Civil War: Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Battle of Campos de Álvarez

Monument erected on the site of the Battle of Campos de Álvarez, fought on 31 January 1852

Juan Manuel de Rosas and Ángel Pacheco, respectively, facilitated for the Empire of Brazil and for Urquiza the easy success they achieved in their triumphant march into the interior of Buenos Aires Province. Rosas referred all matters to Pacheco, and Pacheco, in turn, failed to take timely or effective action. One need only consider the decisive events that shaped the operations culminating in the Battle of Caseros.

A month before Oribe’s capitulation, Colonel Martiniano Chilavert submitted a memorandum to Rosas in which he presented numerous reasons and favourable prospects for having Oribe move to engage Urquiza and, at the same time, preparing an army to invade Brazil. Rosas approved the memorandum and said he would consult Pacheco—but meanwhile allowed Oribe’s army to be undermined.

When Urquiza was gathering his forces in Gualeguaychú, Chilavert again urged Rosas to defend the Paraná River line, offering to lead the defence himself. Rosas responded that he would consult Pacheco. Soon thereafter, Pascual Echagüe was forced to abandon Santa Fe. When Urquiza moved from Rosario and Pacheco ordered Lucio Norberto Mansilla to withdraw from positions along the Paraná, Mansilla assumed this was to reposition him with infantry and artillery to the northern front dominated by Lagos with 8,000 cavalry, in order to defend the line of the Arroyo del Medio. Pacheco would then reinforce him from Luján, and together they would present battle to Urquiza. In the event of defeat, they could retreat to the barracks at Santos Lugares. This strategy would also buy Rosas time to raise the southern campaign in a unified effort and place Urquiza in a critical position, encircled and cut off from his supply lines. Mansilla presented this logic to Rosas, who again directed him to consult with Pacheco. Urquiza then advanced his vanguard to the Arroyo del Medio.

When Urquiza reached that point, and Pacheco insisted that Hilario Lagos retreat to headquarters, Lagos protested to Rosas, stating that he and his soldiers were determined to stand and defend the invaded land. Rosas responded affirming his confidence in Lagos's patriotism and advised him to harmonise his actions with General Pacheco's orders.

There were moments when Rosas showed signs of reacting—particularly when he sensed the disorganisation of his forces. He summoned Major Antonino Reyes, commander at Santos Lugares, and spoke of convening a war council of senior officers. But the impulse passed quickly. It was Pacheco—his constant reliance on Pacheco—that caused him to waver. Still, he told Reyes: “I’ll need you by my side; we must urgently appoint someone to command your battalion, the coastal battalions, and other units that together would make up about 1,500 men with six artillery pieces.” Reyes proposed Colonel Pedro José Díaz, a seasoned officer residing in Buenos Aires since being captured at Quebracho Herrado (28 November 1840) with the last remnants of Lavalle’s infantry. Díaz responded: “Tell the Governor I appreciate the trust he places in me; though a 'Unitarian', I will fulfil my duty as a soldier under the orders of my country’s government.” This led to the formation of that infantry brigade—the only one that, alongside Chilavert’s renowned artillery, held fire until the very end against the imperial forces.

Pacheco’s decisions, however, consistently cleared the path for the allied advance. On 26 January, as the allies reached Arroyo del Gato and moved on to Laguna del Tigre (near Chivilcoy), he ordered all troops withdrawn from the “Guardia de Luján” (present-day Mercedes), leaving only 600 men under Colonel Lagos—the sole commander actively resisting the enemy. Yet on the 28th, Pacheco wrote to Lagos suggesting he proceed as he saw fit with his forces, referring vaguely to movements supposedly made on the night of the 26th. He claimed that Major Albornoz was withdrawn because Lagos’s division was strong enough on its own.

But Pacheco’s assumptions were false—no such movements had occurred. Moreover, he ordered the withdrawal of all reserves, leaving Lagos isolated with a small division facing the enemy. Lagos replied on 28 January:

“Colonel Lagos, sir, made no movement whatsoever with the divisions encamped at Arroyo de Balta on the night of the 26th. I was informed by Major Albornoz that Your Excellency had ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Guardia de Luján on that same day. If I have been forced to engage the enemy solely on their left flank, it was because I was reprimanded for advancing with my force to Laguna de las Toscas, which I calculated (correctly) would be the enemy’s route.”

At the same time, serious accusations circulated against General Pacheco—some alleged that between 26 and 27 January he had established secret contact with General Urquiza, even removing Colonel Bustos’s aides from the area around Luján to that end. Bustos relayed the matter to Rosas through Major Reyes. Rosas simply replied: “He’s mad, sir.” The same was said of a Justice of the Peace who travelled from his post to confirm the rumour, and even of a prominent member of the legislature who echoed the report: “He’s mad,” Rosas repeated.

The allied army advanced from Chivilcoy to Luján, arriving on the morning of 29 January. By the 30th, its vanguard was positioned at Campos de Álvarez, just over two leagues from some of Buenos Aires’ forward divisions, located along the left bank of the Río de las Conchas (today the Reconquista River), defending the Márquez Bridge. Pacheco had just crossed the bridge without issuing orders and took the road to his estancia at El Talar.

Upon hearing of the enemy’s approach, Rosas instructed Lagos to engage them in battle, assuring him that General Pacheco would defend the Márquez Bridge with superior forces. With his own division and those of Colonels Domingo Sosa and Ramón Bustos (son of the Córdoba caudillo Juan Bautista Bustos), Lagos gathered approximately 2,500 men. At dawn on 31 January, he organised three parallel columns, deployed light cavalry to the front, and advanced to confront the enemy.

The allied army had formed in an extended line on the left flank, matching Lagos’s direction. General Juan Pablo López held the left; Colonel Galarza commanded the Entre Ríos cavalry in the centre; Colonels Aguilar and Caraballo positioned their divisions on either side. The allied force numbered about 5,000. The elite Buenos Aires squadrons clashed with the seasoned cavalry of Entre Ríos. These initially wavered when Lagos personally led charges that earned him lasting renown in Argentine military history. But the allied regiments, reinforced by López’s timely support and flanking manoeuvres, overwhelmed Lagos’s inexperienced squadrons. He then regrouped his best troops, led a final charge to stall the enemy, and withdrew in good order to the Márquez Bridge, losing around 200 men—including Commander Marcos Rubio—and several officers, weapons, and horses.

Allied reports and General César Díaz’s “Unpublished Memoirs” (pp. 265–267) claimed Lagos had 6,000 of the finest cavalry, and inconsistently reported both a lack of resistance and 200 casualties among Lagos’s forces, while stating the allies lost only 26 men. General Díaz had no direct knowledge, as he was two leagues from the battlefield and only joined the allied vanguard the next day. It was assumed Lagos still commanded the same force with which he had withdrawn from the northern line, but in reality, at Álvarez he had:

• His own division, militia from Bragado, and veteran detachments: 600 men

• Sosa’s division: 1,300 men

• Bustos’s division: 600 men

Echagüe’s and Cortina’s divisions did not participate. The bulk of Lagos’s Bragado division had been redirected by Pacheco across the Márquez Bridge.

Lagos expected to find Pacheco at the bridge with infantry and artillery, as instructed. But Pacheco was not there—he had left not a single man. Lagos requested orders, reporting he was still skirmishing with the enemy’s advance units. From Santos Lugares came the reply: “Hold your position.” On 11 February, the entire allied army assembled at Álvarez. Lagos informed Santos Lugares, and only late that day was he told that if the enemy attempted to cross the river, he should retreat to headquarters.

In this context, Pacheco resigned as General-in-Chief, stating Rosas was already at Santos Lugares in command of the army. Rosas took it as a personal blow. Showing the resignation to Major Reyes, he said: “Don’t you see, sir? Pacheco is mad, sir.” Yet, as Pacheco had informed all commanders of his resignation and urged them to report directly to Rosas, Rosas responded that he had “not accepted General Pacheco’s request; and given the importance of his role and his distinguished performance, the illustrious general continues in command.”

