FMA IA-30 Ñancú First Flight
Sean Eternos los Laureles
On July 17, 1948, under the command of Captain Edmundo O. Weiss, the FMA IA-30 Ñancú night fighter-bomber made its first flight, designed by the Aerotechnical Institute, which, like all the fantastic designs of that time, never reached the production stage in series or in service
During the Second World War, the then Army Aviation Command, which later became an independent Arm in the Argentine Military Aeronautics (original name of the Argentine Air Force), was immersed in an equipment program according to the potential level of Argentina, the very low threat level, and the most advanced technological advances in aeronautics, basically focused on the Curtiss 75-0 Hawk monoplane aircraft (see attached links) as a fighter element and built under license at the FMA (Fábrica Militar de Aviones ) from the province of Córdoba), the Douglas/Northrop 8A-2 attack aircraft, the twin-engine Glenn-Martin Model 139WAA (and WAN for the Argentine Navy) as a bomber, all of them of American origin, and this last after the single-engine nationally designed and built FMA Ae.M.B.1 Bombi did not satisfy bombing needs; in addition to a series of trainers of national design and manufacture, or foreign ones built under license already manufactured in the 1930s, to which were added the Dewoitine D.21C-1 fighters that, upon being retired from the front line in their role as hunting, they began to operate as advanced trainers.
However, shortly after the outbreak of the war, which soon became a World War, two phenomena emerged: First, the accelerated development of war technologies, aeronautics being no exception, which quickly made even the most advanced weapons systems obsolete. developed in the immediate prewar, like those that Argentina already operated and still incorporated and that were really at the top of military air power technology. And second: the provision of highly technologically complex materials on which Argentina still depended, especially with regard to power plants and some light metals for aircraft construction, since the supplier countries were either blocked or forced to preserve that material for their own use to cover war needs, or to provide aid to their allies already at war.
For this reason, although Argentina was relatively well equipped in 1939 at the beginning of the conflict, and the equipment programs it carried out were consistent, all of this became obsolete in the face of new war developments, finding itself unable to obtain or conceive more sophisticated fighters or bombers having reached the national technological zenith and at the same time not receiving new material, mainly with regard to power plants.
Although the political and military threat from abroad that existed on Argentina at that time was almost zero, it was not oblivious to the strategic value of the country, nor to the position that, at some point and depending on how the conflict developed, it was going to take. have to assume. For this reason, and without going into details or political scenarios that at that time were being considered in our country where in principle there was a pro-Axis position, to move to a pro-Allied one, and then return to the pro-Axis one, but always being officially neutral Argentina at the same time that it provided the Allies with everything they needed to cover their war needs (that was the reality), it was decided based on existing availability, around the year 1942, to start a training program of 5,000 military pilots and the development of an advanced training aircraft for the training of these pilots, and an attack aircraft the following year, which were added to the development of a national engine that had already begun in 1939, this being the most that could be aspired to with the national technology developed until then, and which ended up giving life to the I.Ae-16 El Gaucho engine, and the FMA I.Ae-22DL training and I.Ae-24 Calquín attack aircraft, engine and aircraft that, as can be seen, were requested and conceived before Perón came to power, even though they were later produced during the first Peronist presidency, and specifically they were the engine and airplane models produced in greater quantities than To this day they dominate the minds of the nostalgic through images of the manufacturing lines of the FMA (Military Aircraft Factory) packed with aircraft and operators in full mass production.
However, it became evident that the obsolete Argentine air power required urgent updating and reinforcement and, despite the end of the Second World War in 1945 without Argentina actively participating in it, that Argentina was no longer going to need 5,000 pilots, it still needed new aircraft, especially combat aircraft, and even more so in view of the new developments arising from the same conflict.
