Argentine Confederation: Paraná War

Paraná War

Revisionistas





Patricios in Vuelta de Obligado in El Tonelero


After the Vuelta de Obligado combat, the allied forces that disembarked there with the intention of entering, had been overwhelmed in the months of December and January by those of Colonel Thorne, who commanded the line of observation on the coast. On February 2, 1846, the allies landed 300 soldiers protected by the artillery of their ships anchored on the coast. Thorne deployed against them a strong guerrilla, and after a heavy firefight he fell upon them with two companies of artillery and 50 lancers, forcing them to re-embark.(1)

General Mansilla conveniently placed his flying artillery on the coast of San Nicolás del Rosario, San Lorenzo and Tonelero, and came to personally lead the resistance to the passage of the convoy of those who speculated on the war and in favor of the progress of the intervention. On January 9, the ships of the convoy arrived at the port of Acevedo. Mansilla pointed his cannons against them. Four British and French ships anchored in front of him, responding with their large-caliber artillery. Thus they protected the path of the convoy, which moved away from the coast and towards an island interposed in front of the Mansilla position. In the impossibility of harassing it through the islands that rose between the two coasts at that height of the Paraná, Mansilla followed the convoy by land to verify it where it was within range.

In the ravines of the coast they appeared between the convent of San Lorenzo and Punta del Quebracho, Mansilla had placed eight cannons hidden under piles of brush, 250 police officers and 100 infantrymen in the ravines of the coast arrived between the convent of San Lorenzo and Punta del Quebracho.

At noon on January 16, the steamer Gorgon, the corvette Expeditive, the brigs Dolphin, King and two armed schooners appeared in the Colony, which mounted 37 large-caliber guns and accompanied 52 merchant ships. When facing San Lorenzo, the Expeditive and the Gorgon fired three shots with bullets and shrapnel over the coast to discover the Mansilla force. The Argentine soldiers remained hidden in their post, according to the order received. When the entire convoy found itself in the narrowness of the river that runs upstream from San Lorenzo, Mansilla ordered the fire of his batteries led by captains José Serezo, Santiago Maurice and Alvaro de Alzogaray to break. The attack was accurate; The dismantled merchant ships headed towards two nearby streams, increasing with the collision of one with the other the damages caused by the land cannons.

At four in the afternoon the combat was still going strong, and the convoy did not make up for what it had done with its great damages. Favored by the stern wind and behind the ships that incessantly vomited deadly fire, he approached the Quebracho. Here Mansilla reconcentrated his forces and fought until late afternoon, when, dismounted their cannons and neutralized their rifle fire by the enemy cannon, the convoy was able to save Punta Quebracho, with major damage to the warships, considerable losses in manufacturing, and 50 men out of action. Rear Admiral Inglefield, in his official part to the British Admiralty says that “the English and French steamers held their fire for more than three and a half hours; and hardly a single ship in the convoy left without receiving a bullet.”

The loss of the Argentines was insignificant this time, and Mansilla could correctly say that he had had the honor of defending the flag of his country in the same place of San Lorenzo that San Martín watered with his blood when leading the first charge of his later famous Horse Grenadiers.(2)

As can be seen, the allies did not continue their conquest in Argentine interior waters with impunity. It is true that Mansilla, complying with strict government orders, incessantly covered the extensive coast that he defended, making his few cannons thunder wherever those within range appeared. That was how he outwitted them in their landing attempts after Obligado and San Lorenzo. On February 10, immediately after failing in one of these attempts, the English warships Alecto and Gordon bombarded the Cooper field for three hours with bullets a la Paixhans 64. The artillery and infantry of the Argentines commanded by Major Manuel Virto responded boldly, and they only managed to kill some militiamen, set fire to two guns, and destroy the huts and trees that had . (3) A few days later they renewed hostilities without much success. On April 2, Philomel arrived in front of Quebracho. Lieutenant Colonel Thorne brought his guns upon them, but as the Philomel fled downstream, he tied three pieces of 8's to the girths of his horses and ran up the coast to catch up with her; which he could not verify because the French ship was at full sail and current. On the 6th, the same Thorne battery held another combat with the English warship Alecto, which passed through the Quebracho towing three schooners. The English had some deaths and their ship came out badly damaged.

On the 19th, after another battle, Mansilla managed to dam the Federal pailebot, taken by the allies in Obligado. When informing the government of this event, sending the conquered English flag, and under the relation, all the camera baggage of the former commander of the prized pailebot Carlos G. Fegen, Mansilla added in his note: "The Anglo-French will see the difference that exists between the looting of the baggage of the brave Obligado men who called themselves civilizers, and the conduct of the federals who defend their homeland and respect even the spoils of their enemies." On the 21st, Thorne still had to sustain another two-hour battle with the English ship Lizard, which he riddled with bullets, turning over the flag that was flying at the top and leaving it almost useless for new operations. “The enemy, says Lieutenant Tylden, who commanded the Lizard, on his part to Captain Hotham, capsized our fo'c'sle piece; and their terrible shrapnel and musket fire, sifting the ship from stem to stern, forced me to order the officers and crew to go down…. The Lizard received thirty-five cannonballs and shrapnel, The list of the dead and wounded is in the margin….”(4)

Simultaneously with these combats on the north coast, the blockade ships from the south coast forced the port of Ensenada at dawn on April 21 and organized a landing column, which was rejected by the batteries on that coast under the command of General Prudencio de Rozas. Then the allies entered the bay with blood and fire; they seized the best that they found on board the neutral ships there, and set fire to several of these ships with the cargo they contained. Four days later, an English midshipman in charge of practicing reconnaissance, entered the nearby port of La Atalaya in a boat with a small cannon at the bow and 15 armed men, and held a firefight with the party that garrisoned the point. As he ran aground when he wanted to retire, he raised the flag of parliament and was received ashore by the Argentine chief, who sent a boat with eight men to bring the English crew. This fired a fire that was answered, and in the confusion the officer was killed.(5)

In the presence of the fire and violence perpetrated by the allies in Ensenada, the Argentine government issued a decree of reprisals, in which "constituting itself the duty to save this society, no less than the neutral and Argentine properties from such fires and depredations" proscribed by civilization; and without prejudice to adopting other measures for the future in case the same scandalous attacks are repeated by the naval forces of England and France, it established that the commanders, officers or individuals of the crews of the ships or warships of said two powers, who were apprehended in any of the ports and rivers of the Province, either for violently removing national or foreign ships, or for burning or looting them, would be punished as arsonists with the penalty prescribed for them in the general laws.(6)

The warlike intervention did not, then, resolve the situation in favor of the allies, no matter how much Great Britain and France trusted in their powerful military elements, in the resources of their diplomacy and in the propaganda and efforts of the unitary émigrés and the government of Montevideo. The Argentine government remained firm defending the soil and the rights of the Confederation; and the intervention no longer had a rigorous measure to use against him to reduce him. The only thing left to do was double or triple the naval forces of both powers, and bombard and occupy Buenos Aires. The latter had been the subject of consultation in London and Paris; and if Admirals Lainé and Inglefield had not carried it out, it was because they did not resign themselves to immediately presenting proof of an impotence very similar to defeat, when in their immeasurable pride there was no room for the magnitude of their exploits in Malta, in Acre, in Mojador, in San Juan de Ulloa. They were no longer deceived about this; and the same opinion had been generalized among the English and French officers, to such an extent that several of them did not hide their fears that the mercantile expedition that was to go down the Paraná, protected by the squadrons of the intervening powers, would suffer a disaster. "Rosas is setting up batteries along the ravines between us and Obligado," wrote Lieutenant Robins, of the Firebrand frigate up in the Santa Fe descent; “If there is not a strong division below with ground forces to drive the men out of the ravine, they will scuttle some of the ships in the convoy and probably do great damage to the men-of-war. We have entered very soon upriver. We have taken a position that we cannot hold without many fortified positions. If the Province of Buenos Aires is attacked, the attack must be made in Forced. The country is open and suitable for reorganizing troops..." "The San Martín -wrote Lieutenant Marelly- surged in the descent of Santa Fe awaiting the convoy that had to leave Corrientes, after this campaign it will not be able to do more services without very expensive repairs. We are very concerned about the batteries that Rosas raises against us in San Lorenzo…”. (7)

The accuracy of these observations was revealed very soon. The ships that had passed to Corrientes loaded together with others, on behalf of merchants from there and from Montevideo and even the government of this place and the intervening ministers, and set sail to lower the Paraná protected by the combined squadrons. On May 9 they anchored in an inlet about two leagues from the positions that Mansilla had taken in Quebracho. On the 28th, Mansilla ran along the coast with two howitzers, and fired a few bullets at them, forcing them to retreat upstream, in the midst of the confusion resulting from this operation, whose main objective was to temper the spirit of the novice soldiers who executed it. On June 4, favored by the north wind, the entire convoy of the allies faced the Quebracho position, made up of 95 merchant ships and 12 warships, namely: steamers Firebrand, Gorgon, Alecto, Lizard, Harpy, Gazendi and Fulton; brigantines schooners Dolphin and Procida; brigantines San Martín and Fanny, and corvette Coquette, which mounted 85 cannons of caliber 24 to 80, plus a battery of three rockets à la Congreve that had been placed the night before on an islet to the left of that position.

The Mansilla line was supported by 17 cannons, 600 infantry soldiers and 150 police officers, positioned as follows: to the right a battery and pickets from the San Nicolás y Patricios de Buenos Aires battalion under the command of Major Virto; in the center two batteries and two companies of infantry under Colonel Thorne; to the left another battery and the rest of the Santa Coloma regiment, under the command of this chief; in the reserve 200 infantry, two squadrons of lancers from Santa Fe and the general's escort. In such circumstances, Mansilla reminded his soldiers of their duty to defend the rights of the homeland, already fulfilled in Obligado, Acevedo and San Lorenzo. And taking the national flag and shouting "Long live the sovereign Argentine independence!" He ordered the voice of the homeland to thunder through his cannons, when the allied squadrons had already lined up his powerful artillery against him so that the ships of the convoy could pass through the rear. The sustained fire of the Argentines made the allies falter and wreaked havoc on the merchant ships, some of which ran aground to get to safety, or were torn to pieces when they collided with each other in the narrowness of the river for fleeing too soon. At 1 p.m., after two hours of fighting, the convoy was still unable to save the fires of Thorne's batteries.

Firebrand, Gazendi, Gorgon, Harpy, and Alecto retreat to cover the most engaged line of ships. But, seeing, after another hour of bitter combat, that this was fruitless and that everyone was running a great risk, they set fire to those who could and rushed down the river with the rest. This combat was a significant defeat for the allies; for not only did they suffer more considerable losses than in Obligado, without inferring them on their part to the Argentines, but they also became convinced that they could not navigate the interior waters of the Confederation with impunity by force. They counted about 60 men out of combat and lost a boat, three schooners and a pailebot loaded with merchandise worth one hundred thousand dollars, part of which Mansilla saved by managing to put out the fire of the pailebot. Of the Argentines, only Thorne fell, wounded in the back by a shrapnel helmet, and some soldiers. “The fire was sustained with great determination, –says Lieutenant Proctor in his part to Captain Hotham- we were pursued by flying artillery and by a considerable number of troops that covered the banks making live musketry fire at us. The Harpy is pretty much destroyed; it has many bullets in the hull, chimneys and tops” Captain Hotham himself, in his report to Admiral Inglefield dated May 30 on board the Gorgon, accompanying the list of English and French dead and wounded in Quebracho, declares that “the ships have suffered many”. (8)

The convoy of the allies was awaited with great interest by the merchants of Montevideo, who promised themselves huge profits given the scarcity of many of the products of Corrientes and Paraguay that was felt in that place. The losses and failures suffered in the Quebracho visibly increased the discontent of the main merchants in whose hands was the fate of the Government of Montevideo, and who, as shareholders of the company buying the customs rights under the guarantee of the ministers Ouseley and Deffaudis, had already protested from the new contract made by Minister Vásquez until the year 1848. A in prices; and the government offered them quick profits that Rivera would facilitate, as will be seen.

Rivera had gone into campaign and his first operations had been as happy as they were fast. With just over 400 men, among whom were good officers such as Colonel Mundelle, who was recommended to him by Minister Ouseley and, aided by an Anglo-French flotilla under the command of Garibaldi, Rivera planted himself in the Colony, went to Carmel and fortified it after beating Commander Caballero's forces. Along the way he entered the Vipers with blood and fire, seizing everything he found. Despite Colonel Montoro's dispositions, he headed for Mercedes, seized this city on June 14, and defeated Montoro, taking 400 prisoners, 2,000 horses, and much armament.

These operations were accompanied by depredations, in which the merchants of Montevideo and mainly the comptrolling ministers of Great Britain and France were interested, who entered into the leather, cattle and fruit businesses of the country, which Rivera sent them, and in exchange gave resources and money to continue a devastating war.

It is necessary to see it written like this by the same men from the Montevideo government so that there is no doubt about the role that the Anglo-French intervention in La Plata played in their impotence. On June 5, 1846, Minister Magariños wrote to Rivera: “..I have spoken with the ministers (interventions) about the armaments that they will take charge of paying for it, taking for their reimbursement earned from what you have and will serve the maritime stations. They will also give us 20 quintals of gunpowder these days, and they have already put two of the cannons taken in Obligado into battery; the others went to London as trophies" "Don Agustín Almeida leaves - Magariños himself writes to Rivera on June 24 - so that associated with the person you choose in that, he will take charge of conducting what they want to send to him from what was taken from the enemy, and according to the contracts that were convenient to make, because that has seemed more arranged and expeditious to go in harmony...".

The means for the interested parties to come together in harmony is provided by Finance Minister Bejar, writing to Rivera on that same date: "I have previously told you that the purchase of weapons was arranged with the intervening ministers, who had told me how to arrange this business... Lately they have said that they will take cattle to collect their amount... For the best performance in the remittance of hides, cattle and other fruits taken in the territory occupied by the enemy, the government has appointed a committee concerned, which is Mr. Agustín Almeida, who will proceed in conjunction with another that you name. In this way it has seemed to us that it will be more convenient, and that these resources will be available to the government sooner”. Ratifying Bejar's assurances, Magariños still wrote to Rivera on July 5: "Yesterday it was agreed to notify you that to cover the arms contract, their value in hides and cattle must be delivered at the order of the ministers and admirals." On June 11, Minister Bejar acknowledged Rivera's receipt of a consignment of hides, but charged him with new consignments, "because you know our state well and the need to avoid inconveniences that may arise in this matter."

It is clear that the latter referred to the demands of the intervening ministers, such as that the consignments of hides and fruits should not be very abundant. It is that although Rivera made enormous collections, everything was not enough to entertain his system of squandering. Besieged by those who went to smell his largesse; Exploited by those who thrived in favor of the disorder that characterized him, he was always in need of money, which he reserved nothing for himself. At the end of August he was already asking the Finance Minister for more money, and when he sent it to him, the latter could not help but ask him for the report on hides "with the documents that can illustrate the matter." This is how the intervention and the war were entertained by the intervening ministers of Great Britain and France, when the sudden arrival of the British commissioner Thomas S. Hood began to give a new turn to the question of the Río de la Plata.

References

(1) See El Comercio del Plata of February 10.

(2) See this part of Admiral Inglefield who transcribed La Gaceta Mercantil of January 8, 1847, from the Morning Herald of September 12, 1846. Part of General Mansilla and letter from Captain Alzogaray in La Gaceta Mercantil of February 9, 1846. El Nacional and El Comercio del Plata of Montevideo, when referring to the battle of San Lorenzo, silenced the breakdowns and losses that the convoy suffered; but it is certain that many of the merchant ships were rendered useless, and that the Dolphin and Expeditive could not continue their services afterwards except at the cost of serious repairs.

(3) Lieutenant Austen's part of the Alecto to Captain Hotham, transcribed in The Mercantile Gazette; Ditto from Virto to Mansilla.

(4) This report was published in the Morning Herald of London on September 12, 1846. See the reports from Mansilla, Thorne and Santa Coloma, relating to these four battles, in the Mercantile Gazette of May 14, 1846. See also the letters from the English and French sailors, taken with the correspondence of Federal pailebot, and in which they feel the need to increase their maritime forces against the Confederation , and they discover all the setbacks and losses that the mercantile expedition of the allies suffered in San Lorenzo.

(5) See the Mercantile Gazette of May 2, 1846. The death of midshipman Wardlaw gave El Comercio del Plata the theme for a heroic romance, in which the Argentine soldiers appeared as murdering that officer little less than at close range.

(6) Decree of May 1, 1846.

(7) Correspondence taken to the allies together with the Federal pailebot. See the Mercantile Gazette of May 2, 1846.

(8) These reports were transcribed by La Gazeta Mercantil on January 8, 1847, from the London Morning Herald on September 12, 1846. Mansilla's official report in the Mercantile Gazette on June 12, 1846. See El Comercio del Plata on June 3 and 4, 1846 and what Bustamante says about it (mistaking the battle of San Lorenzo with that of Quebracho) in his book Intervention Errors, page 114.

(9) This protest was inserted in El Nacional de Montevideo on January 17, 1846.

Sources

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado

Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar

Saldías, Adolfo – Rozas y el Brasil – Ed. Americana – Buenos Aires (1945)

Turone, Oscar A. – Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado.