Malvinas: Cover Operation on Cow Beach, 1966

Secret Landing at Cow Bay/Playa Vaca

Operation Cow Beach was conceived in the shadows of a turbulent era—an epic chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy, where determination and stealth combined to confront a challenge that had lingered for over a century. The year was 1966, and Argentina, ruled by a military junta following the overthrow of President Arturo Illia, was growing weary of its diplomatic claims over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The shadow of British incursion, cast over the islands since 1833, loomed heavily in the minds of naval strategists.




The incident involving Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648, hijacked by a group of extremists and diverted to the archipelago, had stirred already turbulent waters. It was a stark reminder that the situation in the Falklands could escalate without warning, and that Argentina needed to be prepared for a confrontation scenario. Thus, in the shadowy offices of Buenos Aires, a plan was drawn up involving one of the fleet’s most veteran submarines—the ARA Santiago del Estero, a former USS Lamprey from the Second World War, repurposed as the guardian of a secret mission.



Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648 was hijacked by Argentine extremists on 28 September 1966 and diverted to the Falklands, where they meekly surrendered to the British colonial authorities.


On 28 October 1966, with its diesel engines roaring beneath the waves, the ARA Santiago del Estero silently navigated the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Under the command of Frigate Captain Horacio González Llanos and Corvette Captain Juan José Lombardo, the submarine stealthily approached the coast of East Falkland, just 40 kilometres from Port Stanley, the capital of the British colony. On board, twelve Navy men—including Sub-Lieutenant Oscar Héctor García Rabini—waited tensely for the moment to act.


Diagram of the Navigation Route Taken by Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero of the Argentine Navy During Operation "Cow Beach", Late October 1966




Cow Bay, Soledad Island/East Falkland (Argentine Republic)

The plan was clear: they were to land on a remote beach, just a few kilometres north of the British position, to gather vital intelligence for future landings. The beach had to be thoroughly surveyed—its gradient, potential underwater obstacles, approach routes—everything needed to be charted without leaving a trace. In the dimness of night, the men assembled their kayaks on the deck of the barely surfaced submarine, and the silence was broken only by the gentle lapping of the waves.


Crew and Command Staff of Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero – Argentine Navy.

Arrival of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero (SS-372 USS Lamprey) at Mar del Plata Naval Base from the United States, 1960
(Photograph by Enrique Mario Palacio)


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy between 1960 and 1971, should not be confused with the later submarines of the same class modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22—which replaced them from 1971 onwards and carried the same names. In this image, the veteran S-11 and S-12 can be seen at the end of their service life at the Mar del Plata Naval Base, while in the background lies the new S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, their replacement, ready to take on the duties left behind by its predecessors. The S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero was retired after a decade of service, having taken part in important missions such as Operation Cow Beach, which became a notable chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy.



S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero Moored at its Home Pier, Mar del Plata Naval Base.

The First Incursion and an Unexpected Encounter

The first incursion was a success. The men landed and explored the coastline, mapping every detail. However, the second night brought an unexpected twist. In the darkness, García Rabini spotted a kelper—a local island settler—watching them from atop a cliff. They knew that being discovered could spark an unprecedented diplomatic crisis. Acting swiftly, they captured the islander and tied him up as they debated their next move. Killing him was not an option—the mission was one of intelligence gathering, not combat. But they also couldn’t risk the man alerting the British authorities.

Then, an idea emerged—both bold and unusual. Some crew members returned to the submarine to fetch a bottle of whisky from the captain’s cabin. They went back to the cliff and forced the kelper to drink until he was semi-conscious, leaving him behind at the very spot where they had found him. With the mission aborted to avoid further complications, the group returned to the submarine, carrying with them the valuable intelligence they had collected.

Born on 19 March 1927 in Salto, Buenos Aires Province, Juan José Lombardo was a key figure in the history of the Argentine Navy. As a Sub-Lieutenant, he served as Second-in-Command aboard submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero during the successful Operation Cow Beach in the Falkland Islands on 28 October 1966—a mission that would become a landmark in Argentina's intelligence operations in the South Atlantic. On 15 December 1981, by then holding the rank of Vice Admiral, he was summoned by the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, to receive a mission that would alter the course of Argentine history: the Falklands.

The Return to Mar del Plata
The journey back to Mar del Plata was as silent as the outbound voyage. Upon arrival, absolute silence was ordered regarding the events that had taken place. None of the participants—not even to their families—were to speak of what had happened in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Despite the unforeseen developments, the mission was deemed a success. The data gathered was handed over to the Navy General Staff—a strategic asset that could have proved critical had diplomatic negotiations failed.


