Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Argentina Buys Garibaldis (7/13)

The Brown's Robust Boy Is a Man Today

Gone were the days when riverine units, with heterogeneous crews, set out to sea to assert sovereignty in Santa Cruz.

As can be seen from the tables accompanying this work, the ARA not only ceased to be a riverine force in the 1880s, but also, following the motto "let us be strong and we will be respected," the national authorities, supported by public opinion, at a level of consensus rarely equaled in our history, had drawn up plans to obtain not only parity, but naval supremacy in South America.

It should be noted that with the acquisition of the transports, the ARA Guardia Nacional (6,700 tons), the ARA Chaco and the ARA Pampa (8,700 tons), the ARA has an effective transport squadron, since these ships, together, can carry a load of 15,000 tons and supplies. The incorporation of the four "Garibaldi" type armored cruisers was an unbalancing factor that totally altered the balance of power in favor of Argentina. These ships, well protected, armed and fast, were the most modern, most powerful and most homogeneous group of warships in the Southern Cone. The Jane's Fighting Ships yearbook for 1936 observes in this regard: these ships constitute the best class of armored cruisers ever designed. The four "Garibaldis": together with the cruiser ARA Buenos Aires, destroyers, auxiliary ships, make up the Bahía Blanca Division, while the cruisers ARA 9 de Julio, ARA 25 de Mayo and ARA Patria and auxiliaries make up the Río de la Plata Division. On January 8, the Bahía Blanca Division sets sail on a series of exercises through the southern ports that will take it to the Beagle Channel. These exercises will last for 80 days. On January 18, in turn, The Río de la Plata Division sets sail on a journey that will take it to Cape Horn, which will last 62 days. The crews carry out exhaustive artillery, torpedo and landing practices without the slightest incident or accident. As an article in the Bulletin of the Naval Center proclaims in those days, it was evident that "the robust child of Brown is a man today" (3 )

Despite the meeting between the presidents of Argentina and Chile known as "The Embrace of the Strait", tensions, far from decreasing, increased.

As we have seen, with the acquisition of a cruiser (the Chacabuco) and six destroyers by Chile, Argentina responded with the purchase of the ARA Moreno and ARA Rivadavia. Chile, in turn, used funds reserved for the sewerage of Santiago and ordered two battleships of 11,800 tons. Day after day, the Argentine authorities received coded telegrams from the military and naval commissions in Europe detailing the urgent purchases of ammunition and all kinds of items by the Chilean authorities. The Argentine commissions, of course, also had no rest, ensuring the provision of grenades of all calibers in large quantities, replacement fuel stocks and the thousand and one indispensable items. The response to the two new Chilean battleships would not take long to arrive: two 14,800-caliber battleships that would be built by the Ansaldo Company, in a construction period similar to that of the new Chilean ships. These ships, which would be called ARA Chacabuco and ARA Maipú.

In addition, the ARA signed a contract with the Pattison Company, of Naples, for six destroyers of the "Nembo" class that were under construction for the Royal Italian Navy, and whose first units had already been launched in October 1899.

With the consent of his country's government, a well-known Chilean financier contacted the British minister in Santiago, as the arms race threatened to ruin both countries. An Argentine industrialist and financier, in turn, initiated contacts with the British minister in Buenos Aires. The British minister in Santiago in turn contacted London and the British minister in Buenos Aires, and an agreement was reached by this means. Chile agreed to part with its two ships under construction if Argentina in turn agreed to do the same with the four ships ordered.

The "Constitución" and "Libertad" were acquired by England to prevent these ships from falling into the hands of the Tsarist Russian navy, as this country was on the verge of war with Japan, a country with which England had established an undeclared alliance, and a country whose fleet had been built almost entirely in English shipyards, and was governed by British patterns. The ARA Moreno and ARA Rivadavia were sold to Japan while they were still under construction. In that country they were designated Nishin and Kasuga. When the anticipated war between Japan and Russia broke out, these ships distinguished themselves during the bombardment and siege of Porth Arthur and the naval battle of Tsu-Shima.

The ARA Chacabuco and ARA San Martín were never built. The peace agreements made them unnecessary. According to oral sources, the abundant materials collected for these units were used for the construction of some of the four battleships of the "Roma" class, for the Italian Navy, since they were ships with practically the same characteristics and armament.

The ARA also cancelled the contract for the six "Nembo" class destroyers, whose construction, since the danger of war had disappeared, was carried out at a slower pace by the Pattison shipyard and they were incorporated into the Italian Navy, where they were designated Aquilone, Borea, Espero Nembo, Turbine, and Zeffiro.


Nembo class destroyers
Displacement: 450 tons
Length: 70 m
Beam: 7 m
Draft: 1.90 m
Armament: 5 x 102 mm
4 torpedo tubes
Engine: 5200-5350 HP
Maximum speed: 30-30 1/2 knots
Crew: 65 men


Photos:

1) Armored cruiser ARA "Moreno" during trials under the national flag. 1903-?


2) ARA Entre Ríos class destroyers- (photos Ingo Würster collection)

ARA Moreno, ARA Rivadavia
Builder: Ansaldo, Genova (Italy)
Launched: May, 1902
Completed: January, 1904
Displacement: 7,750 tons. (9,800 complete)
Dimensions:
Length: 105.15 m
Beam: 18.7 m
Draft: 7.90 m

Armament: (Armstrong)
-4 x 203 mm L.45 (Rivadavia" 2 x 254 L.45)
-14 x 152 mmL.45
-10 x 76mm L.40
- 6 x 47 mm
- 8 Maxim machine guns cal 7.65mm
Torpedo tubes: 4x406mm
Armor:
-Belt: 152 mm
-Deck: 38 mm
-Turns: 140 mm
-Battery: 152 mm
Engine: 2 pairs of 3 cylinders, triple expansion: 13,500 HP
Speed: 20 knots (21 during tests)
Fuel: (coal) normal 650 tons, Maximum: 1100 tons
Crew: 525 -575 men.

Referencia
Jane, Frederick, Fighting Ships (Sampson, Low , Marston and Co, London, 1914) pag. 231 

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Gunboat Magallanes (5/13)

Gunboat Magallanes

Part 5
From Part 4


Its acquisition was approved by a bill enacted on March 4, 1872. This legal body authorized, in addition to the gunboat, the construction of the armored ships Cochrane and Valparaíso (later renamed Blanco Encalada). The cost of the gunboat rose to $200,000 pesos and its construction was commissioned to the Raenhill & Co. shipyards in London, England. 1.

It arrived in Chile in 1875. Its acquisition was due to the death of two English castaways in Tierra del Fuego at the hands of the Fuegian aborigines. Upon learning of this, the British government launched a protest to its Chilean counterpart, in which it threatened to occupy said territory, given the Chilean government's lack of capacity to avoid these bloody events and ensure transit through the Strait of Magellan. For this reason, it was decided to acquire a ship that was capable of arming itself in war for use in the Punta del Fuego Colony. Arenas 1.

   
Gunboat Magallanes 7 

She displaced 950 tons (maximum), her hull was made of mixed iron and wood, she was armed with one 7-inch caliber cannon (177.8 mm), and weighed 7 tons, which launched a 115-pound (52.1 kilo) grenade, one 64-pound (29 kilo) grenade, and two 20-pound (9 kilo) grenades; she had a speed of 11 knots, engine power of 1,230 HP, 220 tons of coal capacity, coal consumption of 24 tons per day, she had a brig-schooner rig of 2.

Since her arrival she served the colony of Punta Arenas, and carried out exploration and hydrographic survey work in the southern channels and in Patagonia.

In 1877, the Magallanes, under the command of Captain Juan José Latorre, suppressed the mutiny of the artillery company that covered the square in Punta Arenas (which at that time had approximately 1,100 inhabitants), called “La Fija de Magallanes”, which had revolted under the work of Corporal Antonio Riquelme and Sergeant Isaac Pozo 3.

In 1876 and 1878, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amelie, and the American barge Devonshire respectively, both vessels loading guano in Río Negro. In both cases, these ships had been authorized by the Argentine government to carry out this task. At that time, both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over said territory, which ultimately determined that their intervention had violated international law 4.

  
Armstrong cannon of 115 pounds (52.21 kilos) and 7 inches of caliber (17.78 cm), belonging to the Magellan Gunboat 8

At the start of the Pacific War, the Magallanes gunboat was the only Chilean warship that was fully operational, as revealed by the technical report prepared in the fleet in 1878 by Captain Ramón Vidal Gormaz contained in the Navy Report of that same year 5.

It carried out the entire campaign of the Pacific War and was the Chilean ship that participated in the first naval action of the war on April 12, 1879 (Naval Battle of Chipana) against the Peruvian corvette Unión and the gunboat Pilcomayo. It also participated in the second Naval Battle of Iquique on the night of July 9-10, 1879, in which it saved the fleet's coalman Matías Cousiño from being captured, and in the Battle of Antofagasta on August 28 of the same year, saving the corvette Abtao, which was undergoing repairs. On both occasions, it was faced the Huáscar and on both occasions the ship was commanded by Captain Juan José Latorre 6.

    
Another view (from bow to stern) of the 115-pounder Armstrong, along with the 64-pounder 9.

After the war, it continued in hydrographic survey operations along the Chilean coast and in the civil war of 1891 it participated on the Congressional side, which was the victor at the time. After that, it continued in hydrographic work until its transfer to the merchant marine in 1906. It was wrecked in a storm in Corral in 1907 and sank.

Sources

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, Páginas 73-75,; La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 694. 

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 722-723; La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, Página 39 

3. El Motín de los Artilleros, Armando Braun Menéndez, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , segunda edición 1972, Argentina. 

4. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 705; Sitio WEB Armada de Chile.

5. Partes del informe se encuentran en: Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911, paginas 159-163 

6. Para una relación de ambos combates se recomienda: Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, Páginas 206-213 y 442-449 

7. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, Almirante A. Silva Palma

8. Memoria Chilena 

9. Especial Revista Ercilla sobre la Guerra del Pacífico Fascículo 2 página 27, suplemento que circulo junto con la revista Nº 3.238 de la quincena del 29/03/2004 – 11/04/2004, la imagen fue obtenida primitivamente desde el libro: Álbum Grafico Militar de Chile: Campaña de Pacífico 1879-1884 de Antonio Bizama Cuevas. Santiago, 1909, Editorial Universo.

Argentina-Chile: On the Historical Mistrust

Rivalry and Mistrust Between Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile's historical rivalry and mutual distrust can be traced back to several key moments and events that have shaped their relationship over the centuries. This essay will explore the origins of their conflict, highlighting significant dates and events that contributed to the tension, leading up to the contemporary period.

Early Conflicts and Colonial Legacies

The roots of the Argentine-Chilean rivalry can be traced back to the colonial period when both regions were part of the Spanish Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included both modern-day Argentina and Chile. However, administrative divisions within the viceroyalty created early distinctions between the two regions.

In 1776, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which included the territory of present-day Argentina. This administrative change heightened the sense of separation and competition between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the respective capitals of the new and old viceroyalties. The different economic and political priorities of these regions sowed the seeds of future conflicts.

The Independence Wars (1810-1826)

The wars of independence from Spanish rule, which began in the early 19th century, further strained relations between Argentina and Chile. Both countries achieved independence around the same time, with Argentina declaring independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. However, their paths to independence were intertwined with mutual suspicions and differing regional interests.

One of the pivotal moments was the crossing of the Andes by the Argentine general José de San Martín in 1817. San Martín's Army of the Andes, composed of Argentine and Chilean patriots, defeated the Spanish royalists in Chile, leading to the country's independence. Despite this shared struggle, the differing political ambitions and visions for the future of the region created underlying tensions.

The War of the Confederation (1836-1839)

A significant early conflict that exemplified the rivalry was the War of the Confederation. In the 1830s, Andrés de Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Argentina saw as a threat to regional balance. Chile, fearing the confederation's expansionist aims, allied with Argentina against it.

The war culminated in the Battle of Yungay in 1839, where the Chilean-Argentine alliance defeated the confederation's forces. This conflict underscored the precarious balance of power in the region and established a precedent for future cooperation against common threats, but it also deepened mutual suspicions as both countries sought to expand their influence.

Border Disputes and the Boundary Treaty of 1881

Territorial disputes have been a recurring theme in the Argentine-Chilean rivalry. The most significant of these disputes arose from the unclear demarcation of borders following their independence from Spain. The Andes Mountains, which form the natural boundary between the two countries, became a focal point of contention.

In 1881, Argentina and Chile signed the Boundary Treaty, which aimed to resolve these disputes by defining the border along the highest peaks of the Andes. Despite this agreement, ambiguities in the treaty's language led to further conflicts, particularly over the Patagonian region and the Beagle Channel, areas rich in natural resources and strategically important.

The Beagle Channel Conflict (1978)

One of the most critical flashpoints in the 20th century was the Beagle Channel conflict. The Beagle Channel, a narrow strait in the southern tip of South America, became the center of a territorial dispute in the 1970s. Both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over several islands in the channel, leading to a severe diplomatic and military standoff.

In 1978, the conflict nearly escalated into full-scale war. Both countries mobilized their armed forces, and a naval confrontation seemed imminent. However, intervention by Pope John Paul II, who mediated the conflict, led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984. The treaty, which awarded most of the disputed islands to Chile, averted war but left lingering resentment in Argentina.

The Malvinas War (1982)

The Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom indirectly influenced Argentine-Chilean relations. During the war, Chile provided intelligence and logistical support to the British, further straining its relationship with Argentina. This support was motivated by Chile's desire to counterbalance Argentina's military strength and protect its own territorial claims in the region.

The aftermath of the Malvinas War saw Argentina's military regime weakened and its international standing diminished. The war's outcome also reinforced Chile's strategic calculations and its distrust of Argentina, leading to increased military readiness along their shared border.

Democratic Transitions and Modern Relations

Both Argentina and Chile transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a gradual thawing of relations. Diplomatic efforts focused on resolving remaining territorial disputes and fostering economic cooperation. The establishment of democratic governments in both countries provided a framework for dialogue and conflict resolution.

The signing of the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, which declared the region a zone of peace and cooperation, marked a significant step toward normalization. Joint commissions were established to address border issues, and bilateral trade agreements were signed, promoting economic integration.

Contemporary Dynamics

In recent years, Argentina and Chile have continued to work on improving their relationship, though underlying tensions persist. Both countries have engaged in regional organizations such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking to enhance economic ties and political cooperation.

However, issues such as competing claims in Antarctica and the ongoing need for resource management in shared territories require ongoing diplomatic efforts. The construction of the Binational Tunnel of Agua Negra, aimed at improving connectivity between the two countries, exemplifies the potential for collaboration despite historical rivalries.

Conclusion

The historical rivalry and mutual distrust between Argentina and Chile are rooted in colonial legacies, independence wars, territorial disputes, and geopolitical conflicts. Key moments such as the War of the Confederation, the Beagle Channel conflict, and the Falklands War have shaped their relationship, creating a complex dynamic of competition and cooperation. While democratic transitions and modern diplomatic efforts have improved relations, underlying tensions continue to influence their interactions. Understanding this history is crucial for appreciating the nuanced and evolving nature of Argentine-Chilean relations in the contemporary period.

 

Argentine Navy: Sarmiento Squadron

Sarmiento Squadron

The "Sarmiento Squadron" is called a set of river warships incorporated during the presidency of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento with the aim of modernizing the Argentine Navy and providing it with a minimum operational capacity against the naval power of the Brazilian Empire.

Background

The importance of the navy of the Brazilian Empire during the Paraguayan War was a lesson for the Argentine Republic and contributed to awakening naval awareness in some of its main leaders.


Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

When Domingo Faustino Sarmiento assumed the presidency in 1868, he found a complex international situation and few possibilities for maneuver, limited mainly by the lack of a minimum naval power.
Still in campaign, Sarmiento's Minister of War and Navy, Colonel Martín de Gainza, communicated in his memory the state of the navy, stating "I am sorry to have to fulfill the painful duty of informing VVHH that we absolutely lack a squadron. Some ships in bad condition state and some chiefs and officers, although very worthy, do not constitute a squad.
The Paraguayan war ended but tensions began over the demarcation of boundaries with Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia. Without armed support, Argentine diplomacy headed by Mariano Adrián Varela Cané faced an idealistic negotiation, acting "evangelically" in the words of Estanislao Zeballos, proposing a resolution of the border issue on an equal footing with the defeated. The "Varela Doctrine", synthesized in the phrase "victory does not give rights to the allied nations to declare for themselves, their limits that the treaty indicated" was rejected by Brazil, adopting an aggressive position, supported by a strong occupation army. and a powerful squadron that even occupied the Argentine island of Cerrito (or Atajo) at the confluence of the Paraguay and Paraná rivers.
Sarmiento, determined to break with the diplomacy of his predecessor Bartolomé Miter in his relations with the countries of the region, characterized by his pro-Brazilian attitude, his indifference towards the Pacific countries and his neglect to ensure military balance in the region1 resolved in August In 1870, Varela was replaced by Carlos Tejedor, who harshly demanded that Brazil respect the clauses stipulated in the Triple Alliance treaty.



However, Brazil agreed with the government of Cirilo Rivarola in separate protocols of December 15, 1870 and January 14, 1871, the willingness to reach an exclusive boundary treaty between Brazil and Paraguay, ignoring the Argentine government in clear violation of article 6 of the treaty of the Triple Alliance of May 1, 1865. Brazil also unilaterally decided its borders with Paraguay and even those of Argentina, since it retained the disputed territories for itself and agreed without permission from Buenos Aires that the Argentine limit did not would pass from Pilcomayo.
On January 9, 1872, by the Cotegipe-Lóizaga treaty, the Empire of Brazil kept a third of Paraguay and maintained the occupation armies for five years. Sarmiento considered that the treaty "...will leave Paraguay a Brazilian province, to which the Banda Oriental will be added by the same means, and that of Entre Ríos and Corrientes will soon follow" and that "in a few years we will be part of the Empire, or such a diminished republic that it is not worth claiming even the name."
The growing and serious conflict caused the Brazilian government to encourage the territorial claims of Bolivia and Chile. Between 1872 and 1873, the Chilean Foreign Minister Adolfo Ibáñez y Gutiérrez maintained, with the acquiescence of Brazil, his claims on the Patagonian territory south of the Río Negro (Argentina) and "on the other side of the Andes, especially at the height of Talca and Chillán."


