Pulqui II: A Prototype Betrayed by Politics

The Day When The Pulqui Became Pulquiría

On 31 May 1951, the fate of the IA-33 Pulqui II was definitively sealed. Rather than investing decisively in its development and mass production, the Peronist government chose to relegate it to the role of a technological demonstrator, effectively dismantling Argentina’s opportunity to position itself at the forefront of global military aviation. This decision, ultimately the responsibility of President Juan Domingo Perón, was critical to the project's failure.

That day, during a test flight of the second prototype, Captain Vedania Adriel Mannuwal was killed while attempting to eject from the aircraft. The crash exposed severe structural deficiencies: one wing detached mid-flight due to faulty welding of its anchor bolts, and the ejection system failed owing to its overly complex operation. Yet the most alarming aspect was that this was an unapproved prototype, being recklessly used for pilot training manoeuvres, exposing personnel to unacceptable risks.



El Pulqui II fue fruto de una coyuntura histórica excepcional. Argentina, al finalizar la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se encontraba entre las pocas naciones con acceso a tecnología de propulsión a chorro. Esta situación fue facilitada, paradójicamente, por su relación con el Reino Unido, que le proveyó motores y repuestos militares sin restricciones. El Instituto Aerotécnico —posteriormente Fábrica Militar de Aviones— ya tenía experiencia en diseño y producción, pero nunca alcanzó una escala industrial significativa. Los modelos IAe-22 y Calquín, diseñados antes del peronismo, son prueba de ello.



The Pulqui II emerged during an exceptional historical juncture. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Argentina found itself among the few nations with access to jet propulsion technology. This was largely thanks to its relationship with the United Kingdom, which supplied engines and military parts without restrictions. The Aerotechnical Institute—later the Military Aircraft Factory—had a background in design and production, but had never reached industrial-scale output. Earlier aircraft such as the IAe-22 and the Calquín, both conceived prior to the Peronist period, demonstrate this limitation.

With the arrival of German engineer Kurt Tank, a specialist in advanced aircraft design, Argentina hoped to capitalise on his expertise. In collaboration with local engineers, Tank led the development of the Pulqui II—a swept-wing fighter jet powered by a Rolls Royce Nene II engine, capable of speeds around 1,080 km/h. At its inception, it was not far behind its contemporaries, such as the American F-86 Sabre and Soviet MiG-15. However, while these foreign aircraft were already being mass-produced and deployed, the Pulqui II remained a prototype in an early development phase, hampered by delays, redesigns and a series of serious accidents.



The programme faced recurring technical issues: structural failures, landing gear malfunctions, instability during certain manoeuvres, and an underpowered engine. These challenges were not insurmountable, but overcoming them required sustained funding, highly skilled personnel, and, above all, political will. None of these factors were sufficiently present.



Between 1950 and 1953—a period crucial for industrial transition—the Peronist government failed to provide the necessary support. The tragic death of Captain Mannuwal, followed by the fatal crash of German test pilot Otto Bherens in 1952, were not isolated incidents but direct consequences of a political approach that prioritised symbolism over technical maturity. Most egregiously, the prototype was used for combat training purposes before it had even completed its flight testing phase—a grossly irresponsible act.



In 1953, a fourth prototype was flown, featuring several improvements including a pressurised cockpit and mounted cannons. But by then, global aviation had already moved on. While Argentina was still trying to perfect a subsonic prototype, major powers were entering the era of supersonic flight with aircraft like the F-100 Super Sabre and MiG-19.



By the time of the 1955 military coup, the Pulqui II was still unapproved for service. Only one prototype remained operational, and its development was far from complete. Although a small group of engineers attempted to keep the project alive, including undertaking ambitious long-distance flights with full weapon loads, the technological gap had become unbridgeable. One such flight nearly ended in disaster when pilot Rogelio Balado suffered from hypoxia due to faulty oxygen equipment, highlighting once more the unresolved safety issues.



In 1956, Brigadier Ahrens met with engineer Guillot, head of planning at the Military Aircraft Factory, and was informed that only enough materials remained to build roughly a dozen aircraft. Despite a proposal to manufacture 100 units, the infrastructure inherited from the Peronist era could not support such output. While the Air Force held a licence to produce the Nene II engine, it would have taken five years to build those twelve aircraft—an unviable timeline for a design already technologically outdated.



Faced with an urgent need to replace ageing IA-24 Calquín aircraft, Ahrens pointed to an alternative: an offer of 100 F-86 Sabres, available immediately. Ultimately, only 28 second-hand F-86F-NA-30s were acquired—without the Orenda engine variant initially considered—but these were delivered in 1960. Despite the delay, the aircraft proved cost-effective, logistically supportable, and operationally viable—something that the Pulqui II, even in the best-case scenario, could never have achieved with just a dozen units and no production infrastructure.



The sole Pulqui II prototype continued limited test flights under the post-coup government, eventually receiving formal approval but never progressing to series production. Its final flight occurred around 1961, with the last prototype flown in 1959. By then, the aircraft was obsolete. The critical investment period had passed, and by 1955 the project remained unapproved, unfinished, and incapable of fulfilling any real strategic role. Its fate was sealed back in 1951, when combat pilots were ordered to fly an untested prototype still deep in its experimental phase—a criminally negligent decision. Blaming the 1955 coup ignores the real issue: the failure to act when it truly mattered. Pilots ended up nicknaming it 'Pulquiría' — a play on words resembling porquería (meaning 'rubbish' in Spanish) — due to its poor performance.



Today, both the Pulqui I and Pulqui II are preserved in the National Aeronautics Museum in Morón, following years of neglect in open air. They serve as relics of a missed opportunity—symbols of a time when Argentina could have broken into the elite of aerospace nations, but failed to do so through indecision, political vanity, and a lack of genuine strategic commitment.



Captain Vedania Adriel Mannuwal, of the 4th Interceptor Fighter Regiment of the Argentine Air Force, acted with a profound sense of duty and national service. His sacrifice, made in pursuit of institutional advancement and national greatness, remains unquestionable—a noble Argentine who gave his life for an ideal that, sadly, others failed to uphold.