Sarmiento and Patagonia

The historian Luciana Sabina analyzes the controversy that involved Domingo Sarmiento regarding the Patagonian lands and Chile’s claims over them.
Luciana Sabina || Memo




Map of the Southern Cone from 1849

Exiled in Chile, Sarmiento paid close attention to the colonizing expedition that the country sent to the Magellan region in 1843, founding Fuerte Bulnes. By 1848, that settlement moved a few kilometers, taking the name Punta Arenas. The occupation was based on the legal principle of res nullius (of no one), universally accepted at that time, according to which any nation could take possession of inhospitable spaces. Like it or not, the entire Patagonian territory was considered an empty space, lands in indigenous hands that had never been conquered by the Spanish, and because of this, they did not belong to the Río de la Plata or to Chile. They would belong to the first to settle there.

It was only five years later that Rosas, through the Foreign Ministry, presented Chile with a formal protest, claiming Argentine rights over the area. As a result, on March 11, 1849, Sarmiento published a first article on the matter in his newspaper La Crónica, titled “The Magellan Question.” There, he defended the Chilean position. Being fair and objective, he pointed out that since 1585 no one had established occupation in the area; that the act of sovereignty by Chile had been repeatedly mentioned in the press and in presidential messages; despite which the Restorer [Rosas] did not express himself. Rosas, remaining silent for years, had consented to the trans-Andean advance and was claiming something without showing titles or precedents of ownership. Furthermore, Sarmiento added, Rosas was concerned with claiming territories abroad while the heart of Argentina was a land of indigenous raids and uprisings. Consequently, he recommended the Restorer take care of populating the Chaco, Río Negro, and interprovincial borders. In other words, he reminded the government of Buenos Aires that it could not handle what it had and wanted more, only to leave it in complete neglect.



At the time, France and England—in the midst of imperialist expansion—saw Hispanic America as a set of young nations suffering the vicissitudes inherent to all infancy, and they attempted to establish themselves in the area. British, French, North American, and German maps of the time show Patagonia as res nullius, with which they could have easily occupied it. It was urgent to establish oneself in the area, and Chile was the only country with some political stability and in conditions to do so. The occupation of the mouth of the strait was surprising to the Europeans and had a deterrent effect. All of Patagonia could have met the same fate as the Falklands.

In response to Sarmiento’s publication, Rosas had a newspaper founded in Mendoza: La Ilustración Argentina. Under the direction of Bernardo de Irigoyen, he was the first to refer to Sarmiento as a “traitor.” Though for the Rosistas, anyone who thought differently was a “traitor to the homeland.”

The Restorer ended up submitting a request to extradite the man from San Juan, stating that Chile could not continue sheltering him because he disturbed the peace between the two nations, thereby violating the right of asylum. The trans-Andean authorities did not entertain the request, arguing that freedom of the press existed there.

Rosas was never able to demonstrate that the area belonged to us because, in fact, it does not belong to us. But the matter did not end there.

Three decades later, during Sarmiento’s presidency, the Chileans experienced a certain imperialist fever and claimed rights based on laughable grounds over Argentine Patagonia. To this end, they cited articles in the Chilean press from the past, in which Don Domingo had spilled his ink and ingenuity. The situation was complex for the man from San Juan: the Paraguayan War had not yet concluded, and the opposition—taking advantage of the moment—sought to tear him apart. The word “traitor” once again lashed at the colossus from Cuyo.

He then sought to demonstrate that he had never written in favor of Chilean sovereignty over our land. For this, he tasked Félix Frías—ambassador in Chile—with carefully reviewing the questioned articles. The seasoned diplomat concluded that, indeed, there was no comment referring to Patagonia. In all of them, Sarmiento referred to Chilean rights over the specific area of the Strait of Magellan. Despite this, many still consider him a traitor who wanted to give away the south.

The 1965 Lago del Desierto Incident

The 1981 SK-105 Deal: How Argentina Outmaneuvered Chile

Argentine Army: 11th Armored Artillery Group

Grupo de Artillería Blindado 11 "Coronel Juan Bautista Thorne"

11th Armored Artillery Group "Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne"

VCA Palmaria conducting maneuvers during training.

It belongs to the 9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade 'Colonel Luis Jorge Fontana' of Comodoro Rivadavia - Province of CHUBUT.

'THE YOUNGEST, SOUTHERNMOST, AND MOST MODERN UNIT OF THE ARTILLERY BRANCH. "

 

Biografía del Coronel D Juan Bautista THORNE 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 11th ARMORED ARTILLERY GROUP

The creation of the southernmost unit of the branch, the 11th Armored Artillery Group, dates back to November 29, 1979.

The Artillery Group was initially established as a core unit in the town of Comandante Luis Piedra Buena on February 23, 1980, under the organic command of the 11th Mechanized Brigade. Its first Commander was Major Héctor Obeid.

On June 20, 1981, its barracks were inaugurated, along with the current 11th Engineers Battalion.


Iveco Transport Vehicle

During the South Atlantic Conflict, the unit carried out various activities, among which the fulfillment of Strategic Operational Security missions stood out, occupying positions in Puerto San Julián and Güer Aike, and then returning to its peacetime station once the conflict ended.

On December 20 of that same year, its designation was changed to the 11th Artillery Group, with its main equipment being the 155mm towed Schneider gun.

In 1984, it modernized its equipment with 18 155mm towed SOFMA Argentine Model guns, thereby increasing its range and firepower.

