War with Brazil: Naval Battle of Los Pozos

June 11th. Anniversary of the Battle of Los Pozos

Background

Imagine a nation on the brink, its borders threatened by a powerful empire, rivers blockaded, and its very sovereignty hanging by a thread. The year is 1825, and the fledgling United Provinces of the Río de la Plata faces a formidable foe: the Empire of Brazil, a giant that seeks to crush any resistance and expand its dominion.

As the specter of war looms, Buenos Aires is thrust into a desperate struggle for survival. A small, hastily assembled fleet, funded by the patriotic fervor of its citizens, is their only hope against Brazil's mighty naval forces. Meanwhile, danger lurks on the southern coast, where whispers of invasion and treachery among indigenous allies threaten to unravel the fragile unity of the provinces.

This is not just a battle for land or power; it is a fight for the very soul of a nation. The stage is set for a conflict that will shape the destiny of South America, where courage, strategy, and determination will be tested to their limits. Will the United Provinces rise to the challenge, or will they be consumed by the imperial ambitions of their neighbor? The answer lies in the epic struggle that is about to unfold. 

The Actions

Picture a nation under siege, its fate hanging in the balance as forces clash on both land and water. The rivers that were once lifelines have become battlegrounds, and the mighty Plata, once claimed by the Empire of Brazil as its own, now bears witness to fierce resistance.

In the closing days of May 1826, the Argentine fleet, though outnumbered and outgunned, dared to challenge imperial dominance. Brig Balcarce, alongside a few schooners and gunboats, stealthily maneuvered to Las Conchillas, where they began the daring task of disembarking troops. The Empire, seeking vengeance, dispatched a squadron of 30 ships to crush this audacious move. But on June 11, as they approached Los Pozos, they met an unexpected foe: Admiral Guillermo Brown, a man of iron will and unyielding courage.

With Buenos Aires as a backdrop and ten thousand spectators lining the harbor, Brown's fleet engaged the imperial forces in a blaze of cannon fire. For fifteen intense minutes, the river roared with the thunder of battle until, against all odds, the imperial ships turned south, retreating from the fray. As the sun dipped below the horizon, the Argentine fleet stood victorious, a testament to their resilience and determination.

Yet, while these naval victories ignited hope, the land war stagnated. The Argentine army, led by General Las Heras, remained in a tense standoff, hindered by political turmoil at home. In a bid to stabilize the nation, Congress acted swiftly, establishing a permanent executive power and electing Bernardino Rivadavia as president.

The stage is set for a dramatic turn in the conflict, where the tides of war may shift at any moment. The courage displayed on the rivers may yet inspire a nation to rise above the challenges that lie ahead, but the road to victory is fraught with uncertainty.



Wikipedia

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 (1/13)

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4

Organic Growth and Development of the Argentine Navy: 1810-1902

Although the May Revolution of 1810 marked the end of the colonial era in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, on the opposite bank of the Plata, remained in the hands of the royalists. From this station, a powerful and well-trained squadron under the command of Captain Jacinto de Romarate soon established a blockade of Buenos Aires and threatened to cut the lines of communication along the coast. The patriot authorities reacted quickly and in August acquired three merchant ships, suitable to be transformed into warships. These were: the brig "25 de Mayo", the schooner "Invencible", and the sloop "Americano". An Argentine veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, and former lieutenant of the Spanish navy, Francisco de Gurrucharaga dedicated himself vigorously to equipping this small squadron. The poverty of the treasury, the lack of trained personnel and materials complicated his task. The command of this flotilla was entrusted to Juan Bautista Azopardo, a privateer of Maltese origin, who was supported by two French privateers: Hipólito Bouchard and Angel Hubac. On February 10, 1811, three of the patriot ships set sail from Buenos Aires and headed towards the Paraná River. On March 2, the patriot squadron was intercepted by a powerful royalist squadron. In the fierce combat that took place, numerical and training superiority prevailed. Aboard the "25 de Mayo", 41 crew members out of a total of 50 on board were injured or killed. To the dismay of the patriots, the first Argentine naval squadron was captured and towed to Montevideo, where after being repaired, the ships were incorporated into the royalist fleet (1)

Phoenix Bird

On July 7, a royalist squadron bombed Buenos Aires, although not without being punished. Bouchard, who was in charge of a gunboat armed with a solitary 18-pounder cannon, went out in search of the royalist ships, managed to inflict serious damage on one of them, causing the enemy to retreat. As a result of this attack; The patriot government equipped a second squadron consisting of the schooners "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" and "Santo Domingo", the ketch "Hiena" and four smaller boats. The royalist fleet reappeared again off Buenos Aires on August 19, but when Bouchard directed his ships towards it, the enemy withdrew and tried, ineffectively, to bombard Buenos Aires from a safe distance. On October 20, 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo concluded an armistice that provided for the cessation of hostilities and the end of the blockade. While the national government disarmed its flotilla, the royalists violated the armistice and proceeded to bomb towns on the Argentine coast with impunity, attacking commercial ships at will. This in turn motivated the creation of the third Argentine naval squadron, which was organized by an Irish merchant captain; Buenos Aires resident William Brown, who is very rightly considered the father of the Argentine navy. This squadron was made up of a frigate, four corvettes, a brig, five schooners and other smaller ships. The officers were mostly foreigners, but soon a growing number of Creoles joined the fleet. (2)

 
San Nicolás Battle

In May 1814 Brown defeated the royalist fleet that once dominated the Rio de la Plata. This triumph in turn made possible the blockade and subsequent taking of Montevideo. This magnificent victory deprived Spain of the only base of operations it had in South America and granted control of the waters to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Furthermore, in order to harass and destroy Spanish trade in the region, the government of Buenos Aires began to grant letters of marque to foreign privateers, among whom those of American nationality predominated. The exact number of these privateers is unknown, although it is known that one of these privateer ships was active in 1815, 4 in 1816, 23 in 1819, 10 in 1820 and two in 1821. In 1815 the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata was the only Spanish American nation that the royalists had not managed to subjugate. In Spain, a powerful expedition was organized that would be commanded by General Pablo de Morillo who had been assigned the task of taking Buenos Aires, but the loss of Montevideo forced Spain to consider its strategy and Morillo's expedition was dispatched towards New Granada, the current Republic of Colombia.(3)

Expedition to the Pacific

In 1816 Brown led an Argentine squadron on a cruise to the Pacific. These ships blockaded Lima and Guayaquil, captured California and hit Spanish maritime trade vigorously. The frigate "La Argentina", commanded by Hipólito Bouchard that was part of this flotilla, separated from the other ships and was the first Argentine flag ship to circumnavigate the world. (4)

A Chilean naval historian describes the outcome of Brown's cruise in the following terms:

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5) 

War against Brazil: 1825-1828

At the end of the wars of independence, the ARA was reduced to a minimum and most of its ships were sold to private shipowners. In 1825, when the war with Brazil broke out, the Argentine fleet consisted of four frigates, two corvettes and 12 gunboats built in Bajo, on the banks of Buenos Aires and armed with old 24-piece pieces taken from the fort of that city. Command of the fleet was again entrusted to Brown. In direct contrast, the fleet of the Brazilian Empire, manned by a plethora of high-ranking English officers and subordinates, veterans of the Napoleonic wars; It had 108 warships, of which half were larger units (frigates, corvettes, brigs) and the rest were gunboats and schooners armed in war of various types and sizes. In a rapid series of battles, the Argentine navy managed to defeat the powerful imperial fleet, and although the latter blocked Buenos Aires, the lines of communication between the United Provinces and the Eastern Band of Uruguay, where the Argentine army was located, They were never cut off or even affected. On the other hand, despite the notorious lack of resources and the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, between 1825 and 127 the Argentine navy managed to destroy or capture more than 50 Brazilian warships, many of which were incorporated into the navy. national and employed with great energy and great skill against their former owners. In addition, Argentine warships and corsairs from Buenos Aires captured 445 Brazilian merchant ships (6)

The Era of Rosas (1829-1852)-Fights for Argentine unification: 1852-1862

During the Rosas era (1829-52) the navy became essentially a riverine force, adequate enough to defeat the Uruguayan fleet in a series of battles throughout the year 1841, but not strong or modern enough to confront to the Anglo-French squadron sent to Plata in 1845. A maritime academy in which officers were trained operated until 1830, then naval cadets were assigned to fleet units. The Argentine navy would not enter the age of steam until 1851. The two nation states that emerged in Argentina after the overthrow of Rosas in 1852 established squadrons equipped with war-armed steam merchant vessels, most of which would be incorporated into the national navy after the Argentine reunification that occurs as a result of the Battle of Pavón. However, by mid-1865, the fleet was reduced to a few vessels in service, the rest having been reduced to pontoon status or serving as storage hulls. The navy did not have a land infrastructure, naval bases or even warships themselves. It was painfully evident that the navy had not experienced adequate development, not only in comparison to the fleets of the great powers, but also in comparison to the fleets of neighboring countries such as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay.

