The GADA 601 Becomes Support Artillery

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ENDED UP CONDUCTING SURFACE FIRE
Account taken from the Gaceta Malvinense

What follows is a transcription based on the account of then Second Lieutenant Claudio Oscar Braghini, Commander of the Third Section of Battery “B” of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (GADA 601) of the Argentine Army…

During the fighting on 1 May, the RAF had identified the positions of the Argentine anti-aircraft artillery pieces, making a change of position necessary. A reconnaissance of the area was first carried out, as the route to be taken was littered with Beluga bombs that had failed to detonate due to the low altitude at which they had been released. The guns had to be moved over 1.5 km and be operational by the early hours of 2 May. Although the distance was short, only one tractor was available to tow two Oerlikon Contraves 35 mm guns (each weighing 6,000 kg), a Skyguard radar (around 5,900 kg), two field generator units (900 kg each), and 280 ammunition crates. This required an extraordinary effort from personnel, whose numbers had been halved, as the remainder were in Puerto Argentino and could not be redeployed because helicopters from Cóndor Air Base were engaged in airlifting Infantry Regiment 12 from Puerto Argentino to Darwin.

Despite everything, the section was operational at first light on 2 May.

To avoid a repeat of the surprise attack of 1 May, it was decided to maintain a permanent “red alert” posture, as the section was located about 80 km from Puerto Argentino and the terrain allowed Sea Harriers to attack at very low altitude without early warning from the surveillance radars in Puerto Argentino.

For the personnel, this operating regime meant extreme physical exhaustion, alleviated only by night-time rest—rest that was constantly interrupted by alerts from Puerto Argentino, British naval harassing fire, or reconnaissance flights detected by the Air Force’s ELTA radar near the position.

There was no alternative, despite insufficient personnel to rotate combat posts, since under these conditions aerial surveillance could not be neglected “for even a minute”—a statement based not on rhetoric but on mathematical calculation.

A combat aircraft such as the Sea Harrier has an attack speed of between 250 and 300 metres per second. Given that the maximum range of the Skyguard fire-control radar is 16 km, and assuming no terrain variations causing blind spots, and that the Harrier flies above 50 metres altitude, it could only be detected at 16 km. At 300 m/s, it would take 53.3 seconds (less than a minute) to cover that distance; by then, however, it would already be over the position, making engagement too late.

The maximum range at which fire can be opened is 4 km from the fire-control director, provided that radar “acquisition” and tracking of the target begins two or three seconds before the aircraft reaches that distance. Thus, timing is reduced as follows: from 16 km to 4 km—40 seconds—minus 3 seconds for acquisition and tracking leaves 37 seconds, and that under ideal conditions, which were certainly not those in the Falklands.

All this caused considerable strain. Personnel had to watch the radar screen with intense concentration from morning until nightfall; similarly, gun commanders and ammunition handlers had to remain at their posts in the open all day under harsh weather conditions. However, this demanding regime proved worthwhile on 4 May at 13:45, when three echoes appeared on the radar screen. All relevant communications were made. Second Lieutenant Braghini, together with his radar operator, Corporal First Class Ferreyra, allowed the three Harriers to approach to within 5 km without “acquiring” them, thereby preventing early warning and avoiding the risk of anti-radiation missile launch. The image of a Harrier approaching at high speed in low-level flight appeared on the TV monitor. Braghini fired the first burst, which struck the ground in front of the aircraft. The shells exploded ahead of the nose, and the aircraft immediately broke away in zigzag evasive manoeuvres. The Second Lieutenant waited for it to stabilise and pressed the firing switch again. This burst struck it directly, likely causing its fuel tanks to explode and completely tearing off its port wing. Engulfed in flames, the Harrier lost level flight, pitched up sharply, rolled along its longitudinal axis, and crashed to the ground. On impact, the pilot was thrown clear along with the ejection seat. His parachute deployed but became entangled in a fence. The wreckage, now a fireball, rose again, passed over infantry positions—burning two soldiers—and finally scattered across the end of the runway (Darwin airfield). Later, the body of the pilot, Lieutenant Nick Taylor of the Royal Navy, was found still strapped to his seat. The Sea Harrier bore the serial XZ450 and belonged to 800 Squadron.

