Argentina: British-origin Sailors Death In Argentine Service

British Sailors Death in Argentine Service

Argentina: The 1890 Revolution

The 1890 Revolution

Source: Wikipedia




The Revolution of the Park, also known as the Revolution of 1890, was a civic-military uprising in Argentina on July 26, 1890, led by the recently formed Civic Union, headed by Leandro Alem, Bartolomé Mitre, Aristóbulo del Valle, Bernardo de Irigoyen, Francisco Barroetaveña, and Lionel Laufi, among others. The revolution was defeated by the government, but nevertheless led to the resignation of President Miguel Juárez Celman and his replacement by Vice President Carlos Pellegrini.

In 1889, Argentina was in turmoil: a severe economic crisis had lasted for two years, causing a sharp drop in wages, unemployment, and a wave of strikes unprecedented in the country. The presidency of General Julio Argentino Roca (1880-1886) had been succeeded by that of his brother-in-law, Miguel Juárez Celman, whose government was characterized by accusations of corruption and authoritarianism. His opponents called his administration the Unicato.

On August 20, 1889, an article titled "Yourself, Youth! Rushing Towards Success," signed by Francisco Barroetaveña, appeared in the newspaper La Nación. It shook public opinion, particularly among young people, condemning the lack of moral principles and the support of certain young men for then-President Miguel Juárez Celman. The article stated: 

Amid this general misrule, or the reign of this disastrous regime, which suppresses the nation's legal life, replacing it with abuse and arbitrariness, the first electoral efforts for the future presidency are underway. It is assured that the current President will impose his chosen successor, for he possesses the gold, the concessions, and the necessary force to break malleable characters and suppress any insurrection." The article in La Nación led to the formation of a youth group around Barroetaveña, which, in turn, called a large rally on September 1, 1889, in the Florida Garden of Buenos Aires. There, it was established as the Civic Youth Union, with the aim of uniting the broad spectrum of opponents to the regime of Miguel Juárez Celman, supported by the ruling National Autonomist Party.  

Revolutionary barricade protecting the Artillery Park.



President Juárez Celman was very discredited in 1890.

On December 15, 1889, Lucas Perrón, president of the Civic Youth Union, inaugurated a civic club at the San Juan Evangelista parish in Buenos Aires, with a rally held at the Iris Theater. At the end of the event, the civic leaders were attacked with firearms by a paramilitary group sent by the government. The police present, far from arresting the attackers, violently repressed those attending the rally. The event caused widespread public outrage and is cited as the most immediate trigger of the revolution.[1]

Aristóbulo del Valle recounts that, a few days later, he, Leandro Alem, and Mariano Demaría decided to take up arms. The immediate reason was "to prevent hopeless submission to the Juárez regime."[2] Juan José Romero, Miguel Navarro Viola, and Manuel Ocampo joined the initial group. Around that time, General Manuel J. Campos, a military officer and a close confidant of Bartolomé Mitre, also arrived from Europe. Del Valle then decided to contact him to enlist him in the revolution and thus incorporate Mitre's movement. Campos's response was emphatic: " Count me in and let me know when the time is right."[2] Parallel to the secret contacts preparing the conspiracy, the Civic Youth Union, led by Barroetaveña, sought to broaden its base of popular support in the City of Buenos Aires by organizing a larger political party: the Civic Union. Its stated purpose was: "to form a large political coalition party that would prevail in the electoral struggles, or on the field of action, if the government officials violated the rights of the people through fraud or violence."[3] In January 1890, the economic crisis continued to worsen. Term obligations could not be paid, and a bank run ensued. Panic led merchants to raise prices on basic necessities, and the population was suddenly impoverished. Local elections were held on February 2, but virtually no one turned out to vote. The newspaper El Nacional ran the headline the following day: Leandro Alem, head of the revolution, appointed provisional president. Yesterday's elections will have an epitaph: here lies the right to vote.[4] Public discontent spread, and President Juárez Celman quickly became its scapegoat.


Francisco Barroetaveña called on the youth to form the Civic Union.


Leandro Alem, leader of the revolution, appointed provisional president.

On April 13, 1890, a massive rally was held to found the Civic Union. The call to action was signed by virtually all sectors opposed to the government through their leading representatives. Among those present were former president Bartolomé Mitre and his followers, of oligarchic conservative leanings, as well as Catholic leaders José Manuel Estrada and Pedro Goyena, who actively opposed the secularism of the ruling National Autonomist Party. The organizers included young figures like Juan B. Justo, who a few years later would found the Socialist Party of Argentina, and the lawyer Francisco Barroetaveña, who had mobilized progressive middle-class youth in Buenos Aires. But there was also Bernardo de Irigoyen, who had distanced himself from the ruling party; the historian and former rector of the University of Buenos Aires, Vicente Fidel López; the historical General Juan Andrés Gelly y Obes; the businessman Mariano Billinghurst; and, of course, the popular wing of Alsina's movement, Leandro Alem and Aristóbulo del Valle. Leandro Alem was elected president of the Civic Union. The creation of the Civic Union culminated in a massive march to the Plaza de Mayo. In the front row walked Mitre, Alem, del Valle, Vicente López, and Estrada, arm in arm. Shortly after it began, thousands of people joined the march, filling the streets of the city center and making it the first mass political demonstration in contemporary Argentine history. [5] The demonstration produced a serious political crisis in the government and the immediate resignation of all the ministers.


Aristóbulo del Valle, as a senator, stirred up revolution from his seat. 

