Declassified Malvinas files: the Brazilian triangulation to bypass European sanctions and supply arms to Argentina
Declassified documents from Brazil’s National Archives revealed a manoeuvre by the authorities to coordinate the arrival in Argentina of military weaponry manufactured in Belgium during the armed conflict. The operation sought to circumvent the European embargo quietly. The unanswered questions that still remain behind Brazilian support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim.
Mariano Sciaroni || Infobae
Personnel of the Argentine Army on the islands. The soldier on the right is carrying an FN FAL rifle, while the other two are holding Browning GP-35 pistols.
When Argentine forces landed on the Islas Malvinas on 2 April 1982, the response from the European Economic Community (EEC) was swift. Within days, and at Great Britain’s request, the EEC imposed economic sanctions on Argentina, including, among other measures, the suspension of exports of defence material.
This created a problem for the Argentine armed forces, which saw weapons and equipment that had been ordered — and often already paid for — retained in Europe. The best-known case is that of France and the powerful Exocet missiles.
But the declassified files in Brazil reveal a story that had remained hidden until now: how the highest Brazilian authorities coordinated with a Belgian arms manufacturer so that key weapons components could reach Argentina, bypassing the imposed blockade.
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Fabrique Nationale Herstal S.A., based in the city of Herstal, in the province of Liège, Belgium, had for years maintained a major series of contracts with Argentina’s armed forces, especially with the Argentine Army and its institutional representative, the Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM).
The main rifle used by Argentine forces was the FAL, the standard-issue machine gun was the MAG — the MAG 60-20 was the infantry section support machine gun and the MAG 60-40 was used in a coaxial configuration in armoured vehicles — and the sidearm was the Browning GP-35 pistol in 9 mm calibre. They are still in use. All were weapons made by Fabrique Nationale (FN) Herstal, and were by then being manufactured or assembled under licence in Argentina, at the Fábrica Militar Fray Luis Beltrán in the Provincia de Santa Fe. These were weapons needed for the war that had already begun.
The situation was critical.
On 3 June 1982, a British Avro Vulcan bomber, registration XM597, had to make an emergency landing in Río de Janeiro after attacking Malvinas and experiencing problems while refuelling in flight. Brazil allowed the bomber to return on the condition that it would not take part in the war again, and retained the AGM-45 Shrike missile it was carrying, which appears covered in the foreground.
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According to a memo that had reached Belgium, Argentine factories were paralysed by a lack of pistol, machine-gun and rifle parts — “leur fabrique est paralysée par manque de pièces” — and the orders were marked as “super urgence”. Weapons that soldiers needed were only half completed on the production lines.
But FN Herstal could not fulfil the orders. Its government would not allow it.
Faced with that situation, FN Herstal turned to its Brazilian subsidiary. The solution devised was legally ingenious: to import the parts from Belgium under the “drawback” customs regime — which suspends import duties on condition that the material is re-exported after processing — subject them to “um rápido processamento/tratamento final” at the industrial plant of FN do Brasil Ltda. in Valença, State of Río de Janeiro, and then re-export them to the Argentine government.
The operation would allow FN Herstal to circumvent the EEC blockade while serving its client, while FN do Brasil would obtain a “certa margem de lucro” as intermediary. But the cost to the buyer would be minimal, since FN Herstal agreed to reduce the list prices of the goods so as not to affect the amount Argentina had to pay.
It was a deal that suited everyone. Except the British, of course. And it allowed the Brazilian government to lend a hand when its neighbour needed it.
The two Embraer EMB-111 Bandeirante Patrulha aircraft, leased to the Brazilian Air Force on very favourable terms, are the best-known face of Brazilian aid to Argentina during the 1982 conflict. Their lease also required formal approval from that country’s president.
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The declassified documents from Brazil’s National Archives reveal that the operation was structured around two formally independent requests, processed before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) under the Diretrizes Gerais para a Política Nacional de Exportação de Material de Emprego Militar (PNEMEM).
Both were initiated by the Director General of FN do Brasil Ltda., Kleber Carvalho Rocha, through letters addressed to Ambassador Paulo de Tarso Flecha de Lima, Head of the Commercial Promotion Department at Itamaraty.
The first request, dated 4 May 1982 — internal reference FN-82/055 — comprised:
• 177,500 precision mechanical parts for the 7.62 mm FAL rifle, detailed in six batches: semi-finished rough parts obtained by investment casting, 17,500 units; semi-finished FAL model 50-00 receiver bodies, 23,000 units; complete FAL magazines, 50,000 units; seamless stainless-steel tubes for the gas cylinder, 21,000 units; seamless steel tubes, 31,000 units; and complete FAL-FN.201 tubular bayonets, 35,000 units.
• 16,000 semi-finished frames — “armaduras PB/GP” — for the 9 mm Parabellum Browning GP pistol.
The estimated total value of this first operation amounted to US$5,500,000, payable in cash by irrevocable letter of credit.
The second request, dated 12 May 1982 — internal reference FN-82/057 — covered a different batch consisting of 209,000 precision mechanical parts for the FAL rifle, including 150,000 complete magazines, 21,000 gas-cylinder fixing screws, 9,000 trigger guards, 12,000 external recoil springs, 12,000 internal recoil springs and 5,000 muzzle brakes, plus 5,780 sets of sub-assemblies and parts for the 7.62 mm MAG machine gun in its 60-20 infantry and 60-40 coaxial versions.
The total value of this second batch was estimated at US$2,500,000, also payable in cash.
Secret document dated 31 May 1982, informing the President of Brazil about the triangulation of arms to Argentina. On the first page, at the top right, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo wrote “Aprovo. Em 31/5/82” and added his signature.
