Malvinas: May 27th on Goose Green

The 27th Was Hell

“On 2 April, I learnt that the islands had been recovered. At the time, I was serving as duty officer at the Military College, where I was an instructor to fourth-year cadets. That was where I found out that we had recovered them... It was a moment of tremendous joy,” Manresa says as he begins to tell his story.

A week later, I was appointed Officer Commanding A Company of the 12th Infantry Regiment “General Arenales”, based in Mercedes, Corrientes. When I arrived in Mercedes, I was ordered to move with the Regiment to cover a section of the border in Santa Cruz, an area between Río Turbio and Río Gallegos, as a precautionary measure. “There were indications that the Chileans might attack.”

Manresa recalls that A Company was made up of newly enlisted soldiers who had received virtually no training. He thought that, given a month in Santa Cruz, he could turn those recruits into lions. Some of the soldiers had completed primary school; others were illiterate, and for all of them the experience was something entirely new.

At Caleta Olivia, before reaching their destination, the Regiment’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ítalo Piaggi, gave them news they could never have imagined.

“We were going across to the Malvinas.”

We were all stunned, yet overcome by an indescribable sense of euphoria.

At around 20 April, they began crossing over to Puerto Argentino. Because of poor planning — something that would become all too common at various stages of the war — essential Regimental equipment was left behind on the mainland: the heavy weapons, the batteries for the communications equipment and a large proportion of the spades needed for digging trenches.

“Every section crossing to the Islands should have arrived fully equipped and ready to go straight into combat, rather than arriving merely as riflemen. Tactically, it was a mistake; strategically, it was another misguided decision born of improvisation.”

A month later, they would end up digging their positions with the bayonets from their rifles and the mugs issued to them for drinking.

The positions they initially occupied were near the airstrip at Darwin. On 1 May, the defence of the area around the airstrip began. They remained in that position until 22 May.

Those were anything but quiet days. The British made their presence felt in one way or another, making it impossible to train the soldiers under his command.

“To conduct training, you have to gather a group of soldiers together, and doing that was practically a death sentence if an air attack happened at that moment.”

By 22 May, a day had already passed since the British had landed at San Carlos Strait. Acting on my own initiative, without anyone ordering me to do so, I altered the defensive layout and moved my company.

“When I had placed them in the new defensive sector, I went to see the Regimental Commander to report what I had done... I went there thinking they were going to beat the living daylights out of me, and instead I was praised.”

That reaction worried me. None of my superiors seemed to have realised that we were no longer a reserve force — we were now on the front line. I returned to my position more disappointed than pleased.

For four days, they dug trenches and strengthened their defensive positions.

“We could say that the position was reasonably well organised. The trenches were the proper depth, the field of fire had been properly cleared, and we had managed to obtain twenty anti-personnel mines from the Air Force.”

Even so, the condition of the troops was far from what was required to face the battle that was approaching.

“The truth is that we weren’t sleeping because we knew the British were coming. The soldiers were extremely weak.”

At midday on the 25th, the situation took another turn.

“I was called to the command post and ordered to move four kilometres forwards. While they were giving me the order, I looked at the only topographical map we had and realised they were sending me into a hollow, into low ground surrounded by higher terrain...

“I went mad. I started shouting. I told them I had no problem carrying out any order, but the orders had to make sense. They were sending me into a bowl. It wouldn’t even be target practice — it would be idiot practice — and to make matters worse, we would be surrounded by high ground.”

On the morning of the 26th, they moved their positions forwards, and the British were now even closer.

At midday, he was summoned once again to the command post and ordered to carry out a spoiling attack towards Cerro Alberdi, a height of 750 metres.

“I had another fit of rage and disbelief...

‘Do you know the condition my troops are in? They’re exhausted soldiers with almost no training. We only arrived at this position this morning, we haven’t even prepared our defensive positions... and now you’re ordering me to abandon them and move farther forwards.’”

“I remember thinking, ‘This is it. You’ve reached the end of the road...’ It was an attack that had to be carried out at night, without any support whatsoever.”

“Night fell, and I set off with two sections. I left Lieutenant Garra behind and moved out with the 2nd and 3rd Sections, commanded by Malacalza and Bracco respectively, to carry out the spoiling attack.”

A spoiling attack is intended to disrupt and destroy as much of the enemy force as possible before withdrawing rapidly. Logic dictates that if an operation — in this case, the spoiling attack — puts the main operation, which was the defence, at risk, then that attack should not be carried out.

And we had not even finished digging our defensive positions.

But those were the orders, and I had to obey them.

I set off towards the objective. It was night. We advanced in column before deploying into an extended line, carrying our rifles loaded, with a round in the chamber, safety off and ready to fire.

Halfway up the slope, in unfamiliar terrain as we climbed the hill, one soldier fell and accidentally discharged his weapon.

The operation had now been compromised, so from that point onwards the entire section began firing towards the high ground where we believed the enemy to be.

I ordered a ceasefire, and we waited.

When there was no reaction, I sent an observation party forwards. They confirmed that there was no enemy presence, and so we returned.

We reached our positions as dawn was breaking, at around nine in the morning.

By the 27th, we had already gone through two long days without sleep and with practically nothing to eat.

HMS Arrow, which was providing direct support to the British forces, had been shelling us. Our sector covered about 1,200 metres, so the rounds were landing a little to one side or the other...

British aircraft came over at least three or four times, dropping bombs and then returning to strafe us with machine-gun fire.

They flew so low that we could see the pilots’ helmets.

They did it because they knew we had no anti-aircraft weapons in that sector.

In the early hours of the 28th, they attacked us.

When the British assault began, the sky suddenly lit up with the tracer rounds they were firing at us.

Exactly what I had predicted happened.

They had night-vision equipment. All we could do was see where their fire was coming from and shoot back in that direction.

The only thing I could do was issue clear, simple orders that could actually be carried out.

We had three sections — roughly 140 men — with no fire support, very few night-vision devices, and we were exhausted.

They had an entire regiment: four infantry companies, around 600 men, twice as many machine guns, direct fire support from a field artillery battery, HMS Arrow, night-vision equipment, well-rested and well-fed troops, Milan anti-tank missiles...

The combat-power ratio was approximately eighteen or twenty to one.

We were facing the third most powerful member of NATO...

I began the withdrawal towards the positions at Darwin, the same positions we had occupied on 22 May.

The 3rd Section arrived with fourteen men. The 1st Section arrived with thirteen, and half an hour later Malacalza arrived with fifteen men from the 2nd Section.

My soldiers did more than was

War of Paraguay: Battle of Humaitá

Battle of Humaitá

Battle of Humaitá – 18 February 1868

During the War of the Triple Alliance, Marcos Paz, Vice President of the Argentine Republic, died in Buenos Aires from a cholera epidemic brought back from the front, which spread like a curse throughout the summer of 1867–68. The truth is that the Brazilians—by then almost the sole owners of the war, as only the Empire was sending reinforcements and arms—grew serious with Mitre after the disastrous defeat at Tuyú-Cué, and pressured him into returning to Buenos Aires. Constitutionally, his presence was not required, even after Paz’s death, since the Cabinet continued functioning (there was no law governing presidential vacancy), and only eight months remained in the presidential term. But Brazil was eager to hasten the end of the war.

With Mitre removed (never to return), prospects brightened for Brazil. Marshal Caxias resumed command of the allied forces. Perhaps he had never read Frederick the Great, but unlike Mitre, he knew how to win battles.

With the Commander-in-Chief out of the way, things moved swiftly. On 19 January, Admiral Inácio forced the passage at Humaitá; by the 24th, two Brazilian monitors reached Asunción and bombarded the Paraguayan capital. With the river now under Brazilian control, it became impossible for Marshal Solano López to hold the fortifications at Humaitá and Curupaytí. On 10 March, he began withdrawing the bulk of his army via the Chaco route, leaving behind just 4,000 men at Humaitá to cover the retreat. In dugouts, barges, and rafts, the decimated Paraguayan troops—who had defended the Curupaytí–Humaitá line with heroism beyond imagination—crossed the Paraguay River and headed north through the Chaco. At Monte Lindo, they crossed the river again and finally camped at San Fernando. This operation was a feat of leadership and courage: an entire army, with its supplies, wounded, and sick, evacuating a compromised position in the presence of the enemy. They crossed the river twice without, as Arturo Bray notes, “the Brazilian fleet even realising the bold double manoeuvre”.

Colonel Martínez remained in Humaitá as a decoy, to tie down the allied army. But by then the once-impenetrable fortress had lost its strategic purpose. In July, Martínez received orders to abandon it with his remaining men, spiking the 180 cannons that could not be transported. Yet the impatient Marshal Osório was determined to seize the fortress by force and launched an attack with 8,000 men. Martínez responded in Humaitá much as Díaz had in Curupaytí: he let the attackers approach and then unleashed a deadly storm of artillery fire. Osório paid dearly for his ambition to storm the fortress and was ultimately forced to withdraw. Thus ended the last great Paraguayan victory of the war. But unlike Mitre, Osório had the foresight to order a timely retreat and managed to save most of his men.

The cambá (Black Brazilian troops) would enter Humaitá and Curupaytí only after the last Paraguayan soldier had evacuated them on 24 July. On the night of the 23rd, Martínez had sent out the final detachments—men and women—by river. At dawn on the 24th, the Brazilians raised the imperial flag over the now-legendary fortress; shortly beforehand, they had done the same at Curupaytí.

Martínez’s retreat through the Chaco was far from successful. The heroic defenders of the fortress had sacrificed themselves to protect the withdrawal of the main army. As they made their way through the Chaco, they were harassed by vastly superior enemy forces and bombarded from the river by the fleet. Inácio and Osório were determined to exact revenge on Martínez for the three years during which Humaitá had resisted them. Eventually, the depleted Paraguayan garrison was encircled at Isla Poi. They held out for ten days, but hunger and overwhelming numbers forced their surrender. These were the last Paraguayan troops remaining in that theatre of war. Moved by the scene, General Gelly y Obes had the Argentine forces march past “the great heroes of the American epic.” A noble gesture that should fill us with pride.

For a Paraguayan, surrender was unthinkable—even if starvation made it impossible to move, and the lack of ammunition rendered any response to enemy fire futile. Solano López, by now the frenzied “soldier of glory and misfortune”, as Bray puts it, was merciless with those who did not share his unwavering resolve. Victory was no longer possible, and attempts to secure an honourable peace had come to nothing. Thus, for Paraguayans, the only path remaining was death—a chance to give the world a lesson in Guaraní courage.

Colonel Martínez had conducted himself as a hero in the defence of Humaitá and in his doomed retreat through the Chaco. But he had surrendered. It did not matter that he had only 1,200 men and women, lacking uniforms, most with only tattered trousers and military caps, no gunpowder for their flintlocks, and no food—facing a force twenty times their size. The Marshal had surrendered, and that was forbidden for a Paraguayan. The word “surrender” had been erased from the national vocabulary. López declared the defender of Humaitá a traitor.

Three years of unjust and unequal war had transformed the refined Francisco Solano López into a wild beast. He was resolved to die with his country and could neither understand nor forgive any other course of action—not even from his closest friends, his most capable commanders, or his own family. Paraguay came before all else, and for it, he would sacrifice his dearest affections. His actions were certainly not “humane”, but in that final agony, López was no longer a man bound by conventional morality. He had become the very symbol of a Paraguay determined to die standing—like a jaguar of the forest, relentlessly pursued by its hunters.

It was in this final stage of the war that the legend of the monster, the bloodthirsty tyrant, and the great executioner took shape—a narrative that would fuel half a century of Paraguayan liberal historiography. He was accused of terrible acts—and not all were inventions of the enemy. Some accounts are deeply disturbing, but we must place ourselves in the land and time to judge them—amid the tragedy-shrouded Paraguay of the war’s final days. Think of the thousands of Paraguayans who died in battle defending their land, or who perished of hunger or disease behind the lines. Only then can one begin to judge a leader who could not forgive those who showed weakness, who spoke of surrender, or who harboured thoughts other than dying in battle. To understand him, one would need the heart of a Paraguayan and a soul torn by the looming collapse of their homeland.

Terrible things would follow: the execution of Bishop Palacios; the flogging and execution of Colonel Martínez’s wife; the death of López’s own brothers, accused of conspiracy; the imprisonment and whipping of his siblings—even his mother. In this tragic atmosphere, the figure of the implacable Marshal looms large, convinced that for the Paraguayans, under his command, there remained only one path: to contest every inch of their beloved soil—or die.

Source:

• César Díaz – Memorias Inéditas, published by Adriano Díaz – Buenos Aires (1878)

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

• Portal: www.revisionistas.com.ar

• Adolfo Saldías – Historia de la Confederación Argentina – Ed. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires (1951)

Reproduction permitted with citation: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Civil War: Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Monument erected on the site of the Battle of Campos de Álvarez, fought on 31 January 1852

Juan Manuel de Rosas and Ángel Pacheco, respectively, facilitated for the Empire of Brazil and for Urquiza the easy success they achieved in their triumphant march into the interior of Buenos Aires Province. Rosas referred all matters to Pacheco, and Pacheco, in turn, failed to take timely or effective action. One need only consider the decisive events that shaped the operations culminating in the Battle of Caseros.

A month before Oribe’s capitulation, Colonel Martiniano Chilavert submitted a memorandum to Rosas in which he presented numerous reasons and favourable prospects for having Oribe move to engage Urquiza and, at the same time, preparing an army to invade Brazil. Rosas approved the memorandum and said he would consult Pacheco—but meanwhile allowed Oribe’s army to be undermined.

When Urquiza was gathering his forces in Gualeguaychú, Chilavert again urged Rosas to defend the Paraná River line, offering to lead the defence himself. Rosas responded that he would consult Pacheco. Soon thereafter, Pascual Echagüe was forced to abandon Santa Fe. When Urquiza moved from Rosario and Pacheco ordered Lucio Norberto Mansilla to withdraw from positions along the Paraná, Mansilla assumed this was to reposition him with infantry and artillery to the northern front dominated by Lagos with 8,000 cavalry, in order to defend the line of the Arroyo del Medio. Pacheco would then reinforce him from Luján, and together they would present battle to Urquiza. In the event of defeat, they could retreat to the barracks at Santos Lugares. This strategy would also buy Rosas time to raise the southern campaign in a unified effort and place Urquiza in a critical position, encircled and cut off from his supply lines. Mansilla presented this logic to Rosas, who again directed him to consult with Pacheco. Urquiza then advanced his vanguard to the Arroyo del Medio.