The preparations

Once the Civic Union was created, a Revolutionary Junta was formed, and contacts began between opposition political leaders and sectors of the armed forces dissatisfied with the Roca regime. In particular, a military lodge was formed to support the Civic Union, which enjoyed the sympathy of young officers and was known as the Lodge of the 33 Officers. Its leaders were Captain José M. Castro Sumblad, Captain Diego Lamas, Lieutenant Tomás Vallée, and Second Lieutenant José Félix Uriburu. The latter would lead the coup d'état that overthrew Hipólito Yrigoyen 40 years later.[6] The military lodge offered Alem the support of the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Artillery Regiment, the 5th Infantry Regiment, the engineer battalion, a company from the 4th Regiment, and a group of cadets from the Military College. Simultaneously, Alem contacted naval officers, led by Lieutenants Ramón Lira and Eduardo O'Connor, and soon after had the support of the entire fleet. On May 29, 1890, Aristóbulo del Valle, then a national senator, denounced in Congress that the government was issuing currency clandestinely, stating that this was the main cause of the severity of the crisis. Del Valle's denunciation had a significant impact on public opinion and continued to worsen the government's reputation in the following months. During this period, Alem secured the support for the revolution of Brigadier General Domingo Viejobueno, head of the Artillery Park located in Plaza Lavalle, just under a thousand meters from the Casa Rosada. In June 1890, the government defaulted on its foreign debt to Baring Brothers, a fact that caused great discontent among foreign investors.[7] That same month, the Revolutionary Junta was composed of Leandro Alem, Aristóbulo del Valle, Mariano Demaría, Juan José Romero, Manuel A. Ocampo, Miguel Goyena, Lucio V. López, José María Cantilo, Hipólito Yrigoyen, Generals Manuel J. Campos and Domingo Viejobueno, Colonels Julio Figueroa and Martín Irigoyen, and Commander Joaquín Montaña.


José Félix Uriburu, 22 years old in 1890, was one of the organizers of the Lodge of the 33 Officers that supported the Revolution. 

On July 17, 1890, General Campos met with approximately 60 officers and sailors to inform them of the plan. The revolution would erupt on July 21 at 4:00 AM. The rebel forces would concentrate at the Artillery Park, where the Revolutionary Junta would be established and receive orders. Simultaneously, the fleet was to bombard the Casa Rosada (Government House) and the Retiro barracks to prevent government troops from regrouping and force their surrender through a combined land and sea attack. At the same time, militia groups were to take President Juárez Celman, Vice President Pellegrini, Minister of War General Levalle, and Senate President Julio A. Roca prisoner, and sever the railway and telegraph lines. The marginal role assigned to the militia was resisted by Alem, who sought to give the revolution a strong civilian character, but ultimately the opinion of the military leaders prevailed.

At that same meeting, Campos announced that the 11th Cavalry Regiment, led by General Palma, was joining the revolution. The announcement had a tremendous impact on the revolutionaries, as it was the unit most loyal to the government. However, it was a trap. The following day, Friday, July 18, the military leader of the revolution, Manuel J. Campos, and other military leaders such as Figueroa, Casariego, and Garaita, were arrested by the government on charges of conspiracy. Thus, the revolution was initially thwarted. In the days following General Campos's arrest, two historical events occurred that have been much debated and which, from the beginning, have been linked to what has come to be called "the secret of the Revolution of 1890." [8] First, the investigation into the conspiracy was assigned to a military officer sympathetic to the Civic Union, which is why the essential details were never fully known to the government. Second, General Julio A. Roca held a secret meeting with General Campos at his place of detention, the content of which is unknown. Furthermore, during his detention, General Campos convinced the commanders of the 10th Infantry Battalion, where he was being held, to join the revolution. All historians have highlighted these mysterious aspects of the Revolution of 1890 and have mentioned the possibility of an agreement between Generals Campos and Roca, as well as a secret plan by the latter to exploit the revolution for his own benefit.


Entrance to the Artillery Park located opposite Plaza Lavalle, on the site later occupied by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.

On Wednesday, July 23, General Campos sent word to Alem that the insurrection had to continue, and that he was ready to leave on the day chosen for the uprising. On Friday, July 25, the Revolutionary Junta decided to begin the armed uprising the following day at 4:00 a.m. At that meeting, it was also decided that Leandro Alem would assume the position of provisional president, and the ministers and the chief of police were appointed. Finally, the Revolutionary Manifesto, drafted by Lucio V. López and Aristóbulo del Valle, was approved.

The armed struggle

Saturday, July 26

Position of the forces. In blue, the government; in red, the rebels.

On Saturday, July 26, between 4:00 a.m. (still dark) and 8:00 a.m., troops from both sides took up positions. The center of the fighting was located in Lavalle and Libertad squares and the adjacent streets, belonging to the San Nicolás neighborhood. The military action of the naval fleet, also in rebellion, was also involved.

The revolutionary troops

The armed uprising began in the early morning of Saturday, July 26, 1890.

At 4:00 a.m., Alem, at the head of an armed civic regiment, seized the strategic Artillery Park of the City of Buenos Aires, present-day Plaza Lavalle (where the Supreme Court building now stands), located 900 meters from the Government House, across from the recently begun construction of the Colón Theater.