In this way, perhaps the most striking and, already important, novelty arising from the aeronautical innovation that Argentina accessed, was the Gloster G-41G Meteor fighter jet incorporated, to a large extent, due to the close alliance relationship. that the then President of the Argentine Nation, General Juan Domingo Perón, maintained with the British Prime Minister Winston Spencer Churchill, managing to make them part of the payment of the large Debt that Great Britain maintained with Argentina for the food and raw materials delivered during the Second World War, since it was Perón who submissively accepted the infamy of the inconvertibility of the £ibra, accepting payment in processed materials and British assets, and since there were other payment options, he decided on military material, the vast majority of which lagged behind the war and at a actual equivalent value much lower than that owed by the United Kingdom. Nor should we ignore that at that time there were not many fighter jet options available to access, the Meteor selected by Argentina being one of the best, and the other being the North American P-80A Shooting Star from a United States that It was also, although much smaller, a debtor to Argentina, and the United States was also a solid supplier of military equipment to Argentina (in fact, the Argentine Armed Forces were almost completely reequipped by the United States and the United Kingdom during the first Peronist presidency! !), nor should we forget that in turn both countries were creditors of Argentina for values similar to that owed, and while Argentina paid its Debt with Gold, Perón accepted payment in processed materials and overvalued assets such as the Railways, which in the following 20 years they had to be completely rebuilt; or the Refrigerators to pay the union favor of the famous march demanding the release of Perón on October 17, 1945, which precisely started from the British Refrigerators in the southern area of Greater Buenos Aires, and in any case remained in the hands of Peronist oligarchs friends of the can. Well, it was a fact that already in the middle of the Second World War, Argentina had begun its reequipment, including the aeronautical equipment that during that conflict had become obsolete as a result of the diversion of resources from the countries that supplied military material for its own war needs and its allies at war.
The Gloster F.Mk-IV Meteor, which at that time was perhaps the most powerful and advanced interceptor fighter aircraft, which was incorporated into the Argentine Aeronautics in mid-1947, was also accompanied by the piston fighter Italian Fiat G-55A/B, due to the distrust (of course, fully justified) that the 1st generation jets still had; as well as the second-hand AVRO 683 Lancaster B.Mk-1 ex-RAF bombers, and the new and ex-RAF AVRO 694 Lincoln B.Mk-2 bombers, forming unmatched air power in the region, regardless of That same year, that power was eclipsed by the appearance of 2nd generation fighter jets such as the F-86 Saber and MiG-15, which upon entering service in 1949 (the date in which the first bomber jets also began operating ) once again made all Argentine air power obsolete!
However, and in the same way as during the prewar, and then, in the face of the contingency of war, plans were put in place that were considered appropriate according to the potential, availability of resources and, of course, level of threats/hypotheses of conflict, on this occasion the same thing was done, although as we will see below, unfortunately the result was not the same, and without the military planners suffering absolutely any type of opposition to their plans, except from the same government that requested the planning.
Returning to the contingency plan developed in the 1940s to provide a solution to the unexpected and rapid obsolescence that the Second World War generated in the Argentine air power, of the material that emerged from it, only the I.Ae-16 El Gaucho engine had complied expectations, but being only useful for the capacity it could deliver; while the I.Ae-22DL advanced trainer was quickly overshadowed by the purchase of Italian Fiat G-46-2B basic-advanced trainers already in the Peronist era, which condemned the Argentine project to the first series of 100 aircraft. penalties will be complemented with a second series until a total of 202 aircraft is reached and the remaining hundred will be cancelled; while the I.Ae-24 Calquín attack aircraft, although it presented major defects, in reality and for the type of design in question (we are talking about an aircraft built largely of wood, since that is how it was designed for the needs of war, and despite its production beginning years after the war ended), it turned out to be operationally successful, and was even known as the "Mosquito criollo" or Creole Mosquito, both for its similarity in design and for its function, despite being far behind of the British DH.98 design by the De Havilland firm, having initially planned to build 300 Calquín units for the Argentine Aeronautics.
The prototype and 10 other pre-production examples were manufactured, of which the first was delivered on September 19, 1947, establishing the Experimental Flight Group for its evaluation, and beginning to allocate I.Ae-24 as series to the 1st Bombardment Regiment. at the BAM Coronel Pringles, in Villa Mercedes, province of San Luis, between September 1947 and February 1948; Already in 1948, the first 30 Calquín built, registered A-01 to A-30, went directly to active service in the then 3rd Attack Regiment, dependent on the Bombing Command, at the BAM El Plumerillo, province of Mendoza, fulfilling their function as light bomber and attack, or observation and reconnaissance.