The War with Paraguay (1865-1870)

When the Paraguayan War broke out, the Argentine navy was reduced to a handful of armed merchant steamers, sailing cutters and old hulls that served as floating stores of material. There was no infrastructure on land, nor training centers for the training of personnel. Although during the war, the command of the allied armies was entrusted to the president of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre, given the fact that among the allies, only Brazil had a navy worthy of the name, the Viscount of Tamandaré was placed in charge. charge of naval operations. The participation of the Argentine navy in this conflict, due to lack of suitable material, was reduced mainly to transportation and logistical support missions. (7)


 
Crew of the Steamship "25 de Mayo", captured in Corrientes, beginning the Argentine intervention in the Paraguayan War

Development of Institutes and land infrastructure: 1872-1902

The first steps on the long road towards modernization and expansion would be taken during the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74). A figure of extraordinary creativity, whom North American historian Hubert Herring described as "Possibly the only practical genius to emerge from Spanish America," Sarmiento devoted considerable time and thought to the importance of naval power for communications and defense. . Therefore, when Major Clodomiro Uturbey, a graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, proposed the creation of a similar establishment in Argentina, Sarmiento gave his support to this initiative. The necessary legislation was promulgated on October 2, 1872 and three days later the Naval Military School (ENM) was officially established aboard the steamship "General Brown", where it operated until 1877, when as a result of the "gabanes mutiny", The government ordered the closure of the ENM, although this measure did not interrupt the "curriculum" of the cadets who were simply transferred to various units of the navy until the ENM was transferred to a new headquarters in the heart of Buenos Aires. The number of cadets in the ENM grew gradually: 15 in 1872, 50 in 1883 and would exceed the figure of 70 in 1887 although the true growth would not occur until 1893, when the ENM was transferred again, this time to Juan's former residence Manuel de Rosas in Palermo, previously used by the Military College of the Nation. The cadet corps began to grow rapidly from then on: 77 in 1895, 88 in 1896, 110 in 1897 and 140 in 1898 (8)

Initially, the course of study at the ENM lasted six semesters. The first included geometry, rectilinear trigonometry, drawing, foreign languages, ballistics and general education. Spatial geometry, physics, naval astronomy and other academic subjects were studied in subsequent semesters, while practical teaching similarly progressed from the duties of a private seaman to those of a helmsman, from piloting small vessels to the duties and responsibilities of an officer. The later semesters emphasized the teaching of shipbuilding techniques, steam propulsion, international law, naval gunnery, and history. The cadets were then assigned to warships in service on the Patagonian coasts and the recently graduated midshipmen were assigned to a flotilla of sailing cutters that patrolled those latitudes, thus acquiring valuable experience. Long-duration trans-oceanic voyages began in the early 1880s, when the ENM received a new steam corvette specially designed as a training ship, we refer to the corvette "La Argentina". At the end of the 1890s this unit would be replaced by the ARA frigate "Sarmiento", a 2800-ton displacement unit, which in turn inaugurated the era of circumnavigation of the world. At the end of the 19th century, the prestige and efficiency of the ENM transcended the country's borders, and was fully recognized abroad, which is why students from neighboring countries competed in the entrance exams to this institution. (9)

In 1875, the School of Apprentice-Sailors was created aboard the boat "Vanguardia", and the following year, a reformatory for young people was established aboard the pontoon "General Paz", designated "Correccional de Menores", although the practice of sentencing young offenders of the penal code to serve in the army was abandoned soon after. In its replacement, the School of Cabins was established aboard the boat "Cabo de Hornos", a unit that during the period 1879-1884 patrolled the Patagonian coasts until it was removed from service, and replaced by the training ship "La Argentina". The Artillery School was established aboard the monitor "El Plata" in 1877 and the Artillery Apprentice School, where cannon corporals were trained, operated aboard various units since its creation in 1881. Firefighters, machinists and electricians received training at the School of Navy Mechanics, which existed under various names since 1880. Finally, the Torpedo School was established in 1883, aboard a ship incorporated at that time, the ARA torpedo ram "Maipú". (10)

