Biography: Captain Héctor Sánchez, the destroyer of Bahía Agradable

Captain Hector “Pipi” Sanchez (AAF)

By Hernan Longoni in Historia de Aviones

1) When did he graduate from the EAM (Military Aviation School)?
December 1975.

2) What reasons led him to join the Aviation School?
He had no idea that the EAM existed, nor what the Air Force was. When my desk mate in 5th year at the Urquiza National School in San Nicolás told me that he was going to join the EAM, I asked him to explain everything related to the Air Force. Since there was the possibility of becoming a military aviator, that fact led me to decide to register to join the Institution. I made this decision almost at the end of the year, so I had to make a great effort to prepare myself to take the exams, with the help of my friend, who had already been preparing for quite some time. Later, Orlando Pons and I would graduate as Ensigns, being classmates of Class XVI.

3) What did you feel when you graduated from it?
Primarily great emotion and relief for the effort that my parents had to make to finance my studies. From that moment on, I had a salary that allowed me to support myself by my own means, without being a burden on my family. Regarding the future, everything was uncertainty and big questions. Would I be able to meet the expectations that the organization placed on me? Would I be able to fulfill my dream/vocation of becoming a military pilot? Would I be able to fly combat aircraft after achieving the goal of overcoming the demands of basic training as an aviator? I was always very aware that, above all, one was a soldier first, and then came the next goal of becoming a Military Aviator. But what decision would I have made if I had not become a pilot, and above all, a fighter pilot?

4) What rank and age did you have when the Malvinas Conflict broke out?
In 1982, I was a 1st Lieutenant in the second year (it takes 4 years in the rank to be promoted to Captain), and I was 28 years old.

5) What position and role did you have?
When the recovery of the Islands occurred, I was undergoing the adaptation course to fly Mirage III aircraft at the VIII Air Brigade. I had not completed more than 5 flights in two-seater aircraft, so I was not qualified to intervene in the conflict with these aircraft. Thanks to Captain Varela, one of the Flight Leaders of the A4-B Squadrons, and at my request, I was called to join as an attaché to the II Air Squadron to fly in the Weapons System.

6) What were the most pressing needs during the conflict from the perspective of your position?
Having accurate information on the position of naval targets, ensuring that all aircraft had the OMEGA navigation system, having the appropriate weaponry to attack naval targets, obtaining proper intelligence information on the positions of British troops after the landing, having a landing strip in the Malvinas suitable for our aircraft, and being allowed to operate from Puerto Argentino despite the risks involved, etc.
It is important to note that the primary responsibility of the Air Force is to train and equip (including weaponry) for air and air-land battles. On the other hand, the primary responsibility of the Navy is to be prepared for air-naval battles, which is why they had weaponry suited to the conflict they faced. For the above reasons, all Air Force Squadrons during the conflict had to adapt to a battle that was not their primary responsibility. The most important thing to keep in mind is that they had never trained in tactics to attack naval targets (ships), nor did they have the appropriate weaponry to attack those targets. All knowledge had to be acquired during the conflict, based on the experiences learned from each mission that was carried out.

7) Who or what was your source of confidence during the conflict?
The training and preparation I had flying the A4s, our Flight Leaders (Tony Zelaya and Trucha Varela, two idols), my Squadron Leaders, those of us who formed a combat formation every time we flew a real mission, the camaraderie and companionship that developed within the group, the Argentine people who supported the conflict to recover our Islands, and, of course, everything was ultimately in the hands of God, for the fate of my life during my engagement with the British.

8) What did your loved ones say regarding the risk?
At that time, there were no cell phones, emails, or the means of communication we have today. Everything was done by telephone, and even that was limited to those who had a phone line installed in their homes. My mother always believed I was in Buenos Aires during the development of the conflict, thanks to the collaboration of the rest of the family who maintained my deception to avoid causing her distress (my father had passed away in 1976). My family was far away and had no military background, so for them, the concept of the risk associated with military activity was difficult to grasp.

9) What do you feel about the performance of your weapons system during the conflict?
I feel proud to have been able to participate in the conflict with such an incredible human group that came together. Everyone was included: the "Gordo" Romero (the Group's doctor), pilots, technical support staff, logistics personnel, etc. Everyone was part of a perfectly functioning team where each specialty contributed its grain of sand to ensure we could fulfill the assigned missions.
In particular, the air squadrons were very united; we knew the risks we were taking and enjoyed every minute we had available when we were not engaged in aerial operations. Each of us contributed goodwill and a sense of humor to always keep the group's spirit high.
When it was time for aerial missions, we always volunteered to go on them. With my dear friend Tucu Cervera, we even argued at times to be part of certain missions.
The Air Squadrons were a perfect combat machine that, despite the old nature of the aircraft, demonstrated to the world what can be achieved with training, ingenuity, effort, sacrifice, and a will to fight.

10) Is there a specific aircraft you flew during the conflict that holds a special memory for you?
Fundamentally, the A4-B with registration number C-231, as it was the aircraft that brought me back on June 8th after surviving the attack of two Sea Harriers in Bahia Agradable.

11) Before or after the conflict, did you ever fly a mission that pushed the limits of your aircraft's capabilities?
During our preparation and training in peacetime, we always conducted long-duration navigation flights. This is part of the training for combat pilots in the Air Force, as our potential targets to attack are always located in the heart of enemy territory (runways, command and control centers, enemy power centers, logistics bases, etc.).
I have several examples of these training flights we carried out (some of them with training ammunition, as we ended the navigation flights with shooting practice in designated areas).
One of the flights I remember was from Villa Reynolds (the natural base for A4-Bs in San Luis) to the Iguazú Falls, air refueling with the C-130s, and returning via a different route to the 5th Air Brigade (Villa Reynolds).
On another occasion, we took off at night with Tucu Cervera (before dawn) from Río Gallegos (where we were deployed to train for operations in the southern part of the national territory), flew at low altitude during the night, carried out a simulated night attack on the Comodoro Rivadavia Air Base, and returned to Río Gallegos. The entire final phase of the approach and attack on Comodoro Rivadavia was carried out with the aircraft's external lights turned off.