But aware that the I.Ae-24, which was powered by 2 Pratt & Whittney R-1830-65-A Twin Wasp, Model S1C3-G 14-cylinder radial engines, which developed a power of 1,065 HP at maximum normal speed and 2,300 RPM at 2,300 meters, or 1,200 HP at 2,700 RPM on takeoff, could not reach expectations, already during its development, perhaps impressed by the visit that, on the occasion of participating in the 1st edition of Aeronautics Week that was carried out in Buenos Aires in 1946, a De Havilland DH-98 Mosquito reconnaissance PR.Mk-34 of the RAF, serial VL-613 carried out to the FMA of Córdoba on October 9 of that year, and where the engineers and technicians who managed to see it in flight and then analyze it on the ground, evidently introduced some modifications to the Calquín, a more advanced variant had already been ordered during manufacturing, which was the IAe-28 which, according to official Aeronautics documentation, it was designed to use the very superior Rolls-Royce Merlin 604 linear engines (in essence we do not know which subtype of Merlin it refers to, since there is no reference from the manufacturer to a 604, it could well be the same one that was mounted on the PR.Mk-34 Mosquito , or even the one later mounted on the Ñancú, Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 and sometimes referred to as 604). Thus, in the Annual Report of the Secretariat of Aeronautics of 1946, you can read the request for "Study, project and construction of a light attack and bombing aircraft, using national wood: this study bears the No. 'I.Ae. 28', was started during 1946 and basically consists of designing and building an aircraft based on the I.Ae 24, modifying the structure in such a way as to allow the adaptation of the Rolls Royce-Merlin 604 liquid-cooled engines, and therefore of superior performances and characteristics to those of the I.Ae 24 'Calquin' with Pratt & Whitney engines". This work has already been partially completed, with 60% of the construction documentation having been executed, representing a total of 960 plans.
The type of construction is similar to that of the 'Calquín', with the difference, on the one hand, of the modifications that were essential to introduce to adapt the new engines, namely: fully metallic movable control surfaces to avoid deformations; adaptation of the radiators on the wing leading edge; change of landing gear; increase in fuel capacity and total change of the gasoline and oil circuits. At the same time, modifications have been introduced to facilitate the maintenance that experience has advised during the use of the 'Calquín' aircraft."
But, as we saw and will see below, that year 1947 was decisive both for Argentine Aeronautics, and despite what many may think because mass production was already beginning, for the premature end of the I.Ae-24. Calquín, because that year the F.Mk-IV Meteor, G-55A/B, B.Mk-1 Lancaster and B.Mk-2 Lincoln were incorporated, and just to specifically mention combat aircraft, among many projects that were being developed in Argentina (including the first jet, the I.Ae-27 Pulqui), construction of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú fighter-bomber, the subject of this publication, had also begun.
Here a story that seems alien or bifurcated and that, taking the same path afterwards, should have ended wonderfully well, in reality this produced the opposite, and was the downfall of absolutely everything.
At that moment, the Italian engineer Marquis Cesare Pallavicino entered the scene, who was a prolific aeronautical designer, undeservedly little to nothing recognized until today among the great aeronautical designers, even in the countries to which he gave his hard-working and brilliant knowledge, and who In essence they were Italy and Argentina. Designer of the Breda Ba.15, Ba.18, Ba.19, Ba.27, Ba.35 and Ba.39 models of the industrial giant, which included aeronautics, Società Italiana Ernesto Breda between 1927 and 1932. Between 1935 and 1941 he directed the design department of the company Società Italiana Caproni (which, under various names, operated between 1908 and 1950), where he designed several relevant aircraft, such as the Caproni models Ca.135, Ca.309, Ca.311, Ca .312, Ca.313, Ca.314 and Ca.315; also the Caproni Ca.355, SABCA S-47, Caproni Ca.335, Ca.350 and Ca.380 models, all aircraft that operated in World War II.
