Beagle Crisis: General Las Heras Group

General Las Heras Group

A mechanized armored grouping was tasked with crossing through the passes near Bariloche, heading towards Temuco, effectively splitting Chile in two. This force consisted of approximately 7,800 men and around 200 combat vehicles, including Sherman tanks, Mowag vehicles, M-3 Diamonds, and M-113s. Leading the formation was the 28th Mountain Infantry Regiment (known as "Rodillas Negras"), a unit with a strong reputation earned in Tucumán in 1975. By the time the order to halt the operation arrived, some of its units had already crossed the border during the night.

Beagle Crisis: ORBAT of Chilean Northern Forces

Chilean ORBAT in the North of the Country

By the end of 1978, the Chilean armed forces were organized and prepared for potential conflict due to the tensions with Argentina. In the north of the country, Chile's military deployment included several key operational units across the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Here’s a list of these units based on the available information:

Chilean Army (Ejército de Chile)

The Chilean Army's northern command was responsible for defending the northern regions, which are strategic due to their proximity to Peru and Bolivia.

1. 1st Army Division (Primera División del Ejército)

   • 1st Armored Brigade (Primera Brigada Blindada)
   • 1st Infantry Brigade (Primera Brigada de Infantería)
   • 1st Artillery Group (Primer Grupo de Artillería)
   • 1st Cavalry Regiment (Regimiento de Caballería Blindada Nº 1 "Granaderos")
   • 1st Engineering Regiment (Regimiento de Ingenieros Nº 1 "Atacama")
   • 1st Communications Battalion (Batallón de Comunicaciones Nº 1)

2. 2nd Army Division (Segunda División del Ejército)

   • 2nd Infantry Brigade (Segunda Brigada de Infantería)
   • 2nd Armored Brigade (Segunda Brigada Blindada)
   • 2nd Artillery Group (Segundo Grupo de Artillería)
   • 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Regimiento de Caballería Blindada Nº 2 "Cazadores")
   • 2nd Engineering Regiment (Regimiento de Ingenieros Nº 2 "Puente Alto")
   • 2nd Communications Battalion (Batallón de Comunicaciones Nº 2)

Chilean Air Force (Fuerza Aérea de Chile)

The Chilean Air Force had several squadrons and air bases in the northern regions to provide air defense and support.

1. Air Group No. 7 (Grupo de Aviación Nº 7)

   • Base Aérea Cerro Moreno (Cerro Moreno Air Base), Antofagasta
   • Aircraft: F-5E Tiger II, T-37 Tweet trainers, and A-37 Dragonfly light attack aircraft

2. Air Group No. 8 (Grupo de Aviación Nº 8)

   • Base Aérea Los Cóndores (Los Cóndores Air Base), Iquique
   • Aircraft: F-5E Tiger II, T-37 Tweet trainers, and A-37 Dragonfly light attack aircraft

Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile)

The Chilean Navy maintained a presence in the northern coastal areas, although its primary focus was on the central and southern regions. Naval assets in the north were mainly for coastal defense and patrol duties.

1. Fourth Naval Zone (Cuarta Zona Naval)
   • Naval Base Iquique
   • Patrol Boats and Coastal Defense Units
   • Naval Infantry Detachments

Summary

The key operational units of the Chilean armed forces in the north of the country by the end of 1978 included:

• Army Units: 1st and 2nd Army Divisions with their respective brigades, regiments, and support units.
• Air Force Units: Air Group No. 7 at Cerro Moreno Air Base and Air Group No. 8 at Los Cóndores Air Base, with aircraft including F-5E Tiger II, T-37 Tweet, and A-37 Dragonfly.
• Navy Units: Fourth Naval Zone with coastal defense assets and naval infantry detachments.

These units were tasked with defending the northern regions of Chile and ensuring readiness in case of escalation with Argentina or any other regional threat.

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Argentine Navy ORBAT in 1862-75 (3/13)

The ARA Ships: 1862-75

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4

In the period 1859-62, the navies of the main powers began to incorporate armored ships, while naval artillery was progressively increased in caliber and power to be able to penetrate the wrought iron plates that protected the vital parts of these ships. At the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the ARA only had 19 ships, few of which were steamships. The largest of these was the Guardia Nacional, a 520-ton side-wheel passenger ship. In fact, the ARA did not have purpose-built warships, but packages (correillos) and river vessels armed with a few antiquated cannons and totally devoid of any protection. The only units of any importance acquired in these years were side-wheel steamships, such as the Colonel Espora (552 tons.) and the Colonel Rosetti (772 tons.) These were joined in mid-1867 by General Brown, but these ships like other ships in the fleet, mere passenger ships armed with few cannons and without the slightest protection. (1)

In comparison, the Brazilian navy, which at that time was the largest in Latin America, had 45 warships, of which 35 were steam-powered, and had incorporated 14 armored ships of various designs, including several of the type Monitor. The ARA would not possess true warships until the 1870s, when the National Congress appropriated $2.6 million for a modest naval re-equipment program. The vessels provided under this program were the monitors
the Andes and El Plata, the corvette-gunboats Paraná and Uruguay, as well as four bombers, and a couple of warning ships. These ships, collectively called “La Escuadra de Sarmiento” arrived in the country during 1874-75 and were the first to be specifically designed to meet the conditions required by the ARA: that is, river vessels for service in the tributaries of the Río de la Plata at a time when a war against Brazil seemed imminent. When Sarmiento was Argentine minister in Washington, shortly after the civil war in that country ended, the man from San Juan followed with great interest the introduction of new military equipment and materials. His keen intellect was attracted to the use of “floating torpedoes”, as anti-ship mines were called in those days. These “floating torpedoes” had been used with excellent results by the Confederate States in their efforts to counteract the blockade of their port and coasts by Union ships. We should not be surprised by the fact that when Sarmiento assumed the presidency of the Republic Argentina, the ARA hired several former Confederate naval officers to lead the ARA Torpedo Division. This navy unit was established in the place where the Naval Museum of the Nation is today, on the Lujan River, in the Paraná Delta (2)

The Torpedo Division consisted of the ARA Fulminante, an explosives and torpedo depot ship, as well as several steam launches equipped with boom torpedoes. The Argentine naval strategy of those times gave capital importance to the possibility of a naval attack by Brazil. Monitors and shallow-draft river vessels could operate without difficulties in the rivers of the Plata Basin, while the channels leading to Buenos Aires would be protected by a network of “floating torpedoes” and the canyons of Martín García Island ( 3).

Photographs

 

1) Monitor ARA El Plata c. 1890-note the sailors on deck and a Gatling gun in artillery carriage, which as in the U.S. Navy and other navies of that time it was used to repel torpedo boats or as a support weapon for landing troops. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch


2) ARA Los Andes Monitor, 1905-note one of the two 120 mm Armstrong guns installed in the 1890s. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch. The ship seen in the background is an ARA lightship.


3) Monitors ARA Los Andes and ARA El Plata at the Río Santiago Naval Base c. 1900-1901. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch

 
3) ARA Uruguay-painting that shows her on her trip to the South Pole, 1903
Observe in photos no.1 and no.2 the excellent state of maintenance of these ships

Monitor: Los Andes, El Plata
Displacement: 1,677 tons
Length: 56.6 m
Beam: 13.4 m
Draft: 3.20 m
Artillery (original) 2 x 280 mm Armstrong mounted on the armored tower
2 x 47mm Armstrong on deck
4 x 37mm Hotchkiss
Armor: 160 mm belt
Main Tower: 255 mm
Machines: 2 x 750 Hp
Compound system, two propellers.
Coal: 120 tons
Maximum speed: 10 knots, service speed 9 knots

Corvette Gunship Paraná, Uruguay
Displacement: 550 tons
Length: 46.3 m
Beam: 7.63 m
Draft: 3.20m
Armament (original)
4 x 177 Armstrong mounted on Vavasseur iron gun carriages.
Machines: 1 x 475 Compund that powered
A Bevis type propeller
Speed: (sail and steam) 11 knots

Bomber ships Bermejo, Constitución, Pilcomayo, República 
Displacement: 416 tons
Length: 32.3 m
Beam: 9.19 m
Draft: 3.20 m
Armament: 1 x 280 mm Armstrong in center line, 2 x 80 mm Armstrong
Maximum speed: 9 knots. (4)

Notes 

1) Burzio, Armada Nacional.,pag.99-100, Rauch, op cit, pag.116-117 
2) Burzio Armada Nacional, pag.100, Rauch, op cit, pag.117-118 
3) Burzio, Humberto H, Historia del Torpedo y sus buques en la Armada Argentina (Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, Serie B, No. 12 (Buenos Aires, 1968) pag.19-24,80-89, Rauch , op cit, pag.120-129 
4) Las características de estos buques provienen en conjunto de Burzio, Armada Nacional, pg.100, y Arguindeguy, Apuntes Sobre los Buques, III: 1122-131, 1238-1245.

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 (1/13)

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4

Organic Growth and Development of the Argentine Navy: 1810-1902

Although the May Revolution of 1810 marked the end of the colonial era in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, on the opposite bank of the Plata, remained in the hands of the royalists. From this station, a powerful and well-trained squadron under the command of Captain Jacinto de Romarate soon established a blockade of Buenos Aires and threatened to cut the lines of communication along the coast. The patriot authorities reacted quickly and in August acquired three merchant ships, suitable to be transformed into warships. These were: the brig "25 de Mayo", the schooner "Invencible", and the sloop "Americano". An Argentine veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, and former lieutenant of the Spanish navy, Francisco de Gurrucharaga dedicated himself vigorously to equipping this small squadron. The poverty of the treasury, the lack of trained personnel and materials complicated his task. The command of this flotilla was entrusted to Juan Bautista Azopardo, a privateer of Maltese origin, who was supported by two French privateers: Hipólito Bouchard and Angel Hubac. On February 10, 1811, three of the patriot ships set sail from Buenos Aires and headed towards the Paraná River. On March 2, the patriot squadron was intercepted by a powerful royalist squadron. In the fierce combat that took place, numerical and training superiority prevailed. Aboard the "25 de Mayo", 41 crew members out of a total of 50 on board were injured or killed. To the dismay of the patriots, the first Argentine naval squadron was captured and towed to Montevideo, where after being repaired, the ships were incorporated into the royalist fleet (1)

Phoenix Bird

On July 7, a royalist squadron bombed Buenos Aires, although not without being punished. Bouchard, who was in charge of a gunboat armed with a solitary 18-pounder cannon, went out in search of the royalist ships, managed to inflict serious damage on one of them, causing the enemy to retreat. As a result of this attack; The patriot government equipped a second squadron consisting of the schooners "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" and "Santo Domingo", the ketch "Hiena" and four smaller boats. The royalist fleet reappeared again off Buenos Aires on August 19, but when Bouchard directed his ships towards it, the enemy withdrew and tried, ineffectively, to bombard Buenos Aires from a safe distance. On October 20, 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo concluded an armistice that provided for the cessation of hostilities and the end of the blockade. While the national government disarmed its flotilla, the royalists violated the armistice and proceeded to bomb towns on the Argentine coast with impunity, attacking commercial ships at will. This in turn motivated the creation of the third Argentine naval squadron, which was organized by an Irish merchant captain; Buenos Aires resident William Brown, who is very rightly considered the father of the Argentine navy. This squadron was made up of a frigate, four corvettes, a brig, five schooners and other smaller ships. The officers were mostly foreigners, but soon a growing number of Creoles joined the fleet. (2)

 
San Nicolás Battle

In May 1814 Brown defeated the royalist fleet that once dominated the Rio de la Plata. This triumph in turn made possible the blockade and subsequent taking of Montevideo. This magnificent victory deprived Spain of the only base of operations it had in South America and granted control of the waters to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Furthermore, in order to harass and destroy Spanish trade in the region, the government of Buenos Aires began to grant letters of marque to foreign privateers, among whom those of American nationality predominated. The exact number of these privateers is unknown, although it is known that one of these privateer ships was active in 1815, 4 in 1816, 23 in 1819, 10 in 1820 and two in 1821. In 1815 the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata was the only Spanish American nation that the royalists had not managed to subjugate. In Spain, a powerful expedition was organized that would be commanded by General Pablo de Morillo who had been assigned the task of taking Buenos Aires, but the loss of Montevideo forced Spain to consider its strategy and Morillo's expedition was dispatched towards New Granada, the current Republic of Colombia.(3)

Expedition to the Pacific

In 1816 Brown led an Argentine squadron on a cruise to the Pacific. These ships blockaded Lima and Guayaquil, captured California and hit Spanish maritime trade vigorously. The frigate "La Argentina", commanded by Hipólito Bouchard that was part of this flotilla, separated from the other ships and was the first Argentine flag ship to circumnavigate the world. (4)

A Chilean naval historian describes the outcome of Brown's cruise in the following terms:

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5) 

War against Brazil: 1825-1828

At the end of the wars of independence, the ARA was reduced to a minimum and most of its ships were sold to private shipowners. In 1825, when the war with Brazil broke out, the Argentine fleet consisted of four frigates, two corvettes and 12 gunboats built in Bajo, on the banks of Buenos Aires and armed with old 24-piece pieces taken from the fort of that city. Command of the fleet was again entrusted to Brown. In direct contrast, the fleet of the Brazilian Empire, manned by a plethora of high-ranking English officers and subordinates, veterans of the Napoleonic wars; It had 108 warships, of which half were larger units (frigates, corvettes, brigs) and the rest were gunboats and schooners armed in war of various types and sizes. In a rapid series of battles, the Argentine navy managed to defeat the powerful imperial fleet, and although the latter blocked Buenos Aires, the lines of communication between the United Provinces and the Eastern Band of Uruguay, where the Argentine army was located, They were never cut off or even affected. On the other hand, despite the notorious lack of resources and the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, between 1825 and 127 the Argentine navy managed to destroy or capture more than 50 Brazilian warships, many of which were incorporated into the navy. national and employed with great energy and great skill against their former owners. In addition, Argentine warships and corsairs from Buenos Aires captured 445 Brazilian merchant ships (6)

The Era of Rosas (1829-1852)-Fights for Argentine unification: 1852-1862

During the Rosas era (1829-52) the navy became essentially a riverine force, adequate enough to defeat the Uruguayan fleet in a series of battles throughout the year 1841, but not strong or modern enough to confront to the Anglo-French squadron sent to Plata in 1845. A maritime academy in which officers were trained operated until 1830, then naval cadets were assigned to fleet units. The Argentine navy would not enter the age of steam until 1851. The two nation states that emerged in Argentina after the overthrow of Rosas in 1852 established squadrons equipped with war-armed steam merchant vessels, most of which would be incorporated into the national navy after the Argentine reunification that occurs as a result of the Battle of Pavón. However, by mid-1865, the fleet was reduced to a few vessels in service, the rest having been reduced to pontoon status or serving as storage hulls. The navy did not have a land infrastructure, naval bases or even warships themselves. It was painfully evident that the navy had not experienced adequate development, not only in comparison to the fleets of the great powers, but also in comparison to the fleets of neighboring countries such as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay.

The War with Paraguay (1865-1870)

When the Paraguayan War broke out, the Argentine navy was reduced to a handful of armed merchant steamers, sailing cutters and old hulls that served as floating stores of material. There was no infrastructure on land, nor training centers for the training of personnel. Although during the war, the command of the allied armies was entrusted to the president of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre, given the fact that among the allies, only Brazil had a navy worthy of the name, the Viscount of Tamandaré was placed in charge. charge of naval operations. The participation of the Argentine navy in this conflict, due to lack of suitable material, was reduced mainly to transportation and logistical support missions. (7)


 
Crew of the Steamship "25 de Mayo", captured in Corrientes, beginning the Argentine intervention in the Paraguayan War

Development of Institutes and land infrastructure: 1872-1902

The first steps on the long road towards modernization and expansion would be taken during the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74). A figure of extraordinary creativity, whom North American historian Hubert Herring described as "Possibly the only practical genius to emerge from Spanish America," Sarmiento devoted considerable time and thought to the importance of naval power for communications and defense. . Therefore, when Major Clodomiro Uturbey, a graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, proposed the creation of a similar establishment in Argentina, Sarmiento gave his support to this initiative. The necessary legislation was promulgated on October 2, 1872 and three days later the Naval Military School (ENM) was officially established aboard the steamship "General Brown", where it operated until 1877, when as a result of the "gabanes mutiny", The government ordered the closure of the ENM, although this measure did not interrupt the "curriculum" of the cadets who were simply transferred to various units of the navy until the ENM was transferred to a new headquarters in the heart of Buenos Aires. The number of cadets in the ENM grew gradually: 15 in 1872, 50 in 1883 and would exceed the figure of 70 in 1887 although the true growth would not occur until 1893, when the ENM was transferred again, this time to Juan's former residence Manuel de Rosas in Palermo, previously used by the Military College of the Nation. The cadet corps began to grow rapidly from then on: 77 in 1895, 88 in 1896, 110 in 1897 and 140 in 1898 (8)

Initially, the course of study at the ENM lasted six semesters. The first included geometry, rectilinear trigonometry, drawing, foreign languages, ballistics and general education. Spatial geometry, physics, naval astronomy and other academic subjects were studied in subsequent semesters, while practical teaching similarly progressed from the duties of a private seaman to those of a helmsman, from piloting small vessels to the duties and responsibilities of an officer. The later semesters emphasized the teaching of shipbuilding techniques, steam propulsion, international law, naval gunnery, and history. The cadets were then assigned to warships in service on the Patagonian coasts and the recently graduated midshipmen were assigned to a flotilla of sailing cutters that patrolled those latitudes, thus acquiring valuable experience. Long-duration trans-oceanic voyages began in the early 1880s, when the ENM received a new steam corvette specially designed as a training ship, we refer to the corvette "La Argentina". At the end of the 1890s this unit would be replaced by the ARA frigate "Sarmiento", a 2800-ton displacement unit, which in turn inaugurated the era of circumnavigation of the world. At the end of the 19th century, the prestige and efficiency of the ENM transcended the country's borders, and was fully recognized abroad, which is why students from neighboring countries competed in the entrance exams to this institution. (9)

In 1875, the School of Apprentice-Sailors was created aboard the boat "Vanguardia", and the following year, a reformatory for young people was established aboard the pontoon "General Paz", designated "Correccional de Menores", although the practice of sentencing young offenders of the penal code to serve in the army was abandoned soon after. In its replacement, the School of Cabins was established aboard the boat "Cabo de Hornos", a unit that during the period 1879-1884 patrolled the Patagonian coasts until it was removed from service, and replaced by the training ship "La Argentina". The Artillery School was established aboard the monitor "El Plata" in 1877 and the Artillery Apprentice School, where cannon corporals were trained, operated aboard various units since its creation in 1881. Firefighters, machinists and electricians received training at the School of Navy Mechanics, which existed under various names since 1880. Finally, the Torpedo School was established in 1883, aboard a ship incorporated at that time, the ARA torpedo ram "Maipú". (10)

In January 1879, the Central Hydrography Office (OCH) was established, which would be responsible for exploring and charting the coasts and waterways, as well as the construction of lighthouses and beacons. In January 1881, the newly created Naval Observatory was attached to the OCH. In this way, the ARA obtained a valuable wealth of information regarding the Argentine interior rivers and the Patagonian coasts. (11)

As can be seen, the ARA placed special emphasis on the training of officers and junior personnel. In 1883, the ARA had a strength of 2,000 men, which included 1,503 sailors, 320 officers (including 48 cadets from the engineering branch) and 133 ensigns and cadets. During the struggles for national reunification and through the Paraguayan War, the ARA hired Argentine and foreign merchant sailors to complete some of the crews of its ships. The services of Argentine merchant ships were also contracted, including their crews for quarantine tasks and logistical support missions. During the 1880s-1890s the ARA experienced a shortage of specialists and machine personnel, so a substantial number of foreign specialists were hired. The naval ranking of 1891 revealed that of a total of 83 engineering officers, 32 were foreigners. In 1897, of a total of 155 officers in this branch, 97 were natives of the country, and the rest were foreigners. As the fleet grew in number, and the ships that were added were invariably of greater tonnage and technically more advanced than their predecessors, the need to increase personnel became apparent. For example, the four "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers in the late 1890s required an average of 25 officers and 440 men per unit, a total of 109 officers and 1,636 crew. In 1902 the ARA had a strength of 8,336 men, a figure that included 327 line officers, 297 officer-engineers, 7,760 sailors and 450 marines. The growing importance of the navy was tacitly recognized on March 15, 1898, when the navy obtained the status of an independent force, that is, it no longer depended on the Ministry of War and Navy. From now on, it would be regulated by the Ministry of the Navy. (12)

Stations and bases

As the ARA increased its fleet and the ships added were increasingly larger, the ARA had to establish a network of naval stations and bases throughout the republic. Although we must deal with the expansion of the fleet separately, we must mention that the first modern units incorporated were shallow draft ships that could anchor in Rio de la Plata or in the Zárate naval base, but as fleet units were added increased tonnage the need for a deep water port became apparent. The town of Punta Alta, in the south of the Province of Buenos Aires was selected for said installation. A famous Italian engineer, Luigi Luiggi, was assigned to design the plans. Work began in 1898, and in July the first three coastal artillery batteries intended to protect the future base had already been placed. Upon completion of the works, in 1902 this strategic port, called Puerto Militar, would emerge as the largest naval base in South America, with enough space to house 20 "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers. The facilities covered an area of 3000 hectares. A strategic railway connected the base with the city of Bahía Blanca, while batteries of cannons and coastal howitzers protected it against the eventuality of a naval attack. (13)

Coastal Artillery Corps

Coastal artillery did not receive special attention until the 1870s. Until 1879, coastal defense had been the responsibility of the army, whose Plaza Artillery Battalion garrisoned the island of Martín García. The Coastal Artillery Corps, established on November 15, 1879 under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Sellstrom, former professor of ballistics at the ENM and superlative engineer. The Coastal Artillery Corps also provided marine infantry and protection forces, but the only existing fortifications were those of Martín García. During the Paraguayan War, the Ministry of War had ordered the construction of five barbettes of material that would mount 36 pieces of artillery, but in mid-1866 only 18 cannons had been installed, and even these were archaic relics inherited from the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and low caliber. During Sarmiento's government, the first modern artillery pieces: 4 381 mm Rodmans and six 254 mm Parrotts were placed on the island. In 1877 these guns were complemented by a battery of 177 mm (7 in) Armstrong pieces that fired 150-pound anti-armor grenades, giving Martín García a true strategic capability. In the mid-1880s, Martín García's cannons and other installations were already outdated, since models with greater penetration capacity and greater range had appeared. The ARA selected the Krupp mod. 1887 240 mm L.35 as regulatory equipment for its batteries, and pieces of this type were located in Martín García, the Zárate Naval Arsenal and in Puerto Militar. In 1899 they would be complemented with three Krupp mod howitzer batteries. 1899 280mm L.11. Meanwhile, the constant tension with Chile led to an expansion of the ARA, whose fleet would be in 1898 the most powerful and best equipped in South America. (14)