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy from 1960 to 1971, should not be confused with later submarines of the same class—modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22, which replaced them from 1971 and bore the same names. In this image, one of the original submarines is seen underway shortly after its arrival in Argentina, already without the forward gun that had been removed as part of its adaptation and modernisation for new missions in the South Atlantic.

Legacy of a Silent Mission
Years later, Commander García Rabini would recall those days with quiet pride, fully aware of the significance of the mission. Although the Cow Beach operation report was not directly used during the 1982 Falklands conflict, it stood as a testament to the commitment and audacity of those sailors who defied history to keep the flame of Argentine sovereignty alive.

The Story of Operation Cow Beach

Interwoven with both legend and fact, the story of Operation Cow Beach remains a hidden episode within the broader struggle over the Falklands—a moment when a small group of men faced the sea, the darkness, and the looming shadows of a war that, though not yet begun, echoed with the weight of the inevitable. It stands as a reminder that the fight for sovereignty is not waged solely on battlefields, but also in silences, in the waves, and in the whisper of the wind on a lonely South Atlantic beach.


Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini. Now aged 83, retired Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini is the Argentine naval officer who, in 1966 as a Sub-Lieutenant, led one of the most daring missions in the history of the Argentine Navy. At the head of a special forces incursion, he landed on the shores of East Falkland on 28 October of that year, during the secret Operation Cow Beach. Launched from the depths of the ocean by the submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, the mission was cloaked in silence and darkness, aimed at collecting vital intelligence to support Argentina’s sovereignty claims over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.


Cow Beach/Playa Vaca, Southern Tip – Photograph Taken from ARA Santiago del Estero by Miguel Salvatierra, 28/10/1966


Balao-Class Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. The Balao-class submarine, formerly the US Navy’s SS-372 USS Lamprey, served the United States from 1944 until 1960, when it was transferred to the Argentine Navy and renamed S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. In the photograph, the submarine is seen departing from the Mar del Plata Naval Base, home to Argentina’s Submarine Force Command. It operated from this base until 1971, when it was replaced by the S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero—a submarine of the same class but modernised to the GUPPY IA standard. The arrival of this updated vessel marked the end of an era for the veteran S-12, which had taken part in key operations such as Cow Beach, demonstrating the Navy’s steadfast commitment to national sovereignty.


ASW Frigate P-36 ARA Piedrabuena in the Periscope Crosshairs of ARA Santiago del Estero During Combat Exercises


Cargo Transfer Between Submarine ARA Santiago del Estero and Destroyer D-10 ARA San Luis


Surface Navigation of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero en Route to Its Objective. As a Balao-class submarine that had not undergone the GUPPY IA modernisation, the vessel lacked a snorkel and high-capacity batteries. Consequently, it still had to operate like a Second World War-era submarine—navigating mostly on the surface, at least at night and in low-risk areas.

Counterinsurgency War: The Attempted Attack on the ARA "Santiago del Estero" Submarine

In 1971, the Argentine flag was hoisted for the first time on the Guppy IA-class submarine USS "Chivo" as it was renamed ARA "Santiago del Estero" for the Argentine Navy.

Operation Corina: The Attempted Sinking of ARA Santiago del Estero.

On March 4, 1973, in a key operation for national security, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police foiled one of the most dangerous subversive conspiracies of the time: the so-called "Operation Corina." The objective of this extremist group, belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), was to sink the submarine ARA Santiago del Estero at the Mar del Plata Naval Base and carry out coordinated attacks on various strategic points in the city. This attack was part of a broader plan to sow chaos in the country in the days leading up to the general elections on March 11, 1973. However, a meticulous investigation and swift police action dismantled the terrorist cell before it could execute its plan.


The GUPPY IA-class submarine S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, formerly USS Chivo (SS-341), underway. The ARA Santiago del Estero was incorporated into the Argentine Navy and decommissioned in 1981. Nevertheless, it served a wartime role in 1982 during the South Atlantic Conflict, being used as a decoy when it was secretly towed out of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and hidden to create confusion among the enemy, making them believe the submarine was operating in the open sea.