12) Did you ever have a mission where you couldn't reach the target? What did you feel?
On June 7, 1982, we set out on a mission to attack naval targets southeast of Gran Malvina Island with Danilo Bolzan as the leader, "Conejo" Dubourg (our Squadron Leader) as Number 2, and myself as Number 3. Unfortunately, despite flying over the area, we were unable to locate any ships, so we had to return to Río Gallegos. The feeling is mixed; on one hand, there is the risk and fear that comes with the aerial formation remaining in the combat zone searching for the enemy (due to the possibility of being detected and intercepted by Sea Harriers). On the other hand, there is the frustration of not being able to locate the targets to neutralize them. Every target that was not attacked or found at the time represented an enormous risk for future attack formations heading into the conflict zone.

13) What is your relationship with your veteran comrades today?
There is a great friendship reflected in the permanent gatherings we organize to share a meal and remember the harrowing days we lived through during the conflict. Of course, our fallen friends and comrades are always present with us, remembered with affection and especially for the human qualities that characterized them. What always stands out during our gatherings is maintaining the same spirit we had during the conflict. Through jokes, songs, and good humor, we avoid dwelling on the risks we faced during those days.

14) When — if it is the case — did the war end for you?
The war still hasn't ended for me; we only lost a battle. None of the members of our group ever surrendered — we were simply ordered to suspend aerial operations. We still had the equipment and crew members to continue fighting despite the losses we had suffered up to that point (9 pilots). Today, the war must continue, even if it is through other means (for example, diplomacy or politics). The strategic objective must never be abandoned.

15) Did you have a mission assigned to be carried out after June 14, 1982, and were you surprised by the surrender?
Aerial missions were suspended on June 14. The surrender in the Islands did not personally surprise me; after the British landing at San Carlos Bay and their advance toward Puerto Argentino, without facing resistance with the available means, the outcome that occurred was foreseeable. Airpower alone is insufficient to stop a landing or the advance of ground forces.

16) Did the war end for you?
The conflict did not end, and it remains a part of my life that has not been fully closed. What's more, even today, we must fight against the forgetfulness of our blessed people regarding the noble cause that was undertaken to recover our Malvinas. I don't want to be simplistic or generalize, as there are always exceptions to the rule. It is sad to see today how divided we are in every area we observe: those who fought and those who did not; the professionals versus the conscripts; those who receive a pension and those who do not. It is truly painful to see the neglect of the effort made by those who gave their lives in combat. At the time, everyone volunteered to fight for their country, without expecting any medals, recognition, or economic compensation. It seems that today, our leaders "buy" or satisfy us with handouts, whether we are poor, war veterans (VGM), or friends of those in power. An example to follow is the one being set by the Japanese people in the face of the difficult times they are going through after the natural disasters they have had to endure. Only national unity will eventually allow us to achieve our strategic objectives, be it the Malvinas, progress and growth, stability, etc. But for that to happen, our people (including their leaders) must set aside personal and sectoral interests.

 

17) Did you go to the islands (landing) during the conflict? Under what circumstances?
No.

18) Did you go to the islands after the conflict? Why? (in case of a yes or no answer)
I haven't gone yet, but I plan to visit at some point. I would like to visit the places where I fought alongside my comrades during the conflict. Stepping on the soil of the Malvinas, even if it is not under our administration, might allow me to shed the "backpack" I have been carrying on my shoulders since the end of the conflict.

Relatos Históricos de la Guerra de Malvinas

Malvinas: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode? (2/8)

Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4 || Part 5 || Part 6 || Part 7 || Part 8

Guilherme Poggio || Poder Aereo




 

 
Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (Falklands, as the British call them). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The Air Power blog publishes an exclusive article in parts, covering the vectors, weapons, and tactics used by the FAA to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. To read the previous parts, click the links below.

Vectors and Armaments

Faced with the challenge of confronting one of the best-equipped and prepared navies in the world, the FAA had limited options. The most suitable vectors for the mission were the IAI Dagger, an Israeli version of the Mirage 5, and the McDonnell Douglas A-4B/C Skyhawk. The latter were very similar to the A-4Q model of the Argentine Naval Aviation, which was also used in naval attacks against the British.
Dagger M-5 C-401 stationed at Río Grande configured for an attack mission, where two Spanish BR-250 bombs can be seen in the central hangar (“Nafgan”) and two 1700-liter fuel tanks (in “Hotel” configuration). This aircraft was used in the mission on June 8. The attack ultimately damaged the HMS Plymouth frigate.FOTO: Museo de Aviación Naval

The issue of armaments was more delicate. The only guided weapon available was the Martín Pescador air-to-surface missile. This missile, still not fully operational at the time, was tested by the FAA in April 1982, using an IA-58 Pucará aircraft as the vector. Due to its radio guidance system and the firing distance, the aircraft was too exposed to anti-aircraft fire. For these reasons, the possibility of using this missile in the war was abandoned.

Lacking guided weapons, the FAA evaluated the use of free-fall bombs. The FAA had essentially four types of general-purpose free-fall bombs available for combat. The first were 454 kg (1000 lb) bombs of British origin. The Argentines called these bombs MK-17. Although they were identical to those used by the British, the latter referred to them as MK 13/15. These were high-resistance bombs that could be equipped with either a smooth tail or a parachute brake. The MK-17 bombs had been acquired by the Argentines 12 years before the conflict as part of the weapons package for their English Electric Canberra B.62/T.64 bombers.


A British-made MK-17 bomb next to an FAA Canberra bomber. These bombs were acquired along with the bomber 12 years before the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

Newer than the MK-17 bombs were the Spanish bombs produced by Expal (Explosivos Alaveses SA). These were low-drag bombs based on the American MK 80 series. There were two models: one weighing 250 kg and another weighing 125 kg. The 250 kg model could be fitted with either a smooth tail or a parachute-brake tail, while the 125 kg bombs only had a smooth tail. They were acquired in 1978 due to the threat of a border conflict with Chile. There is information that high-drag 500 kg Spanish bombs were also part of the FAA’s inventory in 1982.

 
The FAA A-4B with registration C-235 was already in the final stages of the conflict. In the foreground, three Spanish BP-250 smooth-tail bombs are arranged in a single cluster. They were loaded onto the central pylon, beneath the fuselage (station 3).FOTO: FAA
Malvinas 35 Years: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

The third option was the Brazilian-made low-drag BR-BK 125 kg bombs. These were produced by the Armament Factory in the Argentine city of Córdoba. These bombs were exclusively assigned to the IA-58 Pucará, which operated from the Malvinas (and thus did not participate in naval operations). The reasons why the Argentines chose not to use this bomb in naval attacks will be discussed later.

Another option that was evaluated but not used during the conflict was the Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bomb, weighing 130 kg, which had been acquired along with the IAI Dagger a few years before the conflict (details about this case will also be discussed later).

A pair of Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bombs, weighing 130 kg, mounted on an M-5 Dagger fighter. There are no records of this weapon being used during the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

There are reports that the FAA also possessed some American-made AN-M65A1 1,000-pound bombs at the time of the conflict, which had come with the Avro Lincoln bombers. In statements to “The History Channel,” Brigadier Sergio Mayor (V Air Brigade – A-4B) mentioned that AN-M65A1 bombs were used in Malvinas. However, there are no other documents to confirm this version, and it is possible that the general confused the American bombs with the MK-17 bombs.

Another unconventional possibility was the use of incendiary bombs against the British fleet. According to then Vice Commodore (Lieutenant Colonel) Arturo Pereyra, head of the Operations Department of FAS (Southern Air Force – activated to coordinate resources in combat missions), these were not used for "humanitarian reasons."

The option of using incendiary bombs against Royal Navy ships was dismissed for "humanitarian reasons." However, several Napalm bombs were sent to the Malvinas airfields, where the IA Pucará operated in strictly land-based actions. FOTO: archivo

The use of air-launched torpedoes was also evaluated. Argentina had some units of the old American Mk 13 torpedo, previously used by the PBY Catalina. Shortly after the conflict began, a torpedo testing program was initiated, using a modified IA Pucará as the delivery platform. The final test was scheduled for June 14, but with the end of hostilities, the program was suspended.



A modified Pucará prepared for flight tests, armed with an American Mk-13 torpedo in the central hangar. The tests were conducted shortly before the end of the conflict.. FOTO: FAA

Finally, it is worth noting that the FAA tested 454 kg free-fall bombs of French origin and Soviet cluster bombs, both supplied by the Peruvian Air Force. However, there are no known actual attacks using these devices.

The following table, created exclusively for this article, summarizes the general-purpose bombs available to the FAA at the time of the conflict.

Bombs Available in the FAA Inventory in 1982 for Use Against Royal Navy Ships

Malvinas: Why didn't the bombs explode? (1/8)

Why Didn't the Bombs Explode? (Part 1)

Guillermo Poggio || Poder Aéreo

Parte 1 || Parte 2 || Parte 3 || Parte 4 || Parte 5 || Parte 6 || Parte 7 || Parte 8



 



Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (known as "Falklands" to the British). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The following text recounts the story of what was the FAA's most important mission: to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. Taken by surprise, the FAA carried out its missions despite lacking proper training, adequate vectors, and the right armament for the task. This is a story of overcoming challenges, rapid adaptation, and ingenuity. In the end, the results went far beyond what was initially expected.

Introduction

In early June 1944, the Allies were rushing to launch Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing in Normandy, which promised to change the course of World War II. Off the coast of Lyme Bay in the English Channel, HMS Boadicea (H65), a veteran B-class destroyer launched in 1930, was escorting a convoy of merchant ships. On June 13, the convoy fell victim to German aviation. Two torpedoes launched by Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck Boadicea. With the explosion of the ammunition magazine, the British ship quickly sank.

Boadicea was the last Royal Navy ship lost to enemy air action in that conflict. However, considering the use of free-fall devices ("dumb bombs"), the last British loss to enemy aviation was the HMS Panther, a P-class destroyer. The ship was hit by bombs dropped by German Junkers Ju. 87 “Stuka” dive bombers during the Dodecanese campaign in the Aegean Sea on October 9, 1943.


The British cruiser HMS Gloucester being attacked by German Ju-87 'Stuka' aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea on May 22, 1941. The ship would sink that same day after being hit directly by at least four 250 kg bombs. The photo was taken by one of the German aircraft at mid-altitude. If the Argentines were to use this same attack profile, the chances of success would be very small.FOTO: archivo

Since then, naval aviation warfare has undergone profound changes. Forty years later, using aircraft to drop free-fall bombs against escorts equipped with aerial surveillance systems and guided missiles was no longer considered a viable option for naval air attacks, unless the system of the targeted ship was overwhelmed. In 1982, the Argentines demonstrated that old weapons and new tactics could be combined to surprise the Royal Navy, and once again warships would be lost to free-fall bombs.

Caught by Surprise

All the military planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands was carried out confidentially by the high command of the Argentine Navy, with Admiral Anaya, the commander of the force, as the mastermind. By the end of 1981, the Argentine military government considered the possibility of retaking the Malvinas Islands through military action if diplomatic negotiations failed. This option was discussed with President Leopoldo Galtieri.

 
The military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. In the center, President Galtieri. To his left is Anaya, the architect of the Malvinas recapture, and to his left is the FAA commander, Brigadier Lami Dozo. Dozo learned of the plan to retake the islands shortly before the new year. Most of his subordinates only became aware of the events on April 2, 1982, the date of the Argentine landing on the islands. Dozo passed away two months ago at the age of 88. FOTO: archivo

It turns out that at the same time, the Strategic Air Command (CAE) of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had completed an update to the strategic planning of the Force, which did not include military actions against the British to retake the Malvinas Islands. The commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, was the last of the three commanders to learn about the existence of the military plan, being informed of it two days before the end of 1981.

The strategists of the Argentine Air Force had never considered the possibility of getting involved in a conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. There were two major reasons for this, one legal and the other geopolitical.

From a legal standpoint, Resolution 1/69, issued by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, helped resolve some disputes between the three branches and better defined each of their roles. Based on this resolution, by the end of 1969, Law No. 18.416 was enacted, which established the specific responsibilities of each branch.

In this way, the Navy had specific responsibilities over Argentina's territorial waters and coastline. It was tasked with acquiring all necessary assets, including naval and maritime resources, whether onboard ships or not. Regarding naval operations, the FAA was only required to provide indirect support without the need to acquire specialized assets different from those used in air operations.