1. Rauch, George , Conflict in the Southern Cone; the Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (Praeger (Wesport, Conecticut and London, 1999).pag. 101-102
2. Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone..Ibid pag.102-103
3. Iid, pag. 103-104
4. Iid pag.104
5. Lopez Urrutia, Carlos, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1969) pag. 26
6. Baldrich, Amadeo J, Historia de la guerra del Brasil: Contribucion al estudio razonado de la historia militar argentina (Imprenta La Harlem, Buenos Aires, 1905) pag.258-70, Rauch, op cit, pag. 104
7. Rauch, op cit, pag 104-105
8. Burzio Humberto, Armada Nacional: Reseña Historica de su origen y desarrollo orgánico (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B, No 1, Buenos Aires, 1960) pag.160 -161, Burzio, Humberto, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B. 1972, Buenos Aires, 3 vols., 1972) I; 246-248,320-321, 352-353, Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
9. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar, I: 236-27 ,337-338, 367.
10. Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
11. Burzio, Armada nacional, pag.1590160, Rauch op cit, pag. 117
12. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar;II: 458-459, 767-
13. Rauch, p cit, pag. 117. Rauch, op it, pag.116-1177
14. Triado, Juan Enrique, Historia de la Base Naval Puerto Belgrano (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Centro Naval, Buenos Aires, 1992) pag.67-8, Rauch pag.117118

Author: André Marois

Malvinas: Why Did the IMARA Perform so Well?

Organizational Factors and Combat Performance: The IMARA experience in the Malvinas [1]

by Alejandro L. Corbacho
Universidad del CEMA
Documento de Trabajo 255 

Abstract

When soldiers go into combat, they do so within the framework of an organization that sends them and supports them. In this way its quality is put to the test and for this reason, combat is the critical moment of any military organization. In this situation, its performance will depend not only on the strategic plans, its quantity and the available material, but also on the preparation and spirit that was instilled in its members throughout their time in the military organization.
There is no doubt that for the Argentine Armed Forces the Malvinas War was a critical moment. The following work explores the reasons for the behavior of the Marine Infantry units of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) based on the analysis of two organizational factors. The first factor, most commonly noted, is what is called structural in this analysis; the second focuses on some sociological aspects, more precisely the organizational culture. To explain the structural and cultural attributes of the Argentine Marine Corps, Navy officers on active duty or in retirement who participated or who were privileged witnesses of the events described, as well as official documents and articles and other printed testimonies, were interviewed.

[In Malvinas] The Argentines fought well and bravely in many parts of the islands. Not all. But many. And those groups of Argentines are more interesting than those who fled. [2] 

Introduction 
When soldiers go into combat, they do so within the framework of an organization that sends them and supports them. In this way its quality is put to the test and for this reason, combat is the critical moment of any military organization. In this situation, its performance will depend not only on the strategic plans, its quantity and the available material, but also on the preparation and spirit that was instilled in its members throughout their time in the military organization.

There is no doubt that for the Argentine Armed Forces the Malvinas War was a critical moment. This work investigates which of these issues affected the combat performance of a particular unit: the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA).

The South Atlantic conflict that took place between April and June 1982 ended in defeat for Argentina and there are numerous works that analyze and reflect on the reasons for it. However, during the development of the conflict there were troops that stood out for their combat skills. These constitute successful cases that also deserve to be investigated. Among them are Marine Corps units. [3]

The following work explores the reasons for the behavior of Marine Corps units based on the analysis of two organizational factors. The first factor, most commonly noted, is what is called structural in this analysis; the second focuses on some sociological aspects, more precisely the organizational culture. To explain the structural and cultural attributes of the Argentine Marine Corps that were central to its outstanding performance in combat, Navy officers on active duty or in retirement who participated or who were privileged witnesses of the events described were interviewed and official documents and articles and other printed testimonies.

The Marine Corps in the Malvinas Theater
Once the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was successfully completed on April 2, 1982, the Marine Corps forces that participated in the operation must have returned to the continent since the original defense plan did not contemplate their subsequent use. However, when the British decided to respond militarily to the Argentine action, the Argentine authorities decided to reinforce the garrison of the islands and sent, among other units, a contingent of Marines.

The bulk of this contingent was made up of BIM 5. The Naval High Command decided to deploy this unit whose permanent base is in Río Grande (Tierra del Fuego) for several reasons:

1. for being the best adapted to combat in a terrain similar to that of the Malvinas;
   
2. for being well equipped; and
   
3. be highly trained, particularly, in night combat and in the use of air cooperation;. 

For its deployment in the Islands, BIM 5 was reinforced by a group of 12.7mm caliber heavy machine guns, by the First Section of Amphibious Engineers, and by Battery B of the Marine Corps Field Artillery Battalion.



Between April 8 and 12, the battalion's personnel and equipment [5] were airlifted to Puerto Argentino. There, the local High Command assigned him the responsibility of defending part of the belt of elevations that surround that city. BIM 5 corresponded to [6] Mounts Tumbledown, Williams, and Sapper Hill. In addition to the battalion, other IMARA units were present on the Islands: the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, the Amphibious Engineer Company (-), a detachment of Amphibious Commandos, the Third Section of Company D of the BIM 2, Second and Third Sections of Company H of BIM 3, two groups of Bantam anti-tank missiles, three groups of air traffic controllers, a Security section with dogs and a group of Marine Corps Command. These units participated in the defense of the capital, the Camber Peninsula, and Bourbon Island, and all entered combat [7] with satisfactory results. In total, the Marine Corps troops stationed on the islands reached 1,590 men. At the same time, the First Marine Brigade with 3,587 men remained waiting in Tierra del Fuego. This constituted the strategic [8] operational reserve of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS).
It is important to highlight that during their stay on the islands the Infantes were well fed, had adequate clothing and appropriate communications equipment. Also important was the fact that during the waiting period from their arrival until the British landed, the Marines were kept busy preparing for that moment. The battalion also had tools to prepare positions suitable for the [9] Malvinas soil. These were the famous “barretas”. These preparations were later key [10] in the tough defense that the Infantry presented to the British attackers.

Mount Tumbledown: recognition

The British landed at dawn on May 21 in San Carlos (Isla Soledad) and the final battles for the heights surrounding Puerto Argentino took place between June 11 and 14. The Second Battalion Scots Guards attacked Mount Tumbledown on the night of the 13th [11]. A British correspondent who witnessed the fighting described the action in the following terms:

Within minutes, Argentine snipers using night sights had killed three of the Guards and wounded two others. The typical British formula of responding with fire from 66 and 84 millimeter rockets seemed to have little effect on the enemy positions located among the rocks. The Scots Guards heard the Argentines shouting and even singing while they fought. These were the best troops that General Menéndez had on the battlefield, they were BIM 5... As the night progressed, the hard fighting continued and the Argentines showed no signs of breaking and their main positions remained firm. .[12] 

This action described by Hastings and Jenkins lasted eleven hours. His story continues: 

The Guards reached the last positions at Tumbledown only after fighting inch by inch on the rocks using phosphorus grenades and automatic weapons to eliminate the enemy bunkers... The Scots Guards battalion had... captured one of the Argentine positions most strongly defended from war [13]. 

After a long night fighting, the remains of the Infantry reinforced by dispersed Army units were still in possession of the BIM 5 command post and Sapper Hill. From there the Infantry prepared for the counterattack. But around noon on June 14, the Argentine High Command ordered a ceasefire on the islands. The armed struggle for the Malvinas had ended. At the end of the battle, BIM 5 suffered a total of 61 casualties, of which 16 were killed and 45 wounded. The Scots Guards claimed to have had 9 [14] dead and 41 wounded.


The Sunday Times team of correspondents later informed their readers that at Tumbledown “the Guards had faced the toughest action of all. There was, well entrenched in a series of intricate bunkers cut into the ground, a well-trained Argentine Marine Infantry battalion.” Furthermore, “the volume of fire from the Infantry was intense and impressive.” Similarly, American military analyst Harry G. Summers noted that “as the Scots Guards approached the main heights of Mount Tumbledown they encountered strong opposition. Instead of the hasty field fortifications the British had encountered earlier in the war, they faced a well-entrenched company of BIM 5." The American added that "a British artillery officer described those positions as exceptionally well prepared." [15]. 


Even in defeat, the Infantes did not lose cohesion and remained united and orderly [16]. According to the story of Lieutenant Colonel Vaux, commander of the 42nd Marine Commandos, the Argentine Marines marched along the streets of Puerto Argentino “elegantly” (smartly) and carrying their regimental colors high. Finally, the British historian Martin Middlebrook [17] also has words of recognition for the performance of the Argentine Infantes:

The Argentine Infantrymen who consider themselves better soldiers than those in the Army probably are. Its basic component was also conscripts, but the Infantry system of incorporating new conscripts in batches throughout the year meant that the unit had a higher degree of training and did not have any young men from the 1963 class when they were sent to the Malvinas. . Another advantage that the Marines enjoyed was that they had better winter clothing... At the same time they were supported by their own Marine Infantry artillery battery. [18] 

On the Argentine side, the Marine Corps also had positive evaluations from sources outside the Navy. For example, a publication by the Argentine Army listed the reasons, which according to them, explain the superior performance of BIM 5.: 

The BIM 5 possessed a well-balanced set of weapons and excellent communications equipment. But much more important was that it had men who, as a result of the Navy's incorporation system, had completed their training, adapted from peace to the terrain and extreme weather conditions...at the same time it had a particular logistics system of the Navy. Navy...managing to maintain it with excellent combat aptitude. [19] 

On the other hand, the report prepared by the Analysis and Evaluation Commission (also known as the Rattenbach Report) reported that:

The BIM 5 (+)...demonstrated a joint vocation, a high degree of readiness, professionalism and adequate equipment, which was evident in the ground combat, during the defense of Puerto Argentino, an action where it had an outstanding performance. [20] 

Therefore, both our own and our adversaries recognized the outstanding performance of the Marine Corps units and in particular of BIM 5. [21].

Organizational factors: structural and cultural

In general, the combat performance of land units is explained by a psychological variable: the degree of cohesion. According to this, men and units in combat cohere (or stay together) for survival, trust in their comrades, or for patriotism. Furthermore, it is argued that a high degree of cohesion allows units to “try to accomplish their mission despite the situation.” Other authors [22] claim that other factors such as national character, the relationship between society and the armed forces, religious beliefs, and ideology affect the way units fight [23]. However, there are still other factors that have so far been little studied. These are variables related to the characteristics of the organization within which soldiers fight. These also help cement cohesion and can be important when explaining “combat performance.” This concept is used here in terms tactical effectiveness similar to that of tactical effectiveness ( ) defined by Millet and Murray as “the specific techniques used by combat units to fight in confrontations that aim to secure operational objectives.” According to the authors, “tactical activity involves the movement [or deployment] of forces on the battlefield against the enemy, the provision of destructive fire against enemy forces or targets, and the preparation of logistical support to be applied.” in the confrontation.”[24]

In addition to the personnel that gives life to an organization, it is made up of structural and cultural elements. The first are the skeleton, the visible, external elements or characteristics, which can be, among others, military material and equipment, the number of members and the organizational chart and geographical arrangement of the units. The latter are more subtle and therefore more difficult to observe with the naked eye. These are the basic assumptions, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that the members of the organization have. Both sets of elements configure and shape the collective behavior of soldiers. Therefore, this work is based on the assumption that in addition to the degree of cohesion, both the structural and cultural aspects of the military organization must be studied to comprehensively explain its performance in combat since these ultimately help to develop, reinforce or maintain cohesion. In this way, the focus of the research shifts from the human dimension to the organizational dimension of war.

In a historical overview of military organizations, British historian Jeremy Black describes the following pattern: while successful weapons and tactics can be easily reproduced, it is much more difficult to reproduce “efficient military performance.” According to Black, the latter seems to be connected with the quality of the cadres, that is, officers and non-commissioned officers [25]. Therefore, how is it possible to obtain high quality paintings? A quick answer to this question is to look at how military organizations recruit and educate their personnel to get the job done. During this process, the military organization instills uniform knowledge, procedures, and values that allow its members to share the same spirit that distinguishes one group of soldiers from another [26]. Therefore, to understand the performance of an organization it is necessary to pay attention to both its visible aspects and the more subtle ones that are its characteristic cultural elements. The latter constitute “the invisible force behind the organization's activities” [27].

Organizational culture is commonly defined as “the set of assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shapes collective understanding” [28].

According to Mintzberg, ideology (or organizational culture) encompasses “the traditions and beliefs of an organization and what distinguishes it from other organizations and infuses a certain life into the skeleton of its structure.” [29] Thus, organizational culture is the normative and social glue that holds the organization together and expresses the social values and ideals that the members of that organization come to share. At the same time, it helps to overcome challenges external to the organization. Additionally, it is important to note that these ideas are considered valid because they have worked. More importantly, culture is considered the “toolbox” or “repertoire” of organizational behavior [30]. However, it is important to highlight that culture does not define objectives. In this regard, there is a certain degree of agreement among experts about the consequences of culture in organizations [31]: it helps manage collective uncertainties, helps create a social order, and generates continuity in beliefs and practices. At the same time, members who share the same culture create a collective identity and commitment. [32]

Finally, military organizations, as “total” organizations, instill in their members a common culture or esprit de corps. For example, when analyzing the case of the United States Marine Corps, one historian observed that its “men share an institutionally defined relationship based on subordination to the spirit of the Marine Corps.” Therefore, this research investigates the influence that organizational factors of a specific organization can have, that is, the combat behavior of the Argentine marine infantry [33].

Structural Factors

When describing the combat behavior of BIM 5, the comments expressed above agree in pointing out observable aspects, that is, structural factors. These were cohesion, a balanced set of weapons and equipment, superior logistics, and skill in preparing defensive positions. The observers also agreed [34] in valuing another characteristic of the Navy, the system of incorporation of conscripts.

According to one of its members, one of the characteristics of the Argentine Marines is “the obsession with training and enlistment.” And according to him, that means [35] that the Infantes want to be prepared at all times. Without a doubt, an element that helps develop this characteristic is the geographical location of the main base of the Marine Corps, Batteries. Indeed, the location of said base guarding the entrance to the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base helps explain part of this “impulse” for training. Therefore, the isolated location of the base provides the incentive to train more often than [36] any other unit located near a city.

Added to the isolation factor of the Battery garrison is the fact that the core of the force is concentrated there, the Marine Infantry Brigade and the Amphibious Support Force. The first “plans, regulates and supervises the instruction, training and all [37] activity or operational task of the Organic Units” of this great combat unit.

During the Malvinas campaign it was made up of the Command Battalion, BIM 1, BIM 2, Field Artillery Battalion 1, the Logistics Support Battalion, and the Amphibious Engineer Company. The mission of the Amphibious Support Force is to “supply with its personnel, means and weapons systems, the support and/or reinforcements ordered by the Marine Corps Command, at the request of the different Forces of the Corps that must enter or are located in operations” [38]. This unit was made up of the Amphibious Vehicle Battalion 1, the Communications Battalion 1, the Anti-Aircraft Battalion and the Amphibious Commando Group. It is another structural factor that can help consolidate military cohesion, or esprit de corps size. In this regard, the Argentine Marine Corps is a small force that exists within the context of a larger organization, the Navy. In this way, it is possible for its members to know or be more familiar with each other and learn to work together. In that case, it can be said that the Marine Corps is also made up of a dense web of relationships between its members [39]. In 1982 the Marine Corps had a total of 9,500 troops. The total number of troops in the Navy reached 36,000 at that time. This figure included conscripts [40].

Most officers interviewed agreed that these three factors help create an integrated, cohesive and coordinated amphibious force.

As has been pointed out repeatedly, an advantage that the Navy has over other armed forces arises from having its own means of logistical support. In this regard, a veteran officer of the campaign stated [41] that “the secret of the successful logistics capacity of the Navy's land units in the Malvinas was due to the fact that the logistics were ours.” In that sense, “we did not depend on anyone else” [42].

Finally, many observers pointed out another institutional aspect that distinguished the Navy compared to the Army. When the time came, they considered that the conscript incorporation system was critical for their performance. The Navy incorporated new conscripts in five successive bimonthly batches and the conscripts served a fixed period of fourteen months [43]. For many, this system adopted in the 70s was “one of the reasons why the force was always ready for combat” [44].
Up to this point, this research has identified a set of structural aspects that make up the organization's configuration: geographical location, concentration of troops, size, own logistical support and conscript incorporation system. The conjunction of these factors facilitated training and helped to form an integrated, dense and cohesive force that fulfilled the mission expected of it.

Organizational Culture: values, norms, beliefs and ideals

In addition to the factors here called structural, some of the positive assessments of the performance of BIM 5 mention the attribute of “professionalism”. This concept is difficult to quantify but responds, at least, to the impression that those who carry out a specific task perform it as expected [45]. The demonstration of professionalism in the face of a situation such as combat in extreme conditions against an enemy of stature is a demonstration of the presence of a shared culture that allows those who possess it to face and overcome it with greater success than those who lack this attribute. Analysis of official and semi-official documents and personal interviews with Navy and IMARA personnel suggests the presence of the following key elements as part of the organizational culture of the Navy and particularly the Marine Corps. While some elements are common to both, others are specific to the latter.

Integration 

The idea of integration of its cadres is incorporated into the Navy's educational system. From the beginning, with their incorporation into the Naval Academy, the young cadets become part of an integrated force. During the first two years, instruction is given without distinguishing between naval or infantry cadets. Later, when the last ones graduate as midshipmen, they all start in charge of an infantry section. After two years of service in the rifle companies, they begin their specialization in artillery, communications, engineers or infantry in the corresponding school units. It is important to note that Infants consider these specializations as orientations or technical skills [46]. This process contrasts with that used by the Army. There, the separation of weapons was strictly established and the cadets from the beginning received instruction in separate classrooms and had their blocks separated by weapons. [47]




Members of the Marine Corps are also accustomed to working as a whole on extensive campaigns [48]. Consequently, continuous activity generates integration, that is, a situation in which “everyone knows a little about everything and trains together.” For this reason [49], during the Malvinas campaign, the Marine Corps was very effective in the use of coordinated fire support. Integration was not only achieved within the force but also [50] [51] with the other components of the Navy such as naval support and, especially, aviation. In general, the Navy emphasizes the importance of unity of action and the concept of “interoperability”, that is, the ability to operate in any geographic area in conjunction with other components of the weapon [52].
Finally, due to the characteristics of the naval profession, it teaches its personnel the need to work harmoniously as a team. The staff knows that they will be confined to the same ship for a long time. Under these circumstances, the crew members are in close contact with each other and each one performs an important task for the entire group on the ship. Furthermore, the idea is present that “if the ship sinks, all crew members are equal on the rafts” [53].

The Importance of Leadership

Historian Craig Cameron in his book on the combat readiness of the US 1st Marine Division observes that “Marines almost universally attribute their achievements primarily to their extraordinary leadership at the small unit level.” Argentine infants were no exception to this observation [54].



When remembering his experience in the Malvinas, Commander Alberto Baffico points to the quality of leadership of the officers and non-commissioned officers as the key to the success of the Infantes. According to him, leadership is exercised both by presence and by example. The Navy in general emphasizes personnel leadership in both practical and theoretical terms [55].

In contrast to some accounts in which it is stated that Argentine officers abandoned their men at the front, Baffico maintains that the Infantes “were not alone in their positions.” Indeed, “there was a constant presence of the commanding officers.” Furthermore, “in the Navy it is important to be a natural leader and not merely an institutional one.” [56] Rear Admiral (IM) (ret.) Carlos Büsser pointed out that the good performance of the Marine Infantry units was due to the fact that

The officers and non-commissioned officers were always very close to the troops they led, in very direct contact with the different situations posed by modern combat and therefore, in a position to adopt resolutions quickly and safely. [57] 

In short, driving is “knowing how to give an order in such a way that it can be carried out.” [58]

In relation to the role of the leader, some interviewees mentioned that Navy officers are always taught to be concerned for the well-being of their subordinates. Their “concern for staff is real, not merely formal or simply stated” [59].

Furthermore, for infantrymen, “the man and his personal weapon are the most important weapon system” [60].

Discipline

As in any military institution, the Navy and Marine Corps emphasize the value of discipline. In this regard, Vice Admiral (IM) (ret.) Julio Bardi and Captain (IM) Enrique Olmedo agreed in describing the Argentine Infantry as a highly disciplined force. Both stressed that within the force discipline is both formal and fundamental. Infants tend to emphasize formal discipline because they are more rigid and because “they manifest fundamental discipline by adhering to the principles of formal discipline” [61]. Within the Navy, Infantrymen are recognized for their personal care and military manners [62]. According to one officer, “the infantrymen need their formal discipline as a complement to their combat training” [63].

The importance of the initiative

According to those interviewed, the Infantes respect the independent decision-making criteria. That is, they emphasize inventiveness, self-confidence, and the ability to carry out independent action. In this case, “the ability to act on one's own initiative is most marked in the Marine Corps” [64]. The author of this article vividly remembers his time at CIFIM in City Bell as a newly recruited conscript. During the training the non-commissioned officers always repeated: “the soldier thinks and executes!” [65] This contrasted with what his high school friends who were serving in the Army at the same time told him. They were not instructed under the slogan: “the soldier thinks, he executes!” This simple exercise highlights an important aspect of the culture of an organization where even its lower-ranking elements were instilled in the idea of “thinking.” This can be very useful for exercising initiative in the event that men lose the superiors who normally give orders.

The importance of planning

According to CN Olmedo, Infantry officers are educated in such a way that they develop a characteristic capacity for planning. For this reason, Infants are typically assigned planning tasks [66]. This tendency can be illustrated with an anecdote that exists in the Corps. During the Malvinas War, the General Staff of the Marine Corps Command, once it had planned and executed the mobilization and support operations of its troops on the islands and on the continent, was ordered to prepare numerous schematic plans. These very general plans were intended to cover a wide spectrum of contingencies. The demand to carefully plan every conceivable situation was so great that staff began using the unofficial acronym “PAPs” for these plans [67].

The value of tenacity

Tenacity is another of the values indicated by the officers interviewed. According to Captain (IM) (ret.) Jorge Errecaborde “tenacity is valued by the Marines.” Furthermore, it can be said that infants are different not because they are “more intelligent, but because they are more tenacious.” Infants are taught that they should do what they say they are going to do [68]. In this case, stated CN Olmedo, “the idea of fulfilling the mission is such that it must be very difficult to find a justification for not having fulfilled it” [69]. In the Marine Corps, training aims to teach recruits how to “overcome obstacles by creating the means to do so” [70]. A maxim characteristic among its members is: “overcoming shortcomings with ingenuity and sacrifice” [71].

Foresight: logistics culture

One of the advantages of the Navy most often commented on is that in the Malvinas it had “excellent logistical support.” CLIM (ret.) Büsser explains that the Navy had supplied the Marines stationed on the islands with food, fuel, medicine, spare parts and enough clothing for 180 days. The naval command also sent sufficient ammunition to sustain continuous combat for 30 days [72].
The reasons for such foresight derive from an important idea in the Navy. The concept of “ship” which means that to operate successfully the unit must be self-sufficient and, therefore, everything necessary to remain operational must be carried on board [73]. Consequently, due to these requirements, the Navy has developed a profound characteristic “idea of foresight”.

Learning capacity

With respect to preparation, the Navy as an organization showed a remarkable ability to learn from past experiences. In effect, the naval commanders took advantage of the military preparations of 1978 in anticipation of an armed clash with Chile over the Beagle Channel dispute. This experience allowed the Navy to adjust its equipment and obtain the necessary supplies to carry out a campaign in regions with harsh climates such as the Malvinas [74]. The North American naval specialist Robert Scheina agrees in commenting that “one of the lessons that the Argentine fleet learned during the tensions was its need for greater logistical capacity” [75]. Later, during the Malvinas experience, the logistical changes introduced after the 1978 mobilization worked adequately.

Conclusions 

Once the Malvinas War was over, different commentators highlighted the notable performance of the Argentine Marine Infantry units deployed in the Islands. The reasons for such performance, according to them, were the high degree of cohesion, the availability of a balanced supply of weapons and equipment, and the ability to prepare defensive positions. A more comprehensive analysis allows us to observe the presence of other characteristics that also contributed to the force carrying out outstanding work. These factors are: geographical location, concentration of resources, size, own logistical support and the conscript incorporation system. All these elements that we call structural are easily observable and facilitate the presence of the next level of factors, the organizational culture. At the same time, the mere presence of these factors does not guarantee outstanding performance but is supported by the notion of “professionalism.” Therefore, only when the factors are considered together do they help explain the behavior of the IMARA in combat. Thus, this research adds a rarely discussed dimension. It, more subtle and less visible, is present throughout the Navy's educational system and helps shape the spirit of the organization. In the case of IMARA, the organizational culture dimension includes the following elements: integration, leadership, discipline, initiative, planning, tenacity, foresight, and learning capacity.

It could be argued that these elements are common to the cultures of all military organizations and that this research is therefore superfluous. However, the Infantrymen as members of the Navy share these basic values and beliefs that were tested in combat and demonstrated notable performance during the campaign. Consequently, these values and beliefs can be considered valid components of the IMARA culture. This work does not mean to affirm that only the Marine Corps had outstanding behavior, as already noted, other Army units also had it. However, other research by the author seems to suggest that this behavior depended more on individuals, both officers and soldiers, than on the organization as a whole. [76]

This research also shows that as new troops joined, the Marine Corps was successful in instilling a “Marine pride” that appears to be a nearly universal trait of Marine forces around the world. According to an Argentine Infantryman “the Marines are the best troops that have ever existed in the history of our country and to this day” [77]. These words written in present times are similar to others written years earlier by a young United States Marine: “the spirit of the Marine Corps that I cannot explain (you feel it in your body and act according to it) is the reason why which ours is the largest combat organization in the world” [78]. Perhaps this last phrase is the one that best encapsulates the idea of organizational culture and the role it plays.

Finally, a Navy publication published shortly before the Malvinas conflict characterized the BIM 5 as a particularly cohesive unit, capable of “obtaining superlative achievements.” According to it, the causes that explain this condition are isolation, the geographical insularity of Río Grande, and the adverse conditions that prevail in the area. More importantly, the publication noted the presence of a special spirit that provides a “single and inflexible will... that drags and compels its men to give their best” [79]. This work is a first attempt to find an explanation for that spirit.