The Roman, whose political affiliation during the war is unknown, and therefore there is no evidence that, like the engineers of German and French origin who arrived in Argentina at that time, he was now escaping from the occupiers or their collaborators. in power, for having been a fascist or national socialist, on whom revenge usually fell if they were not useful/servile for the new power, since that was one of the main reasons they had for fleeing; The other reason was the degree of destruction in which Europe had been left, the future prospects being really bleak with a new conflict brewing between Western democracies and Marxist totalitarianism (that is, the same pre-national socialist confrontation), which forced people to migrate to more prosperous lands to millions of Europeans, but they were unaware that Argentina's decline was just beginning.
Thus, Pallavicino, shortly before migrating to Argentina, collaborated in the design of the Lambretta, the most famous Italian motorcycle, along with the Piaggio Vespa (the Argentine version of these, Siambretta was later manufactured in Avellaneda by Siam Di Tella) , and by 1946 he was already in our country joining the Special Projects Division No. 2, of the Aerotechnical Institute (I.Ae.), created on June 5, 1947, which was in charge of developing the aeronautical projects that later They would be developed at the Córdoba Military Aircraft Factory, in the province of Córdoba.
By 1947, and having already outlined several ideas, upon receiving the order from the Aeronautics Secretariat of the Argentine government, he was put in charge of a team of Argentine aeronautical technicians and engineers, and one of their all-weather fighter and bomber escort designs. It was accepted to be developed as a night escort for the aforementioned B.Mk-1 Lancaster and B.Mk-2 Lincoln bombers that Aeronáutica Argentina was receiving at that time.
Thus, Pallavicino's team delivered the plans for a single-seat twin-engine monoplane, of entirely metallic construction, which received the nomenclature I.Ae.30, and was later baptized as Ñancú (eaglet in the Mapuche language), which without loss of time Already in July 1947, with the preparation of the plans, the construction of a full-size wooden model had begun. At the end of that year, progress had been made in the manufacture of a prototype that was 30% complete, and two other examples that were in an initial 10% manufacturing phase.
The Ñancú was an all-metal twin-engine monoplane, powered by two Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, Model 134 on the left and Model 135 on the right, which were differentiated by the reverse direction of rotation, liquid-cooled and up to 2,034 hp at 3,300 rpm. Equipped with 4-blade de Havilland 4/4000/5 reverse direction propellers, constant speed, hydromatic control and feathering device per motor, and a diameter of 3.66 meters. The radiators were located on the leading edge of the wings, between the fuselage and the engine nacelle.
With cantilever spar type wing, with one-piece spars; split-flap type flaps operated by a system of bars controlled by a drive cylinder mounted on the rear spar in the fuselage area; Its ailerons were divided into three articulated sections to achieve perfect alignment, it had a rigid transmission command bar, a leading edge divided into an external sector, an air intake area (radiators) and an internal and external flap area. The pear section fuselage, very close to the triangular one, was specially adapted to house the maximum number of weapons in the lower part with a minimum frontal surface; with a tapered longitudinal profile of the all-metal semi-monocoque type, both the frames and currents were made up of omega profiles. Constructively it was divided into two areas: the front part and the rear part integral with the drift, and they were joined in correspondence with the previous spar. The stabilizer divided into two parts, monoplane cantilever, was attached to the drift almost halfway, and had adjustable incidence in flight. It had a twin-string drift integrated into the aft fuselage; with all-metal rudders and elevators with trim fins.
The retractable type landing gear, made of cast aluminum alloy; It had its wheels mounted on forks, which moved forward during damping; and its retraction mechanism had the peculiarity that the wheel rotated on the diametral axis at the same time as it retracted backwards and upwards, a highly developed and complex mechanism that had been seen, for example, in the American Vought F4 naval fighter. U Corsair, but in the Argentine case they served to improve the aerodynamic lines of the engine nacelle; The shock absorbers (2 on each wheel of the train) were high-pressure oil-pneumatic; It had a retractable tail wheel; The tires were Dunlop, 0.43 cm in diameter, with a Dunlop-type pneumatic braking system; The doors of the nacelles were operated with a system of cams controlled by the train and arranged so that they remained closed both in the folded and unfolded position.
The aircraft was equipped with a complete set of instruments for night flights, air navigation and additional instruments for prototypes; 24 V electrical power supplied by a 1450 W generator installed on the left engine and connected in parallel with two batteries in series of 12 V and 40 amps each. It had a Bendix transmitter/receiver and radio direction finder.
The armament formed and planned for the Ñancú consisted of 6 Oerlikon 20x110 mm automatic cannons under the bow, although later it was decided to install the heavier Hispano Switzerland 804, also 20x110 mm. As external weapons, the installation of a 250 kg bomb was planned. launchable under the fuselage or a container with 2 other 20x110 mm Oerlikon cannons; and two batteries of 5 83 mm rockets each hanging on mounts-ramps under the wings, although none of them were ever installed.
The prototype left the factory on July 9, 1948, immediately beginning the tests of engines, taxiing and flight mechanisms, all under the command and supervision of the head of Flight Tests of the FMA, the Captain of the Argentine Aeronautics, Edmundo Osvaldo "Pincho" Weiss.
Once the first test phases were satisfactorily completed, on Saturday, July 17, 1948, at 11:00 a.m., under the command of Captain Weiss, the Ñancú took flight after a taxi of 300 meters, and demonstrating very good flight characteristics for one hour. then it landed safely.
Although the short times taken in the development of the aircraft may be surprising, it must be recognized that this was quite common at that time, either because the technologies used are not as complex as today, requiring much longer developments; Maybe because the tests and controls, although they were rigid, were not as rigid as today. In this way, and given the success of the tests carried out until then, it was decided to present the model in Buenos Aires before the President of the Nation.
Thus, a few days later, in something that today may seem reckless, irresponsible, even insane, on August 8, the I.Ae-30 together with the I.Ae.27 Pulqui I jet (this one, designed by Argentine engineers Cardeilhac E., N.L. Morchio and H.J. Ricciardi, and the Frenchman Emile Dewoitine), is presented in Buenos Aires before the President of the Nation, General Juan Domingo Peron, next to the Vickers Viking presidential plane. The day before, while flying between Córdoba and Buenos Aires, the Ñancú broke a speed record for aircraft powered by piston engines, reaching an average of 648 kph with a maximum indicated horizontal speed of 780 kph at 5,600 meters above sea level. linking Weiss to Córdoba with Buenos Aires in just 55 minutes.
Then it was planned to exhibit the plane at the Farnborough International Fair, in Great Britain, in September 1948, but it did not materialize given that the aircraft was just beginning its tests, it was the only prototype, and it was not even in a position to make a ferry flight. to the United Kingdom, nor could the test program (that is, the development of the aircraft) be stopped for several months, to transport it by sea and back to the United Kingdom to display it there for several days. However, perhaps with some haste, since the aircraft still had to go through an exhaustive test program and most likely undergo numerous adjustments and even modifications before obtaining approval and moving on to the serial production phase, the intention to build 210 copies to be destined for the Argentine Aeronautics to replace the I.Ae-24 Calquín that at that same moment was being incorporated in its first copies to the Aeronautics, and keeping in mind that not even the first series of aircraft was yet complete. 100 copies of 300 Calquín planned, it was evident that the Calquín was already condemned, although to be fair, well condemned!, because despite being an aircraft that was successful in its subsequent service with the Argentine Aeronautics, and that for the regional level It was really good, as we already pointed out, it was far from similar twin-engine attack engines available worldwide or even, although in very small numbers, already in service in some South American countries, such as Venezuela, for example, however the I.Ae-30 Nancú was even more advanced than the Mosquito, and was more in line with aircraft such as the Focke-Wulf Ta-154 and Fw-187, Grumman F7F Tigercat, Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Northrop P-61 Black Widow, De Havilland Hornet, Vickers Type 432, Westland Whirlwind and Westland Welkin.
It was in this way that the construction of a second series of Calquín, responding to the improved design, was not carried out, of course neither was the third although, in fact, perhaps it should have already been the I.Ae-30 Ñancú. But curiously, the IAe-30 Ñancú design, as we will see below, did not prosper either despite investing significant resources in it, since the Engineer Brigadier Major Juan Ignacio San Martín, before leaving the direction of the Aerotechnical Institute, never received what was necessary to complete what was undoubtedly the last project he left in progress: the I.Ae-30.
The tests of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú continued, and so did the demonstrations. In this way, and perhaps irresponsibly, since it must be considered that it was the only prototype that had flown for the first time just a few weeks ago, in October 1948 the device was unnecessarily taken to La Paz, Bolivia to participate in an industrial exhibition, although the event was used to evaluate the aircraft in high altitude conditions, something that could have been perfectly done in Argentine aerodromes located in similar geographical conditions. During his stay in Bolivia, Weiss performed a dive, taking the Ñancú up to 900 kph, a true record for this type of aircraft, and at the same time demonstrating that structurally the plane was capable of withstanding more demanding aerodynamic pressures, which required the installation of higher power power plants in it.
Upon his return and thanks to the tests carried out, modifications were made to the prototype such as the installation of compensators in the ailerons and rudder, modification of flight controls and change of the canopy for a three-piece one with an armored front.
After restarting the test flights in April 1949 and following the advice of Edmundo Weiss and the German engineer Kurt Tank, modifications were made to the second prototype that was not yet complete, incorporating a new tail unit with stabilizers in the lower part of the same instead of those located at mid-height, the rudder became a single piece instead of two, a closed bow nose was adopted prepared to install the 6 20 mm cannons provided and the cupola was replaced of the cabin for greater visibility, but incredibly and inexplicably that prototype was never completed.
Thus, the only example built and in flight continued with its tests until at the end of 1949, on a landing approach, its pilot, Captain Carlos Fermin Bergaglio, let the machine stall without noticing that it was still too high above the runway. and when trying to recover its flight line, the Ñancú made a turn on its longitudinal axis and capped, partially destroying itself although without consequences for its occupant, who could be rescued unharmed, but the device was not repaired. Curiously, it was lost in an accident of the same type that the Calquín usually suffered: the bell roll during landing; This showed that the supposed instability alleged to the IAe-24 Calquín regarding the fact that it originally had to have larger and more powerful linear engines, at least did not seem to be the case, since this problem was suffered by the English Mosquito, and as was also later verified, the only existing Ñancú.
Incredibly, the interest in the I.Ae-30 Ñancú immediately disappeared on the part of the Defense planning political authorities, and the work was abandoned in favor of the Pulqui II despite being a different type of aircraft and conceived for another purpose, and Both this Ñancú example and the second and third prototypes were dismantled. One of the fantastic excuses put forward is that in 1949 it was planned to begin manufacturing under license the Rolls-Royce Nene II jet engine that was going to power the prototypes of the I.Ae-33 Pulqui II fighter, the work of Professor Kurt Tank in the Aerotechnical Institute at that time, an agreement having been reached with the British firm, and that this would consume resources that made it impossible to develop both aircraft at the same time, being strange, although not impossible, the manufacture of that turbine in a country where it was difficult It was barely possible to produce medium power radial engines under license or of one's own design, and in any case, as we will see below, none of this happened, in fact, there was not even a serious threat that would ever begin to occur.
On the boards of the designers of Cesare Pallavicino's team of aeronautical technicians and engineers from the Special Projects Division No. 2 of the Aerotechnical Institute, there were even the variants of the Ñancú, none ever built even as a prototype, and known as I.Ae .30 Pallavicino I, a modification of the IAe-30 Ñancú jet also designed by Cesare Pallavicino, also single-seat in a class similar to that of the Gloster Meteor, featuring the same fuselage as the normal IAe-30 Ñancú, but with linear engine nacelles replaced by 'jet' engine nacelles (as jet engines were then called), each with a Rolls-Royce Derwent V engine with a static thrust of 1,587.5 kg, cabin replaced by a elongated with a full metal nose instead of the glass nose of the Ñancú, to accommodate 4 Hispano-Suiza 20mm autocannons "in" the nose instead of the 6 20mm autocannons featured on the Ñancú found " under" the nose. The I.Ae-30 Pallavicino II, similar to the Pallavicino I but with extended wings and a more squared tail, but which would be a two-seater (pilot and navigator) bombing/light attack aircraft; the navigator had to be seated in a glass nose or behind the pilot (later with a solid nose); Its armament included 4 Hispano-Suiza 20 mm cannons and 2 bombs of 900 or 1,000 kg. each in an internal bomb bay, could also carry 20 75mm air-to-surface rockets.
However, the Pulqui II will not prosper either, because despite concentrating on its development during the next 5 years, there was never more than one copy at a time available for the complicated and already laborious tests to be carried out, while the turbines that were supposed to (according to some versions) they were going to be produced in Argentina, not even a test copy was ever manufactured, with a view to obtaining even approval!, and being a 2nd generation fighter jet that appeared already 3 years behind their similar ones that, at that same moment, 1950, nothing envied them, the truth is that their competitors were already in service while the FMA could not even put more than one prototype into flight or homologate the model, which after being lost one after another in a series of fatal tests, having only one copy, the delay became more delay, while its competitors, already in service, were developed in more advanced variants and even gave life to a new stage, a 3rd generation of jets when the Pulqui II had not even been approved yet.
By 1955, the only existing Pulqui II prototype was stopped on the ground, unapproved and literally obsolete, and that year the 1st generation of supersonic jets entered service, that is, 3 generations above a Pulqui II that was not yet ready to be mass produced. , it was a reality of a totalitarian Peronism that squandered formidable resources in the Aerotechnical Institute and the FMA throughout 9 years of absolutist totalitarianism, without suffering a boycott or external opposition (since even the English provided everything from weapons and reflector sights, to the most advanced existing power plants such as the Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 linear engines, and the Rolls-Royce Derwent V and Nene II jet engines), nor any internal developments, it had not managed to put even one into series production! only of the designs that he developed!!!, and even the aircraft that during the first phase of the first Peronist presidency were or were put into mass production, and we are referring to the I.Ae-22DL and I.Ae-24 Calquín, They ended up annulled due to a boycott by the Peronist administration itself against their production!!! In fact, by 1955 the Military Aircraft Factory had already been producing military aircraft in series for more than 3 years even though the Argentine Aeronautics was still waiting for 100 I .Ae-22DL, 200 I.Ae-24 Calquín or I Ae-28 Calquín improved or failing that 210 I.Ae-30 Ñancú; in addition to the at least 100 I.Ae-33 Pulqui II that were part of the Aeronautics request or already approved programs, but which in any case had never been fulfilled by Peronism.
The arrival of the 1955 Revolution, however, and in view of what had already been invested in the IA-33 Pulqui II program, despite its obvious obsolescence, decided to continue it, without it being clear even today for what purpose, since the discussion between the famous 100 fighters, and the 50 that at some point was the option to build after finally, in 1956, the Pulqui II was homologated, surely they would seek to take advantage of it as an attack jet given its very limited potential as an Interceptor by the time it was built. could put it into production and service, something that in turn was further delayed when that single prototype was also lost, and thus the last Pulqui II prototype only managed to take flight in 1959, with prospects of putting it into production as early around 1961, something that was already meaningless at the time that the 2nd generation of supersonic fighters was already entering service, and even Argentina already had fighters of the same generation as the Pulqui II, the even better F-86F, in service! -NA30 Saber, with which the end of the IA-33 Pulqui II fighter jet that was so promising in 1949, which was sealed in 1951, in 1955 there was not the slightest doubt about it and for 1959 was a reality.
But it was also a reality that when the I.Ae-30 Ñancú was conceived in 1947, with 3 prototypes of a formidable design that did not envy its similar ones and really progressed at a pace of development that could even be said to be war-like, already a year later Next all of this was suppressed, since the recommendations received, considered and adopted by the Special Projects Division No. 2 of the Aerotechnical Institute for Ñancú never received the necessary resources for the FMA to carry them out, not even in the 2 prototypes that there was already in the plant; while with the only prototype in flight it was evident that nothing else could be done, much less with such an incredible and irresponsible schedule of tests and at the same time marketing exhibition that was carried out, all of this being aware of the officials of the Secretariat of Aeronautics that they had already stoned the I.Ae-24 Calquín first; to its improved version I.Ae-28, which literally left the Aeronautics without 200 of the 300 planned attack and reconnaissance aircraft to make way for an I.Ae-30 Ñancú that in 210 copies was to fill that gap but in less than one year it was already more than evident that it was going to be abandoned, so not a single cent was invested in it, to move on to another aircraft, the IA-33 Pulqui II, which even no longer had anything to do with those described, but accepting that in truth it was going to replace them in the production line, although in truth it was to replace the recently incorporated Gloster F.Mk-IV Meteor in its role as an interceptor, the Meteor would surely be destined for fighter-bomber missions, something that as we know anyway It happened when, starting in 1960 and already replaced by the Sabre, the Meteor even changed the prefix I (Interceptor) to C (Fighter-bomber), serving obsoletely until 1970-71.
