Beagle Crisis: The Planned Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas (v1.5)

Assault on the Chilean Government Buildings

Armoured Assault to Punta Arenas

By Esteban McLaren



On 22 December 1978, known as D-Day, various military actions would have been initiated in a coordinated manner along the borders with Chile within the framework of Operation Soberanía (Sovereignty). It is very difficult to determine with certainty which of all the planned actions would have actually started the war, but it is clear that it would have been a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The main focus would have been the naval battle and the landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) would attempt to land part of its troops on the islands of Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by troops of the Chilean Marine Corps, CIM) and Picton, while other troops would seek to occupy the rest of the islands. This front will be the subject of future analysis. Synchronously, there would be a ground advance on the Southern front setting out from Río Gallegos (with a potential second line of advance from Rospentek Aike), with Punta Arenas as the final objective. The purpose of this article is to essay an alternative-history scenario. The war never happened, but how would it have unfolded if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation? That will be our point of divergence from real history. Let us appeal to rationality and foresight in an exercise that will always be incomplete and whose final outcome belongs to another space–time.

Start of the assault on Chilean positions on the border, with Mount Aymond in the background.

Context and development of the invasion

In the southern winter of 1978, tension between Argentina and Chile over the dispute regarding the Beagle Channel reached its peak. In the early hours of 21 December, Argentine troops stationed in Río Gallegos, Rospentek and other border locations received the order to begin the invasion of Chile. Since July, Chilean forces had been preparing for this confrontation, aware that diplomacy might not be enough to resolve the conflict.

The Argentine Forces

Argentina mobilised a formidable force, including the 1st Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade. The X Mechanised Infantry Brigade was deployed in Río Gallegos, ready to cross the border. All units would be reinforced as circumstances required.

In the air, A-4 Skyhawk, Mirage Dagger and Nesher fighter aircraft —as well as up to 14 F-86 Sabres (which had already violated Chilean airspace weeks earlier)— were ready to provide air support, while the Argentine Navy, with its destroyers and frigates, patrolled the nearby waters.

Argentine Forces:

• V Army Corps — General José Antonio Vaquero —. Assigned mission: Strategic offensive starting at 24:00 (H+2), departing from Santa Cruz, with the likely objective of conquering Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas. Thereafter, it would support Army Corps III in its advance through Puyehue towards Chile, cutting communications between the central zone and the south of Chilean territory.
• 1st Infantry Division (with elements of the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the IX Infantry Brigade)
• X Mechanised Infantry Brigade (based in Río Gallegos)
• XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade
• Argentine National Gendarmerie: Border guard forces
• Air Force with A-4 Skyhawk, F-86-F Sabre and Mirage III fighter aircraft
• Naval Forces: IMARA together with the T-28 Fennec, with nearly 20 units stationed on the island of Tierra del Fuego.

Urban combat in the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, Punta Arenas

The Chilean Defence

In response, Chile positioned its III Army Division in Punta Arenas, reinforced by the 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros” and the 6th Army Division, with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade. The general in charge of the defence of the Magallanes region, General Nilo Floody Buxton, always stated that at this stage the border guards (Carabineros) would be his troops of choice. The Chilean Air Force, equipped with 12 A-37 Dragonfly aircraft and 6 Hawker Hunters, was on maximum alert, and the Chilean Navy, with its ships and submarine, was ready to intercept any Argentine naval advance.

Chilean Forces:

• III Army Division (based in Punta Arenas)

• 4th Armoured Brigade “Coraceros”

• 6th Army Division (with elements of the 5th Infantry Brigade)

• Carabineros: Border guard who, on this front, had disproportionate importance due to their knowledge of the frontier. The general in charge of the defence of Punta Arenas always stressed their importance in the defence, but as any militarised police force they were not proper infantry, and their only “encounter” with Argentine forces had left them in a very poor position. See further below.

• Chilean Air Force with Hawker Hunter and A-37 combat aircraft (no confirmation of any of them)

• Naval Forces (CIM tasked with the islands of the channel)

The case of the Carabineros as soldiers

One issue that has rarely been discussed with the attention it deserves —and which seems to have obsessed only the author— is Chile’s decision to employ the Carabineros de Chile (CC) as an infantry force, or even as mechanised infantry, during the Beagle conflict. This decision is particularly striking if one considers the institutional nature of the Carabineros: by their own definition, they are a national police force with functions of internal security and border control, making them a hybrid institution but essentially police. Their role is equivalent, in the Argentine case, to a combination of three forces: the Federal Police, the provincial police forces, and the Argentine National Gendarmerie (GNA), the latter indeed being a militarised security force with responsibility in border areas. Within this framework, any reasonable comparison between the CC and armed or military forces should carry strong conceptual reservations.

During the escalation of the Beagle Channel conflict, responsibility for the defence of the Magallanes Region —whose capital is Punta Arenas— fell to General Ernesto Floody Buxton. A singular figure, of British descent, fair-skinned and with manners that his supporters considered charismatic, Floody stood out for public statements as controversial as they were unfortunate, both in content and in form. It is surprising that an officer of his rank repeatedly declared in Chilean media that, if necessary, he would face a potential armed conflict exclusively with “troops” of the Carabineros. This assertion, far from anecdotal, has been corroborated by multiple testimonies and documentary records.

The underlying problem lies in the military planning implicit in this decision. From positions such as Monte Aymond, on the border, the deployment of Argentine armoured means was evident, suggesting that, in the event of hostilities, Argentina would opt for a high-intensity mechanised offensive. In this context arises a legitimate and deeply troubling question: did General Floody really expect to contain an armoured advance with police personnel lacking training in conventional war doctrine, or in combat as light or mechanised infantry?

The most basic military logic questions this disposition. What previous experience did the Carabineros have in high-intensity engagements? What tactical logic supported this choice? It is not only difficult to imagine an Argentine military plan that, for example, placed the GNA in the first line of an assault on Punta Arenas, but even in a counter-offensive situation it would be highly improbable to delegate to a militarised police force the containment of enemy troops.

And yet, that seems to have been exactly the Chilean approach. The official justifications referred to the use of the Carabineros as rearguard elements —for tasks such as control of prisoners of war and surveillance of civilian areas— but the empirical evidence contradicts that explanation. Carabineros were transported on LAN Chile night flights to Magallanes, with the aim of not alerting Argentine intelligence, and were deployed directly on the front line. Although they had received only a few weeks of training at the infantry school, their additional preparation was no more than that. Contemporary photographs and accounts place them armed with anti-tank rocket launchers in Cabeza de Mar, and other records document their transfer from Chabunco to Porvenir, in the heart of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego —all positions within the immediate theatre of operations.

This deployment not only contradicts the official version but also exposes an alarming lack of strategic judgement. Far from being an extraordinary resource in the face of a logistical or tactical emergency, the use of the CC as a military vanguard reflects serious doctrinal disorganisation and, ultimately, an anachronistic view of modern warfare on the part of the Chilean high command. The defence of the country’s southernmost region was left in the hands of a force inadequate for the type of combat that was taking shape. If one also considers that the very same Carabineros had surrendered almost without resistance in the Lago del Desierto incident years earlier, the decision is not only questionable but openly irresponsible. It is true that in war one goes with what one has, but was there really no other ECh infantry available to employ in their place?

Invasion Routes

The Argentine forces planned their advance towards Punta Arenas using two main routes. The northern route, departing from Río Gallegos, crossed the border through Monte Aymond, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas. This road, although relatively flat, presented natural challenges such as rivers and hills that could slow the advance.

The alternative route, departing from Rospentek, crossed the border following Route CH-40 and then headed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas. This road was more difficult, with mountainous and wooded terrain that would complicate the advance of the armoured formations.

1. Main Northern Route:

• Starting point: Río Gallegos

• Main points: Advance through the Monte Aymond border crossing, following Route CH-255 southwards to Punta Arenas.

• Characteristics: Relatively flat terrain but with possible natural obstacles such as rivers and hills.

• Open ground in many sections for an armoured battle and for the deployment of forces in line, wedge, or V formation.

2. Alternative Western Route:

• Starting point: Rospentek

• Main points: Border crossing via Route CH-40, then proceed south along Route CH-9 to Punta Arenas.

• Initial objective: Would begin with the capture and securing of Puerto Natales, a concentration point for Chilean forces.

• Characteristics: Mountainous and wooded terrain, more difficult for the advance of large armoured formations. Suitable ground for ambushes.

• Engineering considerations: Bridges along the route would be destroyed (for example, Puente Rubens, Río Pendiente), necessitating engineer units.

• Suitability for armour: Poorly suited to broad armoured formations (only columns or diamond formations feasible).

These are the troops of the Chilean 5th Cavalry Regiment “Lanceros” [Lancers] deployed to defend Puerto Natales. They were going to face an Argentine armoured advance with horse-mounted cavalry, Polish style. No joke.

Chilean population in Argentine Patagonia

In his chronicle Cuando el río no era turbio (“When the river was not murky”), Ramón Arriagada recounts the close relationship between Chilean workers, mainly chilotes, and the Río Turbio coalfield in Argentina during the 1950s to 1970s. According to the 1970 census, Puerto Natales had 13,675 inhabitants, of whom 2,800 worked in the mine. By 1976, around 600 Chilean miners were commuting in shifts, using Natales as a dormitory town due to the lack of housing in Río Turbio.

Arriagada cites the writer Nicasio Tangol, who emphasised that the chilotes were fundamental in shaping Patagonia. In 1961, the newspaper El Austral reported that the mine produced 500 tonnes per day and employed 1,200 miners, mostly Chilean–chilotes. In addition, about 1,800 workers were employed on the surface, 80% of them Chileans as well. Another 600 Chileans worked on the construction of the 270-kilometre railway between Río Turbio and Río Gallegos, and by 1951 there were already 1,200 miners working in the coalfield.