Therefore, by April 1982, the FAA lacked the necessary assets and doctrines to engage in naval air warfare. None of the FAA pilots had ever dropped a single device into the sea. Most of them did it for the first time in combat.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the FAA was configured to face a continental enemy in the Southern Cone. Its assets, tactics, and training were all oriented towards a potential border conflict, particularly with Chile, with whom Argentina almost went to war in 1978. Even the Argentine deployment airfields had been defined based on a hypothetical battle against the Andean neighbor.

Argentine Air Force: CIC Squadron (Río Gallegos)

“Ice Radar Operators”

 
Known by this name, the CIC Squadron, which is part of the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, maintains permanent control of the airspace under national jurisdiction.

Composed of twelve radar operators, including officers and non-commissioned officers, the CIC Squadron (Control and Information Center) belonging to the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, works every day to maintain control of Argentine airspace.

Under the command of Major Gabriel Eduardo Torres, it receives support from the Communications Group III and the Southern Air Region (RASU), maintaining permanent communication with the Aerospace Surveillance and Control Center (CeVyCA), the radar operator's governing unit.

Unlike the surveillance sectors in the north of our country, which operate in Resistencia (Chaco) and Posadas (Misiones) controlling illegal flights in that area, the CIC Squadron fulfills the surveillance function of the bordering part of southern Argentina, focusing on the defense of national sovereignty.

It carries out control tasks when airmobile squadrons arrive at the Base.
Thanks to the excellent relationship that this Air Base has with the Rio Gallegos community, support was obtained from the Provincial Road Authority and a fiber optic network was installed that significantly improved data transmission.

The radar has a range of about 220 nautical miles, approximately 440 kilometers, at 360º, and this allows monitoring of almost the entire provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego.
At the same time, while detecting the different flights, this information is sent to the Information and Control Center located at CeVyCA.

Due to the inclement weather in this region of the country, the radar antenna is protected with a radome, allowing its correct performance and preserving its operational life.
The Base also has a bunker next to the radar and a simulator to train personnel.

Known as “Ice Radarists” and continuing the tradition of the “Ice Warriors” who operated in the 10th Fighter Squadron of the former 10th Air Brigade, currently the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, the CIC Squadron works tirelessly to improve day by day, providing operational support and logistical support, making it possible for the radar to cover the entire south of our country.

“I have to highlight the dedication and professionalism of each of the people who make up this Squadron, who work uninterruptedly throughout the year, managing to cover and cover all functions satisfactorily. The truth is that what the staff does is impressive” - said Major Torres proudly.



Source: FAA

AAM: From Shafrir 1 to Python 5

Argentine Air Force: Operation TRANSANTAR

FIRST TRICONTINENTAL TRANSANTARCTIC FLIGHT

Operation TRANSANTAR

Carried out between December 4 and 10, 1973 with a Hercules C-130 aircraft, registration TC-66.



It was carried out on an experimental basis, since it was about connecting Buenos Aires with Australia and New Zealand passing through the South Pole, with a stopover at the Marambio Base.



Facing a very near future, which we are already experiencing, the first tricontinental transantarctic flight carried out with a Hercules C-130 aircraft, opened up a new possibility for the country, that the Argentine Republic, now a terminal for so many airlines, abandons its marginal situation. to become an important air communications center.



Our airfields became transit airfields, instead of terminal airfields, meaning that the world now "does not end down there"; Australia, New Zealand and Oceania are our neighbors via Antarctica.

PREPARATIONS AND DEPARTURE

The flight over the South Pole was achieved after careful planning in which all the
experience that the Air Force has on operations in Antarctica.
Long years of flights carried out by navy and aviation planes provided the necessary data so that nothing was left to chance, that terrible factor that the Antarctic eliminates from all its projects.

“Chance is the door through which so many tragedies entered Antarctica,” the brigadier Fautario was able to recall, while commenting on the completion of the transpolar flight.

As soon as the assault on the Pole had been decided, with extreme urgency the solution to three problems was proposed: that of the necessary autonomy to cover the projected route, strictly determining the possible weights with which the plane could operate and the feasibility of touching the different airfields available for the trip.



Initially, the need to increase the autonomy of the Hercules to twenty hours was recognized, which has the capacity to fly thirteen hours without the need to refuel.

The technical group of the I Air Brigade assumed the task of modifying the fuel systems of the device and equipping it with two extra fuel tanks, which was achieved in an extremely short period of time and at such a low cost that it justified the interruption of a initial contact with the aircraft construction company.

This firm considered that the modifications would require 45 days of work and, in addition, they spent a very high budget to carry it out.



The flight tests of the new equipment - including changes to the aircraft's electronic installations - confirmed the capacity and ingenuity of the civil and military personnel of the I Air Brigade.
Precisely, in the course of one of the verification flights - having already verified the goodness of the fuel and navigation systems - a radial link was established with the Marambio base, during which the personnel stationed on this small Antarctic island reported that the The condition of the track was excellent and the temperature in the area was -2ºC, that is, a “spring” mark for that base.

The prevailing weather at our main air station in Antarctica introduced a variant in the flight calculations since it had been estimated that takeoff from Marambio would take place at about five degrees below zero. With low temperatures, the takeoff operation of a turboprop airplane is simplified. The air is denser and ensures that the engines reach their maximum power in a few seconds, shortening the necessary distance for the plane to achieve the lift necessary to take off.

Given the 1,200 m runway at the Marambio base, a relatively low temperature was required for a plane to achieve lift of 75 tons.

For this reason, it was agreed to use auxiliary rockets, called “JATOS”, which in number of eight represent an additional power equivalent to two more engines for a few seconds.

In any case, that radio conversation with Marambio expedited the events and then the time of departure was set for the night of Tuesday, December 4, 1973.

AT THE MARAMBIO BASE

On a flight without special alternatives, the Hercules arrived in Marambio at 02:51 on December 5.
Another Hercules was waiting on the runway, configured as a tanker plane that provided 17,000 liters of fuel in a minimum of time.

At that time, there was a total absence of wind on the island and the temperature reached 6ºC, unfavorable circumstances that made it necessary to use rockets to take off.

At 06:50 we were ready to head to the South Pole and face the most critical stage of the operation:
travel 1,200 m of the runway with the engines at maximum power and the rockets on to begin the great jump over the frozen continent. And the takeoff was done; Fourteen people aboard the Hercules breathed a sigh of relief when the plane jumped into the clouds to soar to 8,000 m, the optimal level for flight.

ON THE POLAR PLATEAU

The flight between Marambio and Canberra lasted 17:54 hours. A dense layer of clouds hid the Antarctic ice cap from the eyes of sailors. In the immensity of space, surrounded by the impressive silent calm of the heights, the plane maintained radial contact with Argentine territory. From El Palomar or Río Gallegos came voices from a familiar world; Behind each technical communication or meteorological report was hidden the word of encouragement from those who, although on the ground, made this 12,300 km flight that stretched between Australia and Argentina their own.

With favorable winds and an extreme temperature of -50ºC, the Hercules reached 80º South latitude, where the dense layer of clouds opened to offer the aeronauts the grandiose vision of the polar plateau extending its dazzling whiteness across the entire horizon. .

Near the South Pole, when the radar received the echo of the constructions of the Amundsen-Scott base, everyone on board felt like they were protagonists of a special moment: they were truly launched towards distant Australia; They participated in the opening of a new path whose political and economic perspectives are still unpredictable.

UNFAVORABLE WINDS

Shortly after flying over the South Pole, the intensity of the wind began to grow and already near McMurdo, the US base on the Ross Sea, gusts reached 155 km/h.

From that moment on, the wind began to be an obstacle to the plane's movement. Due to this, the Hercules made landfall in the capital of Australia almost two hours late, which involved dangerous fuel consumption.

For this last part of the trip, meteorological information was available from the World Meteorological Center in Melbourne, but it was not accurate enough. The actual high winds far exceeded the calculated winds.

After the passage of Hercules over Antarctica, we can affirm that in the future meteorological data will be of fundamental value to prevent commercial flights from suffering dangerous delays due to bow winds over the Drake Passage or over the Pacific.

On the circumpolar weather charts prepared daily by the National Meteorological Service, pilots must look for a “gap” between the cyclone trains that circumvent the Antarctic continent to have the help of tailwinds and reach their destination with an acceptable margin of security.

Furthermore, the insufficiency of weather data available in the Pacific Ocean west of Argentina, or in the Indian Ocean west of Australia, recommends the use of automatic buoys to close the meteorological network around the Sixth Continent.

THE RETURN

The Hercules took off on Saturday, December 8, from Canberra airport heading to Christchurch, in New Zealand, to depart from there on the 9th at 11:54 p.m. back to Argentina.

Flying in a straight line, the Hercules headed towards Marambio, leaving aside the route to the South Pole. Given the unfavorable weather conditions in the Marambio base area, the device continued its direct flight to Río Gallegos, where it made landfall that same day at 11:43 p.m., apparently eleven minutes before leaving New Zealand.

Paradoxical deception of astronomy and time zones... When the Hercules descended in Buenos Aires, nothing in its structure indicated that it had put an end to a daring voyage that united three continents through a dangerous route like few others: South America, Antarctica and
Australia.

The magnitude of the flight organized by the Air Force appears hidden by the normality that surrounded the operation; but currently flights through Antarctica have become part of everyday life, the regular news of this century in which men lost their capacity for wonder.

Although the world of Antarctic ice is still full of dangers, although the cold and wind create almost insurmountable walls to human activity, the Hercules C-130 opened a new stage in a world where the geography is increasingly smaller.

General Commander of the FAA Brigadier General Héctor Luis FAUTARIO
Aircraft Commander Vicecommodore José Apolo GONZÁLEZ
First Pilot Captain Juan Daniel PAULIK
Second Pilot Captain Héctor CID
First Navigator Captain Adrián José SPERANZA
Second Navigator Captain Hugo César MEISNER
Navigator/Survival Specialist First Lieutenant Jorge VALDECANTOS
Senior Meteorologist Salvado ALAIMO
First Chief Non-Commissioned Officer Pedro BESSERO
Second Deputy Assistant Mechanic Juan Bautista MEDERO
Air Delivery System Operator Senior Warrant Officer Jorge R. LINDER
Photographer Non-Commissioned Officer Major Juan BUENO

Also participated in this flight:

Commodore Julio C. PORCILE
Major Manuel M. MIR

Argentine Air Force: 5th Fighter Group at Villa Reynolds AFB

Argentine Air Force 5th Fighter Group

Loyalty Argentine Republic
Branch Air Force
Especialty Fighterbombing
Part of Two fighter and service squadrons
Equipment
A-4AR Fightinghawk
Cessna 182
Aero Commander 500U





The 5th Fighter Group of the Argentine Air Force is the unit that operates the aircraft of the Vth Air Brigade, located in the town of Villa Reynolds (province of San Luis). Both in its activity in the brigade and in deployments, the material of this unit is assisted by Technical Group 5 for its operation. Major inspections of its aircraft are carried out in the Río Cuarto Material Area.

Origin

It was created in 1975 based on the previous Fighter-bomber Group 4, in force since 1967. In those years its equipment was the A-4P Skyhawk weapons system (locally called A-4B).

Operational history

1970 Decade

In its first years, six A-4Bs formed the Blue Falcons aerobatic squadron for their aerial demonstrations.

During Operation Independence, in 1975, these planes carried out isolated attacks on guerrilla positions in the mountains of Tucumán.

Malvinas War

During the South Atlantic conflict, and within the framework of the so-called Southern Air Force, the 5th Fighter Group deployed 24 A-4Bs in Río Gallegos. On May 1, they mistakenly attacked the Argentine merchant ship ELMA Formosa. On 12 May, a squadron of Group 5 suffered the loss of three aircraft during an attack on the destroyer HMS Glasgow (D88), two of them shot down by Sea Wolf missiles from the frigate HMS Brilliant (F90) and the third crashing into the sea ​​while evading a missile (those who died were First Lieutenant Oscar Bustos and Lieutenants Jorge Ibarlucea and Mario Nivoli). A second wave on HMS Glasgow managed to damage it with bombs, without them exploding, after this action Lieutenant Gavazzi's A-4B was shot down by friendly fire in Goose Green.


The bulk of the fighting in which the unit was involved took place in the San Carlos Strait. On May 21, the unit commanded by Captain Pablo Carballo damaged the frigate HMS Ardent (F184), that day another five aircraft seriously damaged the frigate HMS Argonaut (F56). On the 23rd of that month, a major attack on the English fleet destroyed the frigate HMS Antelope (F170), with the loss of the unit under the command of First Lieutenant Luciano Guadagnini, who died in that combat. On May 25, Captain Hugo Angel del Valle Palaver's A-4B was shot down at Pebble Island by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Coventry (D118), killing the pilot. Hours after that confrontation, the same British destroyer was hit by bombs from Argentine Skyhawks, sinking in a short time.


The third (left) is Captain Carballo

Already in the final days of the actions, the A-4B stood out in the attack on the logistics ships RFA Sir Galahad (L3005) and RFA Sir Tristram (L3505), which were sunk along with a large amount of the war material in their cargo.



A total of 10 Skyhawks of Fighter Group 5 were lost during the conflict.

Post-war

The unit received the A-4Cs from the 4th Fighter Group, bringing together all the A-4 material of the Air Force in the Vth Air Brigade. The planes were subjected to the Halcón program, with which they replaced their 20 mm Mk.12 cannons with 30 mm Defa ones, while new weapons such as the Durandal anti-runway bombs were approved and the operation of the Shafrir-2 missiles continued. although the Matra R.550 Magic missile was evaluated on an A-4C.

In December 1990, some A-4Bs were seen flying over barracks taken during the last Carapintadas uprising, in the area of ​​the City of Buenos Aires and Villa Martelli, armed with rockets.


OA-4AR in inventory

In the mid-90s, it was decided to replace the A-4B and C with the incorporation of American A-4Ms, which were subjected to an important modernization process, resulting in the A-4AR Fightinghawk, achieving a leap technological 25 years.

In 1998 the A-4AR had their first great challenge with the combined exercise Águila, carried out in the V Brigade, repeating this activity in 2001.

In 2002 they participated in the Verification exercise along with all FAA brigades. The combined Cruzex exercise had them as protagonists for the first time in 2004. Another notable exercise was the Ceibo of 2005.

That same year they provided air security, through a no-fly zone around Mar del Plata, to the IV Summit of the Americas, operating from Tandil. In 2006 they were part of the security operation at the Mercosur summit held in Córdoba, after which they participated in the Cruzex exercise.


A-4AR (2010)

In 2008 they were in charge of security for the Mercosur summit held in San Miguel de Tucumán. During 2009 they provided air security to the Unasur summit held in San Carlos de Bariloche, after which they were deployed to Antofagasta for the combined Salitre exercise.

2010 Decade

The unit began this decade without planning major changes for the future, having one of the latest weapons systems incorporated by the force and the best combat element available. Meanwhile, participation in joint exercises is constant, carrying out deployments in various parts of the country. A problem to highlight was the non-participation in the combined Cruzex exercise of 2010 due to delays in the sanction of the law that authorized it by the Congress of the Argentine Nation.



In 2010, its planes integrated the aerial security deployment at the XXXIX Mercosur Summit held in San Juan, and later did so at the XX Ibero-American Summit organized in Mar del Plata. A new Mercosur summit, held in Mendoza in 2012, had the support of the A-4AR.

Since mid-2011, deployments have been made to Northern Argentina, within the framework of Operation Fortín to control irregular flights and fight against drug trafficking, usually operating for periods of one month from Santiago del Estero.



Wikipedia

Argentina: Pictorial Argentine Wings

Planes that provided services to Argentina

Biography: Commodore (Malvinas War Veteran) Guillermo Dellepiane (Argentina)

Honor Brotherhood

The spectacular adventure of Guillermo Dellepiane, a pilot who attacked the English camp in the Malvinas, dropped bombs on Jeremy Moore and when he escaped he lived a movie odyssey. A man whom the British recognize and the Argentines ignore
Jorge Fernández Díaz



He was twenty-four years old, flying low over the sea, and was about to bomb a destroyer and a missile frigate.

They called him Piano because his name was Guillermo Dellepiane, and he was a second lieutenant in a force that had no heroes or heroes because he had never gone into combat. It was the first mission of his life and he had just taken off from Río Gallegos. His father had died without being able to fulfill his dream of realizing in reality what he had pretended to do throughout his entire career: air warfare.

It must be as disturbing as going into battle to dedicate one's life to an event that will not happen. Warriors of theory and training, many hunters receive, develop and retire without ever having hunted real prey. Piano's father, close to retirement, had died two years ago in an absurd accident, when a wing of the Cóndor building collapsed. Flying towards the target in an A-4B Skyhawk, the son now came to fulfill the desired scene concocted by the ghost of his father.

It was May 12, 1982 and a squadron of eight Argentine planes was advancing in radio silence towards two British ships. The first four were ahead and would shoot first. The four falcons behind, at a safe distance, would have a second chance or would come in to finish them off.

For Piano, it was an initiatory mission, the last lesson of a war professional: war itself. Until then everything had been learning and testing. Ensign is the first rank of officers, and Dellepiane had not even experienced in-flight refueling, a complex operation that in this case consisted of flying close to a Hercules, fitting the A-4B's nose lance into the fuel basket and load tanks to continue the journey. Many failed in this attempt: they became nervous and could not put the spear in. "Look if I can't, it's a shame," he said to himself. He was more worried about that embarrassment than about death. But when he had the Hercules face to face he did not fail, and he quickly joined his boss, a first lieutenant, who ordered them to go down to less than fifteen meters from the waves and advance at full speed. They flew so low that they left trails in the sea.

Evading missiles

With their souls in suspense they heard that, five minutes before reaching the target, the first four planes attacked. There was nothing visible on the horizon, but Piano quickly realized that his companions had not fared very well. Within two minutes they learned that three planes had been hit by anti-aircraft artillery and had been shot down amid mushrooms of fire and booms of water. The fourth plane was returning on its own. The sun made a black day splendid. Very black. Piano suddenly saw the enemy ships. There were actually two of them and they were shooting at them. At that moment he did not think about the country or God, he only watched that fantastic Technicolor movie with a certain disbelief. He saw her as if he were not a part of her. It was a short and amazing show but without noise, because you couldn't hear anything in the cabin. They were fractions of seconds: Piano held his breath, checking the speed and height, and at the exact moment in which he passed over one of the two ships, while receiving and evading shots of all kinds, he pressed the button and released a bomb. of a thousand pounds.

