Malvinas: A Tribute to the Heroes of BIM 5

Commander Carlos Robacio leads the 5th Marine Batallion 5 in Tumbledown

The 5th Marine Infantry Battalion from Río Grande stood alone against the onslaught of the Scots Guards at Mount Tumbledown, writing a glorious page in history.


 


During the 74 days of the Malvinas War, British forces were taken aback by the professionalism and fighting spirit of the Argentine troops. There is extensive British literature on the conflict, and all of it acknowledges the courage and resilience of our forces. One particular unit earned, from the British themselves, the nickname “Battalion from Hell” due to its valour and combat effectiveness. These men were the Marines of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5).

On 7 April 1982, the personnel of BIM 5, based in Río Grande, arrived in the Malvinas under the command of Commander Carlos Robacio. The troops were deployed in the defensive system around Puerto Argentino, together with the Infantry Regiments RI 25 and RI 8. To reinforce the naval forces, Company C of RI 3 and Company B of RI 6 were also added. This integration of Army and Navy units was unprecedented and proved highly effective thanks to the professionalism and commitment of their officers.

From 1 May, the enemy began an aerial and naval bombardment campaign that severely affected the daily life of the Argentine soldiers. During the day, Harrier jets attacked the nearby airstrip and trench lines; at night, the Royal Navy carried out shelling. Despite this, the Marines maintained strong morale and continued to improve their defensive positions, preparing for the ground battle they knew was drawing near.

They endured 44 days of relentless siege. When fighting around Puerto Argentino began on 12 June, the marines of BIM 5 were ready to enter history. The British attack started at dusk and continued through the night. The first unpleasant surprise for the attackers was the presence of heavy machine gun nests equipped with infrared sights, which stalled their advance. Artillery exchanges followed, with the British enjoying an advantage thanks to their longer-range guns and greater mobility. Nevertheless, Argentine artillerymen fought with bravery and professionalism, firing until their last rounds, with barrels glowing red-hot.



On 13 June, the British launched their final offensive. They concentrated all their forces—paratroopers and Royal Marines—achieving a 3-to-1 numerical superiority over our Marines at the main breach. The artillery fire was intense, and naval artillery joined the barrage. Our own artillery, undeterred, responded at a rate of 1,000 rounds per hour, choosing to die on their feet rather than abandon their comrades.

In the late afternoon, the British attempted a flanking manoeuvre via Mount Harriet to distract the Argentine command. Robacio did not take the bait and instead set a deadly trap: he ambushed the enemy, pinning them between a minefield and artillery fire, while positioning Marines at their rear to block retreat. The outcome was heroic. The British were crushed by our artillery and infantry fire. Two hours later, the British company commander requested a ceasefire, citing the harrowing cries of the wounded as demoralising his troops. This ceasefire allowed the arrival of helicopters to evacuate the injured. No shots were fired at the helicopters, which were unarmed and clearly only conducting medical evacuation.

In the early hours of 14 June, the Scots Guards moved to the centre of the assault on Puerto Argentino. The firefight was intense. So many tracer rounds filled the sky that it seemed like daylight. In the final moments of the assault, the fighting became hand-to-hand. Argentine forces repelled the attack with fixed bayonets and requested artillery and mortar fire directly on their own positions, as the enemy had reached them. Second Lieutenant Silva and NCO Castillo called for a counterattack after being overrun. They left their positions and launched a bayonet charge until they were killed.

Commander Robacio personally led the counterattack, retaking lost positions and pushing the Scots Guards back to their original lines. By 3 a.m., amid a heavy snowfall, the Marines prepared another counteroffensive against the British paratroopers and requested authorisation as their forward units engaged the enemy. The order from Puerto Argentino was to withdraw, as it had become impossible to resupply 105 mm howitzers and mortars. Despite this setback, morale remained high, and it was difficult to convince the Marines to abandon their positions. With iron discipline, they withdrew from Mount Tumbledown and fell back.

A well-executed withdrawal under enemy pressure is one of the most difficult manoeuvres in military doctrine. History offers many examples of such withdrawals turning into deadly routs. But with pride, the Marines of BIM 5 took up new positions on the outskirts of Puerto Argentino, still determined to fight. Gurkha troops were dispatched to pursue the Argentines to make up for the Scots' poor performance, but they were halted and counterattacked—even though our men had run out of ammunition.

At dawn on Monday, 14 June 1982, BIM 5 had no ammunition left. In 36 hours, they had fired 17,000 artillery shells and all their mortar rounds. At 10 a.m., the ceasefire order came from Puerto Argentino. The battalion was still in combat formation. Commander Robacio requested confirmation of the order. His unit entered the capital of the islands in full marching formation, carrying all their personal weapons. Tragically, a section of the Navy Company that had been separated did not receive the order and at 12:30 engaged a landing of six British helicopters, shooting down two and suffering the loss of the last three Argentine soldiers in combat.

In military history, few units have endured 44 hours of bombardment without relief and then faced the enemy with such courage and determination. The Argentine forces at Tumbledown included 700 Marines and 200 soldiers, who confronted 3,000 of the best-trained troops of the British Armed Forces. Seventy-five per cent of our heroes were conscripts. BIM 5 suffered 30 killed and 105 wounded, inflicting an estimated 360 casualties on the enemy (a figure never officially recognised, though many British officers have acknowledged it privately).

How did they endure such hardship and fight with such determination? BIM 5 and RI 25 were the only units acclimatised to the Malvinas. They were well equipped, and their officers were professional and competent. They also shared a remarkable esprit de corps. As an example: on 14 June at 10:30, during the retreat to Sapper Hill, Commander Daniel Ponce collapsed from exhaustion. Amid gunfire, two conscripts rushed to carry him. Ponce ordered them to leave him and flee. Their reply: “Captain, if we die, we die together.” They lifted him and withdrew. That was the spirit of the marines of BIM 5, who gave everything for their country.

Malvinas: Robacio Masterfully Commands the Artillery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group

Account of Second Lieutenant Juan Gabino Suárez, Chief of the “last gun” of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GAAerot 4)

  

I share this account once again because Rear Admiral Carlos Hugo Robacio deserves to be remembered as he truly was — by living and reliving a part of his life.

I will never tire of saying it. Never.

Our place in the war: Sapper Hill (Puerto Argentino, Malvinas Islands, Republic of Argentina) — with a forward detachment in San Carlos alongside Battery "A".

A field artilleryman loves to see where his rounds land. He thrives on observing, calculating, correcting. But when you’re the Chief of the Gun Section, that privilege is gone. From the rear —where all you hear are the fire commands and the thunder of the guns— you must imagine the battlefield, reconstruct in your mind what’s unfolding ahead, guided only by instinct, by training... and by doctrine.

That’s when fire adjustment comes alive —the craft of bracketing a target with precision. It's a method as old as it is effective: the first shot, far from being decisive, is merely a starting point. In artillery, a direct hit on the first round proves nothing. Only through disciplined bracketing—first in azimuth, then in range—can effective fire be achieved.

But in the urgency of combat, the temptation to cut corners is always there. One tends to stray from the textbook, from regulation, from what was drilled into you in the classroom. You want to solve everything at once. And that’s where those who forget the fundamentals make their first mistake. Because when the situation is real, and the enemy is advancing, all you have left is what you learned —and held onto.

And then, he appeared: Captain Carlos Hugo Robacio, Commander of Marine Battalion 5. The moment his fire requests began coming in, I knew instantly he was applying doctrine with surgical precision. His Initial Fire Request (IFR) was flawless: the target was clearly described —width, depth, distance, bearing from magnetic north. Everyone in the fire chain knew exactly what had to be done. Tactical clarity radiated through the net. And that kind of clarity inspires. From gun crews to the Fire Direction Center (FDC) and the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC), everyone locked in.

  
CN Carlos Robacio in Malvinas
 

I could read his thinking through the rounds.
The first shot landed off to one side.
The second, at the opposite end.
What was he doing?
He was bracketing the target, establishing the axis of correction. Pure doctrine. Pure art.
The third corrected direction.
The fourth refined range.
The fifth: ten rounds, fire for effect.

Not a moment of hesitation. Robacio didn’t ask —he ordered. And every order was exact.

Then came confirmation from the Forward Observer: successful impact. But who exactly were we firing on? These weren’t theoretical targets. We were firing on British troops who had already closed within 150 meters of our lines —some even closer. Robacio had cut the enemy advance in two, separating the forward elements from the main assault force still pushing up from the rear. He bought time —and lives.

And then, the critical moment.

The new coordinates overlapped the exact position of Marine Battalion 5. The FDC hesitated. “We can’t fire there —our own men are on that grid!” But Robacio didn’t flinch:

“They’re among us! Get in your foxholes and open fire. Fire! Fire! Fire!”

The order came out furious, direct, visceral. And it was necessary.

Even with our guns buried, we kept fighting back.

I don’t remember how many volleys we fired on that line —but it was a lot. Hundreds of rounds. Robacio kept pushing them back, forcing the enemy to scatter. And when he sensed it was time, he ordered a fire barrier. Precision calculations. All guns firing on a perfect line. A wall of steel. And he drove them even farther. Until the guns fell silent.

To me, it was a masterclass in fire control. No hesitation. No second-guessing. Robacio owned the battlefield like a conductor with an orchestra —with precision, instinct, and total battlefield awareness. He was a professional. A tactician. A clear-headed combat leader.

But what were the British really trying to do by attacking BIM5? Was it a diversion? A beachhead for a future assault on Port Stanley? A test of our responsiveness?
Even today, this engagement is barely remembered, hardly studied, nearly absent from the official accounts. And yet, it was one of the most technically sound and fiercely fought defenses of the entire war.

I hope this testimony serves to highlight the professional excellence of Captain Robacio, his tactical brilliance, and his nerve under fire. We never had the chance to work together before the war —but in those days, I could read his mind through every shot fired.

And in artillery, that’s worth more than a thousand words.

One of our artillery guns —in those first days, our assigned combat position— might well be the emblematic one. Maybe because of where it stood. The fence posts were still upright, and the comrades of BIM 5 were up ahead, still building their own defenses.

Forgive me for bringing back these memories —memories of those howitzers that once held back the British advance, firing until there was nothing left to shoot.

(Sapper Hil, Puerto Argentino, Republic of Argentina)

Malvinas/Falklands War: The Last Moments of June, 14th in Puerto Argentino

The Malvinas conflict reached its conclusion on June 14, marked by intense hand-to-hand combat, heroic resistance, and the British apprehension towards Argentine aviation.

During the final hours, tense negotiations took place between the Argentine and British forces. General Galtieri issued orders to Menéndez, which were met with defiance. The British harbored bitterness over the relentless air attacks they faced and the battles that etched themselves into history as some of the most valiant displays of courage exhibited by the Argentine troops.

By Adrián Pignatelli || Infobae

General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was the governor. In this photo he addresses troops in Darwin on May 25, 1982. (AP)

During the initial days of June, the English initiated efforts to establish a ceasefire, using the radio telephone at the "King Edward" hospital, a facility frequently used by the islanders for medical consultations. On June 6, a call was answered by Dr. Alison Bleaney, who was initially skeptical and almost dismissed it as a prank. However, it turned out to be a British staff officer trying to communicate with the Argentine authorities.

Dr. Bleaney relayed the message to Commodore Carlos Bloomer Reeve, the Secretary General of the Interior, through a messenger. Governor Mario Benjamín Menéndez was then informed of the communication, and he appointed Navy Captain Barry Melbourne Hussey to listen to the British message without answering any questions. The message from the British was an attempt to find common ground for ending the hostilities.

Both parties agreed to communicate daily at 1:00 p.m. until the 12th of June.

The final hours of the war are renowned for showcasing the greatest display of Argentine resistance.

Mount Longdon was the scene of a dramatic combat by soldiers from the 7th Regiment. (AFP)

Starting from June 9, the British intensified their artillery fire. Subsequent battles occurred between the 11th and 13th at strategic locations, namely Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, Two Sisters, Mount Tumbledown, and Wireless Ridge. These battles formed the final defensive line before reaching Puerto Argentino.

During the combats at Mount Harriet and Mount Two Sisters, the British forces encountered formidable resistance. A skilled sniper managed to impede the advance of a Royal Marines company for hours, while another company from the 45th also faced significant opposition on the slopes of Two Sisters. The tenacious resistance demonstrated by the Argentine troops earned admiration from the enemy.

Jeremy Moore, the British commander. The day before the surrender he saved his life in an air raid.

A grueling battle took place on Mount Longdon, resulting in a significant number of casualties. The British forces had to push forward with fixed bayonets, and once they reached the summit, they had to defend against two Argentine counterattacks. The 7th Regiment's C Company, consisting of a platoon of 46 men, forced the English B Company into a withdrawal.

The severity of the conflict was evident in the numbers: out of the 278 men in the "Maipú" Company, only 78 managed to withdraw after enduring twelve hours of combat against the 3 PARA. The British forces suffered 23 killed and 70 wounded.

On Saturday, June 12, at half past 3, history witnessed the launch of an MM-38 Exocet missile from a ramp near the Puerto Argentino airport. The missile was directed at HMS Glamorgan, a British ship responsible for nightly bombardments of the capital. The shot proved successful, hitting the ship's deck and rendering its electronic devices inoperative.

The Tumbledown combat, June 13, 1982. Painting by Steve Noon, British artist.

On the 13th, approximately twenty air missions were conducted over British positions. During an air raid on his camp at Mount Two Sisters, Commander Jeremy Moore miraculously escaped with his life.

On the same night, around 50 Scottish soldiers launched an attack on the base of Mount William, leading to an order for the Argentine defenders to withdraw. Additionally, a British speedboat raid on the Camber Peninsula, north of the Puerto Argentino roadstead, was repelled before midnight.

In the early hours of June 13, a section of the Amphibious Engineer Company withdrew from the northwest of Mount Tumbledown and headed towards the command post of Marine Infantry Battalion 5. At three in the morning, amidst a snowstorm, a fraction of them, along with members of the Amphibious Engineer Company and a section of riflemen from the Company of the 6th Infantry Regiment, prepared to counterattack the west side of Mount Tumbledown. Two hours later, the Nácar Company attempted to regain control of the mountain. A counterattack ensued, resulting in half a dozen Scotsmen being wounded. However, facing heavy enemy fire, General Menéndez authorized the withdrawal of the forces.

Pilots, mechanics, technicians and soldiers of the M5 Dagger Squadron before one of the missions in Comodoro Rivadavia. The actions of the Air Force and Naval Aviation pilots were the greatest concern of the British.

During the battle of Wireless Ridge, the 7th Regiment's trenches endured a relentless onslaught of nearly 6,000 shells fired by British artillery. Initially, the English forces took control of the northern sector, and two companies, which had been engaged in combat since the previous day, made their way towards Moody Brook while facing the relentless barrage of British cannons.

Despite the valiant efforts of the Argentine troops to hold their ground, the British advance persisted. With the support of light tanks, the British infantry managed to reach their positions and encircle the troops from BIM 5. On the southern slope of Wireless Ridge, approximately 40 men from A Company of Regiment 3 courageously launched a counter-attack against soldiers from Para 2.

As dawn broke on the 14th, the surviving soldiers from the battle at Wireless Ridge regrouped and formed a defensive line near Felton Creek. About 50 survivors from the 7th Regiment launched a counter-attack against Moody Brook Barracks, which was already under British control. However, they were met with fierce artillery fire and had to retreat. The British were impressed by the resolute attitude displayed by the Argentine forces.

Some of the soldiers of Regiment 3 who staged one of the last counterattacks of the war.

The Air Force executed its final mission: deploying two Canberra and two Mirage bombers to attack British positions at Furze Bush Pass. Tragically, one of the Canberras was shot down during the operation.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, the Argentine artillery opened fire towards the top of Wireless Ridge, aiming to halt the advance of the British paratroopers. The artillery provided cover fire to facilitate the retreat of the Argentine soldiers. An hour later, the British forces gained control of Tumbledown, and helicopters fired missiles at the Argentine artillery near Moody Brook.

Amidst the withdrawal, a second lieutenant and 21 gunners from the 4 Airborne Group remained behind to operate the last piece of artillery, which they used to engage British paratroopers. However, they were forced to withdraw when a shell got stuck.

At that moment, Carlos Robacio, the commander of BIM 5, defied two withdrawal orders and continued fighting.

In the war's final engagement, a section of the Sea Company from BIM 5 successfully disabled two British Sea King helicopters. BIM 5 completed its withdrawal by 3:00 p.m., marching at an accelerated pace through the streets of Puerto Argentino, with the troops remaining in possession of their weapons. They aimed to regroup and prepare for urban combat.

Commander Carlos Robacio was the commander of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion. On more than one occasion, he rejected the withdrawal order.

In his memoirs, Admiral Woodward recounted the dire situation during the war's final days: "We were stretched to the limit, with only three ships - Hermes, Yarmouth, and Exeter - functioning without major operational issues. 45% of our destroyers and frigates were incapacitated. The Andromeda's Sea Wolf was disabled, all the Brillant systems had various defects, and the Broadsword had one and a half weapon systems functioning, with one propulsion shaft permanently damaged. None of the 21 ships were fit for battle: the Avenger and Arrow were broken, and Olimpus turbines disabled, among other issues. It was a crumbling fleet."

"In this beautiful place, we have only one Sea Dart line of fire to protect the Etendards. Our convoys to and from the coast are 'escorted' by a semi-paralyzed frigate. The gun line, once consisting of four ships, is now down to two due to damages. The towing, repairs, and logistics area is 'protected' by the broken-down Glamorgan, and South Georgia is valiantly defended by the poor, broken-down Antrim and the formidable battleship Endurance."

The withdrawal of BIM 5 from Sapper Hill marked the end of General Jofre's planned resistance. Most factions abandoned their positions, walking towards Puerto Argentino, some alongside British soldiers who allowed them to retain their weapons.