Firing of a VCA Palmaria piece from the 11th Armored Artillery Group in the town of Azul.

In 1992, the unit's personnel began participating in Peacekeeping Operations in Croatia, Cyprus, Kuwait, and Haiti.

In 1997, with the arrival of the first domestically produced 155mm Palmaria Self-Propelled Artillery Vehicles, the unit began its transformation into an armored unit, changing its designation to the 11th Armored Artillery Group on May 16, thereby increasing its maneuverability, mobility, and firepower.

Maintenance Activities

On November 20, 2007, the Argentine Army bestowed the unit with the historic name of Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne, in honor of the man who explored Southern Patagonia and participated, among other actions, in the Desert Campaign, the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado, and the defense of Martín Garcia Island.

The 11th Armored Artillery Group, the southernmost, youngest, and most modern unit of the Artillery, continues to carry out its activities in fulfillment of its assigned missions, developing and enhancing an unparalleled esprit de corps that characterizes it, and demonstrating its professionalism in war preparation, in the support provided to the community, and in the participation of its personnel in Peacekeeping Missions.

 

 
 
Unit Commander and Gun Crew Personnel.
 
Gun Crew and Mechanics and Engineers Personnel.

 
 
 
 
A few more of the VCA vehicles from the 11th Armored Artillery Group.




 

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Argentine: Defense Politics From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Argentine Defense: From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Encina Moreno and company. Colección del Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Throughout Argentine history, national defense has suffered from not being treated as a state policy that transcends the ideologies and administrations of the ruling governments. This analysis, in three parts, examines the successes, failures, and outstanding issues in the evolution of Argentine defense.

 

Politics, Diplomacy, and War

In 1811, Paraguay declared its independence and outlined its territorial borders. However, these territorial claims conflicted with Brazil's, sparking a long period of tensions between the two countries, which eventually affected Argentina as well.

Over time, Paraguay also had commercial disputes with the Argentine government, leading to a tacit alliance between Argentina and Brazil, both of whom sought to protect their respective territorial and economic interests. Paraguay also faced difficulties trading in Uruguay, which led to tensions with Montevideo. By the end of 1864, Paraguay sent troops to Uruguay to support the Partido Blanco, which was fighting against the Partido Colorado, backed by Brazil.

Paraguay requested permission from Argentine President Bartolomé Mitre to move its troops through the Argentine Mesopotamia region on their way to Uruguay. This request was denied, but in April 1865, Paraguayan forces entered Argentina and occupied the city of Corrientes, forcing Argentina to join Brazil and Uruguay in war against Paraguay, a conflict later known as the War of the Triple Alliance.

This bloody conflict ended in 1870 with Paraguay’s surrender, causing severe territorial losses and demographic devastation, as nearly half of the Paraguayan population and about 90% of its men died.

The Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes could have been avoided if Argentina had better-equipped and strategically deployed armed forces.

Armed Forces and Sovereignty in Patagonia

After the independence of Argentina and Chile, both countries entered a period of rising tensions over their territorial claims in southern Patagonia. These tensions were further complicated by the rugged geography of the Andes Mountains, which made it difficult to accurately demarcate borders, and by the frequent raids carried out by the Mapuche tribes, who originated from the Chilean side of the Andes and often attacked Argentine settlements.

The Mapuches had gained territory in Patagonia and the southern Pampa region, displacing or exterminating local tribes, which increased Chilean influence in the area. Historians suggest that the loot from Mapuche raids—mostly stolen livestock—was sold in Chile with the tacit approval of local authorities.

Argentina, still embroiled in internal conflicts for nearly half a century since its independence, had not made significant advances in securing sovereignty over Patagonia. By the early 1870s, tensions between Argentina and Chile escalated, with both nations reaffirming their territorial claims. In 1872, Chilean authorities interfered with Argentine commercial activities in Santa Cruz, prompting the Argentine government to establish a military garrison in the region and explore the territory.

Sea Fleet Supporting the Desert Campaign. Foto: Archivo DEF.

Tensions further escalated when, in 1876, Chile sent the corvette Magallanes to the port of Santa Cruz to seize a French ship that had been authorized by Argentina to extract guano. In response, the Argentine government dispatched a fleet under the command of Commodore Luis Py to Patagonia in 1878, with the mission of asserting Argentina’s sovereign rights over the region.

Given these tensions, President Nicolás Avellaneda informed Congress that, in legitimate defense, he had ordered Argentine warships to be stationed at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River and to fortify the area with artillery and troops. However, had there been a conflict, Argentina’s military forces would likely have been unable to defeat the Chilean fleet, which was simultaneously engaged in conflicts with Bolivia and Peru in the north.

The Desert Campaign and Affirmation of Sovereignty

In this context, with the nation’s territorial integrity at risk, General Julio Argentino Roca, then Minister of War and Navy, proposed to President Avellaneda the launch of a military campaign known as the Conquest of the Desert. The strategic objective was for the Argentine Army to advance southward to occupy Patagonia and reaffirm Argentine sovereignty over a region that, until then, had been under Mapuche control.

The Argentine government supported these military operations by establishing naval sub-delegations in Carmen de Patagones, Puerto Deseado, Río Gallegos, Isla de los Estados, and Ushuaia, which led to the settlement of the first Argentine communities in these regions, thus helping to consolidate national sovereignty in the south.

At the same time, the Argentine Army began to receive modern weapons (rifles, cannons, etc.) and the Navy acquired new warships (battleships and cruisers), positioning Argentina’s fleet as one of the most powerful in the world. These advancements allowed Argentina to reach a diplomatic resolution with Chile, culminating in the signing of the 1881 Boundary Treaty, which secured Argentine sovereignty over Patagonia.

In 1884, the Argentine Navy, under the command of Commodore Augusto Lasserre, deployed a fleet of six warships to Tierra del Fuego and Isla de los Estados. During this mission, Lasserre encountered a British mission in Ushuaia. After a brief conversation, on October 12, 1884, the British flag was lowered and the Argentine flag was raised, reaffirming Argentina's sovereignty over the southernmost part of its continental territory, a date now considered the official founding of Ushuaia.


The Desert Campaign. Colección Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Conclusion

Argentina's ability to defend its sovereignty in the south was heavily dependent on strengthening its armed forces. The development of a modern navy and a diplomacy backed by military strength were crucial in securing Argentine control over Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The Desert Campaign, though controversial, was fundamental in consolidating Argentine control over vast southern territories, preventing territorial conflicts with Chile, and laying the groundwork for national defense in the late 19th century.

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Py Squadron in Patagonia (6/13)

Py Squadron in Patagonia

The Devonshire incident and its impact on Argentine-Chilean relations
Tensions with Chile

Part 6
From Part 5

The last quarter of 1878 is underway. Doctor Nicolás Avellaneda has been the president of the republic for four years, assisted by General Julio A. Roca in dealing with military issues, from the position of Minister of War and Navy.

The Argentine Republic has very tense relations with Chile due to border issues dating back to 1843, when the trans-Andeans had settled in the Strait of Magellan. This situation has worsened with the presence of Chilean navy ships in the waters of the Santa Cruz River.

In 1876 the French barge Jeanne Amélie was at the mouth of that river, engaged in loading guano, an operation that was authorized by the Argentine consul in Montevideo. On October 20 of that year the Chilean war corvette Magallanes appeared on the scene and captured the French ship. The Chilean authorities based in Punta Arenas ordered that the French ship and its crew, who were detained, be transferred to that port, and during navigation the Jeanne Amélie ran aground on a reef at Cabo Vírgenes and sank.

This seizure, which represented a disregard for our sovereignty over that region, caused great indignation among the national authorities and the Argentine people; protests were filed with the Argentine government, which refused to give satisfaction and affirmed that Chile's jurisdiction extended to the southern bank of the Santa Cruz River. As the months went by, spirits calmed down, while diplomatic efforts were carried out to put an end to the issue.

On June 19, 1878, Augusto M. Ventury, a merchant from Buenos Aires, notified E.L. Baker, the American consular agent in that city, who had rented an American merchant ship, the Devonshire, for the purpose of loading the guano accumulated on the islands located at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River. But on October 11 of that year, the Chilean corvette Magallanes arrived in the area and its commander demanded from the crew of the Devonshire -anchored on the island of Monte León- the authorization of the Chilean government to carry out the operation of loading guano. Since the men of the Devonshire did not have such authorization, the commander of the Magallanes decided to capture the ship and its crew and take them to Punta Arenas, with the aggravating dishonor towards the minimum decorum of the Chilean military that they abandoned their captain on land. (1)

The then Navy Lieutenant Carlos María Moyano, who served as Navy subdelegate in Santa Cruz, sent a communication to the General Command of the Navy in which he reported on the attack committed by the Chilean ship, which again caused the situation to reach a very delicate limit, the slightest issue could force the casus belli.

The Buenos Aires newspapers raised the alarm and stirred up public opinion, which demanded an end to Chilean interference in the Santa Cruz area. This reiteration of the insult on the part of Chile, led the Argentine government to send a warship to Santa Cruz to expel the Chileans from there. Dr. Avellaneda, in his message to the National Congress, stated: [... assuming the case of legitimate defense, the Executive Branch has decided to station a warship at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River, to build a fortification at its entrance and on its northern bank, equipping it with cannons and the corresponding garrison...

The Argentine authorities interpreted this incident as an insult to a friendly country. The Chilean authorities obviously adopted another point of view. As early as September 1878, Foreign Minister Alejandro Fierro had informed the American representative in Chile, Thomas A. Osborn, that an American ship was illegally loading guano south of the Santa Cruz River. After the incident, the minister clarified to the American diplomat that the actions of the Chilean government should not be considered as a provocation to the United States government, since any ship that violated Chilean territory would be captured in the same way. (2)

Monte León Island, Santa Cruz Province (Argentine Republic)

The incident, as in the case of the "Santa Cruz criminals," was linked to unresolved territorial jurisdiction. Chile claimed all lands located south of the Santa Cruz River, a claim that included, of course, the island of Monte León where the Chilean gunboat Magallanes had captured the Devonshire. This incident, far from being an isolated incident, responded to a defined line of Chilean foreign policy aimed at consolidating its dominance south of the aforementioned river. Thus, and with the aim of clearing up any possible doubt on the question of Chilean sovereignty in this area, the trans-Andean government had already issued a declaration on October 26, 1873, which was addressed to all foreign governments and established that Chile's authority should be respected south of the Santa Cruz River. The Chilean government added weight to this declaration when on April 27, 1876, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amélie for illegally loading guano, approximately in the same place as the Devonshire. For the Chilean government, the issue surrounding the Devonshire was simply one of reaffirming a long-established law. (3)


Chilean gunboat Magellan

In this new instance of the dispute between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the exaggerated reaction of both countries almost led to war. The Minister of War and Navy, General Julio A. Roca, with a deep understanding of the Patagonian problem - demonstrated the following year with the beginning of operations against the Indians to dominate the Desert - estimated that what Avellaneda proposed was not powerful enough and convinced the first magistrate that it was convenient to send a naval division to the Santa Cruz River. Roca's criteria prevailed and that is how Commodore Luis Py, then head of our Fleet, was appointed to carry out the delicate mission.