In January 1879, the Central Hydrography Office (OCH) was established, which would be responsible for exploring and charting the coasts and waterways, as well as the construction of lighthouses and beacons. In January 1881, the newly created Naval Observatory was attached to the OCH. In this way, the ARA obtained a valuable wealth of information regarding the Argentine interior rivers and the Patagonian coasts. (11)

As can be seen, the ARA placed special emphasis on the training of officers and junior personnel. In 1883, the ARA had a strength of 2,000 men, which included 1,503 sailors, 320 officers (including 48 cadets from the engineering branch) and 133 ensigns and cadets. During the struggles for national reunification and through the Paraguayan War, the ARA hired Argentine and foreign merchant sailors to complete some of the crews of its ships. The services of Argentine merchant ships were also contracted, including their crews for quarantine tasks and logistical support missions. During the 1880s-1890s the ARA experienced a shortage of specialists and machine personnel, so a substantial number of foreign specialists were hired. The naval ranking of 1891 revealed that of a total of 83 engineering officers, 32 were foreigners. In 1897, of a total of 155 officers in this branch, 97 were natives of the country, and the rest were foreigners. As the fleet grew in number, and the ships that were added were invariably of greater tonnage and technically more advanced than their predecessors, the need to increase personnel became apparent. For example, the four "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers in the late 1890s required an average of 25 officers and 440 men per unit, a total of 109 officers and 1,636 crew. In 1902 the ARA had a strength of 8,336 men, a figure that included 327 line officers, 297 officer-engineers, 7,760 sailors and 450 marines. The growing importance of the navy was tacitly recognized on March 15, 1898, when the navy obtained the status of an independent force, that is, it no longer depended on the Ministry of War and Navy. From now on, it would be regulated by the Ministry of the Navy. (12)

Stations and bases

As the ARA increased its fleet and the ships added were increasingly larger, the ARA had to establish a network of naval stations and bases throughout the republic. Although we must deal with the expansion of the fleet separately, we must mention that the first modern units incorporated were shallow draft ships that could anchor in Rio de la Plata or in the Zárate naval base, but as fleet units were added increased tonnage the need for a deep water port became apparent. The town of Punta Alta, in the south of the Province of Buenos Aires was selected for said installation. A famous Italian engineer, Luigi Luiggi, was assigned to design the plans. Work began in 1898, and in July the first three coastal artillery batteries intended to protect the future base had already been placed. Upon completion of the works, in 1902 this strategic port, called Puerto Militar, would emerge as the largest naval base in South America, with enough space to house 20 "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers. The facilities covered an area of 3000 hectares. A strategic railway connected the base with the city of Bahía Blanca, while batteries of cannons and coastal howitzers protected it against the eventuality of a naval attack. (13)

Coastal Artillery Corps

Coastal artillery did not receive special attention until the 1870s. Until 1879, coastal defense had been the responsibility of the army, whose Plaza Artillery Battalion garrisoned the island of Martín García. The Coastal Artillery Corps, established on November 15, 1879 under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Sellstrom, former professor of ballistics at the ENM and superlative engineer. The Coastal Artillery Corps also provided marine infantry and protection forces, but the only existing fortifications were those of Martín García. During the Paraguayan War, the Ministry of War had ordered the construction of five barbettes of material that would mount 36 pieces of artillery, but in mid-1866 only 18 cannons had been installed, and even these were archaic relics inherited from the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and low caliber. During Sarmiento's government, the first modern artillery pieces: 4 381 mm Rodmans and six 254 mm Parrotts were placed on the island. In 1877 these guns were complemented by a battery of 177 mm (7 in) Armstrong pieces that fired 150-pound anti-armor grenades, giving Martín García a true strategic capability. In the mid-1880s, Martín García's cannons and other installations were already outdated, since models with greater penetration capacity and greater range had appeared. The ARA selected the Krupp mod. 1887 240 mm L.35 as regulatory equipment for its batteries, and pieces of this type were located in Martín García, the Zárate Naval Arsenal and in Puerto Militar. In 1899 they would be complemented with three Krupp mod howitzer batteries. 1899 280mm L.11. Meanwhile, the constant tension with Chile led to an expansion of the ARA, whose fleet would be in 1898 the most powerful and best equipped in South America. (14)

1. Rauch, George , Conflict in the Southern Cone; the Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (Praeger (Wesport, Conecticut and London, 1999).pag. 101-102
2. Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone..Ibid pag.102-103
3. Iid, pag. 103-104
4. Iid pag.104
5. Lopez Urrutia, Carlos, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1969) pag. 26
6. Baldrich, Amadeo J, Historia de la guerra del Brasil: Contribucion al estudio razonado de la historia militar argentina (Imprenta La Harlem, Buenos Aires, 1905) pag.258-70, Rauch, op cit, pag. 104
7. Rauch, op cit, pag 104-105
8. Burzio Humberto, Armada Nacional: Reseña Historica de su origen y desarrollo orgánico (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B, No 1, Buenos Aires, 1960) pag.160 -161, Burzio, Humberto, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B. 1972, Buenos Aires, 3 vols., 1972) I; 246-248,320-321, 352-353, Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
9. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar, I: 236-27 ,337-338, 367.
10. Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
11. Burzio, Armada nacional, pag.1590160, Rauch op cit, pag. 117
12. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar;II: 458-459, 767-
13. Rauch, p cit, pag. 117. Rauch, op it, pag.116-1177
14. Triado, Juan Enrique, Historia de la Base Naval Puerto Belgrano (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Centro Naval, Buenos Aires, 1992) pag.67-8, Rauch pag.117118

Author: André Marois

Triple Alliance War: Riachuelo, the Greatest Naval Battle in America

Riachuelo

On June 11, 1865, the largest naval battle in America was fought, at the site where the water course called Riachuelo flows, located at the mouth of the Paraná River at its conjunction with the Paraguay River, a few kilometers from the city of Corrientes, over Argentine waters. That area of the province of Corrientes was at that time in the power of Paraguayan troops, so they had control of the coast.

By early 1865, Solano López was determined to take control of the Paraná River in the first place to control an entire future cleansing of the Río de la Plata. If he were successful in sneaking up on the Brazilian imperial fleet in the lower waters of the river then he would achieve an important victory that would enable deeper land operations in the future.

Surprise would be essential. At the end of 1864 the Paraguayan navy consisted of 17 small vessels of various sizes. Only two of them, Anhambay and Tacuarí, were built as gunboats. During the 1860s López was hoping to get new ironclads added to his fleet. He maintained contacts with some European countries to obtain these ships. This project, however, had to be abandoned due to financial problems.

The imperial fleet, on the other hand, fielded 45 vessels, 33 steamships and 12 sailing ships at the beginning of the war. The force had at its disposal a total manpower of almost 2,400 officers and men. The main units were the Niterói propeller type and the Amazonas rear-bladed propeller boat. The fleet, however, had a major defect: it had been designed for the high seas rather than for river operations.



On June 8, the Paraguayan fleet was concentrated in Asunción for the departure towards the fortress of Humaitá. López himself was aboard the Tacuarí. The entire population of the capital was present to witness the departure. At the end of the morning the ships left for the fortress. As soon as he arrived in Humaitá on the morning of the next day, López immediately began to prepare the attack against the enemy squadron located near Corrientes, in a width called Riachuelo, which gave support to the land forces of the Triple Alliance to expel the Paraguayans of Corrientes. He gathered the bulk of the Paraguayan armada to hit the Brazilian ships at dawn on June 11. The squadron consisted of eight ships, the flagship Tacuarí, the recently arrived Paraguarí, built in England, the captured Brazilian steamship Marquês de Olinda and the Ygureí, Ybera, Yporá, Jejuí, Salto Oriental and the Pirabebé. Along with the ships, six low flat-bottomed barges with an eight-inch gun each, known as flatboats, would be towed to confront the enemy. The squadron numbered 36 guns. Commodore Pedro Ignacio Meza would order the assault. In addition, the Paraguayan ships would have the support of a cannon battery under the command of Colonel José Maria Bruguez placed along the river coastline.

