The last “outfit” of the A-4Q Skyhawk
Sean Eternos los Laureles
This camouflage scheme is a consequence of the massacre of A-4Q “Skyhawks” at the hands of Sea Harriers on 21 May 1982 over San Carlos Strait. They detected them after being tracked by the CIC of HMS “Hermes” and vectored towards them; but when the British pilots reached the estimated area, they did not find the target because the A-4Qs were flying at sea level and the FRS.1’s Blue Fox radar did not have Doppler scan (on the FA.2 it was replaced by the more capable Blue Vixen with pulse-Doppler), so they could not pick up our Skyhawks. However, at the last moment they almost by chance spotted three white dots moving over a dark grey stretch of water in the strait, and that was enough: the Sea Harriers pounced on the Argentine Skyhawks, which at first had not even noticed their presence. Quickly, Márquez’s 3-A-314 was hit by 30 mm ADEN cannon fire from Leeming’s FRS.1 XZ500; and Philippi’s 3-A-307 was struck by an AIM-9L missile from Morrell’s FRS.1 XZ457.
Both were shot down: Márquez was killed in that action, while Philippi managed to eject. Meanwhile, César Arca in 3-A-312 spotted what was happening and began desperate evasive manoeuvres, limited by the low-level flight profile he was maintaining (seeking to “merge” with enemy radars and missiles using ground/sea clutter), until a number of 30 mm ADEN rounds from Morrell’s FRS.1 XZ457 hit him as well. Even so, thanks to his impressive skill on the stick and pedals (he had no other defence), Arca managed to escape with his damaged Skyhawk, and the Sea Harriers, already short of fuel, could not pursue him at sea level, where their Mk.104 Pegasus engines would guzzle kerosene at rates that would prevent them returning to the carrier. Thus, with serious damage and leaking fuel, unable to get back to Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, Arca managed to fly as far as Puerto Argentino in the hope of making an emergency landing on the runway. But controllers on the ground warned him that one leg of the landing gear had not deployed. At that point Arca decided to abandon the aircraft, since landing on the runway was impossible. He ejected while the aircraft continued flying and began to turn, threatening to collide with the pilot already hanging under his parachute—so from the ground the decision was taken to shoot the aircraft down with Argentine anti-aircraft artillery, and it crashed some 400 metres from the runway.
The A-4Qs had already completed their attack on the Type 21 frigate HMS “Ardent”, which was also attacked by other Navy A-4Qs, and by Air Force Daggers and A-4Bs, and ended up sinking (as can be clearly seen in the photos. Attack and sinking of HMS “Ardent”. But during their escape, Philippi’s 1st Section was betrayed by its light grey paint (which from a distance looked white to the Sea Harrier pilots!!!) against the dark South Atlantic, and that proved fatal for Skyhawks in retreat: with no warning systems or active or passive countermeasures, with no weapons to defend themselves (even the 20 mm ammunition for the Colt cannons had already been fired at “Ardent”), and without enough fuel to manoeuvre in air combat and then reach the KC-130H tankers and return to the mainland.
The A-4Qs were cleared to carry AIM-9B Sidewinder missiles; in fact, on 1 and 2 May 1982, two A-4Qs were aboard the aircraft carrier ARA “25 de Mayo” in an air-defence role (the other six A-4Qs were held with bombs to attack enemy ships), when—together with the two Argentine Type 42 destroyers (ARA “Hércules” and ARA “Santísima Trinidad”)—it tried to close within range of the Task Force. Despite having two aircraft carriers equipped with between 24 and 28 Sea Harrier fighters, and having between 6 and 10 escorting destroyers and frigates, the British avoided combat thanks to their higher speed. They could have ended the war that same day if they had managed to destroy the small Argentine naval group, since at all times they knew the Argentine formation’s position—whether through satellite tracking provided by the USA, and also by the nuclear submarine HMS “Spartan”, which from 28 or 29 April was pursuing the Argentine carrier; and even via a Sea Harrier that, while trying to shoot down an Argentine S-2E Tracker, came within range of the Argentine escorts’ Sea Dart missiles and had to break off. The Royal Navy, at the maximum speed its engines could provide, preferred to run away from the Argentine Navy!
It is evident that, face to face—and with sufficient anti-aircraft armament and fuel in the capable Skyhawks, and with our Navy’s experienced pilots—the outcome might have been very different…; because on 1 and 2 May a British naval force two to three times larger than the Argentine naval formation, and with three or more times Argentina’s air capability, the Royal Navy chose to flee for two whole days at full speed rather than confront Argentine sailors with their old aircraft—already suspecting the lethality of our pilots with their ageing mounts and weapons.
But on 21 May the die was cast. Much of the Royal Navy was anchored in San Carlos Bay landing troops, with the rest sailing nearby to block the entry routes of Argentine air attack formations. Thanks to experienced British commanders who planned the defensive scheme well, almost every approach run towards the enemy troop and cargo transports was covered by British escorts, so that Argentine aircraft inevitably ran into frigates or destroyers (which in turn covered one another and were also covered from land by Rapier missile launchers) before our aircraft could reach the transports. Again and again they were forced to bomb escorts without being able to strike the transports. In that picture, the case of HMS “Ardent” was different: in the middle of San Carlos Strait she was shelling Argentine positions at Darwin, seeking to pin them down to prevent them moving towards the San Carlos beachhead—something impossible for our troops, who could only arrive on foot with whatever weapons and ammunition they could carry, exposed to enemy air and naval attacks, to face thousands of well-equipped and well-supported British troops. But the British did not want to risk the entire landing operation because of that. And once again they risked an escort ship to achieve their aims (that is what such ships are for), and HMS “Ardent” was that ship. By harassing Argentine troops ashore, she quickly drew the attention of Argentine aviation and concentrated no fewer than five attack missions involving more than 15 aircraft, which tore her to pieces—while also drawing attacks away from the beachhead. Argentina lost three A-4Q fighter-bombers, curiously—and this is the key detail—because they were painted white, which is how British pilots perceived them from a distance, intercepted them and shot them down. In other circumstances at that distance, aircraft camouflaged like the Air Force Daggers and A-4Bs would have gone unnoticed (not at closer range, where they would still have been spotted by eye). The camouflage scheme of Argentina’s naval Skyhawks, obviously combined with the circumstances and the long-range attack profile—fuel-limited, without passive-defence systems, without self-defence missiles, and flying at sea level as the only form of evasion—proved fatal for the Argentine aircraft.
