Beagle Crisis: General Las Heras Group

General Las Heras Group

A mechanized armored grouping was tasked with crossing through the passes near Bariloche, heading towards Temuco, effectively splitting Chile in two. This force consisted of approximately 7,800 men and around 200 combat vehicles, including Sherman tanks, Mowag vehicles, M-3 Diamonds, and M-113s. Leading the formation was the 28th Mountain Infantry Regiment (known as "Rodillas Negras"), a unit with a strong reputation earned in Tucumán in 1975. By the time the order to halt the operation arrived, some of its units had already crossed the border during the night.

Chaco War: The Argentine Support to the Paraguay War Effort

Argentine Support for Paraguay in the Chaco War

 


"No one dies on the eve, but on the appointed day (Nha ña mano bay i víspera – pe sino ghiarape)." I want to evoke these harsh words in Guaraní to describe the chilling photographic "Archive" of Dr. Carlos De Sanctis, compiled during the months he spent on the front lines of the Chaco Boreal battlefield. As he himself affirms, he was "…the first foreign doctor that Paraguay allowed to reach the front line…". "Chilling" is an appropriate term, as in my previous note, Facebook's intellectual censorship mechanism selectively blocked part of the content, which was taken precisely from the archive of the doctor from Rosario.

The astounding De Sanctis document captures in photographs, with annexed explanations as brutal as they are succinct (I would say "clinical"), what healthcare was like in the jungle, as seen by a "civilian" who served Paraguay in a war where Argentine public opinion was mostly inclined in favor of Paraguay and against Bolivia.

Other civilians, but with weapons in hand, served in the 7th General San Martín Regiment, formed in the Argentine House in Asunción and composed of a large number of Argentines—many from Goya, it seems—who played a distinguished role. We cannot forget the Argentine army officers who lost their careers due to the events of 1930, several of whom honorably served under the Paraguayan flag in the Chaco.

In terms of psychosocial support from Argentina, perhaps the most potent was the exaltation of Paraguay’s image, promoted by the media, which portrayed it as a small country under attack, a victim of unjust ambitions.

The other side of the coin is daringly presented in Buenos Aires in 1933, during the height of the conflict, by Bolivian diplomat Eduardo Anze Matienzo, under the auspices of the Engineering Students' Center, to a decidedly "pro-Paraguay" audience, as he put it.



Who is Anze Matienzo? A Bolivian who reached the highest position as a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea and who served his diplomatic mission in Asunción in the years 1930 and 1931.

Anze gives a lecture titled "Bolivia in the Continent and in the Chaco Conflict." Extensive, substantial, and sharp, he laments the ignorance about his country, attributing it to "a prejudice that entails injustice," "…a subjective vision…".

I omit all the propositions about the rights of the parties he raises, ignore his arguments denying that Standard Oil subsidized Bolivia, and focus on "The Responsibilities of the War," where he argues against "Paraguay's 'gadfly' policy, which has weakened our governments and our people like an infectious and harmful disease for more than half a century." Anze postulates that Paraguay was a nation "burdened since the War of the Triple Alliance," which made it warlike because "López's madness, which led his people to collective suicide in the War of the Triple Alliance, had the virtue of creating a 'legend of heroism' whereby 'every Paraguayan considers himself an unparalleled hero, and the Paraguayan people form a cluster of heroes capable of making the world tremble'." He exemplifies this with the words spoken by his Paraguayan driver on the way to the legation: "I advise you, Secretary, to warn your compatriots that every Paraguayan soldier can fight ten Bolivians and defeat them." He concludes by stating that "when I left Asunción in 1931, Paraguay was already morally at war."

How does this situation, which this author perceives as a collective inheritance permeated by "the toxins of distrust, fear, and suspicion," this "hereditary poison," fit as a continuation of the historical process of the Francia and López dictatorships? Is it credible? Did Argentine literature play any role? I think it’s enough to recall Alberdi for reflection.



There are authors who believe they see in the former partners of the Triple Alliance a sort of guilty conscience for what happened in Paraguay, just as others see in the Chaco War an attempt at redemption, to heal the wounds of both belligerents. Paraguay with the "Guerra Guasú," and Bolivia with the Pacific War. I see a certain analogy between that historical moment and Paraguay’s struggle for the Chaco Boreal, claiming to be the victim, but quietly mobilizing, buying weapons on behalf of third parties, and being in a position to crush Bolivian forces in Boquerón and nearby forts by sheer numerical strength. And this against a world, perhaps due to its proximity to the disputed area, more inclined to see Paraguay as the attacked and Bolivia as the attacker, the aggressor, an image that the country to the west fueled not a little with the bravado and arrogance displayed by its military and politicians.

I have in my archive images circa 1931, of Paraguayan soldiers stationed in the remnants of the Curupaytí trenches, their greatest success against the allies, where I imagine seeing a ghostly wait for an enemy they hope will appear to be defeated. I see how the legend of Lopismo has not only turned the "marshal" into an eponymous hero but also portrayed Paraguay as a defenseless dove, unjustly crushed by the might of three nations. On the other hand, that Paraguay of despotism is presented as a developing nation, incomparable for its time. The similarities are abundant: López was also already preparing for war long before the allies; he was the one who attacked first, in Matto Grosso against Brazil and in Corrientes against Argentina. However, just a quick search on the web shows the proliferation of fabrications, which through repetition, have convinced not only Argentines but the world of the "justice" of the Lopista cause in that war. Argentine intellectuals, writers, and authors, especially those on the left, have played a significant role in this construction. Today, there are "scholars" who never tire of apologizing, sometimes seemingly just in case, to anyone who claims to have a score to settle with their own country. It’s worth noting that Brazilians, judging by their expressions on social media, display a very different attitude and don’t hesitate to proclaim themselves the victors, and rightly so. They haven’t even returned to Paraguay, despite repeated requests, war trophies like the "Cristiano" cannon, which remains in the Historical Museum of Rio de Janeiro.