By 1955 there had been no production line in operation for years, there were only a few obsolete prototypes on the platform, including the still unapproved I.Ae-33 Pulqui II, with a single prototype already surpassed by three generations of foreign fighter jets, without the slightest possibility of being introduced into a fighter market where the 1st generation supersonic fighters were already entering service and the 2nd generation ones were beginning to be developed, because like the excellent I.Ae-30.Ñancú in 1949 it had its moment in 1949 and in 1949 it ended up in a trash can, the Pulqui II had it in 1951 and that same 1951 it ended up in a trash can, in the same way that the I.Ae-24/I.Ae-28 ended in 1947 when A small group of stateless despots began to sell illusions, trading on the faith of a people.
As General Perón used to say, using Aristotle's own words, and to which the popular imagination gave undisputed status as truth, "the only truth is reality", and this was the reality of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú, born from the reality of the I.Ae-24/I.Ae-28 Calquín/Super Calquín, and died in the shadow of the unreality of the I.Ae-33 Pulqui II and a despotic government, which when it fell in 1955 left the Force Argentine Air Force, mired in a generational delay at the end of the Second World War, which took almost a decade to mass produce aircraft in the aircraft factory that was intended to produce abions and not subsidized scooters, almost 20 years to update the attack capacity. , and 25 years to update the interceptor fighter capacity.
The truth is that the Argentine Aeronautics was missing 200 combat aircraft; The production of 200 combat aircraft was suppressed by the FMA; the design of four models of combat aircraft, in addition to all the enormous resources invested in their development, ended up being thrown away; The Argentine Aeronautics saw its air power reduced and obsolete; The Argentine national aeronautical industry saw its production chain completely broken to become a designer and producer of simple technological demonstrators to sell illusion that, of course, cannot be denied, has delighted many, because the illusion lasts to this day!
Technical specifications I.Ae-30 Ñamcú
- Designer: Aerotechnical Institute; Engineer Cesare Pallavicino.
- Manufacturer: FMA
- Country: Argentina
- Year: 1948
- Type: Single-seat fighter, interceptor and escort monoplane
- Power Plant: 2 V-12 Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 liquid-cooled linear engines and up to 2,034 hp at 3,300 rpm, 4-blade de Havilland 4/4000/5 reverse direction propellers, constant speed, hydromatic control and control device flagged by engine, 3.66 meters. diameter.
- Fuel: 2,980 liters. (internal), 3,592 liters. (with drop tanks); oil 200 liters
- Wingspan 15.00 meters.
- Length: 11.52 meters.
- Height: 5.12 meters.
- Wing area 35.32 m²
- Weights: Empty 6,208 kg, maximum takeoff 7,600 kg.
- Wing loading: 215 Kgs/m²
- Power-weight ratio: 2.06 hgs/hp;
- Speed: 740 kph maximum, 500 kph cruise.
- Stall speed: (full load): 155 kph
- Climbing speed 11 meters/sec.
- Service ceiling: 12,200 meters.
- Takeoff run: 300 meters
- Flight autonomy: 6 hours.
- Range: 3,950 km. to 1,390 km, depending on load and speed
- Planned armament: 6 Oerlikon guns or 4 Hispano-Suiza HS-804 20x110 mm guns; a 250 kg bomb. on a ventral mount or a container for 2 Oerlikon 20x110 mm guns; 10 83 mm rockets. in ramp-underwing mounts
