The 1965 Lago del Desierto Incident

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Py Squadron in Patagonia (6/13)

Py Squadron in Patagonia

The Devonshire incident and its impact on Argentine-Chilean relations
Tensions with Chile

Part 6
From Part 5

The last quarter of 1878 is underway. Doctor Nicolás Avellaneda has been the president of the republic for four years, assisted by General Julio A. Roca in dealing with military issues, from the position of Minister of War and Navy.

The Argentine Republic has very tense relations with Chile due to border issues dating back to 1843, when the trans-Andeans had settled in the Strait of Magellan. This situation has worsened with the presence of Chilean navy ships in the waters of the Santa Cruz River.

In 1876 the French barge Jeanne Amélie was at the mouth of that river, engaged in loading guano, an operation that was authorized by the Argentine consul in Montevideo. On October 20 of that year the Chilean war corvette Magallanes appeared on the scene and captured the French ship. The Chilean authorities based in Punta Arenas ordered that the French ship and its crew, who were detained, be transferred to that port, and during navigation the Jeanne Amélie ran aground on a reef at Cabo Vírgenes and sank.

This seizure, which represented a disregard for our sovereignty over that region, caused great indignation among the national authorities and the Argentine people; protests were filed with the Argentine government, which refused to give satisfaction and affirmed that Chile's jurisdiction extended to the southern bank of the Santa Cruz River. As the months went by, spirits calmed down, while diplomatic efforts were carried out to put an end to the issue.

On June 19, 1878, Augusto M. Ventury, a merchant from Buenos Aires, notified E.L. Baker, the American consular agent in that city, who had rented an American merchant ship, the Devonshire, for the purpose of loading the guano accumulated on the islands located at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River. But on October 11 of that year, the Chilean corvette Magallanes arrived in the area and its commander demanded from the crew of the Devonshire -anchored on the island of Monte León- the authorization of the Chilean government to carry out the operation of loading guano. Since the men of the Devonshire did not have such authorization, the commander of the Magallanes decided to capture the ship and its crew and take them to Punta Arenas, with the aggravating dishonor towards the minimum decorum of the Chilean military that they abandoned their captain on land. (1)

The then Navy Lieutenant Carlos María Moyano, who served as Navy subdelegate in Santa Cruz, sent a communication to the General Command of the Navy in which he reported on the attack committed by the Chilean ship, which again caused the situation to reach a very delicate limit, the slightest issue could force the casus belli.

The Buenos Aires newspapers raised the alarm and stirred up public opinion, which demanded an end to Chilean interference in the Santa Cruz area. This reiteration of the insult on the part of Chile, led the Argentine government to send a warship to Santa Cruz to expel the Chileans from there. Dr. Avellaneda, in his message to the National Congress, stated: [... assuming the case of legitimate defense, the Executive Branch has decided to station a warship at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River, to build a fortification at its entrance and on its northern bank, equipping it with cannons and the corresponding garrison...

The Argentine authorities interpreted this incident as an insult to a friendly country. The Chilean authorities obviously adopted another point of view. As early as September 1878, Foreign Minister Alejandro Fierro had informed the American representative in Chile, Thomas A. Osborn, that an American ship was illegally loading guano south of the Santa Cruz River. After the incident, the minister clarified to the American diplomat that the actions of the Chilean government should not be considered as a provocation to the United States government, since any ship that violated Chilean territory would be captured in the same way. (2)

Monte León Island, Santa Cruz Province (Argentine Republic)

The incident, as in the case of the "Santa Cruz criminals," was linked to unresolved territorial jurisdiction. Chile claimed all lands located south of the Santa Cruz River, a claim that included, of course, the island of Monte León where the Chilean gunboat Magallanes had captured the Devonshire. This incident, far from being an isolated incident, responded to a defined line of Chilean foreign policy aimed at consolidating its dominance south of the aforementioned river. Thus, and with the aim of clearing up any possible doubt on the question of Chilean sovereignty in this area, the trans-Andean government had already issued a declaration on October 26, 1873, which was addressed to all foreign governments and established that Chile's authority should be respected south of the Santa Cruz River. The Chilean government added weight to this declaration when on April 27, 1876, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amélie for illegally loading guano, approximately in the same place as the Devonshire. For the Chilean government, the issue surrounding the Devonshire was simply one of reaffirming a long-established law. (3)


Chilean gunboat Magellan

In this new instance of the dispute between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the exaggerated reaction of both countries almost led to war. The Minister of War and Navy, General Julio A. Roca, with a deep understanding of the Patagonian problem - demonstrated the following year with the beginning of operations against the Indians to dominate the Desert - estimated that what Avellaneda proposed was not powerful enough and convinced the first magistrate that it was convenient to send a naval division to the Santa Cruz River. Roca's criteria prevailed and that is how Commodore Luis Py, then head of our Fleet, was appointed to carry out the delicate mission.

President Nicolás Avellaneda and his then Minister of War and Navy, Julio Argentino Roca, decided to occupy Santa Cruz and send warships to the southern area. Commodore Luis Py, of the Argentine Navy, received orders to organize and lead the naval division that was to set sail for Santa Cruz, with the objective of protecting the homonymous river from Chilean incursions. At the same time, according to the information provided by the American minister in Buenos Aires, General Thomas O. Osborn, on November 18, 1878, the Chilean government had sent two or three gunboats to Patagonia with experts to occupy the Strait of Magellan. (4) For Argentina, the capture of the Devonshire was a personal insult to its people and a matter of deep concern. On October 24, 1878, Augusto Ventury protested against the Chilean government before the American minister in Buenos Aires, Osborn, and before the American consul in this city, Baker. Ventury maintained that the Chilean gunboat Magellan had violated international law since it intervened in waters that were under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic and had also captured the Devonshire and abandoned the captain on the island of Monte Leon without provisions. Ventury also demanded that the Chilean government reimburse the sum sufficient to cover the costs of the capture and imprisonment of the ship and its crew. Osborn immediately transmitted these protests of the Buenos Aires merchant to the Argentine government and telegraphed them to Santiago. He also informed the commander of the American fleet in the South Atlantic. The protests of the Argentine authorities, together with the insinuation of military reprisals on the part of the Americans, forced the Chilean government to moderate its position. The Chilean foreign minister Alejandro Fierro met with Osborn's representative in Chile, informing him of the Chilean government's willingness to release the Devonshire and her crew in exchange for a promise to abide by the legal action of the courts. But the response of Buenos Aires almost led to war. Not only did it reject the Chilean proposal, but it reaffirmed its claims for compensation from the Chilean government to cover the losses suffered by the capture of the Devonshire. (5)

Fortunately, according to Willett, the moderate reaction of the American ministers in Santiago and Buenos Aires, and the selfless action of Warren Lowe, an American citizen and editor of the prestigious Buenos Aires Herald, prevented war. With the purpose of providing a way out of the delicate situation, Lowe met with the American minister in Buenos Aires and then went to the Chilean capital where he contacted the Argentine consul, Mariano de Sarratea, and the Chilean foreign minister, Alejandro Fierro. According to Willett, Fierro was pleasantly impressed with the arguments presented by Lowe. The editor of the Buenos Aires Herald rejected the idea of ​​a forced settlement, which would only guarantee a war between Argentina and Chile. It was better to arbitrate and avoid war, than to fight and arbitrate later. (6)

Lowe repeatedly suggested to Chilean Foreign Minister Fierro that the Devonshire be released unconditionally and returned to the United States as a preliminary step to deactivate the North American diplomatic pressure on Argentina and the negative influence of Argentine public opinion on its authorities, the latter factor paralyzing any progress in negotiations with Chile. Fierro argued that the real threat of war with Argentina prevented the Chilean government from acting on the valid recommendations of the Herald editor. After several twists and turns, the Chilean Foreign Minister confirmed his government's decision to voluntarily release the Devonshire and return it to the United States. This resolution had a positive impact in official circles in Buenos Aires, and finally, on November 15, 1878, the Chilean Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Governor of Magallanes authorizing the Devonshire to set sail, putting an end to the incident. (7)

The Chilean Navy's official version states: "In 1878, Argentina's systematic advance south of Río Negro in Patagonia nearly caused war between the two nations. The American barge "Devonshire" loaded guano at Monte León Cove under license from Argentine authorities, in Chilean territory. The "Magallanes" under the command of Commander Latorre followed orders from the Chilean government and seized the barge and took it to Punta Arenas. This led to claims from Argentina, which at the time claimed those territories, and tempers flared to the point of breaking off diplomatic relations. Common sense prevailed and an agreement was reached through the Fierro-Sarratea Pact."

Argentinian Squadron

On December 1, 1878, Commodore Luis Py of the Argentine Navy raised the national flag in the place called Cañadón Misioneros at 5 p.m. on that historic day. In itself, it was a simple and quick act, but its implications would endure over time until today.
As we know, there had been a long-standing, not-so-hidden confrontation between Argentina and our Chilean neighbors, regarding the definitive possession of Patagonia, which they claimed as their own. The international conflict was not long in coming and the Minister of War of President Avellaneda, General Julio A. Roca, sent Py in command of a squadron heading to the southern seas to avoid further interference from the trans-Andeans, among whose ships was one that would celebrate future days of glory: the then gunboat and later corvette “Uruguay” (today a museum exhibited in Puerto Madero, City of Buenos Aires). On November 27th he went up the Santa Cruz River and finally, on that first day of December, he reaffirmed Argentine rights over such a vast territory.
It is no coincidence that this sublime heroic act coincided with Roca's military campaign towards the Desert, the objective of which was to definitively end the empire of shameless looting and robbery of the Pampas populations by the Mapuches, who were supported by the Chilean government. Chile could not openly occupy our southern lands because it was engaged in a war against Peru and Bolivia, the so-called "War of the Pacific" and it was not strategically appropriate to open another Theater of Operations and one more enemy.

That is why men like Roca, Py, Piedrabuena, Levalle, Villegas or Vintter must be remembered with respect and with the due historical distance, without absurd anachronisms, nor arm-twisting Clio, the muse of History, because History, like Truth, does not need our lies...

This "disputed" territory is an integral part of the current Argentine Republic.

NOTES

1. Dipl. Desp., (M69), reel 20, T.A. Osborn to Evarts, 30-10-1878, cit. en D. E. Willett, op. cit., p. 72.

2. Dipl. Desp., (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 22-10-1878; (M10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 25-10-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 72.

3. R. Burr, op. cit., p. 134, cit. en ibid., p. 73.

4. Osborn to Evarts, Telegram Nº 207, November 18, 1878, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 59, citado en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

5. Dipl. Desp. (M 10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 7-11-1878, cit. en D.E. Willett, ibid., p. 76.

6. Ibid., p. 78.

7. Dipl. Desp., (M 10), reel 29, T. A.O. to Evarts, 12-11-1878, (M69), reel 20, 12-12-1878; (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 21-11-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 81.

Historia de las RR.EE. Argentinas
ACh
Los senderos de Mnemósine

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Gunboat Magallanes (5/13)

Gunboat Magallanes

Part 5
From Part 4


Its acquisition was approved by a bill enacted on March 4, 1872. This legal body authorized, in addition to the gunboat, the construction of the armored ships Cochrane and Valparaíso (later renamed Blanco Encalada). The cost of the gunboat rose to $200,000 pesos and its construction was commissioned to the Raenhill & Co. shipyards in London, England. 1.

It arrived in Chile in 1875. Its acquisition was due to the death of two English castaways in Tierra del Fuego at the hands of the Fuegian aborigines. Upon learning of this, the British government launched a protest to its Chilean counterpart, in which it threatened to occupy said territory, given the Chilean government's lack of capacity to avoid these bloody events and ensure transit through the Strait of Magellan. For this reason, it was decided to acquire a ship that was capable of arming itself in war for use in the Punta del Fuego Colony. Arenas 1.