Photo of Minister Manuel Rafael García Aguirre.

Sarmiento Squadron

The evident need for a navy prompted the Argentine Congress to sanction Law No. 498 of May 27, 1872 (on Naval Armament) which authorized the purchase of "three armored warships of the most advanced system and maars suitable for service in waters." of the Republic". To this end, President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento ordered the immediate transfer of his friend Manuel Rafael García Aguirre (until then head of the Argentine legation in Washington) on commission to London in order to make the purchase of the aforementioned ships and supervise their construction. Despite being completely layman in naval matters, García Aguirre approached the task with the greatest zeal and consulted with two former Confederate officers of the United States Civil War, Captains Thomas Jefferson Page3 and Hunter Davidson.
García Aguirre's commitment to the task was such that he did not hesitate to consult with several officers of the British Admiralty, of whom he informed Sarmiento:

"Those in the artillery department could not have treated me better (...) Read the attached strips about battleships; no large, heavily armored ships. They recommend small ships with large cannons that serve as floating batteries and are easy to move from one point to another."

As a result of the experience gained and thanks to the advice received, García Aguirre signed two contracts that culminated in the acquisition of the Los Andes and El Plata Monitors, four 400-ton bombers (Pilcomayo, Bermejo, Constitución and República) and two gunboats (Paraná and Uruguay) of 600 tons.
Finally, the ships that made up the squadron were:


Monitor Los Andes.

Monitors El Plata and Los Andes, 56.68 m long, 13.40 m wide, 3.35 m deep, an average draft of 3.50 m and 1,677 tons of displacement. They had an iron hull with a bow spur and armor of 160 mm of steel,6 255 mm in the main artillery turret, which was powered by steam.
They carried two steam engines (port and starboard) of 750 HP each, with two propellers that allowed them to maintain a cruising speed of 9.5 knots. It transported 120 tons of coal. The tower was mounted with 2 200-pound Armstrong muzzle-loading cannons, two 47 mm light cannons in a covered barbette and 4 37 mm Hotchkiss rapid-firing cannons. Purchased for £85,000 each at the Cammell Laird shipyard in Birkenhead, England, they were incorporated in 1875 under the command of Bartolomé Cordero and Ceferino Ramírez respectively.

 
Gunship Paraná.


Gunship ARA Uruguay in 1874.

 
Gunship Pilcomayo (or its twin Bermejo)

Paraná and Uruguay gunboats, 46.36 m long, 7.63 m wide, 5.40 m deep, with an average draft of 3.5 m and a displacement of 550 tons, with sails (corvette rig) and a 475 HP steam engine, which moved a propeller that allowed them to reach a cruising speed of 10 knots and a maximum of 11. They transported 90 tons of coal that allowed them a range of 1,500 miles. The iron hull was completely lined with teak wood. They mounted 4 7" Vavasseur cannons on iron carriages, one in front of the funnel, one behind and the rest on each side. Acquired for £32,000 each at the Cammell Laird shipyards, they were incorporated into the squadron in 1874 under the command of Ceferino Ramírez and Erasmo Obligado respectively.
Constitution and Republic bombards, modified Rendell class, with 32.33 m in length, 9.19 in beam, 4.50 in depth, 3.20 in medium draft and a displacement of 416 tons.
Mixed ships, with iron hulls, had a single mast rig and used a 400 HP steam engine that drove two twin propellers reaching a cruising speed of 9 knots. They transported 45 tons of coal. They mounted a 240 mm muzzle-loading Armstrong cannon, mounted on a fixed gun carriage on the bow, so it could only fire along the keel line and had to be aimed with rudder strokes. They carried two 80 mm light guns on deck, one on each side. Purchased for £13,678 each at the Cammell Laird shipyard, they joined the squadron in 1876 under the command of Juan Cabassa and Daniel de Solier respectively.
Bombards Pilcomayo and Bermejo, similar to the previous ones, with small differences (a smaller draft, they transported 62 tons of coal that ensured greater autonomy, deck modifications) were incorporated in 1875 under the command of Jorge Hobson Lowry and Francisco de la Cruz, respectively. Both were built at the Rennie&Co shipyard, Greenwich, England (subcontracted by Cammell Laird).
Steam Workshop and Depot for torpedoes and mines Fulminante, with 55 m in length, 9 in beam, 5 in depth, an average draft of 2.28 and a displacement of 620 tons. A mixed vessel, it had a two-masted schooner rig and a Compound-type steam engine with a propeller that reached a speed of 10 knots. It carried 80 tons of coal as fuel. It joined in 1875, remaining stationary under the command of Hunter Davidson. A flotilla of 4 torpedo boats was also incorporated, 2 of them assigned to the Fulminante, the first of the Argentine Navy. The torpedoes were bronze loaded with 65 pounds of dynamite. They were called "boalón" because for use they were placed on the tip of an 8-meter-long iron boom.
Steamers Notices Resguardo and Vigilante, 30 m long, 5.5 m wide, 3.0 m deep, with an average draft of 1.20 m and 100 tons of displacement, carried two 92 HP steam engines that drove two propellers reaching a speed of 7 knots. It transported 16 tons of coal that gave it an autonomy of 6 days. Mixed vessel, it was rigged as a 2-masted paileboat. His helmet was made of iron and he had a strong wooden belt for defense. It mounted a 6-inch Armstrong gun. Acquired for £5,000 from Cammell Laird, they joined the Port Captaincy under the command of the pilot Cándido Chaneton and the pilot Juan Rubaclo, respectively.