Paraguayan networks post it as "Paraguayan historical heritage residing in Brazil."

Regarding Argentine support for Paraguay, I refer to the words of Paraguayan historian Julia Velilla de Arréllaga, who calls it an "essential aspect of the conflict," asserting that it was "decisive." She notes that this collaboration is spoken of very little in Paraguay because there was a pact of silence between the Paraguayan and Argentine leaders, because pressures from the Paraguayan press prevented leaders from confiding the help they received, because Argentina had proclaimed itself neutral, and because of the "subsequent partiality of the pro-Brazilian ruling sectors." Velilla concludes that "the truth is that Argentine aid was decisive and significant, even if it was (Admiral Casal)," because "how could Paraguay have continued the fight if it had not had Argentine support? It’s better not to consider such a scenario (José Fernando Talavera)."

Contributing to this, it is worth mentioning the supply of fuel, gasoline, and diesel throughout the war, as well as flour, since the Paraguayan soldier's ration was meat and hardtack, or at least something similar.

There is much more to say, but I will simply pay tribute to another of the Argentines who, when it came time to choose, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Paraguayans, and I do so with the words of ABC Revista, which speaks of "A Condor in the Chaco," referring to Riojan Vicente Almandos Almonacid, whose name is engraved on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris for his exploits as a combat pilot in the First World War. He was the one who organized the Paraguayan Air Force and flew the first missions. To be able to join the fight, he had to "sell his belongings and decorations."

I must also mention Colonel Abraham Schweizer, from Corrientes, who was stationed in Paraguay between 1931 and 1934. He became a legend, reportedly the one who designed the military strategy that Estigarribia implemented. Schweizer, reputed to be the most brilliant officer in the Argentine Army, founded the Paraguayan War School.

Finally, regarding Argentine intelligence support for Paraguay: When I was a first lieutenant, during a course, they brought in a very elderly colonel to honor him. We were told he was a sort of mathematical genius who, every morning with just paper and pencil, deciphered Bolivian—and Paraguayan—codes and delivered the clear messages to Minister Saavedra Lamas so he could proceed accordingly.



Source: Diario Epoca

Leadership of Small Groups in the Malvinas Gravel

Malvinas: Leadership in Small Groups

Marcos Gallacher

Twenty-five years ago, on May 28, 1982, ground combat erupted in the town of Darwin-Goose Green in the Malvinas. Following the defeat of the Argentine garrison there, British forces pressed on toward Puerto Argentino, engaging in battles that ultimately led to the outcome we all know. While much has been written about the Malvinas conflict, many aspects remain unexplored. One such overlooked area is the role and behavior of the officers who led small units during these intense battles.

The significance of leadership in such situations is vividly portrayed in the classic film The Bridge on the River Kwai. In the film, the British prisoner commander, played by Alec Guinness, refuses to let his officers do manual labor alongside the enlisted men. His defiance leads to brutal punishment at the hands of his captors. The commander’s reasoning is simple but profound: if officers take on the duties of common soldiers, the entire military hierarchy crumbles. Without that structure, a combat battalion—even a group of prisoners—becomes nothing more than a disorganized mob.

This reference comes to mind for an important reason: while watching the April 2 commemorative events on television, it was striking to see how this crucial principle of leadership was completely overlooked by the program creators. The broadcasts mixed the valuable testimonies of conscript soldiers who fought in the islands with the opinions of journalists, popular historians, and political commentators. However, the voices of those who were directly responsible for leading these soldiers into battle—the young officers who provided the critical leadership on the ground—were conspicuously absent.

These officers were the ones who ensured that a group of individuals could function as a cohesive combat unit in the heat of battle. Their contributions, vital to the outcome of the conflict, deserve to be recognized and understood as we reflect on this chapter of history.



The ranks of the officers involved in the Malvinas conflict varied widely—from fresh second lieutenants straight out of military college to seasoned majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. However, few of these officers were interviewed about their experiences, with one notable exception: Ambassador Balza, who served as a lieutenant colonel during the conflict. His insights, it should be said, are invaluable in truly understanding what transpired.

Professional soldiers, much like doctors, lawyers, or engineers, possess a deep understanding of their field that far surpasses that of the average person. It is these professionals, particularly officers, who are best equipped to analyze the events and draw meaningful lessons from them. These officers are the ones who shape a group of men into an effective combat force, using their training to place everyday experiences into a broader context and learn from them.

The Malvinas conflict is often misunderstood by the general public, in part because much of what people read or see on television comes from observers who were not directly involved in the fighting. Even those who were present as conscript soldiers, while brave and valuable, had a limited perspective on the overall situation. Few people realize, for example, that the casualty rate among officers in ground combat was higher than that of non-commissioned officers and soldiers: 2.5 percent of the officers who participated were killed, compared to 1.7 percent of non-commissioned officers and 1.9 percent of soldiers. This is unusual in military history, where it is generally the enlisted men who bear the brunt of the casualties. But in the Argentine Army during the Malvinas conflict, the opposite was true.

