Argentina: UNIDEF 2012 Drills

UNIDEF 2012 Drills

More than 3,900 personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force participated, who contributed materials such as planes, helicopters, warships, tanks and armored vehicles.

From October 21 to 26, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) participated together with the Army and Navy in the training exercise called UNIDEF (United for Defense), carried out at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, near the city of Bahía Blanca.

At UNIDEF 2012, the operational doctrine used was applied to combat situations in air, sea and land. Its objective was to evaluate the level of joint training and improve the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces for the execution of maneuvers within the framework of territorial defense.



The purpose of the maneuver was to carry out an amphibious incursion to conquer terrain and block the advance of the enemy who had invaded their own terrain, until the arrival of the land component that allowed the counterattack.

For this, procedures such as disembarkations and reembarkations were carried out; refueling of aircraft in flight; infiltrating and exfiltrating of divers; naval, air and ground fire; heliborne operations; parachute drops and armored counterattacks.

Weapon systems and deployed assets

To participate, the Air Force provided IA-58 Pucará aircraft from the III Reconquista Air Brigade; A-4AR fighter-bombers of the V Villa Reynolds San Luis Air Brigade; Mirage III aircraft of the VI Tandil Air Brigade; an MI 17 helicopter and a Bell 212; a TPS 43 radar and an Aerospace Operations Center.



The following tasks were executed such as: air superiority offensive, close air fire support, active direct aerospace defense,
attack on naval targets, special operations, search and rescue, air assault, surveillance and control of airspace.

The purpose of UNIDEF was to evaluate the level of joint training, particularly in those activities that involved the execution of different tactical procedures, and to increase joint operational capabilities for the execution of operations within the framework of the dynamics of a territorial defense.

The final stage

On the last day of operations, UNIDEF was observed by the Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs, Oscar Cuattromo; the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Brigadier General Jorge Chevalier and the operational commander of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Major Humberto Trisano. In addition, the head of the Army, Lieutenant General Luis Pozzi, the head of the Air Force, Brigadier General Normando Costantino, the deputy head of the Navy, Rear Admiral Gastón Erice, and national legislators belonging to the Defense Commission of the National Congress were present.



The delegation was able to learn about the activities planned for that day. The Air Force, to close the exercise, participated with simulated attacks on vessels with the IA-58 Pucará, Mirage III and V, and shooting practice with the A-4 AR.















Fuerza Aérea Argentina

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 (1/13)

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4

Organic Growth and Development of the Argentine Navy: 1810-1902

Although the May Revolution of 1810 marked the end of the colonial era in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, on the opposite bank of the Plata, remained in the hands of the royalists. From this station, a powerful and well-trained squadron under the command of Captain Jacinto de Romarate soon established a blockade of Buenos Aires and threatened to cut the lines of communication along the coast. The patriot authorities reacted quickly and in August acquired three merchant ships, suitable to be transformed into warships. These were: the brig "25 de Mayo", the schooner "Invencible", and the sloop "Americano". An Argentine veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, and former lieutenant of the Spanish navy, Francisco de Gurrucharaga dedicated himself vigorously to equipping this small squadron. The poverty of the treasury, the lack of trained personnel and materials complicated his task. The command of this flotilla was entrusted to Juan Bautista Azopardo, a privateer of Maltese origin, who was supported by two French privateers: Hipólito Bouchard and Angel Hubac. On February 10, 1811, three of the patriot ships set sail from Buenos Aires and headed towards the Paraná River. On March 2, the patriot squadron was intercepted by a powerful royalist squadron. In the fierce combat that took place, numerical and training superiority prevailed. Aboard the "25 de Mayo", 41 crew members out of a total of 50 on board were injured or killed. To the dismay of the patriots, the first Argentine naval squadron was captured and towed to Montevideo, where after being repaired, the ships were incorporated into the royalist fleet (1)

Phoenix Bird

On July 7, a royalist squadron bombed Buenos Aires, although not without being punished. Bouchard, who was in charge of a gunboat armed with a solitary 18-pounder cannon, went out in search of the royalist ships, managed to inflict serious damage on one of them, causing the enemy to retreat. As a result of this attack; The patriot government equipped a second squadron consisting of the schooners "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" and "Santo Domingo", the ketch "Hiena" and four smaller boats. The royalist fleet reappeared again off Buenos Aires on August 19, but when Bouchard directed his ships towards it, the enemy withdrew and tried, ineffectively, to bombard Buenos Aires from a safe distance. On October 20, 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo concluded an armistice that provided for the cessation of hostilities and the end of the blockade. While the national government disarmed its flotilla, the royalists violated the armistice and proceeded to bomb towns on the Argentine coast with impunity, attacking commercial ships at will. This in turn motivated the creation of the third Argentine naval squadron, which was organized by an Irish merchant captain; Buenos Aires resident William Brown, who is very rightly considered the father of the Argentine navy. This squadron was made up of a frigate, four corvettes, a brig, five schooners and other smaller ships. The officers were mostly foreigners, but soon a growing number of Creoles joined the fleet. (2)

 
San Nicolás Battle

In May 1814 Brown defeated the royalist fleet that once dominated the Rio de la Plata. This triumph in turn made possible the blockade and subsequent taking of Montevideo. This magnificent victory deprived Spain of the only base of operations it had in South America and granted control of the waters to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Furthermore, in order to harass and destroy Spanish trade in the region, the government of Buenos Aires began to grant letters of marque to foreign privateers, among whom those of American nationality predominated. The exact number of these privateers is unknown, although it is known that one of these privateer ships was active in 1815, 4 in 1816, 23 in 1819, 10 in 1820 and two in 1821. In 1815 the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata was the only Spanish American nation that the royalists had not managed to subjugate. In Spain, a powerful expedition was organized that would be commanded by General Pablo de Morillo who had been assigned the task of taking Buenos Aires, but the loss of Montevideo forced Spain to consider its strategy and Morillo's expedition was dispatched towards New Granada, the current Republic of Colombia.(3)

Expedition to the Pacific

In 1816 Brown led an Argentine squadron on a cruise to the Pacific. These ships blockaded Lima and Guayaquil, captured California and hit Spanish maritime trade vigorously. The frigate "La Argentina", commanded by Hipólito Bouchard that was part of this flotilla, separated from the other ships and was the first Argentine flag ship to circumnavigate the world. (4)

A Chilean naval historian describes the outcome of Brown's cruise in the following terms:

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5) 

War against Brazil: 1825-1828

At the end of the wars of independence, the ARA was reduced to a minimum and most of its ships were sold to private shipowners. In 1825, when the war with Brazil broke out, the Argentine fleet consisted of four frigates, two corvettes and 12 gunboats built in Bajo, on the banks of Buenos Aires and armed with old 24-piece pieces taken from the fort of that city. Command of the fleet was again entrusted to Brown. In direct contrast, the fleet of the Brazilian Empire, manned by a plethora of high-ranking English officers and subordinates, veterans of the Napoleonic wars; It had 108 warships, of which half were larger units (frigates, corvettes, brigs) and the rest were gunboats and schooners armed in war of various types and sizes. In a rapid series of battles, the Argentine navy managed to defeat the powerful imperial fleet, and although the latter blocked Buenos Aires, the lines of communication between the United Provinces and the Eastern Band of Uruguay, where the Argentine army was located, They were never cut off or even affected. On the other hand, despite the notorious lack of resources and the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, between 1825 and 127 the Argentine navy managed to destroy or capture more than 50 Brazilian warships, many of which were incorporated into the navy. national and employed with great energy and great skill against their former owners. In addition, Argentine warships and corsairs from Buenos Aires captured 445 Brazilian merchant ships (6)

The Era of Rosas (1829-1852)-Fights for Argentine unification: 1852-1862

During the Rosas era (1829-52) the navy became essentially a riverine force, adequate enough to defeat the Uruguayan fleet in a series of battles throughout the year 1841, but not strong or modern enough to confront to the Anglo-French squadron sent to Plata in 1845. A maritime academy in which officers were trained operated until 1830, then naval cadets were assigned to fleet units. The Argentine navy would not enter the age of steam until 1851. The two nation states that emerged in Argentina after the overthrow of Rosas in 1852 established squadrons equipped with war-armed steam merchant vessels, most of which would be incorporated into the national navy after the Argentine reunification that occurs as a result of the Battle of Pavón. However, by mid-1865, the fleet was reduced to a few vessels in service, the rest having been reduced to pontoon status or serving as storage hulls. The navy did not have a land infrastructure, naval bases or even warships themselves. It was painfully evident that the navy had not experienced adequate development, not only in comparison to the fleets of the great powers, but also in comparison to the fleets of neighboring countries such as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay.

The War with Paraguay (1865-1870)

When the Paraguayan War broke out, the Argentine navy was reduced to a handful of armed merchant steamers, sailing cutters and old hulls that served as floating stores of material. There was no infrastructure on land, nor training centers for the training of personnel. Although during the war, the command of the allied armies was entrusted to the president of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre, given the fact that among the allies, only Brazil had a navy worthy of the name, the Viscount of Tamandaré was placed in charge. charge of naval operations. The participation of the Argentine navy in this conflict, due to lack of suitable material, was reduced mainly to transportation and logistical support missions. (7)


 
Crew of the Steamship "25 de Mayo", captured in Corrientes, beginning the Argentine intervention in the Paraguayan War

Development of Institutes and land infrastructure: 1872-1902

The first steps on the long road towards modernization and expansion would be taken during the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74). A figure of extraordinary creativity, whom North American historian Hubert Herring described as "Possibly the only practical genius to emerge from Spanish America," Sarmiento devoted considerable time and thought to the importance of naval power for communications and defense. . Therefore, when Major Clodomiro Uturbey, a graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, proposed the creation of a similar establishment in Argentina, Sarmiento gave his support to this initiative. The necessary legislation was promulgated on October 2, 1872 and three days later the Naval Military School (ENM) was officially established aboard the steamship "General Brown", where it operated until 1877, when as a result of the "gabanes mutiny", The government ordered the closure of the ENM, although this measure did not interrupt the "curriculum" of the cadets who were simply transferred to various units of the navy until the ENM was transferred to a new headquarters in the heart of Buenos Aires. The number of cadets in the ENM grew gradually: 15 in 1872, 50 in 1883 and would exceed the figure of 70 in 1887 although the true growth would not occur until 1893, when the ENM was transferred again, this time to Juan's former residence Manuel de Rosas in Palermo, previously used by the Military College of the Nation. The cadet corps began to grow rapidly from then on: 77 in 1895, 88 in 1896, 110 in 1897 and 140 in 1898 (8)

Initially, the course of study at the ENM lasted six semesters. The first included geometry, rectilinear trigonometry, drawing, foreign languages, ballistics and general education. Spatial geometry, physics, naval astronomy and other academic subjects were studied in subsequent semesters, while practical teaching similarly progressed from the duties of a private seaman to those of a helmsman, from piloting small vessels to the duties and responsibilities of an officer. The later semesters emphasized the teaching of shipbuilding techniques, steam propulsion, international law, naval gunnery, and history. The cadets were then assigned to warships in service on the Patagonian coasts and the recently graduated midshipmen were assigned to a flotilla of sailing cutters that patrolled those latitudes, thus acquiring valuable experience. Long-duration trans-oceanic voyages began in the early 1880s, when the ENM received a new steam corvette specially designed as a training ship, we refer to the corvette "La Argentina". At the end of the 1890s this unit would be replaced by the ARA frigate "Sarmiento", a 2800-ton displacement unit, which in turn inaugurated the era of circumnavigation of the world. At the end of the 19th century, the prestige and efficiency of the ENM transcended the country's borders, and was fully recognized abroad, which is why students from neighboring countries competed in the entrance exams to this institution. (9)

In 1875, the School of Apprentice-Sailors was created aboard the boat "Vanguardia", and the following year, a reformatory for young people was established aboard the pontoon "General Paz", designated "Correccional de Menores", although the practice of sentencing young offenders of the penal code to serve in the army was abandoned soon after. In its replacement, the School of Cabins was established aboard the boat "Cabo de Hornos", a unit that during the period 1879-1884 patrolled the Patagonian coasts until it was removed from service, and replaced by the training ship "La Argentina". The Artillery School was established aboard the monitor "El Plata" in 1877 and the Artillery Apprentice School, where cannon corporals were trained, operated aboard various units since its creation in 1881. Firefighters, machinists and electricians received training at the School of Navy Mechanics, which existed under various names since 1880. Finally, the Torpedo School was established in 1883, aboard a ship incorporated at that time, the ARA torpedo ram "Maipú". (10)

In January 1879, the Central Hydrography Office (OCH) was established, which would be responsible for exploring and charting the coasts and waterways, as well as the construction of lighthouses and beacons. In January 1881, the newly created Naval Observatory was attached to the OCH. In this way, the ARA obtained a valuable wealth of information regarding the Argentine interior rivers and the Patagonian coasts. (11)

As can be seen, the ARA placed special emphasis on the training of officers and junior personnel. In 1883, the ARA had a strength of 2,000 men, which included 1,503 sailors, 320 officers (including 48 cadets from the engineering branch) and 133 ensigns and cadets. During the struggles for national reunification and through the Paraguayan War, the ARA hired Argentine and foreign merchant sailors to complete some of the crews of its ships. The services of Argentine merchant ships were also contracted, including their crews for quarantine tasks and logistical support missions. During the 1880s-1890s the ARA experienced a shortage of specialists and machine personnel, so a substantial number of foreign specialists were hired. The naval ranking of 1891 revealed that of a total of 83 engineering officers, 32 were foreigners. In 1897, of a total of 155 officers in this branch, 97 were natives of the country, and the rest were foreigners. As the fleet grew in number, and the ships that were added were invariably of greater tonnage and technically more advanced than their predecessors, the need to increase personnel became apparent. For example, the four "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers in the late 1890s required an average of 25 officers and 440 men per unit, a total of 109 officers and 1,636 crew. In 1902 the ARA had a strength of 8,336 men, a figure that included 327 line officers, 297 officer-engineers, 7,760 sailors and 450 marines. The growing importance of the navy was tacitly recognized on March 15, 1898, when the navy obtained the status of an independent force, that is, it no longer depended on the Ministry of War and Navy. From now on, it would be regulated by the Ministry of the Navy. (12)

Stations and bases

As the ARA increased its fleet and the ships added were increasingly larger, the ARA had to establish a network of naval stations and bases throughout the republic. Although we must deal with the expansion of the fleet separately, we must mention that the first modern units incorporated were shallow draft ships that could anchor in Rio de la Plata or in the Zárate naval base, but as fleet units were added increased tonnage the need for a deep water port became apparent. The town of Punta Alta, in the south of the Province of Buenos Aires was selected for said installation. A famous Italian engineer, Luigi Luiggi, was assigned to design the plans. Work began in 1898, and in July the first three coastal artillery batteries intended to protect the future base had already been placed. Upon completion of the works, in 1902 this strategic port, called Puerto Militar, would emerge as the largest naval base in South America, with enough space to house 20 "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers. The facilities covered an area of 3000 hectares. A strategic railway connected the base with the city of Bahía Blanca, while batteries of cannons and coastal howitzers protected it against the eventuality of a naval attack. (13)

Coastal Artillery Corps

Coastal artillery did not receive special attention until the 1870s. Until 1879, coastal defense had been the responsibility of the army, whose Plaza Artillery Battalion garrisoned the island of Martín García. The Coastal Artillery Corps, established on November 15, 1879 under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Sellstrom, former professor of ballistics at the ENM and superlative engineer. The Coastal Artillery Corps also provided marine infantry and protection forces, but the only existing fortifications were those of Martín García. During the Paraguayan War, the Ministry of War had ordered the construction of five barbettes of material that would mount 36 pieces of artillery, but in mid-1866 only 18 cannons had been installed, and even these were archaic relics inherited from the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and low caliber. During Sarmiento's government, the first modern artillery pieces: 4 381 mm Rodmans and six 254 mm Parrotts were placed on the island. In 1877 these guns were complemented by a battery of 177 mm (7 in) Armstrong pieces that fired 150-pound anti-armor grenades, giving Martín García a true strategic capability. In the mid-1880s, Martín García's cannons and other installations were already outdated, since models with greater penetration capacity and greater range had appeared. The ARA selected the Krupp mod. 1887 240 mm L.35 as regulatory equipment for its batteries, and pieces of this type were located in Martín García, the Zárate Naval Arsenal and in Puerto Militar. In 1899 they would be complemented with three Krupp mod howitzer batteries. 1899 280mm L.11. Meanwhile, the constant tension with Chile led to an expansion of the ARA, whose fleet would be in 1898 the most powerful and best equipped in South America. (14)

1. Rauch, George , Conflict in the Southern Cone; the Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (Praeger (Wesport, Conecticut and London, 1999).pag. 101-102
2. Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone..Ibid pag.102-103
3. Iid, pag. 103-104
4. Iid pag.104
5. Lopez Urrutia, Carlos, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1969) pag. 26
6. Baldrich, Amadeo J, Historia de la guerra del Brasil: Contribucion al estudio razonado de la historia militar argentina (Imprenta La Harlem, Buenos Aires, 1905) pag.258-70, Rauch, op cit, pag. 104
7. Rauch, op cit, pag 104-105
8. Burzio Humberto, Armada Nacional: Reseña Historica de su origen y desarrollo orgánico (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B, No 1, Buenos Aires, 1960) pag.160 -161, Burzio, Humberto, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B. 1972, Buenos Aires, 3 vols., 1972) I; 246-248,320-321, 352-353, Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
9. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar, I: 236-27 ,337-338, 367.
10. Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
11. Burzio, Armada nacional, pag.1590160, Rauch op cit, pag. 117
12. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar;II: 458-459, 767-
13. Rauch, p cit, pag. 117. Rauch, op it, pag.116-1177
14. Triado, Juan Enrique, Historia de la Base Naval Puerto Belgrano (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Centro Naval, Buenos Aires, 1992) pag.67-8, Rauch pag.117118

Author: André Marois

1955 Revolution: The Fighting in the South of Buenos Aires

Fight in the Southern Part of Buenos Aires Province

Aircraft from the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base take off to conduct bombing operations against the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca. (Image: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

With the Sea Fleet positioned in open waters and no updates on its location, only the battleships "Moreno" and "Rivadavia," along with the destroyers "Santa Cruz," "Misiones," and "Juan de Garay" from the Ríos Squadron, remained in port. The cruisers "25 de Mayo" and "Almirante Brown," designated as reserve ships without artillery, three torpedo boats, a beacon, two BDI, flatboats, and tugboats completed the contingent. Argentina undeniably possessed a significant war fleet; however, at the onset of the conflict, most of its units were distanced from their home bases.

On the night of September 15, the Comandante Espora police force exhibited heightened activity, leading Captain Jorge E. Perren, the leader of the uprising, to suspect a possible information leak.

Following a series of strategic maneuvers, with officers discreetly convening at predetermined locations, all preparations were finalized. Accompanied by a cadre of rebel leaders, Perren departed from the residence of Lieutenant Commander Ciro Scotti, where he had been in hiding. The group made their way to the house of Vice Admiral Ignacio Chamorro, the base commander, with the intention of arresting him.

Both Vice Admiral Chamorro and Admiral Héctor W. Fidanza, a member of the Special Court of the Navy, were subdued and transported as detainees to the battleship "Moreno." The same fate befell the ship captains overseeing the 2nd Division and all officers who had not aligned themselves with the revolution.


Navy Armored Vehicles run the city



At 7:00 in the morning, a time when both military and civilian personnel were entering the unit, the area fell under rebel control, including the nearby Naval Base of Puerto Belgrano. As Ruiz Moreno outlines in his work, after securing strategic points, the primary concern arose from the 5th Infantry Regiment stationed near Bahía Blanca, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadeo Angel Albrizzi.

Faced with the regiment's tight-lipped stance on the revolution, a decision was made to dispatch a message urging them to either join the uprising or lay down their arms. Albrizzi, employing tactical measures, maintained radio silence in an attempt to confound his adversaries, unaware that his calls for assistance from colleagues in Olavarría and Azul had been received that morning and appropriate measures were being taken.

Given Albrizzi's unyielding position, Captain Arturo Rial, the revolutionary commander in the Southern Sector, issued a subsequent summons. The response confirmed that the regiment's leader would personally appear before Commander Espora to engage in dialogue. However, the revolutionary leaders saw these responses as mere delaying tactics.

By 3:00 p.m., an air-naval formation identified troop movement near General Cerri, causing concern among base authorities who promptly went on high alert. These were three trucks carrying reinforcements for the 5th Infantry Regiment, dispatched that very morning by the Repression Command.

In an attempt to halt their advance, rebel planes were deployed towards them, releasing bombs that forced the reinforcements to hastily disperse. Subsequently, the occupation of Bahía Blanca was coordinated, a pivotal point for the unfolding events. To execute this, Marine Corps troops received orders to mobilize towards the city. At 3:30 p.m., the troops boarded several trucks, setting out under the command of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Castellanos—the same individual who, earlier that morning, had flown over the barracks of the 5th Infantry Regiment in a Catalina plane piloted by Frigate Captain Raúl Galmarini.



Rebel Forces Occupy Bahía Blanca (Image: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

According to Ruiz Moreno, Bahía Blanca was occupied at 4:00 p.m. sharp, without opposition, patrolling the access roads and raiding the GCT and CGE premises, where weapons and documentation were seized. The final movements took place in Villa Mitre, a working-class neighborhood with a marked Peronist presence, where two trucks and an armored vehicle with twenty men and a radio equipment were stationed in order to keep such a conflictive sector under strict surveillance.
When Captain Castellanos was installed in the Municipality (6:00 p.m.), the population was under complete control and it was then that citizens took to the streets en masse to support the movement, cheering the Navy and hurling epithets against Perón.
From the LU7 broadcasting station, Castellano radiated a fiery revolutionary proclamation that only increased the combative ardor of the population. Many civilians volunteered, eager to join the anti-government ranks, while naval planes dropped leaflets spreading the principles of the uprising and inviting the people to join.
It was beginning to get mid-afternoon when Captain Perren was able to inform the rebel command that both Bahía Blanca and Punta Alta, up to a radius of 300 kilometers around, were under revolutionary control, with the exception of the facilities of the 5th Infantry Regiment.


Naval Aircraft Flying over Bahía Blanca

At that point it was evident that Lieutenant Colonel Albrizzi hoped to receive reinforcements from the Azul and Olavarría regiments, ignoring that the sailors, upon occupying Bahía Blanca, had seized the Army's communications codes and were aware of all his movements. For this reason, Captain Rial, after the agreed deadlines for a definition had expired, decided to attack the unit.
By his order, Commander Edgardo S. Andrew established a new telephone contact and after he handed him the device, he notified Albrizzi that he had exactly two minutes to speak because otherwise the regiment was going to be bombed. .
After receiving the order to ready, six naval aircraft were positioned at the head of the runway, ready to take off and, faced with a new series of excuses, after the agreed time had expired, they received the order to take off.
Concerned, Captain Andrew tried to mediate, asking his superior to stop the raid:

-Sir, don't bomb them, I know them and I know that sooner or later they are going to give in to us.

Not accustomed to war, the officer did not admit entering into action. However, Captain Rial remained firm.

-Give the order to bomb!

One after another, the North American AT-6s taxied down the runway and took off with a difference of half a minute from each other, towards the outskirts of the city.
At 5:00 p.m. they attacked the regiment's facilities, receiving intense machine gun and rifle fire in response. Lieutenant Rubén Iglesias' plane was hit and although the pilot was injured in the leg, he was able to reach Espora and land without problems.
The first raid was followed by another, with their planes making low flights over the objective, in order to keep the unit intimidated. However, far from giving up its attitude, the regiment maintained its silence, evidencing its intention not to give in to the uprising.

Preparations in Comandante Espora

While the second attack was taking place, the Repression Command encouraged the resistance from Buenos Aires and announced the sending of reinforcements. Albrizzi must have experienced great relief when he learned that the III Cavalry Division under the command of General Eusebio Molinuevo was advancing to his aid, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Communications Detachment, and the powerful 3rd Motorized Infantry Regiment based in La Tablada (the same one that entered into combat against the Gloster Meteor on June 16) and the Sapper Detachment 3. For its part, the 1st Cavalry Regiment set out from Azul and the 2nd Regiment from Tandil, both taking the paths of Juárez and Tres Arroyos.

Ground crew assembles a bomb under the wing of a PBY Catalina


Information received from different parts of the country showed that the fighting at the Río Santiago Naval Base was becoming unfavorable and that in the Río de la Plata, the destroyers “La Rioja” and “Cervantes” had received harsh punishment from Air Force. That, plus the advance of the Army units, decided a new attack on the 5th Infantry Regiment.
At 9:30 p.m. on that eventful day, two Catalina bombers left Comandante Espora bound for the military unit, reaching the objective fifteen minutes later.
The first threw flares to illuminate the target and the second dropped its bombs, impacting the facilities, without causing any casualties. This time there was no response and the devices returned to the base without incident. Half an hour later, a communication from the Army was intercepted haranguing the 5th Infantry which, among other things, said: “Do not surrender to the Navy. The bombing will be suspended because they do not have fuses. "In a short period of time, it will receive air support."

An AT-6 North American fly towards the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca

That radio interception led the rebel high command to adopt defensive measures in anticipation of the regiment carrying out some type of mobilization. To this end, permanent air patrols were maintained over their barracks and the regrouping of the military forces occupying Bahía Blanca was ordered. The rebel advances came so close to the enemy lines that at two different points, the sections of lieutenants Martín Schwarz and Juan J. Costa surpassed their defensive perimeter.



At 11:00 p.m. Navy troops, who had already cut the telephone lines that connected Bahía Blanca with Buenos Aires, blew up the bridge of National Route No. 3, over the Quequén Salado River, located between Coronel Dorrego and Tres Arroyos, 150 kilometers away. of the naval air base. The mission was carried out by a demolition section made up of seventeen men under the command of Lieutenant Engineer Jorge Yódice, supported by Lieutenant Navy Infantry Eduardo Fracassi and Midshipman Luis Pozzo, an expert in explosives. The commandos took off in a plane from Comandante Espora and at 6:45 p.m., they landed in a field near the objective. As soon as they landed, one group ran to the route to block it with branches and different types of obstacles while the other proceeded to place the explosives in two different points of the structure.

Communication Center. Comandante Espora Base

Once the device was assembled, the troops withdrew and when they were at a safe distance, they stopped and activated the mechanism. A terrible explosion occurred that shook the night and while the glow and flames illuminated the area, the bridge collapsed. The plan included blowing up a railway bridge near the previous one, but lack of time prevented the operation. The commandos boarded the plane and at 12:00 p.m. they began their return, after successfully completing the first phase of the plan aimed at hindering access to the rebel sector.

Rebel troops occupy the Municipality


DC Guillermo Castellanos (right), naval chief in charge of Bahía Blanca (Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Images
Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva

Notes

1. In 1982, Admiral Carlos Büsser led the occupation forces of the Malvinas/Falklands archipelago during Operation Rosario.
2. Jorge E. Perren, Puerto Belgrano y la Revolución Libertadora, p. 187.

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón