Malvinas 1982: The Misunderstood
Mariano Sciaroni
I often read comments about the Navy: the Navy did this, the Navy did that; whether it put to sea, and why it did not. I would like to know whether, after reading this account, the reader would be willing to sail aboard a submarine that could not dive — as in the ordeal of the submarine Santa Fe — or one armed with torpedoes that were effectively useless.
The condition of the SST-4 torpedoes during the Malvinas War
The German SST-4 torpedoes — “Special Surface Target 4”, also nicknamed “Sol Sol Taco Cuatro” — were delivered to the Argentine Navy between 1974 and 1975. At the time, they were among the most modern submarine weapons in the world.
This intelligent, wire-guided weapon remained connected to the launching submarine by a cable, allowing it to be guided remotely. It had a maximum range of 56,000 yards at 23 knots, or 24,000 yards at 35 knots, and carried a 573-pound warhead.
After the torpedoes arrived in Argentina, 19 test firings were conducted as part of the certification process: 15 from submarines and four from surface craft. Only eight were completed without incident. None of the torpedoes used in these trials carried a live warhead.
Despite this poor reliability rate — which, it must be said, was not very different from that of other contemporary submarine weapons — the torpedo was accepted into service.
Between December 1975 and May 1980, no operational firings were conducted. The only exceptions were three very short-range tests carried out in 1977 to take various measurements.
As early as 1975, the Submarine Force Command had asked the Directorate of Naval Weapons to conduct a live-warhead firing. The request was repeated in 1977. On both occasions, it was denied.
Between May 1980 and March 1982, eight SST-4 torpedoes were launched. Only one completed its run without incident. Another was lost, while in the remaining six cases the guidance wire was severed. In light of these results, the weapon was considered non-operational during this period.
During the Malvinas conflict, SST-4 torpedoes were loaded aboard the submarines ARA Salta and ARA San Luis. The latter fired two of them at enemy warships.
As might have been expected from the experience of previous years, however, the torpedoes failed to perform as intended.
For a detailed examination of these incidents, see Ready for Combat? Submarine Weapons in Malvinas, 1982.
Post-war assessments identified several possible causes for the weapon’s failures during the conflict:
According to the manufacturer, each torpedo required a full overhaul every ten years. As they had been manufactured in 1972 and 1973, they were already approaching the end of their intended service life. That ten-year lifespan, however, applied only when the weapons were stored under specified conditions of humidity, pressure and temperature. A suitable storage facility was not brought into operation until 1981. In practice, therefore, the torpedoes had already exceeded their service life.
The torpedoes’ gyroscopes were supposed to undergo maintenance every 48 months, but Argentina lacked the equipment required to perform the work. In 1980, six gyroscopes had been declared unserviceable and were sent to Germany for maintenance together with three others. Twenty-two remained in Argentina, but their reliability could not be properly assessed. Neither of the two torpedoes fired by ARA San Luis was fitted with an overhauled gyroscope.
The torpedoes’ batteries had been manufactured between 1971 and 1972 and were expected to last between seven and nine years. Between 1979 and 1982, thirteen new batteries were purchased, bringing the total number available to forty-three. In February 1981, the Submarine Force Command requested that the batteries be tested, but the tests were never conducted. Of the two torpedoes fired by San Luis, one had a new battery and the other had an expired one.
The maintenance condition of the torpedoes was therefore clearly unsatisfactory. The weapon also suffered from an inherent design problem. In September and October 1982, the manufacturer, AEG, offered the Argentine Navy a large quantity of spare parts free of charge, apparently as a form of compensation. It also offered to maintain and repair the torpedoes already in service.
In 1984, despite the arms embargo, a substantial part of one torpedo was sent to Germany for examination. Once the investigation had been completed, the conclusions were forwarded to Argentina. By then, however, the weapon was already becoming obsolete.
It was a new and poorly understood technology, affected by both design defects and maintenance failures. Given all these problems, the SST-4’s poor performance during the 1982 Malvinas War was hardly surprising.
Even so, the submariners were ordered to put to sea practically unarmed.