The Malvinas conflict remains a deeply emotional issue for many Argentines, but there are important lessons to be learned. One of these lessons is the critical role of leadership at the small unit level, which was a key factor in the tough resistance our forces offered in several engagements. Argentina, in both its private and public sectors, suffers from a significant leadership deficit. Perhaps by reflecting on the positive examples of leadership from the Malvinas, we can begin to understand the kind of leadership that our country so desperately needs.

Marcos Gallacher is a professor of Business Organization at the University of CEMA.

Argentine Armed Forces Receive First Modernized TAM 2C A2 Tanks

1955 Revolution: Status Report from Cuyo

Cuyo Mobilizes

On the night of September 17, the troops of the Second Army arrived at the gates of the city of Mendoza and stopped there. General Julio Alberto Lagos was waiting for them at that point ready to receive command from his commander, General Eugenio Arandía.



Once at the head of the powerful unit, Lagos requested a report on the situation as he needed to take quick measures before setting off towards Córdoba. The picture of the situation that Arandía described to him was not what he expected because, as they explained to him, there was a lack of integration between the commanders and the news broadcast on the radio, they limited the revolution to the rebel focus of the Mediterranean province that at that time was being surrounded. by loyal troops under the command of generals Iñíguez, Morello and Moschini.
In view of this, influenced by the false news broadcast by government radio stations and letting himself be carried away by a counterproductive excess of caution, Lagos approved the resolution issued by his General Staff and retreated towards Mendoza, abandoning Lonardi's forces to his side. luck. According to the conclusion they had reached with General Arandía, if the civil war broke out (which in fact had already begun), it would be necessary to consolidate the three Cuyo provinces without risking their forces in a confrontation that would short term, it would have to annihilate them.
The Lagos troops spent the night next to the access bridge to Palmira and the next morning they entered the city, with the 2nd Mountain Infantry Battalion of Calingasta at the head, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre. The long column of vehicles found the access roads blocked by buses and trucks that the CGT had abandoned during the night to make progress difficult, punctured the tires of most of them. Under the direction of officers and non-commissioned officers, the conscripts proceeded to remove them, moving the vehicles off the road or throwing them into the river and slowly, the displacement became effective.
The Second Army was received with joy. The population, mobilized by Dr. Facundo Suárez[1], took to the streets to cheer him and people approached the soldiers to give them food and drinks while shouting and applauding his passage from Guaymallén, along San Martín Avenue.
Lagos installed his command in the Military High School and appointed General Roberto Nazar as provisional governor of the province. Whoever was its owner until that moment, Dr. Carlos Horacio Evans, appeared shortly after, to make himself available to him and after a brief and correct exchange of words, he was told that he could leave the province or remain at home, finally opting for this last proposition.


General Julio Alberto Lagos

One of the first orders given by Lagos upon arriving in Mendoza was to occupy the radio station, dispatching for that mission a platoon under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre, chief of the 2nd Mountain Battalion of Calingasta, which performed prominently during the San Luis rebellion. . Aguirre took over the station without any problems and immediately put Lieutenant Colonel Mario A. Fonseca on duty, who once at the microphone, proceeded to inform the citizens that both Mendoza and San Luis were in the power of the revolution.
Another important measure adopted by General Lagos was the arrest of senior leaders of the regional ruling party, represented mainly by the political and union leadership and by militants of the Justicialist basic units, who represented a serious threat to the revolution. There was no resistance in any of the basic units raided. Where there were problems was at the CGT premises, where many of its leaders, members and workers had barricaded themselves.
Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre headed towards the headquarters of the workers' union at the head of a platoon, believing that taking over the building was going to be a simple matter. However, upon arriving at the place, he was greeted by a large hail of bullets that forced him to to adopt defensive measures.
Following orders from their boss, the soldiers jumped out of the jeeps in which they had come and once under cover they opened fire, generating a violent exchange of fire in which two conscripts lost their lives and two officers were wounded.
The fight continued for several minutes, with the unionists containing any attempt to approach them, which forced Aguirre to ask for reinforcements. While he fired the submachine gun, he gave directives, concerned for the safety of his men. Two of them lay dead on the pavement and two others, seriously injured, were trying to take cover behind the vehicles.
Aguirre saw that the union members were shooting from various points, some from the upper windows and others from the roofs, so he tried to concentrate his bursts on those points.
The arrival of two trucks with troops was what decided the confrontation. Knowing they were surrounded and overwhelmed in men and weapons, the unionists waved a piece of white cloth tied to a stick and surrendered. The union headquarters was controlled and its defenders forced to leave slowly, with their hands on their heads. Once outside, they were subjected to an intense search and were then forced to board trucks to be taken to prison. The bodies of the dead soldiers were evacuated in an ambulance that arrived a few minutes later and the wounded left with them in the direction of the hospital. The actions in Cuyo had claimed their first victims.


Once the city was dominated, General Lagos ordered the occupation of the El Plumerillo Air Base, to which he sent General Arandía's second, Colonel Nicolás Plantamura, accompanied by the escort of the Mountain Infantry Detachment 1 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Cabello. Waiting for them at the place was Vice Commodore Martín Alió, known for his Peronist tendency, who handed over the military unit, clarifying beforehand that he did not agree to the uprising. However, his officers did, whom Plantamura met in the casino to talk and find out his position regarding the revolution. Twelve nationally manufactured Calquin bombers were at the disposal of the rebel forces, which, added to the powerful crew of Villa Reynolds, constituted a weapon of great value.
Back in Mendoza, Lieutenant Colonel Cabello received the order to support Major Rufino Ortega's platoon that was to take the local headquarters of the Federal Police, a mission that was accomplished with the support of revolutionary civilian commands without any incidents.
That was the situation in Mendoza and San Luis when, after noon, Lieutenant Colonel Fonseca, the same one who had transmitted the revolutionary messages by radio, requested authorization to march on San Juan, fearful of the attitude that the head of the army might assume. that garrison, Colonel Ricardo Botto.
After obtaining the approval of his superiors, Fonseca gathered under his command Colonel Aguirre's Infantry Battalion and the San Juan Sapper Company that reinforced the Second Army there and provided it with a cannon from the artillery battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fernando. Elizondo, he started.
The troops traveled throughout the night, stopping their march at dawn, in the town of Carpintería, close to the provincial capital. From there they continued in broad daylight, while people, almost all from the fields, farms and vineyards immediately around the route, gathered on the side of the route to greet the troops. As Ruiz Moreno, from whom we extract most of the information, relates, people did not forget the prohibition on carrying out the procession of the Virgin of Andacollo, imposed by the government.
Where there was tension was in San Juan, as a result of the deployment of police forces carried out by Commissioner César Camargo. The police were determined to resist but the intervention of Fonseca, also from San Juan and a childhood friend of Camargo, prevented bloodshed. It was evident that the police were not an adequate force to confront the Army and it was necessary, at all costs, to avoid any type of clash.
Camargo agreed and raised the device for the troops to enter the city, birthplace of illustrious personalities in Argentine history such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Brother Justo Santa María de Oro and Francisco Narciso Laprida. There were also scenes of joy, with the crowd cheering and applauding the passage of the rebel troops. The Virgin of Mercy was even taken out of the cathedral in front of which the crowd gathered and prayed, covering the Plaza 25 de Mayo. Fonseca was carried on a litter to the Government House where his head, Juan Viviani, handed over command to him. In this way, Cuyo was left in the power of the revolution with General Lagos, at the head of the civil and military command.

At 06:30 on September 19, a Beechcraft AT-11 from Córdoba landed in the countryside, on Route 40, 30 kilometers south of Mendoza, bringing on board frigate captain Carlos García Favre, emissary of General Lonardi. As soon as he got off the plane, the naval officer boarded a private vehicle that immediately took him to Luján de Cuyo, a stop before the provincial capital, where he arrived around 11:00 when the population was celebrating the arrival of the Second Army in the streets. coming from St. Louis.
An hour later, he was brought before General Lagos, urgent as he was to inform him of the difficult situation that the rebel garrison was going through. Once in his presence, frigate captain Carlos García Favre conveyed to him his distressing request for reinforcements and the imperative need for him to get underway as soon as possible to alleviate the difficult situation of he. While this was happening, in the streets, the crowd chanted slogans in favor of revolution and freedom, ignorant of those events that were unfolding.
Far from what García Favre imagined, Lagos's attitude was one of caution. After listening attentively, the general spoke slowly, detailing the inconveniences involved in providing aid to Lonardi. According to him, the Second Army was not fully aware of what was happening, it was imbued with the slogan of not spilling blood between brothers and for that reason, its full subordination could not be counted on when marching on Córdoba. . On the other hand, the capture of Río Cuarto was impossible because fuel was scarce and extremely difficult to obtain.
García Favre was dismayed because he did not expect such an attitude. Extremely nervous, he insisted again: Córdoba urgently needed reinforcements because if it did not have them the revolution would end up being defeated. Lagos remained in his position. Without saying a word, he listened to the emissary with a serious expression and then summoned him to a new meeting at 6:00 p.m.
By then, all Peronist party headquarters had been raided and the private homes of several activists confiscated, in order to prevent acts of sabotage, all this before the radio reported that starting at 9:00 p.m. that same day, the curfew and that martial law was in force throughout the city.