The Argentine Navy took note of this as operations developed, realising that the US Navy scheme on Argentina’s naval fighter-bombers was not suitable for the South Atlantic. And so, after this incident, they set about “hiding” the conspicuous Skyhawks from the enemy’s eye.
On that basis, several schemes were tested during and after the war, as seen in the images, all of them far more effective than the US Navy’s pearl-grey/white. In the end it was concluded that naval grey was the most suitable, both because these aircraft operated primarily over a naval environment, and because it also proved effective over land—at least in island theatres and along the Patagonian coasts of the South Atlantic. In addition, insignia and numbers were reduced or eliminated to the minimum, although a striking light blue and white rudder was retained, which—while suitable for peacetime—would very likely have been covered or blurred in wartime, in the manner of British Sea Harriers and Harriers during the conflict. On the way to the Malvinas they removed all markings that might stand out to the human eye (or optical sensors) in a theatre like the South Atlantic, even eliminating the white ring of the roundel on wings and fuselage—including on the Vulcans, Victors, Nimrods and Hercules used from Ascension Island, and the Phantoms that provided air defence at Ascension.
On the underside of the Skyhawks, a medium-tone grey was adopted, more compatible with the sky when viewed by enemy anti-aircraft gunners with the aircraft silhouetted against a sky background.
This was the scheme with which the Douglas A-4Q Skyhawk “retired” from the Argentine Navy without receiving an adequate replacement, around 1988, although some aircraft still flew in the old US Navy scheme, since it was known their service life would soon end—as it did—and they did not invest even in paint to camouflage them. Even so, it is obvious that if a mobilisation like those of 1982—or even 1978—had occurred (in 1978 very effective protective schemes had also been tested), it is hard to understand why, as soon as the Argentine mobilisation to respond to the British attack began in 1982 (from 7 April), the Skyhawks were not camouflaged. The Task Force sailed on 5 April towards the Malvinas, but Argentina waited 48 more hours before decreeing a massive mobilisation of troops and equipment to the islands, waiting to see what measures the UN would adopt, since Resolution 502 of 3 April 1982—requiring a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops from the area—was in force for both Argentina and Great Britain. Yet while Argentina, on the very same 2 April 1982 when we recovered the islands, had begun withdrawing troops back to the mainland, five Royal Navy ships (including a nuclear submarine) were already heading towards the Malvinas; and on 5 April the attack began when the Task Force sailed from Portsmouth. By 7 April, in the face of the UN’s absolute passivity (Argentina always sought to act lawfully and to negotiate—always!), and after the TIAR—which in theory should have led all of the Americas, including the United States, to mobilise to defend Argentina—the UN never even acknowledged it; and the TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), by wrongly considering Argentina the aggressor—impossible, since British aggression dates from 2 January 1833 when it occupied the islands and expelled the Argentine authorities—did not respond. Argentina thus began mobilisation to defend the Malvinas Islands and South Georgia (the first reinforcement troops began arriving in the Malvinas on 11 April, and in South Georgia on 25 April), finally violating Resolution 502—after the British had done so two days earlier. It is obvious there was enough time to reconsider the A-4Q camouflage scheme, yet on 1 May they entered action with an unsuitable scheme, and incredibly on 21 May they still retained it; and worse still, it was expected that by the end of June Great Britain would have to surrender or withdraw from operations because its endurance would run out. At that point Argentina’s Sea Fleet would begin the counterattack to harass them, including the Argentine aircraft carrier with its Skyhawks, of which only 5 or 6 units were then available (with one recovered from Espora), and more incredibly still, they still retained the suicidal US Navy scheme.
P.S.: The scale model was made some years ago by the author of this text. It is actually a 1/72 Douglas A-4A Skyhawk that I had to modify into an A-4B (Q) with putty and parts from a blister-pack of spares to make the in-flight refuelling probe, the VHF aerial and the dorsal Doppler fairing, as well as the arrestor hook, since the kit I bought lacked them. The serial number and insignia are purely hand-painted (using the tip of a wooden toothpick as a “pen”). The Snakeye bombs—like those used by Philippi’s 1st Section in the HMS “Ardent” attack mentioned above, carrying four 227 kg Mk-82s per aircraft—and their bomb rack were leftovers from an F-117 or an A-10 kit, I cannot remember which now, and I added them to complete the model. The aircraft stand with the national colours was actually from a 1/72 Grumman F-4F Wildcat kit, which I had not used because when I built it (in a US Navy 1943 North Atlantic scheme, when the F-6F Hellcat was already taking its place) I built it with the landing gear down; so I later reused it—this time—to display this A-4A configured as an A-4Q (B) of the CANA (later COAN) of the Argentine Navy in an in-flight attack configuration.