President Nicolás Avellaneda and his then Minister of War and Navy, Julio Argentino Roca, decided to occupy Santa Cruz and send warships to the southern area. Commodore Luis Py, of the Argentine Navy, received orders to organize and lead the naval division that was to set sail for Santa Cruz, with the objective of protecting the homonymous river from Chilean incursions. At the same time, according to the information provided by the American minister in Buenos Aires, General Thomas O. Osborn, on November 18, 1878, the Chilean government had sent two or three gunboats to Patagonia with experts to occupy the Strait of Magellan. (4) For Argentina, the capture of the Devonshire was a personal insult to its people and a matter of deep concern. On October 24, 1878, Augusto Ventury protested against the Chilean government before the American minister in Buenos Aires, Osborn, and before the American consul in this city, Baker. Ventury maintained that the Chilean gunboat Magellan had violated international law since it intervened in waters that were under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic and had also captured the Devonshire and abandoned the captain on the island of Monte Leon without provisions. Ventury also demanded that the Chilean government reimburse the sum sufficient to cover the costs of the capture and imprisonment of the ship and its crew. Osborn immediately transmitted these protests of the Buenos Aires merchant to the Argentine government and telegraphed them to Santiago. He also informed the commander of the American fleet in the South Atlantic. The protests of the Argentine authorities, together with the insinuation of military reprisals on the part of the Americans, forced the Chilean government to moderate its position. The Chilean foreign minister Alejandro Fierro met with Osborn's representative in Chile, informing him of the Chilean government's willingness to release the Devonshire and her crew in exchange for a promise to abide by the legal action of the courts. But the response of Buenos Aires almost led to war. Not only did it reject the Chilean proposal, but it reaffirmed its claims for compensation from the Chilean government to cover the losses suffered by the capture of the Devonshire. (5)

Fortunately, according to Willett, the moderate reaction of the American ministers in Santiago and Buenos Aires, and the selfless action of Warren Lowe, an American citizen and editor of the prestigious Buenos Aires Herald, prevented war. With the purpose of providing a way out of the delicate situation, Lowe met with the American minister in Buenos Aires and then went to the Chilean capital where he contacted the Argentine consul, Mariano de Sarratea, and the Chilean foreign minister, Alejandro Fierro. According to Willett, Fierro was pleasantly impressed with the arguments presented by Lowe. The editor of the Buenos Aires Herald rejected the idea of ​​a forced settlement, which would only guarantee a war between Argentina and Chile. It was better to arbitrate and avoid war, than to fight and arbitrate later. (6)

Lowe repeatedly suggested to Chilean Foreign Minister Fierro that the Devonshire be released unconditionally and returned to the United States as a preliminary step to deactivate the North American diplomatic pressure on Argentina and the negative influence of Argentine public opinion on its authorities, the latter factor paralyzing any progress in negotiations with Chile. Fierro argued that the real threat of war with Argentina prevented the Chilean government from acting on the valid recommendations of the Herald editor. After several twists and turns, the Chilean Foreign Minister confirmed his government's decision to voluntarily release the Devonshire and return it to the United States. This resolution had a positive impact in official circles in Buenos Aires, and finally, on November 15, 1878, the Chilean Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Governor of Magallanes authorizing the Devonshire to set sail, putting an end to the incident. (7)

The Chilean Navy's official version states: "In 1878, Argentina's systematic advance south of Río Negro in Patagonia nearly caused war between the two nations. The American barge "Devonshire" loaded guano at Monte León Cove under license from Argentine authorities, in Chilean territory. The "Magallanes" under the command of Commander Latorre followed orders from the Chilean government and seized the barge and took it to Punta Arenas. This led to claims from Argentina, which at the time claimed those territories, and tempers flared to the point of breaking off diplomatic relations. Common sense prevailed and an agreement was reached through the Fierro-Sarratea Pact."

Argentinian Squadron

On December 1, 1878, Commodore Luis Py of the Argentine Navy raised the national flag in the place called Cañadón Misioneros at 5 p.m. on that historic day. In itself, it was a simple and quick act, but its implications would endure over time until today.
As we know, there had been a long-standing, not-so-hidden confrontation between Argentina and our Chilean neighbors, regarding the definitive possession of Patagonia, which they claimed as their own. The international conflict was not long in coming and the Minister of War of President Avellaneda, General Julio A. Roca, sent Py in command of a squadron heading to the southern seas to avoid further interference from the trans-Andeans, among whose ships was one that would celebrate future days of glory: the then gunboat and later corvette “Uruguay” (today a museum exhibited in Puerto Madero, City of Buenos Aires). On November 27th he went up the Santa Cruz River and finally, on that first day of December, he reaffirmed Argentine rights over such a vast territory.
It is no coincidence that this sublime heroic act coincided with Roca's military campaign towards the Desert, the objective of which was to definitively end the empire of shameless looting and robbery of the Pampas populations by the Mapuches, who were supported by the Chilean government. Chile could not openly occupy our southern lands because it was engaged in a war against Peru and Bolivia, the so-called "War of the Pacific" and it was not strategically appropriate to open another Theater of Operations and one more enemy.