As this aircraft was crashing, a second one was acquired by the fire-control system; it jettisoned its bombs to lighten its load and escape. Fire was opened, causing some damage, as it withdrew trailing a long plume of smoke. The third Harrier departed without causing damage.

This second attack confirmed the value of the section’s change of position, as the attack came from the opposite direction to the previous one—likely aiming to strike the former position and then operate freely. Continuous “red alert” also proved correct, as early warning from Puerto Argentino was not feasible due to the distance. After this, enemy aircraft limited themselves to reconnaissance at a distance. In the days prior to the ground advance, they again attempted to soften infantry positions, this time using chaff (metallic strips) to deceive radar, without success, as they were consistently met with heavy fire from GADA 601 and 20 mm Air Force guns near the runway. Harriers often withdrew damaged, and on one occasion one exploded in mid-air about 5,000 m from the position, falling into the sea.

From 27 May onwards, heavy artillery fire began to hit the runway and infantry positions. On the 28th, following bombardment, small-arms fire was received, with tracer rounds visible at night. From the position, it was unclear what was happening at the front. Argentine field artillery, under First Lieutenant Chanampa with three 105 mm Oto Melara howitzers, fired continuously through the night and into the next day until ammunition was exhausted. On the morning of the 28th, there was still uncertainty about events at Darwin, until the Air Force command post reported that friendly aircraft would attack British troops.

Minutes later, two Pucará aircraft arrived from Puerto Argentino and fired their weapons 4 km from the GADA 601 section’s position. Initially it seemed they had missed, but in fact British forces had advanced past the first lines during the night and were very close. Field artillery fire resumed immediately, reinforced by improvised rocket launchers mounted by Air Force personnel. Soon flares were seen and troops advancing in line formation north of Goose Green. It was unclear whether they were friendly forces withdrawing or British advancing. The sector—about 2,000 metres long and 700 wide—was open ground. The doubt ended when Air Force anti-aircraft crews reported incoming small-arms fire. Immediately, one of the GADA 601’s 35 mm guns opened fire—manned by Second Lieutenant Braghini with Corporals Rubina and Gallo feeding ammunition while soldiers continuously supplied rounds. The twin guns, firing at about 550 rounds per minute each, proved devastating in ground fire; British troops nearest the runway were left scattered across the terrain. Over the radio, Vice Commodore Pedrozo was heard urging: “Very good, GADA—keep it up, hit them hard!”

Fire continued for some time, always targeting concentrations of troops attempting to reach cover behind terrain features. At one point, the gun jammed due to a casing stuck in the chamber, fouled by dirt and grass from the intensity of combat. Corporal Gallo cleared it, but the brief delay allowed British troops to reach a small schoolhouse about 800 m away. Shortly after, mortar rounds began falling closer. Reports indicated small-arms fire coming from the schoolhouse windows. Braghini targeted the base of the structure; successive hits destroyed large sections and set it ablaze. It was later struck directly by 105 mm artillery, leaving only metal framework and piping.

Meanwhile, mortar fire closed in. One round struck the generator panel, cutting power to the gun. Manual operation was possible but ineffective against air attack, so Braghini ordered his men to move the 900 kg generator from another gun about 100 m uphill by hand. Although the northern advance had been halted, mortar fire intensified.

While attempting to move the generator, a shell landed just 5 metres from the previously used gun, damaging it and its generator. With the weapon unusable, Braghini ordered his men to take cover. At that moment, a Harrier dropped a Beluga bomb on the already disabled gun, but its aim was poor: half fell into the sea, the rest about 80 m away.