 
From the left, Ensign Vázquez (died in combat), Ensign Dellepiane (today Commodore), Vice Commodore Douburg, Lieutenant Arraráz (died in combat) and Captain Zelaya.
 
From the left, Ensign Dellepiane (now Commodore), Doubourg and Zelaya

The bombs hit the destroyer, tearing horrible, final holes in it. She was out of commission, but Piano learned that much later because at that moment the only thing he could do was get out of the mousetrap quickly, evading missiles and fleeing at full speed. When a squadron fires, the planes disperse and each one returns as best they can. The young ensign felt alone for a few minutes but suddenly he spotted his boss's ship and caught up with her. They could not speak to each other, because the air navigations were silent, but they flew together, like brothers, at a distance of two hundred meters from each other, with hell behind and the continent in front. They had fulfilled and returned with glory; It was a strange and pleasant feeling.

Until suddenly a low projectile emerging from the fog hit an aileron of the first lieutenant's plane. It was a fatal blow at infinite speed that made him flip, hit the surface of the ocean and explode into a thousand pieces. All in the blink of an eye. Piano saw it without believing it but without stopping to press the accelerator. He descended even further and practically plowed the sea with a metallic taste in his mouth. He was emotionally dependent on his boss. He had let his guard down for a moment, thinking "he's going to take me home," but now he was alone and desperate. Now he depended solely on his own expertise, or his luck.

He flew for a while that way, fleeing from the devil, and then, when he was sure that they were not following him, he notified the Hercules C-130, which the hunters call "La Chancha", and began the ascent. "La Chancha" placed the basket and without losing his pulse the young ensign pushed the lance and reloaded fuel. Then he flew the last leg almost blind: the sea had formed a thick layer of salt on the plane's windshield.

The salt air of desolation clouded Piano's eyes. The hardest thing was to enter the room of a dead comrade, gather his clothes, pack his suitcase and leave it in the lobby of the hotel where his squad was staying the night. That ritual awaited him in Río Gallegos at the end of that day in which he had finally had his baptism of fire in the South Atlantic. The gods, as the old Greek saying said, punish men by fulfilling their dreams.

In the following years he would only remember that first mission. And the last one. In the middle there were only reconnaissance flights, raids in the Fitz Roy area, terrible nerves and more falls and duels. Also the spirit of the mechanics, who always said goodbye to the fighter pilots with flags and cheers, and the return from the base to the hotel that, with success or without success, with or without deaths, they did in a jeep or a truck. Ford F100 singing songs against the English.

They had, of course, no idea how the war was going. And when they were transferred to San Julián they suffered a certain sadness: they occupied an inn and walked around that small city in a state of total alert.

They were not very superstitious, but they had cabals and in fact they did not take photos of each other because they instinctively believed that eternalizing themselves in those images meant a direct passage to misfortune.

They thought nothing, however, of that mission on the 13th: it was cloudy and cold, and Piano and his companions were ordered to leave for the islands. They said that the English had landed and that they were fighting hand to hand on land. The A-4Bs carried bombs, rockets and cannons. Piano was, as always, anxious. Although that anxiety usually ended when they tied him up in the cabin and had to go out into the ring. The nerves then disappeared, like the bullfighter who feels a knot in his stomach until he goes down to the arena and faces the bull with his cape.

But takeoff was not so easy. Some hydraulic fluid pipes broke and a twin plane had to be searched 1,500 meters away. The ensign was desperate that his squadron would leave without him, so he got into the other A-4B and began taxiing without loading the Omega system, which allowed for precise coordination and flight. Piano did not want to stay in San Julián, and since his people had already left, he called the leader of the second squadron and asked permission to join his group. They gave him the go-ahead and he took off without having the plane properly configured. He ascended and searched the clouds for direction, and in a moment found the Hercules, which was carrying twelve men and had orders not to enter the battle zone or remain within range of enemy missiles for any reason.

He refueled and followed his guide through the north of the Falkland Islands, then headed east at low altitude and towards the south under showers. And he was surprised to hear the islands' radar operator ask if there were planes in flight. The head of the formation responded with a request, to provide them with the positions of the Sea Harrier patrols.

When the verbal report arrived, the Argentine pilots felt a chill. There were four patrols in the air and a fifth north of the San Carlos Strait. The sky was infested with English planes. It was a death trap, and logic dictated returning immediately to the mainland.

But they were already five minutes from the objective and the day had cleared, and then the guide made the decision to continue. Later they would discover that they were attacking a huge bivouac set up by the English in Monte Dos Hermanas. More than two blocks with tents, containers and helicopters, a camp from where General Jeremy Moore directed the war.

Everything happened within minutes. The A-4Bs were traveling at eight hundred kilometers per hour and twenty meters apart. The pilots feared that a missile frigate would cut them off before reaching the target. They did not carry weapons to attack a ship; the bombs had fuzes for ground targets. Due to the large mobilization of helicopters in that area, the generals of Puerto Argentino had surmised that the very center of British operations could be there. And they were not wrong.

The flight charts said that the attack should be made at 12:15. And there were two minutes left. The hunters passed over San Luis Bay and the Malvinas radar operator warned them that the Harriers had detected them and were already converging on them. With one minute and twenty seconds left, the squad almost upset an English soldier who was climbing a hill. Now the planes, in the final run, flew close to the ground. Beyond the rise the camp appeared. And Jeremy Moore evacuated his tent a minute before the shells fell on him.

Dellepiane launched his three 250-kilo bombs, causing destruction, and realized that they were throwing everything they had at them. From missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to hand weapons. It was a fireworks festival. And almost all the pilots detached themselves from the reserve tanks and missile carriers and made a curve to return through the North, each one left to his intelligence.

Piano flew doing evasion and acrobatic maneuvers, and felt impacts to the fuselage. It was again an incredible and terrifying sight. At the height of Mount Kent he encountered a Sea King helicopter in mid-flight and shot it. Two projectiles came out and the barrel jammed, but a bullet hit the blades and forced the English pilot to make an emergency landing.

Immediately, on the left, he saw two fireballs passing by that were going directly towards his lieutenant's plane, so he shouted into the radio "Close to the right" and continued turning until he saw that the missiles were passing by and were lost. Later he ran into another Sea King and tried to shoot it again, but it was also in vain: the barrel would not unlock. So at the last moment he raised the Skyhawk and passed within centimeters of the helicopter's blades to prevent the pilot in the green helmet from killing him with his trigger.

It was more or less at that moment that he realized that something unexpected was happening: he was running out of fuel. A shell had pierced his tank, and he was only 2,000 pounds. He needed more than twice as much to reach the position of "La Chancha." But he was not thinking at that crucial moment about getting anywhere but about escaping the harassment of the Harriers. He then detached himself from the missile carriers and continued flying for a distance asking the Malvinas radar to tell him, without technicalities and with precision, where his executioners were. The Harriers were flying at a considerable distance, so already over the north of the San Carlos Strait he doubted whether he should eject on the island or try to reach the Hercules. His teachers, in theory lessons, had always recommended that in a similar situation he try to return. Ejecting meant missing the plane and being taken prisoner. Crossing meant facing the risk of not making it and ending up in the sea. If he fell he could not survive more than fifteen minutes in the icy waters, and there was no operational chance that any ship could rescue him in time.

His companions, on the radio, tried to give him advice and get him out of the dilemma. But his boss thundered: "Let Piano decide." And then Piano decided. He went out to sea, put himself on the Hercules' frequency and began talking to the pilot who commanded it. That day, two men ignored the orders of the high command: the pilot of "La Chancha" left his protective position, entered the danger zone and advanced at full speed to meet Piano's A-4B, and An officer from San Julián had an outburst, got on a helicopter and went two hundred miles into the sea to look for him, a completely irregular and risky flight that did not help but showed the suicidal courage of the pilot and the desperation with which he continued in earth the fate of that fuel-injured hunter who was trying to return home.

The ensign heard "Let's go look for you" and tried to remain optimistic, but the liquidometer kept telling him that he would not make it out of that last trip alive. "How far away are they?" he asked every three minutes. "How far away are they?" The radio was filled with voices: "Go ahead, asshole, with faith, with faith you will arrive." The ensign was calculating the amount of fuel, which was dramatically extinguished, and predicted that it would collapse. And his listeners redoubled their cries of encouragement: "Calm down, kid, that's enough for you!" He knew they were lying to him. When he reached 200 pounds he gave up. At any moment the engine would stall and go directly into the sea. Fish food. When he reached 150 pounds he remembered that it was equivalent, more or less, to two minutes of flying. "Don't abandon me!" -He cursed at them, because there was silence on the line-. Suddenly the pilot of the Hercules C-130 thought he saw him, but he was a companion. Piano went from euphoria to depression in fifteen seconds.

He did not pray in those instances, only flashes of memory of his father came to him. The ghost was inside that cabin, stuck in his headphones. "Give me a hand, old man," he asked him gutturally, with his vocal cords and with the ventricles of his heart.

The liquidometer then read zero, and suddenly Piano heard that he had been spotted and finally saw "La Chancha." He saw her crossing the sky, to the right and far below. He asked the pilot to get into position and dived without forcing the engines, gliding towards the rescue basket. When he had it in front of him he gave it maximum power with a drop of fuel in the tank and when he got within range he pressed the flight brake and inserted the spear. Everyone thundered with joy on the radio and hugged each other on the ground. Piano was also shouting, but he wanted to resupply quickly, regain control and return to San Julián at his own expense. They soon discovered that this was not possible. All the fuel that entered went into the tank and fell through the hole. "Stay hooked," the Hercules pilot told him. They had no alternative. They flew coupled the rest of the way, losing fuel and risking an explosion or not arriving in time.

It was another dramatic race until they saw the gulf and then the base. Then the A-4B broke away and, dripping with lethal liquid, searched for the runway. Piano tried to lower the landing gear but the nose wheel resisted. There was all the personnel from the San Julián base waiting, and he was running around, leaving trails of jet fuel and trying to get that damn wheel to come down. He finally came down, and the ensign landed, untied himself quickly, took off his helmet, jumped onto the asphalt and ran away from the enormous lake of fuel that was forming at the feet of the A-4B.

Medal for valor

There was partying until late and unbridled happiness in San Julián. Since Piano considered himself alive by a miracle, he had many drinks and they had to accompany him to his room: he fell asleep with a smile and woke up very late. It was June 14, 1982 and his colleagues informed him that Argentina had surrendered.

Thanks to a providential license, two days later he was already in Buenos Aires. The city remained mired in anger and depression. And also in indifference. Anyone who crossed paths with Piano approached him cautiously and after a while asked him to tell everything he had experienced. But Piano didn't feel like saying anything. For years he dreamed of those deadly pirouettes, those low flights, those deaths: persistent insomnia and frightening specters that pursued him like merciless Sea Harriers.

They gave him the Medal for Valor in Combat, and he remained in the Air Force, pursuing a quiet career with an impeccable record and a lot of professional training. Two years ago he was sent as an aeronautical attaché to London. The English received him as a great warrior. In the same tradition of Wellington and Napoleon, European armies still practice honor for their ancient and respectable enemies.

The pierced blades of the Sea King that Piano had shot down at Mount Kent are in the Royal Navy Museum, and the helicopter pilot who was driving that day is alive but retired. Piano got his phone and chatted affectionately with him. "I'm glad I didn't kill him," he said to himself.

The English veterans who fought in the South Atlantic have enormous respect for the Argentine aviators. And they are nostalgic for those times: "It was the last conventional war," they say. "Some against each other over a specific territory. Today everything is done at a distance, in terrains without defined borders and for blurred causes, with atomized terrorism and combatants." eternal religious. With those enemies in the end we cannot get together to have a beer."

That ensign, turned commodore, was invited one afternoon to present an award at the RAF aviation school. At night, the newly received war pilots and their officers dined in a majestic hall with very long tables. Piano occupied a privileged place, and the school director asked for silence and spoke about the Argentine pilot. She knew his war resume by heart and in his speech he showed his pride in having that night a man who had truly fought against them.

Last Thursday Guillermo Dellepiane took over as director of the Air War School in Buenos Aires. He occupies an office in the Cóndor Building, where his father died. Piano is now a short, chubby fifty-year-old. His hair fell out, he is extremely cordial and has modern thinking, and of course no one recognizes him on the street. Nobody knows that he is part of the brotherhood of honor, and that he is an indelible hero of a cursed war.

© LA NACION