Primicia means Scoop in English], the most spectacular attack by the guerrilla of Peronist origin and the baptism of fire of the Montonero Army.

It was the first attack by Montoneros on an Army barracks, whose head was already General Jorge Rafael Videla. There were, in total, twenty-eight deaths, which is why the operation caused a nationwide commotion.



About seventy guerrillas participated directly in "Operation Primicia" in five stages, some of which were simultaneous:

• Hijacking of Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 706, with one hundred and two passengers and six crew members, which was headed from Buenos Aires Airport to Corrientes but was diverted to Formosa, 1,190 kilometers from Buenos Aires.
• Taking over the "El Pucú" international airport, at the entrance to the capital of Formosa. There was a police officer, Argentino Alegre, wounded and finished off on the ground, unarmed, by a guerrilla.
• Attack on the 29th Monte Infantry Regiment, the second in firepower in the entire country. The Montoneros were convinced that the soldiers were going to surrender easily. They were wrong: in just half an hour of combat, there were twenty-four casualties, twelve guerrillas and twelve defenders of the barracks (ten conscripts or "colimbas", a 21-year-old second lieutenant and a 31-year-old sergeant). The soldier who opened the doors of the barracks, Roberto Mayol, a man from Santa Fe who was studying law and was a "second officer" of Montoneros, also died.
• Escape of the guerrillas who survived the attack in the very modern Boeing 737-200 of Aerolíneas and in a four-seater Cessna 182 that served to confuse the pursuers in the air.
• Landing of the Airlines plane 700 kilometers from Formosa, on a runway prepared for the occasion in a ranch near Rafaela, the "Pearl of the West" of Santa Fe. The Cessna landed in a rice field on the outskirts of Corrientes.
  

The Aerolíneas Argentinas aircraft that the guerrillas hijacked

"Operación Primicia" (Scoop) was designed and directed by the "senior officer" Raúl Yaguer, better known as "El Gringo", "Roque" or "Mario", a methodical and caustic chemical engineer from Santa Fe who was number four in the national leadership of Montoneros. The first three in the hierarchy, Mario Firmenich, Roberto Perdía and Roberto Quieto, approved the takeover.

After the attack, Army patrols left the barracks and killed three neighbors—among them a 15-year-old high school student—who had nothing to do with the guerrilla.

One of the political consequences of "Operation Primicia" was that Videla and the head of the Navy, Admiral Emilio Massera, set March 24, 1976 as the date of the coup that they had been organizing for three months. I explain all this in my book "Operación Primicia", whose first edition was published in 2010.


The dead soldiers were all Peronists; almost all came from the interior of Formosa

Furthermore, the day after the attack, the Peronist government signed three memorable decrees that delegated the fight against the guerrillas to the Armed Forces. From that moment on, the disappearances began.

Over time, the relatives of the dead guerrillas were compensated as if they had been Victims of State Terrorism with the equivalent of one hundred times the highest salary of the national public administration, about 5 million pesos today.


The mother of Marcelino Torales, one of the conscripts killed

At the time of publication of my book, the relatives of eight of the twelve dead guerrillas had received payment. Two other compensation payments were pending. At that time, I tried to interview the sister of Mayol, the soldier/guerrilla who is considered a traitor by the soldiers and military, and a hero by the former guerrillas and their sympathizers. She did not want to be interviewed for the book, but she told me, informally, that, although they had the best of memories of her brother, her family did not plan to ever collect that compensation.

Meanwhile, the parents of the dead colimbas receive a very low pension, which in 2010 was 842 pesos per month. That year, compensation for Victims of State Terrorism amounted to 620,919 pesos.


Boero and Briggiler died in the attack on the barracks, but they appear in the Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism, on the Buenos Aires Coast

There was not only gold but also bronze for the attackers: the dead guerrillas are remembered as heroes and martyrs in their towns and cities, and appear in the Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism located on the Buenos Aires waterfront.