Para 2 commanded Wireless Ridge, Para 3 Mount Longdon, 42 Commando Mount Harriet, and 45 Commando Two Sisters. The Scots Guards controlled Tumbledown, the Gurkhas were on Mount Williams, and the Welsh on Sapper Hill, with Puerto Argentino dominated by two English brigades.

Generals Menéndez and Jofre agreed that continuing the fight would only lead to more loss of life. Jofre stated, "This is not enough."

In the midst of a conversation with General Leopoldo Galtieri, the call was abruptly cut off by an English bombardment. Galtieri, at Casa Rosada, remarked, "It seems that Menéndez is giving up..." and asked to speak with him.

Menéndez's assistant was sent to communicate with the English troops and seek a ceasefire agreement.

Galtieri called again, demanding loudly that the soldiers leave their foxholes and counterattack. Menéndez explained that he lacked sufficient support, particularly from naval and air forces. Despite Galtieri's insistence to counterattack using troops from the 3rd and 25th regiments and the marine infantry, Menéndez refused, knowing the futility of such an action. Galtieri warned him that he would have to answer for his decision upon returning to the continent. Menéndez considered invoking United Nations Resolution 502, which called for Argentina to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and negotiate, but Galtieri objected. Faced with difficult choices, Menéndez decided to "leave with honor."

A Gazelle helicopter from Fearless took off, carrying British Parliamentarians. They tied a white parachute cloth to its belly. The officers Bell, Reid, and a Spanish-speaking radio operator accompanied them.

As they walked towards the seat of government, Menéndez awaited them at the door. In the talks, Captain Melbourne Hussey was joined by Vice Commodores Carlos Bloomer Reeve and Eugenio Miari, a specialist in international treaties.

During the first meeting, the British expressed concern about Argentine aviation and called for their attacks to cease.

Until the last moment, Galtieri demanded that Menéndez counterattack with the forces available. He also did not want the governor to sign any documents. (Telam)

At 11 a.m., as snow began to fall, a ceasefire was reached. For the British, this was a stroke of luck as the troops who attacked Puerto Argentino were left with only six batches of ammunition; the rest had sunk with the Atlantic Conveyor.

Galtieri laid out his conditions: Menéndez should not sign any document, and the discussions should revolve around evacuation rather than surrender. Each man was expected to return in uniform, with his weapons, and the commitment was to be upheld with honor. Menéndez was taken aback by the order not to sign, knowing it would be an impossible request to fulfill.

Moore y Menéndez acordaron el alto el fuego. El gobernador exigió quitar la palabra "incondicional", de los términos de la rendición.

Each party retreated to confer with their superiors and agreed to reconvene later, this time with their respective leaders, during the night.

At 19:45, Jeremy Moore, the British forces commander, arrived by helicopter, visibly perturbed by the snowstorm they had to navigate through. He was accompanied by seven officers from his General Staff, the radio operator with direct communication to London, and a legal officer. In one hand, he held a document outlining the terms of surrender, and in the other, a bottle of whiskey.

The Argentinians declined to sign an "unconditional" surrender; they insisted that there would be no public surrender ceremony, that the officers would retain command over their troops, and they would keep their flags.

Moore's telegram announcing that it was all over.

Moore's main concern revolved around the airmen. The aviation action had resulted in the loss of 7 British ships, with 5 being rendered inoperative and 12 experiencing mechanical breakdowns. In response, they reached out to Brigadier Ernesto Crespo, who had proclaimed at the start of the war: "If anyone thought that the phrase 'defend the Homeland until losing your life' was merely rhetoric, this is the moment of truth." As the head of the air command, Crespo pledged to comply with the cessation of hostilities, although he made it clear that he was not surrendering.

After removing the word "unconditional" from the document and obtaining assurances from the air command, all obstacles were overcome. Menéndez then initialed the document, followed by Moore and a British officer as a witness.

Cover of the Clarín newspaper that gave an account of the ceasefire on the islands.

The ceasefire would begin at 23:59 on June 14. Menéndez requested authorization to meet with his General Staff but it was denied, informing him that he would shortly be transferred to “Fearless” as a detainee.

The war was over.

Sources: La guerra inaudita. El conflicto del Atlántico Sur, de Rubén Oscar Moro; 1982. Los documentos secretos de la guerra de Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del proceso, de Juan B. Yofre; Los cien días. Las memorias del comandante de la flota británica durante la guerra de Malvinas, de Sandy Woodward; Una cara de la moneda. La guerra de Malvinas according tothe complete version of The Sunday Times Insight Team de Londres; newspaper from June 1982.