Rosas, however, flew into a rage when told Pacheco had failed to defend the Márquez Bridge with the troops withdrawn from Luján, as previously ordered: “It cannot be—surely the General Pacheco could not have disobeyed the orders of the Governor of the Province!” On the night of 31 January, Benjamín Victorica arrived at Santos Lugares on Pacheco’s behalf. Rosas dismissed him without hearing the message. The following afternoon, Pacheco himself arrived. Reyes announced him and returned to speak with Colonel Bustos. Moments later, both men were astonished to see Pacheco leave Rosas’s quarters, head down, without speaking, mount his horse, and ride to Witt’s estate, from where he witnessed the subsequent military events.

The victory at Álvarez was naturally celebrated in Urquiza’s camp and boosted allied morale. In light of the ease of their progress, they began to believe—perhaps rightly—that they would soon enter Buenos Aires with weapons in hand. In Rosas’s camp, although the defeat was keenly felt, it produced no outward sign. On the night of 1 February, some 400 men deserted from the allies and joined Santos Lugares, greeted by cheers from their former comrades.

Among the Buenos Aires population, strong support for Rosas persisted, rooted in a cultural loyalty reinforced by shared adversity and struggle. Many soldiers believed they were defending national honour against a foreign invasion. Was that merely poetic? Perhaps, but it was the poetry of honour—an inner truth resonating within individual conscience. The rural population saw only the astonishing fact of the Brazilian Empire’s invasion and rallied around Rosas as the personification of national salvation.

General César Díaz, commander of the eastern division of the allied army, observed:

“The people of Luján displayed the same studied indifference as those of Pergamino; and to the outward signs of sympathy for Rosas, they added actions clearly reflecting their sentiments. They exaggerated the size and quality of Rosas’s forces, recalled the many political storms he had weathered, and were convinced he would once again emerge victorious.”

Upon the full allied army’s arrival at Álvarez, Díaz recounts Urquiza’s thoughts:

“I went to visit the General and found him in the Major General’s tent. He spoke of the bitter disappointment in the spirit we had expected from Buenos Aires. Until then, we had not faced any resistance. The General said, ‘If it were not for my interest in promoting the Republic’s organisation, I should have remained allied to Rosas, for I am persuaded that he is a very popular man in this country.’”
And Díaz concludes:
“If Rosas was so publicly hated, or no longer feared, as was claimed, why did the people not seize this opportunity to realise their long-held desires? Why did they show such exaggerated zeal in defending their own servitude? From what I witnessed, I am deeply convinced that Rosas’s authority in 1852 was as strong—perhaps stronger—than it had been a decade earlier, and that neither popular submission nor confidence in his leadership had ever abandoned him.”

Sources:

• César Díaz – Unpublished Memoirs – Adriano Díaz Publications – Buenos Aires (1878)

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

• Portal: www.revisionistas.com.ar

• Adolfo Saldías – Historia de la Confederación Argentina – Ed. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires (1951)

Reproduction permitted with citation: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Argentine Confederation: Embargos on Unitarians in Flores

Embargo on the Unitarians of Flores

The Jueces de Paz (Peace Judges) replaced the former Alcaldes de Hermandad (Brotherhood Majors) when the Cabildo of Buenos Aires was officially dissolved in 1821. To the traditional rural lower-court powers held by their predecessors, new responsibilities were gradually added—especially during the Rosista era—turning them into central figures in the machinery established by Juan Manuel de Rosas to control life in the countryside, thereby consolidating their role as an effective instrument of rural population control.

Between 1832 and 1852, only four men held the office in the Partido de San José de Flores: Martín Farías, Vicente Zavala, Eustaquio Martínez, and Isidro Silva. The years 1841–1842 imposed an even heavier burden on these Justices of the Peace, beyond their usual judicial and policing functions, as they were tasked with enforcing the decree of 16 December 1841, which ordered the seizure of property from the opposition known as the “Savage Unitarians”:

“All movable and immovable property, rights, and claims of any kind, located in the city or countryside, belonging to the savage Unitarian traitors, are to be used to compensate for the damages inflicted on the fortunes of loyal Federalists by the hordes of the unnatural traitor Juan Lavalle; for the extraordinary expenses incurred by the public treasury in resisting the barbaric invasion of this execrable murderer; and for the rewards granted by the government to the regular army, the militias, and the other brave defenders of the freedom and dignity of our Confederation and that of America.”

Estates in Flores belonging to the “Savage Unitarians” that were seized:

• Achaval, José

• Blanco, Francisco

• Borches, José

• Carabajal, José María

• Castro, Joaquín

• Cortés, Alejo

• Díaz, Fermín

• Florete, Manuel

• Mainuetas, Manuel

• Mayoral, Regina

• Ramos de Lastra, Josefa

• Ramos Mexía, Francisco

• Ramos, Ramón

• Ruvino, Ignacio

• Zurita, Francisco de Paula

The same decree required the Justice of the Peace to submit a monthly report detailing the condition of the animals and properties that had been confiscated. These reports, titled “Monthly report showing the status of the animals that belonged to the Savage Unitarians, kept in winter pasture, specifying location, condition, and quantity”, were accompanied by correspondence sent to Santos Lugares, which was the General Regiment. They reveal compliance with the decree through records such as:

• Notes on animals in winter pasture

• Tree maintenance

• Firewood dispatches

• Wages for firewood cutters

• Transfers of money from firewood sales

• Sale of seized livestock

• Requests for wages for firewood cutters

• Funds for caretakers of winter pastures

• Funds to repair carts

• Funds for the construction of sheds

• Hiring of labourers

This measure was a response to one of the most severe crises faced during Rosas’s long rule, which included the French blockade of the port of Buenos Aires (1838–1840). The blockade severely disrupted the province’s foreign trade and, as a result, its public revenues. This period also saw the 1839 rural uprising in the southern campaign of Buenos Aires, known as the Libres del Sur. Finally, in 1840, Rosas was confronted with an invasion from the north of the province led by General Juan Lavalle, his old rival.

The principle behind the measure was not unprecedented, neither before nor after Rosas. In our civil wars or major social upheavals, confiscation and embargo have consistently been employed by governments to punish opponents or secure funding. Consider, for example, the confiscations during the French Revolution, or in the early 20th century during the Russian Revolution. It is, at first glance, logical that the material damages of war or revolution should be paid by those who seemingly provoked them; for the state, or peaceful citizens, ought not to bear the burden of conflicts they did not seek.

In the 1840 annual address, Arana justified the measure in unequivocal terms, which confirm this interpretation of what had become an almost codified custom:

“The government found itself faced with the choice of either passively allowing the wealth of the enemies of the Republic to support the barbarian invaders, or depriving them of every means of hostility. It could not hesitate in its choice.”

And, indeed, it did not.

Source

Deppeler, Néstor R. – Los embargos en la época de Rosas -, Ed. La Facultad, Buenos Aires (1936).
Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
Gavilán Enciso, Digna – Pueblo y campaña en la época de Rosas: San José de Flores, 1832-1852 – UNAM, San Justo (2018).
Gelman, Jorge y Schroeder, María Inés – Los embargos a los “unitarios” de la campaña de Buenos Aires – Duke University Press, (2003).
Heras, Carlos – Confiscaciones y embargos durante el gobierno de Rosas – UNLP, La Plata (1921).
Portal revisionistas.com.ar

Argentine Civil War: Letter from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Juan Facundo Quiroga

Letter from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Juan Facundo Quiroga, stained with his blood after being assassinated in Barranca Yaco

Figueroa Estate in San Antonio, December 20, 1834

My dear comrade, Mr. Juan Facundo Quiroga,

In accordance with our agreement, I begin by informing you that I have come to believe that the disputes between Tucumán and Salta, and the dissatisfaction between their governments, may have been caused by former Governor Mr Pablo Alemán and his associates. This man fled to Tucumán, where I believe he was received cordially and treated with friendship by Mr Heredia. From there, he orchestrated a revolution against Latorre, but when he returned to the Rosario frontier to carry it out, his plans failed and he was apprehended and taken to Salta. There, he was released on bail on the condition that he not return to the province, and while passing through Tucumán, it seems he maintained good relations with Mr Heredia.

All this, understandably, would have angered Latorre and emboldened Mr Alemán’s faction. In such a context, the Unitarians—who are ever watchful like wolves lying in wait for a lapse in vigilance—sought to exploit this situation, perhaps through the notorious student López who was held on the Pontón, using these developments to reassert their influence.

However, regardless of how this came about, I find Mr Heredia’s request for damages and compensation to be unjust. He himself admits in official notes to this government and to Salta’s, that his grievances are based on indications and conjecture, not on certain and undeniable facts that would eliminate all doubt regarding Latorre’s allegedly hostile conduct.

In this case, the law of nations would only permit Mr Heredia to request explanations and guarantees, but certainly not reparations. Affairs between States cannot be resolved under the laws governing private disputes, for such laws are dictated by particular circumstances only relevant in the State where they are enacted. Furthermore, it is not customary to sentence a party to indemnify another based solely on signs and suspicions.

Even if this demand for indemnity were not repugnant to justice, it surely is to politics. First, it would foster an eternal hatred between the provinces, which, sooner or later, would bring great harm to the Republic. Second, such a precedent would open the door to intrigue and bad faith, allowing factions to provoke disputes that would serve as a pretext to force some provinces to sacrifice their fortunes for the benefit of others.

In my view, we must not lose sight of how carefully Mr Heredia avoids addressing the charges Latorre makes about his handling of Alemán, who, according to Latorre’s own complaints, incited a revolution from Tucumán using that province’s resources with Mr Heredia’s knowledge and tolerance—a matter mentioned in Latorre’s proclamation published in Thursday’s Gazette, which you will have read.

Justice has two ears, and in order to find it, you must uncover matters from their very origin. If it should become evident, based on indisputable facts, that one of the two disputants has openly betrayed the national cause of the Federation, in your place, I would advocate that he be removed from office.

As I consider it unnecessary to dwell on some other points, which the Governor has already well explained in his instructions, I shall now proceed to the matter of the Constitution.

It seems to me that in your efforts to restore the peace and order that have been so unfortunately disturbed, the most powerful argument and the strongest reason you must convey to these Governors and other influential figures—whenever you have the opportunity—is the retrograde step the Nation has taken by pushing further away the long-desired day of our great National Constitution.

What is the current state of the Republic but the consequence of this delay? You and I deferred to the provinces, allowing them to focus on drafting their own constitutions so that, once proclaimed, we might then lay the groundwork for the great National Charter. We acted not because we were convinced the time had truly come, but because the Republic was at peace and the need for a Constitution had become widespread. We felt it prudent to proceed as we did to avoid greater evils.

The results are painfully evident: the succession of scandals and the truly dangerous state in which the Republic now finds itself, a sombre picture that extinguishes any hope of remedy.

And after all this, after what experience so clearly teaches us, can anyone still believe that rushing into a national Constitution is the solution?

Permit me a few observations on this matter, for although we have always been in agreement on such an elevated topic, I wish to leave in your hands, well in advance and for whatever use it may have, a small portion of what I think must be said.

No one more than you and I is persuaded of the necessity for the organisation of a general government, and that it is the only way to give substance and responsibility to our Republic. But who can doubt that such a government must be the happy result of all means properly aligned for its creation? Who aspires to an end by marching in the opposite direction? Who, when building a structured and compact whole, does not first organise and solidify the parts that are to comprise it?

Who attempts to form an orderly army from groups of men lacking officers, discipline, or subordination, who are in constant conflict with each other, dragging the rest into their disarray? Who forms a living and robust body from dead, torn, or gangrenous limbs, when it is evident that the life and strength of the whole must come from the vitality of its parts?

A bitter and costly experience has shown us that a federal system is absolutely necessary in our case, primarily because we completely lack the elements required for a unified government.

Consider how the dominance of a faction deaf to this reality has destroyed the resources once available to us. It has incited animosity, corrupted public opinion, pitted private interests against each other, spread immorality and intrigue, and fractured society into factions to such a degree that almost no ties remain. Even the most sacred bond—the one that could restore the others, religion itself—has not been spared. In this deplorable state, everything must be created anew, beginning with small efforts, fragment by fragment, until we can establish a general system that encompasses all.

A Federal Republic is the most disastrous illusion if not composed of well-organised States. When each State retains its sovereignty and independence, the general government’s internal power is virtually non-existent. Its primary role is purely representative—to speak on behalf of the Confederated States in dealings with foreign nations. Thus, if individual States lack the means to maintain internal order, the creation of a general representative government merely risks spreading disorder across the Republic at each local crisis.

This is why the United States of America did not admit new territories or provinces into the Confederation until they were able to govern themselves. In the meantime, they remained unrepresented, considered as territories attached to the Republic.

In our current state of unrest, with populations corrupted by Unitarians, lodge members, aspirants, secret agents of other nations, and the major lodges that disturb all of Europe, what hope can there be for calm when drafting a federal pact, the first step a Federative Congress must take? In our current poverty, brought on by political upheaval, who will fund the assembly and maintenance of this Congress, let alone a general administration?

[Due to length, the translation continues in the next message.]

Continuation – Translation of Juan Manuel de Rosas’s Letter to Juan Facundo Quiroga (Part 2):

How shall we fund the national foreign debt, incurred for the benefit of the entire Republic, which will immediately become a pressing concern upon the establishment of a general administration?

Furthermore, when we can barely find capable men to govern individual provinces, from where will we draw those who are to govern the entire Republic? Are we to hand over the general administration to the ignorant, the ambitious, the Unitarians, and every kind of opportunist?

Did we not witness how the so-called constellation of wise men could find no better candidate for general government than Don Bernardino Rivadavia, and how he was unable to form a cabinet except by taking the priest from the Cathedral (1) and bringing Dr Lingotes (2) from San Juan to serve as Minister of Finance—though he understood that department no better than a man born blind understands astronomy?

Finally, when we look upon the Republic’s pitiful condition, which of the heroes of the Federation will dare take on the general government? Who among them could gather a body of federal representatives and ministers, possessing the intelligence and cooperation necessary to perform their duties with dignity, succeed in office, and not ruin their reputation?

There is so much to say on this matter that even a volume written over the course of a month would barely cover the essentials.

The general Congress must be conventional, not deliberative. Its purpose must be to negotiate the bases of the Federal Union, not to resolve them by vote. It must be made up of deputies paid and supported by their own people, without expectation that one province will subsidise another. Buenos Aires once might have done so, but that is now entirely impossible.

Before the assembly is convened, the governments must unanimously agree upon its location and upon the formation of a common fund to cover the official expenses of Congress, such as premises, furnishings, lighting, clerks, assistants, porters, attendants, and other necessary services. These are significant costs—much greater than generally believed.

The place chosen for the meeting must offer guarantees of safety and respect for the deputies, regardless of their views. It must be hospitable and comfortable, as the deputies will require a long time to conduct business. Failing this, many of the most capable individuals may decline to attend or resign after arriving, and the Congress will be reduced to a group of incompetents—lacking talent, knowledge, judgment, or experience in state affairs.

If you were to ask me today where such a place might be, I would say: I do not know. And if someone were to propose Buenos Aires, I would reply that such a choice would be a certain sign of the most unfortunate and disastrous end—for this city and for the entire Republic.

Only time—time alone, under the shadow of peace and the people’s tranquillity—can provide and indicate such a place.

The deputies must be proven federalists, men of respect, moderation, circumspection, prudence, and administrative knowledge, who thoroughly understand the internal and external situation of our country—both domestically and in relation to neighbouring states and the European nations with which we trade. These matters involve complex and significant interests. If two or three deputies lack such qualifications, disorder will follow—as it always has—if not outright corruption by those who, finding themselves in such a position and unable to accomplish any good for the country, seek only their personal gain. That is precisely what our past Congresses have done—ending in dissolution, leaving only gossip, lies, intrigues, and plunging the country into a chaos of calamities from which it may never recover.

The first matter to be addressed in the Congress is not, as some believe, the establishment of the general government or the appointment of the supreme head of the Republic. That is the last step. The first is to decide whether the Congress will continue its sessions in the same location or relocate elsewhere.

The second matter is the General Constitution, beginning with the structure of the general government: how many officials it will comprise—both the supreme head and ministers—and what their powers will be, ensuring that the sovereignty and independence of each federated State remain intact. It must outline the election process, eligibility criteria, the seat of government, and the size of the permanent land and sea forces during peacetime—essential for maintaining order, security, and national dignity.

