Submarine S-21 Santa Fe
At the outbreak of the armed conflict, the Argentine Navy had four submarines. Two of them, S-22 Santiago del Estero and S-21 Santa Fe, had been built in the United States in 1944 as SS-341 Chivo and SS-339 Catfish, respectively, and belonged to the Balao class. Between 1948 and 1949, Catfish was modernised under the GUPPY II programme, and in 1961 Chivo was modernised under the GUPPY IIA programme. In 1971, the submarines were transferred to Argentina. Santiago del Estero was decommissioned in 1981, and Santa Fe met the same fate between August and September 1982.
SS-339 Catfish in 1946
SS-339 Catfish after her modernisation, 1969.
SS-339 Catfish before and after the upgrade
The fleet also included two modern Type 209 submarines. These submarines were designed in West Germany by Ingenieurkontor Lübeck, Project IK-68, and their sections were built at the HDW shipyards in Kiel. In 1974, after being assembled in Argentina, the submarines S-31 Salta and S-32 San Luis joined the Argentine fleet. When used skilfully, these submarines represented a serious threat. A good example is provided by their sister submarines in the Peruvian Navy. During the inter-American Unitas-1996 exercises, for example, Pisagua sank the US SSN Narwhal six times, always being the first to attack the surface ships. In 2001, during the US-Peruvian SIFOREX-2001 exercises, a Peruvian submarine sank a US frigate. Since then, every year one of the Peruvian submarines has taken part in US anti-submarine exercises in the Atlantic, based at Norfolk.
Argentine Type 209 submarine
At the outbreak of hostilities, only S-32 San Luis was operational, while her sister, S-31 Salta, was undergoing repairs. She sailed in mid-April, but because of excessive noise, never entered combat. To replace the Balao-class submarines, the submarines S-41 Santa Cruz and S-42 San Juan were being built in West Germany to the TR 1700 design. The most experienced submariners were assigned to commission them, creating certain difficulties in manning the remaining submarines. Construction of four more submarines of this type was planned at a Buenos Aires shipyard. Had this plan been implemented, it would have given the military junta led by General Galtieri a very persuasive argument: eight latest-generation submarines.
| Specifications |
S-21 Santa Fe |
S-32 San Luis |
Displacement, t:
surfaced
submerged |
1870
2340 |
1248
1440 |
| Maximum length, m |
93.9 |
55.9 |
| Maximum beam, m |
8.3 |
6.3 |
| Mean draught, m |
5.2 |
5.5 |
| Hull design type |
double hull |
single hull |
| Operational diving depth, m |
150 |
250 (max. 500) |
| Endurance, days |
? |
50 |
| Number × power (type) of diesel engines, hp |
4 × ? (General Motors 16-278A) |
4 × 600 (MTU 12V493AZ80) |
| Number × power of electric propulsion motors, hp |
2 × 2400 |
1 × 4600 |
Maximum speed, knots:
surfaced
under snorkel
submerged |
18
9
15 - one hour, 6 - 34 days |
10
11
22 |
Range (at speed, knots), miles:
surfaced
economical submerged |
10,000 (10)
95 (5) |
6000 (8)
400 (4) |
Torpedo armament:
number of torpedo tubes (bow/stern) × calibre, mm
torpedo stowage (type) |
10 (6/4) × 533
24 (Mk 14, Mk 37) |
8 × 533
14 (SST-4, Mk 37) |
Main tactical and technical characteristics of Argentine submarines
Actions of the submarine "Santa Fe"
In late March 1982, the Argentine Armed Forces launched Operation Rosario to recover the Malvinas Islands and South Georgia. Three naval forces were created for this purpose: a covering force, Task Force 20; a landing force for the Malvinas, Task Force 40; and a landing force for South Georgia, Task Force 60. Task Force 40 included a landing ship, two transports, two destroyers, two corvettes and the submarine S-21 Santa Fe. The submarine was assigned two missions: first, to land the tactical group Task Unit 40.1.1, made up of 13 naval special-forces combat divers, Agrupación de Buzos Tácticos - APBT, near Cape San Felipe, north of Port Stanley, to capture the Cape Pembroke lighthouse and Port Stanley airport — this mission was later cancelled — and to reconnoitre and mark the main force landing area, the "Yellow Zone"; the second was to patrol the assigned area.