   
Gunboat Magallanes 7 

She displaced 950 tons (maximum), her hull was made of mixed iron and wood, she was armed with one 7-inch caliber cannon (177.8 mm), and weighed 7 tons, which launched a 115-pound (52.1 kilo) grenade, one 64-pound (29 kilo) grenade, and two 20-pound (9 kilo) grenades; she had a speed of 11 knots, engine power of 1,230 HP, 220 tons of coal capacity, coal consumption of 24 tons per day, she had a brig-schooner rig of 2.

Since her arrival she served the colony of Punta Arenas, and carried out exploration and hydrographic survey work in the southern channels and in Patagonia.

In 1877, the Magallanes, under the command of Captain Juan José Latorre, suppressed the mutiny of the artillery company that covered the square in Punta Arenas (which at that time had approximately 1,100 inhabitants), called “La Fija de Magallanes”, which had revolted under the work of Corporal Antonio Riquelme and Sergeant Isaac Pozo 3.

In 1876 and 1878, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amelie, and the American barge Devonshire respectively, both vessels loading guano in Río Negro. In both cases, these ships had been authorized by the Argentine government to carry out this task. At that time, both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over said territory, which ultimately determined that their intervention had violated international law 4.

  
Armstrong cannon of 115 pounds (52.21 kilos) and 7 inches of caliber (17.78 cm), belonging to the Magellan Gunboat 8

At the start of the Pacific War, the Magallanes gunboat was the only Chilean warship that was fully operational, as revealed by the technical report prepared in the fleet in 1878 by Captain Ramón Vidal Gormaz contained in the Navy Report of that same year 5.

It carried out the entire campaign of the Pacific War and was the Chilean ship that participated in the first naval action of the war on April 12, 1879 (Naval Battle of Chipana) against the Peruvian corvette Unión and the gunboat Pilcomayo. It also participated in the second Naval Battle of Iquique on the night of July 9-10, 1879, in which it saved the fleet's coalman Matías Cousiño from being captured, and in the Battle of Antofagasta on August 28 of the same year, saving the corvette Abtao, which was undergoing repairs. On both occasions, it was faced the Huáscar and on both occasions the ship was commanded by Captain Juan José Latorre 6.

    
Another view (from bow to stern) of the 115-pounder Armstrong, along with the 64-pounder 9.

After the war, it continued in hydrographic survey operations along the Chilean coast and in the civil war of 1891 it participated on the Congressional side, which was the victor at the time. After that, it continued in hydrographic work until its transfer to the merchant marine in 1906. It was wrecked in a storm in Corral in 1907 and sank.

Sources

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, Páginas 73-75,; La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 694. 

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 722-723; La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, Página 39 

3. El Motín de los Artilleros, Armando Braun Menéndez, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , segunda edición 1972, Argentina. 

4. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 705; Sitio WEB Armada de Chile.

5. Partes del informe se encuentran en: Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911, paginas 159-163 

6. Para una relación de ambos combates se recomienda: Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, Páginas 206-213 y 442-449 

7. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, Almirante A. Silva Palma

8. Memoria Chilena 

9. Especial Revista Ercilla sobre la Guerra del Pacífico Fascículo 2 página 27, suplemento que circulo junto con la revista Nº 3.238 de la quincena del 29/03/2004 – 11/04/2004, la imagen fue obtenida primitivamente desde el libro: Álbum Grafico Militar de Chile: Campaña de Pacífico 1879-1884 de Antonio Bizama Cuevas. Santiago, 1909, Editorial Universo.

Argentina-Chile: On the Historical Mistrust

Rivalry and Mistrust Between Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile's historical rivalry and mutual distrust can be traced back to several key moments and events that have shaped their relationship over the centuries. This essay will explore the origins of their conflict, highlighting significant dates and events that contributed to the tension, leading up to the contemporary period.