The raid that dismantled the operation took place in a chalet at the corner of Matías Strobel and Blas Parera, in the heart of Parque Luro. There, officers from Regional Unit IV arrested eight FAR members, a group that, despite portraying itself as a defender of the proletariat, was mostly composed of individuals from wealthy families, with university backgrounds and no real connection to the working class. Among the detainees were Jesús María Aguinagale, Daniel Roque Armengol, Osvaldo Alfredo Lenti, María Cristina Bonfiglio de Armengol, and Beatriz Mariana Quiroga de Porfirio, among others. A significant arsenal was seized at the scene, including UZI submachine guns, Browning pistols, Rubí .32 caliber revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, and large quantities of ammunition and explosives. Many of these weapons had been stolen in previous bank robberies and attacks on police facilities, demonstrating the high level of organization within the group.

But the most revealing discovery was the documentation found inside the chalet. Sketches, maps, and blueprints detailed the operation’s targets with precision, including the Mar del Plata Naval Base, the port, and YPF’s fuel depots. Other secondary targets were also identified, such as the 1st Police Station of Necochea, which they planned to seize to obtain police weaponry. The plan was to carry out these attacks simultaneously on March 11, coinciding with the national elections, with the aim of triggering a security crisis and undermining the country’s stability.

In today’s Argentina, the same terrorists whom the government, the judiciary, and the media have turned into "victims," honoring them with monuments and official recognition, were responsible for the murder of Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya. Her only "crime" was being at her newspaper stand working that morning of April 10, 1974, in Rosario. On that busy street, she became the victim of a terrorist ambush aimed at assassinating two Argentine Army officers. While her killers were granted compensation, tributes, and state honors, Elcira and her family were condemned to oblivion, ignored to this day.

On April 10, 1972, in Rosario, a group of approximately 15 FAR extremists ambushed and murdered Major General Juan Carlos Sánchez, head of the Argentine Army’s II Army Corps. That same day, the subversive forces also executed Oberdán Sallustro. Among the attackers were some of the militants who, a year later, would be captured in Mar del Plata on March 4, 1973, while planning to attack the Naval Base and sink the S-22 ARA Santa Fe submarine. During the attack on General Sánchez, Army Sergeant Berneche, who was driving the official vehicle, was seriously wounded, and Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya, an innocent civilian who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, was killed.

The attack on ARA Santiago del Estero was the central objective of the operation. Acquired by the Argentine Navy in 1971, the submarine was a Balao-class vessel, modernized with Guppy IA technology to enhance its combat capabilities. Its destruction would have been a devastating blow to the operational capacity of the Argentine fleet in the context of the Cold War, where the country’s Armed Forces played a key role in the hemisphere’s strategic balance. According to the intelligence gathered, three members of the group had received specialized diving training and were planning to place an explosive charge beneath the submarine’s hull. For months, they had conducted night drills in nearby waters, practicing approach maneuvers with inflatable boats and studying the naval guards’ movements.

The police operation led to the arrest of one of the divers involved in the incursion, Alfredo Ruscio, who confessed that the cell was fully prepared to act and was merely awaiting orders from their superiors. This statement triggered an emergency protocol in Mar del Plata. Security was reinforced at the Naval Base, the port, police stations, and other strategic locations, including the Mar del Plata Golf Club, which had been identified in the seized documents as a potential secondary target. Authorities intensified controls throughout the city, aware that part of the group remained at large and could attempt further attacks.

Thanks to these preventive measures, the attack was completely thwarted. The capture of the group and the confiscation of their weapons and explosives prevented the operation from proceeding, averting what could have been one of the most devastating assaults on the country's military infrastructure. However, the story did not end there.

Just months later, in a decision that exposed the weakness of the state in the face of the terrorist threat, the detainees were released by the government of Héctor Cámpora. This mass pardon, which included hundreds of imprisoned subversive militants, allowed many of them to return to clandestine operations and resume their criminal activities. Several of those involved in “Operation Corina” later participated in further attacks, proving that Argentina’s fight against terrorism was far from over.

The once-glorious Buenos Aires Provincial Police, relentless against the Castro-Guevarist terrorist enemy of the Argentine Nation, has since been corrupted, degraded, disarmed, dismantled, and undermined by Argentine politicians from 1983 to the present through their ideological revenge. It has been reduced to a lifeless security agency, barely capable of serving political demagoguery. However, this does not apply to the vast majority of its members, who still stand strong in defense of the nation, putting their lives on the line against crime every day.

The context in which this terrorist plot was conceived cannot be understood without analyzing the global landscape of the time. During the 1970s, Argentina became a key battleground in the Cold War, with revolutionary groups supported by communist powers and a state that often wavered between repression and permissiveness. Declassified documents years later confirmed that organizations such as FAR and Montoneros operated with funding and training from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Their goal was not merely to fight the government in power but to establish a revolutionary regime through violence and the destruction of republican institutions.

Operation Manuel in the Czechoslovak Service

Copy of the March 1967 report from StB Intelligence (Státní bezpečnost: State Security) of Czechoslovakia A-00921/10-67, written three years after the launch of "Operation Manuel" as an assessment by the First Administration, with a copy sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Eighth Department. The report details the objectives and scope of the operation, including the destruction of all nationalist and democratic movements in Latin America through institutional destabilization, particularly targeting the Armed Forces and Security Forces. It also outlines the recruitment, training, and equipping of subversive agents, their command structure, and financial support.

Additionally, more than 10,000 similar documents have been declassified by the Czech Republic, which acted as an operational intermediary between the USSR and Cuba, from where terrorist operations in Argentina were coordinated. These documents undeniably prove that Argentina was subversively and genocidally attacked by agents of a global superpower and several other nations.

Transcription in Czech

Zpráva 27.10.1966

Akce MANUEL – perspektiva.

V průběhu svého pobytu v Francii SVISTO hovořil v tom smyslu, že nadále bude při vysílání lidí do LA dbát především na kvalitu. Z jeho vysvětlení vyplývá, že ztráta osob, vyslaných v rámci akce MANUEL, bude klesat a navrhl, že v současné a další práci (vyladit po sřízení technické součásti) na přípravu tematické zprávy slova smyslu.

Pokud se týká akce MANUEL, chceme tuto i nadále realizovat co nejlépe v souladu s připomínkami (k časovým) k technice hlášení přechodů a ke kategorii „Mastníků akce“, která se mění na rezidenturu krátkého setonu telegramem č. …, což bylo rozváděné s kádrem jednajícím RICHARD, jenž projevil pro tyto přecházející plně pochopení. Jako pochopitelně všem těm, dočasně termíny hlášení přechodu, za níž se mají i lo. odbor, že v rámci sotva politicky dojdete. Byl v řádu byl dobré vztah ze strany rezidentury na dodržování těchto termínů alespoň u těch nejdůležitějších případů, kteří jsou z hlediska majitelůvání technické dokumentace a tím v Maďarsku poměrně komplikovanější než je normální přechod.

Souvislosti se skora uvedeným prohlášením JURA 1 v souvislosti – podobnými zprávami z rezidentury na další perspektivu hlášení přechodu, které jsme formě pochopitelně, že hlášení přechodu vůbec důležitá násobně přihlášeného počtu osob, které snad obětují několik půl roku nebo 1 roku přejdou Francii a jejich zprávy bude třeba zajistit vratné jako u jako deset.

Závěrem, bude tuto otázku při nejbližší vhodné příležitosti zjemnit, bude o tom především informován, a to hlásit hlavní závady plánů i potřeb technického zabezpečení a pak hlásit na příslušnou akci v centrále a v určitka orgánech.

Translation to English:

Report 27.10.1966

Operation MANUEL – Perspective.

During his stay in France, SVISTO stated that, in the future, when sending people to LA (Latin America), special attention would be given to quality. From his explanation, it follows that the loss of individuals sent under Operation MANUEL will decrease, and he proposed that, in both current and future work (after fine-tuning the technical component), a thematic report be prepared for this purpose.

Regarding Operation MANUEL, we intend to continue executing it in the best possible way, in accordance with the comments on the timing and technique of crossing reports, as well as with the category of "Operation Mastníků," which is being modified in the residency through a short telegram No. …, a matter that was discussed with agent RICHARD, who expressed full understanding for these crossings. As is clear to all involved, the temporary crossing reporting deadlines must be coordinated with the relevant department, as political conditions will barely allow for any progress. There was good cooperation from the residency in adhering to these deadlines, at least in the most crucial cases, which, from the perspective of technical documentation management in Hungary, are considerably more complicated than a normal crossing.

In connection with the recent declaration by JURA 1 and similar reports from the residency on the future perspective of crossing reports, it is evident that the importance of these reports increases proportionally with the number of registered individuals. It is estimated that some of these individuals will be able to cross into France within a period of six months to a year, and it will be necessary to ensure their reporting in a manner similar to previous cases.

In conclusion, this issue will be clarified at the earliest appropriate opportunity. The main objective will be to report on the major planning issues and technical support needs and subsequently report the corresponding action to headquarters and the responsible authorities.

Operation Corina

The case of Operation Corina is merely a reflection of the undeclared war that was being waged in Argentina at the time. The struggle between state forces and armed organizations intensified over time, leading to a spiral of violence that left thousands dead and disappeared. The release of those responsible for this failed attack was not only an act of impunity but also set a dangerous precedent that weakened the country's ability to confront the terrorist threat.

At Dock No. 2 of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal—the largest dry dock in all of Latin America—we observed the presence of the Argentine Navy’s Guppy-class submarines, ARA *Santiago del Estero* and ARA *Santa Fe*, both undergoing maintenance.  

As the 1970s progressed, attacks on military and civilian targets became increasingly frequent. Kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings dominated the country’s agenda, creating a climate of insecurity that led to stricter security policies and open confrontation between the State and insurgent organizations. By 1976, Argentina would enter a new phase, where the fight against subversion would be led by the Armed Forces in a conflict that would forever change the country's history.

Today, the failed attempt to sink the ARA Santiago del Estero remains a symbol of a time when the nation was torn between order and chaos, between democracy and political violence. The story of Operation Corina is not only a reminder of the danger posed by these extremist groups but also a warning about the consequences of impunity and the lack of a clear policy to combat terrorism.

The submarine Santiago del Estero enters the Naval Base. In the background, the facilities of the Mar del Plata Golf Club can be seen—both were targets of the genocidal Castro-Guevarist organization FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) in March 1973. (Photo from La Nación newspaper.)

Many questions remain unanswered. To what extent did the political decisions of that era contribute to prolonging the conflict? What role did foreign interests play in the radicalization of armed groups? Has Argentina learned from its past, or is it still repeating the same mistakes?

What is certain is that, five decades later, the scars of that struggle remain in the country's memory. Operation Corina was just one of many episodes in an internal war that left an indelible mark on Argentine history, a legacy that continues to spark debate today.

The Attack on ARA Santísima Trinidad

The ARA Santiago del Estero submarine was the first strategic target of extremist forces, preceding the ARA Santísima Trinidad destroyer. However, in 1973, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police successfully prevented that attack. The destroyer D-2 ARA Santísima Trinidad, commissioned in 1969 by the Argentine Navy and AFNE for construction in Argentina, was the most advanced warship of its kind at the time. At a moment when few believed Argentina could achieve such a technological leap, the country became the first in Latin America to build a missile-launching, helicopter-carrying warship.



Built between 1972 and 1977, the ship's completion was delayed by a Castro-Guevarist terrorist attack. While it was in its final assembly stages, a sabotage operation severely damaged it and partially sank it in 1975. On August 22, 1975, Montonero terrorists attempted to destroy the ARA Santísima Trinidad. Although they failed to do so by force at the time, they ultimately succeeded 28 years later by infiltrating Argentina's political sphere under the guise of Peronism. Additionally, an Argentine Navy officer involved in the project, Commander Bigliardi, was assassinated by the same extremist organization that sought to prevent the project from ever coming to fruition.



Despite these setbacks, the destroyer officially entered service in 1977, just in time to participate in naval operations during the near-war conflict with Chile in 1978. In 1982, the ARA Santísima Trinidad served as the flagship of the Argentine Navy during "Operation Rosario," the mission to reclaim the Malvinas Islands. Throughout the conflict, it also acted as an escort vessel for the ARA 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier, which, on May 1–2, 1982, pursued the British Task Force, forcing it to evade combat. The destroyer continued patrolling the Argentine Sea throughout the war, prepared for a planned Argentine naval counteroffensive in late June or early July—an operation that never materialized due to the fall of Puerto Argentino and the subsequent overthrow of President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri.



The vessel remained operational until 1987, when maintenance difficulties arose due to its British origin and the arms embargo imposed on Argentina. As a result, some of its components were cannibalized to provide spare parts for its sister ship, the ARA Hércules. Decommissioned and placed in reserve, the destroyer awaited a modernization and reactivation that never came.

Ironically, in the early 2000s, when members of the same Castro-Guevarist terrorist organization that had tried and failed to destroy the ship in the 1970s gained control of the Ministry of Defense, they finally succeeded—not through sabotage, but through deliberate political neglect. The destroyer, which neither Cold War subversion nor one of the world’s most powerful navies could sink in open war, was ultimately destroyed by Argentine politicians—former members of the very terrorist group that had once fought against it.