When Urquiza reached that point, and Pacheco insisted that Hilario Lagos retreat to headquarters, Lagos protested to Rosas, stating that he and his soldiers were determined to stand and defend the invaded land. Rosas responded affirming his confidence in Lagos's patriotism and advised him to harmonise his actions with General Pacheco's orders.

There were moments when Rosas showed signs of reacting—particularly when he sensed the disorganisation of his forces. He summoned Major Antonino Reyes, commander at Santos Lugares, and spoke of convening a war council of senior officers. But the impulse passed quickly. It was Pacheco—his constant reliance on Pacheco—that caused him to waver. Still, he told Reyes: “I’ll need you by my side; we must urgently appoint someone to command your battalion, the coastal battalions, and other units that together would make up about 1,500 men with six artillery pieces.” Reyes proposed Colonel Pedro José Díaz, a seasoned officer residing in Buenos Aires since being captured at Quebracho Herrado (28 November 1840) with the last remnants of Lavalle’s infantry. Díaz responded: “Tell the Governor I appreciate the trust he places in me; though a 'Unitarian', I will fulfil my duty as a soldier under the orders of my country’s government.” This led to the formation of that infantry brigade—the only one that, alongside Chilavert’s renowned artillery, held fire until the very end against the imperial forces.

Pacheco’s decisions, however, consistently cleared the path for the allied advance. On 26 January, as the allies reached Arroyo del Gato and moved on to Laguna del Tigre (near Chivilcoy), he ordered all troops withdrawn from the “Guardia de Luján” (present-day Mercedes), leaving only 600 men under Colonel Lagos—the sole commander actively resisting the enemy. Yet on the 28th, Pacheco wrote to Lagos suggesting he proceed as he saw fit with his forces, referring vaguely to movements supposedly made on the night of the 26th. He claimed that Major Albornoz was withdrawn because Lagos’s division was strong enough on its own.

But Pacheco’s assumptions were false—no such movements had occurred. Moreover, he ordered the withdrawal of all reserves, leaving Lagos isolated with a small division facing the enemy. Lagos replied on 28 January:

“Colonel Lagos, sir, made no movement whatsoever with the divisions encamped at Arroyo de Balta on the night of the 26th. I was informed by Major Albornoz that Your Excellency had ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Guardia de Luján on that same day. If I have been forced to engage the enemy solely on their left flank, it was because I was reprimanded for advancing with my force to Laguna de las Toscas, which I calculated (correctly) would be the enemy’s route.”

At the same time, serious accusations circulated against General Pacheco—some alleged that between 26 and 27 January he had established secret contact with General Urquiza, even removing Colonel Bustos’s aides from the area around Luján to that end. Bustos relayed the matter to Rosas through Major Reyes. Rosas simply replied: “He’s mad, sir.” The same was said of a Justice of the Peace who travelled from his post to confirm the rumour, and even of a prominent member of the legislature who echoed the report: “He’s mad,” Rosas repeated.

The allied army advanced from Chivilcoy to Luján, arriving on the morning of 29 January. By the 30th, its vanguard was positioned at Campos de Álvarez, just over two leagues from some of Buenos Aires’ forward divisions, located along the left bank of the Río de las Conchas (today the Reconquista River), defending the Márquez Bridge. Pacheco had just crossed the bridge without issuing orders and took the road to his estancia at El Talar.

Upon hearing of the enemy’s approach, Rosas instructed Lagos to engage them in battle, assuring him that General Pacheco would defend the Márquez Bridge with superior forces. With his own division and those of Colonels Domingo Sosa and Ramón Bustos (son of the Córdoba caudillo Juan Bautista Bustos), Lagos gathered approximately 2,500 men. At dawn on 31 January, he organised three parallel columns, deployed light cavalry to the front, and advanced to confront the enemy.

The allied army had formed in an extended line on the left flank, matching Lagos’s direction. General Juan Pablo López held the left; Colonel Galarza commanded the Entre Ríos cavalry in the centre; Colonels Aguilar and Caraballo positioned their divisions on either side. The allied force numbered about 5,000. The elite Buenos Aires squadrons clashed with the seasoned cavalry of Entre Ríos. These initially wavered when Lagos personally led charges that earned him lasting renown in Argentine military history. But the allied regiments, reinforced by López’s timely support and flanking manoeuvres, overwhelmed Lagos’s inexperienced squadrons. He then regrouped his best troops, led a final charge to stall the enemy, and withdrew in good order to the Márquez Bridge, losing around 200 men—including Commander Marcos Rubio—and several officers, weapons, and horses.

Allied reports and General César Díaz’s “Unpublished Memoirs” (pp. 265–267) claimed Lagos had 6,000 of the finest cavalry, and inconsistently reported both a lack of resistance and 200 casualties among Lagos’s forces, while stating the allies lost only 26 men. General Díaz had no direct knowledge, as he was two leagues from the battlefield and only joined the allied vanguard the next day. It was assumed Lagos still commanded the same force with which he had withdrawn from the northern line, but in reality, at Álvarez he had:

• His own division, militia from Bragado, and veteran detachments: 600 men

• Sosa’s division: 1,300 men

• Bustos’s division: 600 men

Echagüe’s and Cortina’s divisions did not participate. The bulk of Lagos’s Bragado division had been redirected by Pacheco across the Márquez Bridge.

Lagos expected to find Pacheco at the bridge with infantry and artillery, as instructed. But Pacheco was not there—he had left not a single man. Lagos requested orders, reporting he was still skirmishing with the enemy’s advance units. From Santos Lugares came the reply: “Hold your position.” On 11 February, the entire allied army assembled at Álvarez. Lagos informed Santos Lugares, and only late that day was he told that if the enemy attempted to cross the river, he should retreat to headquarters.

In this context, Pacheco resigned as General-in-Chief, stating Rosas was already at Santos Lugares in command of the army. Rosas took it as a personal blow. Showing the resignation to Major Reyes, he said: “Don’t you see, sir? Pacheco is mad, sir.” Yet, as Pacheco had informed all commanders of his resignation and urged them to report directly to Rosas, Rosas responded that he had “not accepted General Pacheco’s request; and given the importance of his role and his distinguished performance, the illustrious general continues in command.”

Rosas, however, flew into a rage when told Pacheco had failed to defend the Márquez Bridge with the troops withdrawn from Luján, as previously ordered: “It cannot be—surely the General Pacheco could not have disobeyed the orders of the Governor of the Province!” On the night of 31 January, Benjamín Victorica arrived at Santos Lugares on Pacheco’s behalf. Rosas dismissed him without hearing the message. The following afternoon, Pacheco himself arrived. Reyes announced him and returned to speak with Colonel Bustos. Moments later, both men were astonished to see Pacheco leave Rosas’s quarters, head down, without speaking, mount his horse, and ride to Witt’s estate, from where he witnessed the subsequent military events.

The victory at Álvarez was naturally celebrated in Urquiza’s camp and boosted allied morale. In light of the ease of their progress, they began to believe—perhaps rightly—that they would soon enter Buenos Aires with weapons in hand. In Rosas’s camp, although the defeat was keenly felt, it produced no outward sign. On the night of 1 February, some 400 men deserted from the allies and joined Santos Lugares, greeted by cheers from their former comrades.

Among the Buenos Aires population, strong support for Rosas persisted, rooted in a cultural loyalty reinforced by shared adversity and struggle. Many soldiers believed they were defending national honour against a foreign invasion. Was that merely poetic? Perhaps, but it was the poetry of honour—an inner truth resonating within individual conscience. The rural population saw only the astonishing fact of the Brazilian Empire’s invasion and rallied around Rosas as the personification of national salvation.

General César Díaz, commander of the eastern division of the allied army, observed:

“The people of Luján displayed the same studied indifference as those of Pergamino; and to the outward signs of sympathy for Rosas, they added actions clearly reflecting their sentiments. They exaggerated the size and quality of Rosas’s forces, recalled the many political storms he had weathered, and were convinced he would once again emerge victorious.”

Upon the full allied army’s arrival at Álvarez, Díaz recounts Urquiza’s thoughts:

“I went to visit the General and found him in the Major General’s tent. He spoke of the bitter disappointment in the spirit we had expected from Buenos Aires. Until then, we had not faced any resistance. The General said, ‘If it were not for my interest in promoting the Republic’s organisation, I should have remained allied to Rosas, for I am persuaded that he is a very popular man in this country.’”
And Díaz concludes:
“If Rosas was so publicly hated, or no longer feared, as was claimed, why did the people not seize this opportunity to realise their long-held desires? Why did they show such exaggerated zeal in defending their own servitude? From what I witnessed, I am deeply convinced that Rosas’s authority in 1852 was as strong—perhaps stronger—than it had been a decade earlier, and that neither popular submission nor confidence in his leadership had ever abandoned him.”

Sources:

• César Díaz – Unpublished Memoirs – Adriano Díaz Publications – Buenos Aires (1878)

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

• Portal: www.revisionistas.com.ar

• Adolfo Saldías – Historia de la Confederación Argentina – Ed. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires (1951)

Reproduction permitted with citation: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Malvinas: Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Part 1

Background

Consolidation of the British Beachhead at San Carlos

Following the successful attacks carried out by the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) on the afternoon of 21 May, during the night of 21–22 May, the enemy undertook an intense effort to land the bulk of its forces and deploy security elements to the high ground surrounding the beachhead. All available helicopters were used successively for that purpose.

On the same afternoon of 21 May, numerous troop movements were observed, transporting personnel, heavy weapons, and air defence systems to the northwest of Cerro Alberdi, as well as to the heights southeast of San Carlos settlement and Montevideo Hill.

By the afternoon of 22 May, when the FAA resumed its attacks, the enemy had succeeded in consolidating its landing, with an effective ground-based air defence network already established around the beachhead.

On 21 May, the Joint Command Malvinas requested continuation of aerial bombing, which was carried out as mentioned above, although the results could not be assessed. Requests for aerial photography could not be fulfilled due to active enemy air defences.

On 22 May, since the heavy mortars of Regiment 12 (RI 12) had not yet arrived at Puerto Argentino, orders were issued to embark two artillery pieces from the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) with their crews aboard an Argentine Coast Guard vessel. This ship departed for Darwin at first light on 23 May. Near the entrance to Choiseul Bay, the vessel was attacked by British Harrier aircraft, which inflicted severe damage, forcing the ship to run aground on the northern shore.

A fire broke out onboard. The crew managed to disembark and take cover under makeshift shelters along the beach. Later, they were able to recover equipment and supplies from the ship, including materials for treating the wounded. On 24 May, during a risky helicopter operation, the personnel were evacuated, along with the artillery pieces and ammunition, which were transported to Darwin, where they were immediately assigned to defensive positions. The operation was secured by a patrol under the command of an officer dispatched from Darwin. Once the mission was completed, the patrol had to withdraw on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters. Only one of the rescued artillery pieces could be brought back into service; the second had been damaged in the bombing and could not be repaired.

On the morning of 23 May, British aircraft attacked south of Howard a formation of Army helicopters that had departed Puerto Argentino en route to that location. The helicopters were carrying supplies and heavy mortars for RI 12 (received on that date), conducting reconnaissance south of San Carlos, and attempting to extract personnel from 601 Commando Company, who were operating in the area of RI 5 on a previously assigned mission.

In this attack, two Puma helicopters and one Augusta A-209 helicopter were destroyed. A second Puma, piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Alberto Pérez Cometo, managed to evade the enemy strike, returned to the area, and rescued the crews of the downed helicopters — risking a second enemy attack to save his comrades. Subsequently, patrols from RI 5 recovered the heavy weapons and part of the ammunition.

On the same day, 23 May, following intense air attacks, the British seriously damaged the Carcarañá vessel, which was anchored in San Carlos Strait near Soledad Island Bay. Another British air attack hit the Bahía Buen Suceso, anchored in Fox Bay, causing damage. The vessel was later repaired and restored to sailing condition.

On 24 May at 21:00, the Commander of the Coastal Group issued the Commander of Task Force Mercedes (RI 12) the defence operations order, which was received on 25 May at 18:00, followed by an order for a disruption attack, received on 26 May at 08:30.

On 26 May, two 105 mm howitzers from GA Aerot 4, along with their crews, were airlifted to Darwin by Army helicopters to reinforce the guns received the day before. They were assigned fire missions against Cerro Alberdi and Monte Osborne. As previously mentioned, only three artillery pieces were operational.

Operations of Task Force Mercedes from 1 May to 27 May (Darwin Position)

By 30 April, RI 12 had completed the concentration of its forces, except for Company B (still at Monte Challenger under orders of the Joint Command Malvinas), the Signals Section and part of the Service Company in Puerto Argentino, and the Heavy Mortar Section, which had not yet been transported from the mainland. The Commando Company and the remaining elements of the Service Company completed their movement to Darwin on 22 May.

In the afternoon, the RI 12 Commander attended a briefing by the Commander of RI 25 on the situation and deployment of his unit. He also met with the Commander of the Vicecommodore Pedrozo Military Air Base, who briefed him on the deployment of available resources and the measures taken with the local population. Reconnaissance was carried out alongside company commanders and members of the Logistics Planning Team (PL My).

It continued to rain, as it had in previous days. Since arriving in Malvinas, troops and officers had been operating with damp clothing. Nevertheless, overall health conditions remained acceptable, although several cases of frostbite in the lower limbs were reported. The unit was bivouacked near the airstrip.

The RI 12 Commander ordered that the companies bivouacked near the airstrip immediately relocate to the positions reconnoitred the previous afternoon by Company A. By 06:00, the movement was completed, and the elements were positioned 4 km from their original location.

At 08:30, the anticipated British air attack on Darwin began. Four Sea Harrier aircraft struck the area around the airstrip. A Pucará aircraft, with engines running, took an almost direct hit. Two more bombs fell on the runway, and a fourth landed near a Jeep carrying personnel.

At Fanning Head, the SBS accepted the surrender of Argentine soldiers — marking the first encounter between the two infantry forces.

Deployment and Combat Readiness in the Darwin–Goose Green Area

The unit takes up its assigned positions. All light and heavy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and the large field gear bags —impractical for troops in operations— must be transported manually and across open terrain. The transport means belonging to the Military Air Base (helicopters, jeeps, and tractors) cannot be used, as they are reserved for exclusive use by the Air Force.

Digging of positions begins using short-handled shovels — the only available entrenching tools, which are in limited supply. Improvised tools are also used. Only by nightfall are troops able to have a hot meal. Since arrival, it has rained almost constantly.

As of 2 May, Argentine forces deployed in Darwin–Goose Green number 642 men, with 202 from the Air Force (FAA).