Early Conflicts and Colonial Legacies

The roots of the Argentine-Chilean rivalry can be traced back to the colonial period when both regions were part of the Spanish Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included both modern-day Argentina and Chile. However, administrative divisions within the viceroyalty created early distinctions between the two regions.

In 1776, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which included the territory of present-day Argentina. This administrative change heightened the sense of separation and competition between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the respective capitals of the new and old viceroyalties. The different economic and political priorities of these regions sowed the seeds of future conflicts.

The Independence Wars (1810-1826)

The wars of independence from Spanish rule, which began in the early 19th century, further strained relations between Argentina and Chile. Both countries achieved independence around the same time, with Argentina declaring independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. However, their paths to independence were intertwined with mutual suspicions and differing regional interests.

One of the pivotal moments was the crossing of the Andes by the Argentine general José de San Martín in 1817. San Martín's Army of the Andes, composed of Argentine and Chilean patriots, defeated the Spanish royalists in Chile, leading to the country's independence. Despite this shared struggle, the differing political ambitions and visions for the future of the region created underlying tensions.

The War of the Confederation (1836-1839)

A significant early conflict that exemplified the rivalry was the War of the Confederation. In the 1830s, Andrés de Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Argentina saw as a threat to regional balance. Chile, fearing the confederation's expansionist aims, allied with Argentina against it.

The war culminated in the Battle of Yungay in 1839, where the Chilean-Argentine alliance defeated the confederation's forces. This conflict underscored the precarious balance of power in the region and established a precedent for future cooperation against common threats, but it also deepened mutual suspicions as both countries sought to expand their influence.

Border Disputes and the Boundary Treaty of 1881

Territorial disputes have been a recurring theme in the Argentine-Chilean rivalry. The most significant of these disputes arose from the unclear demarcation of borders following their independence from Spain. The Andes Mountains, which form the natural boundary between the two countries, became a focal point of contention.

In 1881, Argentina and Chile signed the Boundary Treaty, which aimed to resolve these disputes by defining the border along the highest peaks of the Andes. Despite this agreement, ambiguities in the treaty's language led to further conflicts, particularly over the Patagonian region and the Beagle Channel, areas rich in natural resources and strategically important.

The Beagle Channel Conflict (1978)

One of the most critical flashpoints in the 20th century was the Beagle Channel conflict. The Beagle Channel, a narrow strait in the southern tip of South America, became the center of a territorial dispute in the 1970s. Both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over several islands in the channel, leading to a severe diplomatic and military standoff.

In 1978, the conflict nearly escalated into full-scale war. Both countries mobilized their armed forces, and a naval confrontation seemed imminent. However, intervention by Pope John Paul II, who mediated the conflict, led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984. The treaty, which awarded most of the disputed islands to Chile, averted war but left lingering resentment in Argentina.

The Malvinas War (1982)

The Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom indirectly influenced Argentine-Chilean relations. During the war, Chile provided intelligence and logistical support to the British, further straining its relationship with Argentina. This support was motivated by Chile's desire to counterbalance Argentina's military strength and protect its own territorial claims in the region.

The aftermath of the Malvinas War saw Argentina's military regime weakened and its international standing diminished. The war's outcome also reinforced Chile's strategic calculations and its distrust of Argentina, leading to increased military readiness along their shared border.

Democratic Transitions and Modern Relations

Both Argentina and Chile transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a gradual thawing of relations. Diplomatic efforts focused on resolving remaining territorial disputes and fostering economic cooperation. The establishment of democratic governments in both countries provided a framework for dialogue and conflict resolution.

The signing of the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, which declared the region a zone of peace and cooperation, marked a significant step toward normalization. Joint commissions were established to address border issues, and bilateral trade agreements were signed, promoting economic integration.

Contemporary Dynamics

In recent years, Argentina and Chile have continued to work on improving their relationship, though underlying tensions persist. Both countries have engaged in regional organizations such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking to enhance economic ties and political cooperation.

However, issues such as competing claims in Antarctica and the ongoing need for resource management in shared territories require ongoing diplomatic efforts. The construction of the Binational Tunnel of Agua Negra, aimed at improving connectivity between the two countries, exemplifies the potential for collaboration despite historical rivalries.

Conclusion

The historical rivalry and mutual distrust between Argentina and Chile are rooted in colonial legacies, independence wars, territorial disputes, and geopolitical conflicts. Key moments such as the War of the Confederation, the Beagle Channel conflict, and the Falklands War have shaped their relationship, creating a complex dynamic of competition and cooperation. While democratic transitions and modern diplomatic efforts have improved relations, underlying tensions continue to influence their interactions. Understanding this history is crucial for appreciating the nuanced and evolving nature of Argentine-Chilean relations in the contemporary period.

 

Argentina: Relations with Chile around 1880

Argentine and Chilean perceptions regarding the border conflict

Argentine public opinion became increasingly polarized around the border dispute. Chile was perceived as an aggressor state by the expanding "internationalist" faction. The "internationalists" included in their ranks distinguished personalities such as Roque Sáenz Peña, who had served in the Peruvian army during the Pacific War, Indalecio Gómez and Estanislao Zeballos. The last two advocated the adoption of a hard line towards Chile (1). Another faction, opposed to the previous one, was made up of former president Bartolomé Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini and other sectors closely linked to the export-import economy. These men perceived that a war against Chile could slow Argentina's economic progress and affect its foreign trade (2). For these men, Argentina's path to greatness was written in an economic key. As the years passed, Argentina would grow and become richer and more powerful each year, until the trans-Andean nation would no longer be a problem.

On the other side of the Andes, Chileans perceived their neighbor with varied emotions, which ran the entire possible spectrum, from envy to contempt and from smug complacency to fear (3). According to Encina, the majority of Chilean intellectuals - with the express exception of Miguel Amunátegui, Adolfo Ibáñez, Vicente Pérez Rosales and a few others - openly or covertly fought the Chilean government's efforts to defend their rights in Patagonia. In this sense, the cases of José Victorino Lastarria or Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna are evident. The latter developed a tenacious campaign against Chilean titles in the Patagonian region for more than ten years, which culminated with his great speech in the Senate, and with his book titled precisely "La Patagonia." Among bankers, capitalists and landowners, the idea of a break with Argentina for Patagonia was perceived as irrational. As for public opinion, initially it was indifferent to the issue, only to years later be captured by the arguments in favor of confrontation between the two countries (4).
In Rauch's opinion, Chile's victory over the Andean nations in the Pacific War inflamed the nationalist spirit of Chilean public opinion. If before 1879, Chile's economic progress led its inhabitants to perceive themselves as "the England of South America," their victory over the Andean nations led Chileans to believe that they had earned the nickname "the Prussia of South America" (5). Many of those who visualized their nation in the role of Prussia in 1870, in turn perceived Argentina in the role of South American France, corrupt and motivated by commercial greed, and that could be overwhelmed by Chilean power. There were also those Chileans who believed their country was superior to Argentina in virtue and power and who wanted to go to war to prove it (6). The results obtained in the Pacific War had certainly accentuated the perception of self-importance. Thus, Chilean diplomats adopted positions characterized by their rudeness, rooted in the idea that their army, the best after that of Prussia, and their navy, the second after the British, could easily defeat the Argentine forces (7).
For their part, Argentines reviewed their own perceptions regarding Chile. His admiration for the neighboring nation's past progress was replaced by a feeling of growing suspicion, particularly after the incidents with the Jeanne Amélie and Devonshire ships. By 1890, Argentina had achieved institutional stability, a prerequisite for economic development (8). According to Rauch, Argentina did not fear Chile's military power, as Chilean historians suggest (9). As the most basic rules of prudence advised vigilance over the aggressive neighbor to the west, the Argentine government began to be governed by an old proverb, si vix pacem para bellum.

NOTES

1. Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto y paz con Chile: 1898-1903, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1968, pp. 29-30, 46-47, citado en George Victor Rauch, The Argentine-Chilean Boundary Dispute and the Development of the Argentine Armed Forces: 1870-1902, Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1989, p. 323.
2. G. Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 65-66, cit. en ibid., pp. 323-324.
3. Ibid., p. 324.
4. Francisco A. Encina, La cuestión de límites entre Chile y la Argentina desde la Independencia hasta el tratado de 1881, Santiago de Chile, Nascimento, 1959, p. 104.
5. Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 34, cit. en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., p. 326.
6. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 137, cit. en ibid., p. 326.
7. Vicente Quesada, La política chilena en El Plata, Bueno Aires, Moen, 1895, pp. 72-73, cit. en ibid., p. 327.
8. Oscar E. Cornblitt, Ezequiel Gallo y Alfredo A. O'Connell, "La generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", en Torcuato S. Di Tella (ed.), Argentina, sociedad de masas, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965, pp. 48-49, cit. en ibid., p. 328.
9. Ver, por ejemplo, los casos de Mario Barros, Historia diplomática de Chile, Barcelona, Ariel, 1971, 322-323, 353-355; Oscar Espinosa Moraga, La postguerra del Pacífico y la Puna de Atacama, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1958, p. 180, cit. en ibid., p. 329.

The convention of 1888 and the Zeballos-Matta declaration of 1889. The divergence between the criteria of the "high peaks" and the "divortium aquarum"

As a consequence of mutual fears (both countries curiously perceived that the 1881 treaty implied territorial losses), until 1888 a convention on demarcation and experts was not reached to delimit on the ground what was agreed in the treaty. This convention was signed on August 20, 1888 in Santiago de Chile by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Demetrio Lastarria, and the Argentine extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, José Evaristo Uriburu (1).
It established the procedure for the appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881. Each of these experts could have an advisory commission with the same number of members, and they had to execute in the ground the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty. If they did not reach an agreement, they had to communicate it to their respective governments, so that they could proceed to appoint the third expert, who would have to resolve the controversy.
The Lastarria-Uriburu convention was ratified by law No. 2488, and the exchange of its ratifications became effective on January 11, 1890. Consequently, the Argentine government appointed engineer Octavio Pico as an expert and the Chilean government appointed Diego Barros. Spider.
However, each small advance in the bilateral relationship had to be faced with new obstacles. By virtue of the offer of shares by a company in London for the acquisition of twenty-four leagues of land on the railway from Chubut to Bahía Blanca, the Chilean government ordered its representative in Buenos Aires, Guillermo Matta, to claim for what it perceived as a Argentine advance in contentious territory. To overcome this obstacle, the Argentine chancellor Estanislao Zeballos and the Chilean minister Matta formulated a reciprocal declaration in 1889, which established that any act of one or another government that extended its jurisdiction to the part of the mountain range of dubious ownership, because it had not been drawn its limit, would not affect the results of the demarcation that was going to be carried out. This declaration was general in nature, applicable to the entire border in dispute with Chile from Bolivia to Navarino Island. According to Carrasco Domínguez, it was intended "to establish a status quo in the undefined border region, detracting from the acts of the parties executed prior to the definitive demarcation, but after the corresponding boundary arrangements" (2).
In accordance with the provisions of the 1881 treaty and the 1888 convention, in 1892 the Argentine and Chilean experts met, but they were unable to reach an agreement. The Chilean expert, Diego Barros Arana, formulated, in January 1892, the theory of divortium aquarum, that is, the separation between the rivers that go to the Atlantic and those that flow into the Pacific, and sought to impose it on his Argentine colleague, Octavio Pico. , as a criterion prior to beginning the demarcation task. For his part, Pico remained firm in his position of defending the line of the highest peaks as a criterion, regardless of its continuity as a watershed. Pico maintained that the Andes mountain range was the natural barrier between the two countries. The essential divergence regarding the criteria to be used in the demarcation work caused the suspension of negotiations between both experts.
On the other hand, the tension between Buenos Aires and Santiago had been stimulated by the media. A report from the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, at the end of 1887, detailed the support of the Argentine press for an expedition sent to Patagonia, which had supposedly discovered three rivers, whose origin was in Argentine territory and which flowed into the Pacific, and which therefore granted Argentina ports on said ocean. Although he did not believe in the existence of these rivers, the Chilean representative was convinced that the Argentine media supported the idea of ports in the Pacific, to pressure the Casa Rosada authorities to make a decision in that regard (3 ). This pressure paid off, as the Argentine authorities rejected the Chilean criterion of divortium aquarum, in order not to give up potential access to the Pacific (4).

