Argentine public opinion became increasingly polarized around the border dispute. Chile was perceived as an aggressor state by the expanding "internationalist" faction. The "internationalists" included in their ranks distinguished personalities such as Roque Sáenz Peña, who had served in the Peruvian army during the Pacific War, Indalecio Gómez and Estanislao Zeballos. The last two advocated the adoption of a hard line towards Chile (1). Another faction, opposed to the previous one, was made up of former president Bartolomé Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini and other sectors closely linked to the export-import economy. These men perceived that a war against Chile could slow Argentina's economic progress and affect its foreign trade (2). For these men, Argentina's path to greatness was written in an economic key. As the years passed, Argentina would grow and become richer and more powerful each year, until the trans-Andean nation would no longer be a problem.
On the other side of the Andes, Chileans perceived their neighbor with varied emotions, which ran the entire possible spectrum, from envy to contempt and from smug complacency to fear (3). According to Encina, the majority of Chilean intellectuals - with the express exception of Miguel Amunátegui, Adolfo Ibáñez, Vicente Pérez Rosales and a few others - openly or covertly fought the Chilean government's efforts to defend their rights in Patagonia. In this sense, the cases of José Victorino Lastarria or Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna are evident. The latter developed a tenacious campaign against Chilean titles in the Patagonian region for more than ten years, which culminated with his great speech in the Senate, and with his book titled precisely "La Patagonia." Among bankers, capitalists and landowners, the idea of a break with Argentina for Patagonia was perceived as irrational. As for public opinion, initially it was indifferent to the issue, only to years later be captured by the arguments in favor of confrontation between the two countries (4).
In Rauch's opinion, Chile's victory over the Andean nations in the Pacific War inflamed the nationalist spirit of Chilean public opinion. If before 1879, Chile's economic progress led its inhabitants to perceive themselves as "the England of South America," their victory over the Andean nations led Chileans to believe that they had earned the nickname "the Prussia of South America" (5). Many of those who visualized their nation in the role of Prussia in 1870, in turn perceived Argentina in the role of South American France, corrupt and motivated by commercial greed, and that could be overwhelmed by Chilean power. There were also those Chileans who believed their country was superior to Argentina in virtue and power and who wanted to go to war to prove it (6). The results obtained in the Pacific War had certainly accentuated the perception of self-importance. Thus, Chilean diplomats adopted positions characterized by their rudeness, rooted in the idea that their army, the best after that of Prussia, and their navy, the second after the British, could easily defeat the Argentine forces (7).
For their part, Argentines reviewed their own perceptions regarding Chile. His admiration for the neighboring nation's past progress was replaced by a feeling of growing suspicion, particularly after the incidents with the Jeanne Amélie and Devonshire ships. By 1890, Argentina had achieved institutional stability, a prerequisite for economic development (8). According to Rauch, Argentina did not fear Chile's military power, as Chilean historians suggest (9). As the most basic rules of prudence advised vigilance over the aggressive neighbor to the west, the Argentine government began to be governed by an old proverb, si vix pacem para bellum.
In Rauch's opinion, Chile's victory over the Andean nations in the Pacific War inflamed the nationalist spirit of Chilean public opinion. If before 1879, Chile's economic progress led its inhabitants to perceive themselves as "the England of South America," their victory over the Andean nations led Chileans to believe that they had earned the nickname "the Prussia of South America" (5). Many of those who visualized their nation in the role of Prussia in 1870, in turn perceived Argentina in the role of South American France, corrupt and motivated by commercial greed, and that could be overwhelmed by Chilean power. There were also those Chileans who believed their country was superior to Argentina in virtue and power and who wanted to go to war to prove it (6). The results obtained in the Pacific War had certainly accentuated the perception of self-importance. Thus, Chilean diplomats adopted positions characterized by their rudeness, rooted in the idea that their army, the best after that of Prussia, and their navy, the second after the British, could easily defeat the Argentine forces (7).
For their part, Argentines reviewed their own perceptions regarding Chile. His admiration for the neighboring nation's past progress was replaced by a feeling of growing suspicion, particularly after the incidents with the Jeanne Amélie and Devonshire ships. By 1890, Argentina had achieved institutional stability, a prerequisite for economic development (8). According to Rauch, Argentina did not fear Chile's military power, as Chilean historians suggest (9). As the most basic rules of prudence advised vigilance over the aggressive neighbor to the west, the Argentine government began to be governed by an old proverb, si vix pacem para bellum.
NOTES
The convention of 1888 and the Zeballos-Matta declaration of 1889. The divergence between the criteria of the "high peaks" and the "divortium aquarum"
As a consequence of mutual fears (both countries curiously perceived that the 1881 treaty implied territorial losses), until 1888 a convention on demarcation and experts was not reached to delimit on the ground what was agreed in the treaty. This convention was signed on August 20, 1888 in Santiago de Chile by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Demetrio Lastarria, and the Argentine extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, José Evaristo Uriburu (1).
It established the procedure for the appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881. Each of these experts could have an advisory commission with the same number of members, and they had to execute in the ground the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty. If they did not reach an agreement, they had to communicate it to their respective governments, so that they could proceed to appoint the third expert, who would have to resolve the controversy.
The Lastarria-Uriburu convention was ratified by law No. 2488, and the exchange of its ratifications became effective on January 11, 1890. Consequently, the Argentine government appointed engineer Octavio Pico as an expert and the Chilean government appointed Diego Barros. Spider.
However, each small advance in the bilateral relationship had to be faced with new obstacles. By virtue of the offer of shares by a company in London for the acquisition of twenty-four leagues of land on the railway from Chubut to Bahía Blanca, the Chilean government ordered its representative in Buenos Aires, Guillermo Matta, to claim for what it perceived as a Argentine advance in contentious territory. To overcome this obstacle, the Argentine chancellor Estanislao Zeballos and the Chilean minister Matta formulated a reciprocal declaration in 1889, which established that any act of one or another government that extended its jurisdiction to the part of the mountain range of dubious ownership, because it had not been drawn its limit, would not affect the results of the demarcation that was going to be carried out. This declaration was general in nature, applicable to the entire border in dispute with Chile from Bolivia to Navarino Island. According to Carrasco Domínguez, it was intended "to establish a status quo in the undefined border region, detracting from the acts of the parties executed prior to the definitive demarcation, but after the corresponding boundary arrangements" (2).
In accordance with the provisions of the 1881 treaty and the 1888 convention, in 1892 the Argentine and Chilean experts met, but they were unable to reach an agreement. The Chilean expert, Diego Barros Arana, formulated, in January 1892, the theory of divortium aquarum, that is, the separation between the rivers that go to the Atlantic and those that flow into the Pacific, and sought to impose it on his Argentine colleague, Octavio Pico. , as a criterion prior to beginning the demarcation task. For his part, Pico remained firm in his position of defending the line of the highest peaks as a criterion, regardless of its continuity as a watershed. Pico maintained that the Andes mountain range was the natural barrier between the two countries. The essential divergence regarding the criteria to be used in the demarcation work caused the suspension of negotiations between both experts.
On the other hand, the tension between Buenos Aires and Santiago had been stimulated by the media. A report from the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, at the end of 1887, detailed the support of the Argentine press for an expedition sent to Patagonia, which had supposedly discovered three rivers, whose origin was in Argentine territory and which flowed into the Pacific, and which therefore granted Argentina ports on said ocean. Although he did not believe in the existence of these rivers, the Chilean representative was convinced that the Argentine media supported the idea of ports in the Pacific, to pressure the Casa Rosada authorities to make a decision in that regard (3 ). This pressure paid off, as the Argentine authorities rejected the Chilean criterion of divortium aquarum, in order not to give up potential access to the Pacific (4).
NOTES
Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas (c)
- Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto y paz con Chile: 1898-1903, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1968, pp. 29-30, 46-47, citado en George Victor Rauch, The Argentine-Chilean Boundary Dispute and the Development of the Argentine Armed Forces: 1870-1902, Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1989, p. 323.