At the agreed time, García Favre, wearing civilian clothes, appeared at the barracks of the Sapper Battalion 8 for his second meeting with Lagos. Upon arrival, he was invited to witness the formation in the parade ground, in front of which, the general took formal possession of his position and harangued troops and civilians, exhorting them to fight for freedom. He also praised the Navy for its courageous and unwavering actions, stating at the end that the union of the three forces would ultimately grant them victory. But as far as the help requested is concerned, he said nothing specifically to García Favre. When the liaison tried to communicate with Lonardi to relieve him of the situation, he found that the arrest of the officers in charge of communications prevented him from establishing contact.
During the night of September 18 to 19, General Lagos and his high command developed a plan to alleviate the difficult situation in which General Lonardi found himself. Among other things, an air attack was decided from Villa Reynolds to the Las Higueras airfield, in order to neutralize the loyalist Gloster Meteors operating from there.
As Ruiz Moreno explains, Villa Reynolds, seat of the V Air Brigade, had been occupied on Sunday the 18th by troops from the IV Mountain Detachment of Tupungato who had left the previous day from San Luis, with that destination.
The taking of the base was carried out by the I Battalion of the 21st Mountain Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Celestino Argumedo, who arrived after two hours of march along a 110-kilometer route. In the brigade, the officers who at that time (03:00 in the morning) had control of the unit were waiting for them, after an intense combat with the 278 loyal non-commissioned officers who guarded it and who attempted acts of sabotage.
That same afternoon (5:30 p.m.), Major Argumedo contacted General Lagos to suggest carrying out the planned attack on the Las Higueras airfield, because at that height, it was imperative to neutralize the threat posed by the Gloster Meteors that operated from there. They responded three hours later, telling him to stay in his position until further notice.
The attack never materialized and Argumedo limited himself only to supplying bombs to both the revolutionary forces of Córdoba and those of Comandante Espora and to providing light weapons to the revolutionary civilian command of Dr. Guillermo Torres Fotheringham that was to take over Radio Ranquel in Río Cuarto. .
The next morning, an unexpected event took place that significantly raised the morale of the revolutionary forces. Soldiers of the Second Army who were inspecting the Mendoza railway station discovered a car full of cutting-edge weapons from the United States, which was there in transit to Chile. The cargo, composed of bazookas, recoilless rocket cannons and machine guns, was seized and distributed among the troops that were to march on Río Cuarto the next day. The joy that the discovery aroused meant little to Captain García Favre since in the afternoon, General Lagos told him that he was not planning to divert troops towards Córdoba because he planned to consolidate his positions in Mendoza.
General Lonardi's emissary was perplexed but managed to make a proposal aimed at complicating Perón's situation and lightening that of his superior: request international organizations to recognize Cuyo as a belligerent territory. Lagos agreed and without wasting time, ordered Dr. Bonifacio del Carril, honorary auditor of the Army in the Field, to begin the corresponding steps.
Because the situation in Cuyo was unknown in Córdoba, Lonardi dispatched Major Francisco Guevara with the mission of communicating to Lagos that he was ready to establish an air bridge between both provinces in order to transport the reinforcements of the Second Army to the combat zone. .
In accordance with this plan, the Military Aviation School began to prepare three DC-3s and a Convair from Aerolíneas Argentinas, from which the seats were removed to increase its capacity. Civil aviator Alfredo Barragán, pilot of the state airline company and determined supporter of the revolution, was placed in charge of them, who had to drive the planes to Mendoza in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Godoy.
Guevara boarded a Beechcraft AT-11 piloted by Captain González Albarracín, a co-pilot and a radio operator and left through the San Roque Lake air corridor, the only one that still remained open to rebel aviation, bound for Cuyo. The ship flew low until it reached the waters and at that point took flight, to move away between the positions occupied by the 14th Infantry Regiment and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.
After two hours of flight, the plane touched down in El Plumerillo, from where Guevara departed to meet Lagos.
Upon seeing him arrive, the general stood up and greeted him affectionately, inviting him to participate in the meeting that he was currently holding with Arandía and García Favre. The head of the Second Army seemed oblivious to reality and gave the impression that the triumphal entry he had made in Mendoza had negatively influenced him.
Guevara gave a detailed account of what was happening in Córdoba and, like García Favre, placed special emphasis on General Lonardi's need for reinforcements. When he finished speaking, he gave Lagos a letter from the leader of the revolution in which he requested the urgent sending of all the infantry with their mortars and machine guns, explaining that the crisis that his group suffered was, precisely, an infantry crisis and that His situation had worsened so much that he counted on that help to overcome it as soon as possible.
Despite this and the fact that Guevara explained that Lonardi planned to resist until the end, Lagos hesitated again, arguing that he had only 1,000 men to defend Cuyo and that he could not deprive himself of any. When he expressed his decision to establish a provisional government in Mendoza, Guevara was surprised and responded that this idea had already been adopted by General Lonardi but that it was not essential at that time.
That made Lagos reconsider and, at least for the moment, he scrapped the project to once again study sending reinforcements to Córdoba.
He was leaving on the 19th and Lagos was still thinking.

While Lagos and Guevara argued, the Aerolíneas Argentinas plane that Lonardi had sent to Barragán's command landed in El Plumerillo.
Once on land, the new arrivals hurried to the Lagos command post and asked to speak to him. At that time, the general was meeting with General Arandía, Major Enzo Garuti, Judge of Military Instruction, Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre, Captain García Favre and Major Guevara.
The newcomers were extremely anxious when they entered the room, assuming that by then everything had been decided, but once again Lagos delayed the matter, wanting his General Staff to stop and thoroughly analyze the situation. This attitude exasperated spirits, especially that of Commander Barragán who, raising his voice, demanded the immediate sending of reinforcements. The response he received left him stunned by its unusual and absurd nature:

-I can't distract troops because here the CGT is very strong and I could have problems.

That was the straw that broke the camel's back.
-But how is the CGT going to be a problem for the Army?!! -Barragán shouted- what are you saying?!! We have the problem!! Come on general, you have to give us the troops and weapons right now!!!

The pilot was so out of his mind that while he was speaking he pulled out his weapon, forcing those present to intervene to try to appease his anger.

-Calm down Barragán! - said Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre - Everything will be solved!

 Then, it was Major Garuti who made himself feel above the tumult.

-We must help Córdoba, general. Whose is able to do it!

Upon hearing those words, Lagos seemed convinced and in a serious tone ordered:

-Well Garuti, organize a Company.

Finally, after wasting precious hours in musings, the doubtful chief of the Second Army authorized the enlistment of 200 infantry personnel who, equipped with heavy machine guns and under the command of Major Garuti, immediately left for El Plumerillo to board the planes that, in a non-stop flight would take them to the theater of operations.

Notes

1. He was a known radical leader of the province.

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

 

Triple Alliance War: The Honor of the 1st of the Line

"I am not worthy of being your Boss" - By Esteban D. Ocampo

Escuadrón De Caballería Histórica

I remember a time of Glory where the Battalion Chiefs marched in front of their men to show themselves as examples, and not to remain in orders... Time in which together with the last of their soldiers they suffered the Battle; where they bled with them; where his heart broke when he saw his boys fall to the enemy's fire... A time where each of them was like a father to his men.

"The 1st of the Line and the 1st of the National Guards of Corrientes, attacked by an infernal fire of rifles and rockets, were soon surrounded by two Paraguayan infantry battalions and a regiment of cavalry that, determined and impetuous, forced them to retreat. However, recovered from the initial surprise and despite the heavy casualties suffered, the 1st of the Line managed to gain footing and stop the enemy's overwhelming advance, barely holding on, awaiting the sending of reinforcements with which they would resume the offensive. They do not arrive, on the contrary, they receive an unexpected order: to withdraw the battalion! This meant abandoning the field to the enemy, and what was even worse, leaving the wounded and the dead there.
Colonel Rosetti, head of the 1st Line, citing these reasons, requested that protection be sent to him to save those and also the honor of the battalion. But the response was confirmation of the previous order.(...)
Naturally, the movement towards the rear that was carried out encouraged the enemy who, undertaking the advance and reaching the abandoned field, fell with ferocious violence to kill the wounded with bayonets and collect their loot from the victory.
Moments before, one of the wounded who was left abandoned, 2nd Sergeant José María Abrego, who had a leg fractured by a bullet at thigh height (and who was later bayoneted to death), stood up and, raising his rifle, shouted in a loud voice. energetic:

-"Is it possible, comrades, that you withdraw and let us take prisoners? Come, comrades!"

Soldier Alejandro Sider, who had a bullet wound to his ankle, shouted that they should not abandon him, and other calls were heard. The battalion had moved 80 steps away when these events occurred. Colonel Rosetti, as brave as he was a noble soldier, hearing this, could not bear it and determined to disobey the order at any price, addressing his battalion he expressed:

-"It is the first time that the 1st of the Line retreats in the face of its enemies," and letting himself be carried away by this cruel idea, he tore off one of the rank loops and, throwing it at the Paraguayans, added: "I am not worthy of being their chief", and turning around he charged the enemy alone.

His words and his action made the shattered ranks of the 1st react, and upon seeing the heroic desperation of his leader, he faced the enemy and launched into combat shouting: "Long live the 1st Battalion." Infantry!"



Thus, as if obeying a mandate from history, the 1st of the Line faced the enemy and counterattacked.

His troops were dismembered, there was no order and groups of soldiers led by officers and non-commissioned officers stood out in different directions, running to meet the Paraguayans (...)
After collecting the fallen, the battalion formed a column and marched to their field and although everyone's face could clearly see the sadness that overwhelmed their spirits for the loss of so many companions, they carried in their hearts the conviction of having fulfilled their mission. word pledged by his boss, Colonel Rosetti, to the President of the Republic, when answering the speech that he addressed to the battalion when marching to the Paraguay campaign and which he concluded, saying:

"You are the first in glories and the first to appear on the battlefield to wave that flag that you have covered with glories so many times..."

To which his brave leader replied:

"Your excellent sir, you can be sure that the battalion will know how to fulfill its duty in the position assigned to it."

And so it was." (1)

There was a time of glory where people fought for the country with reckless courage, courage and camaraderie... where when one fell, it was like a sure blow to the heart, because one of the sons of the country was giving up the most sacred thing that a man has: its own life.
A time of Glory, where the Chiefs thought they were not worthy of their brave boys, and that is why they charged for Glory alongside them... alongside their men...

A time where everyone knew that:

"To perish where the freedom and independence of the country rise is the most glorious grave for the brave..."

Even if they were not leaders worthy of their men...
Although today, given their example, I am not worthy of being called ARGENTINE like they were...

Esteban D. Ocampo


(1) Giunti, Luis Leopoldo "Páginas de Gloria", Círculo Militar, pag. 88

Argentine Army: Ca Cz Mte 18, Army's First Division Best

My Jorge Muga
"I am pleased to share the news that the 18th Bush Hunter Company has been chosen as the best unit in the First Army Division."



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Argentine Army: Military Ranks

1955 Revolution: A Peronist General's Failed Rebellion and His Succesful Execution

Not even a damn military rebellion can organize a Peronist

Argentina en la Memoria
@OldArg1810






On June 9, 1956, the uprising of General Juan José Valle, and other soldiers and civilians who participated in the Peronist resistance, took place against the government of the Liberating Revolution, chaired by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu.




In adopting its harsh anti-Peronist policies, the government had to take into account the possibility of counterrevolutionary violence. Above all because of the punitive measures he adopted against those whom he considered immoral beneficiaries of the "Peronist regime." The arrest of prominent figures, the investigation of people and companies allegedly involved in illicit profits, and the extensive purges that affected people who held union and military positions contributed to forming a group of disaffected individuals.



It was only logical to expect that some of them, especially those with military training, would resort to direct action to harass the government or overthrow it. Although incidents of sabotage carried out by workers were common in the months that followed Aramburu's inauguration, it was only in March 1956, as a consequence of the decrees that had declared the Peronist Party illegal, prohibiting the public use of Peronist symbols and other political disqualifications, when the conspiracies began.






A contributing factor, although ultimately misleading, may have been the government's decision, announced in February, to remove the death penalty for promoters of military rebellion from the military justice code. This punishment, which had been enacted by the Congress controlled by the Peronist Party, and which represented the interests of Perón, after the coup attempt of September 1951, led by General Menéndez, was eliminated from the military code on the basis that “ “It violates our constitutional traditions that have forever abolished the death penalty for political causes.” The facts would prove that this statement was premature.