NOTES

1. The text of the convention is the following:
        The governments of the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic, animated by the common desire to implement what was established in the treaty signed by both on July 23, 1881, in accordance with the demarcation of the territorial limits between one country and the other , have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, namely:
   
        His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile, Mr. Demetrio Lastarria, Minister of Foreign Affairs. And His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. José E. Uriburu, his extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister in Chile.
        Those who, duly authorized for this purpose, have agreed to the stipulations contained in the following clauses:
        I. The appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881 will be made by the signatory governments within a period of two months, counted from the exchange of the ratifications of this agreement.
        II. To assist the experts in the performance of their functions, each of the governments will also appoint five assistants within the same period.
        The number of these may be increased in identical proportion by both parties, provided that the experts request it by mutual agreement.
        III. The experts MUST carry out, on the FIELD, the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty.
        IV. However, experts may entrust the execution of the work to commissions of assistants.
        These assistants will be appointed in equal numbers for each party.
        The commissions will adjust their procedures to the instructions that the experts will give them, by common agreement and in writing.
        V. The experts must meet in the city of Concepción, Chile, forty days after their appointment, to appoint themselves in agreement on the starting point or points of their work, and on any others that may be necessary.
        They will prepare duplicate minutes of all the agreements and determinations they make at that meeting, and in the course of their operations.
        SAW. Whenever the experts do not reach agreement on any point of the establishment of limits or on any other issue, they will respectively communicate this to their governments, so that they can proceed to designate the third party that must resolve the controversy, according to the boundary treaty. 1881.
        VII. The experts may have, at the will of the respective government, the necessary personnel for their particular service, such as healthcare or any other; and when they deem it convenient for their safety, they may request a troop party from each of the two governments, or only from that of the nation in whose territory they are located; In the first case, the escort must consist of an equal number of seats for each party.
        VIII. The experts will set the times of work in the field, and will set up their office in the city they determine, being able, however, by common agreement, to move it from one point to another, whenever the needs of the service so advise.
        Each government will provide the expert it appoints and its assistants with the necessary elements and resources for their work; Both will jointly pay the expenses incurred by the offices and the marking of the boundaries.
        IX. Whenever any of the positions of expert or assistant become vacant, the respective government must appoint the replacement within a period of two months.
        X. This convention will be ratified, and the exchange of ratifications will be made in the city of Santiago or Buenos Aires, in the shortest possible time. (...).
        Text of the Lastarria-Uriburu convention, Santiago de Chile, August 20, 1888, in Ernesto Quesada, Chilean politics in El Plata, Buenos Aires, Arnoldo Moen, 1895, pp. 348-349.

1. Germán Carrasco Domínguez, El arbitraje británico de 1899-1903. Sus aspectos procesales, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1968, p. 168, n. 43; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas (1810-1955), Buenos Aires, Perrot, 1961, p. 231.
2. Guillermo Matta al ministro de relaciones exteriores de Chile, Buenos Aires, 11 de octubre de 1887, Legación de Chile en el Plata, 1887-1888, cit. en Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force. Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830-1905, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 185.
3. Memorándum quoted in Luis Vicente Varela, La República Argentina y Chile: historia de la demarcación de sus fronteras (desde 1843 hasta 1899). Obra escrita con motivo del arbitraje pendiente ante su majestad británica, apoyada en los documentos inéditos del Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1899, I, pp. 256-258, n. 115, fuente a su vez citada en R.N. Burr, op. cit., p. 186..

Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas (c)