The question of the location of the government seat is particularly sensitive, often provoking jealousies and rivalries among provinces, and resulting in a complicated overlap between national and local authorities. These issues were so serious that the Americans chose to found Washington, D.C., a federal capital belonging to no State.

Once the structure, powers, and location of government are agreed upon, the Congress must proceed to establish a permanent national fund to cover all ordinary and extraordinary general expenses and the repayment of national debt—both foreign and domestic, regardless of the justice or injustice of its causes or the management of State finances. Creditors are not concerned with these matters; they are to be addressed separately.

Each federated State must contribute to this fund (as with military contingents for the national army) in proportion to its population, unless an alternative arrangement is agreed upon. There is no fixed rule; all depends on mutual agreements.

The Americans agreed to fund this via customs duties on overseas trade, because all their States had seaports. If not, such a system would not have been feasible. Additionally, their geographic conditions are largely maritime, as evidenced by their active commerce, large number of merchant and war ships, and the high cost of maintaining their naval power—hence the logic of funding the government with revenues from foreign trade.

Included in these discussions should be the National Bank, paper currency, all part of the national debt owed to Buenos Aires, the British debt incurred during the war with Brazil, the millions spent on military reforms, and payments made toward the recognised debt dating from the War of Independence. Also to be accounted are all expenditures made by this province in support of previous general congresses—on the understanding they were to be reimbursed.

Once these financial and organisational matters are resolved, and mechanisms established for each State to generate its own revenue without harming national interests, only then should the appointment of the head of the Republic and the creation of the general government take place.

[Final portion of the letter continues in the next message.]

Continuation – Translation of Juan Manuel de Rosas’s Letter to Juan Facundo Quiroga (Part 3 – Final Part):

And can anyone truly believe that, in the sad and lamentable condition in which our country now finds itself, it is possible to overcome such vast difficulties and bring to completion an enterprise so immense and arduous—one that, even in times of peace and prosperity, with the most capable and patriotic men at our disposal, could scarcely be realised in two years of constant labour?

Can anyone who understands the federal system honestly believe that creating a general government under such a structure will resolve the internal disputes of the provinces? This mistaken belief, sadly held by some well-meaning individuals, is exactly what fuels the ambitions of others—perfidious and treacherous men who stir unrest in the provinces with cries of "Constitution!" not in pursuit of peace, but to ensure chaos endures—for it is in disorder that they find their opportunity to thrive.

The general government in a federative republic does not unite the member states—it represents them as united. Its function is not to create unity, but to represent existing unity before other nations. It neither involves itself in the internal matters of any single state, nor resolves disputes between them. The former is handled by the local authorities, and the latter is addressed by provisions already included in the Constitution itself.

In short, unity and peace create the general government; disunity destroys it. It is a result, not a cause. If its absence is painful, its collapse is even more catastrophic, for it never falls without taking the entire Republic down with it.

Since we currently lack unity and peace—as we undeniably do—it is a lesser evil that no such general government yet exists, than to suffer the devastation of its collapse.

Are we not witnessing how every province struggles to overcome immense difficulties just to establish its own constitution? And if we cannot even resolve those isolated problems, how could we possibly hope to overcome them in addition to the greater discord between provinces—a discord that remains dormant only so long as each tends to its own affairs, but which erupts like a storm the moment a general Congress is convened?

Certain men must be disabused of the grave error in which they live. For if they succeed in their endeavour, they will drag the Republic into a catastrophe the likes of which it has never known.

And I, for my part, believe that if we wish to preserve our reputation and honour our past glories, we must under no circumstance lend our support to such madness—at least not until the proper moment arrives and we can be sure the result will be the genuine happiness of the Nation.

If we are unable to prevent them from going ahead with such a plan, then let them proceed—but we must make it clear to the public that we had no part in such folly, and that our failure to prevent it is due to our inability, not our will.

The maxim that one must place oneself at the head of the people when one cannot change their course is indeed a sound one—but only when their path is rightly directed, albeit with excessive haste. It is also valid when one seeks to gently change their course through practical reasoning, rather than force. In that sense, we have fulfilled our duty. But subsequent events have shown, in the clearest light, that among us, there is no other path than to give time—time for the elements of discord to be exhausted and die out, by encouraging, in each government, the spirit of peace and tranquillity.

When that spirit becomes visible everywhere, then the groundwork will begin—with peaceful and friendly missions, through which the governments may, quietly and without noise or agitation, negotiate among themselves—one day, one base; another day, another—until all are so well established that, when the Congress is finally formed, nearly all of its work is already laid out, and it need only proceed smoothly along the path that has been prepared.

This may be slow—indeed, it must be—but I believe it is the only approach possible for us, now that everything has been destroyed and we must rebuild from the very void.

Farewell, my comrade.
May Heaven have mercy on us, and grant you health, success, and happiness in the fulfilment of your mission; and to both of us, and our friends, the strength and unity to defend ourselves, to foresee and prevent, and to save our fellow countrymen from the many dangers that threaten us.

Juan M. de Rosas

Notes:

(1) Julián Segundo de Agüero
(2) Salvador María del Carril

Source: Collection of Adolfo Saldías, folios 179–184.
Room VII, Nº 229. Department of Written Documents. Buenos Aires. Argentina. (AGN│General Archive of the Nation)

Argentine Navy: Navy Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne

Navy Colonel Juan Bautista THORNE



The Thornes had ancient recorded origins in Europe and North America. One of the Thornes was among the first to settle on American soil; Enrique, the father of Juan Bautista, a naval engineer by profession as a ship captain, fought for the independence of the United States. Juan Bautista, son of Margarita Brayer and Enrique, was born on March 8, 1807.

He enlisted in the Argentine Navy that, under the command of Brown, was preparing Rivadavia to defeat the power of the Brazilian empire in the waters of the Plata. Discharged from the squadron on June 1, 1826, he went on to review with the rank of Midshipman and pilot on the warship Congreso, placed under the command of Fournier, whom the Brazilian newspapers called "Exterminator Ray." Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of 1827, he was assigned to the brig Chacabuco, which under the command of Santiago J. Bynnon, later second commander of the Argentine fleet, came from Chile to join the original fleet and was later to fight the heroic defense of Patagones.

That March 7, 1827, in front of the river bar that the enemy ships had tried to cross and the coastal battery that Admiral Pinto Guedes had ordered to be destroyed, a glorious action would be fought for Argentine naval weapons. Commander Bynnon, with the Chacabuco and the ships of his squadron, at dusk set out to board the Brazilian ships; He took the Escudeiro, fell on the Constança, and the brave Thorne jumped first onto the deck of the Itaparica to triumphantly raise the Argentine flag. The action earned him command of the brig Patagones, armed with two cannons and an 18-gun revolving wheel, which on December 23, 1827 engaged in combat with the sixteen-gun Brazilian brig Pedro II and was surrendered, while Thorne was wounded. shrapnel was taken prisoner and taken to the capital of the empire, from where he returned when peace was made with Brazil in 1828.

Returning to service, he joined the brig Balcarce, which at the beginning of the war had been Brown's flagship. While there, he received the rank of captain on February 23, 1830, and then obtained several assignments: in February 1831, He was transferred to the schooner Martín García, in September 1832 he reached command of the brig Republicano with which he carried out the Entre Ríos campaign, upon whose return he was promoted to Sergeant Major. In the schooner Margarita he undertook the campaign to the Colorado River in 1833, and in order to assist in the expedition of Don Juan Manuel de Rosas, he explored said river in the schooner Sofía. The following year he was part of the exploration cruises to the southern regions, and alternately commanded the schooner brig San Martín, the brig Republicano and the lugger Patriota.

Designated Commander of the Sarandí, he was entrusted with the mission of assisting the defense of Martín García Island, a task he completed to be transferred to command of the land artillery of said island, where on October 12, 1838, with a hundred braves Gauchos led by Gerónimo Costa sold their lives dearly in the single combat they fought against the blocking French squad. Thorne fought heroically and remembering the episode many years later he used to say:

"My grave should be Martín García, because there I fought defenseless and
even with anger when seeing my helplessness..."

Difficult days ensued. The fight between federalists and unitarians became bitter and persistent. Thorne, a foreigner, was unable to discern any slogans in his chosen homeland other than subordination and discipline. Destined to land service, he carried out the Entre Ríos campaign with Echagüe in 1839. He was in many combats, received numerous wounds, and in old age he could locate under the skin, in different parts of the body, the leads of the bullets received. When on April 15, 1841, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he returned to place himself under the orders of Admiral Brown, he had to note in his service record that he had attended the war actions of Cagancha, Pago Largo, Don Cristóbal, Caaguazú , Yerúa, Sauce Grande and Punta Diamante.


Appointed commander of the brig General Belgrano in June 1842, he accompanied Brown in the campaign against Garibaldi; The Admiral continued going up the Paraná with the purpose of defeating the enemy, while Thorne had the mission of guarding the entry of reinforcements through the Plata, for which he had the second division of the fleet, made up of the 25 de Mayo and the General San Martín.

Assigned to the river defense service, on August 17, 1845 he was appointed commander of one of the three batteries located in the Vuelta de Obligado, in which position, a few months later, on November 20 of the same year he maintained with high courage and a tough fight against the blocking squad would be bizarre. The action having begun in the middle of the morning, Thorne's guns grumbled until late in the afternoon, and only ceased when the bullets had run out.

The brave opponent of the Anglo-French squadron obtained, perhaps in recognition of his previous services, the designation of Commander in Chief of the coasts of Paraná. From this position he directed the fortification of the Quebracho coast and fought some skirmishes against the blockading squad, in one of which he was wounded in the shoulder. Commander of the schooner Pontón in 1849, Caseros found him on February 3, 1852, commanding the boat Julio from which he descended to soon begin the path of political banning.

Erased from the military list he was forced to earn a living. Sea dog, as captain of a low-freight merchant ship, made many trips to India and worked in various tasks as a naval expert, until calmer spirits, the just and patriotic law of September 24, 1868, ended in general with the material sufferings and the moral agony of the brave combatants of the independence campaigns and the war against the empire of Brazil. The state remembered the helpless octogenarians who had founded the Republic and reparations were made.

Retired with the rank of colonel to the peace of the home, which he had formed by marrying María Abad. Thorne's existence came to an end at the age of seventy-eight, he suddenly fell ill and left life in his house in Tucumán Street, on August 1, 1885. His mortal remains were buried in the Dissidents cemetery. Twenty-two years later, in March 1907, on the centenary of his birth, a popular tribute commission honored him, and Dr. Pedro J. Coronado recalled his memory to say, among other things: "A century has passed since he was born on earth. "our hero misses, and his figure grows out of the cloud of passions and partisan mirage. Thorne chose his country and his destiny." The newspaper La Nación also expressed: "History owes him an illuminated page of heroism. Today, he belongs without hesitation to immortality."

Argentine Navy (c)

Argentine Confederation: Rosas' Gunsmith

Rosas' Gunsmith

Friedrich Nell (1819-1894)

Friedrich Nell was born in Baden-Baden, Germany in 1819. He was a man of great drive and aspirations who, after traveling throughout Germany in the early 1800s, settled in Buenos Aires before 1850.

Nell met the Indians in the area of large ranches of the time, in the vicinity of Dolores (Province of Buenos Aires). Later he moved to San Luis, working in the La Carolina gold mine; He settled in San Luis (Capital) and finally lived in Mendoza, in Alto Verde, near San Martín, where he died in 1894.

Despite not having been a professional – says Puntano geologist Lucero Michaut – he instilled in his children an interest in the German and French languages and in the positive sciences. He had Catholic religious convictions and always despised everything superstitious and lacking logical explanation. He was a man of great personal courage, forming what could be defined as a “guts gringo”, one of those who contributed to forming countries.”

Friedrich Nell arrived in the country around 1846 or 1847. He married in October 1850 in Buenos Aires María Theodore Elisabeth Polte, a German from Hannover, born in 1820, all the witnesses to their marriage being also German, which indicates that at the time There was already an appreciable flow of spontaneous German immigration, without counting men of science who arrived shortly after, from the hierarchy of Germán Burmeister, a true scholar in matters of natural sciences, organizer of the Argentine Museum of Natural Sciences “Bernardino Rivadavia”, and in whose In honor, an Argentine mosquito (Chunga burmeistari), whose popular name is chuña, has been named.

His daughter, Basilia Nell, born in Dolores, Province of Buenos Aires, was the wife of Dr. Adolphe Joseph Michaut, a prestigious French doctor who in 1866 was hired by the Ministry of War and Navy to provide services in the War of the Paraguay.

The informative material provided by Dr. Lucero Michaut includes the Memoirs of Don Carlos Michaut Nell (1) about his maternal grandparents, Friedrich Nell and María Polte, according to the stories he heard in his childhood from their mouths, in family wheel

German Gunsmith in Rosas Service

In the interesting “Memories” it is related that the Nell-Polte couple had an Artistic Blacksmithing Workshop in which spears, sabers and other weapons such as rifles were forged, to supply the cavalry militias called “Los Colorados de Rosas”.

“My grandfather Federico narrated – says Carlos Michaut Nell – that Rosas himself once personally appeared in his workshop, who, after carefully observing the entire existence of weapons prepared and in preparation, left without speaking to anyone.

Both Don Federico and his wife María E. Polte were supporters and sympathizers of Rosas and therefore federalists by conviction and both permanently used the federal currency; The same, which consisted of a wide red ribbon, was worn on the hat by my grandfather and on the “chapeca” that hung on his back, by my grandmother.

Despite this, both the workshop and the house were visited very often by the leaders of La Mazorca, generally by Commander Ciriaco Cuitiño and Andrés Parra, in search of possible Unitarian refugees, who were persecuted to the death. What happened was that La Mazorca systematically distrusted them due to the fact that they were “gringos”, as Cuitiño himself told them in those reviews in which they investigated even the basements.

Don Federico remembered that Cuitiño once showed up with his police group of gauchos with red chiripá and pony boots; Cuitiño was in his shirt sleeves and his right arm was completely stained with the blood of a Unitarian that he had just personally beheaded.

Shortly afterwards, on a date that I cannot specify but which evidently had to be before Caseros, my grandparents decided to sell the workshop and move to the countryside of the province of Buenos Aires, excited to start raising sheep; Thus, they settled in a ranch in the Dolores District, belonging to a rich family with the last name Cisneros; On that ranch my late mother Doña Basilia Nell was born (1858) (who would later marry my father Joseph Adolph Michaut in 1880, in Paso Grande, San Luis).

The Cisneros couple became attached to my grandfather Federico's family and asked my grandmother to name the newborn Basilia and that they were going to be her godparents; Likewise, Mr. Cisneros ordered his butler that every calf that was born male be designated in the name of his “daughter” Basilia. I don't know what purpose that promise had, because on my mother's birth certificate a German Goldschmidt and another person with the last name Adaro, both from Dolores, appear as godfather.

My grandfather said that on two occasions they owed their lives to the punzón currency that they still used permanently while they worked on the aforementioned Cisneros ranch. My grandparents lived in a part of that large ranch, which had been assigned to them, and in which they busily dedicated themselves to raising a huge flock of sheep, for which they occupied an old ranch whose doors were barred shut at night out of fear. to the banditry that at that time devastated the entire national territory.

On two occasions with a very similar development, they were presented with two malones of “pampas Indians”, who upon seeing them wearing the punzón badge did not attack them, since the Indians of that time adored Juan Manuel de Rosas; In fact, the chief shouted to the Indians: “Christian being a federal, not killing, not killing and not stealing, brother, giving capons,” and my grandfather with his blunderbuss on his belt answered them, imitating the Indians' way of expressing themselves: “yes.” , brothers, all grabbing capons, “and there began the mass slaughter until the savages were fed up, after which they withdrew at dawn, keeping their word not to harm them or steal anything from them. While my grandfather had attended to them kindly, trying not to provoke her anger, my grandmother, in desperation, was walking around with a bottle of gin and a jug serving the drink to the chief and her captain, who were very respectful towards her.

The Indians considered Rosas as a kind of ally against the Unitarians, whom they evidently hated with a prevention possibly fueled by him. These malones, upon returning inland, systematically devastated the large ranches belonging to the Unitarians.”

The Three Friedrich Nell Stakes

“About his stay at the ranch, my grandfather always recounted in family gatherings the memory of three mishaps that happened to him there.

One Sunday, my grandfather, like many other residents of that vast countryside, went to a “pulpería” to entertain himself with horse races and card games, on which occasion he had an altercation with one of the gauchos present, whom he stabbed. a strong fist blow; His immediate response was a stab in the lower abdomen. The shopkeeper had him transported to his house where upon entering he simply said “Maria, give me a glass of wine, they have stabbed me, damn it!” The local healers cured him with weed poultices. The word “fuck” was permanently in my grandfather's mouth; He evidently found it very expressive and used it to underline the end of any sentence.

On another occasion - Don Federico said - he was riding his horse along those deserted roads of the region, with the aim of visiting a friend, when suddenly he encountered a group of four semi-wild gauchos who, after making him get off his horse and When they hit him, they told him: “We just killed a gringo and now we are going to kill you.” While some of the assailants pressed him to the ground, another sharpened his knife on a stick at the same time he told him. "I'm going to cut your throat." Then, at the right moment, like a miracle from God, they saw a horseman approaching the great race, before which the bandits released him and mounted their pingos and fled. I say that this happened at the right moment, because one of the savages had my grandfather pulling him by the black beard he wore, or "pear" as it was called, to proceed with the slaughter, while he told them: "Cut quickly, damn it." ”, according to his custom of expressing himself. The person who had arrived so opportunely was a friend of his, very dear and linked to the family by ties of sponsorship that were taken so seriously at that time; This man, like many others in the area, was a very decent gaucho who had assimilated quite a bit of civilization.

On another occasion, while Don Federico was in the same grocery store mentioned, he heard from the locals that nearby there was a place where at night no one dared to walk without being the subject of terrible "scares" or serious accidents. Since my grandfather always used to say that he never knew what fear of anything or anyone was, he assured everyone present that he “planned to go that same night, damn it.” He did so and that night, mounted on his regal pingo, with the faith that he was as good a rider as the best of the gauchos, he went to the aforementioned place in order to personally find out what was true in that mystery that He had terrified the gauchaje of the area, no matter how brave some of them were. Arriving at the place after midnight, he noticed that his horse reared up asking for rein and more rein until suddenly, he received a terrible blow or slap in the face that knocked him off his horse; He fell to the ground with the reins in his hand, which prevented the horse from fleeing, leaving him on foot. Next, Don Federico says, he resolutely shouted: “Hit me again, damn it,” but from then on everything was silent, so he decided to return home, not scared as he said, but very worried about what had happened and because he had not been able to unravel the mistery".

Gold Rush in La Carolina (San Luis)

“Around 1860 (when my mother Basilia was two years old) attracted by the “gold fever” sparked by the discovery of the then rich gold deposits in the “La Carolina-Cañada Honda” area of the province of San Luis , my grandfather decided to leave the Buenos Aires countryside and move with the whole family to the aforementioned place, where the precious metal was extracted both from the sands of the rivers by washing with carob plates, and from quartz veins that carried the same.

Apparently, there he met the Swiss Emile Ruttimann and they worked together for some time. My grandfather and his family stayed in the precarious camp of an abandoned mine long ago and he dedicated himself with all his might to the new task; Unfortunately, and according to their own expressions, the vein developed from top to bottom, requiring the extraction of the metal at increasingly greater depths that came up against the flooding of the works due to the water circulating in fissures in the rock. He finally had to leave the company after heavy financial losses. This situation forced him to move to the capital of the Province (San Luis) where, based on the knowledge acquired about the aforementioned metal, he set up a jewelry business, which allowed him a certain economic recovery.

The stay of the Nell family in the capital of San Luis must have been quite long, since their five children began to go to school and four of them (the three girls and one of the boys) got married there. The three women, Basilia (married in Paso Grande, San Luis, to Dr. Joseph Adolphe Michaut in 1880), Juana (married to Becerra) and María (married to Romanella) were the only blondes who attended the College, so They were called by their companions “the three Marys”; Another of the sons, Pedro, also got married in San Luis and as for the remaining one, Juan, when the whole family moved to their last home (always in that east-west migration so common among foreigners who enter the country ) in San Martín-Buen Orden, Mendoza, he went to Chile where he married, giving rise to a large family; I remember seeing my mother Basilia cry bitterly when she received the news from Chile of the death of her brother Juan de ella, and later after a strong earthquake that occurred in that country, she lost until now all contact with that family branch ; This happened around 1895 or 1896, if I remember correctly.

Once the Nell family (Don Federico, his wife María Theodore E. Polte and the then only unmarried son Juan) moved to Mendoza, my grandfather opened an Artistic Blacksmith Workshop again in a place in the San Martín Department called Alto Salvador; The Michaut-Nell couple, that is, my parents, had already lived in San Martín since 1884, where I was born the following year. Shortly after, we went to live in Alto Alegre, where I remember that grandparents Federico and María Nell visited us very often.

From that time of my childhood so full of pleasant memories due to the almost constant presence of my grandparents and their very interesting stories, I remember very clearly that I once saw him arrive for a visit (I was about 7 years old, so it may have been because 1892) on horseback on his superb dark pingo malacara at full gallop and he made it streak across the patio at the foot of the gallery with his mastery as an accomplished rider, at the same time that his white “perita” (beard) flew over the shoulder; My grandfather would have been around 73 years old at that time.

In his conversations he used to repeat with good Spanish diction, although still with a bit of a German accent, “I'm going to die working, damn it!” And so it was indeed; One day he was working in his Workshop, when he was already 75 years old (in 1894, I think) striking a hot iron, when he suddenly fell on his back, dead of cardiac syncope, with a hot iron held in a clamp in one hand. , and the hammer in the other.

My grandfather Federico was buried in the Buen Orden Cemetery (San Martín), but since at that time there were no permanent niches but rather he was buried directly in the ground, his remains have been lost and it has not been possible to locate the exact place of his burial. his grave; On the other hand, my grandmother María T. E. Polte de Nell, who died in 1904, is currently in a niche in perpetuity, very close to the Pantheon of Dr. Michaut (her son-in-law).

They are descendants of the primitive Nell-Polte branch (my maternal grandparents) the Michaut-Gatica (Buenos Aires and Córdoba), the Lucero-Michaut (Mercedes-San Luis-Córdoba), the Michaut-Ríos-Gutiérrez (San Martín-Mendoza) , all of whom are linked to my mother Basilia Nell de Michaut (1858-1941); From the branch of María Nell de Romanella, among others, the Musset-Romanella (Buenos Aires) descend, from that of Juana Nell de Becerra, there are the Iturralde-Becerra (Buenos Aires); From Pedro, also son of Don Federico, the Barraza-Nells who live in Córdoba descend; As for the descendants of

Reference

(1) Son of the Dr. Joseph Adolphe Michaut and Basilia Nell Polte marriage.

Sources

• Benarós, León – Francisco Nell: Alemán, armero de Rosas y un “gringo de Agallas”.
• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
• Michaut Nell, Carlos – “Memorias” – Villa Mercedes, San Luis (1977)
• Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar

Todo es Historia – Año XI, Nº 130, Buenos Aires (1878)

Argentine Confederation: Paraná War

Paraná War

Revisionistas





Patricios in Vuelta de Obligado in El Tonelero


After the Vuelta de Obligado combat, the allied forces that disembarked there with the intention of entering, had been overwhelmed in the months of December and January by those of Colonel Thorne, who commanded the line of observation on the coast. On February 2, 1846, the allies landed 300 soldiers protected by the artillery of their ships anchored on the coast. Thorne deployed against them a strong guerrilla, and after a heavy firefight he fell upon them with two companies of artillery and 50 lancers, forcing them to re-embark.(1)

General Mansilla conveniently placed his flying artillery on the coast of San Nicolás del Rosario, San Lorenzo and Tonelero, and came to personally lead the resistance to the passage of the convoy of those who speculated on the war and in favor of the progress of the intervention. On January 9, the ships of the convoy arrived at the port of Acevedo. Mansilla pointed his cannons against them. Four British and French ships anchored in front of him, responding with their large-caliber artillery. Thus they protected the path of the convoy, which moved away from the coast and towards an island interposed in front of the Mansilla position. In the impossibility of harassing it through the islands that rose between the two coasts at that height of the Paraná, Mansilla followed the convoy by land to verify it where it was within range.

In the ravines of the coast they appeared between the convent of San Lorenzo and Punta del Quebracho, Mansilla had placed eight cannons hidden under piles of brush, 250 police officers and 100 infantrymen in the ravines of the coast arrived between the convent of San Lorenzo and Punta del Quebracho.

At noon on January 16, the steamer Gorgon, the corvette Expeditive, the brigs Dolphin, King and two armed schooners appeared in the Colony, which mounted 37 large-caliber guns and accompanied 52 merchant ships. When facing San Lorenzo, the Expeditive and the Gorgon fired three shots with bullets and shrapnel over the coast to discover the Mansilla force. The Argentine soldiers remained hidden in their post, according to the order received. When the entire convoy found itself in the narrowness of the river that runs upstream from San Lorenzo, Mansilla ordered the fire of his batteries led by captains José Serezo, Santiago Maurice and Alvaro de Alzogaray to break. The attack was accurate; The dismantled merchant ships headed towards two nearby streams, increasing with the collision of one with the other the damages caused by the land cannons.

At four in the afternoon the combat was still going strong, and the convoy did not make up for what it had done with its great damages. Favored by the stern wind and behind the ships that incessantly vomited deadly fire, he approached the Quebracho. Here Mansilla reconcentrated his forces and fought until late afternoon, when, dismounted their cannons and neutralized their rifle fire by the enemy cannon, the convoy was able to save Punta Quebracho, with major damage to the warships, considerable losses in manufacturing, and 50 men out of action. Rear Admiral Inglefield, in his official part to the British Admiralty says that “the English and French steamers held their fire for more than three and a half hours; and hardly a single ship in the convoy left without receiving a bullet.”

The loss of the Argentines was insignificant this time, and Mansilla could correctly say that he had had the honor of defending the flag of his country in the same place of San Lorenzo that San Martín watered with his blood when leading the first charge of his later famous Horse Grenadiers.(2)

As can be seen, the allies did not continue their conquest in Argentine interior waters with impunity. It is true that Mansilla, complying with strict government orders, incessantly covered the extensive coast that he defended, making his few cannons thunder wherever those within range appeared. That was how he outwitted them in their landing attempts after Obligado and San Lorenzo. On February 10, immediately after failing in one of these attempts, the English warships Alecto and Gordon bombarded the Cooper field for three hours with bullets a la Paixhans 64. The artillery and infantry of the Argentines commanded by Major Manuel Virto responded boldly, and they only managed to kill some militiamen, set fire to two guns, and destroy the huts and trees that had . (3) A few days later they renewed hostilities without much success. On April 2, Philomel arrived in front of Quebracho. Lieutenant Colonel Thorne brought his guns upon them, but as the Philomel fled downstream, he tied three pieces of 8's to the girths of his horses and ran up the coast to catch up with her; which he could not verify because the French ship was at full sail and current. On the 6th, the same Thorne battery held another combat with the English warship Alecto, which passed through the Quebracho towing three schooners. The English had some deaths and their ship came out badly damaged.

On the 19th, after another battle, Mansilla managed to dam the Federal pailebot, taken by the allies in Obligado. When informing the government of this event, sending the conquered English flag, and under the relation, all the camera baggage of the former commander of the prized pailebot Carlos G. Fegen, Mansilla added in his note: "The Anglo-French will see the difference that exists between the looting of the baggage of the brave Obligado men who called themselves civilizers, and the conduct of the federals who defend their homeland and respect even the spoils of their enemies." On the 21st, Thorne still had to sustain another two-hour battle with the English ship Lizard, which he riddled with bullets, turning over the flag that was flying at the top and leaving it almost useless for new operations. “The enemy, says Lieutenant Tylden, who commanded the Lizard, on his part to Captain Hotham, capsized our fo'c'sle piece; and their terrible shrapnel and musket fire, sifting the ship from stem to stern, forced me to order the officers and crew to go down…. The Lizard received thirty-five cannonballs and shrapnel, The list of the dead and wounded is in the margin….”(4)

Simultaneously with these combats on the north coast, the blockade ships from the south coast forced the port of Ensenada at dawn on April 21 and organized a landing column, which was rejected by the batteries on that coast under the command of General Prudencio de Rozas. Then the allies entered the bay with blood and fire; they seized the best that they found on board the neutral ships there, and set fire to several of these ships with the cargo they contained. Four days later, an English midshipman in charge of practicing reconnaissance, entered the nearby port of La Atalaya in a boat with a small cannon at the bow and 15 armed men, and held a firefight with the party that garrisoned the point. As he ran aground when he wanted to retire, he raised the flag of parliament and was received ashore by the Argentine chief, who sent a boat with eight men to bring the English crew. This fired a fire that was answered, and in the confusion the officer was killed.(5)

In the presence of the fire and violence perpetrated by the allies in Ensenada, the Argentine government issued a decree of reprisals, in which "constituting itself the duty to save this society, no less than the neutral and Argentine properties from such fires and depredations" proscribed by civilization; and without prejudice to adopting other measures for the future in case the same scandalous attacks are repeated by the naval forces of England and France, it established that the commanders, officers or individuals of the crews of the ships or warships of said two powers, who were apprehended in any of the ports and rivers of the Province, either for violently removing national or foreign ships, or for burning or looting them, would be punished as arsonists with the penalty prescribed for them in the general laws.(6)

The warlike intervention did not, then, resolve the situation in favor of the allies, no matter how much Great Britain and France trusted in their powerful military elements, in the resources of their diplomacy and in the propaganda and efforts of the unitary émigrés and the government of Montevideo. The Argentine government remained firm defending the soil and the rights of the Confederation; and the intervention no longer had a rigorous measure to use against him to reduce him. The only thing left to do was double or triple the naval forces of both powers, and bombard and occupy Buenos Aires. The latter had been the subject of consultation in London and Paris; and if Admirals Lainé and Inglefield had not carried it out, it was because they did not resign themselves to immediately presenting proof of an impotence very similar to defeat, when in their immeasurable pride there was no room for the magnitude of their exploits in Malta, in Acre, in Mojador, in San Juan de Ulloa. They were no longer deceived about this; and the same opinion had been generalized among the English and French officers, to such an extent that several of them did not hide their fears that the mercantile expedition that was to go down the Paraná, protected by the squadrons of the intervening powers, would suffer a disaster. "Rosas is setting up batteries along the ravines between us and Obligado," wrote Lieutenant Robins, of the Firebrand frigate up in the Santa Fe descent; “If there is not a strong division below with ground forces to drive the men out of the ravine, they will scuttle some of the ships in the convoy and probably do great damage to the men-of-war. We have entered very soon upriver. We have taken a position that we cannot hold without many fortified positions. If the Province of Buenos Aires is attacked, the attack must be made in Forced. The country is open and suitable for reorganizing troops..." "The San Martín -wrote Lieutenant Marelly- surged in the descent of Santa Fe awaiting the convoy that had to leave Corrientes, after this campaign it will not be able to do more services without very expensive repairs. We are very concerned about the batteries that Rosas raises against us in San Lorenzo…”. (7)

The accuracy of these observations was revealed very soon. The ships that had passed to Corrientes loaded together with others, on behalf of merchants from there and from Montevideo and even the government of this place and the intervening ministers, and set sail to lower the Paraná protected by the combined squadrons. On May 9 they anchored in an inlet about two leagues from the positions that Mansilla had taken in Quebracho. On the 28th, Mansilla ran along the coast with two howitzers, and fired a few bullets at them, forcing them to retreat upstream, in the midst of the confusion resulting from this operation, whose main objective was to temper the spirit of the novice soldiers who executed it. On June 4, favored by the north wind, the entire convoy of the allies faced the Quebracho position, made up of 95 merchant ships and 12 warships, namely: steamers Firebrand, Gorgon, Alecto, Lizard, Harpy, Gazendi and Fulton; brigantines schooners Dolphin and Procida; brigantines San Martín and Fanny, and corvette Coquette, which mounted 85 cannons of caliber 24 to 80, plus a battery of three rockets à la Congreve that had been placed the night before on an islet to the left of that position.