- G. Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 65-66, cit. en ibid., pp. 323-324.
- Ibid., p. 324.
- Francisco A. Encina, La cuestión de límites entre Chile y la Argentina desde la Independencia hasta el tratado de 1881, Santiago de Chile, Nascimento, 1959, p. 104.
- Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 34, cit. en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., p. 326.
- Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 137, cit. en ibid., p. 326.
- Vicente Quesada, La política chilena en El Plata, Bueno Aires, Moen, 1895, pp. 72-73, cit. en ibid., p. 327.
- Oscar E. Cornblitt, Ezequiel Gallo y Alfredo A. O'Connell, "La generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", en Torcuato S. Di Tella (ed.), Argentina, sociedad de masas, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965, pp. 48-49, cit. en ibid., p. 328.
- Ver, por ejemplo, los casos de Mario Barros, Historia diplomática de Chile, Barcelona, Ariel, 1971, 322-323, 353-355; Oscar Espinosa Moraga, La postguerra del Pacífico y la Puna de Atacama, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1958, p. 180, cit. en ibid., p. 329.
The convention of 1888 and the Zeballos-Matta declaration of 1889. The divergence between the criteria of the "high peaks" and the "divortium aquarum"
As a consequence of mutual fears (both countries curiously perceived that the 1881 treaty implied territorial losses), until 1888 a convention on demarcation and experts was not reached to delimit on the ground what was agreed in the treaty. This convention was signed on August 20, 1888 in Santiago de Chile by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Demetrio Lastarria, and the Argentine extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, José Evaristo Uriburu (1).
It established the procedure for the appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881. Each of these experts could have an advisory commission with the same number of members, and they had to execute in the ground the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty. If they did not reach an agreement, they had to communicate it to their respective governments, so that they could proceed to appoint the third expert, who would have to resolve the controversy.
The Lastarria-Uriburu convention was ratified by law No. 2488, and the exchange of its ratifications became effective on January 11, 1890. Consequently, the Argentine government appointed engineer Octavio Pico as an expert and the Chilean government appointed Diego Barros. Spider.
However, each small advance in the bilateral relationship had to be faced with new obstacles. By virtue of the offer of shares by a company in London for the acquisition of twenty-four leagues of land on the railway from Chubut to Bahía Blanca, the Chilean government ordered its representative in Buenos Aires, Guillermo Matta, to claim for what it perceived as a Argentine advance in contentious territory. To overcome this obstacle, the Argentine chancellor Estanislao Zeballos and the Chilean minister Matta formulated a reciprocal declaration in 1889, which established that any act of one or another government that extended its jurisdiction to the part of the mountain range of dubious ownership, because it had not been drawn its limit, would not affect the results of the demarcation that was going to be carried out. This declaration was general in nature, applicable to the entire border in dispute with Chile from Bolivia to Navarino Island. According to Carrasco Domínguez, it was intended "to establish a status quo in the undefined border region, detracting from the acts of the parties executed prior to the definitive demarcation, but after the corresponding boundary arrangements" (2).
In accordance with the provisions of the 1881 treaty and the 1888 convention, in 1892 the Argentine and Chilean experts met, but they were unable to reach an agreement. The Chilean expert, Diego Barros Arana, formulated, in January 1892, the theory of divortium aquarum, that is, the separation between the rivers that go to the Atlantic and those that flow into the Pacific, and sought to impose it on his Argentine colleague, Octavio Pico. , as a criterion prior to beginning the demarcation task. For his part, Pico remained firm in his position of defending the line of the highest peaks as a criterion, regardless of its continuity as a watershed. Pico maintained that the Andes mountain range was the natural barrier between the two countries. The essential divergence regarding the criteria to be used in the demarcation work caused the suspension of negotiations between both experts.
On the other hand, the tension between Buenos Aires and Santiago had been stimulated by the media. A report from the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, at the end of 1887, detailed the support of the Argentine press for an expedition sent to Patagonia, which had supposedly discovered three rivers, whose origin was in Argentine territory and which flowed into the Pacific, and which therefore granted Argentina ports on said ocean. Although he did not believe in the existence of these rivers, the Chilean representative was convinced that the Argentine media supported the idea of ports in the Pacific, to pressure the Casa Rosada authorities to make a decision in that regard (3 ). This pressure paid off, as the Argentine authorities rejected the Chilean criterion of divortium aquarum, in order not to give up potential access to the Pacific (4).
NOTES
- The text of the convention is the following:
The governments of the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic, animated by the common desire to implement what was established in the treaty signed by both on July 23, 1881, in accordance with the demarcation of the territorial limits between one country and the other , have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, namely:
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile, Mr. Demetrio Lastarria, Minister of Foreign Affairs. And His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. José E. Uriburu, his extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister in Chile.
Those who, duly authorized for this purpose, have agreed to the stipulations contained in the following clauses:
I. The appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881 will be made by the signatory governments within a period of two months, counted from the exchange of the ratifications of this agreement.
II. To assist the experts in the performance of their functions, each of the governments will also appoint five assistants within the same period.
The number of these may be increased in identical proportion by both parties, provided that the experts request it by mutual agreement.
III. The experts MUST carry out, on the FIELD, the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty.
IV. However, experts may entrust the execution of the work to commissions of assistants.
These assistants will be appointed in equal numbers for each party.
The commissions will adjust their procedures to the instructions that the experts will give them, by common agreement and in writing.
V. The experts must meet in the city of Concepción, Chile, forty days after their appointment, to appoint themselves in agreement on the starting point or points of their work, and on any others that may be necessary.
They will prepare duplicate minutes of all the agreements and determinations they make at that meeting, and in the course of their operations.
SAW. Whenever the experts do not reach agreement on any point of the establishment of limits or on any other issue, they will respectively communicate this to their governments, so that they can proceed to designate the third party that must resolve the controversy, according to the boundary treaty. 1881.
VII. The experts may have, at the will of the respective government, the necessary personnel for their particular service, such as healthcare or any other; and when they deem it convenient for their safety, they may request a troop party from each of the two governments, or only from that of the nation in whose territory they are located; In the first case, the escort must consist of an equal number of seats for each party.
VIII. The experts will set the times of work in the field, and will set up their office in the city they determine, being able, however, by common agreement, to move it from one point to another, whenever the needs of the service so advise.
Each government will provide the expert it appoints and its assistants with the necessary elements and resources for their work; Both will jointly pay the expenses incurred by the offices and the marking of the boundaries.
IX. Whenever any of the positions of expert or assistant become vacant, the respective government must appoint the replacement within a period of two months.
X. This convention will be ratified, and the exchange of ratifications will be made in the city of Santiago or Buenos Aires, in the shortest possible time. (...).
Text of the Lastarria-Uriburu convention, Santiago de Chile, August 20, 1888, in Ernesto Quesada, Chilean politics in El Plata, Buenos Aires, Arnoldo Moen, 1895, pp. 348-349.
- Germán Carrasco Domínguez, El arbitraje británico de 1899-1903. Sus aspectos procesales, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1968, p. 168, n. 43; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas (1810-1955), Buenos Aires, Perrot, 1961, p. 231.
- Guillermo Matta al ministro de relaciones exteriores de Chile, Buenos Aires, 11 de octubre de 1887, Legación de Chile en el Plata, 1887-1888, cit. en Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force. Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830-1905, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 185.
- Memorándum quoted in Luis Vicente Varela, La República Argentina y Chile: historia de la demarcación de sus fronteras (desde 1843 hasta 1899). Obra escrita con motivo del arbitraje pendiente ante su majestad británica, apoyada en los documentos inéditos del Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1899, I, pp. 256-258, n. 115, fuente a su vez citada en R.N. Burr, op. cit., p. 186..
Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas (c)
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