The Brazilian squadron anchored near Corrientes formed the Amazonas (flagship) and the ships Jequitinhonha, Belmonte, Parnaíba, Ipiranga, Mearin, Iguatemi, Araguarí and the Beberibé. The total firepower of the squadron amounted to 59 guns. Admiral Francisco Manuel Barroso was in command of the ships.

Meza must sail downstream of the Paraná during dawn on June 11 to reach the enemy around dawn. The surprise would compensate for the fact that the Paraguayan ships were outgunned. At two in the morning the fleet left Humaitá. At five o'clock the chatas assembled the ships. Despite this, a problem with the Iberá's engine delayed the plan.

Battle Plan


Only at nine o'clock, in the broad light of day, the ships reached Riachuelo.

After placing the chatas near the coast, Meza led his ships directly into the enemy to split the Imperial squadron in two.

Barroso's ships were anchored near the confluence of the Paraná and two narrow channels. The attack, if not entirely a surprise, occurred when Barroso's ships were lined up toward the coast.

Meza's squadron passed over the enemy ships sending fire on them. Each of his ships chooses a ship to pawn. Soon the Amazonas was under fire from the Tacuarí, while the Ipiranga exchanged fire with the Salto.

Google Map of the battle zone

In the battle the two squadrons changed positions. Meza was below the squadron and cut off by the enemies from his base in Humaitá. The Paraguayan commander then adopted the strategy of luring the enemies into the lower channels where they would not be able to maneuver as well as the Paraguayans did.

The Jequitinhonha, Barroso's largest ship after the Amazon, was struck on a sandbank. This made him an easy target for Bruguez's ruthless artillery.

The Belmonte was hit several times by the chatas' fire.

The Parnaíba hit the coast and was set adrift. Several Paraguayan ships soon surrounded her. The Marquês de Olinda boarded the Brazilian ship and a deadly combat occurred on the deck of Parnaíba. On several occasions, the Paraguayans tried to take command of the ship. Only with the iron resistance of the Parnaíba crew did he save the ship. Finally, a final assault was expelled and the ship slid away from the enemy.

At this point, things began to change.

Despite the difficulties in maneuvering, the superior firepower of Barroso's ships began to show effectiveness. The Jejuí was sunk by nearby fire from Brazilian ships. The Marquês de Olinda caused her boilers to explode and she was out of action. The Paraguarí was hit by the Amazon and was left helpless. Meza gave orders to retreat. At 1 P.M. the combat was over. Of the eight Paraguayan vessels, only four returned to Humaitá. The others were sunk, captured or left stranded on a sandbank (this included the Paraguarí, the Jejuí, the Marquês de Olinda and the Salto Oriental). Two flatboats were sunk and the other four remained in Brazilian hands. A few days later, however, the Paraguayans succeeded in removing the Paraguarí, sending the ship to Asunción for repairs. The Paraguayan casualties are not known exactly. Brazilian assumptions of 1,000 casualties are probably exaggerated. Perhaps this number is between 300 and 400 (Brazilian sources say it can reach 750).

Meza died a few days later in Humaitá from the wounds he received during the battle.

The imperial squadron lost one ship, the Jequitinhonha while two other vessels, the Parnaíba and Belmonte were severely damaged. The Ipiranga was slightly damaged. Barroso had 104 men killed, 123 wounded and 20 lost.

The Paraguayans failed in the attempt to have the entire power of the Paraná River from Asunción to Montevideo. Furthermore, they would not be able to replace the lost ships. While Brazil added new units to the fleet.




Remarks

• I would highlight the fact that in the river the East-West escape and maneuver axes are considerably smaller. For this reason and due to the number of ships used, the battle had to have a lot of congestion between so many ships and ships giving back to the cannon shots. Another issue was the loss of surprise of the attack given that the Iberá broke down. This caused the attack to begin at 9 AM when it was planned for 5 AM. It was a failure of surprise that added light to the scenario to the detriment of the Paraguayan plan. As in Tuyuty, the loss of surprise caused a good initial attack plan to falter. (SiberianSky, FDRA moderator).
• "...largest naval battle in America"... The most paradoxical thing is that this action was in a river (Mongoose, FDRA moderator).