The dead conscripts were part of an unfortunate group made up of the "Sunday afternoon soldiers", that is, the poorest, who did not have money to visit their families in the interior of the province and used to exchange their francs for a small sum of money, like Luna, and the most generous, like Edmundo Sosa, a fatherless boy who, first, postponed his discharge so that a companion who was poorer than him and had two children to feed could come in his place, and Then, that Sunday, October 5, he had given his franc to another colleague so that he could go to Clorinda to earn a few pesos hauling bags of smuggled flour to Paraguay.

A simple calculation indicated that Sosa's mother, for example, should have collected that pension of 842 pesos every month for 61 and a half years of her life to reach the sum already received by the relatives of each of the guerrillas. And without inflation.



With the exception of Formosa, national-level soldiers typically do not receive tributes or recognition anywhere else. However, there is a possibility that their relatives may soon be eligible for compensation equivalent to what the families of deceased guerrillas have already received. The Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies is currently reviewing two bills. One has been proposed by Martín Hernández, a Formoseño deputy from the radical party, while the other is presented by Carlos Kunkel, a Kirchnerist deputy with a past affiliation to the "Montonero Army." Kunkel is now seeking to somehow rectify what he calls "the mistakes we made."

Three years ago, Ricardo Buryaile, another radical representative from Formosa who is currently the Minister of Agriculture, introduced a bill aimed at equalizing subsidies. However, despite numerous discussions, the project was not approved due to opposition from Kirchnerist deputies associated with La Cámpora and various human rights organizations.

Surviving soldiers, many of whom remain in precarious financial situations, have requested a subsidy, but both the Army and the national government have denied their request. Meanwhile, Federal Judge Claudio Bonadio is conducting an investigation to determine whether any wrongdoing occurred in the payment of compensation to the families of deceased guerrillas.


The Formosian little soldiers resist to be forgotten and keep making noise.

*Excecutive editor of Fortuna magazine and  author of Operación Primicia.

War against Subversion: The 1973 Terrorist Attack List

Chronicle of Terrorist Attacks in Argentina during 1973 - Part 2:

On October 6, 1975, during a period of turmoil in Argentina, three National Executive Power (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional) Decrees were issued provisionally under Italo Luder's authority, as President María E. Martínez was facing a nervous breakdown. These decrees authorized the Armed Forces to conduct military and security operations aimed at eradicating the actions of subversive elements throughout the country.

Notably, among the cabinet ministers who signed these decrees were Carlos Ruckauf and Antonio Cafiero. However, it is worth mentioning that this particular Decree is not referenced beyond 1984. In later years, these events came to be referred to as "the alleged war of the armed forces" or even described as a "hunt for innocent rabbits," as stated by lawyer Moreno Ocampo.

YEAR 1973:

01-7-73: FAR carries out an arson attack on the MINIMAX Supermarket in Munro.

01-10-73: ERP seizes a train traveling in Santa Fe, delivering a revolutionary harangue to the mostly railway workshop workers on board.

01-12-73: ERP takes over the LUJÁN motorcycle factory in Córdoba. Throughout January 1973, various terrorist organizations carry out execution-type attacks, resulting in the murder of nine policemen.

02-19-73: ERP takes over the Communications Battalion 141 in Cordoba, stealing a large number of weapons, including machine guns, automatic rifles, machine pistols, grenade launchers, and semi-automatic pistols. The entry was facilitated by a conscript who was a member of the terrorist organization.

03-11-73: The Peronist candidate Campora wins the elections with 49.7% of the votes. Subsequently, the attacks are seen as an obvious provocation aimed at preventing the smooth handover of power by the authorities of the outgoing military government, providing pretexts for continuing armed revolutionary actions.

03-19-73: FAR carries out an attack with explosives at the home of the Dean of the Faculty of Exact Sciences, UNLP.

03-25-73: ERP takes over the Atucha Nuclear Power Plant in Buenos Aires.

03-28-73: ERP takes over a classroom at the Faculty of Architecture of the UNLP, using it as a platform for terrorist indoctrination.

03-30-73: ERP attempts to attack the Libertad building - Navy Command in the Federal Capital with explosives. However, the bomb explodes prematurely in a bathroom, killing conscript Julio Provenzano, who was a member of the terrorist organization.

04-01-73: ERP kidnaps Rear Admiral D. Francisco A. Alemán, but he is later released.