On 3 May, reports from the BAM Commander suggest that the 1 May Harrier attack on the airstrip may have been guided from the ground, allegedly with assistance from a local resident. Control measures are adopted over the civilian population, also intended to protect them from renewed British air and naval strikes. The population is gathered inside the local church. This decision provokes significant complaints from the Kelpers.

On 4 May, at first light, a Chinook helicopter from the FAA transports the Deputy Commander of RI 12, one officer, and 18 soldiers from the Commando Company still stationed in the Monte Challenger area to Darwin, along with a food resupply.

Shortly after, a British air raid targets the airstrip from east to west. A Sea Harrier is shot down; the pilot ejects but is found dead, only 20 metres from the runway threshold. He is identified as Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. The wreckage and body show numerous small-calibre bullet impacts, indicating that concentrated light weapons fire can be effective against low-flying aircraft.

During this action, the courageous conduct of Military Chaplain Santiago Mora is noteworthy, as he moves among positions under enemy fire, providing spiritual support to the troops.

Personnel continue to improve their positions and lay mines and obstacles. At 17:30, a formation is held and honours rendered to Lt. Nicholas Taylor, followed by the burial of his remains.

Due to food shortages, sheep begin to be requisitioned for troop rations. The situation is reported by radio to higher command. On 9 May, the food supply situation becomes critical and is reiterated to command. A shipment of provisions for 10 days is arranged and begins arriving on 10 May.

On 11 May, a helicopter delivers food for 7 days. At 23:30, the ship Montsunen arrives carrying 100 drums of JP-1 fuel (helicopter fuel), 97 drums of petrol, and 100 crates of 105 mm ammunition.

On 13 May, the Commander of the Coastal Task Group issues an operations order to detach a reduced-strength company-sized element to occupy the San Carlos area. Urgent allocation of support weapons is requested for this.

On 17 May at 09:00, two air attacks strike anti-air and heavy weapons positions near the airstrip and within the C Company / RI 12 sector. Numerous Beluga-type bomblets are scattered across the terrain. This is the first air raid since 4 May. That night, starting at 23:00, British helicopters once again overfly the area.

On 18 May, the BAM and TF Mercedes Commanders conduct a joint inspection of positions to coordinate use of FAA and Army resources. It is agreed to employ 500 lb bombs as interceptive fire. A request is made to Coastal Task Command for anti-personnel mines and detonators.

Rotationally, troops use designated barns to dry clothing and conduct physical recovery — a system in place since 5 May, yielding satisfactory results despite tactical constraints.

On 19 May, the Signals Section finally arrives from Puerto Argentino, though without its equipment, which remains in Comodoro Rivadavia, awaiting transport. First Lieutenant Ernesto Kishimoto, the Section Commander, reorganises the existing system. Civilian radio equipment is requisitioned for wireless communication, both with higher command and between company and platoon commanders. These sets are mounted on jeeps due to their battery requirements. Company leaders lack both wired and wireless communication with their sections, and sections have no comms with their squads. A wired network is improvised using discarded materials sourced from the local population.

That evening, from 21:00, British helicopters again overfly the area but withdraw under fire.

On 20 May, the health of the troops begins to deteriorate. Officers and soldiers suffer from harsh weather conditions (constant humidity and cold, especially at night) and insufficient food. Measures are taken to prioritise care for the worst affected. Some officers and NCOs, despite illness, refuse to abandon their posts. Twelve soldiers are hospitalised in an improvised infirmary, nine of them due to malnutrition.

On 21 May at 09:00, a 120 mm mortar section (one piece) arrives under an officer. From 09:00 to 11:00, intense naval gunfire is received from the northwest, directed by a British helicopter. Fire is accurate and targets anti-aircraft and heavy weapons positions. One FAA 20 mm cannon is knocked out, though no casualties occur. Between 11:00 and 12:00, enemy aircraft conduct two simulated attack runs.

On 22 May at 09:30, two air strikes target the runway. One enemy aircraft appears damaged and is seen heading out to sea.

Night Attacks, Artillery Movements and Contact with the Enemy

On 24 May, 30 troops previously attacked by Harriers and helicopters 17 km from Goose Green, are airlifted to the position from the Iguazú Coast Guard ship. Patrols are dispatched to recover two 105 mm artillery pieces and ammunition. That night, the enemy launches illumination rounds and conducts naval fire against the position.

During the morning of 26 May, four air raid alerts are issued. Between 04:20 and 12:30, heavy naval shelling hits the position. A Company, ordered to relocate to new frontline positions at the isthmus entrance, becomes pinned down in open terrain.

At 08:30, an order for a disruption attack is received from the Coastal Task Commander. It includes:

1. Confirm the current defence order.

2. Conduct a night attack (26/27 May) with one infantry company against potential enemy concentrations south and southwest of Cerro Alberdi, supported by reconnaissance elements in Sussex.

3. Based on outcomes, launch a second similar attack the following night (27/28 May).

4. All operations must be conducted at night; other units are to continue improving defences.

Between 12:30 and 13:00, four air attacks are launched from east–west and north–south approaches. One enemy aircraft is shot down.

During the afternoon, reconnaissance of the new position is carried out. Artillery pieces are manually moved due to the Land Rovers being unfit for towing. Fire missions are calculated and executed that night on hills to the north and northeast, using 30% of available ammunition.

A Company advances north of the isthmus, preceded by Reconnaissance Section patrols. The advance is made in wedge formation, with the 1st Section deployed. With extreme effort, they reach the vicinity of Camilla Creek, without encountering enemy forces. From that line, the company commander reports back and is ordered to return. The troops are exhausted.

The rest of the unit continues intense work, constructing new positions and moving equipment and supplies.

At 23:00, a patrol 20 km southeast of the position reports a large vessel sailing in Darwin Bay. One artillery piece is repositioned and opens long-range fire toward the presumed enemy ship. The South Sector Commander is ordered to deploy patrols to the beach to monitor for possible landings.

At 04:00, Coastal Task Command orders the deployment of a reduced section to Saladero (18 km northwest of Goose Green) to verify possible presence of the British ship Uganda and determine its mission.

A patrol under Sergeant First Class Berdugo is launched but subsequently loses all contact. Transported by FAA helicopter, they cannot be retrieved due to lack of air assets. Later, it is learned that after repeatedly evading British forces, the patrol was captured on 7 June following a brief engagement.

Operational Development

General Situation as of 27 May

The Reconnaissance Section, the Combat Advance, and A Company, as well as one section of the Commando Company deployed west of Darwin, have not yet managed to establish their positions or transport their logistical supplies. Notably, A Company and the Reconnaissance Section are exhausted due to the operation carried out during the night of 26/27 May, combined with the hardships, physical strain, and tension of the preceding days.

On the high ground to the north-northeast and east of Boca House, the RI 8 Section (under Second Lieutenant Aliaga) has been positioned, along with a group of service personnel equivalent to two understrength sections. To equip the latter with FAL rifles, it was necessary to withdraw such weapons from the personnel of 4th Airborne Artillery Group and the Section of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group, who were instead issued 11.25 mm pistols.

To the north of Salinas Beach, one section of the Argentine Air Force is operating independently, under the direct command of the BAM Commander (totaling 202 personnel).

The forces of Task Force Mercedes, with the exception of the central sector between Goose Green and the airstrip (where small FAA elements operate independently), are cut off from one another. This situation forces the Regiment Commander to deploy service personnel with limited training in frontline positions. Communications between the Task Force Commander and company commanders, and between them and subordinate levels, are entirely inadequate due to the unit never having received its communications equipment.

With regard to the personnel and materiel situation within Task Force Mercedes, it is important to note that most of the heavy equipment embarked on the ship Córdoba never arrived. The unit has the following support weapons in service:

• Two 81 mm mortars, each with 126 rounds of standard and high-capacity ammunition

• One 120 mm mortar, used with limitations, as its base plate had been welded to the tube

• Two additional 120 mm mortars, left on the mainland, arrived at Puerto Argentino on the night of 27 May, and were redirected to Darwin on the afternoon of 28 May, by which time the battle was essentially over and they did not take part in it

• One 105 mm recoilless rifle, without a sighting device

• Ten MAG general-purpose machine guns

• One 12.7 mm machine gun, mounted on a requisitioned jeep

B Company, detached and deployed to the Monte Kent area under the command of the Joint Command Malvinas, arrived in the combat zone —minus one section that remained in Puerto Argentino— at nightfall on 28 May 1982. It was airlanded 4 km south of Goose Green, at a point when the situation had already become critical.

C Company, formed from a redistribution of NCOs and conscripted soldiers, is organised into two rifle sections, each with four squads. Its only support weapon is a single MAG machine gun. Of the company's 22 NCOs, 16 are acting corporals from the Sergeant Cabral NCO School.

The Service Company has only part of its personnel present, since most members of the Intendance and Ordnance Sections remain in Puerto Deseado (loading and unloading the Córdoba) and in Comodoro Rivadavia (airlifting equipment and supplies), and have not yet arrived in the theatre of operations.

Pucara's Rocket Launcher Transportations

Formation and Composition of Ec Güemes (San Carlos Area)

To form Ec Güemes —operating in the San Carlos area— the following elements have been employed: the Company Commander, the Company Command Group, and 1st Section of C Company / RI 25; along with the Support Section of RI 12, composed of two 81 mm mortars (out of the four available to the unit) and two 105 mm recoilless rifles (out of three available).

As a result, the remaining support weapons available for combat are one 105 mm recoilless rifle, which lacks a sighting device, and two 81 mm mortars.

The A Battery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) is composed of three howitzers, a third of their ammunition having been expended in fire missions between 26 and 27 May. An additional cannon, recovered following the attack on GC Iguazú, could not be repaired and remains out of use.

3rd Battery, 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (3/B GADA 601) is equipped with two 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, integrated into the air defence system established by the Condor Military Air Base (J BAM Cóndor).

Argentine Air Force (FAA) personnel assigned to the BAM are deployed in air defence roles around the runway, in securing installations and deployed equipment, and in forming a section-level defensive position northwest of the airstrip.

The unified command structure under the Task Force Commander —intended to coordinate ground defensive operations— was not ultimately established.

Pucará rocket launcher installed on top of a tin shed

Company Leadership and Logistical Situation – Task Force Mercedes

The company commanders of RI 12 assigned to lead these detachments are not the unit’s original organic officers, as they were replaced in order to complete the organisational structure. The appointed commanders are senior in rank to the original company commanders, who now remain with their respective elements as executive officers.

Logistical Situation of Task Force Mercedes

Rations:
Since 15 May, food has been reduced to one ration per day due to the shortage of supplies. Distribution has been severely hampered by the lack of transport, thermal containers, and the long distances involved. At the start of the British ground assault, the force had autonomy for 3 to 5 days.

Although airdrops of food supplies were carried out on 25 and 26 May to extend this autonomy, part of the cargo was lost, and another portion was retained by the FAA detachment for its own needs. As a result, only a limited amount of provisions reached Task Force Mercedes.

Personnel have, in general, lost a significant amount of weight due to the imposed restrictions since 1 May, compounded by prior shortages since the unit left its home garrison. This situation, combined with accumulated physical strain, has had a clear impact on morale.

Equipment and Materials:
No spare parts, replacement materials, or equipment are available. Of particular concern is the lack of cleaning equipment for weapons, which has had a very negative impact on their performance — especially under the prevailing climatic conditions.

Ammunition:
The ammunition allocation for personal weapons is sufficient for 3 to 5 days of combat. The quantity of available rounds for 81 mm and 120 mm mortars is very limited. Ammunition stocks for the 105 mm guns are satisfactory (3 to 5 days of combat). The FAA garrison maintains its own supply depots.

Argentine soldiers surrender at Goose Green


Infanteria.mil.ar

Conquest of the Desert: Arbolito, the Ranquel Who Killed Rauch

The Story of the Ranquel “Arbolito”, the Native Who Beheaded Colonel Rauch

Saturday, 28 March 1829 dawned cloudy and cold on the Buenos Aires plains. The weak rays of sunlight breaking through the clouds were not enough to warm the men making camp at Las Vizcacheras, a spot a few kilometres south of the Salado River, near what is today the town of Gorchs, Buenos Aires Province.

They had marched all night from Laguna de las Perdices. Hungry and exhausted, they knew the enemy was close and could not afford to lower their guard. Commander Juan Aguilera ordered that, once the tents were up, everyone was to remain at their posts and on alert. There were about six hundred men, well armed with firearms, lassos and bolas, mostly Buenos Aires federal militiamen, organised into four squadrons and reinforced by a group of Ranquel warriors under Colonel Ventura Miñana.

By mid-morning, as the autumn sun began to take the chill out of the air, a courier arrived with news: the Unitarian forces under Colonel Federico Rauch, also around six hundred strong, were less than a league away and ready to attack.

The political climate was tense. Just two months earlier, the federal governor Manuel Dorrego had been overthrown and executed by the Unitarian Juan Lavalle, triggering a bitter civil conflict. Rauch, a European-born officer in Unitarian service, had been sent to hunt down and imprison federal fighters loyal to rancher Juan Manuel de Rosas.

The battle began before noon. Rauch advanced in three columns: the central column broke through the federal lines, inflicting heavy casualties, but on the flanks Aguilera’s men managed to prevail. Rauch did not realise the flanks had collapsed until he found himself surrounded. He tried to escape at full gallop, but Corporal Manuel Andrada brought down his horse with a boleadora. Once on the ground, a Ranquel named Nicasio Maciel — nicknamed Arbolito (“Little Tree”) for his height — finished him off by cutting off his head.

Rauch’s death caused an immediate stir. For Lavalle’s Unitarians, it was a heavy blow: they had lost an experienced officer who had played an important role in various campaigns. For the Federals, it was cause for celebration: they had removed a formidable adversary. But among the indigenous peoples who had suffered his harsh military campaigns, the news was felt as both relief and justice.

For the Ranquel, Catrielero and other frontier communities, Arbolito became a hero — the man who avenged years of abuses and violence, and whose act ended the life of one of the most feared military figures among the native peoples.

Fragment of the book “Mitos, leyendas y verdades de la Argentina indígenas”, by Andrés Bonatti

La Voz del Chubut

English Invasions: Battle of Pedriel

Battle of Perdriel

Lorenzo López Saves the Life of Gral.
Juan Martín de Pueyrredón
in the battle of Perdriel.

The colonel Gillespie not is the only English who praised the benevolence with which the conquerors were treated by the main families of Buenos Aires. And if well the gentlemen showed certain reluctance in political matters, "the ladies –says– us compensated with excess the absence of those matters, with the animated chat, the fascinating sweetness and, by what never fail in their purposes, the desire of pleasing." Ignacio Núñez adds that, except for objections related to points of religion, the English "were particularly distinguished by the main families of the city, and their generals walked arm in arm through the streets, with the Marcos, the Escaladas and Sarrateas." And the lieutenant Linch reassured his mother with a letter in which he said: "Here not me consider as an enemy; the kindnesses of which I am object in all parts and especially those that me dispense the noble families of Lastra, Terrada, Sarratea and Goyena, are very great for attempt to explain them with words."

Be what be about these refinements, and of one that other romance with which Buenos Aires gifted to the English, we know that to many Spaniards and Creoles dominated them the rancor, the indignation, the shame; as was seen in the rudeness of the countryman Guanes, which had to cost him a beating with belts and a night in the stocks, in the pride of a foul-mouthed girl of the inn. "Astonished the people at seeing conquered the city by a handful of men that could undo with stones," soon began to react. "All we fled to hide in the farms and in the fields; but with the purpose of avenging ourselves," tells us José Melián. They had to "combine some plan to shake off the yoke that the English just imposed on them," says Trigo.

With much secrecy, some patriots began to mature the idea of reconquering the country. "I, who desired it with eagerness –would say Zelaya– and who had many friends with whom I met, I resolved immediately to work in this sense."

Indeed: in the 46 days of English domination there were complaisant ones who entertained the invaders with their gatherings, their sweets, and their waltzes. There were helpful spies who, by night, brought them the small snack of their betrayal. "We had in the city some hidden enemies," tells Gillespie. There were others who already practiced the "do not get involved" inside the city or moving away from it with some pretext. But, also, there were those who risked themselves to vindicate the masculinity stained that should have been in half of Buenos Aires: those who would risk their fortunes and their lives to expel the intruders. Among these dissenters was Zelaya. He was then 24 years old.

Various subversive groups intended to harass the English, each one in their own way. Gerardo Esteve Llach, with the help of Pepe "the Blond" (José Alday), wanted "to gather a portion of sailors," to capture with them the English ships that were at anchor and take them to Montevideo. But the young Felipe de Sentenach convinced him that "it would be better if they tried to see if they could achieve the reconquest of this plaza," for which it would be a good strike to install mines beneath the barracks occupied by English detachments.

For his part, Juan Vázquez Feijoo had proposed to Juan Trigo that on a determined day and at an agreed hour, they attack the parade and the detachment of the fort "with knife in hand."

Martín Rodríguez thought that, taking advantage of the habit of Beresford and Pack of going out for horseback rides with two soldiers up to the Paso de Burgos, they could be kidnapped.

Several conspirators who were with Liniers before he went to Montevideo in search of reinforcements, tried to dissuade him, and "they proposed to him several projects for an immediate movement"; but to him, they seemed some absurd and others very dangerous (Nuñez).

With the purpose of "gathering the spirits of the various factions and opinions that there were" and joining their efforts, Sentenach, Llach, Tomás Valencia, Trigo, and Vázquez met on the outer seats of the Plaza de Toros (Retiro) and decided to work together. New meetings were held at the house of the comedian Sinforiano, in the back room of Valencia’s bookstore, and in other homes, with the necessary secrecy, to discuss what should be done.

Don Martín de Alzaga, who was willing to contribute "all the money that was needed," summoned the conspirators for a decisive meeting at his house (today, Bolívar 370). In it, "each of the attendees proposed the idea that in his concept should be adopted"; and, "after having debated various plans to carry out the reconquest," they agreed on a common plan.

This agreement did not entirely conceal, however, the ill-will between the subversive group of "the Catalans," led by Sentenach and financed by Alzaga, with the "party" of Trigo and Vázquez. The resentment of these was particularly directed at Alzaga, whom his followers would come to call "the Father of the Homeland"; and his detractors, "Martincho Robespierre." And it would culminate later when Trigo accused Alzaga and the Catalans of having "ideas of independence" that were heard in the secret councils of the conspirators. More precisely, it was stated that in the back room of Valencia’s bookstore, they had talked about forming an independent republic after the reconquest. And perhaps something of this was overheard by an orphan girl that Valencia had; "because as a girl she sneaked in to hear everything, although sometimes they threw her out of the room, and she would go and come, either out of curiosity or with the purpose of bringing some mates." Such a "horrendous crime" could not be proven, which slander had attached like burrs to the honor of faithful vassals; but it gave them a grievance.

To all this would lead the rivalry of the Catalans with the "dependents" of Trigo, for the moment still united in a common subversive plan.

The Plan in Motion

The plan consisted of recruiting people, stockpiling horses, weapons, and ammunition, and placing explosive mines beneath the barracks where English detachments were stationed.

For the mines, they considered renting the house of Manuel Espinosa, in front of the first bastion of the Fort, towards La Merced; but as they could not, they rented the house next door, which had an entrance through La Alameda and belonged to P. Martiniano Alonso. To disguise it, a supposed carpentry was installed there.

Near the grounds of San Ignacio, on the streets of San Carlos and the Holy Trinity (Alsina and Bolívar), in the building that had belonged to the Procurator’s Office of the Missions, was installed the Fixed Infantry Barracks, commonly called Ranchería Barracks; in it, there was also an English detachment. Therefore, they rented, in its vicinity, the house of José Martínez de Hoz; and there the "miners" Bartolomé Tast and Isidoro Arnau dug the tunnel entrance to place the explosive. An armed group watched from the rooftop of the Café and billiards of José Marco.

Recruiting people carried the risk of being discovered by an informant. To avoid greater harm in this case, they adopted a cell system, the only contact being 5 volunteers; and each captain would be the head and only contact of 5 corporals.

In this they set out to see a subject who had told me he had 80 men ready –tells us Domingo Matheu–; but that they had to be given 4 reales daily until the reconquest." There was no issue: Alzaga had assured that they had "a great fund at disposal"; and he was not the only one contributing money.

The 27 of June at night, instructed to Cornelio Zelaya, who in little time recruited 72 countrymen. Each one received daily, at the prayer, their four reales (Honor for Hipólito Castañer, a modest laborer “who wanted nothing”). The canary Zerpa recruited 50 men. Others stockpiled white weapons and firearms. In some secret place, howitzers were being mounted. The conspirators did not rest.

Another relevant “leader” was Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who had arrived from Montevideo with Manuel Arroyo to recruit countrymen and prepare provisioning, in support of the expedition of Liniers. “Pueyrredón passed us the word, that instantly found echo in all our friends” – tells us Melián. “We enlisted more than 300, who should meet armed on a given day in the Chacarita of the Colegiales,” adds Martín Rodríguez.

It had been arranged that the volunteers were concentrated and prepared outside the city. For that, the called “Chacra of Perdriel” was rented, a property situated 4 leagues from Buenos Aires (Villa Ballester, Street Roca 1860, 200 meters from kilometer 18 of Route 8), not far from the farm of Diego Cassero. It had taken the name of its former owner, the Frenchman Julián Perdriel, and later belonged to Domingo Belgrano. It was enclosed with thorny trees that bordered a ditch and had a building of two bodies and a terrace, whose rooms faced a central patio, closed with a gate.

In the night of the 26 of July, Trigo and Vázquez went with some 200 men towards the farm of Perdriel and installed the camp there. There are those who say that the objective was to call the attention of the enemy “and distract it from what was being executed in the city,” where “there was already enough scandal or murmur” about the conspiracy.

Certainly, “the enemies did not lack news about these movements” (Núñez), due to “their informers, of whom they had many” (Beruti).

One day (27 of July), while Zelaya was at his house with his friend Antonio Villalta, discussing details of the subversive plan, a constable of the Cabildo, nicknamed Petaca, came to look for him and said:

• “Are you Mister Cornelio Zelaya?”

• “Yes, sir, I am.”

• “By order of His Excellency the Governor, you must present yourself immediately in the chapter hall, where His Excellency awaits you.”

• “Very well. Tell His Excellency that I will go at once.”

Zelaya entered, meditating on a well-founded suspicion, and told Villalta:

• “Friend, they have discovered me! Beresford is calling for me, and it can only be to hang me. While I go to the billiard hall to see if I can find Palomares to arrange something, do me the favor of saddling my horse. As soon as I return, I will mount and ride to the countryside before they capture me. And you will lead the people to Perdriel.”

Indeed, Palomares was in the billiard hall, and upon learning that Beresford had found the end of the thread, he fled along with Zelaya, fearing being turned in “by so many informers.”

Both went to the farm of Francisco Orma, in Barracas, where they met with Diego Baragaña, Manuel Arroyo, José Pueyrredón, and other patriots who had gathered to go together to Luján, where they would join the forces of Juan Martín de Pueyrredón.

They left at dusk in the direction of the newly founded parish of San José, in the lands of Ramón Flores (today the neighborhood of Flores). From there, they took the road to Córdoba (today Gaona), which crossed the ravine of Morón by the north of Nuestra Señora del Camino (Morón), and at midnight, they reached the bridge of Pedro Márquez, from where they would continue to Luján.

Pueyrredón had gathered the contingent of countrymen summoned in the Chacarita of the Colegiales and in the Holy Places of Jerusalem (today San Martín), along with the dragoons that Commander Antonio Olavarría had collected on the frontier. Together, they returned towards the farm of Perdriel.

For their part, the Catalans had dispatched, on the 30 of July, a body of 50 riflemen and 4 howitzers under the command of Esquiaga and Anzoátegui, with the secret intent of replacing Trigo and Vázquez, either peacefully or forcibly, in the command of the camp. But they had not yet mounted the howitzers when they encountered an unexpected surprise.

Battleground Today

Time To Fight

Informed Beresford of that concentration of forces and that they had few weapons, he decided to strike. At dawn on August 1st, a division of 500 infantry with two cannons, commanded by Colonel Pack and guided by the disgraced mayor Francisco González, left the city stealthily.

At 7 in the morning, they fell by surprise upon the farm of Perdriel and, in one swift blow, dismantled that camp of inexperienced men where, with little fortune, the homeland was beginning to be foreseen.

Although Beruti strives to prove that "the victory was ours" due to the stubborn resistance against the enemy, let us accept that, when the English deployed in battle line and opened fire at will, "the rout was total, without a single man remaining in the field," as Martín Rodríguez states. "Ours defended themselves bravely," affirms Sagui, "but could not avoid retreating with some losses." This is corroborated by the author of Diary of a Soldier, admitting that the patriots "fought like lions, but there was no other choice but to flee each as best they could."

With greater detail, Núñez tells us that the patriots insisted on fighting, despite the disadvantage of their weapons, forgetting that the main objective was to prepare to operate with the expedition that was expected to arrive at any moment. “The result was as it had to be: the supporters could not withstand the enemy’s volleys and fled in disorder, despite the heroic efforts of Citizen Pueyrredón and the brave volunteers who accompanied him.”

Yes, the confrontation was unequal. The determined effort of a hundred armed countrymen, the cries of Viva Santiago Apóstol! and Death to the heretics! were not enough to hold back that barrage for long. Olavarría retreated with his blandengues. The howitzers were abandoned. Confusion and panic spread. Suddenly, Pueyrredón and twelve horsemen appeared, launching a fierce charge against the enemy artillery, seizing a cart of ammunition. A bullet struck down Pueyrredón’s horse, but a comrade saved him. The English were victorious but stunned by the audacity of Pueyrredón’s men, among whom was Cornelio Zelaya. He was “one of the few intrepid ones who charged the enemy at my side,” Pueyrredón himself would later say. Palomares confirmed that Zelaya had been “one of those who helped seize the ammunition cart taken from the enemy.”

Pueyrredón, Zelaya, Francisco Orma, Francisco Trelles, José Bernaldez, and Miguel Mejía Mármol headed to San Isidro, where they boarded a boat that took them to Colonia, from where they would return with Liniers’ expedition.

Meanwhile, the scattered men from Perdriel regrouped at the Chacra de los Márquez (Boulogne, Thames Street, between Fondo de la Legua and the Panamericana), where they would meet the expeditionary forces.

When the time came for accusations and justifications, the Catalans blamed the failure at Perdriel on Trigo’s incompetence: “he is a thief who has squandered all the money for the reconquest” and, on the eve of battle, allowed gambling, drunkenness, and the constant presence of “women for dancing and jokes” in the camp. No less scathing were the accusations against Vázquez, who, coming into the city every night, “would speak at gatherings about everything that was being planned” with reckless carelessness. Sentenach added that, while the battle was raging, Vázquez appeared at Fornaguera’s house “dressed in an old poncho, a polished felt cap, and some sandals tied with leather strips”; and to avoid danger, he disguised himself as a friar and disappeared until after the reconquest when he reappeared in uniform once more.

Without adding or removing anything, we suppose that these disputes were influenced by the rivalry between the Catalans and the followers of Pueyrredón. This rivalry had a colorful outburst once in the hallway of Llach’s house when he, unwilling to send his men to San Isidro under Liniers’ command, lost his temper at a pestering interlocutor and responded, “flipping his fingers under his chin” three times: “Do you know what I will give Señor Liniers? A garlic!” (we record the euphemism as it appears in a famous lawsuit later aired publicly). “I do not work for others to take the glory!”

As events accelerated, the Catalans hurried to gather their men in Plaza Nueva (on today’s Carlos Pellegrini Street, between Cangallo and Sarmiento) and sent them to Retiro under Liniers’ command.

August 12

The hour of the reconquest had arrived. On one side were the victors: some disinterested, others ambitious, some opportunists, others dead. On the other side were “the heretics” and the traitors. Núñez recounts that gangs mercilessly targeted those “who had acted as informers” or aided the enemy with “other vile tasks,” dragging them out to be prosecuted, stripping them of everything—“even the iron bars from their houses.”

In that world of joy and tears, of shouts and silences, like a reawakening of the old virreinal Buenos Aires, stood, proud, that reckless young man whom Liniers had praised so highly for being “one of the citizens of this capital who fought most fervently from the beginning to free it from enemy rule.”

Thus had Cornelio Zelaya begun his service to his homeland. He would continue for many years, selflessly. At the end of them, he found himself alone with his memories, in poverty and obscurity. “Even the gold medals with which my homeland decorated me—I had to sell them for trinkets to feed my family…”

 

Source

Barrionuevo Imposti, Victor – Un combatiente de Perdriel.
Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado.
Todo es Historia – Año XV, Nº 178, marzo de 1982.
www.revisionistas.com.ar

Se permite la reproducción citando la fuente: www.revisionistas.com.ar