That is why men like Roca, Py, Piedrabuena, Levalle, Villegas or Vintter must be remembered with respect and with the due historical distance, without absurd anachronisms, nor arm-twisting Clio, the muse of History, because History, like Truth, does not need our lies...

This "disputed" territory is an integral part of the current Argentine Republic.

NOTES

1. Dipl. Desp., (M69), reel 20, T.A. Osborn to Evarts, 30-10-1878, cit. en D. E. Willett, op. cit., p. 72.

2. Dipl. Desp., (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 22-10-1878; (M10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 25-10-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 72.

3. R. Burr, op. cit., p. 134, cit. en ibid., p. 73.

4. Osborn to Evarts, Telegram Nº 207, November 18, 1878, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 59, citado en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

5. Dipl. Desp. (M 10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 7-11-1878, cit. en D.E. Willett, ibid., p. 76.

6. Ibid., p. 78.

7. Dipl. Desp., (M 10), reel 29, T. A.O. to Evarts, 12-11-1878, (M69), reel 20, 12-12-1878; (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 21-11-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 81.

Historia de las RR.EE. Argentinas
ACh
Los senderos de Mnemósine

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Gunboat Magallanes (5/13)

Gunboat Magallanes

Part 5
From Part 4


Its acquisition was approved by a bill enacted on March 4, 1872. This legal body authorized, in addition to the gunboat, the construction of the armored ships Cochrane and Valparaíso (later renamed Blanco Encalada). The cost of the gunboat rose to $200,000 pesos and its construction was commissioned to the Raenhill & Co. shipyards in London, England. 1.

It arrived in Chile in 1875. Its acquisition was due to the death of two English castaways in Tierra del Fuego at the hands of the Fuegian aborigines. Upon learning of this, the British government launched a protest to its Chilean counterpart, in which it threatened to occupy said territory, given the Chilean government's lack of capacity to avoid these bloody events and ensure transit through the Strait of Magellan. For this reason, it was decided to acquire a ship that was capable of arming itself in war for use in the Punta del Fuego Colony. Arenas 1.

   
Gunboat Magallanes 7 

She displaced 950 tons (maximum), her hull was made of mixed iron and wood, she was armed with one 7-inch caliber cannon (177.8 mm), and weighed 7 tons, which launched a 115-pound (52.1 kilo) grenade, one 64-pound (29 kilo) grenade, and two 20-pound (9 kilo) grenades; she had a speed of 11 knots, engine power of 1,230 HP, 220 tons of coal capacity, coal consumption of 24 tons per day, she had a brig-schooner rig of 2.

Since her arrival she served the colony of Punta Arenas, and carried out exploration and hydrographic survey work in the southern channels and in Patagonia.

In 1877, the Magallanes, under the command of Captain Juan José Latorre, suppressed the mutiny of the artillery company that covered the square in Punta Arenas (which at that time had approximately 1,100 inhabitants), called “La Fija de Magallanes”, which had revolted under the work of Corporal Antonio Riquelme and Sergeant Isaac Pozo 3.

In 1876 and 1878, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amelie, and the American barge Devonshire respectively, both vessels loading guano in Río Negro. In both cases, these ships had been authorized by the Argentine government to carry out this task. At that time, both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over said territory, which ultimately determined that their intervention had violated international law 4.

  
Armstrong cannon of 115 pounds (52.21 kilos) and 7 inches of caliber (17.78 cm), belonging to the Magellan Gunboat 8

At the start of the Pacific War, the Magallanes gunboat was the only Chilean warship that was fully operational, as revealed by the technical report prepared in the fleet in 1878 by Captain Ramón Vidal Gormaz contained in the Navy Report of that same year 5.

It carried out the entire campaign of the Pacific War and was the Chilean ship that participated in the first naval action of the war on April 12, 1879 (Naval Battle of Chipana) against the Peruvian corvette Unión and the gunboat Pilcomayo. It also participated in the second Naval Battle of Iquique on the night of July 9-10, 1879, in which it saved the fleet's coalman Matías Cousiño from being captured, and in the Battle of Antofagasta on August 28 of the same year, saving the corvette Abtao, which was undergoing repairs. On both occasions, it was faced the Huáscar and on both occasions the ship was commanded by Captain Juan José Latorre 6.

    
Another view (from bow to stern) of the 115-pounder Armstrong, along with the 64-pounder 9.

After the war, it continued in hydrographic survey operations along the Chilean coast and in the civil war of 1891 it participated on the Congressional side, which was the victor at the time. After that, it continued in hydrographic work until its transfer to the merchant marine in 1906. It was wrecked in a storm in Corral in 1907 and sank.

Sources

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, Páginas 73-75,; La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 694. 

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 722-723; La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, Página 39 

3. El Motín de los Artilleros, Armando Braun Menéndez, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , segunda edición 1972, Argentina. 

4. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 705; Sitio WEB Armada de Chile.

5. Partes del informe se encuentran en: Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911, paginas 159-163 

6. Para una relación de ambos combates se recomienda: Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, Páginas 206-213 y 442-449 

7. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, Almirante A. Silva Palma

8. Memoria Chilena 

9. Especial Revista Ercilla sobre la Guerra del Pacífico Fascículo 2 página 27, suplemento que circulo junto con la revista Nº 3.238 de la quincena del 29/03/2004 – 11/04/2004, la imagen fue obtenida primitivamente desde el libro: Álbum Grafico Militar de Chile: Campaña de Pacífico 1879-1884 de Antonio Bizama Cuevas. Santiago, 1909, Editorial Universo.