04-06-73: ERP attacks with explosives at the home of Dr. Roberto Etchepareborda, Rector of the Universidad del Sur in Bahía Blanca.

04-08-73: ERP kidnaps Executive Víctor Bricombe for extortion, demanding a ransom of $1,360,000.

04-18-73: An UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION carries out an attack with explosives at the home of a professor at the University of Rosario.

04-24-73: ERP takes over Liceo Señoritas No. 1 in the Federal Capital, addressing students with harangues, pamphleteering, and hoisting an ERP flag.

04-26-73: ERP kidnaps Jacobo Nasif, the Main Commander of the Gendarmerie's Northwest Region. The ERP distributes his photograph with a communiqué announcing the death sentence of the Secretary General of the CGT, Ignacio José Rucci. However, it was MONTONEROS who assassinated Rucci later, following orders from their highest leadership.

04-30-73: ERP assassinates Admiral D. Hermes Quijada. During the attack, one of the terrorists, Víctor José Fernandez Palmeiro, is killed by a plainclothes policeman who intervenes.

05-05-73: ERP seizes and places a terrorist flag in the Faculty of Philosophy of Rosario.

05-07-73: ERP takes over ENET No. 2 of San Nicolás, addressing students with harangues and pamphleteering.

05-08-73: An UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION carries out an attack with explosives at the Faculty of Agronomy of the University of Corrientes.

05-22-73: ERP assaults the Faculty of Architecture of the Rosario University, stealing printing materials.

05-22-73: MONTONEROS assassinates Peronist trade unionist Dirk Kloosterman, General Secretary of S.M.A.T.A., in the Province of Buenos Aires.

05-22-73: MONTONEROS fails in an attempted kidnapping of a SWIFT company executive, Mr. Volinsky.

05-23-73: MONTONEROS assassinates Mr. Luis Giovanelli, an executive of the FORD company, who succumbs to his injuries days after the attack.

05-23-73: ERP kidnaps Executive Bellinson, one of the managers of the BABIC company, for extortion.

05-24-73: ERP attacks with explosives on the Director's home of the Institute of Computing, in Santiago del Estero.

05-25-73: President Cámpora assumes the government, and all the events mentioned thereafter, until 3/24/76, occurred during Peronist governments constitutionally elected by the citizens. Cámpora was elected with 49.7% of the votes, and Perón received 62% support.

05-29-73: FAR releases the kidnapped businessman Enrique Fridman, manager of the company MECANICA LANIN, after paying a ransom.

06-02-73: FAR releases the kidnapped businessman Oscar Castell, manager of the COCA COLA company, after paying a ransom.

06-02-73: ERP takes over the BONELLI metallurgical company in Córdoba, stealing weapons.

06-04-73: FAR assassinates the Peronist trade union leader Pascual Almada.

06-06-73: ERP takes over School No. 52 of La Plata, engaging in harangue and pamphleteering.

06-06-73: ERP launches an armed attack against the Radioelectric Command headquarters in MERLO, Buenos Aires, with the terrorist Luis Castrogiovanni being seriously wounded in the combat.

06-06-73: Luis Castrogiovanni dies and is veiled in the Faculty of Architecture of the UBA.

06-06-73: ERP kidnaps Executive Carlos Lockwood for extortion (ransom $2,300,000).

06-09-73: ERP takes over a radio broadcasting station in Avellaneda, Buenos Aires, broadcasting Marxist revolutionary proclamations.

06-12-73: UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION attacks with explosives at the home of a UNLP professor.

06-13-73: ERP takes over the SCAC company, stealing weapons.

06-15-73: ERP seizes the family home of an executive from the company DALMINE SIDERCA in Campana. The house is mined and partially blown up with explosives.

06-15-73: ERP takes over the company DULESNEA in La Plata, stealing milk.

06-18-73: ERP kidnaps the executive of the FIRESTONE company, John Thompson, in Lomas de Zamora, Buenos Aires, and a ransom of one million dollars is paid.

06-18-73: ERP takes over the INCOMET company in Rosario, with hostage-taking among the managers.

06-19-73: ERP assaults a police patrol car, stealing weapons and injuring a policeman.

06-20-73: EZEIZA massacre occurs during the mass reception of Perón's final return to the country, where MONTONEROS and FAR confront ARMED GROUPS OF THE PERONIST EXTREME RIGHT and the PERONIST UNIONS. More than five hundred people are estimated dead and wounded after hours of confused shootings and skirmishes.

06-20-73: ERP attacks the General Güemes Police Detachment, Province of Buenos Aires.

06-20-73: ERP attacks and sets fire to the home of businessman Mr. Blois, Province of Buenos Aires.

06-25-73: ERP takes over a classroom at the Faculty of Architecture of Rosario, engaging in harangue.

06-25-73: ERP takes over the company ESTELA in San Nicolás, Buenos Aires.

06-25-73: ERP murders the deputy Alberto Armesto.

06-25-73: ERP attacks with explosives at the homes of the FIAT company executives, Messrs. Mario Rébora and Daniel Pacheco.

06-25-73: FAR kidnaps the merchant Mr. José Sigüeza for extortion.

06-26-73: MONTONEROS kidnaps Liliana Aerin and Mirta Rubin for extortion and releases them after ransom payment.

06-26-73: FAR kidnaps businessman Mr. Alberto Mazzarella for extortion.

06-28-73: ERP assaults the Catholic University of Córdoba, stealing typewriters and microscopes.

07-12-73: MONTONEROS kidnaps Executive Carlos Pulenta for extortion (ransom $920,000).

06-13-73: Under pressure exerted by Perón, orthodox Peronism, and Justicialist unions, President Cámpora and Vice Solano Lima resign due to the total chaos prevailing in the country and the government. Lastiri takes office, and new presidential elections are called.

07-23-73: FAR attacks with explosives on the University Pavilion in Córdoba.

07-28-73: ERP takes over Provincial Schools No. 117 and 527 in Santa Fe, engaging in harangue and pamphleteering.

08-01-73: MONTONEROS attacks with explosives at the Faculty of Medicine of the UBA.

08-05-73: ERP assassinates the Official Inspector General Hugo Tomagnini in Tucumán.

08-25-73: MONTONEROS issues a proclamation against the Peronist government, inciting the revolutionary seizure of power.

09-06-73: ERP attacks and takes over the Army Health Command in the Federal Capital, with the aim of stealing existing weapons. Conscript soldier Hernán Invernizzi, son of the psychologist and "progressive" militant Eva Giberti, acted as a handover for his comrades. In the attack on the guard, Lieutenant Eduardo Rusch and conscript soldier Osvaldo Dedged are injured, they came to reclaim the recently lost colony. The successful operations to regain control of the Command were executed by the forces of the Patricios Regiment, led by Second Chief Lieutenant Colonel Raúl Duarte Hardoy, who valiantly fought in the most perilous position and ultimately perished in combat. It remains uncertain if the new Legislature of the City of Buenos Aires will honor him by including his name on the proposed new monument along the Costanera Norte. The monument, seemingly designated for one side only, intends to commemorate the terrorists who fell during the civil war of the seventies.

On 09-11-73, MONTONEROS carried out an explosive attack on the Faculty of Law at the UBA. Subsequently, on 09-23-73, the presidential formula Perón-Perón emerged victorious, securing 62% of the votes. However, on the same day, MONTONEROS struck again, assassinating Lt. 1st Fernando Cativa Tolosa in Mar del Plata.

A significant event occurred on 09-25-73 when MONTONEROS executed the assassination of the General Secretary of the CGT, the Peronist José Ignacio Rucci, through a hail of bullets. This brazen act was undertaken as a direct challenge to Perón, as it took place merely two days after his election. The operation, ordered by the highest leadership, involved meticulous intelligence work spanning five months, culminating in locating one of the safe houses where the threatened Rucci spent his nights. With careful planning, they rented the house across the street and waited for his arrival on the night of the 24th. The assassination group, led by N.G. Thomas, carried out the fatal attack the next morning when Rucci left the house. The multiple bullet impacts on his body led MONTONEROS to ironically codename the operation "OPERATION TRAVIATA," drawing a connection to the numerous holes in a cookie. This event exposed MONTONEROS' true ideology, resulting in a loss of support from the justicialist masses, ultimately paving the way for their eventual military defeat.

The interception and deception of police communications were expertly managed by Chief Officer Marcelo Kurlat, N.G. MONRA, while the crucial prior intelligence tasks were undertaken by the Information field, led by First Officer N.G. Esteban, legal Rodolfo Walsh. Walsh, now recognized as a "brilliant writer and defender of human rights," was tragically killed in combat in 1977. His name now adorns various university lecture halls, literary awards, and a small square in the Federal Capital, at the intersection of Chile and Peru streets.

It raises an intriguing question: will Rucci's name be placed alongside Walsh's on the future monument along the north coast? What would the Peronist workers say if they were aware of this tragic irony? The Peronist union leaders may have been aware, but memories can be tactically flexible and selective, guided by personal interests, of course."



Journalist and terrorist Rodolfo Walsh, intelligence chief officer of Montoneros terrorist group.

09-26-73: Assassination of the Peronist politician Enrique Grinberg, as he left his home in the Federal Capital.
09-27-73: FAR, attacks with explosives in Schools No. 1 and 2 of Mar del Plata.
09-27-73: MONTONEROS, attacks with explosives in the Faculties of Dentistry and Pharmacy - Biochemistry.
09-27-73: ERP, takeover of School No. 7 of Zárate.
09-27-73: FAR, attack with explosives in the Faculty of Law of the UBA.
09-28-73: ERP, takeover of School No. 20 of San Nicolás.

The month of October 1973 marks the beginning of a series of periodic sporadic attacks, primarily targeting surface organizations associated with terrorist groups and, in a few cases, left-wing politicians unrelated to terrorism. Each incident is self-attributed to an alleged far-right organization called AAA, which, however, is widely believed never to have existed, though it contributed to the exacerbation of institutional chaos.

These actions were isolated and impulsive, carried out by a few small groups comprising right-wing military, police, students, and mainly Peronist trade unionists. They were emotionally and anarchically reacting to the perceived total passivity of judges and state security agencies, which created an environment of total impunity for the Marxist terrorists—many of whom had been recently released en masse by the National Congress.

The only common thread among these incidents was the use of the initials AAA in the messages left after each event. If Lopez Rega's custodians were indeed involved in some cases, they should simply be included in the overall chaotic picture, as the said minister could not have directed a non-existent clandestine organization.

10-10-73: Groups presumed to be AAA attack radical senator Hipólito Solari Irigoyen, a member of the most left-wing faction within the party. He is known as a defense lawyer for ERP terrorists and publicly suspected of being involved in an organization.

10-08-73: ERP takes over School No. 389 in Rosario.
10-17-73: ERP takes over the Córdoba University Dining Hall.
10-18-73: ERP takes over the National College of La Plata.
10-19-73: MONTONEROS attack with explosives at National School No. 2 in Rosario.
10-22-73: ERP takes over the Ricardo Palma Educational Institute.
10-30-73: ERP takes over the Faculty of Architecture in La Plata.

11-08-73: MONTONEROS takes over the School of Social Assistants.
09-11-73: ERP kidnaps Peronist trade union leader Pedro Saucedo for extortion.

11-10-73: FAR attacks with explosives at the home of the Rector of the National University of Rosario.
11-14-73: ERP takes over the Manuel Dorrego Higher School of Commerce in Córdoba.
11-15-73: ERP takes over an Elementary School in Tucumán.
11-17-73: ERP kidnaps the General Manager of the BANK OF LONDON, E. Niborg Anderson.
11-24-73: MONTONEROS attacks with explosives at the Gral. Belgrano de Merlo National College.
11-29-73: ERP takes over the ALAS ARGENTINAS Elementary School in Córdoba.

12-06-73: ERP kidnaps high executive of the company ESSO, Víctor Samuelson, for extortion.
12-14-73: MONTONEROS takes over the University Dining Hall of the U.N. del Noroeste.
12-22-73: An unknown individual murders student Tomás Guillermo Burns at the University of Córdoba.