The prominent figure in the conspiracy attempts against Aramburu was General (Retired) Juan José Valle, who had voluntarily retired after the fall of Perón and actively participated in the Military Junta of loyal officers that obtained Perón's resignation and handed over the government to General Eduardo Lonardi in September 1955.



Valle tried to attract other officials dissatisfied with the government's measures. One of those who chose to join him was General Miguel Iñiguez, a professional who enjoyed a great reputation and who was still on active duty, although he was on duty, awaiting the results of an investigation into his conduct as commander of the loyal forces in the Córdoba area, in September 1955. Iñiguez had not intervened in politics before the fall of Perón, but with a deep nationalist vocation, General Iñiguez joined General Valle in the reaction against the policies of the Aramburu government.



At the end of March 1956, Iñiguez agreed to act as chief of staff of the revolution, but a few days later he was arrested, denounced by an informer. Held under arrest for the next five months, he was able to escape the fate that awaited his companions.



The Valle conspiracy was, in essence, a military movement that attempted to take advantage of the resentment of many retired officers and non-commissioned officers as well as the unrest among active duty personnel. Although it had the cooperation of many Peronist civilians and the support of elements of the working class, the movement did not achieve the personal approval of Juan Domingo Perón, then exiled in Panama.


The sexual degenerate and his gang

In its preliminary stages, the movement tried to attract nationalist officers dissatisfied with Aramburu who had played key roles during the coup attempt of June 1955, in the coup d'état against Perón in September 1955 and during the Lonardi government, such as the generals Justo Bengoa and Juan José Uranga, who had just retired; but the evident disagreement about who would assume power after the victory ended with their participation. Finally, generals Juan José Valle and Raúl Tanco assumed leadership of what they called the “National Recovery Movement” and they, instead of Perón whose name did not appear in the proclamation prepared for June 9, hoped to be its direct beneficiaries.

The plan provided that military commando groups, mostly non-commissioned officers and civilians, would take over Army units in various cities and garrisons, take over media outlets and distribute weapons to those who responded to the proclamation of the uprising.



This included various terrorist attacks on public buildings, on national and provincial officials, on premises of political parties related to the Liberating Revolution, and on the editorial offices of various newspapers in the country. There was also an extensive list of military and political leaders, government sympathizers, who would be kidnapped and shot by the National Recovery Movement, whose homes were marked with red crosses at that time.



One of them was the one occupied by the socialist leader Américo Ghioldi and the teacher Delfina Varela Domínguez de Ghioldi, on 84 Ambrosetti Street, in the heart of the Caballito neighborhood. Other homes that were marked with red crosses were those of Pedro Aramburu, Isaac Rojas, the relatives of the deceased Eduardo Lonardi, Arturo Frondizi, Monsignor Manuel Tato, Alfredo Palacios, among others.






The government had only recently been aware that a conspiracy was being prepared, although it did not know precisely its scope or date. In early June, several signs, including the appearance of painted crosses, suggested that the uprising was imminent. For this reason, before President Aramburu left Buenos Aires accompanied by the Ministers of the Army and the Navy for a scheduled visit to the cities of Santa Fe and Rosario, it was decided to sign undated decrees and leave them in the hands of Vice President Rojas to to be able to proclaim martial law, if circumstances demanded it.





On June 8, the police detained hundreds of Peronist union soldiers to discourage mass worker participation in the planned movements. The rebels began the uprising between 11 p.m. and midnight on Saturday, June 9, gaining control of the 7th Infantry Regiment based in La Plata, and temporary possession of radio stations in several cities in the interior. In Santa Rosa, province of La Pampa, the rebels quickly took over the military district headquarters, the police department, and the city center. In the Federal Capital, loyal officers, alerted hours before the imminent coup, were able to thwart in a short time the attempt to take over the Army Mechanics School, and its adjacent arsenal, the Palermo regiments, and the Field Non-Commissioned Officers School of May.




Only in La Plata were the rebels able to take advantage of their initial victory, with the help of the civilian group, to launch an attack against the headquarters of the provincial police and that of the Second Infantry Division. There, however, with reinforcements from the Army and Navy that came to support the Police, the rebels were forced to withdraw from the regiment's facilities where, after attacks by Air Force and Navy planes, they surrendered to 9 in the morning of the 10th. The air attacks on Santa Rosa, capital of La Pampa, also ended in the surrender or dispersion of the rebels, more or less at the same time, therefore the rebellion ended up being a failure.





General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, back in Buenos Aires after his brief visit to Santa Fe and Rosario, gave a speech on the National Network, in which he spoke about the events that occurred during the early hours of June 9.




The June 9 insurrection was crushed with a harshness that was unprecedented in the last years of Argentine history. For the first time in the 20th century, a government ordered executions when repressing an attempted rebellion. Under the provisions of martial law, proclaimed shortly after the first rebel attacks, the government decreed that anyone who disturbed order, with or without weapons, would be subjected to summary trial. Over the next three days, twenty-seven people faced firing squads.

During the night of June 9 to 10, when nine civilians and two officers were executed, the rebels still dominated a sector of La Plata and the possibility of workers' uprisings in Greater Buenos Aires and other places could not be discounted. Those first executions were, according to the government, an emergency reaction to frighten and prevent the rebellion from turning into a civil war. This would explain the government's speed in authorizing and making public the executions, a speed that was demonstrated in the lack of any kind of prior trial, in the inclusion, in those who faced the firing squads, of men who had been captured before proclaiming themselves martial law, and in the confusion of the communiqués during the night of June 9 to 10.




During that night, they began to exaggerate the number of rebel civilians shot and erroneously reported the identity of the executed officers, to instill fear in the rebels and prevent them from taking to the streets to try to participate in the movement.



On the afternoon of the 10th, a massive demonstration took place in the Plaza de Mayo, which gave rise to scenes of joy and relief, as anti-Peronist crowds flocked to the Plaza de Mayo to greet President Aramburu and Vice President Rojas, and ask punishments for nationalist/Peronist rebels.

There, Admiral Isaac F. Rojas gave a speech from the balcony of the Casa Rosada:



Similar scenes, although with the roles reversed, had occurred in the past, when Peronist crowds demanded revenge against the rebels in September 1951 and June 1955. Only this time the government paid more attention than Perón to the cry for blood. After this act in Plaza de Mayo, Vice President Rojas, the entire Military Consultative Board, Aramburu and the three military ministers, made the disastrous decision to shoot the prisoners who had participated in the revolution against the government.





Against the advice of some civilian politicians, including some members of the Advisory Board, who urged an end to the executions, including a delegation formed by Américo Ghioldi and other members of the Advisory Board who went to the Government House, to request clemency and that the executions and attempts of some generals who opposed the executions be put to an end by calling Arturo Frondizi to put pressure on the authorities, and even though officers who made up the martial courts recommended that the rebels be subjected to military justice ordinary, the members of the de facto government resolved to continue applying the punishments provided for in martial law.




By making that decision, they persuaded themselves that they were setting an example that would increase the authority of the government and discourage future attempts at rebellion, thus preventing the loss of more lives. It is not known whether the Military Junta, at the June 10 meeting, took into account the fact that the majority of those already executed were civilians and that if the executions were suspended, the military leaders would suffer lighter punishments than those civilians. The truth is that the Military Junta rejected the suggestion of the commander of Campo de Mayo, Colonel Lorio, in the sense of limiting the pending executions to that of one or two lower-ranking officers.



Admiral Rojas strongly opposed making exceptions for the most senior officers, considering that this was a violation of ethics that “history” would not forgive; He preferred to suspend all executions rather than take any measure that would allow military leaders to escape the punishment imposed on those who had followed them. Ultimately, the Military Junta assumed direct responsibility for ordering the execution, over the next two days, of nine officers and seven non-commissioned officers.




On June 12, Manrique went to look for Valle, convinced that the shootings would be interrupted, and took him to the Palermo Regiment, where they interrogated him and sentenced him to death. Aramburu was convinced of doing so and said that "if after we have shot non-commissioned officers and civilians we spare the life of the person most responsible, a general of the Nation who is head of the movement, we are creating a terrible precedent; it will seem that the law It is not the same for everyone and that nothing happens between friends or similar hierarchies; the idea that the law applies only to the unhappy will be consolidated.




At eight at night they told Valle's relatives that he would be executed at 10. His daughter went to ask Monsignor Manuel Tato, deported to Rome in June 1955 during the conflicts between Perón and the Catholic Church and who was targeted for Valle's movement, to do something. Tato spoke with the Apostolic Nuncio, who telegraphed the Pope to ask Aramburu for clemency. But the request was denied. Valle said goodbye to his daughter and gave her some letters, including one addressed to Aramburu in which he said "You will have the satisfaction of having murdered me (...) I retain all my serenity in the face of death. Our material failure is a great moral triumph (...) As a Christian, I stand before God, who died executed, forgiving my murderers."



Shortly after, several sailors took him to an internal courtyard and shot him there. Moments after Valle's execution, the government suspended the application of martial law, bowing to increasing pressure from civilians and the military demanding an end to executions.




The political parties grouped in the National Advisory Board supported the government against the uprising. There was a secret meeting of the Advisory Board, on June 10, in which everyone said that they agreed with what was decided and what was resolved was support for the government. There was nothing related to the executions. Only Frondizi demanded to Aramburu, the next day and in his personal capacity, that civilians not be shot.




Américo Ghioldi, who had sought to stop the executions, wrote an article for the newspaper La Vanguardia in which he developed a justification for them, after learning that General Valle's uprising sought the execution of the socialist leader himself, saying: "The milk of mercy. Now everyone knows that no one will try, without risking life, to alter the order because it means preventing the return to democracy. It seems that in political matters, Argentines need to learn that the letter in blood enters.



Juan Domingo Perón, in a letter to John William Cooke from his exile, was highly critical of the Valle uprising and blamed several of the members of the attempted revolution for betraying him during the events of September 1955, saying: "The frustrated military coup It is a logical consequence of the lack of prudence that characterizes the military. They are in a hurry, we do not have to be in a hurry. Those same soldiers who today feel plagued by the injustice and arbitrariness of the dictatorial scoundrel did not have the same decision. September 16, when I saw them hesitate before every order and every measure of repression of their comrades who today put them to death (...) If I had not realized the betrayal and had remained in Buenos Aires, they themselves "They would have killed me, if only to make merit with the victors."



The first to promote the memory of "the martyrs of June 9" would be the different neo-Peronist groups, such as the Popular Union of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, who would campaign in 1958 against Perón's order to vote for Arturo Frondizi in the presidential elections of this year.