Due to her poor technical condition, the submarine’s combat value was practically nil: worn batteries required a long time to charge and limited the time she could remain submerged, some of the torpedo tubes were inoperative and many systems were unreliable. The maximum diving depth was reduced to 120 m.
At 23:00 on 27 March, Santa Fe, under Captain Horacio Bicain and with an ARVT detachment commanded by Captain Alfredo Cufré, left the Mar del Plata naval base. Despite strong winds, the passage passed without incident on 28 March. The next day, taking advantage of improved weather, ARVT carried out a landing exercise with personnel in inflatable boats in sea state 2 to 3. Later, the wind increased to 40-50 km/h, prompting the order to delay the start of the operation by 24 hours, until 22:00 on 30 April; the landing had initially been scheduled for 1 April.
On 31 March, the submarine approached the north-eastern coast of Gran Malvina (East Falkland) to reconnoitre the currents and determine the landing area. The sonar operators detected the sound of a propeller, and periscope observations revealed lights on the shore, vehicle movement and a ship leaving Port Stanley; this ship was the Royal Navy’s A171 Endurance, en route to South Georgia.
On 1 April, the submarine commander received an order changing the combat mission, under which the APBT was to mark the "Red Section" landing area north of the previously planned landing zone. At 12:30 on 1 April, due to an electrical fault, the submarine lost radio contact, and at 17:30 the submarine and APBT commanders decided to begin the landing without waiting for contact with command. While approaching the coast at 23:50, the radar station failed and did not work again until 1:00 a.m. The landing took place north of Punta Celebronya, near Rinión Island. At 2:30, the APBT began boarding three inflatable boats, which set off from one side and reached the shore at 2:50. At 3:35, the reconnaissance and marking with signal lights of the main force landing area in York Bay was successfully completed. Shortly afterwards, the 2nd Battalion of the Argentine Marine Corps landed here from the landing ship Cabo San Antonio.
Routes of the Argentine naval force for the capture of South Georgia and the Malvinas Islands.
Capture of Port Stanley: 1 - Argentine landing in the Malvinas Islands; 2 - Reconnaissance by the submarine Santa Fe and marking of the "red section" of the landing between 02:30 and 03:35 on 2 April 1982; 5 - Landing of marines from Cabo San Antonio at 06:30 on 2 April 1982.
Santa Fe then moved to patrol area 080 San Felipe 60, 100 miles east of Port Stanley, before returning to Mar del Plata on 7 April. The trip back to base was not without incidents: communications were intermittent, the cooling system suffered constant failures, the bilge pumps could only operate at periscope depth, the main engines’ oil consumption exceeded all permitted limits, and the outer cover of the rubbish-disposal hatch jammed open.
Personnel from the Mar del Plata Naval Arsenal and Santa Fe worked non-stop for eight days to fix the problems and prepare the submarine for deployment. Twenty-three torpedoes, 20 Mk14 and the rest Mk37, fuel, fresh water and provisions for 60 days were loaded aboard. At that time, the arsenal had only 12 torpedoes of the required type, received from the United States along with the submarines, so the remaining torpedoes were provided by "friendly" countries — Peru? The Mk37 torpedoes could only be fired from the bow torpedo tubes.
Mk14 torpedo
Mk37 torpedo
Santa Fe’s main mission was to deliver 20 marines, Golf Group, armed with Bantam anti-tank missiles, recoilless guns and anti-tank grenade launchers to reinforce the South Georgia garrison, four tonnes of ammunition and equipment, and a new commander for the Argentine garrison on the island. The boat would subsequently patrol north of the island. Owing to uncertainty over the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between Britain and Argentina, Horacio Bicain was ordered to avoid engaging the enemy first, which considerably reduced his chances of success.
Santa Fe sailed from Mar del Plata at 23:30 on 16 April, and a few miles out new problems arose. The electrical control system of the propulsion system failed, leaving the boat adrift for three hours while repairs were made. The following day, the piston of diesel engine No. 1 failed, requiring 24 hours to bring it back into service. On 19 April, a failure in the cooling-pump gear caused diesel engine No. 4 to overheat. Emergency repairs with epoxy resins took 48 hours. This caused a delay in the planned landing.
On 20 April, due to bad weather, the submarine was forced to dive and continue the voyage submerged, which further delayed the landing. Between 21 and 22 April, despite a strong storm, Santa Fe continued surfacing, causing damage to the bridge rail and superstructure. The submarine submerged again. The damaged hull vibrated, interfering with the sonar system and revealing the submarine’s presence.
On 23 April they surfaced to find and remove the source of the noise. By then, the delay had reached 36 hours. That afternoon, the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance intercepted a coded radio message indicating the presence of an enemy submarine, presumably Santa Fe, 100 miles from South Georgia. This caused some concern among the British command, as two British tankers were in the area transferring fuel from one ship to another.
The frigate HMS Plymouth was sent to the area to protect the tankers and escort them beyond the 200-mile zone. Admiral Sandy Woodward noted in his memoirs,
One Hundred Days:
Tension was rising and the operation in South Georgia seemed to be stalled by fear of an Argentine submarine. Unfortunately, the range of our patrol aircraft from Ascension Island was insufficient.
The frigate HMS Brilliant and the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror were sent to reinforce the British anti-submarine force heading for the island.
Santa Fe received information on the location of British ships near South Georgia from Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, C-130 Hercules and Boeing 707. For example, Endurance intercepted radio signals from the Boeing addressed to the submarine, indicating that it was heading towards the island to deploy special forces and had orders to sink Endurance.
HMS Endurance
In the early hours of 24 April, news was received that British forces had begun the liberation of South Georgia. Santa Fe’s commander received orders to speed up the operation. It was decided to head for Cape North, the western end of the island, and then to Cumberland Bay. The boat remained surfaced all night, submerged at 5:00 a.m. and snorkelled until dusk.
At 11:30 p.m., Santa Fe reached her destination and, stopping one mile from King Edward Point, unloaded Golf Group and the cargo between 2:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. using a motor launch captured from a British polar station. After completing the unloading, the boat’s commander decided to seek shelter in one of the many bays, carry out repairs and then proceed to the patrol area. But one hour later, when the boat was five miles from Grytviken, the administrative centre of the British Overseas Territory of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, a battle alarm sounded: radar detected an approaching air target.
South Georgia
It was a Wessex helicopter piloted by Lieutenant Commander Stanley from the destroyer HMS Antrim. The destroyer’s sonar detected the noise of the Argentine submarine at a distance of approximately 50 miles. The helicopter dropped two Mk II depth charges, with fuzes set to minimum depth, which detonated off the starboard stern. The resulting damage prevented the submarine from diving. The submariners, in turn, opened fire on the Wessex with small arms.
A Wasp helicopter with an AS 12 missile
Wasp helicopter attacks Santa Fe
Depth-charge attack on Santa Fe
The Sea Lynx and Wasp helicopters from HMS Endurance, HMS Plymouth and HMS Brilliant arrived shortly afterwards, launching a Mk 46 torpedo, which passed beneath the submarine’s hull, and attacking her with AS 12 missiles and machine-gun fire. Three AS 12 missiles struck the fibreglass structure of the conning tower but did not detonate, disabling the snorkel and other retractable devices and seriously wounding a crew member. To avoid further casualties, Bikain ordered the crew to take shelter inside the pressure hull and, at 7:30, approached the quay at King Edward Point using a periscope.
Under cover of fire from the Argentine marines, the submariners abandoned their boat and took refuge ashore. A few hours later, the South Georgia garrison surrendered to the British with virtually no resistance; the island had been called San Pedro for only 23 days. The only fatal casualty of the operation was a Santa Fe sailor, who was immediately evacuated by helicopter to Antrim, where he underwent a successful leg-amputation operation.