Simultaneously, from Palermo, in the northern part of the city:

• Colonel Figueroa, with the help of Colonel Mariano Espina, led a mutiny in the 9th Infantry Regiment, aided by a strange order given to the 11th Cavalry Regiment, which was guarding it, to go out for target practice at dawn. The order has been attributed to Roca.[9]
• Aristóbulo del Valle and Hipólito Yrigoyen managed to incite a rebellion among the cadets of the Military College;
• General Manuel J. Campos led a mutiny in the 10th Infantry Battalion where he was being held;
• Captains Manuel Roldán and Luis Fernández led a rebellion in the strategic 1st Artillery Regiment, with its new Krupp 75 cannons under the command of Major Ricardo Day.

All these troops assembled and marched together as the Northern Column toward the Artillery Park, arriving at approximately 6:00 a.m. Other rebel military units and hundreds of "civic" militiamen also joined them, totaling some 1,300 soldiers,[10] around 2,500 militiamen,[11] and all the artillery in the capital.

Meanwhile, from the south, the 5th Infantry Battalion, located near Constitución Station at the corner of Garay and Sarandí streets, also rose up and marched toward the Park, under the command of Commander Ruiz and Major Bravo.

Also during the early morning hours, Lieutenant Commander Eduardo O'Connor led a mutiny of most of the naval squadron stationed at the port of La Boca del Riachuelo, south of the Casa Rosada. The revolutionary ships were the flagship cruiser Patagonia, the Villarino, the torpedo boat Maipú, and the monitor Los Andes. Taking control of the fleet took some time because of a bloody armed confrontation at Maipú, and because the loyal Admiral Cordero managed to maneuver the battleship Los Andes to hinder the revolutionaries' actions, until the ship's own crew mutinied and stopped him.

Finally, the revolutionary troops had the support of armed civilians organized into "civic militias." Most of the civilian militiamen joined the cantons, where they were placed under the command of the local commander. However, the main body of the civic militias was the Citizen Legion, which comprised some 400 fighters and was commanded by Fermín Rodríguez, President of the Independent Club of Concepción and member of the Executive Board of the Civic Union; Emilio Gouchón was the second-in-command. The Citizen Legion was organized into five battalions, commanded by José S. Arévalo, Enrique S. Pérez, José Camilo Crotto (who years later would become governor of the Province of Buenos Aires for the UCR), Francisco Ramos, and José L. Caro, respectively.

During the Revolution, another organized militia corps was also formed: the Buenos Aires Civic Battalion, formed and commanded by Colonel Dr. Juan José Castro, with Commander Pedro Campos as second-in-command. The Buenos Aires Battalion was organized with a headquarters staff, six grenadier companies, one rifle company, and four additional civic companies.[12]

Government troops

Meanwhile, loyalist troops also began to assemble very early, as several government officials learned of the uprising first thing in the morning.

The main site where government forces concentrated was Retiro, in the northeastern part of the city. There, on the site of what is now Plaza San Martín, stood an important barracks. The Retiro railway terminal was also located there, strategically important for bringing in troops stationed in the provinces. At 6:00 a.m., key government figures established themselves in Retiro: President Miguel Juárez Celman, Vice President Carlos Pellegrini, President of the Senate Julio A. Roca, Minister of War General Nicolás Levalle, who would assume direct command of the loyalist troops, and Chief of Police Colonel Alberto Capdevila.

Since all the artillery had fallen into rebel hands, Levalle had three small cannons brought to Retiro from the Riachuelo Port Prefecture base, where they were used for salutes, and another used for training at the Military Academy.

Meanwhile, some 3,000 police officers concentrated at the Police Department, on the southwestern edge of the Monserrat neighborhood, at what are now Moreno and Virrey Cevallos streets.

The Casa Rosada was essentially undefended, guarded only by a few police officers.

Once the government convened at the Retiro barracks, Pellegrini and Roca recommended that President Juárez Celman leave Buenos Aires for Campana. Juárez Celman objected, rightly suspecting an internal conspiracy, but the cabinet's unanimity left him no room to defend his position. Thus, political power fell into the hands of Pellegrini and Roca.


Revolutionary poster.

General Campos orders everyone to stay inside the park

Once the revolutionary troops were concentrated in the Artillery Park, General Manuel J. Campos changed the plan established the previous night. Instead of attacking the government positions and taking the Casa Rosada (Government House), he ordered them to remain inside the park.

This decision by Campos has been the subject of much analysis. The vast majority of historians agree that Campos had reached a secret agreement with Julio A. Roca days earlier, when the latter visited him while he was detained. Apparently, Roca encouraged the uprising in order to bring about the fall of President Juárez Celman and, at the same time, prevent the rebel forces from launching an offensive and defeating the government troops—an outcome that would have installed Leandro Alem as provisional president and ended the power of the all-powerful National Autonomist Party—through his secret agreement with General Campos.

The arguments given by General Campos for making such a decision varied throughout the day and, in some cases, became absurd. He initially maintained that the soldiers needed to get to know each other and that they needed to be fed. He then claimed he was waiting for loyal troops to defect to the revolution, and later argued that his plan was to lure government forces into Plaza Lavalle via Viamonte and Tucumán streets and defeat them in a single, decisive battle.

By remaining within the park, General Campos allowed the government, first, to organize in Retiro, and then to launch an offensive against the revolutionaries' positions, while fresh troops from the provinces joined the government forces. Furthermore, many troops who had been waiting for the rebel offensive to switch sides, such as the police guarding the central barracks and some regiments from the Province of Buenos Aires, ultimately decided against it due to the revolutionaries' inaction.

Leandro Alem initially questioned General Campos's decision because it deviated from the revolutionary plan, but he eventually accepted it without fully realizing that it significantly jeopardized the revolution's chances of success. Alem himself later acknowledges this serious error in his year-end report to the Civic Union on the events of July:

I agreed to the modifications to the revolutionary military plan, which the general of our army made to me at that crucial moment, invoking the aforementioned arguments and others of that nature; and consequently, I sent the summonses to the heads of government bodies and the chief of police. I acknowledge that it was a grave error to have accepted these modifications to the military plan, which had been quite successful beforehand; but since these were military operations, to which the Army general raised so many objections, I ended up yielding. For me, the failure of the revolution consisted in the fact that the military plan drawn up by the Revolutionary Junta was not executed. Now understanding the immense significance of that modification to the aforementioned plan, I see that I should have submitted such a radical modification of the revolutionary movement to a war council, and not accepted such a responsibility alone.[13]

General Campos then ordered the defense of the Park, and to that end, he had Krupp cannons installed at the six street corners guarding the entrances. Major Ricardo Day carried out this task, with the assistance of Captains Roldán and Fernández and Lieutenant Layera. The batteries located at the corner of Talcahuano and Viamonte streets, at the entrance to the Avellaneda School, one block from the Park on the same side of the street, would prove particularly critical.


The Miró Palace, used as the main revolutionary headquarters, was demolished in 1937.

The cantons

The civilians who went to the Park to join the revolution received weapons there and orders to set up cantonments and barricades at the street corners surrounding the Park. The cantonments were military outposts set up in houses strategically located on street corners. Both revolutionaries and loyal troops would take over these houses and position themselves on the rooftops, balconies, and windows, from where they would attack any approaching enemy force. The revolutionary cantonments were often combined with barricades made from the cobblestones of the streets.

It is estimated that there were about 50 revolutionary cantonments, concentrated in an area of ​​about 100 city blocks, where some 2,500 civic militiamen were stationed, who wore white berets to distinguish themselves. To the north, they extended as far as Paraguay Street (three blocks from the Park); to the south, they reached Moreno Street, in front of the Police Headquarters, eight blocks from the Park; To the west, they reached Junín Street, seven blocks from the park, and to the east, Suipacha Street, four blocks away.

The most important garrison was established in the Miró Palace, a large mansion with gardens located across from Lavalle Square, with its buildings near the corner of Libertad and Viamonte Streets. It was initially commanded by Major Carmelo Cabrera and later by Captain Cortina. The Miró Palace garrison eventually had 100 combatants and a machine gun on the roof. The battles caused it extensive damage.

Another important garrison was established at the Avellaneda School, on the corner of Viamonte and Talcahuano Streets, where a battery of cannons was also installed. Due to the number of deaths there, it became known as the Corner of Death. Among the combatants who died there were General Campos's brother, Colonel Julio Campos, and Captain Manuel Roldán, one of the founders of the Lodge of the 33 Officers.

Also of importance was the General Mitre Cantonment, one of the most advanced and the one that suffered the most attacks. It was located at Córdoba and Talcahuano streets and under the command of Colonel Juan José Castro. Among the combatants who died in this cantonment was the child N. Díaz, in charge of the drum corps.[12]

The Frontón Buenos Aires Cantonment was located on Viamonte Street between Libertad and Cerrito streets. It was in constant combat and was completely surrounded by government forces without surrendering.

Other important cantonments were:

• "Julio Campos" Canton, named in honor of the colonel killed in combat, located at Rivadavia and Santiago del Estero (SE corner), under the command of Francisco Fernández;
• Lavalle and Cerrito (SE corner) under the command of Lieutenant Leandro Anaya, who years later, during the government of Hipólito Yrigoyen, would be Commander-in-Chief of the Army;
• Talcahuano and Piedad (today Bartolomé Mitre). It was very important because it occupied three corners. It was commanded by the militiaman Mariano H. De la Riestra (see photo);
• Lavalle 1439, between Uruguay and Paraná, under the command of militiaman Luis N. Basil;
• Canton No. 1, located in Libertad between Lavalle and Tucumán, under the command of Captain Augusto C. Fortunato;
• Lavalle and Paraná, under the command of Captain D. Gualberto V. Ruiz;
• Talcahuano and Lavalle (SE Angle), probably located in the Café del Parque, under the command of the militiaman Domingo A. Bravo, where the civilian leaders of the revolution used to be located;
• Paraná and Tucumán (N:W angle), under the command of the cadet of the Military College Ramón Tristán;
• Rivadavia and Junín (northwest corner) under the command of militiaman Antonio Martínez;
• Lavalle, between Libertad and Cerrito (almost at the corner of Libertad, on the right) remained in constant combat for three days; and was under the command of the Spanish marksman José López;
• "General Campos" Canton, in Rivadavia and Rodríguez Peña (NW corner) under the command of the militiaman and lawyer Carlos D. Benítez;
• "Libertad" Canton in Lavalle and Callao, under the command of militiaman Eduardo Farías;
• Uruguay between Tucumán and Viamonte, under the command of the militiaman Alejandro Suárez;
• Artes (today Pellegrini) 526, under the command of militiaman José Fernández.[12]

The well-known El Molino confectionery shop also served as a revolutionary stronghold, as did the Jesuit church and convent of El Salvador, located on the block bordered by Lavalle, Callao, Tucumán, and Riobamba streets.

The rebels also organized field hospitals at the front, staffed by volunteer doctors and students. Among them were Dr. Julio Fernández Villanueva, who died at the intersection of Libertad and Viamonte streets rescuing the wounded; medical student Elvira Rawson, who would later become the country's second female doctor and a prominent feminist; and Dr. Juan B. Justo, who six years later would found the Socialist Party.

Initial errors

The revolutionary plan included the arrest of government leaders: Miguel Juárez Celman, Carlos Pellegrini, Julio A. Roca, and General Nicolás Levalle. This action was crucial not only to disrupt the government but also to prevent a civil war, which would have been likely to erupt should the revolution initially succeed. In the event of such a success, the government was expected to consolidate its power in the provinces and reorganize from there.

The task should have been carried out by civilian militiamen, but for reasons that were never fully clarified, the arrests were not made. The underlying reason appears to have been the highly deficient organization of the mission by the Revolutionary Junta of the Civic Union.

The failure to arrest the government leaders allowed for the rapid organization of loyalist forces and contributed significantly to the revolution's defeat.

Another major initial error was related to the amount of ammunition available to the revolutionaries. At the outset of the movement, civilian and military leaders estimated that the Artillery Park held 510,000 rounds of Remington ammunition. However, it wasn't until the midpoint of the fighting that the revolutionaries realized the ammunition supply was less than half the estimated amount. Some sources have attributed this discrepancy to rampant government corruption and falsification of records; others have maintained that the confusion regarding the actual quantity of ammunition was deliberately sown by General Campos to lead to the revolution's defeat, or that the revolution's leaders made the egregious error of failing to personally verify the stockpiles.

There were also difficulties communicating with the rebel fleet. The plan called for signals to be sent via balloons. However, the balloons could not be obtained, disrupting communication with the fleet and hindering the coordination of actions.

First battles

Early in the morning, Police Commander Ramón Falcón arrived at the Park to take command of the police troops guarding it, but was detained by the revolutionaries.[14] Several years later, Falcón would be appointed Chief of Police and order a bloody crackdown on a union march, before being assassinated in an anarchist attack.

Between 8:30 and 9:00, a heavy exchange of gunfire took place at the intersection of Paraná and Corrientes streets. At the same time, two large columns of police, each with 100 men, led by Major Toscano, attacked the rebel positions on Cerrito Street, along Viamonte and Lavalle streets. In the latter case, the police, led by Commissioner Sosa, attempted to reach Lavalle Square in three streetcars. The attack was repelled by several battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Espina, who openly disagreed with General Campos's passive stance. They were supported by militias from the civic cantonments and barricades, and by artillery positioned in Plaza Lavalle. The fighting resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. Among the wounded was the Chief of Police himself, Colonel Capdevila.


Revolutionaries were also present in the Piedad (Mitre) and Talcahuano area.


The cruiser "Patagonia," flagship of the revolutionary fleet, bombarded Buenos Aires.

The naval bombardment

The rebel fleet, despite serious communication problems with the rebel leaders in the Park, sailed from its base at the mouth of the Riachuelo River, positioned itself behind the Casa Rosada (Government House), and began randomly bombarding the Retiro Barracks, the Police Headquarters, the surrounding area in the south of the city, and the Casa Rosada itself. In two days, they would fire 154 shells at the city.[15]

The effectiveness of the fleet's attack was reduced because, on the one hand, it lacked the means to verify the targets and coordinate with ground troops. On the other hand, the foreign warships in the port of Buenos Aires, especially the USS Tulapoose, ordered the rebel fleet to cease bombarding the city. For this action, the American sailors would later be decorated by the Argentine government.


Military operations during Revolution 90. Government forces are shown in blue, revolutionary forces in red.

From the Battle of Plaza Libertad to the Battle of Plaza Lavalle

Shortly after, mid-morning, General Levalle personally organized a large force composed of cavalry, infantry, and police, and marched from Retiro through Santa Fe and then along Cerrito. Upon entering Plaza Libertad, the government troops were met with a fierce attack from the civic cantonments located on Paraguay Street and the bell tower of the Church of Las Victorias (corner of Paraguay and Libertad). The government cavalry attacked the cantonments, but suffered heavy casualties and the forces scattered. It has been estimated that there were more than 300 dead and wounded in the official ranks alone. Levalle himself was thrown from his horse.

Meanwhile, the rebels' cannons systematically bombarded the government positions.

As evening approached, the revolutionaries under the command of Second Lieutenant Balaguer were preparing to occupy Plaza Libertad. At that moment, General Campos made another controversial decision, ordering Second Lieutenant José Félix Uriburu to carry the order to immediately suspend the offensive and return to the Park.[16]

Once again, Campos's decision allowed government forces to reorganize and capture Plaza Libertad that afternoon, where they established their headquarters and Carlos Pellegrini himself set up his office.

Shortly afterward, government forces, prevented from advancing along Libertad or Talcahuano Streets toward Plaza Lavalle due to the massive fortifications of the Miró Palace and the cannons commanded by Day, made the bold decision to cut through the blocks facing Plaza Libertad. In this way, they were able to reach the corner of Viamonte and Libertad and establish themselves opposite the Miró Palace fortifications and on the northeast corner of Plaza Lavalle, where they also positioned one of their cannons. Thus, the center of the fighting shifted to Plaza Lavalle, which became a major battlefield.

Having secured that position, Levalle ordered another advance along Talcahuano Street against the revolutionary positions in Lavalle Square. Discovered by the garrisons located on Talcahuano Street (the General Mitre garrison, the Miró Palace garrison, and the Avellaneda School garrison), the government troops suffered a fierce attack from the battalion led by Colonel Espina and supported by Major Day's cannons. The loyalist forces were completely decimated. It was in this battle that a large number of the soldiers and militiamen defending the Avellaneda School garrison were killed, among them Colonel Julio Campos, brother of the revolutionary leader, who was also responsible for transporting weapons to the rebel troops in the city of La Plata. The place became known as "Death Corner." Also among the dead from the General Mitre garrison, at the corner of Talcahuano and Córdoba streets, was the young N. Díaz, a drummer boy for the revolutionary troops.

Under these conditions, night fell and the fighting practically ceased. The revolutionaries used the night to consolidate their positions and expand their cantons.

Sunday, July 27

Battle in Córdoba and Talcahuano and ceasefire

July 27th dawned with a dense fog. At first light, General Levalle again ordered an attack by government troops against the revolutionary positions along Talcahuano Street. The loyalist troops then advanced, using bales of hay for cover. The "Bartolomé Mitre Canton," located at the intersection of Córdoba and Talcahuano streets, was the crucial point of the battle for more than two hours. Finally, the batteries of Major Day, who had positioned a second cannon on Talcahuano Street, decided the battle, causing a large number of deaths. Under these circumstances, Colonel Mariano Espina, disregarding Campos' orders, counterattacked along Talcahuano Street, intending to attack Plaza Libertad from the left flank. The fighting became hand-to-hand combat, with bayonets used, and loyalist positions were taken house by house, supported by Day's artillery. At 10:00 AM, the battle was at its height when bugles from both sides sounded, ordering a ceasefire. The Truce: By mid-morning, General Campos announced that ammunition was running out and that it was necessary to request a truce, using the excuse of burying the dead, in order to obtain more ammunition. It was a most peculiar situation. Apparently, the ammunition stocks in the Park were less than half of what had been reported the previous day. Shortly afterward, Leandro Alem said:


The Krupp 75mm cannons in the hands of the revolutionaries turned the tide of the fighting.

At once I saw that it was a serious fault for a military leader not to have checked the war materiel when he arrived at the Park, but I did not want to make recriminations to him at that supreme moment of fierce fighting.[13]

The Revolutionary Junta then maintained that the decisive attack should be launched immediately, but General Campos again refused. The civilian leaders even considered removing Campos,[17] but did not dare and agreed to request a truce. Historian Cabral argues that this decision was the immediate cause of the revolution's defeat.[18] Time strengthened the government, which awaited new troops and artillery from the provinces. Apparently, the revolutionary leaders, and especially Alem, failed to grasp the role Campos was playing and once again accepted his proposals in order not to jeopardize the alliance with the military.

Shortly afterward, Aristóbulo del Valle, representing the Revolutionary Junta, went to Plaza Libertad, where the government headquarters was located, and met there with Carlos Pellegrini. They agreed to a 24-hour truce to bury the dead.

While the Revolutionary Junta sent some delegates, including José María Rosa, to the fleet in search of ammunition, they only obtained a small amount.

Meanwhile, the revolutionaries took advantage of the truce to spread the ideas that inspired the Civic Union among the rebels and the population. The revolution had the decisive support of the popular magazine Don Quijote (1884-1905), whose driving force was the cartoonists Eduardo Sojo (Demócrito) and Manuel Mayol Rubio (Heraclito).[19] Leandro N. Alem would later say that the Parque Revolution was made by the people and "Don Quijote".[20]

Furthermore, the revolution had the support of Mauricio G. Alemann, owner of the newspaper Argentinisches Tageblatt, who provided his printing press to print the revolutionary proclamation and pamphlets.[21]

Dardo Rocha's mediation

Taking advantage of the truce, several prominent figures, including Dardo Rocha, the banker Ernesto Tornquist, Luis Sáenz Peña, General Benjamín Victorica, and Eduardo Madero, began acting as mediators.

The revolutionaries set two fundamental conditions: amnesty for all participants and the president's resignation.

Initially, Vice President Carlos Pellegrini, who would have become president following President Juárez Celman's resignation, accepted the proposal. However, he later opposed it upon learning that Roca was also negotiating the vice president's resignation.

Monday, July 28

Day's Plan and the Decision to Capitulate: That afternoon, a meeting of the War Council was held in the Park, with the participation of the Revolutionary Junta. General Campos reported that there was no ammunition to continue the fight. Immediately, other officers argued that the insurrection had to be stopped. Against the general opinion, Major Day maintained that they had to continue and proposed a plan: to advance the revolutionary lines in two simultaneous directions, through Talcahuano and through Lavalle, until they reached the Río de la Plata from both sides. In this way, the government would be surrounded on both flanks in a triangle whose base would be the river where the rebel fleet was located. [22] Day's plan was rejected, and the decision to capitulate was made.

Immediately afterward, and while the Junta was still meeting, the fighting resumed. Espina had given orders to attack because the truce had ended. He was immediately ordered to halt the attack, but his attitude demonstrated the discontent of a large part of the revolutionaries with the surrender.

Tuesday, July 29

On Tuesday, July 29, the capitulation was signed at the Miró Palace, stipulating the terms of surrender and the troop disarmament process.

Despite the surrender signed by the revolutionary leaders, the cantons refused to disarm and continued fighting, some even into the following day. That afternoon, the last death of the revolution occurred: that of Lieutenant Manuel Urizar, attached to the Artillery Park.

At dusk, Leandro Alem was the last to leave the Park. He walked alone toward Talcahuano and Lavalle streets, where a group of soldiers refused to surrender. A second lieutenant shouted to him that he was in danger. When Alem didn't respond, the second lieutenant ran and tackled him just as a volley of rifle fire passed over his head. [23]

Consequences of the Park Revolution

The victims

The number of victims of the Revolution of 1890 has never been definitively established. Different sources cite figures ranging from 150[24] to 300 dead,[25] or, more indiscriminately, 1,500 casualties, including both dead and wounded.[26]

A pantheon was erected in the Recoleta Cemetery in memory of those who fell in the Revolution of the Park. Since then, every year, the Radical Civic Union has held a march with strong political undertones from the city center to the pantheon.