References 

[1] This is an improved version of the work presented at the XIVth Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, September 23-25, 1999. The author thanks Rear Admiral (ret.) Guillermo Delamer for his comments and the support provided during the research for the same, and Captain (ret.) Guillermo Montenegro for for their valuable comments and to the officers interviewed for having generously shared their experiences with the author. (New York: Brasseys,
[2] Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & Boys. Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War 1991). pp. 127-128.
[3] In addition to BIM 5, Stewart identifies as Argentine units that fought with distinction the 25th Infantry Regiment, the 601st and 602nd Commando Companies, the 7th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Artillery Group. p. 108.
[4] See, for example, Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas. The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (London: Penguin Books, 1990) pp. 47-48; F. R. Aguiar et. al., Land Operations in the Malvinas Islands (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1985) pp. 33-34, 60-61, 103; and Carlos Augusto Landaburu, The Malvinas War (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1988) pp. 133.
[5] Disembarkation Separata No. 16 (1996), 14-15. CLIM (ret.) Carlos Büsser also mentions geographical proximity as one of the reasons that led to the decision to send BIM 5 to the islands (Emilio Villarino, Battalion 5. The Marine Infantry Battalion No. 5 in the Malvinas War (Buenos Aires: Aller Atucha, 1992), p. 9. The BIM 5 is the school unit specialized in cold areas, low mountain terrain and combat in the southern mountains. The VLIM (ret.) Julio Juan Bardi explained in a personal interview with the author that the fact that BIM 5 was prepared and ready was the product of the Navy's strategic vision. This highlighted the battalion in a maritime area (Personal interview, Buenos Aires, 10-08- 99).Vice Admiral Julio Juan Bardi was commander of the Marine Corps during the 70s.
[6] Battalion 5, 58. From the Front. Marine Infantry Battalion; Carlos H. Robacio and Jorge Hernández, Villarino, Battalion N° 5 (Buenos Aires: Solaris, 1996) pp. 250 and 258. On April 28, the Malvinas Military Garrison was organized into two sub commands, the Litoral Army Group and the Puerto Argentino Army Group. BIM 5 came under the command of the latter.
[7] Disembarkation, Separatas No. 10 (s/f), 14 (1995), No. 15 (1995), and No. 20 (1997).
[8] On the South Georgia Islands there was also a small detachment of Marines (70 men) (Landing). According to the Official Report of the Argentine Army No. 160, March 1997, pp. 41-42 the number of force personnel in the Malvinas reached 10,001 (t. 2, Annex 21) ().
[9] Villarino, pp. 64-65; Robacio and Hernández, Battalion 5, pp. 72, 118, 189.
[10] Ibid. 123; ibid. 19; Disembarkation from the Front, Separata No. 16 (1996), 20.
[11] The British first attacked Longdon, Two Sisters, and Harriet Mountains during the night of the 11th and 12th. On the night of the 13th and 14th they attacked Tumbledown, Williams, and Wireless Ridge Mountains.
[12] Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983) pp. 301-303.
[13] Ibid. 303. According to Middlebrook, “the Argentinians lost Tumbledown after a determined and prolonged resistance that upset the English schedule (The Fight for the Malvinas, 262).
[14] Paul Eddy et al., The Falklands War, 253; Martin Middlebrook, Task Force. The Falklands War, 1982 (London: Penguin Books, Rev. ed. 1987) p. 366; Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle..., 303.
[15]Harry G. Summers Jr., “Yomping to Port Stantley,” Military Review LXIV (3) March 1984, p. 14.
[16] Stewart, Mates & Boys, p. 104.
[17] N. Vaux, March to the South Atlantic: 42 Commando Royal Marines in the Falklands War (London: Buchan and Enright, 1986) p. 206-07 cited in ibid. p. 105; Villarino, Battalion 5, p. 201. As a sign of recognition the British allowed the Infantrymen to keep their personal weapons for a short time.
[18] Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, pp. 254-55.
[19] Eugenio Dalton and Martin Balza, “The Battle of Puerto Argentino” in Land Operations in the Malvinas Islands (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar), p. 203.
[20] Rattenbach Commission, Rattenbach Report. The Drama of Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Espartaco, 1988), p. 236.
[21] However, an IMARA officer present during the conflict told the author that the unit was not able to operate at one hundred percent of its capacity due to the extreme fatigue of his men due to lack of sleep due to the intense bombing. They were subdued for many days. This observation seems to be supported by the statement of a British intelligence officer: “The Marines coped well with the hostile conditions. However, rain, rest and recovery were rare” (Nicholas van der Bijl: Nine Battles to Stantley, Leo Cooper: 1999. p. 189). For an evaluation of the performance of the other IMARA units see Horacio A. Mayorga, No Expired. Accounts of naval operations in the South Atlantic conflict (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1998), pp. 458-462, 463-471, 495, 501-02, and Desembarco Separatas Nos. 10 (sf), 14 (1995), 15 (1995), 16 (1996), 20 (1997).
[22] John G. Fowler, Jr.: “Combat Cohesion in Vietnam,” Military Review, December 1979, p. 26. On the topic specifically referring to the Malvinas conflict, see Stewart, Mates & Muchachos... op. cit.
[23] Martin van Creveld: Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1982) p. 4. See also Omer Bartov: Hitler's Army. Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 1992) and Stephen Fritz: Frontsoldaten. The German Soldier in the World War II (Lexington, Ky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995).
[24] Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Vol. I, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 19. Another similar definition may be that of “combat power,” which according to military historian Martín van Creveld is “the sum of all the mental qualities that make an army fight.” (Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army performance, 1939-1945. p. 3)
[25] Jeremy Black: “Military Organization and Military Change in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Military History 62 (4) October 1998, p. 884.
[26] According to North American historian Elisabeth Kier, “military organizations develop strong cultures due to their long-term membership and powerful assimilation mechanisms.” (Imagining War. French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 28).
[27] Steven J. Ott, The Organizational Culture Perspective, (Pacific Grove, Ca.: Brooks/Cole, 1989) p. fifty.
[28] Kier, Imagining War, p. 28.
[29] Henry Mintzberg: “The structuring of organizations” p. 372.
[30] According to Schein, organizational culture is, among other things, a pattern of basic assumptions that “have worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be transmitted to new members as the correct way of perceive, think, and feel in relation to problems.” (Edgard H. Schein, 25 (2) 1984, p. 3). “Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture”, Sloan Management Review
[31] Kier, Imagining War, p. 31.
[32] See Harrison Trice and Janice Beyer: The Cultures of Work Organizations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993. pp. 8-10.
[33] Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai. Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 196.
[34] This ability is more notable given that the Marine Corps' primary mission is to attack positions and not the static defense of the front.
[35] Personal interview with Captain IM (ret.) Jorge Errecaborde (07-21-1999). Captain Errecaborde collaborated with the Commission for Analysis of Combat Actions in the Malvinas Conflict, and since 1987 he has been Head of the Malvinas Office of the Marine Corps Command.
[36] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999) and with a high-ranking officer who requested to remain anonymous (07-17-1999). Geographic isolation also helps to explain the traditional predisposition of BIM 5 to training and professional development (Jorge A. Errecaborde, Anecdotario de la Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1997. p. 179).
[37] Argentine Navy, Marine Infantry. Three Centuries of History and One Hundred Years of Organic Life. 1879-November 19-1979, Buenos Aires, 1979. p. 122.
[38] Ibid. p. 134.
[39] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999). See also Errecaborde, “Reflections”, 32 (5); personal interviews with Bardi (08-10-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999).
[40] Errecaborde, “Reflections”, 42-42. At the same time, the Army had a total of 125,000 troops (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, Military Balance, 1982-1983, London, 1983, p. 99)
[41] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999). See also Errecaborde, “Reflections”, pp. 37-38 (6. Logistics).
[42] Interview with Baffico (08-20-1999).
[43] Robacio and Hernández, From the Front, p. 14; Villarino, Battalion 5, p. twenty-one.
[44] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999).
[45] See above commentary on the Rattenbach Report. In a recently published book, General Martín Balza, who commanded Artillery Group 3 deployed during the conflict on the islands, points out the following: “the English say that in Tumbledown they faced an elite Marine Infantry Battalion. I attest to his professionalism”, Buenos Aires: Editorial Atlántica, 2003, p. 175)(Malvinas. Deed and incompetence
[46] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[47] The contrast with the Army is stark. The Arms within it remained strongly separated and a very competitive spirit was created among its members, it can be described as “tribal”. In those years, Army cadets took classes in separate classrooms according to the Arm to which they belonged (infantry, cavalry, artillery, communications, engineers and quartermasters). Each one had its block separate from the others. Once graduated, the young second lieutenants were assigned to the units of their specialization and then to the Arms' own schools.
[48] According to Olmedo, “Brigade-wide exercises begin every October...This is a system operating as a whole. In this way, the Brigade is accustomed to operating together in long campaigns” (Interview 07-20-1999).
[49] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[50] To achieve such a degree of efficiency “you need to be highly trained” (ibid.. See also Jorge Errecaborde, “Reflections 15 years after the feat,” Desembarco XLI No. 160, 1997, p. 36). The account of the operations of the Marine Corps artillery is found in Desembarco, Separatas N° 16 (1996) 58-66 and N°, 124-25.
[51] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, 84-85; Mayorga, Not Expired, 463-471. 17 (1996), pp. 162-64; Villarino, Battalion 5
[52] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999); Bardi (08-10-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999). CF Baffico commented that “in the Navy we continually work with other arms, there was integration, especially with naval aviation.”
[53] Interview with a naval officer who asked to remain anonymous (Buenos Aires, 07-17-1999).
[54] Cameron, The American Samurai, pp. 222-23.
[55] Personal interview with Baffico (08-20-1999).
[56] idem. This statement contrasts with that of British journalists Hasting and Jenkins who maintain that when the war ended “many Argentine soldiers were bitterly critical of the lack of leadership shown by their officers on the battlefield...many officers withdrew from their positions. at the front as soon as the battle began" and cite the opinion of an Argentine stretcher-bearer conscript who stated that "when the soldiers found themselves alone, in the middle of the night, in total darkness, and sought the support of their superiors they did not “They were able to find them.” (The Battle for the Malvinas, pp. 296).
[57] Büsser in Villarino, Battalion 5, p. 16.
[58] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[59] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[60] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[61] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999) and Olmedo (07-20-1999). This can be summarized in the phrase “short hair and a flat belly” (Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 168).
[62] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 168.
[63] Ibid. p. 127.
[64] Olmedo (07-20-1999). Some anecdotes about the inventiveness of the Infantes during their training are told in the Anecdotario, pp. 29-30, 38-.39 and, 40-41.
[65] CIFIM: Marine Corps Instruction and Training Center. The center was located in City Bell, Province of Buenos Aires.
[66] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[67] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, pp. 187-188. In the comments to this work, CN (ret.) Guillermo Montenegro confirmed that the Infantes are recognized as “fanatics” in terms of their attachment to planning in general (XIVth Naval History Symposium, Annapolis, United States, 09-14- 1999).
[68] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[69] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[70] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999).
[71] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 41.
[72] Büsser in Villarino, Battalion 5, p. fifteen.
[73] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999) and Bardi (08-10-1999).
[74] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999), and interview with Vice Admiral Máximo E. Rivero Kelly, Naval Center Bulletin N° 752/753, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 100.
[75] Robert L. Scheina, Iberoamerica. A Naval History, 1810-1987 (Madrid: Ed. San Martin, s.f.) p. 200.
[76] Alejandro L. Corbacho: “Reassessing Fighting Performance of Conscripts Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982)” Paper presented at the Annual Congress for the Society for Military History 1998 Lisle Hilton, Lisle, IL. United States, April 24-26, 1998.
[77] Captain of the Frigate (IM) Jorge Saénz in Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 132.
[78] Letter to his parents from Second Lieutenant Richard C. Kennard (USMC), cited by Cameron, American Samurai, p. 156.
[79] Argentine Navy, Marine Infantry, pp. 133-134.