A British account later noted that radar-directed guns had been harassing 2 PARA, prompting an air strike by Harriers dropping cluster bombs, after which the intensity of the battle decreased significantly—suggesting the effectiveness of the Argentine fire.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery: Mission Accomplished!

Malvinas: Our First Air Hero

Our First Hero

At 4:40 AM on May 1st, the British began a bombing raid on the runway at Puerto Argentino. The days of preparation were over, and we were at the beginning of a battle. The crews were taking off in search of their baptism of fire, and at the same time, that of the Argentine Air Force.

Narrated by: The Author (A-4B Skyhawk Pilot)

The moment had arrived. May 1st, in the morning. Following the attack on the South Georgia Islands days earlier, the British fleet had launched its attack on Puerto Argentino. We had to counterattack. The first to take off was Captain Hugo Ángel del Valle Palaver, with his A-4B Skyhawk squadron, "Sky Hawk." The squadron also included Lieutenant Gálvez, Section Leader, First Lieutenant Luciano Guadagnini, and Ensign Gómez, who were about to engage the enemy for the first time. Their call sign for that mission was "Mole" (during the war, they change it daily so that if the enemy shoots one down, they won't know who it was, since in peacetime a permanent call sign is used). A section of Mirage IIIs, composed of Captain Gustavo Argentino García Cuerva and the First Lieutenant Perona, call sign "Dardo" for that mission. They began the first crossing of that immense, wild, and solitary sea, propelled by their single engine.

Near the islands, the Squadron Leader made contact with the radar at Puerto Argentino, and it began guiding them toward a target, giving them the heading to set toward it. The inexperience of both our ground crew and aircrew was considerable, due both to the Theater of Operations in which we had to fight and to the fact that it was the first time our Air Force had entered combat. This was quickly overcome by the enormous professionalism of its men and some painful experiences.

1- Contact: Speaking by radio.

2- Target: A material objective or part of it, against which offensive action is carried out.

"Your target is 30 miles away at level 200!" said the radar operator.

Suddenly, Captain Hugo del Valle Palaver realized that a terrible mistake was being made; that he They were being sent to intercept a squadron of British Harrier jets, when their mission and armament were intended to attack ships that were bombarding the eastern islands at that moment.
The Mirage section covering them had already informed the control tower that they were beginning their return to the mainland due to low fuel.



The A-4B commander decided to act quickly to prevent his men from being shot down by enemy missiles; but they also had to protect their auxiliary fuel tanks, pumps, and bombs, because, being a “David versus Goliath” situation, they had to prepare themselves, in their humility, to maintain a long confrontation with the maximum of their operational capacity, so he did not jettison his external stores.
He began a rapid descent, seeking speed and low-level flight to avoid being detected by the radar of any British frigate, which would give their position to those pursuing them. Meanwhile, the Mirage section commander carried out the first heroic action of the Argentine Air Force in this war and On the first mission of the same, he demonstrated the immensity of his heart. Despite having minimal fuel, and knowing that he might not have enough to return to the mainland, upon hearing what was happening over the radio, he returned to the Islands, risking the lives of both himself and his wingman. By placing himself between the A-4Bs and the Harriers, his aggressive stance managed to rout the enemy, whom he encountered in the air.



Then they returned—the section and the squadron—to their home base on the mainland, landing the Mirage IIIs, as we say in aviation jargon, "without juice," that is, almost out of fuel.

The first page of our Air Force's history in this war had just been written, and we could already say with pride: those are some of our own! We were waiting for them on the ground to give them a hug.

I remember that "Paco" told us that if he had any problems with his Mirage, he would attempt to land on the Puerto runway. Argentinian, since it was a shame to lose a plane that had cost the country so much, especially with a runway suitable for emergencies. This would later cost him his life on another mission that same day.

Río Negro Squadron: The third attempt to reach Lake Nahuel Huapi

It took the Navy three expeditions to reach Lake Nahuel Huapi

El Cordillerano

It took the Navy three expeditions to reach Lake Nahuel Huapi

Before the original "Modesta Victoria" expedition, there were other attempts by sailors that failed due to the limited knowledge of the region's rivers.

