Showing posts with label communications. Show all posts
Showing posts with label communications. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Malvinas: The Murrell Bridge Counter-Ambuscade and the Communications

 

Communications and a Pivotal Engagement on the Darkest Day of the Fleet


(From my interview with Captain (Ret.) VGM Eduardo Cerruti, Section Leader in Communications Company 3):

In the Malvinas, the most secure means of communication were wired systems. However, the signals personnel had to work tirelessly to repair lines that were frequently cut—either by shrapnel from bombardments, by sheep chewing through the cables, or, at times, by soldiers who used the wire to secure items while constructing their positions.



 

Inevitably, due to the use of HF communications on the islands, basic encryption and decryption systems had to be employed—elementary, to use the word loosely—since the type of cipher used had been originally developed by the British and American armies and was widely known across the world’s militaries. It was based on a five-digit code, and the British, though able to intercept Argentine communications, were not immune from making serious errors themselves.

To illustrate this, Captain (Ret.) Eduardo Cerruti refers to a specific engagement between a detachment of the British 3rd Parachute Battalion and a group of Argentine special forces from the 601 Commando Company. This occurred at the Murrell River bridge, during the night of 6 June and the early hours of 7 June 1982. In their retreat, the British abandoned not only their tents and various field supplies, but also their radio equipment. Most crucially, their radio operator left behind a communications pack containing documents listing frequencies, call signs, and network identifiers (e.g., alarm network, fire support network, logistics network, etc.).

For the Argentine communications personnel—who were trained under the doctrine that a message must be swallowed, destroyed, or burned before falling into enemy hands—this captured material was known as the Instructions for the Use and Operation of Communications (IEFC).

With the British documents now in Argentine hands, each time they tuned into a frequency, they heard voices speaking in English. They tried various channels repeatedly, and each time an English voice came through. Still, there was hesitation: given the professionalism of the British forces, they suspected that their enemies were already aware that the IEFC had been lost and that this could be a case of what is known in electronic warfare as simulative deception.

They continued monitoring the British using a Thompson field radio, which was not designed for electronic warfare. To aid in translation, they requested assistance from Communications Company 10 and were sent two soldiers who spoke English.

Meanwhile, Major Rábago reported the situation to General Menéndez, who authorised the purchase of a radio cassette recorder and several TDK tapes (60- and 90-minute lengths) from Port Stanley. Sergeant Edgardo Dalurzo, a field radio technician, successfully adapted the Thompson radio to the cassette recorder, enabling the team to record British transmissions.

On the morning of 7 June, one of the English-speaking soldiers informed Second Lieutenant Cerruti and other communications officers that the enemy was planning a landing at Bluff Cove (Bahía Agradable) the following day. This information was later confirmed by the second translator, who had received the tape and, after listening to it, corroborated the landing plan—and even added the names Bluff Cove/Fitz Roy.

It is worth emphasising that, using only a standard-issue Thompson field radio, which lacked any specialised electronic warfare capability, and thanks to the intel seized during the Murrell River bridge engagement, Communications Company 3 managed to conduct improvised electronic warfare. The report compiled by its personnel directly supported the Argentine Air Force in planning the successful strike carried out on 8 June 1982, during the British landing at Bluff Cove.

An extraordinary achievement.


Friday, March 22, 2024

Argentine Army: Armored Communications Squadron I


Escuadrón de Comunicaciones Blindado I

Armored Communications Squadron I


By Sergio Toyos 


Esc Com Bl 1 
Commander Name: Major Carlos Horacio Martín
Address: Pujol s/n - 7000 TANDIL (Buenos Aires)



It remained this way until March 1, 1955, when it moved to Curuzú Cuatía, a town where the Armored Cavalry Command was concentrated, with several units located in nearby towns. Five years later, under the same name and dependency, it returned to its old barracks in Campo de Mayo, where it would remain until the end of 1964. That year, as a result of the major restructuring that took place in the Army, the Armored Communications Company 1 It was dissolved, giving rise to the creation of the 1st Armored Communications Squadron (dependent on the 1st Armored Cavalry Brigade Command) which moved to the town of Tandil where it remains to this day. Currently, this independent subunit has M113 armored vehicles, specially adapted to serve as a base for the communications equipment that keeps the entire I Armored Brigade linked. Other materials are located on wheeled vehicles that contribute to maintaining versatile mobility. and all-terrain capability for the communications support needs of this Large Combat Unit it serves



The 1st Armored Communications Squadron will provide telecomputing support to the First Armored Brigade during the development of on-demand operations, through the installation, operation and maintenance of the facilities that make up the Campaign Communications Subsystem, eventually the fixed Communications Subsystem of the Brigade, to facilitate command and control and the transfer of information, in order to contribute to the fulfillment of the mission of the Great Combat Unit.




















































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