The author highlights how migration from Chiloé to Patagonia increased, especially after the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, and how the 1978 border conflict between Chile and Argentina marked a change, when Chilean miners were replaced by workers from northern Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay.

In his chronicle Sueños de Carbón (“Dreams of Coal”), Arriagada addresses the 2004 mining accident, which left 14 dead, and how retired miners from Natales who had worked in Río Turbio survive on miserable pensions and must cross the border to receive medical care, since they have no access to social security in Chile, making them outcasts in their own country. (El Tirapiedras)

From these population movements, entirely under the sovereign authority of the Argentine Republic, Chilean General Floody would complain, associating them with an act of war. No joke.

Following with the story, both routes converge at Laguna Cabeza de Mar where, if two coordinated invasion forces were to set out, they could regroup and continue on to Punta Arenas. The road to Punta Arenas via CH-9 is a coastal route highly vulnerable to air attacks and ambushes or hit-and-run strikes. The route leads the force to the core of Chilean regional military power: the Chabunco air base and, opposite it, the headquarters of the III Army Division.

Chilean defensive lines

Chile would have adopted a defence-in-depth strategy, as declared by the general in charge of the Army Division (Southern Theatre of Operations). The first line of defence could already have been sited at Monte Aymond and its surroundings, right on the frontier. That line was, from the few photographs gathered, a jumble of foxholes and trenches, with poorly equipped soldiers — undoubtedly cannon fodder to wear down the advance.

When a penetration of this kind occurs, the theory of war leads us to think of three phases for the force facing it:

1. Containment: Hold the penetration in place — that is, stop it or slow it so it cannot continue to advance.
2. Flanking: Begin moving forces to the flanks of the penetration, basically to the sectors close to where the breach began. This is done to operate on those flanks simultaneously and “strangle” the penetration by cutting the enemy’s communications with its rear.
3. Annihilation: The detailed destruction of the encircled troops (death or capture).

Here, Chilean troops would have built forward positions to slow the enemy’s advance. Anti-tank guns and conventional field artillery — not in great quantity or variety — are visible in photographs and documentaries. Probably the best trans-Andean weaponry in this phase was the deployment of anti-tank mines. A second line of defence would be at San Gregorio, with fortifications, minefields and trenches ready to resist an assault. From there to the regional capital, various points could be fortified. The final defence is concentrated around Punta Arenas, where troops, long-range artillery and the best anti-tank defences are assembled.

See below the “Maginot line” that Chilean strategists had developed: simple trenches and foxholes. The soldier in the front line is using an old bolt-action Mauser 1909 rifle from the First World War.

Photo of a “foxhole” with a Chilean infantryman armed with a bolt-action Mauser rifle near Monte Aymond

The Chilean defence-in-depth would probably have included:

• First line of defence: Forward positions at Monte Aymond and surrounding areas.
• Second line of defence: Fortifications and trenches around San Gregorio along Route CH-40, and ambushes from wooded areas between Laguna Arauco and Primavera. Trenches at Laguna Cabeza de Mar (Arancia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano, 2017:164). All bridges were fitted with explosive charges, cavalry units armed with anti-tank rockets were sent forward, and night firing zones were prepared and properly “staked out” and painted to avoid confusion (AC&BS, 2017:141).
• Final defence: Fortifications and troops concentrated near Punta Arenas, including long-range artillery and anti-tank defences (few and outdated in the ECh inventory of that period). Many civilians actively collaborated in the mobilisation. Much of the vehicles and heavy machinery used in the construction of trenches, shelters, watch posts and anti-tank ditches was provided by local businessmen. In turn, ranch owners made available sheds to house troops and store equipment and supplies (AC&BS, 2017:114).

It should be noted that this scenario contained several factors that emerged over time. For example, Chilean forces lacked anti-tank mines and ammunition was scarce. The soldiers in the first line of defence were placed as cannon fodder, with only 80 cartridges per weapon and no resupply. Many — perhaps too many — indicators showed that Chile was very, very poorly prepared for war.

The stalemate of the advance

The Argentine advance faced its first major test at San Gregorio, where Chilean defences would be well prepared and the terrain favoured the defenders. Here, the advance would slow considerably, turning into a battle of attrition. The apparently most fortified area was the road in the lagoon zone of Cabeza de Mar.

From Rospentek, the troops would have to overcome harassment attacks and construct bridges over river crossings where the bridges had been destroyed. Once joined with the forces coming from Río Gallegos, they would need to regroup and assess the damage and the reorganisation of the advance.

There is a key issue to bear in mind throughout this entire campaign: Argentine air superiority. The only Chilean air base in the Area of Operations was Chabunco, in Punta Arenas. That air base was to be attacked by the Argentine Air Force in the early hours of the advance, and finished off later that same afternoon by the Naval Aviation Command. Any resistance put up by Chilean ground forces would then have to endure continued aerial harassment.

How many examples are there of ground defences being immune to simultaneous air and land attacks? Imagine a pocket of Chilean resistance — perhaps an artillery battery hidden in a ravine, or machine-gun nests strategically positioned along the route of advance. The Argentine military commander would simply need to pass the coordinates to Río Gallegos, to the dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, or to the naval air base at Río Grande, so that aircraft from both air branches could deliver machine-gun fire, bombs or rockets to dismantle the defence.

These same options were not available to the Chilean commander.

Armored Regiment No. 5 "Punta Arenas", deployed in 1978 in the Magallanes region. The Scorpion Detachment advances, in M-41 tanks and M-113 armoured personnel carriers.

Countering the Chilean defence

To overcome this obstacle, Argentina could deploy the XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade to penetrate and disrupt the initial defences. Argentine artillery would bombard the Chilean positions, while airborne units and the air force would carry out flanking manoeuvres and provide crucial air support.

 

• The XI Mechanised Infantry Brigade must penetrate and disorganise the initial defences.
• Artillery forces to bombard defensive positions.
• Airborne units and Air Force for flanking and air support.
• The Chabunco air base would have to be put out of action for the advance to succeed.

Trans-Andean soldiers firing the service SIG rifle

Airborne assault on Punta Arenas

In the context of this conflict, Argentine forces planned a bold airborne assault on Punta Arenas. Accounts from veterans of this crisis, particularly from the 14th Parachute Infantry Regiment based in Córdoba, indicate that an airborne assault was being planned to capture the city of Punta Arenas. For this purpose, BAM Río Gallegos was already hosting DC-3 and C-130 transport aircraft ready for the operation.

The main objectives of this assault included seizing Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport, thereby securing a vital bridgehead for the continuous flow of troops and supplies. It would also focus on destroying Chilean command and control facilities to disrupt their defences, and on capturing the port and key logistical installations, thus cutting off enemy supplies and reinforcements.

This could be achieved following a surprise Air Base Attack (ABA) carried out by the Argentine Air Force using A-4 Skyhawks and BAC Canberras at H+2 of the invasion.

Main objectives:

• Capture Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport to secure a bridgehead and allow the continuous flow of troops and supplies.
• Destroy command-and-control facilities to disorganise Chilean forces.
• Seize the port and principal logistical installations to cut supplies and reinforcements.

Entry into Punta Arenas

Argentine armour and mechanised infantry would move rapidly along Route 9, advancing with lethal precision. Armoured vehicles would adopt line formations to maximise frontal firepower, while infantry units would follow closely, ready to disembark and secure the streets. A secondary column would advance along road Y-505, flanking the Chilean defences and dividing their attention.

Objectives in the city

The Port of Punta Arenas was one of the principal objectives. By the time of the ground assault the actual condition of the airport would need to be assessed, since it would probably already have been put out of action by an initial air attack by the Argentine Air Force (case analysed in this link). Controlling the port would allow Argentine forces to secure a vital supply line and receive maritime reinforcements. Specialised commandos and mechanised infantry units would be deployed to seize the docks and port facilities, facing fierce Chilean resistance.

The Presidente Carlos Ibáñez del Campo Airport and its annex, the Chabunco air base, would also be crucial. Controlling the airport would guarantee an airhead, allowing the continuous transport of troops and supplies. Argentine airborne and rapid-assault units, already familiar with the terrain from their operations at Chabunco, would be launched in a swift offensive to secure the runways and neutralise any resistance. There would be a high probability of runways and facilities being blown up to deny their use to the attackers. It was entirely to be expected that, before falling into the hands of Argentine troops, the locals would demolish all installations crucial to their operation.

Government and communications buildings will be equally strategic. Battle-hardened Argentine forces will infiltrate the city center to capture the Magallanes Intendancy and the police headquarters, seeking to disrupt Chilean defenses and establish administrative control. These will undoubtedly be the most savage scenes imaginable throughout the campaign, due to the very nature of urban combat.

The capture of Punta Arenas

Urban resistance

As Argentine troops pushed into Punta Arenas, they would encounter tenacious resistance at several key points. The Civic Centre area, with its government and commercial buildings, would undoubtedly become a battlefield. Chilean troops, entrenched inside buildings, would mount an organised defence, slowing the Argentine advance.

In the 18 de Septiembre neighbourhood, a dense residential area of mostly wooden houses, Chilean forces would adopt urban guerrilla tactics. Ambushes, snipers and improvised barricades turned every street and every house into a point of resistance. Fighting intensified, with Argentine troops battling house by house to clear the area. It would also prove an area very easy to destroy with fire, given the predominance of wood in its construction.