Argentine Air Force: CIC Squadron (Río Gallegos)

“Ice Radar Operators”

 
Known by this name, the CIC Squadron, which is part of the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, maintains permanent control of the airspace under national jurisdiction.

Composed of twelve radar operators, including officers and non-commissioned officers, the CIC Squadron (Control and Information Center) belonging to the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, works every day to maintain control of Argentine airspace.

Under the command of Major Gabriel Eduardo Torres, it receives support from the Communications Group III and the Southern Air Region (RASU), maintaining permanent communication with the Aerospace Surveillance and Control Center (CeVyCA), the radar operator's governing unit.

Unlike the surveillance sectors in the north of our country, which operate in Resistencia (Chaco) and Posadas (Misiones) controlling illegal flights in that area, the CIC Squadron fulfills the surveillance function of the bordering part of southern Argentina, focusing on the defense of national sovereignty.

It carries out control tasks when airmobile squadrons arrive at the Base.
Thanks to the excellent relationship that this Air Base has with the Rio Gallegos community, support was obtained from the Provincial Road Authority and a fiber optic network was installed that significantly improved data transmission.

The radar has a range of about 220 nautical miles, approximately 440 kilometers, at 360º, and this allows monitoring of almost the entire provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego.
At the same time, while detecting the different flights, this information is sent to the Information and Control Center located at CeVyCA.

Due to the inclement weather in this region of the country, the radar antenna is protected with a radome, allowing its correct performance and preserving its operational life.
The Base also has a bunker next to the radar and a simulator to train personnel.

Known as “Ice Radarists” and continuing the tradition of the “Ice Warriors” who operated in the 10th Fighter Squadron of the former 10th Air Brigade, currently the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, the CIC Squadron works tirelessly to improve day by day, providing operational support and logistical support, making it possible for the radar to cover the entire south of our country.

“I have to highlight the dedication and professionalism of each of the people who make up this Squadron, who work uninterruptedly throughout the year, managing to cover and cover all functions satisfactorily. The truth is that what the staff does is impressive” - said Major Torres proudly.



Source: FAA

Argentina-Chile: On the Historical Mistrust

Rivalry and Mistrust Between Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile's historical rivalry and mutual distrust can be traced back to several key moments and events that have shaped their relationship over the centuries. This essay will explore the origins of their conflict, highlighting significant dates and events that contributed to the tension, leading up to the contemporary period.

Early Conflicts and Colonial Legacies

The roots of the Argentine-Chilean rivalry can be traced back to the colonial period when both regions were part of the Spanish Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included both modern-day Argentina and Chile. However, administrative divisions within the viceroyalty created early distinctions between the two regions.

In 1776, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which included the territory of present-day Argentina. This administrative change heightened the sense of separation and competition between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the respective capitals of the new and old viceroyalties. The different economic and political priorities of these regions sowed the seeds of future conflicts.

The Independence Wars (1810-1826)

The wars of independence from Spanish rule, which began in the early 19th century, further strained relations between Argentina and Chile. Both countries achieved independence around the same time, with Argentina declaring independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. However, their paths to independence were intertwined with mutual suspicions and differing regional interests.

One of the pivotal moments was the crossing of the Andes by the Argentine general José de San Martín in 1817. San Martín's Army of the Andes, composed of Argentine and Chilean patriots, defeated the Spanish royalists in Chile, leading to the country's independence. Despite this shared struggle, the differing political ambitions and visions for the future of the region created underlying tensions.

The War of the Confederation (1836-1839)

A significant early conflict that exemplified the rivalry was the War of the Confederation. In the 1830s, Andrés de Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Argentina saw as a threat to regional balance. Chile, fearing the confederation's expansionist aims, allied with Argentina against it.

The war culminated in the Battle of Yungay in 1839, where the Chilean-Argentine alliance defeated the confederation's forces. This conflict underscored the precarious balance of power in the region and established a precedent for future cooperation against common threats, but it also deepened mutual suspicions as both countries sought to expand their influence.

Border Disputes and the Boundary Treaty of 1881

Territorial disputes have been a recurring theme in the Argentine-Chilean rivalry. The most significant of these disputes arose from the unclear demarcation of borders following their independence from Spain. The Andes Mountains, which form the natural boundary between the two countries, became a focal point of contention.

In 1881, Argentina and Chile signed the Boundary Treaty, which aimed to resolve these disputes by defining the border along the highest peaks of the Andes. Despite this agreement, ambiguities in the treaty's language led to further conflicts, particularly over the Patagonian region and the Beagle Channel, areas rich in natural resources and strategically important.

The Beagle Channel Conflict (1978)

One of the most critical flashpoints in the 20th century was the Beagle Channel conflict. The Beagle Channel, a narrow strait in the southern tip of South America, became the center of a territorial dispute in the 1970s. Both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over several islands in the channel, leading to a severe diplomatic and military standoff.

In 1978, the conflict nearly escalated into full-scale war. Both countries mobilized their armed forces, and a naval confrontation seemed imminent. However, intervention by Pope John Paul II, who mediated the conflict, led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984. The treaty, which awarded most of the disputed islands to Chile, averted war but left lingering resentment in Argentina.

The Malvinas War (1982)

The Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom indirectly influenced Argentine-Chilean relations. During the war, Chile provided intelligence and logistical support to the British, further straining its relationship with Argentina. This support was motivated by Chile's desire to counterbalance Argentina's military strength and protect its own territorial claims in the region.

The aftermath of the Malvinas War saw Argentina's military regime weakened and its international standing diminished. The war's outcome also reinforced Chile's strategic calculations and its distrust of Argentina, leading to increased military readiness along their shared border.

Democratic Transitions and Modern Relations

Both Argentina and Chile transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a gradual thawing of relations. Diplomatic efforts focused on resolving remaining territorial disputes and fostering economic cooperation. The establishment of democratic governments in both countries provided a framework for dialogue and conflict resolution.

The signing of the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, which declared the region a zone of peace and cooperation, marked a significant step toward normalization. Joint commissions were established to address border issues, and bilateral trade agreements were signed, promoting economic integration.

Contemporary Dynamics

In recent years, Argentina and Chile have continued to work on improving their relationship, though underlying tensions persist. Both countries have engaged in regional organizations such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking to enhance economic ties and political cooperation.

However, issues such as competing claims in Antarctica and the ongoing need for resource management in shared territories require ongoing diplomatic efforts. The construction of the Binational Tunnel of Agua Negra, aimed at improving connectivity between the two countries, exemplifies the potential for collaboration despite historical rivalries.

Conclusion

The historical rivalry and mutual distrust between Argentina and Chile are rooted in colonial legacies, independence wars, territorial disputes, and geopolitical conflicts. Key moments such as the War of the Confederation, the Beagle Channel conflict, and the Falklands War have shaped their relationship, creating a complex dynamic of competition and cooperation. While democratic transitions and modern diplomatic efforts have improved relations, underlying tensions continue to influence their interactions. Understanding this history is crucial for appreciating the nuanced and evolving nature of Argentine-Chilean relations in the contemporary period.

 

Casamiquela: Araucanians are Chilean and Cannot Claim Lands in Argentina

Rodolfo Casamiquela: The historian who assured that “The Mapuches do not have rights to Argentine lands”

10/22/2017
Informa de Patrulla

Rodolfo Casamiquela was a paleontologist, archaeologist, Doctor of Science, researcher, teacher, historian and writer. He left around twenty books and 400 research papers. He dedicated his life to the study of the origins of Patagonia. He was born in Ingeniero Jacobacci (province of Río Negro) in 1932  and died in Cipolletti in 2008. He was the author of numerous publications on the origins of human settlement in Patagonia and promoted the recognition of the Tehuelche ethnic group as a native people of the northern part of the Patagonia region.

The historian Rodolfo Casamiquela was harsh with the Mapuches, who "scratched" him several times. He says that "they have no real interest in safeguarding indigenous culture, but are rather 'piqueteros'." He spoke of fighting to rescue the language of the Tehuelche people from oblivion. And that worried him much more than the insults he receives when he wants to talk about the story. "If they define themselves as Mapuches, they are Chileans and if they are Chileans they have no right to the land of Argentina," said Casamiquela.

He graduated as a National Mining Expert, while continuing his training in Patagonian topics in the library of the Ethnographic Museum. A scholarship took him to Belgium and, upon his return, he decided to pursue a career in Paleontology at the University of La Plata. He worked for Conicet until the military coup of 1966. He decided to settle in Chile, where he graduated with a doctorate in Biology at the end of the 60s. He returned to Río Negro, where he created the Río Negro Scientific Research Center, based in Viedma.

In 1978, Casamiquela created the Ameghino Foundation in Viedma to promote regional research and the study of agriculture, geology, mining, fishing and biology. His research works include iconological and ethnological studies of Patagonia, rock art and Tehuelche grammar,

In 1965 he received the first National Prize for Anthropology and the third for Biology from the Undersecretary of Culture of the Nation. He served as a professor at different universities and academic institutions in Chile and Argentina. He was an emeritus professor at the National University of Southern Patagonia and nominated for an honorary doctorate.

“Casamiquela had different episodes where he was harshly criticized for investigations in which he maintained that the Tehuelches were the true original settlers of Chubut and northern Patagonia. His studies led him to affirm that the Mapuches crossed the border and invaded the Tehuelches in the 17th century, a people whom he considered practically extinct.

“This position earned him severe criticism from aboriginalists from Argentina and Chile, who on several occasions prevented the researcher from completing his dissertations in universities and institutions. The root of the discussion is that Casamiquela considered the Mapuches, Chileans, when it comes to “pre-existing” peoples that inhabited the mountain range before the political geographical delimitations that we currently know. However, it was a basis that served judicially to evict several indigenous communities. Beyond the controversies over this extreme position, his contributions to the knowledge of Patagonia acquire special relevance; which is expressed in a work of great extension and depth.”



His opinion expressed almost 10 years after his death

-What led you to study about this?

– My concern for indigenous things began when I was 14 years old. I went to study in Buenos Aires and one day, in the National Library, I started reading Mapuche, without knowing that in my town (Ingeniero Jacobacci) half of the kids my age spoke that language, because then they hid their origin. Not even the teachers knew. So, when I returned, it was a pleasant surprise to discover that the laborers who baled the wool in a commercial house where my father worked were of indigenous origin. I had a fantastic summer with them, because I began to write down the first things about their language. At the age of 16, always accompanied by the indigenous people, he was already building the first museum referring to his history.

-What have you been able to learn about them?

– I have met hundreds of indigenous people and all the Tehuelche speakers in Patagonia. I studied and learned that first came the Paleolithic Tehuelche world, very ancient. The ancestors of their ancestors date back to 10,000 or 12,000 years ago and evolved in Patagonia. Long after the arrival of the Spanish, around 1600, the horse allowed the Tehuelches to dominate the entire Pampas and Neuquén area. At that same time Mapuchization began. There are differences between them.



The Patagonian giants are not a fantasy, but rather the Tehuelches, who reached almost two meters in height and weighed 150 kilos, with dark complexions and Asian eyes, who lived by hunting and dressed in skins. The Araucanos or Mapuches, however, are a race of medium height, cultivators of Andean culture, who had houses made of wood and straw and worked wonderfully with weaving and silversmithing; They had a superior cultural trajectory, which the Tehuelches imitated.

-What was happening with the language?

– With the arrival of religion and name days, a transformation takes place in it. Then, the Tehuelche men, especially the caciques, in northern Patagonia, began to be bilingual. But the women continued speaking Tehuelche, some families even switched from Tehuelche to Spanish, without going through Mapuche. There was a religious syncretism and the Tehuelche became Mapuchized. But the Mapuche as a people were on the other side of the Cordillera.

-Do the descendants preserve the indigenous language?

– Today there are living descendants of great Tehuelche chiefs. There are only a few families, the others are descendants of Mapuches. The Ñanco, for example, are descendants of Sacamata, one of the most serious chiefs of northern Patagonia, born between 1870 and 1880. One of my teachers was the one who saved the Tehuelche language, since he was the last one who spoke it. His name was José María Cual (which in Tehuelche means neck). He died in 1960, aged 90. When I met him, I was a boy and he was blind. For many years we dedicated ourselves to the Tehuelche language and for this I want to pay the greatest tribute to this people, descendants of the oldest inhabitants of all of America.

-How?

– One day I swore to pay tribute to this unique town, saving everything I could from its history. Unfortunately I'm alone in all this. Descendants do not study their ancestors, because that means reading white people and there is a kind of rejection, a denial that is like cheating in life's solitaire. You can't move forward. So I am a plum teacher, that is, a scientist, who tells the story as it is told by science, anthropology. I do not make demagogic concessions. Therefore, if I say that there were no Mapuche here in 1865 and that they only arrived in 1890, I am saying what history is, I am not inventing it. Only others don't say it or say it differently. So I'm the bad guy.

-Is that why they give you escraches?

– Yes. But these people are not indigenous in the cultural sense, they are in the piquetero sense. They are politicians.

-What are they questioning you about?

– There are no questions. That's a pretext. You have to think about what they are looking for. If they define themselves as Mapuches they are Chileans and if they are Chileans they have no right to the land of Argentina. This is the key. So, as I explain that they are Chileans, I am the enemy. Any Chilean knows that the Mapuches are Chileans. Leaders know it too. But not youth. 99 percent of those who define themselves as Mapuche are of Tehuelche origin. But there have been many confusions due to language or surname. This is how identity is lost.

-Why would they have the need to feel like Mapuches if they are not?

– Because the word Mapuche is very attractive. It means people of the earth. If it is used as a symbol it is correct. I am also people of the earth. In 1960, as a tribute, the First Congress of the Araucanian Area of ​​Argentina proposed that the Araucanians be called Mapuche as in Chile.

-What would be the answer if someone asked who the originators were?

– It would be necessary to see with respect to what. Upon the arrival of the Spanish it is one thing. The constitution of the Argentine State is another. Because in 1816 there were no Mapuches in Argentina. The first settled in the center of La Pampa in 1820 and in 1890, south of Limay Negro, the first settlers of Chilean origin were the Mapuches and the Chilotes. You have to distinguish this whole thing very subtly.

-Why do you mention the loss of identity?

– That is the most terrible thing. The grandchildren of my teachers, who knew what they were, today are all Mapuche. That is, the grandfather is pure Tehuelche, but the grandson is Mapuche. Then Patagonia lost its identity. This is a land of floods, because people arrive from other places every day. So, the teachers are not from here and it is very difficult to recreate that wonderful identity that - until 30 years ago - was the word, the open house, the hospitality, the security and the indigenous base, now faded by all this confusion that there is with the Mapuches. But until a few years ago the story was clear.

-What happens with the Tehuelche language?

– It is a dead language. He died in 1960. And there are no people interested in learning it. I did it because I was aware that my teacher, José María Cual, was one of the last to speak it. He communicated with me in Spanish and we could make translations from Mapuche to Tehuelche, review them for several years and pass them clean. He was aware that he was the only one left to speak that language. But he died before seeing the grammar. Today culture is lost. The descendants, for the most part, do not maintain the language. Even the names that are here, in the shops, are false. The vocabulary is wrong and that is my suffering. This worries me much more than the escraches. Indigenous people have to improve and professionalize themselves without losing their language of origin. In Argentina, the indigenous language has one generation left and no one cares about recovering it.

-What do you feel every time you say you are alone in this?

– You feel helplessness, because it is difficult to reach teaching and those who have political decision over it. When I go to teach at schools, the kids and teachers are amazed. At the end of the talks, the boys who have indigenous surnames who were shy come forward and feel good, because they are descendants of the great chiefs. The same thing happens when they know what the meanings of their names are in Mapuche, because the Tehuelches have no meanings. All of this can be done, but who bells the cat.

Source: El Chubut Newspaper – Azkintuwe Noticia