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The operation required express authorisation from the Brazilian State at several levels. The file reveals a bureaucratic circuit involving at least five institutional actors: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE/Itamaraty), the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (CSN), the Ministry of the Army, Banco do Brasil’s Foreign Trade Portfolio (CACEX), and ultimately the Presidency of the Republic.
The MRE processed the requests as SECRET–EXTREMELY URGENT under number DPG/DAM-I/DSI/112/665.16(B46)(B29). In its communication to the CSN on 14 May 1982, Itamaraty — under Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro — issued a favourable opinion on both operations from the standpoint of Brazil’s foreign relations.
On 19 May, Brigadier General Danilo Venturini, Minister of State and Secretary General of the CSN, submitted the consultation to the Minister of the Army, Army General Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, and to CACEX. CACEX replied on 24 May via telex DICEX 82/849, stating that it had no objections to the operation. The Ministry of the Army, for its part, issued a favourable opinion on 28 May.
With all favourable opinions gathered, on 31 May 1982 Venturini submitted Explanatory Statement 043/82, classified as SECRET, to His Excellency the President of the Republic, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, for approval of the first request, dated 4 May. The presidential response, handwritten on the document itself, was terse and definitive: “Aprovo. Em 31/5/82.” Below it was his signature.
The Brazilian government was approving an arms triangulation operation for Argentina.
The second request, dated 12 May 1982, received the same treatment and the same conclusion days later from the Brazilian president: “Aprovo. Em 07/06/82.”
Declassified Malvinas Brazil documents.
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The file cannot be read without the context provided by an internal memorandum from the CSN itself, dated 19 April 1982 and entitled “A Questão das Malvinas e as Relações Brasil-Argentina”.
That document — exceptionally frank in diplomatic terms — describes Brazil’s position on the conflict as one of “não-engajamento ostensivo”, neither equidistant nor neutral, given Brazil’s historic support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the islands.
Brazil had agreed to represent Argentine interests before His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and President Figueiredo maintained a notably warm personal relationship with President Galtieri.
The April memorandum identified with explicit clarity the opportunities the conflict opened up for the bilateral relationship. It noted that in areas such as military-use material and the aerospace industry, Brazilian commercial penetration had been “básicamente vedada” by Argentina, which had historically turned to extra-continental sources for items that Brazil could have supplied on advantageous terms.
The Malvinas crisis appeared as an opportunity to transform that asymmetric relationship qualitatively, making cooperation between the two countries “íntima e irreversível” across a wide range of areas.
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The question that inevitably arises is whether these parts reached their destination before the ceasefire on 14 June 1982. The documents analysed allow the authorisation chronology to be reconstructed, but they do not directly prove that the shipments were carried out. Presidential approval was granted on 31 May and 7 June.
The delivery times declared by FN Herstal in its pro-forma invoices ranged from fifteen days to two months, suggesting that at least the fastest-delivery materials may have begun to move before the Brazilian bureaucratic process was completed.
It is one more piece to investigate.
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The FN Herstal–FN do Brasil triangulation was not the only transfer of military material that Brazil authorised or processed for Argentina’s benefit during the conflict. The Brazilians leased two EMB-111 Bandeirante Patrulha aircraft to the Armada Argentina on very favourable terms. In addition, through Petrobras, they supplied quantities of aviation fuel and other things that remain not entirely clarified — because no one wants them to be entirely clear.
The FN Herstal–FN do Brasil case, however, has a specificity that distinguishes it: it was not a direct export of Brazilian-made material, but Brazil’s deliberate insertion as a node in a supply chain that would otherwise have been severed by the European blockade.
The triangulation was known and accepted as such by all the institutional actors involved. In this context, Figueiredo’s presidential approval was a political decision adopted with full awareness of the role Brazil would assume as facilitator.
Malvinas War – Argentina – Peruvian Air Force – Peru – 25 January.
Brazil’s declassified files revealed a triangulation between FN Herstal, FN do Brasil and Argentina to circumvent the European embargo during Malvinas (NA).
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The declassified documents from Brazil’s Arquivo Nacional make it possible to reconstruct with remarkable precision an operation that, until now, remained outside the available historiographical record on external support for Argentina during the Malvinas conflict.
The triangulation between FN Herstal of Belgium, FN do Brasil Ltda. and, ultimately, the Argentine Army/DGFM constituted a mechanism for evading the EEC embargo, processed secretly throughout the Brazilian chain of command and finally sanctioned by President Figueiredo himself.
The case illustrates at least three dimensions of historical significance.
First, the real effectiveness of the EEC blockade. Although European sanctions deprived Argentina of direct supplies, the existence of a subsidiary in a third country — Brazil, which did not join the sanctions — was enough to create an effective alternative channel, at least in legal and administrative terms.
Second, the coherence of Brazilian foreign policy during the conflict: diplomatic support for Argentina’s sovereignty claim was consistent with an operational willingness to facilitate the logistical sustainment of its armed forces.
Third, the strategic use of ordinary commercial instruments — the drawback regime, PNEMEM consultations, pro-forma invoices — to channel an essentially political decision with the least possible visibility.
Brazil collaborated more than is officially acknowledged. A strategy, of course, to avoid hindering relations with the United Kingdom, whose officials remained largely in the dark.
In the words of the then United Kingdom Air Attaché in Brazil: “After the war, we were informed that the head of the Armada Argentina, Admiral Anaya, was going to visit the country to ‘thank Brazil for the support it had provided’. Of course, we were not present at the inevitable diplomatic reception, but the Brazilians assured us that, since in reality no help had been given to Argentina, the whole matter was nothing more than a meaningless farce.”
It was not a meaningless farce. Brazilian support did exist. And this top-level arms triangulation is proof of it.