The industrial zone north of the city could also be a focus of resistance. Chilean defenses, using industrial equipment and heavy vehicles as barricades, would turn factories and warehouses into makeshift fortifications. Argentine troops should consider deploying specialized assault units to overcome these defenses.


Trans-Andean soldiers armed with SIG rifles parading

Argentine Strategies

To counter Chilean resistance, Argentine forces deployed a combination of tactics and resources. The use of artillery and air support would be crucial to weaken defenses before the ground assault. Precise bombing raids disrupted Chilean lines, facilitating the advance of ground units.


Paratroopers from the Leopardo Company of the 2nd "General Balcarce" Airborne Infantry Regiment, Argentine Army, Ushuaia, November 1978

Commando operations (the newly created Halcón 8 special team) and paratroopers would play a pivotal role. Elite units infiltrated the city to neutralize strategic points, capturing key objectives quickly and with the fewest casualties possible. These commandos would carry out surgical strikes against Chilean defenses, facilitating the advance of the main forces.

Urban warfare would become the main focus. Mechanized patrols, assault teams, and specialized urban combat units would systematically advance, facing fierce resistance but managing to secure key areas. Coordination and communication would be essential to maintain the momentum of the advance.

Population Control and Stabilization

Finally, to maintain control of the city and prevent acts of sabotage, Argentine forces would establish checkpoints and conduct regular patrols. The constant presence of troops would help stabilize the situation and ensure that the city remained under Argentine control after the capture of the main objectives. Acts of guerrilla warfare and resistance would be expected throughout the period.

The Fall

The capture of Punta Arenas would be a complex and bloody operation, testing the capabilities and determination of the Argentine forces. Their numerical and material superiority would give them a significant advantage, but the Chilean resistance, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and well-prepared defenses, would turn each advance into a fierce struggle. The city would eventually fall, but at a significant human cost to both sides.

 

Probability analysis of success

Argentina’s numerical and material superiority is evident: a ratio of 5:1 in armour, 4:1 in aircraft and 3:1 in infantry. These advantages, together with strategic planning and tactical execution, suggest a high probability of success for Argentina in the capture of Punta Arenas. However, Chile’s preparation and defensive strategy, making use of knowledge of the terrain and defence in depth, also held possibilities of success.

Probability of success for Argentina: 70%
Probability of success for Chile: 40%

Argentina:

• Probability of success: High, due to numerical and material superiority (armour, aircraft and infantry), although it would face significant difficulties in terrain and well-prepared defences.

• Estimated success: 70%

Chile:

• Probability of success: Moderate, considering defence in depth and knowledge of the terrain, although outnumbered and out-equipped.

• Estimated success: 40%

Tanks entering 18 de Septiembre slum

Estimated casualties

Casualties in this conflict would be significant for both sides, reflecting the intensity of the fighting and the well-prepared defences.

• Estimated Argentine casualties: minimum of 15,000–20,000 (including dead, wounded and prisoners)

• Estimated Chilean casualties: minimum of 15,000–40,000 (including dead, wounded, prisoners and civilians depending on their degree of involvement)

These estimates underline the human cost of a conflict which, although hypothetical, reflects the gravity of a military escalation between two neighbouring nations.

Summary

An armoured campaign by the Argentine Army against Chilean forces in the Magallanes region would have been a bloody affair under any consideration. The possibility of success existed, but it was by no means guaranteed. With time and when comparing opposing analyses from each side, it becomes clear that, from the Chilean perspective, many potential Argentine attacks would have been completely surprising and even innovative, despite being drawn straight from doctrinal manuals since the Second World War. The Chilean defensive scheme was classical — one could even say out of yellowed pages of defensive tactics books. A layered tactical and static defence, but with a severe shortage of resources, making them like bricks without mortar. And here I refer to the very comments of the mining explosives producer turned arms magnate in exile, Mr Cardoen. In an interview for a state television programme across the Andes, he himself remarked that the armed forces had requested his services to produce anti-tank mines since the Chilean Army had none at all in its inventory. In other words, the defence of Magallanes was not going to be flooded with AT mines — far from it — perhaps one of the key elements to slow an armoured advance. Not my words, I repeat. Without that, Mr Floody’s defence looks like a giant scarecrow.

On the other hand, it is essential to point out the alarming overestimation that the organiser of the defence, the aforementioned Mr Floody Buxton, gave to the Carabineros. This is, indisputably, a civilian border police force, and under no circumstances should it be considered a combat force. It is possible that this man intended to make use of their vast knowledge as baqueanos of the region or through intelligence with infiltrated farmhands, but did this officer of British descent really think he could successfully face an armoured or airborne assault with Carabineros? Did Floody truly believe he could entrust his life and the defence of Punta Arenas to a militarised police force without any wartime record? Worse still, their only “combat record” had been invading Argentine territory at Lago del Desierto. There, a Carabineros patrol stationed itself for several days with SIG rifles, entrenched in a shed turned checkpoint, defending the position. No need to invoke La Concepción or Prat: at the first burst from the gendarmes, which killed one Chilean soldier, all the Carabineros surrendered. All of them. Was that the force upon which this “majestic” general pinned his hopes? By any analysis, both in terms of function and of record, Floody was completely mistaken.

Finally, and the final blow, Chile lacked air superiority. What would the Chilean infantry or cavalry, even entrenched in a well-planned defensive position, have done when 450- or 500-kilogram bombs fell on their position with impunity? Historical evidence shows that troops in defensive positions have managed to survive air or artillery attacks (Monte Cassino, Stalingrad, among others). However, it is obvious that this is not the side of the battlefield the troops wished to be on, and there is also further evidence that defensive positions have been dismantled by overwhelming air attacks that disarmed and demoralized the resistance.

All analyses lead to an inexorable Chilean defeat in which, at best, a stalemate might have been achieved within current Chilean territory. The damage to local infrastructure would have been in the billions, and human casualties in the tens of thousands. A scenario, in every respect, lamentable. This fear instilled in the Chilean armed forces, together with the Malvinas event in 1982, would shape that country’s entire defence policy up to the present day.

Citations

Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Francisco Bulnes Serrano. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas. Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017. ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0

Argentine Navy: Submarine ARA Santa Fé

 

Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe

The submarine ARA Santa Fe (S-21) hoisted her Argentine flag on 2 July 1971. At the end of 1978, as a result of the disagreement over sovereignty of the three islands, Lennox and Nueva in the Beagle Channel, tensions rose between Argentina and Chile.

On 22 December 1978, Argentina launched Operation Sovereignty to militarily occupy the islands. When conflict seemed inevitable, the timely intervention of Pope John Paul II prevented the start of hostilities. On 30 March 1982, she was incorporated into Task Force 40, Task Group 40.4, carrying on board part of the landing force of Operation Rosario. From her, the tactical divers departed who enabled the landing of Argentine forces that recapture the Malvinas Islands. She was assigned a new mission for which she was resupplied with fuel and provisions to transport a detachment of marines towards South Georgia Islands. She managed to evade the British blockade and entered San Pedro Island, penetrating Captain Vago Cove in National Guard Bay (Grytviken), disembarking personnel and materials. At 05:50 hours (local time), she departed to return to her assigned patrol zone, but was detected and attacked by a Wessex helicopter. The vessel returned to Grytviken. Resistance was offered by firing at the enemy helicopters from the sail, led by Corporal Héctor O. Feldman. At 07:30 she moored, listing to port and with the stern submerged. Faced with British superiority in troop numbers, the Argentine garrison surrendered along with the submariners. On 27 April, an attempt was made to change her position; during the manoeuvre, Petty Officer First Class Félix O. Artuso was fatally wounded when a British marine shot him, indicating that he had made movements that led him to believe he was about to operate a valve to scuttle the vessel. During the austral summer of 1984/1985, the United Kingdom ordered the salvage of the former ARA Santa Fe (S-21) in order to remove her from the anchorage at Vago Cove, to free the pier for use by active vessels. The S-21 began to be towed to deeper waters. Finally, the veteran vessel sank definitively in the South Atlantic, settling on the seabed at 196 metres depth.

Class: Balao Class (modified to GUPPY II) Diesel-electric attack submarine.

Launched:
19 November 1944 – Shipyard: Electric Boat Company (Groton, Connecticut, USA).

Power:
3 General Motors 278A 16-cylinder diesel engines
2 General Electric electric motors
2 main Exide batteries of 126 cells • 2 propellers.
Surface speed: 20–25 knots – 37.5 KM/Hour.
Submerged speed: 8.75 knots – 16 KM/Hour.

Armament:
10 Torpedo tubes of 533 mm (21 in) (6 forward, 4 aft, 24 torpedoes)
1 deck gun of 127 mm/25 calibre (5 in)
1 20 mm AA gun
2 12.7 mm (0.5") machine guns
1 40 mm AA gun

The elements for constructing the model parts are entirely made with recyclable materials respecting the measurements according to plans.
SCALE: 1/100 – Model built in 2008 by LEANDRO CISNEROS.

Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe

Force Navy 

Length 95 mts.

Beam 8.31 mts.

Draught  4.65 mts.

Crew 80 – 85 personnel

Beagle Crisis: The Air-Naval Battle in Beagle Channel/Cape Horn (version 2.0)

Beagle Crisis: Fleets Face Off in the South Seas

Esteban McLaren
FDRA

"Our country will, I believe, sooner forgive an officer for attacking an enemy than for letting it alone."
Admiral Horatio Nelson

On December 22, 1978—D-Day—various military operations would have been launched in a coordinated manner along the Chilean border as part of Operation Soberanía. It is exceedingly difficult to determine with absolute certainty which of the planned actions would have formally initiated the war; however, it is evident that hostilities would have commenced with a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The primary engagement would have been a naval battle and amphibious landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy’s Marine Corps (Infantería de Marina de la Armada de la República Argentina, IMARA) would have deployed troops on Lennox, Nueva, and Picton Islands—the latter already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps (Cuerpo de Infantería de Marina, CIM) forces.

The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative historical scenario. The war never took place, but what might have transpired had Argentina refused papal mediation?

In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over sovereignty of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both nations were preparing for an armed confrontation. The Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR), with its formidable combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was poised to face the Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)—a well-equipped force but one at a numerical and technological disadvantage.

Chilean authors speculate that, in terms of infantry, Argentine forces outnumbered Chilean troops by nearly two to one. In armored vehicles, the disparity was estimated at 5:1; in aircraft, at 3:1. In naval power, Argentina was somewhat superior in surface combatants, decisively inferior in operational submarines in the region, and qualitatively unmatched in aircraft carriers.

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)

Main Warships:

• Tre Kronor-class light cruiser: Almirante Latorre
• Brooklyn-class light cruiser: Capitán Prat
• Almirante-class destroyers: Almirante Riveros, Almirante Williams
• Leander-class frigates: Almirante Condell, Almirante Lynch, Zenteno, Baquedano
• Fletcher-class destroyers: Blanco Encalada (DD-14), Cochrane (DD-15)
• Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer: Ministro Portales

Submarines:

• SS Simpson (Balao-class, without Guppy modernization), the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

Naval Aviation:

• AS-326 Alouette B helicopters

The Almirante Condell frigate was painted in a World War I-style camouflage pattern to break its silhouette and make it more difficult for FLOMAR air attacks to accurately target the vessel.

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)

Main Warships:

• Colossus-class aircraft carrier: ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
• Brooklyn-class cruiser: ARA General Belgrano
• Type 42-class destroyer: ARA Hércules
• Gearing-class destroyer: ARA Py
• Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers: ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, ARA Piedrabuena
• Fletcher-class destroyers: ARA Almirante Brown (D-20), ARA Espora (D-21), ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), ARA Almirante Storni (D-24)
• A69-class corvettes: ARA Drummond, ARA Guerrico

Submarines:

• Guppy-class submarines: ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Santa Fé
• Type 209-class submarines: ARA Salta, ARA San Luis

Naval Aviation:

• 8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft deployed on the carrier, with one on 24/7 combat air patrol alert. The interceptor aircraft on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft from Puerto Williams twice.
• SH-3 Sea King ASW helicopters and SA-316 Alouette utility helicopters.

2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets

Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)

• Qualitative:

  • High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
  • Limited submarine capability with only one operational submarine.
  • Good coordination between surface and air units.

• Quantitative:

  • 2 light cruisers
  • 4 frigates
  • 5 destroyers
  • 1 operational submarine

Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)

• Qualitative:

  • Air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Greater submarine capability with four operational submarines.
  • High force projection capability with missile-armed destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.

• Quantitative:

  • 1 aircraft carrier
  • 1 light cruiser
  • 10 destroyers
  • 2 missile corvettes
  • 4 operational submarines

 

Conflict Expansion

The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it intensified. FLOMAR decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso, heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles southwest of Cape Horn (some sources cite 193 miles), as it prepared to support Operation Soberanía. The primary objective of this operation was the amphibious landing and capture of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands.

Capabilities Analysis

Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, ACh)

The Chilean Navy possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a crucial disadvantage in modern naval warfare.

Argentine Sea Fleet (Flota de Mar, FLOMAR)

FLOMAR, on the other hand, held a key advantage with the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority through its A-4Q Skyhawks. The presence of modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines granted FLOMAR a robust defensive and offensive capability.

 

Key Advance Points and Refuge Locations of the Chilean Navy (ACh)

To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before proceeding toward its final destination.

In the event that refuge was required, Chilean fjords would serve as strategic locations for concealment and counterattacks. Among these, the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, and Comau Fjord were particularly well-suited for such operations.

Quintupeu and Comau Fjords

  

Última Esperanza Fjord

Final Approach the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)

The upper map illustrates the route taken by the Chilean fleet, as documented in both official Chilean and Argentine sources. Notably, the fleet's course passed directly over the last known position of the submarine ARA Santa Fé—a direct consequence of the submarine having detected it in the days leading up to December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been located and tracked by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS).

The Chilean fleet was advancing south of Cape Horn, positioning itself in combat anchorages, with two ships moored side by side awaiting the order to attack. This arrangement allowed for crew rotation and social interaction while they remained on standby (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017).

These anchorages were nothing more than natural harbors near islands in the region, where dense vegetation and additional camouflage made the vessels difficult to detect from the air. Just as camouflage paint had been used, the fleet also employed World War I and World War II concealment tactics to evade Argentine aerial reconnaissance. A remarkable level of ingenuity—a point to which we shall return later.

Detection and Engagement Strategies

FLOMAR would deploy its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions—a strategy that would prove highly effective four years later in the Falklands War. Meanwhile, A-4Q Skyhawks would be used for airstrikes, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical chokepoints in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR's destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to safeguard amphibious and heliborne assault operations.

Once again, a review of the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017) offers insight. According to this source, Chilean naval officers trained on a land-based simulator (surprisingly, this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles mimicking warships. These exercises took place in the basement of the Tactical Training Center at the Chilean Naval War Academy in Valparaíso.

Using this analog simulator, Admirals Merino and López tested various attack scenarios against FLOMAR and reached the conclusion that "command of the sea" had to be established through a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. Their final tactical formation dictated that "all missile ships should advance first, while artillery ships followed behind" (p. 86).

One might question why the Redifon simulator was necessary to devise such an obvious strategy. Would it not have been logical to position gun-armed ships (Prat, Latorre) at the front and place missile-armed vessels (Almirante-class, Leander-class) behind them? In fact, this did have a rationale, as later explained by Chilean naval officers. The gunships were meant to act as decoys, absorbing the first Exocet missile strikes, under the assumption that they could withstand the hits without sinking. In other words, the gunships were being sacrificed, yet this aspect is poorly articulated in the official account.

In contrast, FLOMAR had no need for a simulator, as its crews spent the majority of the year at sea, conducting real-life naval maneuvers in real tactical conditions, facing real operational challenges in real time. On average, Argentine crews spent approximately two-thirds of the year embarked, something verifiable by anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at the time. Many Argentine sailors from this "golden age" of the Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their constant deployments prevented them from visiting sooner.

Thus, the gap between the two navies was not merely geographical but profound in terms of operational experience. This makes it particularly bizarre to find claims on blogs and online forums suggesting that the ACh had superior training. The reality was the exact opposite, and we will revisit this issue later.

 

Analysis of the Clash of Forces

During the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile escalated to a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Soberanía, planned by Argentina, aimed to execute an amphibious landing and seize Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be carried out under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Sea Fleet (FLOMAR).

Preparations and Force Composition

By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo was a key asset, carrying A-4Q Skyhawks for air interception and S-2 Trackers for maritime patrol missions.

The fleet also included modern destroyers, such as ARA Hércules, along with frigates like ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina maintained a significant submarine force, composed of ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis.

Although smaller in size, the Chilean Navy (ACh) maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat, along with the still-formidable Almirante Latorre, supported by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles.

The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance. Notably, one of them, SS-23 Hyatt, was suspected of having been hit by ASW depth charges launched by ARA Rosales in a prior encounter.

The ARA Hércules (D-28) was the only dedicated air defense vessel operating in the Theater of Operations (TOA). Equipped with four Exocet missiles and twenty-two Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, which also had a secondary anti-ship capability, the destroyer possessed formidable firepower.
Under ideal conditions, it alone could have potentially neutralized the entire Chilean Squadron.

Operation Development

The Argentine landing operation was primarily focused on Isla Nueva, where approximately 150 entrenched Chilean Marines were known to be stationed. The Argentine strategy involved executing a landing on the island’s northern coast, supported by naval and aerial fire from Río Grande or Ushuaia.

To accomplish this, the amphibious transport ship ARA Cabo San Antonio would be deployed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection. However, before the landing could proceed, there was a crucial prerequisite—the Chilean fleet had to be neutralized first.

The Chilean forces anticipated a conventional amphibious landing scenario on the islands. However, the most probable course of action was that the occupation would be executed through a vertical assault using heliborne troops.

Final Approach Phase of FLOMAR

The final approach phase of FLOMAR was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, toward the east, closing in on the Beagle Channel. Three Task Groups (GT 42), under the command of Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi, had been organized:

• GT 42.1: Aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, guided-missile destroyer ARA Hércules, missile corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.
• GT 42.2: Cruiser ARA General Belgrano, destroyers ARA Rosales, ARA Bouchard, ARA Piedrabuena, amphibious landing ship ARA Cándido de Lasa, landing ship tank ARA Cabo San Antonio.
• GT 42.3: Destroyers ARA Py, ARA Almirante Storni, ARA Espora, ARA Almirante Domecq García.

Chilean Naval Response

Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) was mobilizing from its secret wartime bases, heading toward the Beagle Channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Two simultaneous courses of action were being executed:

1. The main fleet advanced into the Drake Passage, aiming to engage FLOMAR in open waters.
2. Smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) were deployed from Puerto Williams to confront the Argentine landing force.

Chilean Squadron Formation

The Chilean squadron assigned to face FLOMAR was under the command of Rear Admiral López Silva, organized into two combat formations:

• Formation "Acero" ("Steel"): Light cruisers Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat (the gunships).
• Formation "Hierro" ("Iron"): The missile ships, including destroyers Almirante Riveros, Almirante Williams, Blanco Encalada, Cochrane, Ministro Portales, and frigates Almirante Condell, Almirante Lynch, Zenteno, Baquedano.

According to Redifon simulations, this was considered the optimal formation for engagement.


In any case, landing ships were stationed at the Ushuaia Naval Base (BNU), ready to deploy troops to secure the islands or reinforce occupied sections once the initial assault had been successfully carried out.

Submarine Warfare

The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political aspects of the conflict, with a particular focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text lacks technical details regarding the assets involved, it provides a valuable overview of squadron operations in southern Chile.

According to this account, the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of:

• The Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21)
• The British-built Oberon-class submarines Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22)

However, operational setbacks significantly limited Chile's submarine capabilities:

• The O'Brien was in dry dock and unavailable for combat.
• The Hyatt, which had been moving south, was forced to return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure, officially reported near Puerto Edén, deep within Chilean fjords.

This claim, however, is contested by Argentine accounts. Around the same date, the destroyer ARA Rosales launched depth charges (hedgehogs) against a detected contact near Isla de los Estados, confirming at least one direct impact. It is possible that this target was the Hyatt, which subsequently returned damaged to Talcahuano.

The other Balao-class submarine, Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned in the book, suggesting that it had already been decommissioned due to obsolescence. Indeed, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their Balao-class submarines in the early 1970s, following the acquisition of Guppy-class submarines.

Despite its technological inferiority, the Simpson managed to reach and patrol the area. However, the aging submarine was severely disadvantaged, as it lacked a snorkel system, forcing it to surface for up to eight hours at a time to recharge its batteries—a highly vulnerable position that exposed it to Argentine radar and periscopes.

At least twice, the Simpson was photographed by Argentine submarines while surfaced. Given its deteriorating condition, it is likely that these surfacing intervals became more frequent than usual. On both occasions when the Simpson was detected, Argentine submarines opted not to fire their torpedoes.

Nonetheless, it remains possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, may have attempted an attack, despite his severe technological disadvantage.

Patrol Areas Assigned to Argentine Submarines. (Source: Deyseg)

Near Engagement of the Guppy-Class Submarines

Although the exact dates remain uncertain, the Argentine Guppy-class submarines came very close to engaging in combat. However, their commanders exercised sound judgment in interpreting their orders.

By mid-December, the submarine ARA Santa Fe was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters when its sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of S-21 immediately called for battle stations, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were readied.

As the sounds intensified, it became evident that this was not a single vessel, but rather an entire fleet. The Chilean squadron was passing directly above S-21, moving toward the open waters of the South Pacific.

Sonar operators counted three, four, six… up to thirteen ships. Some had "heavy propellers," resembling cruisers, while most had "lighter propellers," similar to those of destroyers.

However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals—meaning its escort vessels were not using active sonar.

A task force commander’s decision to navigate without emissions can be based on several strategic considerations:

• They were not actively searching for submarines.
• They sought to maintain a low acoustic profile.
• They wanted to avoid revealing their course and position, as active sonar transmissions travel long distances, making them detectable by submarine countermeasure systems.

This is the 13-ship Squadron Detected by the ARA Santa Fé

It is not difficult to imagine the intense tension experienced by the crew of ARA Santa Fe. Suspended in absolute silence, dozens of meters beneath the Pacific, they waited for the Chilean fleet’s next move, their weapons primed, ready to launch if the right tactical opportunity presented itself.

Ultimately, the Chilean fleet veered into open waters, moving away from S-21. Following his orders, the commander of Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean squadron’s maneuver as a hostile act, particularly given that no formal declaration of war had been made at that moment.

This episode underscores a crucial fact: the ARA Santa Fe had pinpointed the position of the Chilean fleet. Had war broken out, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean squadron.

Point of Engagement and Battle

The anticipated meeting point of the Argentine and Chilean fleets would have been near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to contend with the threat posed by the Chilean Navy’s (ACh) MM-38 Exocet missiles, which had a range of 35–40 km.

A recurring theme in discussions and debates—whether among experts or laypersons—is the overestimation of Chile’s Exocet capability, leading to the assumption that a naval battle would have "clearly" favored the ACh. Based on a simple count of missile launchers, Chile would have four to eight more Exocet-firing platforms than Argentina at that time.

However, this selective analysis conveniently omits the Argentine Navy’s most decisive assets:

1. The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
2. Four operational submarines

Furthermore, beyond this already disastrous outlook for the ACh, the Chilean Air Force (FACh) faced an even more dire situation:

• Chabunco Air Base was a catastrophe waiting to happen.
• The exact number of operational aircraft was uncertain, but Chile’s entire air defense rested on just three F-5E Tiger IIs and nine Hawker Hunters, all of which were stationed at Cerro Moreno Air Base in northern Chile—far from the theater of operations.

By contrast, the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a decisive advantage, enabling strikes from over 200 nautical miles (370 km) away.

Additionally, in contrast to the Malvinas War, where many Argentine bombs failed to detonate, the Argentine Naval Aviation had already mastered anti-ship strike operations, and their bomb fuzes were correctly calibrated to explode on impact.

Had the Chilean fleet been detected by S-2 Tracker or P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would have been relayed to Argentine Air Force (FAA) bases and to the Submarine Force (CFS). From that moment, it would have been only a matter of time to see who reached the "hunt" first.

For further insight into FLOMAR’s capabilities against a fleet like the Royal Navy in the Malvinas, one can listen to Vice Admiral Benito Rótolo’s account (García Enciso & Rótolo, 2021).

In the video below, in Spanish, the now Vice Admiral Benito Rótolo (ret.) recounts how, by late April 1982, the Argentine fleet, led by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, approached a Royal Navy squadron composed of seven warships, headed by the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

FLOMAR remained undetected, as it relied on its own reconnaissance assets, particularly the S-2 Tracker aircraft. This meant that Argentina could have launched a decisive strike on the British squadron unopposed, as the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarines (SSNs) were operating farther south at the time.

The planned A-4Q Skyhawk attack was not executed for a purely meteorological reason—the wind suddenly died down in that region of the South Atlantic, preventing the carrier-based aircraft from taking off. The fleet had to wait 12 hours for the wind to return.

However, before the attack could be carried out, an order arrived from Buenos Aires to suspend all combat operations due to the progress of peace negotiations. This diplomatic effort was later revealed to have been a delaying tactic orchestrated by Margaret Thatcher, allowing the United Kingdom to initiate the conflict under more favorable conditions.

Did the Chilean Squadron truly believe it could attack and sink FLOMAR? Without effective air support or submarine cover? Seriously? Was Rear Admiral López Silva really the Chilean Navy’s expert in naval-air warfare? And was he planning to engage FLOMAR head-on with missiles and cannons? Even more absurdly, was he in a hurry to seek battle?  The entire concept seems like a poorly conceived plan—if not an outright bad joke.

Landing and Engagement Scenarios

1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Halt the Landing

The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from its covert combat anchorages toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Chilean fast attack boats would also be used to disrupt landing operations and attack support vessels.

The ACh’s strategy relied on launching Exocet missiles and employing naval artillery to harass Argentine landing craft. Additionally, they would attempt to coordinate airstrikes from Punta Arenas, using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft—provided any were actually operational at that base.

However, entering the Beagle Channel would have been a losing strategy for either fleet due to:

1. Severely restricted maneuverability
2. Sensor disruption from terrain clutter
3. Decreased weapon system effectiveness

2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Move

Upon detecting the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would have deployed its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier, conducting preemptive strikes on ACh vessels. Argentine submarines would patrol key strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships, while FLOMAR’s air defense systems would engage incoming aircraft.

Unlike the Chilean fleet, which relied solely on ship-based weapons, the Argentine Navy possessed an external strike element—carrier-based aviation. The confined waters of the channel would have played directly into Argentina’s hands, enabling aerial attacks followed by rapid rearming and re-engagement cycles.

Evidently, Rear Admiral López Silva was deeply concerned about being trapped within the channels (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017, p. 87).

3. ACh Actively Seeks Out FLOMAR for a Decisive Engagement

Based on available literature, this was the course of action chosen by the Chilean fleet.

If the ACh had actively sought a decisive confrontation with FLOMAR, it would have maneuvered around Navarino Island or advanced through the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast approach). The Chileans would have coordinated with the submarine Simpson and air patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missile and artillery strikes as soon as contact was made.

However, according to historical sources, ARA Santa Fe had already detected the Chilean fleet as it moved into open waters. The Argentine Naval Aviation would have intercepted the ACh squadron en route, subjecting it to successive waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks.

By the time what remained of the Chilean fleet reached FLOMAR, it would have been severely weakened. Check.

4. FLOMAR Seeks Out the ACh for a Decisive Engagement

If FLOMAR had instead pursued and engaged the Chilean Navy, it would have advanced northeast from its position south of Cape Horn. Using its carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, its battle plan would have unfolded in the following phases:

1. Repeated airstrikes to sink or disable Chilean surface assets
2. Anti-ship missile barrages from destroyers and frigates
3. Coordinated submarine attacks to eliminate any remaining threats

At this point, the Chilean fleet’s combat anchorage ("apostadero de combate") becomes relevant. Chilean warships were moored in pairs, allowing crews to socialize and exchange supplies while awaiting orders.

If ARA Veinticinco de Mayo launched A-4Q Skyhawks while the Chilean formation was still anchored, it would have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the bombing runs.

A single pass by three aircraft, each carrying three 450 kg bombs, could have hit two ships at once, doubling the attack’s efficiency. Checkmate.

Roles of Naval and Air Forces

Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation

• A-4Q Skyhawk: Conducted interception, air superiority missions, and anti-ship strikes to protect landing forces (8 units deployed).
• S-2 Tracker: Carried out maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks (2 units deployed).
• P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these aircraft had very long-range capabilities, with highly trained crews conducting year-round operations over the Argentine Sea.

Argentine Land-Based Naval Aviation (Río Grande)

• T-28 Fennec: Close air support and ground attack missions to cover landing troops (19 units, dispersed between Río Grande and Estancia La Sara).
• MB-326 Aermacchi: Interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (number unknown).
• T-34C Turbo Mentor: Light attack, logistical support, and supply transport missions (more than 12 units).

Chilean Air Force (FACh) at Chabunco Air Base

• Hawker Hunter: Interception, air combat, anti-ship strikes, and ground support (at most 2 operational units).
• A-37 Dragonfly: Ground attack, close air support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (at most 6 operational units).
• The operational state of Chabunco Air Base was extremely poor, according to the FACh’s own commander.

Argentine Air Force (FAA) at Río Gallegos

• A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: Anti-ship strikes, ground support, interception, and air combat (12 units).
• Mirage IIIEA / Mirage 5 Dagger / IAI Nesher: More than 30 units across all three models.
• F-86 Sabre: Pure interceptor, deployed specifically to counter Hawker Hunters, based on experiences from the Indo-Pakistani Wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot testimonies suggest more than 4 units and less than 14.

Primary FAA Objectives:

1. Bombing military targets in Punta Arenas (Chabunco Air Base) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú Airfield).
2. Destruction of the Chilean Air Force, using tactics similar to Israel’s preemptive air strikes during the Six-Day War (1967).
3. Implementing these air strike strategies across all open fronts.

 

An A-4Q Skyhawk, launched from the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, successfully strikes the Chilean Navy’s APD-29 Uribe.

Planned Argentine Offensive Against Chile (Wikipedia)

The Argentine offensive against Chile was set to unfold in the following sequence:

• 20:00 (H-2), December 22, 1978 (D-Day):

  • FLOMAR and the Marine Corps (Battalion No. 5) would seize control of Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos Islands (see map below).

• 22:00 (H-Hour):

  • FLOMAR and Marine Corps Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 would occupy Picton, Nueva, and Lennox Islands, securing full control over the Beagle Channel (see map below).

• 24:00 (H+2):

  • The land offensive would commence, led by the V Army Corps, advancing from Santa Cruz Province into Chilean Patagonia, with the goal of capturing as much territory as possible.
  • Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would initiate strategic bombing operations.

• 06:00 (H+8), December 23, 1978:

  • The destruction of the Chilean Air Force (FACh) on the ground would be carried out.

 

A naval conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a highly complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and land forces within a challenging geographic environment.

Argentina’s air and submarine superiority would have provided a significant advantage, yet Chile’s coastal defenses and tactical coordination would have posed a formidable resistance.

The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness with which both nations executed their planned operations.

Airpower Distribution and Tactical Considerations

In this specific scenario, it is important to note that the Argentine Armed Forces had three operational airbases along the front:

1. A mobile airbase—the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
2. Two land-based airbases—Río Grande and Río Gallegos, both of which would later prove highly effective during the Falklands War (1982).

In contrast, Chile relied solely on Chabunco Air Base in Punta Arenas, which would have been responsible for an overwhelming number of missions, including:

• Attempting to halt Argentine amphibious landings.
• Conducting anti-ship strikes against FLOMAR.
• Intercepting air raids from the northeast (Río Gallegos) and east-northeast (Río Grande).
• Planning and executing airbase attack (ABA) operations against Argentine airbases.

Would a single runway have been capable of handling such an extensive combat workload?

Meanwhile, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would have focused exclusively on anti-ship strikes and close air support (CAS), while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would have been tasked with:

• Supporting the armored assault on Punta Arenas.
• Executing an ABA operation against Chabunco Air Base.
• Establishing air superiority over Punta Arenas.
• Providing air support to amphibious operations upon request from the Argentine Navy (ARA).

Situation Report

The Chilean Fleet’s Strategy and Its Flaws

Regarding a potential Argentine amphibious landing, the Chilean Navy (ACh) was already deployed in the area under a strategy led by Rear Admiral López Silva. However, this strategy appears questionable, as some sources indicate it was based on sequential engagements in open waters against FLOMAR’s Task Groups (GTs).

This plan unrealistically assumed that each individual attack would be decisive enough to destroy an entire Argentine task group, while the rest of FLOMAR—including the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo—would not retaliate in any meaningful way.

Furthermore, some Chilean officers placed their hopes on bad weather, which could ground COAN’s carrier-based aircraft. Other Chilean analysts have suggested a prolonged, phased naval battle over several days, under the assumption that Argentine sailors would passively watch their fleet being destroyed (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017).

This borderline magical realism suggests a lack of rigorous military planning—one wonders if basic calculations were ever conducted to test the feasibility of such assumptions.

Deceptive Task Force Composition: Was an Amphibious Landing the True Plan?

At first glance, FLOMAR’s division into three task groups seemed to indicate a coordinated amphibious assault. However, this may not have been the actual plan.

The assault on the Cape Horn islands was designed to be executed via heliborne operations. Only one section of Marine Battalion No. 4 (BIM4) was embarked on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, while the amphibious transports Cándido de Lasala and Cabo San Antonio were reportedly empty.

Thus, dividing FLOMAR into three groups made little strategic sense—unless it was intended as a feint to lure the Chilean Squadron into expending its MM-38 Exocet missiles prematurely.

Even this hypothesis, however, seems improbable, as the Argentine Navy (ARA) was unlikely to sacrifice ships and crews in the manner that the ACh was seemingly willing to do with its "Acero" and "Bronce" formations (a contradiction present in Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano book).

FLOMAR’s Likely Strategy: Naval Combat Superiority

A far more plausible scenario is that, by December 22, FLOMAR was organized into an optimal formation for naval-air warfare, with the primary objective of neutralizing the Chilean Squadron in open waters.

The Argentine plan likely involved:

1. Luring the Chilean Squadron into revealing all its ships.
2. Launching persistent aerial attacks from 200–350 nautical miles away to weaken or destroy Chilean vessels.
3. Engaging in a decisive surface battle once Chile’s fleet had been degraded.

This theory is reinforced by the positioning of Argentine submarines at the exits of Chilean fjords, suggesting they were tasked with tracking the Chilean Squadron’s movements—which, in fact, they successfully accomplished. These submarines would then attack any surviving Chilean vessels during their retreat.

The Argentine strategy was logically sound, given that Chilean forces had anticipated a direct attack on Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands. As a result, Chile had concentrated significant manpower and equipment on these islands, immobilizing these units and leaving them vulnerable to aerial strikes before an actual amphibious assault took place.

Additionally, these troops were unable to defend Tierra del Fuego, where four Argentine Marine battalions were scheduled to land.

This approach aimed to maximize the operational effectiveness of Argentine forces while gradually eroding Chilean defensive positions.

Challenges of Carrier Operations: Why Was FLOMAR Divided?

The Argentine Navy (ARA) could not operate as a single formation due to the design limitations of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which cruised at 20 knots and needed to stay at a safe distance from missile and artillery engagements.

Once the carrier launched its A-4 Skyhawks, whether for naval strikes or to neutralize Chilean maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), it remained vulnerable until their return.

Out of eight available A-4Q Skyhawks:

• Two were configured for interception.
• Three were designated for naval strikes.
• Three were assigned to logistical support, with one acting as a tanker (all of which could be quickly converted into attack aircraft if necessary).

Additionally, the carrier’s speed limitations—with a maximum of 28 knots for short bursts but an operational cruising speed of 20 knots—necessitated the division of FLOMAR into three operational groups.

Operational Constraints and Strategic Fleet Distribution

FLOMAR was traditionally trained to operate in two groups but was not accustomed to maneuvering as three separate forces. The shortage of modern warships had been partially mitigated by the acquisition of two A-69 frigates in 1978, which arrived in August and October of that year.

The fleet was structured as follows:

• The carrier battle group (PAL) was centered around ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and included the Type 42 destroyer ARA Hércules.
• One task group was designed to simulate an amphibious force, luring the Chilean Squadron into a direct engagement, drawing it away from the carrier.
• The third group, composed of destroyers, functioned as a blockade force, positioned to intercept any Chilean fleet movements toward the carrier battle group. If Chile’s fleet failed to split its forces, this group was prepared to maneuver and attack from the flank.

This strategy maximized Argentine naval effectiveness while protecting high-value assets like the carrier and its air wing in a high-risk combat environment.

Speed Considerations and Closing Rates

It is important to note that FLOMAR was a 20-knot fleet, but so was the Chilean Navy, given that its two cruisers were also limited to 20 knots.

Thus, the approach speed was:

• 20 knots for both the Chilean fleet and the Argentine amphibious groups (ARA General Belgrano) and the PAL (carrier battle group).
• The central destroyer group, however, could exceed 20 knots, giving it a maneuverability advantage.

Probability of Success

Argentine Forces

With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, as well as a modern surface fleet and an operational submarine force, Argentina held a significant advantage.

The joint air-sea-submarine operations conducted by FLOMAR would have further increased the likelihood of success, enabling:

• Preemptive aerial strikes against Chilean naval assets.
• Coordinated submarine ambushes at key maritime chokepoints.
• Surface fleet maneuvers to exploit vulnerabilities in Chile’s defensive positioning.

The comparison between the Chilean Navy (ACh) and FLOMAR highlights a clear asymmetry in capabilities. The pink bands represent the effective range of primary weapons, specifically the MM38 Exocet missiles (35–42 km range). The ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is depicted with an A-4Q Skyhawk fully loaded with bombs and fuel, capable of executing a low-altitude (Lo-Lo) flight profile with a strike radius of 350 km—a tactic designed to evade radar detection during approach. These zones define the critical areas that each fleet needed to control before posing a legitimate threat to its adversary. From an analytical perspective, it is difficult to see even a semblance of parity between the two forces. Argentina’s carrier-based aviation and submarine warfare capabilities provided a substantial strategic advantage, making a balanced engagement highly unlikely.

Before analyzing Chile’s overall position, it is crucial to assess the Chilean Navy’s (ACh) ability to repel an aerial attack, which was expected to be the primary offensive strategy of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean Almirante-class destroyers were equipped with the British Short Sea Cat SAM system. This was a small, subsonic missile, powered by a solid-fuel, two-stage rocket motor. It featured a cruciform wing structure for in-flight stability and was command-line-of-sight (CLOS) guided via a radio link. This meant that a remote operator manually directed the missile while keeping both the missile and the target within their field of vision. The same system was mounted on the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano and, in its land-based Tigercat version, was deployed by the Argentine Marine Corps (IMARA) in Tierra del Fuego and the Army (EA) in Río Gallegos.

Short Sea Cat’s Effectiveness in Combat

During the Malvinas War (1982), the Sea Cat proved highly inaccurate, primarily due to its lack of autonomous guidance. Its effectiveness was limited by the human operator’s ability to track a fast-moving target, a task complicated by:

• Depth perception issues at long range.
• Difficulties in accurately judging distances and spatial positioning.

As a result, the estimated probability of a successful interception with the Sea Cat was only 10%.

Best-Defended Chilean Naval Units

The most capable Chilean warships for anti-aircraft self-defense were likely the light cruisers Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat, each equipped with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom installations. These cruisers would have been the most challenging targets to approach and attack. However, if communications and targeting coordination had allowed it, the task of neutralizing these ships may have been delegated to Argentine submarines rather than aircraft.

Critical Strategic Analysis: The Chilean Fleet’s Fatal Vulnerability

The most crucial intellectual exercise, which no previous analysis has seemingly considered, is the following:

Chilean Approach Timeline and Limitations

The Chilean fleet would advance toward FLOMAR at a speed of 21–28 knots, assuming that its CASA C-212 maritime patrol aircraft successfully located the Argentine fleet (as Chile had no other reconnaissance assets). According to Chilean sources, the distance to be covered was between 120 and 193 nautical miles. This means that the Chilean fleet would take between 5 and 8 hours to reach within 20 miles of the Argentine fleet—the minimum range required to launch an MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive naval weapon. For 5 to 8 hours, the Chilean fleet would be completely unable to fire upon or damage the enemy.

Argentine Air Superiority: FLOMAR’s Window of Opportunity

During this 5 to 8-hour approach period, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 full combat sorties of its Carrier Air Group (GAE).

Assuming:

• Each strike package flew at 400 knots round-trip.
• Aircraft were refueled and rearmed in 25 minutes between missions.

Each A-4Q Skyhawk would be armed with three 458 kg (1,000 lb) bombs, equipped with naval impact fuzes. Thus, in the first strike alone, the Argentine aircraft would drop 24 bombs on the Chilean Squadron (Escuadra). However, the A-4Q could also be configured to carry six 227 kg (500 lb) bombs, effectively doubling the number of bombs per sortie.

Assuming:

• No Argentine aircraft losses, 96–120 bombs would be dropped on the Chilean fleet by the fourth or fifth wave.
• Even in a worst-case scenario, where up to four Argentine aircraft were shot down per sortie, the Chilean fleet would still be hit by a minimum of 36 bombs before it could launch a single Exocet missile.

Chilean High Command’s Critical Miscalculation

This means that, before any Chilean combat operator could press the launch button of a single Exocet, their fleet would have already been subjected to between 36 and 120 bomb strikes. Does this fundamental flaw in Chile’s battle plan become clear? Was Formation "Acero" truly as "armored" as its name suggested? What exactly was the Chilean command thinking? Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi, commanding FLOMAR, would not have believed his luck.

Approach Time to 20 Nautical Miles, Number of Attack Waves, and Bombs Delivered (Including Losses)

Desperation Breeds Creativity: The Chilean "Decoy Helicopters"

As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention, though in this case, it appears more like desperation disguised as innovation.

Rear Admiral López Silva, seemingly convinced that FLOMAR’s greatest threat was its MM-38 Exocet anti-ship missiles, devised a rather unconventional countermeasure. In what can only be described as a bold act of ingenuity, he ordered Chilean technicians to modify their SA-316B Alouette helicopters, which were embarked on their Leander-class frigates.

The "Floating Decoy Fleet" Plan

• What modifications were made?
  • Large steel cages (3x3x3 meters) were suspended beneath the helicopters’ fuselages.
• What was the goal?
  • These helicopters would take off from their motherships and fly parallel to them at 20–25 knots, aiming to simulate additional ships on radar.
  • The hope was that Argentine Exocets would lock onto these "phantom ships" instead of actual Chilean vessels, wasting valuable Argentine missiles.

While this approach deserves credit for creativity, it raises three serious questions:

1. What if an Exocet Actually Hit One of These Helicopter Decoys?

If an Exocet locked onto one of these "floating decoys", the resulting explosion would have been nothing short of spectacular. A 1,100 kg missile striking a lightweight helicopter would have created an aerial fireball unlike anything seen in naval warfare.

2. What if These Helicopters Encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk at 300 Knots?

A more probable and horrifying scenario:

• If one of these low-speed helicopters encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk screaming in at 300 knots, its crew wouldn’t have a chance to react.
• At best, the Skyhawk’s twin 20mm Colt Mk 12 cannons would shred the helicopter to pieces.
• At worst, the Skyhawk could fire an AIM-9B Sidewinder, ensuring an even more catastrophic end.

3. López Silva’s Flawed Assumption: A "Missile-Only" Naval Battle

This entire strategy further confirms that López Silva expected a naval battle akin to the 1973 Battle of Latakia—where two opposing fleets engaged each other exclusively with long-range missiles. His reliance on bad weather as his only real air defense, much like Hitler’s dependence on winter storms during the Ardennes Offensive, highlights the lack of a viable anti-air strategy. "Sail south and win the war..." Admiral Merino had told López Silva, in what now seems like an attempt to manufacture a legendary naval hero for Chilean morale. Instead, López Silva sailed south armed with nothing but a wish, a prayer, and a squadron of "decoy helicopters."

The Chilean Squadron’s "Trump Card": Alouette Helicopters with Radar-Reflecting "Chicken Coops"

Chilean Forces: A Doomed Fleet at the Mercy of FLOMAR

Once the Chilean fleet entered open waters, it would have been at the complete mercy of:

1. Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN), initially.
2. Argentine submarines, subsequently.

As previously analyzed, distance overwhelmingly favored FLOMAR.

• If the Chilean fleet were detected at 190 miles, successive bombing waves from A-4Q Skyhawks would have inflicted devastating damage, even when factoring in potential aircraft losses.
• It is almost tragic to imagine a fleet accelerating to engage the enemy, only to be progressively bombed over and over again—with no support from the air or from below the surface.

Furthermore, if the Chilean Squadron attempted to close the distance, FLOMAR would:

1. Detect it first (via S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, followed later by shipborne radar).
2. Simply sail in the opposite direction, extending the engagement further into the Argentine Sea—a fundamental matter of physics and naval maneuvering.

The "Pursuit" Scenario: A Tactical Absurdity

If we remove the slow-moving "Acero" formation and only consider the faster "Hierro" formation (capable of 28 knots), the following scenario unfolds:

• If a CASA C-212 patrol aircraft successfully located FLOMAR at 190 miles, the Chilean fleet would begin pursuit.
• FLOMAR, restricted to 20 knots due to ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, would continue maneuvering.
• Time required for the Chilean fleet to close to 20 miles (Exocet firing range): 21 hours and several minutes—covering nearly 600 nautical miles.
• This hypothetical pursuit would place both fleets north of the Malvinas Islands—a completely ridiculous outcome.

Conclusion: There was no realistic scenario in which Chilean warships could approach within Exocet range of the Argentine fleet.

Probability of success: Zero.

Alternative Strategy: Luring FLOMAR into the Fjords

The alternative strategy that Rear Admiral López Silva failed to consider was:

• Abandoning the defense of the islands, instead retreating into Chile’s interior fjords and channels.

This option had serious political consequences, as Admiral Merino would never have forgiven him for "ceding" the islands. However, it would have significantly increased the Chilean fleet’s chances of survival.

Even so, this approach had severe limitations:

• With over 50 Argentine naval aviation aircraft patrolling the area, a successful anti-ship strike on FLOMAR was only a matter of time.
• While this plan prioritized the survival of the Chilean fleet, it failed to prevent the Argentine amphibious landings—which was its primary mission.

The Harsh Reality: The Chilean Navy Lacked "Decisive Weapons"

The Chilean Navy (ACh) was a serious opponent but entirely lacked definitive offensive weapons:

• No combat aviation to challenge the enemy in the third dimension (altitude).
• No operational submarines to strike from below with full stealth.

Had the war lasted just one week, it is not unreasonable to assume that the entire Chilean fleet would have been sunk—or, for all practical purposes, rendered combat ineffective.

Probability of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario: The Inevitable Fate of the Chilean Navy (ACh)

Had the Chilean Navy (ACh) suffered defeat, the most likely outcome would have been the sinking or neutralization of its primary combat assets.

Priority Targets:

1. First priority: The Leander-class and Almirante-class frigates, given their modern capabilities and strategic value.
2. Second priority: The light cruisers Capitán Prat and Almirante Latorre, as their naval artillery posed a direct threat to Argentine amphibious operations.
3. Other targets would have been engaged as tactical circumstances dictated.

López Silva’s Blind Spot: The Malvinas War as a Case Study

Rear Admiral López Silva, supposedly the ACh’s leading expert in naval-air warfare, failed to recognize a fundamental reality—one that became undeniable just four years later.

• In 1982, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) proved that a fleet confined to a narrow waterway (such as the San Carlos Strait) or operating close to the coast (as the southern Cape Horn islands would have forced the Chilean fleet to do) was highly vulnerable to low-altitude jet attacks.

• The Royal Navy, which possessed far superior air-defense missile systems compared to the Chilean fleet, only managed limited aerial kills.

• The only reason the Royal Navy’s surface fleet was not crippled was due to faulty bomb fuzes on Argentine ordnance, which often failed to detonate upon impact.

Could Chile Have Fared Any Better?

The Chilean fleet would have faced sustained attacks from:

1. A-4 Skyhawks (FAA - B/P variants & COAN - Q variant).
2. Israeli-built Mirage variants (FAA - Dagger/Nesher).

These aircraft had proven devastatingly effective in anti-ship operations, even against a technologically superior fleet like the Royal Navy.

Did the Chilean high command truly believe they would achieve a different outcome?

Was this an operational miscalculation or sheer wishful thinking?

ACh in the Beagle Channel: A Guaranteed Defeat

If the Chilean Navy (ACh) attempted to maneuver through the Beagle Channel, its destruction would have been assured.

• The fleet would be trapped in confined waters or forced to sail close to the southern coast of the islands, which would severely limit maneuverability and provide no escape routes.
• This positioning would have made it significantly easier for Argentine aircraft to approach undetected by flying below radar coverage, using terrain masking—exactly as was done in the San Carlos Strait during the Falklands War.

Tactical Breakdown of the Attack on ACh

1. Argentine airstrikes would systematically neutralize the ACh’s main warships.
2. Once these primary targets were out of action, Argentine destroyers and missile corvettes would finish off the remaining vessels using Exocet missiles.

However, this was not the scenario the Chilean Navy envisioned, according to the account provided by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.

FACh: The Last Hope That Would Never Arrive

With no viable naval escape, the ACh would have been forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), operating from Chabunco Air Base.

Unfortunately for Chile:

• At 06:00 AM on December 23, Chabunco was scheduled to be the primary target of a massive preemptive strike by all combat aircraft from BAM Río Gallegos.
• Even if Chilean fighters managed to take off, their situation would be even worse upon their return:
  • The Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) had a dozen T-28 Fennecs stationed just under 200 km from Chabunco, waiting to ambush landing Chilean fighters with machine-gun and rocket attacks.

The result? Any remaining Chilean air assets would be decimated before they could rearm and refuel.

The Last Resort: A Retreat to the Fjords

If any remnants of the Chilean fleet survived the battle in the Fuegian channels, they would have been forced to retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau.

• If Argentina retained air superiority, the Chilean forces would have no realistic chance of survival, as FLOMAR could conduct continuous, precision airstrikes against the trapped fleet.
• If Chile somehow managed to contest air superiority, the fleet might have had a better chance of defending itself, but it would still face overwhelming Argentine naval and air attacks.

Final Assessment: The Chilean fleet, whether trapped in the Beagle Channel or forced into the fjords, was ultimately doomed to destruction or irrelevance.

The Ship "Avoided" in the Chilean Narrative: The Best Aircraft Carrier in Latin American History—ARA Veinticinco de Mayo

Summary: FLOMAR’s Overwhelming Technological and Operational Superiority

The technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted Argentina a decisive advantage in any direct engagement with the Chilean Navy (ACh). Carrier-based air power, modern submarines, and advanced reconnaissance capabilities ensured that FLOMAR would dictate the terms of battle. The Chilean fjords could serve as a natural refuge, but they would not change the fundamental strategic imbalance.

Without the means to counter Argentina’s air and naval dominance, Chilean forces would have faced insurmountable challenges—ultimately leading to a one-sided defeat. 

Runawat to the Fjords, perhaps the best end for the ACh...

Final Assessment: ACh’s Best Efforts Were Simply Not Enough

This analysis does not seek to discredit the efforts or planning of the Chilean Navy (ACh). They did the best they could with the resources available. Or did they?

That said, it simply wasn’t enough. Submarine operations were doomed from the start:

• The SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while Chile’s more capable Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.
• Even if all Chilean submarines had been operational, Argentina had more than a dozen NATO-trained ASW aircraft, meaning the outcome would not have changed.

• Air support was non-existent:

  • Chile lacked a dedicated naval strike aviation force.
  • FACh’s air assets would have been targeted before they could contribute.

• Chabunco Air Base was a lost cause:

  • By the early morning of December 23, Chabunco would have been rendered inoperative, either by:
    • Pre-dawn strikes from A-4 Skyhawks and Mirage jets of the FAA.
    • Sustained attacks throughout the day from T-28 Fennecs and MB-326s.

In the end, no amount of strategic improvisation could compensate for the overwhelming material and operational disadvantage Chile faced.

Strategic Critique: López Silva’s Flawed Mahanian Gamble

One of the most significant flaws in López Silva’s planning was his insistence on seeking a decisive fleet engagement—a Mahanian naval battle—despite leading a force that was crippled both strategically and tactically.

He committed his entire fleet (all-in) to an engagement where it would suffer heavy losses long before even detecting the enemy on radar—if it ever did at all.

Once the Chilean fleet revealed itself, its fate was sealed for the remainder of the conflict. López Silva’s plan essentially gifted the precise location of his forces to FLOMAR, allowing Argentina to dictate the battle on its own terms.

Alternative Strategies: What Chile Could Have Done Differently

When a smaller fleet faces a larger, more capable one, it should avoid direct confrontation and instead rely on naval guerrilla tactics or attritional skirmishes.

Historical Precedents:

• Argentina’s naval history was built on using smaller forces to wear down much larger enemies—whether Spanish fleets or the Brazilian Imperial Navy.
• The Norwegian fjords in World War II provided the perfect defensive environment for hit-and-run naval operations, proving that well-positioned warships could survive under enemy air superiority if protected by layered defenses.

Instead of rushing into open waters to engage an aircraft carrier battle group without air cover and with only one compromised submarine, Chile’s best option would have been:

1. Using the fjords as defensive strongholds for ambush attacks.
2. Preserving naval assets for prolonged resistance rather than immediate destruction.
3. Exploiting geographic cover to increase survivability and counterattack opportunistically.

López Silva’s Misjudgment: Quality Over Quantity

In this conflict, the "larger fleet" wasn’t determined solely by numbers but by combat capability.

• FLOMAR wasn’t just bigger—it was exponentially more effective.
• The Chilean fleet had almost no air support and was operating with minimal submarine capability.
• Argentine naval aviators were elite pilots trained annually in ship-killing tactics, with world-class proficiency in anti-ship strikes.

Sending the Chilean fleet "solo" into battle, without meaningful support from submarines or airpower, was not just a strategic oversight—it was a catastrophic miscalculation.

Did López Silva truly believe that the Argentine Navy (ARA) would willingly bring its key naval assets within Exocet range, allowing for some chivalrous missile duel? Did he expect a Jutland-style battleship engagement or perhaps a 1973 Latakia-like missile exchange, all while unknowingly sailing into a Midway-style ambush? Did the Chilean naval command seriously assume that the ARA would not exploit its overwhelming air and submarine advantage by deploying its carrier-based fighters and submarines before the Chilean fleet even detected FLOMAR on radar?

Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks wouldn’t be used against his ships?

Long before a Chilean officer could press the launch button on an MM-38 Exocet, the Chilean fleet would have already been under attack—

• First by COAN (Argentine Naval Aviation)
• Then by CFS (Argentine Submarine Force)
• Potentially by both at the same time

History never placed López Silva’s reckless plan to the test, but in retrospect, he sold a purely suicidal strategy as if it were a winning battle plan.

Across the Andes, some Chilean perspectives claim that the Chilean Navy’s presence "forced" FLOMAR to retreat. According to this version, López Silva and Admiral Merino’s decisions "deterred" Argentina, as FLOMAR chose not to engage, supposedly out of fear.

However, a more logical perspective emerges:

• Who says FLOMAR’s withdrawal wasn’t part of its assigned mission?
• With all available evidence, how could FLOMAR possibly feel inferior to the Chilean Navy?
• Why would FLOMAR engage in an unnecessary battle when it had already achieved its strategic objectives?

Chile had already taken on the massive diplomatic cost of rejecting an arbitration ruling (a blunder originally committed by the Lanusse government) and then accepting Vatican mediation under pressure. Would Chile have agreed to this had Argentina not placed a knife to its throat militarily? Probably not (Madrid Murúa, 2003). Yet, Argentina’s passivity in 1978 continues to have geopolitical consequences today.

Just like in May 1982, when FLOMAR had the opportunity to strike HMS Invincible undetected but failed to act (García Enciso & Rótolo, 2021), a similar opportunity was lost four years earlier—the chance to destroy the Chilean fleet when it was fully exposed.

That is why this article begins with a quote from Nelson—because in both 1978 and 1982, Argentina failed to act at the decisive moment. And that hesitation still carries geopolitical weight today.

Sources

• Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
• Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg
• García Enciso, José y Rotolo, Benito (2021), Malvinas: Cinco días decisivos, Editorial SB, ISBN: 09789878384535.
• Madrid Murúa, Ruben (2003), "La estrategia nacional y militar que planificó Argentina, en el merco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile, año 1978", Memorial del Ejército de Chile 471: 50-70.