The Mansilla line was supported by 17 cannons, 600 infantry soldiers and 150 police officers, positioned as follows: to the right a battery and pickets from the San Nicolás y Patricios de Buenos Aires battalion under the command of Major Virto; in the center two batteries and two companies of infantry under Colonel Thorne; to the left another battery and the rest of the Santa Coloma regiment, under the command of this chief; in the reserve 200 infantry, two squadrons of lancers from Santa Fe and the general's escort. In such circumstances, Mansilla reminded his soldiers of their duty to defend the rights of the homeland, already fulfilled in Obligado, Acevedo and San Lorenzo. And taking the national flag and shouting "Long live the sovereign Argentine independence!" He ordered the voice of the homeland to thunder through his cannons, when the allied squadrons had already lined up his powerful artillery against him so that the ships of the convoy could pass through the rear. The sustained fire of the Argentines made the allies falter and wreaked havoc on the merchant ships, some of which ran aground to get to safety, or were torn to pieces when they collided with each other in the narrowness of the river for fleeing too soon. At 1 p.m., after two hours of fighting, the convoy was still unable to save the fires of Thorne's batteries.

Firebrand, Gazendi, Gorgon, Harpy, and Alecto retreat to cover the most engaged line of ships. But, seeing, after another hour of bitter combat, that this was fruitless and that everyone was running a great risk, they set fire to those who could and rushed down the river with the rest. This combat was a significant defeat for the allies; for not only did they suffer more considerable losses than in Obligado, without inferring them on their part to the Argentines, but they also became convinced that they could not navigate the interior waters of the Confederation with impunity by force. They counted about 60 men out of combat and lost a boat, three schooners and a pailebot loaded with merchandise worth one hundred thousand dollars, part of which Mansilla saved by managing to put out the fire of the pailebot. Of the Argentines, only Thorne fell, wounded in the back by a shrapnel helmet, and some soldiers. “The fire was sustained with great determination, –says Lieutenant Proctor in his part to Captain Hotham- we were pursued by flying artillery and by a considerable number of troops that covered the banks making live musketry fire at us. The Harpy is pretty much destroyed; it has many bullets in the hull, chimneys and tops” Captain Hotham himself, in his report to Admiral Inglefield dated May 30 on board the Gorgon, accompanying the list of English and French dead and wounded in Quebracho, declares that “the ships have suffered many”. (8)

The convoy of the allies was awaited with great interest by the merchants of Montevideo, who promised themselves huge profits given the scarcity of many of the products of Corrientes and Paraguay that was felt in that place. The losses and failures suffered in the Quebracho visibly increased the discontent of the main merchants in whose hands was the fate of the Government of Montevideo, and who, as shareholders of the company buying the customs rights under the guarantee of the ministers Ouseley and Deffaudis, had already protested from the new contract made by Minister Vásquez until the year 1848. A in prices; and the government offered them quick profits that Rivera would facilitate, as will be seen.

Rivera had gone into campaign and his first operations had been as happy as they were fast. With just over 400 men, among whom were good officers such as Colonel Mundelle, who was recommended to him by Minister Ouseley and, aided by an Anglo-French flotilla under the command of Garibaldi, Rivera planted himself in the Colony, went to Carmel and fortified it after beating Commander Caballero's forces. Along the way he entered the Vipers with blood and fire, seizing everything he found. Despite Colonel Montoro's dispositions, he headed for Mercedes, seized this city on June 14, and defeated Montoro, taking 400 prisoners, 2,000 horses, and much armament.

These operations were accompanied by depredations, in which the merchants of Montevideo and mainly the comptrolling ministers of Great Britain and France were interested, who entered into the leather, cattle and fruit businesses of the country, which Rivera sent them, and in exchange gave resources and money to continue a devastating war.

It is necessary to see it written like this by the same men from the Montevideo government so that there is no doubt about the role that the Anglo-French intervention in La Plata played in their impotence. On June 5, 1846, Minister Magariños wrote to Rivera: “..I have spoken with the ministers (interventions) about the armaments that they will take charge of paying for it, taking for their reimbursement earned from what you have and will serve the maritime stations. They will also give us 20 quintals of gunpowder these days, and they have already put two of the cannons taken in Obligado into battery; the others went to London as trophies" "Don Agustín Almeida leaves - Magariños himself writes to Rivera on June 24 - so that associated with the person you choose in that, he will take charge of conducting what they want to send to him from what was taken from the enemy, and according to the contracts that were convenient to make, because that has seemed more arranged and expeditious to go in harmony...".

The means for the interested parties to come together in harmony is provided by Finance Minister Bejar, writing to Rivera on that same date: "I have previously told you that the purchase of weapons was arranged with the intervening ministers, who had told me how to arrange this business... Lately they have said that they will take cattle to collect their amount... For the best performance in the remittance of hides, cattle and other fruits taken in the territory occupied by the enemy, the government has appointed a committee concerned, which is Mr. Agustín Almeida, who will proceed in conjunction with another that you name. In this way it has seemed to us that it will be more convenient, and that these resources will be available to the government sooner”. Ratifying Bejar's assurances, Magariños still wrote to Rivera on July 5: "Yesterday it was agreed to notify you that to cover the arms contract, their value in hides and cattle must be delivered at the order of the ministers and admirals." On June 11, Minister Bejar acknowledged Rivera's receipt of a consignment of hides, but charged him with new consignments, "because you know our state well and the need to avoid inconveniences that may arise in this matter."

It is clear that the latter referred to the demands of the intervening ministers, such as that the consignments of hides and fruits should not be very abundant. It is that although Rivera made enormous collections, everything was not enough to entertain his system of squandering. Besieged by those who went to smell his largesse; Exploited by those who thrived in favor of the disorder that characterized him, he was always in need of money, which he reserved nothing for himself. At the end of August he was already asking the Finance Minister for more money, and when he sent it to him, the latter could not help but ask him for the report on hides "with the documents that can illustrate the matter." This is how the intervention and the war were entertained by the intervening ministers of Great Britain and France, when the sudden arrival of the British commissioner Thomas S. Hood began to give a new turn to the question of the Río de la Plata.

References

(1) See El Comercio del Plata of February 10.

(2) See this part of Admiral Inglefield who transcribed La Gaceta Mercantil of January 8, 1847, from the Morning Herald of September 12, 1846. Part of General Mansilla and letter from Captain Alzogaray in La Gaceta Mercantil of February 9, 1846. El Nacional and El Comercio del Plata of Montevideo, when referring to the battle of San Lorenzo, silenced the breakdowns and losses that the convoy suffered; but it is certain that many of the merchant ships were rendered useless, and that the Dolphin and Expeditive could not continue their services afterwards except at the cost of serious repairs.

(3) Lieutenant Austen's part of the Alecto to Captain Hotham, transcribed in The Mercantile Gazette; Ditto from Virto to Mansilla.

(4) This report was published in the Morning Herald of London on September 12, 1846. See the reports from Mansilla, Thorne and Santa Coloma, relating to these four battles, in the Mercantile Gazette of May 14, 1846. See also the letters from the English and French sailors, taken with the correspondence of Federal pailebot, and in which they feel the need to increase their maritime forces against the Confederation , and they discover all the setbacks and losses that the mercantile expedition of the allies suffered in San Lorenzo.

(5) See the Mercantile Gazette of May 2, 1846. The death of midshipman Wardlaw gave El Comercio del Plata the theme for a heroic romance, in which the Argentine soldiers appeared as murdering that officer little less than at close range.

(6) Decree of May 1, 1846.

(7) Correspondence taken to the allies together with the Federal pailebot. See the Mercantile Gazette of May 2, 1846.

(8) These reports were transcribed by La Gazeta Mercantil on January 8, 1847, from the London Morning Herald on September 12, 1846. Mansilla's official report in the Mercantile Gazette on June 12, 1846. See El Comercio del Plata on June 3 and 4, 1846 and what Bustamante says about it (mistaking the battle of San Lorenzo with that of Quebracho) in his book Intervention Errors, page 114.

(9) This protest was inserted in El Nacional de Montevideo on January 17, 1846.

Sources

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar

Saldías, Adolfo – Rozas y el Brasil – Ed. Americana – Buenos Aires (1945)

Turone, Oscar A. – Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado.