1955 Revolution: Aftermath

The people of Bahía Blanca take to the streets to celebrate the triumph of the Revolution.

Aftermath



Joy and happiness in the crowd after Perón resignation

Thus concluded the first Argentine armed conflict of the 20th century, which, in just seven days of fighting, claimed the lives of nearly a thousand people. The casualties included civilians and soldiers—men, women, children, and the elderly. The majority of the deaths occurred on June 16 during the bombing of Buenos Aires, when 229 victims were identified in hospitals, clinics, and public aid facilities. However, the true death toll was far higher, as Dr. Francisco Barbagallo notes in Daniel Cichero's Bombs Over Buenos Aires. The chaos was so overwhelming that tracking the countless bodies transported by ambulances and trucks became impossible.

To grasp the scale of the attack, it is worth noting that 14,000 kilograms (14 tons) of explosives were dropped that day—half the amount used in the bombing of Guernica—yet the death toll was nearly equivalent to that of the Spanish city.

On that day, 43 rebel aircraft carried out the assault: twenty North American AT-6s, five Beechcraft AT-11s, three Catalinas, one Fiat G-55A Centauro reconnaissance aircraft dispatched to Rosario to contact General Bengoa, and ten rebel Gloster Meteors. Additionally, four aircraft initially refused to counter the attack but later joined the rebellion. Including loyalist aircraft, the total number of planes involved exceeded fifty.


Celebrations in Bahía Blanca

On June 16, 1955, the Air Force and Naval Aviation took their first baptisms of fire; the first two shoot-downs in the national aeronautical history occurred when the AT-6s of midshipmen Arnaldo Román and Eduardo Bisso were hit by the enemy, the first by shrapnel from the Gloster Meteor of Lieutenant Ernesto Adradas over the Río de la Plata and the second by anti-aircraft guns from the 3rd Regiment of La Tablada in the town of Tristán Suárez, Buenos Aires, not counting the Gloster that, due to lack of fuel, crashed into the waters of the Plata, between Carmelo and Colonia. That day also saw the first shoot-down carried out by a jet on the American continent (that of midshipman Romás by Lieutenant Adradas) and the entry into action of the tanks when a Sherman of the Motorized Regiment “Buenos Aires” fired on the Ministry of the Navy.


Victorious leaders. From left to right: CN Arturo Rial, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, General Julio A. Lagos, General Eduardo Lonardi, General Dalmiro Videla Balaguer and Commodore Julio César Krausse

Buenos Aires became the first (and so far, only) capital in South America to endure a large-scale aerial bombardment, joining the ranks of only a few cities worldwide to have suffered such an attack. It shares this tragic distinction with Gibara in Cuba, bombed by President Machado's air force in 1931, and Puerto Casado in Paraguay, targeted by the Bolivian Air Force in 1933. However, both of these events pale in comparison to the scale of the bombardment in Buenos Aires.

During the attacks, numerous locations in the city were hit, with the main targets including the Government House, Plaza de Mayo, the National Mortgage Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Army Ministry (Libertador Building), Hotel Mayo, the Central Police Department, the CGT headquarters, the Ministry of Public Works, the Patagonia Import and Export Company, various buildings along Av. Paseo Colón, the service station of the Argentine Automobile Club, and the presidential residence at Unzué Palace.

Additionally, La Tablada suffered heavy damage as the 3rd Infantry Regiment was strafed and bombed on Av. Crovara and Av. San Martín while marching toward the city center. The Ministry of the Navy was also struck during an attack by Army units, and the Banco Nación was hit as revolutionary civilian commandos took refuge on its rooftop.

On September 16, Argentina witnessed its first air-naval battle when the Peronist Air Force engaged the Ríos Squadron. Mar del Plata was also bombed, initially by a lone naval aircraft and later by Navy ships targeting large coastal oil deposits, the Submarine Base, Army positions on a nearby golf course, and the Camet Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.

Three days later, the submarine Santiago del Estero entered combat for the first time, using its 40 mm Bofors cannon to fire on unidentified aircraft near Montevideo. The towns of Saavedra and Río Colorado also fell victim to aerial bombardments during this period.


The Plaza de Mayo is packed, cheering on the Revolution that overthrew the tyrannical president

In that revolution, the greatness and miseries of war were fully exposed: acts of heroism and resolve, reckless actions, brutal deeds, weaknesses, and betrayals.

On June 16, it became evident that a significant portion of the population was willing to fight for Perón to the death. That day, thousands of workers took to the streets to arm themselves and fight for their leader. Dozens died in combat, most during the attack on the Ministry of the Navy. Similarly, on September 21, an unidentified number of fervent members of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista perished during revolutionary troops' assault on their headquarters.

There were soldiers who fulfilled their mission according to the training they had received, such as the much-criticized Lieutenant Adradas, who simply did his duty, or Vice-Commodore Síster, steadfast in his determination to defend the Peronist regime. Others failed to rise to the occasion. Some military figures upheld their honor, like Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, who, like ancient Roman generals, chose to take his own life rather than face disgrace. There were officers willing to die rather than surrender, including General Lonardi, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, Captains Perren and Rial, Commodore Krausse, Majors Montiel Forzano and Juan Francisco Guevara, Colonel Arias Duval, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina, and the somewhat reckless Dalmiro Videla Balaguer, all on the rebel side. Others fell in combat, such as Brigadier General Tomás Vergara Ruzo and numerous aviators, soldiers, and sailors who fought valiantly on both sides.

On the loyalist side, the resolve and professionalism of generals like Franklin Lucero, Miguel Ángel Iñíguez, and José María Sosa Molina, Lieutenant Colonel César Camilo Arrechea, Captain Hugo Crexell, and many others stood out, honoring their respective branches of service. The Argentine honor also shone aboard the destroyers La Rioja and Cervantes, and in the steadfastness of the personnel in Bahía Blanca and Punta Alta, who held firm in their posts against powerful advancing forces.

However, there were also ambiguous and wavering actions, such as those of Admiral Olivieri, Generals Bengoa, Lagos, and even Aramburu. Lieutenant Colonel Barto displayed indecision and despair during the regiments’ advance toward southern Buenos Aires. Similarly, First Lieutenant Rogelio Balado, one of the regime’s iconic pilots, switched sides and, during combat, refused to fire on an enemy Avro Lincoln that had just strafed loyalist positions at the Pajas Blancas airfield. Captain Bernardo Benesch did the same when ordered to attack targets in Mar del Plata on June 19. (Before setting sail, he had offered dissenting officers and sailors the opportunity to leave the ship and return to shore, though he himself did not follow through.) Captain Edgardo Andrew also hesitated, asking Captain Rial to revoke the order to bomb the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca, which was refusing to surrender.