 
Armed Transport Steamer Pampa.

Armed transport steamer Pampa, (former Parminghan), acquired in 1870 from Miguel Soler & Cía for $f 50,000.
With a length of 69.44 m, a beam of 7.44, a depth of 3.41, an average draft of 2.00 m and a displacement of 409 tons, it had a mild steel hull, two-masted paileboat rigging, a steam engine of 260 HP with 2 cylinders and 4 boilers, which drove side wheels reaching a maximum speed of 13 knots and 8 knots cruising. She was initially armed with 2 75 mm Krupp cannons.
Some smaller ships: steamship Sirena, tugboat Puerto de Buenos Aires, transport Santa Fe, whaleboat Guarda Costa, boat Talita and Pontón Vanguardia

Complementary measures

On the other hand, despite protests from Brazil, Sarmiento decided to heavily artillery Martín García Island with heavy Rodman coastal cannons that, although they were already outdated (muzzle-loading and smoothbore), due to their high caliber (381 mm, 500 pounds). They were capable of damaging the armor of Imperial monitors and covering the access channels to the interior rivers.
For the purposes of establishing logistical bases and workshops for the ships that were purchased, in October 1873 he obtained funds from Congress for the construction of an arsenal and marine depot in Zárate, which he created in December of that year.
Finally, Sarmiento created the Naval School on October 5, 1872, which initially operated aboard the steamship General Brown under the command of Sergeant Major Clodomiro Urtubey, and which in the first stage was maintained until its dissolution in 1877 as a result of the "rebellion of the capes", being reorganized shortly after in the corvette Uruguay in charge of Martín Guerrico.

All these measures contributed to stopping the estuary from being visited by foreign squadrons in a permanent attitude of pressure and probably facilitated the resolution of the boundary issue in 1875.
However, although the units acquired represented the best that the mixed technology of the time (sail and steam) could offer and even when they operated both in Argentine rivers and on the high seas, even in Antarctic waters, they were in all cases vessels rivers.
On the other hand, the incorporation of the main ships, the monitors, immediately caused Brazil to acquire two more monitors to its squadron, the Javary and the Solimões of 3700 tons, 4 cannons of 250 mm and 2 of 37, incorporated in 1875, while Chile added the Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada, of 4,500 tons, 13 knots and 4 9-inch guns, which would soon be decisive in the war with Peru and Bolivia. Thus, the improvement in the relationship of forces in a short time was again uneven, which would be revealed in 1878 on the occasion of the Py Expedition.

References

1. Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina and its neighbors, in Argentina from the Eighties to the Centennial, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1980, page 671.
2. Manuel Gálvez, Life of Sarmiento.
3. (1808-1902) He was linked to the country before his participation in the Civil War through his exploration trips to the Bermejo and Salado rivers. He actively collaborated in the design and construction of the Los Andes and El Plata monitors
4. Ratto, Héctor: "The first naval commissions abroad", Bulletin of the Naval Center, Volume 58, year page 19.
5. Captain Page once again advised the minister on the construction of which
6. At the height of the belt, a band that surrounds the hull of the boat to protect it.

Bibliography

• Teodoro Caillet-Bois, Historia Naval Argentina, 1944, Imprenta López, Buenos Aires 
• Arguindeguy, Pablo E. CL, y Rodríguez, Horacio CL; "Buques de la Armada Argentina 1852-1899 sus comandos y operaciones", Buenos Aires, Instituto Nacional Browniano, 1999. 
• Héctor Raúl Ratto, José Craviotto, Humberto F. Burzio, Sarmiento y la marina de guerra, Secretaria de Estado de Marina, 1963 
• Carlos López Urrutia, Historia de la Marina de Chile, Andres Bello, 1969. 
• Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, Historia marítima argentina, Cuántica Editora, 1982.

External links

• Maniobras y términos navales 
• Sitio oficial de la Armada de la República Argentina (ARA) 
• Escuadra de Sarmiento, en Historia y Arqueologia Marítima 
• Sitio oficial de la Armada del Brasil, in Portuguese. 
• Navíos de Guerra, en naval.com.br , in Portuguese. 
• Las relaciones con los demás países americanos durante las presidencias de Mitre y Sarmiento 
• Los efectos del tratado Cotegipe-Lóizaga en la política interna argentina.

Wikipedia

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Chile Buys Ironclads (4/13)

The Purchasing of the Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada Ironclads

By Eddie Cerda Grollmus



Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4


The idea of providing Chile with armored ships dates back to 1864. It has its genesis in the events that led to the war between the allied side (Peru and Chile) against Spain, as a result of the occupation by the squadron of the latter. of the Chinchas Islands, at that time the main source of foreign exchange in the Peruvian economy (exploitation of the Guano). The first promoters of this idea were Messrs. Manuel José Irarrázaval (Former Minister of the Interior), Federico Errázuriz (Minister of Justice, Worship and Public Instruction), and Alejandro Reyes (Minister of Finance), they advocated the acquisition of two monitors or armored vehicles that were powerful enough to counter the Spanish squadron at that time in the Pacific 1.

Then the Interior and Foreign Relations portfolio was occupied by Abdón Cifuentes, who continued with the idea of such an acquisition, but given the poverty of the national treasury and the opposition of the then president José Joaquín Pérez Mascayo, Abdón Cifuentes' attempts were in vain. These were maintained throughout the decade in which Pérez governed (1861-1871).

The main consequence of this refusal was the bombing of the port of Valparaíso (March 31, 1866), by the Spanish fleet. The president's lack of vision resulted in the almost disappearance of the national merchant marine 2, and only the destruction . of the port cost close to 15,000,000 pesos 3.

After the war with Spain (1864-1866) ended, Chile could not take out the O'Higgins and Chacabuco corvettes from the English shipyards given the blockade imposed by England claiming neutrality in the conflict. In the same way, England had blocked the delivery of the Armored Frigates. “Victoria” and “Arapiles” to Spain, before this Spain reached an agreement with Chile (1868), which stipulated that for Chile to be able to take out its corvettes it had to commit to acquiring war supplies in England or any other state until the sum was equal. invested by Spain in its two frigates, the difference amounted to 403,000 pounds (540,000 pounds had cost the Spanish frigates and 137,000 the Chilean corvettes). Given the status of allies between Chile and Peru, the Chilean ministers in Europe, Maximiano Errázuriz and Alberto Blest Gana, informed their counterpart from Peru, Jara Almonte, who gave his approval, so on February 18, 1868, the agreement reached was submitted to the public. of the English government, but on March 5, 1868, Alberto Blest Gana was surprised by a note from his Peruvian colleague Jara Almonte in which he vetoed the agreement and indicated (verbally to Lord Stanley) that a state of war existed between Chile and Peru. , it happened at that time that President Mariano Ignacio Prado (1865-1868), had been replaced by Pedro Díez Canseco (1868), and the latter by José Balta (1868-1872), who took a turn in their foreign policy regarding to his former ally 4.

In 1871 5, Federico Errázuriz Zañartú won the presidency of Chile, and sent to Congress the bill that authorized the executive to acquire two armored vehicles, the project was approved with only one vote of rejection (that of the previous president José Joaquín Pérez Mascayo) , it was agreed that these armored vehicles would be of medium size (Second Class Armored), both ships were commissioned in 1872, at a cost of 2,000,000 pesos, this amount was approved by the congress authorized the president of the republic to hire a loan abroad for the total and allocate it only for the acquisition of said ships, in reality the total amount approved corresponds to $2,200,000 of which the 200,000 would be used for the construction of the Magallanes Gunboat, I will not go into more detail about this vessel since it is not relevant to topic 6.

Minister Alberto Blest Gana was commissioned to carry out all the arrangements in this regard. Blest Gana contracted the designer of the ships (E.J. Reed, former Naval Architect of the Admiralty), as Technical Advisor, who recommended lining the interior with Teak and Zinc wood in order to To improve its stability and protection, it also contracted the Earle's Shipbuilding Co shipyard, in Hull, Yorkshire, England for its construction, as well as other equipment for the ships (weapons, machines, etc.).

The Armored would be called Cochrane and Valparaíso, the first of them was commissioned in April and the second in June 1872, then to make the supervision of their construction closer, Captain Leoncio Señoret Montagne was sent to England, even so the construction Both suffered delays for different reasons, including worker strikes, unfit personnel, rain, and price increases in coal and iron 6.


Almirante Cochrane Armored Frigate

The previously mentioned situation (the delay) was aggravated given the new tensions between Chile and its neighbors Bolivia and Argentina due to treaty and boundary issues, the demonstration of force carried out by Peru in mussels as a result of Quevedo's expedition to the Bolivian coast. (1872), in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, José de La Riva Agüero, had expressed the surprise with which Peru viewed the purchase of two Armored Vehicles and that Chile did not need them for its defense 7.

In 1873, the Treaty of Defensive Alliance was signed between Peru and Bolivia (obviously this was secret and Chile was not aware of it), and Peru's attempt to extend this alliance to Argentina, given the above, the president ordered that work be done day and night. night in the armored Cochrane (at the time the most advanced), and to set out for Chile as soon as possible, the Cochrane arrived in Valparaíso on December 25, 1874, without the wooden and zinc lining and other details that would not prevent its use. as a war unit.

It was known, and this is demonstrated by the correspondence between President Errázuriz and his minister in Europe Alberto Blest Gana, that if a conflict broke out in the region, Chile would not be able to remove its ships from the shipyards, given the blockade that England would impose8




At that time, Chile was in talks with Bolivia that would result in the treaty of 1874, which was finally ratified by the Bolivian Congress. Argentina ultimately did not adhere to the treaty with Peru and Bolivia. The history of Chile indicates that there are two reasons for this: presence of Cochrane (the one that is most often referred to), and the territorial dispute with Bolivia over Tarija and a sector of the Chaco, I do not know which of the two weighed more in the decision, but I tend to think that it was more the second, given the details exposed in the negotiations of said treaty 9.

On January 24, 1876, the “Valparaíso” arrived in Chile, which unlike her sister ship (Cochrane) was completed and with all her rigs. On September 5, 1876, Admiral Blanco Encalada died (one of the heroes of the independence of Chile, who in 1818, in command of the squadron, captured a convoy and the Spanish frigate María Isabel that escorted it, and was also the commander in chief of the first expedition against Santa Cruz in the War Against the Peru-Bolivian Confederation with meager results), at the age of 86 and in recognition of his military merits, the name “Valparaíso” was changed to “Blanco Encalada”.


Blanco Encalada (former Valparaíso) Armored Frigate

In January 1877 the armored Cochrane was sent to England for completion and fairing, arriving in Chile again in 1878.

The armored vehicles had brigantine rigs, they displaced 3,560 tons, the power of their two engines (which moved two propellers) gave them 2,960 HP of power, their dimensions were: 210 feet in length (64 meters), 45 feet and 9 inches in height. beam (14 meters), draft 19 feet and 8 inches (6 meters), bunker capacity of 254 tons, speed 12 knots, and 300 men crew 10

The armament consisted of 6 9-inch (230 mm approx.) Armstrong muzzle-loaders, housed in a central casemate distributed three per side, capable of launching a 250-pound (113.5 kilo) grenade, each piece weighing 12 tons, and They were mounted on a Scout gun carriage with a central pivot. These pieces are installed in a central casemate and allow the bow gun to fire from the front to the beam, the central piece fired with an angle of 70º to the bow and 35º to the stern and the third from from the beam to the stern, her armament was completed by a 20-pounder cannon, one 9-pounder and one 7-pounder. The Blanco Encalada was equipped, in addition to the cannons, with 2 Noldenfeldt machine guns, the Cochrane only had one installed on the “apostle.” from the bow, its caliber was one inch (2.54 cm), and it fired a bullet weighing one pound (454 grams), 10.


Armstrong 9-inch gun, Blanco Encalada Ironclad.

The ships had a double hull and 7 watertight compartments, the armor was composed of a 9-inch (approximately 230 mm) shell in the central strip that was reduced to 4.5 (114.3 mm) in the bow and stern, The teak covering was 10 inches thick 10.

The Ram was shaped like a ram with a length of 7 feet (2.1 meters), submerged at 6 feet and 9 inches (2.06 meters), below waterline 10.

In January 1878, and faced with the economic problems, President Aníbal Pinto commissioned the Minister in Europe, Alberto Blest Gana, to put the ships up for sale as soon as the dispute with Argentina was resolved, commissioned by the Minister, the designer of the ships (E.J. Reed), offered Cochrane to England for 220,000 pounds sterling, the country was not interested, then an attempt was made to sell the two armored vehicles to Russia, obtaining the same result, in this way an attempt was made to alleviate the economic crisis that had prevailed in the country for some time. years 11..




Fortunately for Chile, the sale of the armored vehicles was frustrated, a situation that would have been critical in the event of a war, in some way these ships acted as a deterrent element, even so for the start of the Pacific War they required deep maintenance, their bottoms were dirty (accumulation of mollusks and other marine living beings), the boilers needed to change tubes and their machinery had to be completely serviced, the speed of the ships was limited to 9 knots, there was no dock in Chile for these ships and given the economic crisis It was impossible to send them to Europe to be faired. Of the two armored vehicles, the Cochrane was in better condition, in terms of its bottom cleaning, but not the machinery and boilers. This situation was the same in all units of the squadron except the Magallanes Gunboat.

Both armored vehicles were the fundamental axis of the squadron in the Pacific War (1879-1884) and strictly speaking the only ones truly of war and for 13 years they were the backbone of the Chilean Navy.

Notes

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, página 72.

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III página 681. In 1861 there were 267 Chilean vessels totaling 60,847 tons, in 1864 there were 232 vessels, in 1867 there were 19 sailboats (2,7580 tons) and 2 steamers with 644 tons, in 1871 there were 75 vessels (14 steamers), totaling 15,870 tons.

3. $14,773,700, which was distributed as follows: private buildings $633,000; fiscal buildings $550,700; furniture and merchandise in private buildings $1,500,000; merchandise set on fire at customs $12,000,000; miscellaneous damages $30,000; Of the destroyed merchandise, $8,300.00 belonged to Foreigners and $3,700,000 belonged to Chileans. La Guerra Entre España y las Republicas del Pacífico, Alfonso Cerda Catalán, Editorial Puerto de Palos, Chile páginas 252-253.

4. See Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, página 73 y La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III páginas 682-683.

5. By then, Peru had in its naval inventory the armored frigate “Independencia” (1866), monitor “Huascar” (1866) and the river monitors “Manco Capac” and “Atahualpa” (both arrived in 1870).

Independencia was commissioned in 1864, in anticipation of the events of the Chichas Islands, built in England by J.A. Samuda for 176,600 Pounds Sterling, displaced 2,004 tons, armored 4.5 inches, had a ram and was armed by 1 Vavasseur of 250 pounds in the bow, 1 Armstrong of 150 pounds in the stern and 12 Armstrongs of 70 pounds, or 6.4 inches, displaced in the central battery, all scratched.

Sources:
Peru Sovereign
Guerra del Pacífico

The Huáscar had its origin in the same events of the Chinchas Islands, it was commissioned to the Laird Brothers shipyard, Birkenhead, Poplar on Thames, England, designed by Captain Cowper Coles of the Royal Navy, under the "Ericsson" model.

The case had a double bottom and was divided into five watertight compartments, it displaced 1,130 tons, it had two engines that gave it a power of 1,500 horsepower and that moved a single propeller, it was protected by 4.5 (11.43 cm), inches of armor in the center that decreased to 2.5 fore and aft (6.35 cm), its main armament was a pair of 10-inch (254mm) muzzle-loading rifled Armstrongs, capable of launching a 300 lb grenade ( 136.2 kilos), mounted on a circular rotating tower installed in the bay, (Coles Tower), 30 feet in diameter (9.1 meters), manually moved, whose armor was 5.5 inches (14 cm), completed Its armament is 2 Armstrong of 40 pounds (18.6 kilos) on the port and starboard sides and 1 of 12 pounds (5.5 kilos) on the stern, coal capacity 300 tons, speed 11 knots.

Sources:
Armada Chile
Peru Sovereign

The river monitors Manco Capac and Atahualpa belonged to the Canonicus class built at the Niles & Rivers Works shipyard in Cincinnati, Ohio, by the Union Navy of the United States of North America, at the time of the Civil War, the first It was named Oneota and the second Catawaba, both were acquired by Peru in 1868.

Both displaced 2,100 tons; power 350 horsepower; speed 8 knots, shell 3 inches and 5 in the vital parts; Armament 2 15-inch (381 mm) Rodmans, muzzle-loading smooth, capable of launching a 500-pound (227 kilo) spherical bullet, mounted in a 10-inch (25.4 cm) armored turret

Fuente: http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/monitores.html

6. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, páginas 74-75.

The project in question established the following:

Article No. 1: The President of the Republic is authorized to acquire one or two armored warships.
Article No. 2: You are also authorized to acquire a steamship capable of arming itself for war and assigning it to the service of the colony of Magallanes.
Article No. 3: You are finally authorized to raise a loan that produces two million two hundred thousand pesos, which will be used exclusively for the payment of the aforementioned ships.
Article No. 4: This authorization will last two years.

7. La Guerra del Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, página 36.

8. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, páginas 76-78.

9. In the book of Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá”, Capitulo II, emerge the details of the negotiations of said treaty appear.

10. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III página 721. y La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, páginas 33-36.

11. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III, página 705.

12. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, A. Silva Palma.

Bibliography and Other Sources Consulted.

I. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago.

II. La Guerra Entre España y las Republicas del Pacífico, Alfonso Cerda Catalán, Editorial Puerto de Palos, Chile.

III. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III.

IV. La Guerra del Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911.

V. La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , 1971, Argentina.

VI. Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911.