It took the Argentine Navy three expeditions to reach Nahuel Huapi by river, requiring considerable effort and significant resources. The objective was finally achieved on December 13, 1883, after several failed attempts. The honor fell to then-Lieutenant Eduardo O'Connor, commanding a vessel that would later become emblematic: the "Modesta Victoria."

History also witnessed some setbacks. First, “by decree of December 27, 1880, it was ordered that Commander Erasmo Obligado should lead an expedition to explore the Limay River and Lake Nahuel Huapi, in conjunction with the campaign that General Villegas would conduct as far as the aforementioned lake,” as reported by Alfredo Serres Güiraldes in his book “The Strategy of General Roca” (1979).

The author explained that “the embarked commission was named ‘Exploradora’ (Explorer) and consisted of Commander Erasmo Obligado, Lieutenant Eduardo O’Connor, who commanded the ‘Río Neuquén,’ Second Lieutenant Santiago Albarracín, and pilot Eduardo Moyzes. In total, the personnel numbered 18 men, with the addition of Infantry Lieutenant Jorge Rhode, who had requested to accompany the explorers.”

As can be seen, some of the protagonists lend their surnames to streets in Bariloche, though most people are unaware of why. “On February 25, 1881, they set sail, beginning their journey up the Río Negro. The voyage was arduous due to the difficulties they encountered along the way. They finally arrived at Fort Roca on May 17. From there, they departed on the 26th of the same month for the confluence of the Neuquén and Limay rivers.”

The account indicates that “initially, the expedition members attempted to navigate the Neuquén River, but the shallow waters prevented them from doing so. Therefore, they headed towards the Limay, but after a short distance, they found it difficult to continue navigating, also due to the low water levels.” At that time, the dams had not yet altered the river flows.

According to Serres Güiraldes, “in view of these setbacks, Obligado ordered Lieutenant O’Connor to continue navigating upstream with a boat and its crew. After covering 18 miles, he returned on April 1st. The ‘Río Neuquén’ remained at the Neuquén Pass awaiting the return of Villegas’s expedition. On May 25th, Villegas agreed with Commander Obligado to conclude the exploration of the Limay River, and the ship returned to Carmen de Patagones.”

Persistence

There was no room for discouragement. “Commander Obligado quickly prepared and launched a new expedition to the Limay River. This time, he chose the ship ‘Río Negro,’ which, due to its greater speed, would be better suited to overcome the force of the current. At the time the voyage began, the river was high, which facilitated the ship’s movement.” Things had started better. “Thus, on October 14, 1881, they met in Choele Choel. Colonel Vintter, temporarily in charge of the division, ordered, as a safety measure, that 50 men under the command of Captain Juan Gómez escort the steamship overland. Luck continued to favor the crew, as the Limay River was also carrying more water, reaching its confluence at the Collón Curá.”

But their good fortune only lasted up to that point. “From that point on, they were unable to continue their voyage, as the current kept throwing the ship against a rocky outcrop they named Río Negro (Black River). Faced with this impossibility, Obligado decided to continue the journey in a rowboat with sails, but for most of the voyage they had to tow the boat, and on some occasions, they had to haul the vessel out of the water and carry it by hand.”

Serres Güiraldes' account, based on that of González Lonzieme, published in the Naval Center Bulletin (1964), states that “thus, through a superhuman effort, they reached, on November 18, the place where Villarino had begun his return journey in 1783. But, from that point, a new obstacle was added to the many they had faced. On November 23, the Sayhueque Indians blocked their passage, forcing them to turn back.”

The reconstruction indicates that “faced with this insurmountable setback, with the few men they had, they had to return to where the ‘Río Negro’ was moored and, once aboard, continue their journey to Carmen de Patagones.

This second voyage demonstrated that navigation by ship to Nahuel Huapi was impossible. But it allowed them to carry out a series of
of geographical surveys of the banks of the Negro and Limay rivers.”

The “third” expedition is underway.

Obviously, “Obligado did not cease in his efforts to reach Nahuel Huapi by river. On October 31, 1882, the preparations were complete, and they set sail again on the ‘Río Negro.’ The voyage was faster thanks to the lessons learned on previous trips. This increased speed allowed them to reach the confluence of the Neuquén and Limay rivers on December 19, turning the bow of the ‘Río Negro’ once more upstream to the Río Negro rock, where they moored the boat.”

This time, it seemed that everything was in their favor. “As before, Obligado continued the journey in a launch, but with better luck since the indigenous people did not bother them. They only had to contend with the current, the rapids, the whirlpools, and the large logs carried by the current.” All these obstacles contributed to once again thwarting the aspiration to reach the lake.

Ironically, fate did not grant Obligado the joy of reaching Lake Nahuel Huapi, as he was appointed by the government to a mission in Europe. Lieutenant O’Connor was left in charge of the expedition. The Río Negro was under the command of Lieutenant Wilson, with O’Connor as the expedition leader. After a difficult voyage, including an eight-day grounding near Villa Roca, the Río Negro reached the confluence of the Collon Curá and Limay rivers. After several attempts to overcome the current and continue the journey, they had to moor the ship to the rocky outcrop.

The mission was on the verge of success. From there, O’Connor continued the journey in a specially built launch. As on previous occasions, much of the journey was made while towing. On the 30th, after immense effort, they reached the Traful River, and on December 13th, they entered Lake Nahuel Huapi. The logbook reads: “At 2:40 p.m., the boat, then called Modesta Victoria, triumphantly entered Lake Nahuel Huapi with its long rig and the National Flag flying high.” The epic journey had concluded.

Argentine Navy: Polar Support Vessel Project

Polar Support Vessel Project

Sebastian Perez

@Seba_IndArg

Argentina seeks to recover a capability lost since 1989: a new Argentine polar logistics vessel.
The Tandanor project, designed in conjunction with the Finnish company Aker Arctic, aims to be the ideal partner for the icebreaker ARA Irízar, strengthening our presence in Antarctica.




The project is based on the Aker ARC 133 design but adapted to Antarctic conditions. With a length of 131.5m and a deadweight of 5,000 tons, diesel-electric propulsion, and three generators, it will be able to operate in first-year ice (PC4/PC5 class).





The hull is designed according to the international Polar Classification 4 (PC4) standard. This allows it to operate year-round in thick, old-year ice and to move continuously at 2 knots over ice up to 1 meter thick.


Its unique geometry, unlike that of conventional cargo ships, features a specific curvature in the bow and sides designed to break through ice by weight and displace the ice blocks to the sides, preventing damage to the propellers.

The original plan at Tandanor involved manufacturing the hull using pre-assembled blocks at the Almirante Storni Shipyard, which would then be assembled and welded on the slipway.

The construction of the new vessel requires the use of special naval steels that possess not only high mechanical strength but also exceptional toughness at extremely low temperatures.


The standard for vessels operating in polar waters, due to their ability to resist brittleness in extreme cold, is EH36/EH40. These are the most likely grades for the ice belt.




The technical development involves a key technology transfer. The goal is to decentralize the workload of the ARA Almirante Irízar, allowing it to focus on its role as a heavy icebreaker and scientific laboratory.

This unit seeks to recover the capabilities lost after the sinking of the ARA Bahía Paraíso in 1989. That vessel, built at the Príncipe, Menghi, and Penco shipyards (Buenos Aires), was a landmark of the national naval industry, measuring 132 meters in length and possessing a significant helicopter landing capability.





Today, the project faces budgetary challenges (estimated at over USD 195 million), but its completion is vital for the logistics of Petrel Base and the Antarctic bridge. Recovering a vessel of this class will restore the Argentine Navy's polar transport autonomy.

Liberating Revolution: Should Perón have been Prevented from Escaping in 1955?

Alternate History: The Decapitating Revolution

Introduction – Argentina, 1955: A Country on the Brink

In mid-1955, Argentina was a deeply fractured nation. Juan Domingo Perón had dominated the political scene for almost a decade, leading a government that had radically transformed the country since coming to power in 1946. From the perspective of the working class and the labor movement, the country was experiencing a period of unprecedented social inclusion. Perón had institutionalized labor rights, or, to put it more accurately, had convinced the population that labor laws originated from their own labor. Thus, a robust social safety net had been created, and workers had been empowered as key political actors. The Eva Perón Foundation, even after Evita's death, maintained its welfare-oriented approach among the poorest sectors of society. The economy, however, was experiencing turbulence: the exhaustion of the import-substitution industrialization model, external constraints, rampant inflation, and dwindling reserves were beginning to generate tensions. Even so, the union apparatus and the Peronist machinery maintained a strong capacity for mobilization and resistance. For millions, Perón was the legitimate leader who had dignified the people and embodied a new form of social justice.

At the other end of the spectrum, a significant portion of society—comprising sectors of the middle class, the business elite, broad sectors of the Church, liberal intellectuals, and a large part of the Armed Forces—considered Peronism an authoritarian, populist, and corrupt regime. They accused the government of having co-opted the state apparatus to consolidate a cult of personality, persecute opponents, control the press, and degrade republican institutions. Education had been subverted, transforming everything from kindergarten to high school into a full-fledged cult of personality surrounding the leader. The only ones who resisted were the universities, the intellectuals, and the scientists. Tensions with the Church, particularly after the elimination of religious holidays and the legalization of divorce, escalated to the point of severing a relationship that had been allied in the early years. The political climate became suffocating: newspapers were shut down, censorship was imposed, political parties were banned, and the discourse became increasingly militarized. For the opposition, the defense of the "Republic" justified the use of extreme means, and the most conservative sectors viewed the idea of ​​a military coup as the only way out of the "Peronist onslaught" with growing sympathy.

In this tense and polarized context, the bombing of June 16, 1955, marked a point of no return. The failed assassination attempt, which left more than 300 civilians dead in Plaza de Mayo, demonstrated that the political struggle had crossed the threshold into violence. Three months later, with a military uprising consolidating from Córdoba and the country on the brink of civil war, Perón understood that his continued presence would only mean more bloodshed. On September 19, he submitted his resignation and went into exile, leaving a power vacuum that the Liberating Revolution would rush to fill with proscriptions, persecutions in the form of seeking justice for abuses, and an uncertain promise of "recovered republicanism."

The Flight and Aftermath

Juan Domingo Perón's flight in September 1955 was as dramatic as it was revealing of the political collapse gripping the country. After weeks of escalating instability, with military uprisings from within the country and increasingly weakened support within the Armed Forces themselves, Perón realized that his continued hold on power could trigger an open civil war. On September 19, he submitted his resignation in a letter to General Franklin Lucero, the Minister of the Army, invoking his desire to avoid a "fratricidal catastrophe." From that moment on, a silent but carefully executed withdrawal began.


The general who carried out the execution was Perón, as this clearly states.

Perón spent that night at the Unzué Palace, his official residence, from where he secretly departed at dawn on September 20. In another letter, to his aide-de-camp, he asked him to bring a list of items from his house, including photos of his 15-year-old lover. He was taken to the Navy arsenal in Río Santiago, where he remained hidden under naval protection, disguised in a sailor's uniform to avoid being recognized. From there, he was taken by launch to a Paraguayan ship anchored in the Río de la Plata—the Paraguay, a diplomatic gunboat—which transported him under political asylum to Asunción, with the approval of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner.

Paraguay was merely a stopover. Perón spent a few days there in precarious conditions and under the constant threat of being handed over to the new Argentine military command. Determined to avoid that possibility, he quickly sought a safer destination. He first traveled to Panama, a country that traditionally offered asylum to Latin American exiles, and from there began a long journey that would later take him to Nicaragua, Venezuela, and finally to his longest exile in Spain, under the Franco regime.

In those early days, however, Perón's exile was neither comfortable nor safe. He traveled with provisional documents, without guarantees of stable diplomatic protection, and in many cases had to rely on the help of personal friends, contacts within the Peronist movement, and allied Latin American governments. Meanwhile, in Argentina, the so-called Liberating Revolution was beginning, promising to restore the "republic" but quickly adopting a systematic policy of proscription, persecution, and repression against Peronism, which would seal the country's political fracture for decades.

EMcL

Decree Creating the Military Commandancy of the Malvinas Islands

Decree Creating the Military Commandancy of the Malvinas Islands and Adjacent Coasts

Dedicated to the British bastards occupying what is ours!

Handwritten copy of the Decree establishing a Military Commandancy in the Malvinas Islands and adjacent coasts, Buenos Aires — dated 10 June 1829.

TRANSCRIPTION:

When, through the glorious revolution of 25 May 1810, these provinces separated themselves from the rule of the Mother Country, Spain possessed a material portion of the Malvinas Islands and of all the others surrounding Cape Horn, including that known by the name of Tierra del Fuego, that possession being justified by the right of first occupant, by the recognition of the principal maritime powers of Europe, and by the proximity of these islands to the mainland that formed the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, upon whose Sovereign they depended. For this reason, the Government of the Republic, having succeeded to all the rights which the former Mother Country held over these provinces and which its viceroys enjoyed, has continued to exercise acts of dominion over the said islands, their ports and coasts, despite the fact that circumstances have not hitherto permitted that part of the Republic’s territory to receive the attention and care that its importance requires.

But as it is necessary no longer to delay the measures that may safeguard the rights of the Republic, while at the same time enabling it to enjoy the advantages that the products of those islands may provide and ensuring the protection due to their population, the Government has resolved to decree:

Article 1. The Malvinas Islands and those adjacent to Cape Horn in the Atlantic Ocean shall be governed by a political and military commander to be appointed immediately by the Government of the Republic.

Article 2. The residence of the political and military commander shall be on Soledad Island, and there a battery shall be established under the flag of the Republic.

—End of Part 1—

South Georgias: Operational Debut of the Argentine Army Aviation

Courage Under Fire

On 3 April, a Navy Alouette, crewed by Lieutenant Remo Busson, Sub-Lieutenant Guillermo Guerra and Second Petty Officer Julio Gatti, carried out an armed reconnaissance over the area.

Following this reconnaissance, which met with no opposition, the landing of the Marines was ordered to begin aboard the Argentine Army’s Puma helicopter, crewed by Lieutenants Alejandro Villagra and Eduardo López Leguizamón, and Sergeant Jorge Díaz Medín. In the first wave, a group of 15 Argentine Marines under Lieutenant Luna was landed.

The second wave was then carried out. It took off from ARA Bahía Paraíso in a Puma helicopter, transporting Sub-Lieutenant Giusti and another 14 Marines, with the aim of landing in an area different from that of the first wave. During the approach, both helicopters came within range of British weapons, which opened intense fire, mainly directed at the Puma aircraft.

Although the Puma was struck by a large number of rounds, this did not prevent the pilot from crossing the bay and making an emergency landing on the opposite shore from where the British were positioned, at a distance of approximately 500 metres.

From the Alouette, Sub-Lieutenant Guerra disembarked with a MAG machine gun and, together with Sergeant Díaz Medín, provided support so that the helicopter could evacuate the wounded and the dead, and the landing of the Marines could continue. In that attack, the conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila were killed, while four other men were wounded.

This historic event was the baptism of fire of Argentine Aviation, and all the aircraft crew members were decorated.

In the photographs are the now retired Captain Guillermo Guerra of Naval Aviation and the retired Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Villagra of Army Aviation, a Malvinas War veteran.