During the second phase of the revolution, over 70 combat and patrol sorties were conducted, and the main regiments and military units from Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, and Patagonia were mobilized.

Rear Admiral Toranzo Calderón upon arriving at the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, 1955, as the final acts of the conflict concluded, an atmosphere of anticipation lingered across the country. While government emissaries and representatives of the rebel forces engaged in negotiations, combat units in Córdoba began their gradual return to base.

That same day, news of the revolutionary forces’ victory spread, prompting the people of Córdoba to flood the streets in celebration of the regime’s fall. Crowds gathered at Plaza San Martín, in front of the ruined Cabildo building, adorned with three Argentine flags, cheering for the leading figures of the rebellion. Thousands of men and women entered the adjacent Cathedral to give thanks to the Lord and the Holy Mother for the end of the conflict. Meanwhile, a jubilant procession of cars, motorcycles, trucks, buses, and pedestrians filled the streets, chanting in support of the revolution, its leaders, and the nation’s heroes.

Two days earlier, Bahía Blanca had erupted in similar enthusiasm. Residents filled the streets, cheering, singing, and waving flags while wearing sky-blue and white ribbons and rosettes. Portraits of San Martín, Belgrano, and Our Lord Jesus Christ were prominently displayed. Outside the CGT building, crowds sang the National Anthem, symbolizing the defiance of the fallen regime, and applauded Admirals Toranzo Calderón and Olivieri as they arrived at Bahía Blanca’s municipal headquarters after their release from detention in La Pampa. In front of the burned-out offices of the Democracia newspaper and the Bernardino Rivadavia Public Library, the crowd shouted, “Death to Perón!” and “Long live the Fatherland and Liberty!”

Toranzo Calderon in the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, back in their respective units and after a refreshing hot bath, cadets and conscripts from the Military Aviation and Airborne Troops schools in Córdoba were informed that the next day they were going to participate in the parades that had been held to commemorate the victory.
On the 22nd, very early in the morning, the soldiers formed up in the courtyards of both schools to head into the city to parade with the Army troops and civilian commandos who had taken part in the battle. The Cadet's Diary is graphic in recounting the events.

"The unit remains in the same condition as always... All the officers gathered with General Lonardi at the Cadet Casino, which is why we couldn’t contact F... to request a replacement. When we finally managed to, he told us there was only one tent left with a cadet and 16 soldiers. We worked like mad to take down the tents and move them to the Squadron. Once we finished everything, we went to the unit, and there, among the three group leaders, the 'exciting' draw took place to decide who would stay... If it had been me, I would have had to muster a great deal of willpower to remain, but luck was on my side; of course, it fell to the 'Turk.' Poor guy, he won’t be any better off than I am."

Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderon arrives in Bahia Blanca

Thus, the troops boarded military trucks and buses and headed toward the provincial capital where, upon reaching Av. Vélez Sarsfield, they dismounted to begin the parade. They did so after a long wait, in front of the population who cheered them and threw flowers at them while a shower of papers fell from nearby buildings to the cry of “Freedom! Freedom!” which could be heard everywhere.
After the parade, the troops returned to the barracks to continue their activities during peacetime, unaware that the following day would claim the life of another comrade.
During a patrol and observation flight, the Calquin I.Ae-24 of the 2nd Attack Group, piloted by Second Lieutenant Edgardo Tercillo Panizza, crashed on the outskirts of the city due to mechanical problems.


Officers welcome their boss after his release

Once they had heard of this, cadets and officers headed towards the site, first crossing the Aeronautical District, with the intention of seeing the remains of the aircraft that was still smoking on the field. Once there, they came across the remains, observing them in silence while meditating on the events that had taken place in the previous days and the course that history would take from that moment on.
Mar del Plata also joined in the celebrations with long human columns parading through its streets to the City Hall, to sing the National Anthem and wave flags.
On September 23, the fronts of the city woke up decorated with the colors blue and white; around 10:00 there was a new march to the government palace where rosettes, ribbons and flowers were distributed as in the days of May and the celebrations continued in different places until late at night.
Argentina was beginning a new path; An era had ended and another had begun, but the disagreement between brothers was not going to end there. The country would never find its way again and society would continue to crumble to unsuspected limits.

Notes

[1] Gargiulo was the creator of IMARA (Argentine Marines), infusing the spirit of the US Marines into their training and enlistment..

Photos: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. la Marina se subleva

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

Argentina: On How the 1955 Revolution Shaped Military Thought

Under the Aegis of Aries

By Esteban McLaren

During World War II, as in World War I, Argentina maintained an official stance of neutrality for much of the conflict. However, within the armed forces—particularly in the Army—tensions emerged among factions debating what the country’s true position should be. One such faction, aligned with the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United Officers Group - GOU), sympathized with the Nazi regime and, until 1943, advocated for Argentina to join the war on the side of the Axis powers. Following their successful coup d'état that same year, this faction seized control of the government, laying the groundwork for their preferred candidate, Juan Domingo Perón, to ascend to the presidency in the 1946 elections.

Perón, the son of Italian immigrants, initially assumed office as a constitutional president. However, he soon implemented a series of reforms aimed at suppressing opposition and consolidating his grip on power. Leveraging the surplus funds accumulated during Argentina’s wartime trade boom, he garnered support through bribes, subsidies, and other corrupt practices that allowed him to manipulate institutions to his advantage. Mismanagement of public resources became rampant: individuals with no prior wealth amassed fortunes, opposition media outlets were shut down or co-opted, and dissenting voices were systematically silenced—some through torture.

Amid this climate, a marginalized faction of the armed forces, sympathetic to the Allies and sidelined since the 1943 coup, began to regroup. This paper seeks to examine the recurring patterns within the anti-Peronist, or constitutionalist, forces that influenced Argentina's internal political-military dynamics, particularly during the period from 1955 to 1988, when these factions played a pivotal role in shaping the nation’s political landscape.

The Pro-Allied Faction

The earliest manifestations of this faction within the Argentine Army likely became evident during the failed coup attempt of 1951. What defined this group was their unwavering focus on action. These were military professionals trained to view challenges through the lens of the friend-enemy dichotomy. Their approach to any threat was inherently military: once the threat was identified, the enemy was delineated, and operations were executed to attack, pursue, and, if possible, annihilate it.

A prominent example of this ethos is Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, the founder of the Argentine Navy's Marine Infantry Corps (IMARA). Inspired by the U.S. Marine Corps, Gargiulo instilled a spirit of rigorous preparation and combat readiness in his troops. During the failed coup of June 16, 1955, when his efforts were thwarted, Gargiulo chose to commit suicide—an act that shocked many but epitomized his sense of military honor and courage. This same valor would be echoed 27 years later at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, where the Marine Infantry displayed exceptional bravery in the defense of Puerto Argentino during the Malvinas War.

This decisive and action-oriented approach stood in stark contrast to the hesitation shown by Juan Domingo Perón during the Liberating Revolution of 1955 (or 1955 Revolution). Faced with a rebellion in which only 18% of the troops turned against him, Perón faltered. The insurgents, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, stood firm, refusing to negotiate or compromise. Perón, accustomed to the political arena where deals and compromises were standard, seemingly misjudged the rebels’ intentions. Believing they sought a power-sharing agreement, he hesitated to order a decisive assault against their encircled forces. This hesitation allowed the insurgents to regroup and resume their offensive.

Once Lonardi's forces had reorganized, his first act was to order Perón’s arrest. This move, naturally, opened the door to his trial and potentially his execution—bringing Perón’s government to an abrupt end. Only then did Perón fully realize he was facing seasoned military professionals, not the political opportunists he was accustomed to outmaneuvering. His miscalculation sealed his fate, underscoring the stark difference between a military trained for decisive action and a politician unprepared for the harsh realities of armed rebellion.

The Liberating Revolution and the Formation of Army Officers

The Liberating Revolution, which overthrew the government of Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, had a profound impact on the composition and professional trajectory of officers within the Argentine Army. This process began with mass purges of officers deemed loyal to Peronism and the reinstatement of those aligned with anti-Peronist forces. Spearheaded by the Revolución Libertadora between 1955 and 1956, these changes disrupted the Army’s hierarchy, significantly altering its command structure and deeply affecting the careers of numerous officers (Mazzei, 2013).

The purge of Peronist officers resulted in the forced retirement of approximately 500 officers, many of whom were from the 60th to 74th graduating classes of the Military Academy. This affected officers from various branches, including infantry (53%), cavalry, and artillery. The vacancies left by their removal were often filled by less updated or less capable officers, which weakened the Army’s upper ranks.

Simultaneously, the Liberating Revolution reinstated around 180 anti-Peronist officers who had previously been dismissed. Many of these individuals later ascended to high-ranking positions within the military hierarchy, with some achieving the rank of general. The restoration of these officers solidified the influence of a military faction closely aligned with anti-Peronist ideology, significantly shaping the institution's leadership and operational outlook for years to come.na visión conservadora y antiperonista, que jugaría un rol crucial en los años venideros.

The "Blues" and the Consolidation of Military Power

Following the coup, the faction known as the "Blues" emerged as the dominant faction within the Army, consolidating its control throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This faction, under the leadership of figures such as Alejandro Lanusse and Alcides López Aufranc, imposed a militaristic and conservative vision that influenced both internal politics and Argentina's participation in territorial conflicts and the anti-subversive war. This faction managed to stay in power through a network of internal loyalties and through control of promotions and retirements within the military institution.

The Ideological and Operational Legacy

The impact of the Revolución Libertadora was not limited to a reconfiguration of the military hierarchy, but established a doctrine that would influence key events in Argentine history, such as the anti-subversive struggle and the conflict in the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The work underlines how this militaristic ideology promoted violent intervention in both internal and external conflicts, in defence of "national sovereignty" and the stability of internal order.

The changes in the composition and profile of Army officers during the Liberating Revolution significantly influenced military decisions in the following decades, particularly in how the Army approached counterinsurgency operations and territorial conflicts. The training and consolidation of these cadres during and after the Liberating Revolution instilled a distinctly aggressive decision-making style, exemplified by the harsh measures employed during the military dictatorship’s counterinsurgency campaign. This period saw the implementation of violent repression strategies against any perceived threat to the established order.

Moreover, the establishment of a high command that favored the use of force and embraced a nationalist perspective played a critical role in decisions such as the escalation of tensions during the Beagle Channel conflict with Chile in the 1970s and the invasion of the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The dominant ideology among these military officers—shaped during the Revolución Libertadora (1955 Revolution) and solidified in the subsequent decades—portrayed the Army as the guardian of national sovereignty against external enemies and as the enforcer of internal order against perceived subversion.

Professional soldiers trained under this doctrine operated with a clear and uncompromising premise: all problems were to be resolved militarily. Ambiguity was not an option. They assessed situations, identified enemies, planned attacks, and executed operations decisively, relying on force or the threat of it. The first major adversary of this philosophy was its ideological nemesis: the dictator Juan Domingo Perón. Subsequently, internal power struggles between factions emerged, including the infamous Azules versus Colorados clashes, leading to decades of military uprisings and internal conflicts.

Magdalena's 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment M4 Sherman Firefly over the Punta Indio Naval Station tarmac in 1965.

Conflict resolution within this faction of the Argentine military was consistently taken to extremes. The failed coup of 1951, the bombing of Plaza de Mayo on June 16, 1955, the decisive coup of September 13, 1955, the executions at León Suárez, and the series of coups throughout the 1960s left no doubt about the faction's uncompromising approach. On April 3, 1965, the 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment from Magdalena brutally attacked the Punta Indio Naval Air Base after being bombarded with rockets and napalm by naval aircraft. This level of unrestrained aggression became the norm.

A mentality shaped by the spirit of blitzkrieg dominated operations during the counterinsurgency campaigns, the near-war territorial disputes with Chile in 1978, and the climactic recovery of the Malvinas Islands. Operations such as Soberanía and Tronador exemplified this mindset. These plans were masterpieces of military strategy, marked by creative approaches and the ability to anticipate Chilean responses several steps ahead. They encapsulated the lessons learned by the officer corps, meticulously applying the most advanced military doctrine of the era.

The reliance on military solutions did not end there. The Carapintada rebellions and the brutal retaking of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment at La Tablada marked the closing chapter of a generation of soldiers forged for war. Often unable to resolve matters through other means, they consistently chose the use of military force as their primary response.

The negative consequences of this approach were evident in the widespread social condemnation of the methods employed during the counterinsurgency campaigns. The defeat in the Falklands War delivered the final blow to this mindset, leaving not only a profound loss of life but also a deep scar on national pride.

From a more positive perspective, the Argentine military approached their profession with uncompromising consistency, making decisions rooted firmly in military doctrine. Despite errors, indecision, and the brutalities committed, their actions often adhered to rigorous operational planning. Notable examples of military precision included Operation Rosario, an amphibious assault brilliantly executed against an enemy garrison with the explicit objective of avoiding casualties. Additionally, Argentina became the first country to simultaneously dismantle two terrorist movements—one urban and one rural—through a decentralized and audacious operation involving all military and police units to neutralize insurgent hideouts.

However, this war was later scrutinized in Argentine civil courts through a judicial process marred by irregularities, including the retroactive application of laws and improper proceedings that remain controversial. One critical misstep in the military’s counterinsurgency method was the disposal of insurgents’ bodies instead of returning them to their families, a decision that continues to fuel contention.

A Reflection on Military Responses and Leadership Failures

Allow me a personal reflection. One expects a military response from the armed forces; otherwise, there is no reason to call on them. When the military is summoned to address a problem, it is understood that the issue will be resolved manu militari. This entails frontal assaults, flanking maneuvers, precision strikes, saturating defenses, and seeking the enemy's surrender. The generation of Aries, guided by the Roman god of war, responded as expected—sometimes with massive errors, but always consistent with how the nation had trained them.

I deeply detest, with significant conviction, when a military officer ventures into political analysis, planning, or implementation for a real-world problem. When a tactician delves into geopolitics instead of focusing on executing orders from their superiors, it reflects a clear lack of professionalism. Such failures have existed, continue to exist, and will likely persist. A case in point was the HMS Shackleton incident, when the British oceanographic vessel intruded into Argentine waters in a blatant affront to national sovereignty. Intercepted by the ARA Rosales, the naval command from Libertad headquarters issued a direct order: "Sink it!" However, the naval officer in charge chose instead to have a coffee—a gesture that not only dishonored his uniform but also assumed roles reserved for the General Staff.

In 1982, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, as Argentina's military governor in the Malvinas, was tasked with designing the defensive plan against a potential British re-invasion. His plan, however, was a static defensive setup devoid of imagination or strategy. It resembled something conceived by a Chilean general—lacking in creativity and more concerned with maintaining good relations with the kelpers (the British-settled population) than defending the territory. When the enemy landing at San Carlos was detected, Menéndez's response was painfully reactive, if it could even be called that.

From that moment, events spiraled downward. There were no ambushes planned, no maneuvers to regroup forces, and no flanking or encirclement strategies implemented. Menéndez left each position commander to act independently, offering no centralized coordination or leadership. What emerged was a general with little intellect and even less courage, paralyzed by mediocrity, passively awaiting the inevitable. He failed to optimize the resources at his disposal, whether abundant or scarce. Instead of leading, Menéndez surrendered to inertia, displaying a complete lack of strategic vision and leadership. This was the cost of nepotism—elevating an officer tied to families associated with the Revolución Libertadora and the counterinsurgency campaigns. Menéndez prioritized geopolitical relations with those who despised him rather than focusing on his troops and crafting the best possible military plan.

A Broader Legacy of Patriotism

Despite the tragic context of Latin America, this generation of Aries left behind a lesson in patriotism that transcends generations. The shameful examples of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—where senior military officers, lacking ethics, morals, and discipline, handed their nations over to petty dictators—stand as cautionary tales of what Argentina could have become. Yet, in Argentina, a cadre of patriotic officers emerged. When a dictator like Perón sought to perpetuate his rule, it was the brave 18% of troops who rose in rebellion to depose him. This is not the cursed Caribbean; this is Argentina. And in Argentina, when the military acts with honor, it does not surrender its homeland to tyrants.

Lessons from the Liberating Revolution

The Liberating Revolution not only restructured the Argentine Army and the entire armed forces in terms of their composition, but it also laid the ideological and operational groundwork for the decisions that would shape the nation’s military history in the decades that followed. From this experience, both positive lessons and critical errors emerge. It is our generation’s duty to learn from both as we shape the doctrine that will restore us to the military power we were destined to be.

1955 Revolution: Status Report from Cuyo

Cuyo Mobilizes

On the night of September 17, the troops of the Second Army arrived at the gates of the city of Mendoza and stopped there. General Julio Alberto Lagos was waiting for them at that point ready to receive command from his commander, General Eugenio Arandía.



Once at the head of the powerful unit, Lagos requested a report on the situation as he needed to take quick measures before setting off towards Córdoba. The picture of the situation that Arandía described to him was not what he expected because, as they explained to him, there was a lack of integration between the commanders and the news broadcast on the radio, they limited the revolution to the rebel focus of the Mediterranean province that at that time was being surrounded. by loyal troops under the command of generals Iñíguez, Morello and Moschini.
In view of this, influenced by the false news broadcast by government radio stations and letting himself be carried away by a counterproductive excess of caution, Lagos approved the resolution issued by his General Staff and retreated towards Mendoza, abandoning Lonardi's forces to his side. luck. According to the conclusion they had reached with General Arandía, if the civil war broke out (which in fact had already begun), it would be necessary to consolidate the three Cuyo provinces without risking their forces in a confrontation that would short term, it would have to annihilate them.
The Lagos troops spent the night next to the access bridge to Palmira and the next morning they entered the city, with the 2nd Mountain Infantry Battalion of Calingasta at the head, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre. The long column of vehicles found the access roads blocked by buses and trucks that the CGT had abandoned during the night to make progress difficult, punctured the tires of most of them. Under the direction of officers and non-commissioned officers, the conscripts proceeded to remove them, moving the vehicles off the road or throwing them into the river and slowly, the displacement became effective.
The Second Army was received with joy. The population, mobilized by Dr. Facundo Suárez[1], took to the streets to cheer him and people approached the soldiers to give them food and drinks while shouting and applauding his passage from Guaymallén, along San Martín Avenue.
Lagos installed his command in the Military High School and appointed General Roberto Nazar as provisional governor of the province. Whoever was its owner until that moment, Dr. Carlos Horacio Evans, appeared shortly after, to make himself available to him and after a brief and correct exchange of words, he was told that he could leave the province or remain at home, finally opting for this last proposition.


General Julio Alberto Lagos

One of the first orders given by Lagos upon arriving in Mendoza was to occupy the radio station, dispatching for that mission a platoon under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre, chief of the 2nd Mountain Battalion of Calingasta, which performed prominently during the San Luis rebellion. . Aguirre took over the station without any problems and immediately put Lieutenant Colonel Mario A. Fonseca on duty, who once at the microphone, proceeded to inform the citizens that both Mendoza and San Luis were in the power of the revolution.
Another important measure adopted by General Lagos was the arrest of senior leaders of the regional ruling party, represented mainly by the political and union leadership and by militants of the Justicialist basic units, who represented a serious threat to the revolution. There was no resistance in any of the basic units raided. Where there were problems was at the CGT premises, where many of its leaders, members and workers had barricaded themselves.
Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre headed towards the headquarters of the workers' union at the head of a platoon, believing that taking over the building was going to be a simple matter. However, upon arriving at the place, he was greeted by a large hail of bullets that forced him to to adopt defensive measures.
Following orders from their boss, the soldiers jumped out of the jeeps in which they had come and once under cover they opened fire, generating a violent exchange of fire in which two conscripts lost their lives and two officers were wounded.
The fight continued for several minutes, with the unionists containing any attempt to approach them, which forced Aguirre to ask for reinforcements. While he fired the submachine gun, he gave directives, concerned for the safety of his men. Two of them lay dead on the pavement and two others, seriously injured, were trying to take cover behind the vehicles.
Aguirre saw that the union members were shooting from various points, some from the upper windows and others from the roofs, so he tried to concentrate his bursts on those points.
The arrival of two trucks with troops was what decided the confrontation. Knowing they were surrounded and overwhelmed in men and weapons, the unionists waved a piece of white cloth tied to a stick and surrendered. The union headquarters was controlled and its defenders forced to leave slowly, with their hands on their heads. Once outside, they were subjected to an intense search and were then forced to board trucks to be taken to prison. The bodies of the dead soldiers were evacuated in an ambulance that arrived a few minutes later and the wounded left with them in the direction of the hospital. The actions in Cuyo had claimed their first victims.


Once the city was dominated, General Lagos ordered the occupation of the El Plumerillo Air Base, to which he sent General Arandía's second, Colonel Nicolás Plantamura, accompanied by the escort of the Mountain Infantry Detachment 1 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Cabello. Waiting for them at the place was Vice Commodore Martín Alió, known for his Peronist tendency, who handed over the military unit, clarifying beforehand that he did not agree to the uprising. However, his officers did, whom Plantamura met in the casino to talk and find out his position regarding the revolution. Twelve nationally manufactured Calquin bombers were at the disposal of the rebel forces, which, added to the powerful crew of Villa Reynolds, constituted a weapon of great value.
Back in Mendoza, Lieutenant Colonel Cabello received the order to support Major Rufino Ortega's platoon that was to take the local headquarters of the Federal Police, a mission that was accomplished with the support of revolutionary civilian commands without any incidents.
That was the situation in Mendoza and San Luis when, after noon, Lieutenant Colonel Fonseca, the same one who had transmitted the revolutionary messages by radio, requested authorization to march on San Juan, fearful of the attitude that the head of the army might assume. that garrison, Colonel Ricardo Botto.
After obtaining the approval of his superiors, Fonseca gathered under his command Colonel Aguirre's Infantry Battalion and the San Juan Sapper Company that reinforced the Second Army there and provided it with a cannon from the artillery battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fernando. Elizondo, he started.
The troops traveled throughout the night, stopping their march at dawn, in the town of Carpintería, close to the provincial capital. From there they continued in broad daylight, while people, almost all from the fields, farms and vineyards immediately around the route, gathered on the side of the route to greet the troops. As Ruiz Moreno, from whom we extract most of the information, relates, people did not forget the prohibition on carrying out the procession of the Virgin of Andacollo, imposed by the government.
Where there was tension was in San Juan, as a result of the deployment of police forces carried out by Commissioner César Camargo. The police were determined to resist but the intervention of Fonseca, also from San Juan and a childhood friend of Camargo, prevented bloodshed. It was evident that the police were not an adequate force to confront the Army and it was necessary, at all costs, to avoid any type of clash.
Camargo agreed and raised the device for the troops to enter the city, birthplace of illustrious personalities in Argentine history such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Brother Justo Santa María de Oro and Francisco Narciso Laprida. There were also scenes of joy, with the crowd cheering and applauding the passage of the rebel troops. The Virgin of Mercy was even taken out of the cathedral in front of which the crowd gathered and prayed, covering the Plaza 25 de Mayo. Fonseca was carried on a litter to the Government House where his head, Juan Viviani, handed over command to him. In this way, Cuyo was left in the power of the revolution with General Lagos, at the head of the civil and military command.

At 06:30 on September 19, a Beechcraft AT-11 from Córdoba landed in the countryside, on Route 40, 30 kilometers south of Mendoza, bringing on board frigate captain Carlos García Favre, emissary of General Lonardi. As soon as he got off the plane, the naval officer boarded a private vehicle that immediately took him to Luján de Cuyo, a stop before the provincial capital, where he arrived around 11:00 when the population was celebrating the arrival of the Second Army in the streets. coming from St. Louis.
An hour later, he was brought before General Lagos, urgent as he was to inform him of the difficult situation that the rebel garrison was going through. Once in his presence, frigate captain Carlos García Favre conveyed to him his distressing request for reinforcements and the imperative need for him to get underway as soon as possible to alleviate the difficult situation of he. While this was happening, in the streets, the crowd chanted slogans in favor of revolution and freedom, ignorant of those events that were unfolding.
Far from what García Favre imagined, Lagos's attitude was one of caution. After listening attentively, the general spoke slowly, detailing the inconveniences involved in providing aid to Lonardi. According to him, the Second Army was not fully aware of what was happening, it was imbued with the slogan of not spilling blood between brothers and for that reason, its full subordination could not be counted on when marching on Córdoba. . On the other hand, the capture of Río Cuarto was impossible because fuel was scarce and extremely difficult to obtain.
García Favre was dismayed because he did not expect such an attitude. Extremely nervous, he insisted again: Córdoba urgently needed reinforcements because if it did not have them the revolution would end up being defeated. Lagos remained in his position. Without saying a word, he listened to the emissary with a serious expression and then summoned him to a new meeting at 6:00 p.m.
By then, all Peronist party headquarters had been raided and the private homes of several activists confiscated, in order to prevent acts of sabotage, all this before the radio reported that starting at 9:00 p.m. that same day, the curfew and that martial law was in force throughout the city.

At the agreed time, García Favre, wearing civilian clothes, appeared at the barracks of the Sapper Battalion 8 for his second meeting with Lagos. Upon arrival, he was invited to witness the formation in the parade ground, in front of which, the general took formal possession of his position and harangued troops and civilians, exhorting them to fight for freedom. He also praised the Navy for its courageous and unwavering actions, stating at the end that the union of the three forces would ultimately grant them victory. But as far as the help requested is concerned, he said nothing specifically to García Favre. When the liaison tried to communicate with Lonardi to relieve him of the situation, he found that the arrest of the officers in charge of communications prevented him from establishing contact.
During the night of September 18 to 19, General Lagos and his high command developed a plan to alleviate the difficult situation in which General Lonardi found himself. Among other things, an air attack was decided from Villa Reynolds to the Las Higueras airfield, in order to neutralize the loyalist Gloster Meteors operating from there.
As Ruiz Moreno explains, Villa Reynolds, seat of the V Air Brigade, had been occupied on Sunday the 18th by troops from the IV Mountain Detachment of Tupungato who had left the previous day from San Luis, with that destination.
The taking of the base was carried out by the I Battalion of the 21st Mountain Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Celestino Argumedo, who arrived after two hours of march along a 110-kilometer route. In the brigade, the officers who at that time (03:00 in the morning) had control of the unit were waiting for them, after an intense combat with the 278 loyal non-commissioned officers who guarded it and who attempted acts of sabotage.
That same afternoon (5:30 p.m.), Major Argumedo contacted General Lagos to suggest carrying out the planned attack on the Las Higueras airfield, because at that height, it was imperative to neutralize the threat posed by the Gloster Meteors that operated from there. They responded three hours later, telling him to stay in his position until further notice.
The attack never materialized and Argumedo limited himself only to supplying bombs to both the revolutionary forces of Córdoba and those of Comandante Espora and to providing light weapons to the revolutionary civilian command of Dr. Guillermo Torres Fotheringham that was to take over Radio Ranquel in Río Cuarto. .
The next morning, an unexpected event took place that significantly raised the morale of the revolutionary forces. Soldiers of the Second Army who were inspecting the Mendoza railway station discovered a car full of cutting-edge weapons from the United States, which was there in transit to Chile. The cargo, composed of bazookas, recoilless rocket cannons and machine guns, was seized and distributed among the troops that were to march on Río Cuarto the next day. The joy that the discovery aroused meant little to Captain García Favre since in the afternoon, General Lagos told him that he was not planning to divert troops towards Córdoba because he planned to consolidate his positions in Mendoza.
General Lonardi's emissary was perplexed but managed to make a proposal aimed at complicating Perón's situation and lightening that of his superior: request international organizations to recognize Cuyo as a belligerent territory. Lagos agreed and without wasting time, ordered Dr. Bonifacio del Carril, honorary auditor of the Army in the Field, to begin the corresponding steps.
Because the situation in Cuyo was unknown in Córdoba, Lonardi dispatched Major Francisco Guevara with the mission of communicating to Lagos that he was ready to establish an air bridge between both provinces in order to transport the reinforcements of the Second Army to the combat zone. .
In accordance with this plan, the Military Aviation School began to prepare three DC-3s and a Convair from Aerolíneas Argentinas, from which the seats were removed to increase its capacity. Civil aviator Alfredo Barragán, pilot of the state airline company and determined supporter of the revolution, was placed in charge of them, who had to drive the planes to Mendoza in the company of Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Godoy.
Guevara boarded a Beechcraft AT-11 piloted by Captain González Albarracín, a co-pilot and a radio operator and left through the San Roque Lake air corridor, the only one that still remained open to rebel aviation, bound for Cuyo. The ship flew low until it reached the waters and at that point took flight, to move away between the positions occupied by the 14th Infantry Regiment and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.
After two hours of flight, the plane touched down in El Plumerillo, from where Guevara departed to meet Lagos.
Upon seeing him arrive, the general stood up and greeted him affectionately, inviting him to participate in the meeting that he was currently holding with Arandía and García Favre. The head of the Second Army seemed oblivious to reality and gave the impression that the triumphal entry he had made in Mendoza had negatively influenced him.
Guevara gave a detailed account of what was happening in Córdoba and, like García Favre, placed special emphasis on General Lonardi's need for reinforcements. When he finished speaking, he gave Lagos a letter from the leader of the revolution in which he requested the urgent sending of all the infantry with their mortars and machine guns, explaining that the crisis that his group suffered was, precisely, an infantry crisis and that His situation had worsened so much that he counted on that help to overcome it as soon as possible.
Despite this and the fact that Guevara explained that Lonardi planned to resist until the end, Lagos hesitated again, arguing that he had only 1,000 men to defend Cuyo and that he could not deprive himself of any. When he expressed his decision to establish a provisional government in Mendoza, Guevara was surprised and responded that this idea had already been adopted by General Lonardi but that it was not essential at that time.
That made Lagos reconsider and, at least for the moment, he scrapped the project to once again study sending reinforcements to Córdoba.
He was leaving on the 19th and Lagos was still thinking.

While Lagos and Guevara argued, the Aerolíneas Argentinas plane that Lonardi had sent to Barragán's command landed in El Plumerillo.
Once on land, the new arrivals hurried to the Lagos command post and asked to speak to him. At that time, the general was meeting with General Arandía, Major Enzo Garuti, Judge of Military Instruction, Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Aguirre, Captain García Favre and Major Guevara.
The newcomers were extremely anxious when they entered the room, assuming that by then everything had been decided, but once again Lagos delayed the matter, wanting his General Staff to stop and thoroughly analyze the situation. This attitude exasperated spirits, especially that of Commander Barragán who, raising his voice, demanded the immediate sending of reinforcements. The response he received left him stunned by its unusual and absurd nature:

-I can't distract troops because here the CGT is very strong and I could have problems.

That was the straw that broke the camel's back.
-But how is the CGT going to be a problem for the Army?!! -Barragán shouted- what are you saying?!! We have the problem!! Come on general, you have to give us the troops and weapons right now!!!

The pilot was so out of his mind that while he was speaking he pulled out his weapon, forcing those present to intervene to try to appease his anger.

-Calm down Barragán! - said Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre - Everything will be solved!

 Then, it was Major Garuti who made himself feel above the tumult.

-We must help Córdoba, general. Whose is able to do it!

Upon hearing those words, Lagos seemed convinced and in a serious tone ordered:

-Well Garuti, organize a Company.

Finally, after wasting precious hours in musings, the doubtful chief of the Second Army authorized the enlistment of 200 infantry personnel who, equipped with heavy machine guns and under the command of Major Garuti, immediately left for El Plumerillo to board the planes that, in a non-stop flight would take them to the theater of operations.

Notes

1. He was a known radical leader of the province.

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

 

1955 Revolution: A Peronist General's Failed Rebellion and His Succesful Execution

Not even a damn military rebellion can organize a Peronist

Argentina en la Memoria
@OldArg1810






On June 9, 1956, the uprising of General Juan José Valle, and other soldiers and civilians who participated in the Peronist resistance, took place against the government of the Liberating Revolution, chaired by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu.




In adopting its harsh anti-Peronist policies, the government had to take into account the possibility of counterrevolutionary violence. Above all because of the punitive measures he adopted against those whom he considered immoral beneficiaries of the "Peronist regime." The arrest of prominent figures, the investigation of people and companies allegedly involved in illicit profits, and the extensive purges that affected people who held union and military positions contributed to forming a group of disaffected individuals.



It was only logical to expect that some of them, especially those with military training, would resort to direct action to harass the government or overthrow it. Although incidents of sabotage carried out by workers were common in the months that followed Aramburu's inauguration, it was only in March 1956, as a consequence of the decrees that had declared the Peronist Party illegal, prohibiting the public use of Peronist symbols and other political disqualifications, when the conspiracies began.






A contributing factor, although ultimately misleading, may have been the government's decision, announced in February, to remove the death penalty for promoters of military rebellion from the military justice code. This punishment, which had been enacted by the Congress controlled by the Peronist Party, and which represented the interests of Perón, after the coup attempt of September 1951, led by General Menéndez, was eliminated from the military code on the basis that “ “It violates our constitutional traditions that have forever abolished the death penalty for political causes.” The facts would prove that this statement was premature.



The prominent figure in the conspiracy attempts against Aramburu was General (Retired) Juan José Valle, who had voluntarily retired after the fall of Perón and actively participated in the Military Junta of loyal officers that obtained Perón's resignation and handed over the government to General Eduardo Lonardi in September 1955.



Valle tried to attract other officials dissatisfied with the government's measures. One of those who chose to join him was General Miguel Iñiguez, a professional who enjoyed a great reputation and who was still on active duty, although he was on duty, awaiting the results of an investigation into his conduct as commander of the loyal forces in the Córdoba area, in September 1955. Iñiguez had not intervened in politics before the fall of Perón, but with a deep nationalist vocation, General Iñiguez joined General Valle in the reaction against the policies of the Aramburu government.



At the end of March 1956, Iñiguez agreed to act as chief of staff of the revolution, but a few days later he was arrested, denounced by an informer. Held under arrest for the next five months, he was able to escape the fate that awaited his companions.



The Valle conspiracy was, in essence, a military movement that attempted to take advantage of the resentment of many retired officers and non-commissioned officers as well as the unrest among active duty personnel. Although it had the cooperation of many Peronist civilians and the support of elements of the working class, the movement did not achieve the personal approval of Juan Domingo Perón, then exiled in Panama.


The sexual degenerate and his gang

In its preliminary stages, the movement tried to attract nationalist officers dissatisfied with Aramburu who had played key roles during the coup attempt of June 1955, in the coup d'état against Perón in September 1955 and during the Lonardi government, such as the generals Justo Bengoa and Juan José Uranga, who had just retired; but the evident disagreement about who would assume power after the victory ended with their participation. Finally, generals Juan José Valle and Raúl Tanco assumed leadership of what they called the “National Recovery Movement” and they, instead of Perón whose name did not appear in the proclamation prepared for June 9, hoped to be its direct beneficiaries.

The plan provided that military commando groups, mostly non-commissioned officers and civilians, would take over Army units in various cities and garrisons, take over media outlets and distribute weapons to those who responded to the proclamation of the uprising.



This included various terrorist attacks on public buildings, on national and provincial officials, on premises of political parties related to the Liberating Revolution, and on the editorial offices of various newspapers in the country. There was also an extensive list of military and political leaders, government sympathizers, who would be kidnapped and shot by the National Recovery Movement, whose homes were marked with red crosses at that time.



One of them was the one occupied by the socialist leader Américo Ghioldi and the teacher Delfina Varela Domínguez de Ghioldi, on 84 Ambrosetti Street, in the heart of the Caballito neighborhood. Other homes that were marked with red crosses were those of Pedro Aramburu, Isaac Rojas, the relatives of the deceased Eduardo Lonardi, Arturo Frondizi, Monsignor Manuel Tato, Alfredo Palacios, among others.






The government had only recently been aware that a conspiracy was being prepared, although it did not know precisely its scope or date. In early June, several signs, including the appearance of painted crosses, suggested that the uprising was imminent. For this reason, before President Aramburu left Buenos Aires accompanied by the Ministers of the Army and the Navy for a scheduled visit to the cities of Santa Fe and Rosario, it was decided to sign undated decrees and leave them in the hands of Vice President Rojas to to be able to proclaim martial law, if circumstances demanded it.





On June 8, the police detained hundreds of Peronist union soldiers to discourage mass worker participation in the planned movements. The rebels began the uprising between 11 p.m. and midnight on Saturday, June 9, gaining control of the 7th Infantry Regiment based in La Plata, and temporary possession of radio stations in several cities in the interior. In Santa Rosa, province of La Pampa, the rebels quickly took over the military district headquarters, the police department, and the city center. In the Federal Capital, loyal officers, alerted hours before the imminent coup, were able to thwart in a short time the attempt to take over the Army Mechanics School, and its adjacent arsenal, the Palermo regiments, and the Field Non-Commissioned Officers School of May.




Only in La Plata were the rebels able to take advantage of their initial victory, with the help of the civilian group, to launch an attack against the headquarters of the provincial police and that of the Second Infantry Division. There, however, with reinforcements from the Army and Navy that came to support the Police, the rebels were forced to withdraw from the regiment's facilities where, after attacks by Air Force and Navy planes, they surrendered to 9 in the morning of the 10th. The air attacks on Santa Rosa, capital of La Pampa, also ended in the surrender or dispersion of the rebels, more or less at the same time, therefore the rebellion ended up being a failure.





General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, back in Buenos Aires after his brief visit to Santa Fe and Rosario, gave a speech on the National Network, in which he spoke about the events that occurred during the early hours of June 9.




The June 9 insurrection was crushed with a harshness that was unprecedented in the last years of Argentine history. For the first time in the 20th century, a government ordered executions when repressing an attempted rebellion. Under the provisions of martial law, proclaimed shortly after the first rebel attacks, the government decreed that anyone who disturbed order, with or without weapons, would be subjected to summary trial. Over the next three days, twenty-seven people faced firing squads.

During the night of June 9 to 10, when nine civilians and two officers were executed, the rebels still dominated a sector of La Plata and the possibility of workers' uprisings in Greater Buenos Aires and other places could not be discounted. Those first executions were, according to the government, an emergency reaction to frighten and prevent the rebellion from turning into a civil war. This would explain the government's speed in authorizing and making public the executions, a speed that was demonstrated in the lack of any kind of prior trial, in the inclusion, in those who faced the firing squads, of men who had been captured before proclaiming themselves martial law, and in the confusion of the communiqués during the night of June 9 to 10.




During that night, they began to exaggerate the number of rebel civilians shot and erroneously reported the identity of the executed officers, to instill fear in the rebels and prevent them from taking to the streets to try to participate in the movement.



On the afternoon of the 10th, a massive demonstration took place in the Plaza de Mayo, which gave rise to scenes of joy and relief, as anti-Peronist crowds flocked to the Plaza de Mayo to greet President Aramburu and Vice President Rojas, and ask punishments for nationalist/Peronist rebels.

There, Admiral Isaac F. Rojas gave a speech from the balcony of the Casa Rosada:



Similar scenes, although with the roles reversed, had occurred in the past, when Peronist crowds demanded revenge against the rebels in September 1951 and June 1955. Only this time the government paid more attention than Perón to the cry for blood. After this act in Plaza de Mayo, Vice President Rojas, the entire Military Consultative Board, Aramburu and the three military ministers, made the disastrous decision to shoot the prisoners who had participated in the revolution against the government.





Against the advice of some civilian politicians, including some members of the Advisory Board, who urged an end to the executions, including a delegation formed by Américo Ghioldi and other members of the Advisory Board who went to the Government House, to request clemency and that the executions and attempts of some generals who opposed the executions be put to an end by calling Arturo Frondizi to put pressure on the authorities, and even though officers who made up the martial courts recommended that the rebels be subjected to military justice ordinary, the members of the de facto government resolved to continue applying the punishments provided for in martial law.




By making that decision, they persuaded themselves that they were setting an example that would increase the authority of the government and discourage future attempts at rebellion, thus preventing the loss of more lives. It is not known whether the Military Junta, at the June 10 meeting, took into account the fact that the majority of those already executed were civilians and that if the executions were suspended, the military leaders would suffer lighter punishments than those civilians. The truth is that the Military Junta rejected the suggestion of the commander of Campo de Mayo, Colonel Lorio, in the sense of limiting the pending executions to that of one or two lower-ranking officers.



Admiral Rojas strongly opposed making exceptions for the most senior officers, considering that this was a violation of ethics that “history” would not forgive; He preferred to suspend all executions rather than take any measure that would allow military leaders to escape the punishment imposed on those who had followed them. Ultimately, the Military Junta assumed direct responsibility for ordering the execution, over the next two days, of nine officers and seven non-commissioned officers.




On June 12, Manrique went to look for Valle, convinced that the shootings would be interrupted, and took him to the Palermo Regiment, where they interrogated him and sentenced him to death. Aramburu was convinced of doing so and said that "if after we have shot non-commissioned officers and civilians we spare the life of the person most responsible, a general of the Nation who is head of the movement, we are creating a terrible precedent; it will seem that the law It is not the same for everyone and that nothing happens between friends or similar hierarchies; the idea that the law applies only to the unhappy will be consolidated.




At eight at night they told Valle's relatives that he would be executed at 10. His daughter went to ask Monsignor Manuel Tato, deported to Rome in June 1955 during the conflicts between Perón and the Catholic Church and who was targeted for Valle's movement, to do something. Tato spoke with the Apostolic Nuncio, who telegraphed the Pope to ask Aramburu for clemency. But the request was denied. Valle said goodbye to his daughter and gave her some letters, including one addressed to Aramburu in which he said "You will have the satisfaction of having murdered me (...) I retain all my serenity in the face of death. Our material failure is a great moral triumph (...) As a Christian, I stand before God, who died executed, forgiving my murderers."



Shortly after, several sailors took him to an internal courtyard and shot him there. Moments after Valle's execution, the government suspended the application of martial law, bowing to increasing pressure from civilians and the military demanding an end to executions.




The political parties grouped in the National Advisory Board supported the government against the uprising. There was a secret meeting of the Advisory Board, on June 10, in which everyone said that they agreed with what was decided and what was resolved was support for the government. There was nothing related to the executions. Only Frondizi demanded to Aramburu, the next day and in his personal capacity, that civilians not be shot.




Américo Ghioldi, who had sought to stop the executions, wrote an article for the newspaper La Vanguardia in which he developed a justification for them, after learning that General Valle's uprising sought the execution of the socialist leader himself, saying: "The milk of mercy. Now everyone knows that no one will try, without risking life, to alter the order because it means preventing the return to democracy. It seems that in political matters, Argentines need to learn that the letter in blood enters.



Juan Domingo Perón, in a letter to John William Cooke from his exile, was highly critical of the Valle uprising and blamed several of the members of the attempted revolution for betraying him during the events of September 1955, saying: "The frustrated military coup It is a logical consequence of the lack of prudence that characterizes the military. They are in a hurry, we do not have to be in a hurry. Those same soldiers who today feel plagued by the injustice and arbitrariness of the dictatorial scoundrel did not have the same decision. September 16, when I saw them hesitate before every order and every measure of repression of their comrades who today put them to death (...) If I had not realized the betrayal and had remained in Buenos Aires, they themselves "They would have killed me, if only to make merit with the victors."



The first to promote the memory of "the martyrs of June 9" would be the different neo-Peronist groups, such as the Popular Union of Juan Atilio Bramuglia, who would campaign in 1958 against Perón's order to vote for Arturo Frondizi in the presidential elections of this year.