A Sea Lynx helicopter with a torpedo slung underneath.
Frigate HMS Brilliant
The captured Argentines were housed in a building near the quay. Santa Fe’s commander requested permission for several members of his crew to return aboard the submarine to collect personal belongings, food and medical supplies. The request was granted, and half a dozen petty officers, escorted by British marines, boarded the submarine. Some managed to enter the heads and the galley and open the water-system valves to flood the submarine. The next day, the British decided to re-moor the boat about 400 metres from the quay of the old whaling plant in Grytviken, since the ammunition and batteries aboard posed a serious danger. In addition to the submarine’s commander, six other crew members took part in the mooring, supervised by a group of British marines. By then, the submarine’s stern had begun to sink, and a rotary blower was used to empty the ballast tanks and maintain buoyancy. Propulsion was provided by electric motors, using remaining electrical power. During the re-mooring, a tragedy occurred: Petty Officer Félix Artuso, who was operating the compressor and the diving-and-surfacing system valves, was killed. The English sentry, unfamiliar with submarines, mistook Artuso’s rapid movements — he had to operate 24 valves simultaneously — for an attempt to sink the submarine. The submariner did not understand English and did not respond to the warnings. The sentry fired a burst from his Sterling submachine gun.
Félix Artuso
Under these circumstances, the mooring was cancelled and, a few days later, Santa Fe sank at her mooring in 20 metres of water, listing to port. Only the superstructure railing remained afloat. The deceased submariner was buried with military honours in the local cemetery. The remaining crew members were transferred aboard the tanker RFA Tidespring to Ascension Island, and from there a chartered KLM aircraft flew to Montevideo.
The funeral of F. Artuso in Grytviken cemetery.
Santa Fe semi-submerged at the Grytviken quay.
After the end of the war, the British Ministry of Defence decided to refloat Santa Fe, which was obstructing the quay and, moreover, whose torpedoes and other ammunition aboard posed a serious danger. Work began at the end of June and was carried out by the crews of Endurance, the tug Typhoon and the salvage vessel Salvageman. Their task was to pump the water from the flooded compartments using portable pumps and, subsequently, to empty the ballast tanks with the compressed air remaining in the submarine’s cylinders. The situation was complicated by the virtual absence of submarine-engineering specialists; only two Endurance officers, a hydrographer and a supply officer, had served briefly in a submarine. There were also no plans of the submarine. Nevertheless, after more than two weeks of intense work, Santa Fe was afloat again, albeit with a 25-degree list.
Santa Fe alongside Salvageman after the boat had been raised.
This is how Endurance’s commander, N. Barker, described the scene that unfolded before the British sailors:
We also discovered a considerable collection of weapons, including torpedoes, mines, boxes of small arms, ammunition and explosives. Four homing torpedoes were piled up in the bunks, as if they were plague victims. A large number of torpedoes were stored on racks, in the removable deck flooring and in the torpedo tubes. One of the tubes was empty; they were probably trying to sink one of our ships, and it may have been us!
On 15 July, a team of specialists arrived from England to inspect Santa Fe, which had been pumped out. We all recognised a serious problem: the large quantities of TNT, which were drying out rapidly, were becoming increasingly unstable. Thanks to our efforts, Santa Fe had become a floating time bomb.
The divers prepare to inspect Santa Fe.
Therefore, it was decided to tow the vessel to a safer place and beach her there with the hatches and bulkhead doors open. It was believed that this would gradually flood the compartments and make the wet TNT safe again.
Santa Fe is being towed to the beach.
Between 1984 and 1985, after four months of work — the divers made 868 dives — the RMAS rescue ships Goosander and Salvageman, using 10 inflatable pontoons, refloated the submarine on 11 February 1985 and, after removing harmful substances, including diesel fuel, attempted to tow her to deep water away from the coast on 20 February 1985, Operation Okehampton, but the submarine sank 5 miles north of South Georgia at a depth of 350 m.
Raising of Santa Fe
Santa Fe is being towed to the sinking site.
To be continued ...