VII. Enciclopedia Monitor, Editorial Salvat, España 1972, Tomo XII página 4.806.

IX. Chilean Navy website.
http://www.armada.cl/p4_tradicion_historia/site/edic/base/port/tradicion_historia.html
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/156.htm
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/155.htm
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/163.htm

X. Foro Fach-Extraoficial.
http://www.fach-extraoficial.com/portal/modules/news/

XI. Big Ships of the Peruvian Navy
http://es.geocities.com/peruwarships/index.htm

XII. Some Historical Ships of the Marina de Guerra del Perú
http://www.geocities.com/perusovereign/buques.html

XIII. Peruvian Historian Juan del Campo Rodríguez Webpage
http://members.tripod.com.pe/~guerra_pacifico/index.html
http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/guerra_pac.html
http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/monitores.html

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: The ships of the Argentine Navy: 1862-75 (4/13)

The ships of the Argentine Navy: 1862-75

Parte 3

In the period 1859-62, the navies of the main powers began to incorporate armored ships, while naval artillery was progressively increased in caliber and power to be able to penetrate the wrought iron plates that protected the vital parts of these ships. At the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the ARA only had 19 ships, few of which were steamships. The largest of these was the Guardia Nacional, a 520-ton side-wheel passenger ship. In fact, the ARA did not have purpose-built warships, but packages (correillos) and river vessels armed with a few antiquated cannons and totally devoid of any protection. The only units of any importance acquired in these years were side-wheel steamships, such as the Colonel Espora (552 tons.) and the Colonel Rosetti (772 tons.) These were joined in mid-1867 by General Brown, but these ships like other ships in the fleet, mere passenger ships armed with few cannons and without the slightest protection. (1)

In comparison, the Brazilian navy, which at that time was the largest in Latin America, had 45 warships, of which 35 were steam-powered, and had incorporated 14 armored ships of various designs, including several of the type Monitor. The ARA would not possess true warships until the 1870s, when the National Congress appropriated $2.6 million for a modest naval re-equipment program. The vessels provided under this program were the monitors Los Andes and El Plata, the corvette-gunboats Paraná and Uruguay, as well as four bombers, and a couple of warning ships. These ships, collectively called “La Escuadra de Sarmiento” arrived in the country during 1874-75 and were the first to be specifically designed to meet the conditions required by the ARA: that is, river vessels for service in the tributaries of the Río de la Plata at a time when a war against Brazil seemed imminent. When Sarmiento was Argentine minister in Washington, shortly after the civil war in that country ended, the man from San Juan followed with great interest the introduction of new military equipment and materials. His keen intellect was attracted to the use of “floating torpedoes”, as anti-ship mines were called in those days. These “floating torpedoes” had been used with excellent results by the Confederate States in their efforts to counteract the blockade of their port and coasts by Union ships. We should not be surprised by the fact that when Sarmiento assumed the presidency of the Republic Argentina, the ARA hired several former Confederate naval officers to lead the ARA Torpedo Division. This navy unit was established in the place where the Naval Museum of the Nation is today, on the Lujan River, in the Paraná Delta (2)

The Torpedo Division consisted of the ARA Fulminante, an explosives and torpedo depot ship, as well as several steam launches equipped with boom torpedoes. The Argentine naval strategy of those times gave capital importance to the possibility of a naval attack by Brazil. Monitors and shallow-draft river vessels could operate without difficulties in the rivers of the Plata Basin, while the channels leading to Buenos Aires would be protected by a network of “floating torpedoes” and the canyons of Martín García Island ( 3).

Pictures

1) Monitor ARA El Plata c. 1890-note the sailors on deck and a Gatling gun in artillery carriage, which as in the U.S. Navy and other navies of that time it was used to repel torpedo boats or as a support weapon for landing troops. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch


2) ARA Los Andes Monitor, 1905-note one of the two 120 mm Armstrong guns installed in the 1890s. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch. The ship seen in the background is an ARA lightship.


3) Monitors ARA Los Andes and ARA El Plata at the Río Santiago Naval Base c. 1900-1901. Photo collection Georg v. Rauch


3) ARA Uruguay-painting that shows it on its trip to the South Pole, 1903. Observe in photos no.1 and no.2 the excellent state of maintenance of these ships

Monitors: Los Andes, El Plata
Displacement: 1,677 tons
Length: 56.6 m
Beam: 13.4 m
Draft: 3.20 m
Artillery (original) 2 x 280 mm Armstrong mounted on the armored tower
2 x 47mm Armstrong on deck
4 x 37mm Hotchkiss
Armor: 160 mm belt
Main Tower: 255 mm
Machines: 2 x 750 Hp
Compound system, two propellers.
Coal: 120 tons
Maximum speed: 10 knots, service speed 9 knots

Gunboat corvettes Paraná, Uruguay
Displacement: 550 tons
Length: 46.3 m
Beam: 7.63 m
Draft: 3.20m
Armament (original)
4 x 177 Armstrong mounted on Vavasseur iron gun carriages.
Machines: 1 x 475 Compound that powered
A Bevis type propeller
Speed: (sail and steam) 11 knots

Bermejo, Constitución, Pilcomayo, Republic Bombardiers
Displacement: 416 tons
Length: 32.3 m
Beam: 9.19 m
Draft: 3.20 m
Armament: 1 x 280 mm Armstrong in center line, 2 x 80 mm Armstrong
Maximum speed: 9 knots. (4)


Notes 

1) Burzio, Armada Nacional.,pag.99-100, Rauch, op cit, pag.116-117 
2) Burzio Armada Nacional, pag.100, Rauch, op cit, pag.117-118 
3) Burzio, Humberto H, Historia del Torpedo y sus buques en la Armada Argentina (Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, Serie B, No. 12 (Buenos Aires, 1968) pag.19-24,80-89, Rauch , op cit, pag.120-129 
4) Las características de estos buques provienen en conjunto de Burzio, Armada Nacional, pg.100, y Arguindeguy, Apuntes Sobre los Buques, III: 1122-131, 1238-1245.