Leandro Alem and the Radical presidents Hipólito Yrigoyen, Arturo Illia, and Raúl Alfonsín are also buried in the Pantheon of the Fallen in the Revolution of the Park.

Acts of Revenge and Repression for the Revolution of '90: Although the armistice signed on July 29 stipulated that no reprisals would be taken against the revolutionaries, in the following months several massacres occurred, clearly motivated by revenge for the uprising and a warning about the consequences of future attempts.

In Saladas (Corrientes province), a repression of opponents took place, known as the Saladas Massacre, in which Manuel Acuña, Castor Rodríguez, and Pedro Galarza were killed.

Something similar occurred in 1891, with a small mutiny in the then national territory of Formosa by some veterans of the Revolution of '90, which ended with the execution of the ringleaders after a "trial by proxy" that was not recorded.[27]

Political consequences

Once the revolution was defeated, the Senate met to discuss what had happened. On that occasion, Senator Manuel D. Pizarro, from Córdoba and a supporter of Roca, uttered a phrase that became historic: "

The revolution is defeated, but the government is dead."
In that speech, Pizarro argued that, given the gravity of the situation, the President and all the senators should resign.

On August 6, 1890, a week after the surrender, President Miguel Juárez Celman submitted his resignation, which was immediately accepted. Vice President Carlos Pellegrini assumed the presidency and appointed Julio A. Roca as his Minister of the Interior.

It is evident that Roca acted secretly in numerous ways to influence the course of the Revolution of 1890 and its consequences. After the insurrection ended, Roca emerged the most powerful. On September 23, 1890, he wrote the following to García Merou: "

It has been a great blessing and providence for the Republic that the Revolution did not triumph and that Juárez did not emerge victorious." I saw this solution clearly from the very beginning, and I set to work on it. Complete success crowned my efforts, and the whole country applauded the result, even though the principal author of the work was unknown.[28]
After the revolution, the Civic Union began to polarize behind the two major tendencies that coexisted within it: one more conservative and conciliatory towards Roca's regime, led by Bartolomé Mitre, and the other more combative and opposed to the power structure imposed by Roca, led by Leandro Alem. In 1891, these differences led to the split of the Civic Union into two parties: the National Civic Union, led by Mitre, and the Radical Civic Union, led by Alem.

The Radical Civic Union would repeatedly resort to armed struggle in response to the lack of free elections. In the future, the UCR would stage two major armed insurrections known as the Revolution of 1893 and the Revolution of 1905, as well as several other smaller or local uprisings. Faced with the threat of further armed uprisings, in 1910 the newly elected president, Roque Sáenz Peña, made a secret pact with Hipólito Yrigoyen to enact a law establishing a system capable of guaranteeing free elections. The law, passed in 1912, established secret and universal suffrage for men and became known as the Sáenz Peña Law.

Social consequences

The Revolution of 1890 marked a turning point in Argentine history. It clearly marks the moment when an urban civil society began to emerge, differentiated into social groups with specific demands. In particular, the Revolution of 1890 marks the moment when the middle class entered public life.

Simultaneously, the organization of the working class into unions, modern political parties (Radical Civic Union, National Civic Union, Socialist Party, Southern League), the first cooperatives, feminist organizations, opposition political magazines, etc., formed a complex urban society that made seizing power through street revolutions increasingly unfeasible.

In this sense, the Revolution of 1890 in Argentina signifies the emergence of the people as a political and social subject, demanding effective recognition as protagonists of political, social, and cultural life, and calling for the establishment of a democratic society.

Historian Julio Godio states:

The economic and political situation of the 1990s accelerated the political expression of new social strata emerging from the process of dependent capitalist development and also mobilized intermediate social strata linked to traditional economic activities. The formation of the Radical Civic Union, three years after the revolution, was one of the clearest indicators of the beginning of the end of a political era in the country; the mechanisms of operation of the liberal state could no longer rely solely on agreements between the parties structured by the upper class since the 1970s.[29]

The Revolution of '90 thus appears as a historical bridge between the old rural armed conflicts between caudillos followed by undifferentiated masses, and a modern urban society founded on wage labor and a large middle class that provides services, which demands resolving conflicts through institutional processes.

References

1.↑ Cabral:412

2.↑ ab Cabral:413
3.↑ Cabral:414
4.↑ Cabral:415
5.↑ Cabral,1967:421
6.↑ Revolution of 90, by José M. Mendía- Luis O. Naón
7.↑ [HS Ferns, Great Britain and Argentina in the 19th Century, Solar-Hachette, p. 452]
8.↑ Jackal (1892), The Secret of the Revolution, Buenos Aires:La Defensa; Mendía, José M (1892), The Secret of the Revolution: What Has Not Been Said - Genesis of the Agreement, Buenos Aires: La Defensa del Pueblo
9.↑ Cabral:449
10.↑ Cabral:451
11.↑ Etchepareborda:58
12.↑ abc Mendía,1892
13.↑ abs:Exposition on the Revolution of 1890 - Leandro Alem
14.↑ Jitrik,1970:78
15.↑ Etchepareborda, 60
16.↑ Cabral, 454
17.↑ Jitrik,1970:82
18.↑ Cabral:458
19.↑ Don Quixote, by Carlos Boyadjian, published in History of Argentine Magazines, Volume III, AAER
20.↑ Don Quixote, Read Magazines
21.↑ Etchepareborda, 1966:60
22.↑ Etchepareborda, 61/62
23.↑ Cabral:463/464
24.↑ Clarin Visual Encyclopedia of Argentina
25.↑ Etchepareborda, 1966
26.↑ Biography of Carlos Pellegrini, Pellegrini Foundation
27.↑ Executions of Radicals in Formosa (Central Chaco) in 1891, by Eduardo R. Saguier, 2005
28.↑ Julio Argentino Roca: Visual Biography (1843-1914), Marcela F. Garrido, Roca Museum, 2005
29.↑ Godio, Julio (2000). History of the Argentine Labor Movement, Buenos Aires: Corregidor, Volume I, p. 95/96 

 

Bibliography

ALEM, Leandro N. (1890). Exposición sobre la organización, desarrollo y capitulación de la Revolución de Julio. Buenos Aires: Carta a Francisco Barroetaveña. Documento original en Wikisource.
CABRAL, César Augusto (1967). Alem: informe sobre la frustración argentina. Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo. ISBN.
DEL VALLE, Aristóbulo (1890). Exposición sobre la Revolución de Julio. Buenos Aires: Carta a Francisco Barroetaveña. Documento original en Wikisource.
ETCHEPAREBORDA, Roberto (1966). La Revolución Argentina del 90. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.
JITRIK, Noé (1970). La Revolución del 90. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
LUNA, Félix (1964). Yrigoyen. Buenos Aires: Desarrollo.
MENDIA, José M; NAON, Luis O. (1892). La Revolución del 90. Buenos Aires:La Defensa. Consultado 24 de agosto de 2006.
SOMMI, Luis V. (1957). La revolución del 90. Buenos Aires: Pueblos de América 

Argentine Army: The Discipline of the MechIR 3

DISCIPLINE
Account by Quartermaster Second Lieutenant Dardo José Forti. The second lieutenant took part in the Malvinas campaign as a member of the quartermaster section of Infantry Regiment No. 3 “General Belgrano”.

Malvinas: Historias de Coraje

A delicate issue in war is discipline. From my humble point of view, and without being a specialist, I believe there is one way to maintain it: by example. It is quite easy to write that; the difficult part is putting it into practice. Once again, Colonel Tocagni warns about this matter: “Discipline must be strengthened. A certain limitation of activities, the short duration of the day, the harsh climate, a monotonous landscape, shortcomings in accommodation, failures in equipment and food, all tend to cause a relaxation of discipline and fighting morale, against which timely and energetic measures must be adopted.”

Thanks be to God, I did not find it too difficult to lead my group of men in Puerto Argentino. Without setting out to do so, perhaps because of my personality, I liked to be present in every task, both those related to our work and those involving recreation. Just as I could carry supplies, I would also join in when it came time to tell a joke or recite something. Besides, as I have already said, those soldiers and non-commissioned officers had their own drive; they were committed to the task. Under those circumstances, leadership becomes much easier.

What else is discipline? Jorge Vigón, in Estampas de capitanes, quotes a fitting answer by Bocaccia: “Discipline is solidarity in action for the common purpose.” Even today, so many years after those events, one of my former soldiers will still remind me of some anecdote from those hours of shared conversations. I believe that, should I be able to leave you one piece of advice, it is this: personal example carries people along, mobilises them, enthuses them. Try it, and you will be surprised.

However, as is usually the case, there are exceptions. One night I asked about one of those souls, and he was not there. Still not losing my sense of humour, I mobilised my aide and right-hand man, Gustavo De Vincenzo, so that he could go around the sector and ask whether anyone had seen Private Donda.

—No, my second lieutenant, he is nowhere to be found.

Donda was adding one more ingredient to this war: he had disappeared.

Only when I had exhausted every means of finding him did I have to report the news. I felt a little calmer; that is what always happens when one shares a problem with another person. From another point of view, that person offers a possible solution — and the solution was given to me.

—Forti, find him! —Lieutenant Colonel Comini ordered me.

So, with my jeep and three volunteers, we went out to look for him. It would not be simple; many hours had already passed. We began in the town. Four pairs of eyes examined every place as we moved forward. Every soldier we crossed seemed to be him, but each sighting turned out to be a mirage that vanished when we got closer and saw their faces. We discovered that everyone looks alike from a distance if you put them in a green uniform. The more time we spent searching, the more our anxiety grew, and anxiety manufactured Dondas in every corner of the town.

—Let’s go towards the Sapper Hill area —I told the driver.

We kept moving, now along the road. The time to hand out dinner was approaching, and I wanted to be there. But returning without Donda, and with night falling, would not be good.

—There he is! —shouted one of the searchers.

—Donda! What the hell are you doing here, for f…’s sake?

—I went to see a friend, Sergeant First Class Edgardo Taylor. He needed cigarettes.

—And you crossed half the island for that?

In reality, he had walked a little over ten kilometres.

—Well, yes… I left at dawn.

—Get in the jeep. We’ll talk when we get back to the ranch.

In truth, I did all the talking. Donda paid for his adventure with the much-hated “run to the sea, hit the ground”, breaking the frost every now and then as he crashed against the ground. Much later, when I remember that action, I think of the loyalty of those men: a simple soldier putting himself in danger because a comrade needed something.

As for Private Donda, he stayed with us. The war was not such that we could leave him without work.